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
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
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
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
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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. I.

FROM THALES TO THE PRESENT TIME

Translated from the Fourth German Edition.

With Additions.

With a Preface

BY THE EDITORS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.

VOL. I.—HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT AND MEDÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

NEW YORK:
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,
1887.

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

The wide adoption of UEBERWEG'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, as a text book in the higher institutions of learning, has induced the publishers to issue the work in this smaller and less expensive form, in order to bring it more generally within the reach of students.

As now produced the work contains all the matter of the original edition.

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PREFACE.

DR. UEBERWEG's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, in three parts, was first published at Berlin, 1862 to '66. It met with such approval, notwithstanding the competition with other able compends, that the first part has already reached a fourth edition (1871). Since Tennemann's *Manual* (1812, 5th edition by Wend, 1829),* no work has appeared so well adapted to meet the wants of students. Indeed, no work on the subject contains such a careful collection of authorities and citations, or so full a bibliographical apparatus. The opinions of the various schools and their contrasted principles, as well as the views of individual philosophers, are presented with clearness and precision. This is the great value of the work. It is not written, like some histories of philosophy, to propound or fortify the special theories of the author. It shows a full mastery of the whole course of philosophic thought, with independent investigations and criticisms. The various systems are given, as far as possible, in the phraseology of their authors, and this imparts variety to the style. It is eminently impartial.

The undersigned selected it as the best work with which to begin the philosophical division of their proposed Library, after a full comparison of it with other works of its class, and upon consultation with those best qualified to judge about its merits. It is more concise than Ritter's *General History*, and more full and authentic than Schwegler's *Outline*, which was first prepared for an Encyclopædia. The works of Fries, and Rixner, and Reinhold have been supplanted by more recent investigations. Ritter's *History of Christian Philosophy* (1858-'59), though very valuable, covers only a part of the ground, and presupposes some acquaintance with the sources which Ueberweg so fully cites. The well-known history of Morell is restricted to the later European systems. The able critical histories of modern philosophy by Erdmann and Kuno Fischer are limited in their range, yet too extended for our object. The work with which we most carefully compared Ueberweg's Treatise, was Professor Erdmann's *Compend of the Whole History*

* Translated by Rev. A. Johnson, revised and enlarged by T. B. Morell, London, 1852.

of *Philosophy*, in two volumes (Berlin, 1866). This is the product of a master of philosophic systems, and it is elaborate in method, and finished in style. But it is perhaps better fitted to complete than to begin the study of the History of Philosophy. Its refined criticisms and its subtle transitions from one system to another, presuppose considerable acquaintance with recent German speculations. And Professor Erdmann himself generously expressed to Dr. Schaff his appreciation of the special value of Ueberweg's Manual, saying that he always kept it before him, and considered it indispensable on account of its full literature of the subject.

This translation of Ueberweg appears under the sanction, and with the aid of the author himself. He has carefully revised the proofs, and given to our edition the benefit of his latest emendations. He did not survive to see the completion of this work; he died, after a painful illness of seven weeks, June 7, 1871, at Königsberg, while yet in the prime of his career. In repeated letters to Dr. Schaff, who conducted the correspondence with him, he has expressed his great satisfaction with this translation, in comparison, too, with that of his *System of Logic* (3d edition, Bonn, 1868), recently issued in England.* His friend, Dr. Czolbe, wrote in behalf of his widow, that, "on the day of his death, he carefully corrected some of the proof-sheets of this translation, and was delighted with its excellency."

The work has been translated from the latest printed editions; the First Part, on Ancient Philosophy, is from the proof-sheets of the fourth edition, just now issued in German. For the Second and Third Parts, special notes, modifications, and additions were forwarded by the author.

At our suggestion, Professor Morris has, in the majority of cases, translated the Greek and Latin citations; retaining also the original text, when this seemed necessary. A long foot-note, § 74, on the recent German discussions concerning the date and authorship of the Gospels, which was hardly in place in a History of Philosophy, has been omitted with the consent of Dr. Ueberweg.

Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, has examined this translation and enriched it by valuable additions, especially on the history of English and American Philosophy.

The first volume, now issued, embraces the first and second parts of the original, viz., Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy; the second and last volume will contain the history of Modern Philosophy, with a full alphabetical index. The sections have been numbered consecutively through both volumes.

* *System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines*. By Dr. FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG, Prof. of Phil. in the University of Königsberg. Translated from the German, with Notes and Appendices, by THOMAS M. LINDSAY, M.A., F.R.S.E., Examiner in Philosophy to the University of Edinburgh. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1871.

Besides this work, and his *System of Logic*, Professor Ueberweg was the author of a treatise on *The Development of Consciousness by Teachers*, a series of applications of Beneke's Theory of Consciousness, in didactic relations (Berlin, 1853); *Investigations on the Genuineness and Order of the Platonic Writings*, including a sketch of the Life of Plato,—a volume crowned by the Imperial Academy of Vienna, 1861; *De Priore et Posteriore Forma Kantianæ Critices Rationis Puræ*, a pamphlet published at Berlin, in 1862. The later labors of his life were chiefly given to his History of Philosophy. In 1869 he published in J. H. von Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek*, an excellent German translation of Bishop Berkeley's treatise on the "Principles of Human Knowledge," with critical notes and illustrations. This was, in part, the result of an animated metaphysical discussion; for there are even now German as well as English advocates of the intense *Subjectivism* of Berkeley. The two chief philosophical journals of Germany have entered into this controversy, which was begun by a work of Collins Simon, LL.D., entitled *The Nature and Elements of the External World, or Universal Immaterialism*, London, 1862, in which Berkeley's theory was acutely advocated. Dr. Ueberweg replied to it in Fichte and Ulrici's *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 55, and Prof. Dr. von Reichlin-Meldegge of Heidelberg in the same journal, Bd. 56, 1870. Dr. Simon's rejoinder appeared, with comments by Ulrici, in the same volume. In Bergmann's *Philosophische Monatshefte*, Bd. v., May, 1870, Simon, Hoppe, and Schuppe in three articles controverted Ueberweg's positions; his reply appeared in August, with a rejoinder by Schuppe, February, 1871. In this controversy Dr. Ueberweg showed a full mastery of the subject. In Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, Bd. 57, 1870, he continued his investigations upon the Order of the Platonic Writings, by replying to Brandis and Steinhart, who had criticised his views.* Such high-toned discussions contribute to the progress of thought and knowledge.

Friedrich Ueberweg was born January 22, 1826, the son of a Lutheran clergyman near Solingen in Rhenish Prussia. His excellent mother was early left a poor widow, and devoted herself to her only son till her death in 1868. He was educated in the College at Elberfeld and the Universities of Göttingen and Berlin, and attained to extraordinary proficiency in philosophy, philology, and mathematics. In 1852 he commenced his academic career as *Privatdocent* in Bonn, and in 1862 he was called as Professor of Philosophy to the University of Königsberg. There he labored with untiring industry till last summer, when (in the forty-sixth year of his age) he died in the midst

* This essay is entitled: *Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen Methodikern und Genetikern und dessen Vermittelung bei dem Problem der Ordnung der Schriften Plato's.*

of literary plans for the future, leaving a widow and four children and many friends and admirers to mourn his loss. He was a genuine German scholar, and ranked with the first in his profession. His History of Philosophy and his Logic will perpetuate his name and usefulness.*

Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, while complete in itself, also forms a part of a select Theological and Philosophical Library, which the undersigned projected some years since, and now intend to issue as rapidly as is possible with so large an undertaking. A prospectus of the whole accompanies the present volume.

HENRY B. SMITH AND PHILIP SCHAFF,

New York, Oct. 18, 1871.

Editors.

* Compare the fine tribute to his memory by his friend, Professor Fr. A. Lange, of Zurich: *Friedrich Ueberweg*, Berlin, 1871. Also Dilthey: *Zum Andenken an Fried. Ueberweg*, in the "*Preuss. Jahrbücher*" for Sept. 1871, pp. 309-323; and Adolf Lasson: *Zum Andenken an F. U.*, in Dr. Bergmann's "*Philos. Monatshefte*," vol. vii., No. 7, and separately published, Berlin, 1871.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

OF THE CONCEPTION, METHOD, AND GENERAL SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH THE LITERARY HELPS.

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY as a conception, historically, is an advance upon, as it is an outgrowth from, the conception of mental development in general and that of scientific culture in particular. The conception is ordinarily modified in the various systems of philosophy, according to the peculiar character of each; yet in all of them philosophy is included under the generic notion of science, and, as a rule, is distinguished from the remaining sciences by the specific difference, that it is not occupied, like each of them, with any special, limited province of things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full extent, but with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever actually is. With this common and fundamental characteristic of the various historical conceptions of philosophy corresponds our definition: Philosophy is the science of principles.

On the conception of philosophy cf. the author's article in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, ed. by Imm. Herm. Fichte, Ulrich, and Wirth, New Series, vol. xlii, Halle, 1863, pp. 185-199; also, among others, C. Hebler, in No. 44 of Virchow and von Holtzendorf's *Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftl. Vorträge*, and Ed. Zeller, *Akadem. Rede*, Heidelberg, 1863. The historical development of the conception of philosophy and the various meanings of the word are specially treated of by R. Haym, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encycl. der Wiss. u. Künste*, III. 94, Leipsic, 1848; and by Eisenmann in his *Ueber Begriff und Bedeutung der σοφία bis auf Sokrates*, Progr. of the Wilh.-Gymn., Munich, 1860; cf. Ed. Alberti, on the *Platonic Conception of Philosophy*, in the *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, New Series, vol. II, Halle, 1867, pp. 29-52, 166-204.

The word philosophy (*φιλοσοφία*, love of wisdom) and its cognates do not occur in Homer and Hesiod. Homer uses *σοφία*, the second word in the compound (*Il.* XV. 412) with reference to the carpenter's art. In like manner, Hesiod speaks of one who is *καλλιῶς σοφισμέντος* (*Op.* 651). Later writers use *σοφία* also for excellence in music and poetry. With Herodotus any one is *σοφός* who is distinguished from the mass of men by any kind of art or skill. The so-called seven wise men are termed by him *σοφισταί*, "sophists" (*I.* 30 et al.), and the same designation is given by him to Pythagoras (*IV.* 95).

The compounds *φιλοσοφείν* and *φιλοσοφία* are first found in Herodotus. In Herod. I. 30, Cræsus says to Solon: "I have heard that thou *φιλοσοφῶν* hast traveled over many lands for the purpose of observing;" *ibid.* I. 50, *φιλοσοφία* is applied to the knowledge of the stars. Thucydides represents Pericles as saying in the Funeral Oration (II. 40): *φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφούμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας*, where *φιλοσοφείν* (philosophizing) signifies the striving after intellectual and, more especially, after scientific culture. Thus is confirmed for this period the allegation of Cicero: "*Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominata est.*" This more general signification, in which the "philosopher" is identified with him who *μετέλληκε παιδείας διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς*, or who is educated above the mass of men, was long afterward retained by the word side by side with that given to it as a term of art.

Pythagoras is cited as the first to designate by the word *φιλοσοφία* philosophy as science. The statement in regard to this point, which we find in Cicero (*Tusc.* V. 3), Diogenes Laërtius (I. 12, VIII. 8), and others, and which (according to Diog. L. VIII. 8), was also contained in a work (*διαδοχαί*), now no longer extant, written by Sosicrates of Alexandria, is derived from Heraclides of Pontus, a scholar of Plato. Cicero represents Pythagoras as saying, in a conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius: "*Raros esse quosdam, qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos (id est enim philosophos).*" Diog. Laërt. (I. 12) adds, as the reason given by Heraclides for this designation, "that no man, but only God, is wise." Whether the narrative is historically true, is uncertain; Meiners (*Gesch. der Wiss. in Griech. u. Rom.* I. 119), and more recently Haym (in Ersch and Gruber's *Allgem. Encycl. der Wiss. u. Künste*, Leips. 1848, III. 24, p. 3), Zeller (*Philos. der Griechen*, 3d ed., Vol. I., 1856, p. 1), and others have doubted it; probably it is only a Socratic and Platonic thought (see below) transferred by Heraclides to Pythagoras (perhaps as a poetic fiction, which subsequent writers took to be historical). The modest disclaimer of Socrates in regard to the possession of wisdom, and the preference given by Plato and Aristotle to pure theory above all praxis and even above all ethico-political activity, are scarcely in accord with the unbroken confidence of Pythagoreanism in the power of scientific investigation and with the undivided unity of the theoretical and practical tendencies of that philosophy. The natural philosophers who call the universe *κόσμος* (which, according to Diog. Laërt. VIII. 48, the Pythagoreans were the first to do), are in Xenophon (*Memor.* I. 1. 11) called *σοφισταί*, in Plato (*Gorg.*, p. 508 a, ed. Steph.), "wise men" (*σοφοί*), without the least intimation that the Pythagoreans would themselves have desired to be named, not wise, but lovers of wisdom. It is also noticeable, though without demonstrative force, that in the preserved fragments of the probably spurious work ascribed to Philolaus the Pythagorean and devoted to the description of the astronomical and philosophical knowledge of the order which reigns in the universe, *σοφία*, not *φιλοσοφία*, is used (Stob. *Ecl.* I. 23; cf. Boeckh, *Philolaos*, pp. 95 and 102 f.)

Socrates calls himself in the *Banquet* of Xenophon (I. 5) a laborer in philosophy (*αἰτουργὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας*), in contrast to Callias, a disciple of the Sophists. In the *Memorabilia* *σοφία* is found often, *φιλοσοφία* rarely. According to Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 6. 7, *σοφία* is synonymous with *ἐπιστήμη* (science). Human wisdom is patchwork; the gods have reserved what is greatest to themselves (*ibid.* and I. 1. 8). We may ascribe this thought with all the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in the *Apologia* of Plato (pp. 20 and 23 of the edition of Stephanus, whose paging accompanies most later editions), where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise (*σοφός*) in human wisdom, but this is very little, and in truth only God can be called wise. In the Platonic *Apologia* Socrates interprets (p. 26) the declaration of the oracle in reply to Chærephon, that "no one was

wiser than Socrates," as teaching that he among men was wisest who, like Socrates, disclaimed the possession of any wisdom of his own (*ὅτι οὐτος . . . σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡς περ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίως ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν*); he calls (p. 28 sq.) that examination of himself and others by which he broke up the shameful self-deception of those who, without knowing, supposed themselves to know, his "philosophizing," and sees in it the mission of his life (*φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους*). Since the wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and not the consciousness of a positive, gradual approximation to the knowledge of truth, it was impossible that *φιλοσοφία*, in distinction from *σοφία*, should become fixed in his terminology as a technical term; so far as wisdom seemed to him attainable, he could make use as well of the words *σοφός* and *σοφία* (*ἀνθρωπίνῃ*) to express it. In the *Apologia* Socrates applies the terms *σοφούς* and *φιλοσοφούντας* to earlier thinkers, the former rather in an ironical sense (especially so, to the Sophists), but the latter more seriously (*Apol.* p. 23). Yet it remains uncertain whether Plato, in his *Apologia* (which appears to reproduce with fidelity the essential parts of the actual defense of Socrates), confined himself in every particular to the exact form of speech adopted by the historical Socrates. With the disciples of Socrates *φιλοσοφία* appears already as a technical designation. Xenophon (*Memor.* I. 1, 19) speaks of men, who asserted that they philosophized (*φάσκοντες φιλοσοφεῖν*); by whom a Socratic school—the school of Antisthenes—is probably to be understood.

Plato expresses in various places (*Phædr.* p. 278 d, *Conviv.* p. 203 e; cf. *Lysis*, p. 218 a, ed. Steph.) the sentiment ascribed by Heraclides of Pontus to Pythagoras, that wisdom belongs only to God, while it belongs to man to be rather a lover of wisdom (*φιλόσοφος*). In the *Convivium* (and the *Lysis*) this thought is developed to the effect that neither he who is already wise (*σοφός*), nor he who is unlearned (*ἀμαθής*), is a philosopher, but he who stands between the two. The terminology becomes most distinct and definite in two dialogues of late origin, probably composed by one of Plato's disciples, namely, in the *Sophistes* (p. 217 a) and the *Politicus* (p. 257 a, b), where the Sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher (*ὁ σοφιστής, ὁ πολιτικός, and ὁ φιλόσοφος*) are named in the preceding order, as the advancing order of their rank. Wisdom itself (*σοφία*), according to Plato (*Theætet.* p. 145 e), is identical with *ἐπιστήμη* (true knowledge), while philosophy is termed in the dialogue *Euthydemus* (p. 288 d) the acquisition of such knowledge (*κτησις ἐπιστήμης*). Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation (*δόξα*) is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation (*Rep.* V. p. 477 a). Accordingly Plato defines (*Rep.* 480 b) those as philosophers, "who set their affections on that, which in each case really exists" (*τοὺς αὐτὸ ἀρα ἑκαστον τὸ ἐν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους κλητέον*), or (*Rep.* VI. 484 a) who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immutable" (*φιλόσοφοι οἱ τοῦ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι*). In a wider sense Plato uses the term philosophy so as to include under it the positive sciences also (*Theæt.* p. 143 d): *περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν*.

We find also the same double sense in Aristotle. *φιλοσοφία* in the wider signification (*Metaph.* VI. 1, p. 1026 a, 18 ed. Bekker et al.)—for which *σοφία* but rarely occurs (*Met.* IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 1: *ἐστὶ δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη*, cf. *Met.* XI. 4, 1061 b, 32)—is science in general and includes mathematics and physics, and ethics and poetics. But *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, or "first philosophy" (*Met.* VI. 1, 1026 a, 24 and 30; XI. 4, 1061 b, 19), which Aristotle also calls *σοφία*, and which he indicates as pre-eminently the science of the philosopher (*ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπιστήμη*, *Met.* IV. 3, p. 1005 a, 21; cf. *φιλοσοφία*, *Met.* XI. 4, 1061 b, 25), is in his system that which we now term *metaphysics*, namely, the science of being as such (*τὸ ἐν ᾧ ὄν*, *Met.* VI. 1, 1026 a, 31; cf. XI. 3, 1060 b, 31, and XI. 4, 1061 b, 26), and not of any single department of being—the science, therefore,

which considers the ultimate grounds or principles of every thing that exists (in particular, the matter, form, efficient cause, and end of every thing). *Met.* I. 2, 982 b, 9: *δεῖ γὰρ ταύτης (τὴν ἐπιστήμης) τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν*. In contrast with this "first philosophy," the special sciences are termed (in *Met.* IV. 1, 1003 a, 22) partial sciences (*ἐπιστήμαι ἐν μέρει λεγόμεναι*). The plural *φιλοσοφίαι* is used by Aristotle sometimes in the sense of "philosophical sciences" (*Met.* VI. 1, 1026 a, 18, where mathematics, physics, and theology are named as the three "theoretical philosophies;" cf. *Ethic. Nicomach.* I. 4, 1096 b, 31, where from ethics another branch of philosophy, *ἄλλη φιλοσοφία*, is distinguished, which from the context must be metaphysics), and sometimes in the sense of "philosophical directions, systems, or ways of philosophizing" (*Met.* I. 6, 987 a, 29: *μετὰ δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας φιλοσοφίας ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐκτετένετο πραγματεία*).

The Stoics (according to Plutarch, *De Plac. Philos.* I., *Prooem.*) defined wisdom (*σοφία*) as the science of divine and human things, but philosophy (*φιλοσοφία*) as the striving after virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, and logic. Cf. Senec. *Epist.* 89, 3: *Philosophia sapientiae amor et affectatio*; *ibid.* 1: *philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem*. The Stoic definition of philosophy removes the boundary which in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle "first philosophy," from the other branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank.

Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness (Sext. *Empir. Adv. Math.* XI. 169: *Ἐπικουρὸς ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι λόγους καὶ διαλογισμοὺς τὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιούσαν*).

Since all subsequent definitions of philosophy until the modern period were more or less exact repetitions of those above cited and hence may here be omitted, we pass on to the definition which was received in the school of Leibnitz and Wolff. Christian Wolff presents (*Philos. Rationalis, Disc. Praelim.*, § 6), the following as a definition originating with himself: (*Cognitio philosophica est cognitio rationis eorum, quae sunt vel sunt, unde intelligatur, cur sint vel fiant*; (*ibid.* § 29): *philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt*. This definition is obviously cognate with the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions, in so far as it makes philosophy conversant with the rational grounds (*ratio*) and the causes, through which existing objects and changes become possible. It does not contain the restriction to first causes, and hence Wolff's conception of philosophy is the wider one; but it fails, on the other hand (as do Plato and Aristotle, when they use *φιλοσοφία* in the broader signification as synonymous with *ἐπιστήμη*) to mark the boundaries between philosophy and the positive (in particular, the mathematical) sciences. In this latter particular Kant seeks to reach a more accurate determination.

Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method*, chap. 3) divides knowledge in general, as to its form, into historical (*cognitio ex datis*), and rational (*cognitio ex principiis*), and the latter again into mathematical (rational cognition through the construction of concepts), and philosophical (rational cognition through concepts as such). Philosophy, in its scholastic signification, is defined by him as the system of all the branches of philosophical knowledge, but in its cosmical signification, as the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*).

Herbart (*Introductio to Philos.*, § 4 f.) defines philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions. This elaboration comprehends the three processes of the analysis, the correction and the completion of the conceptions, the latter process depending on the determination of their rank and value. This gives, as the leading branches of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and aesthetics. (Under *aesthetics* Herbart includes ethics, as well as aesthetics in the nar-

lower and popular signification of the word. What Herbart understands by aesthetics might be expressed by the word *Timology*, a term, however, which he never employs.)

According to Hegel, for whose doctrine Fichte, in respect of form, and Schelling, in respect of matter, prepared the way, philosophy is the science of the absolute in the form of dialectical development, or the science of the self-comprehending reason.

The definition of philosophy given by us above meets the case even of those schools which declare the principles of things to be unknowable, since the inquiry into the cognoscibility of principles evidently belongs to the science of principles, and this science accordingly survives, even when its object is reduced to the attempt to demonstrate the incognoscibility of principles.

Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is "the science of spirit"), fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed as the basis of an historical exposition.

§ 2. History in the objective sense is the process by which nature and spirit are developed. History in the subjective sense is the investigation and statement of this objective development.

The Greek words *istoria* and *istoriaiv*, being derived from *eidéin*, signify, not history in the objective sense, but the subjective activity involved in the investigation of facts. The German word *Geschichte* involves a reference to that which has come to pass (*das Geschehene*), and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Yet, not all that has actually taken place falls within the province of history, but only that which is of essential significance for the common development. *Development* may be defined as the gradual realization, in a succession of phenomena, of the essence of the subject of development. As to its form, development generally begins through the evolution of contraries or oppositions, and ends in the disappearance and reconciliation of these contraries in a higher unity (as sufficiently illustrated, for example, in the progressive development which shows itself in Socrates, his so-called "one-sided disciples," and Plato).

Through the study of history the whole life of the race is, in a manner, renewed on a reduced scale in the individual. The intellectual possessions of the present, like its material possessions, repose in all cases on the acquisitions of the past; every one participates, to a degree, in this common property, even without having a comprehensive knowledge of history, but each one's gain becomes all the more extensive and substantial the more this knowledge is expanded and deepened. [Only that productive activity which follows upon a self-appropriating reproduction of the mental labor of the past, lays the foundation for true progress to higher stages.]

§ 3. The *methods of treating history* (divided by Hegel into the naïve, the reflecting, and the speculative) may be classed as the empirical, the critical, and the philosophical, according as the simple collocation of materials, the examination of the credibility of tradition, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and significance of events, is made the predominant feature. The philosophical method proceeds by explaining the connection and endeavoring to estimate the relative worth of the phenomena of his-

tory. The genetic method investigates the causal connection of phenomena. The standard by which to estimate the relative worth or importance of phenomena may be found either immediately in the mental state and opinions of the individual student, or in the peculiar nature and tendency of the phenomena themselves, or, finally, by reference to the joint development in which both the historical object and the judging subject, each at its peculiar stage, are involved; hence may be distinguished the material, the formal, and the speculative estimate of systems. A perfect historical exposition depends on the union of all the methodical elements now mentioned.

The later historians of philosophy in ancient times, as also the earliest modern historians, contented themselves, for the most part, with the method which consists in merely empirical compilation. The critical sifting of materials has been introduced chiefly in modern times, by philologists and philosophers. From the first, and before any attempts were made at a detailed and general historical delineation, philosophers sought to acquire an insight into the causal connection and the value of the different systems, and for the earliest philosophies the foundation for such insight was already laid by Plato and Aristotle; but the completion of the work thus begun, the widening and deepening of this insight, is a work, to the accomplishment of which every age has sought to furnish its contribution and to which each age will always be obliged to contribute, even after the great advances made by modern philosophers, who have sought to make the history of philosophy intelligible as a history of development. The subjective estimate of systems, by the application of the philosophical (and theological) doctrine of the historian as the norm of judgment, has, in modern times, been especially common among the Leibnitzians (Brucker and others) and Kantians (Tennemann, notably). The method of formal criticism, which tries the special doctrines of a system by its own assumed principle, and this principle itself by its capacity of development and application, has been employed by Schleiermacher (particularly in his "Critique of Previous Ethics") and his successors (especially by Brandis; less by Ritter, who is more given to "material" criticism). Last of all, the speculative method has been adopted by Hegel (in his "History of Philosophy and Philosophy of History") and by his school.

To the oft-treated question, whether the history of philosophy is to be understood from the stand-point of our own philosophical consciousness, or whether, on the contrary, the latter is to be formed, enlarged, and corrected through historical study, the answer is, that the case in question, of the relation of the mind to the historical object of its attention, is a case of natural action and reaction, and that consequently each form of that relation indicated in the question has its natural time and place; the one must follow the other, each in its time. The stage of philosophical culture, which the individual, before his acquaintance (or at least before his more exact familiarity) with the history of philosophy, has already reached, should facilitate his understanding of that history, while it is at the same time elevated and refined by his historical studies. On the other hand, the philosophic consciousness of the student, when perfected by historical and systematic discipline, must afterward show itself fruitful in a deeper and truer understanding of history.

§ 4. The most trustworthy and productive sources for our knowledge of the history of philosophy are those philosophical works which

have come down to us in their original form and completeness, and, next to these, the fragments of such works which have been preserved under conditions that render it impossible to doubt their genuineness. In the case of philosophical doctrines which are no longer before us in the original language of their authors, those "reports" are to be held most authentic which are based immediately on the writings of the philosophers, or in which the oral deliverances of the latter are communicated by immediate disciples. If the tendency of the author (or so-called "reporter"), whose statements serve us as authorities, is less historical than philosophical, inclining him rather to inquire into the truth of the doctrines mentioned by him than simply to report them, it is indispensable, as a condition precedent to the employment of his statements as historical material, that we carefully ascertain the line of thought generally followed by the author of whom he treats, and that in its light we test the sense of each of the reporter's statements. Next to the sources whence the "reporter" drew, and the tendency of his work, his own philosophical culture and his capacity to appreciate the doctrines he reports, furnish the most essential criteria of his credibility. The value of the various histories of philosophy as aids to the attainment of a knowledge and understanding of that history, is measured partly by the degree of exactness shown by each historian in the communication of the original material and his acuteness in their appreciation, and partly by the degree of intelligence with which he sifts the essential from the non-essential in each philosopher's teachings, and exhibits the inner connection of single systems and the order of development of the different philosophical stand-points.

On the literature of the history of philosophy, compare especially Joh. Jonsius, *De Scriptoribus Historicarum Philosophicarum Libri quatuor*, Frankf. 1650; *recogniti atque ad presentem aetatem usque perducti cura*, Joh. Chr. Dorn, Jen. 1716. J. Alb. Fabricius, in the *Bibl. Graeca*, Hamb. 1705 sqq. Joh. Andreas Ortleib, *Handbuch der Literatur der Philosophie*, 1. Abth.; *Die Literatur der Litterargeschichte und Geschichte der Philosophie*, Erlangen, 1798. Ersch and Geiseler, *Bibliographisches Handbuch der philosophischen Literatur der Deutschen von der Mitte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis auf die neueste Zeit*, 8d. ed., Leips. 1850. V. Ph. Gumppel, *Die philosophische Literatur der Deutschen von 1400-1850*, Regensburg, 1851, pp. 846-862. Ad. Büchting, *Bibliotheca philosophica, oder Verzeichniss der von 1557-1867 im deutschen Buchhandel erschienenen philos. Bücher und Zeitschriften*, Nordhausen, 1867. Cf. the copious citations of literature in Buhle's *Geschichte der Philos.*, and also in F. A. Carus's *Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.*, Leipzig, 1869, pp. 21-90, in Tennemann's larger work and in his *Manual of the History of Philosophy*, 5th ed., revised by Amadeus Wendt, Leips., 1829, as also in other works on the history of philosophy; see also the bibliographical citations in various monographs relating to literary history, such as Ompstead's on the Literature of International Law, etc., and the comprehensive work of Julius Petzholdt, *Bibliotheca Bibliographica*, Leips. 1866, of which pp. 458-463 are devoted to the history of the literature of philosophy.

The writings of the early Greek philosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now only in fragments. The complete works of Plato are still extant; so also are the most impor-

tant works of Aristotle, and certain others, which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and Neo-Platonic schools. We possess the principal works of most of the philosophers of the Christian period in sufficient completeness.

At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species of authority, which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and was disposed to favor the pre-Socratic philosophy, speaks of an *exposé* of the *placita philosophorum* as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous *general histories* of philosophy, the following may here be mentioned:—

The History of Philosophy, by Thom. Stanley, London, 1655; 2d ed., 1687, 3d ed., 1701; translated into Latin by Gottfr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1711; also Venice, 1733. Stanley treats only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in his view the only philosophy; for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laërtius.

Jac. Thomasi (ob. 1684), *Schediasma Historicum, quo varia discutuntur ad hist. tum philos., tum ecclesiasticam pertinentia*, Leipsic, 1665; with the title: *Origines Hist. Philos. et Ecclesiast.*, ed. by Christian Thomasius, Halle, 1699. Jac. Thomasi first recommended disputed questions in the *history* of philosophy as themes for dissertations.

J. Dan. Hueti, *Demonstratio Evangelica; philosophiæ veteris ac novæ parallelismus*, Amsterdam, 1679.

Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*, 1st ed., Rotterd. 1697. [English translation by Birch and Lockman, London, 1734–35, 2d ed., 1736–38.—Tr.] This very comprehensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded. The philosophical articles have been published in an abridged German translation by L. H. Jakob, 2 vols., Halle, 1797–98.

The *Acta Philosophorum*, ed. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Halle, 1715 ff., contain several valuable papers of investigation on questions in the history of philosophy.

Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, par Mr. D. (Deslandes), tom. I.–III., 1st ed., Paris, 1730–36. Includes also modern philosophy.

Joh. Jak. Brucker, *Kurze Fragen aus der philosophischen Historie*, 7 vols., Ulm, 1731–36, with additions, *ibid.* 1737. *Historia Critica Philosophiæ a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque ætatem deducta*, 5 vols., Leips. 1742–44; 2d ed., 1766–67; English abridged translation by Wm. Enfield, Lond. 1791. *Institutiones hist. philosophicæ, usui acad. juventutis adornatæ*, 1st ed., Leips. 1747. Brucker's presentation, especially in his chief work, the *Historia Crit. Philos.*, is clear and easily followed, though somewhat diffuse, and often interspersed with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laërtius, and too rarely portraying the connection of ideas. Brucker wrote in the infancy of historical criticism; still he often gives proof of a sound and sober insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in his times; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the conceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but error is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows "*infinita falsæ philosophiæ exempla*." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brucker does not understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the

form of Hellenism, and still less as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against Christianity—"in id conjuravere pessimi homines, ut quam veritate vincere non possent religionem Christianam, fraude impederent;"—and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosticism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result of pride and willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy; according to the measure of its material accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false.

Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), *Della Istoria e della Indole di ogni Filosofia*, Lucca, 1766-81, also Ven. 1782-84, on which is based the work: *Della Restaurazione di ogni Filosofia ne' Secoli XV., XVI., XVII.*, Ven. 1785-89 (translated into German by Carl Heydenreich, Leipsic, 1791).

Dietr. Tiedemann, *Geist der speculativen Philosophie*, 7 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. By "speculative" Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian philosophy. His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and Wolff, modified by elements from that of Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But his understanding of them has, occasionally, its limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally admitted, but "to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said any thing new and has displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thought is marked by inner harmony and close connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions."

Georg Gustav Fülleborn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, sections 1-12, Züllichau, 1791-99.

Joh. Gottlieb Buhle, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und einer kritischen Literatur derselben*, 8 vols., Göttingen, 1796-1804; *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften*, 6 vols., Göttingen, 1800-1805. Buhle writes as a disciple of Kant, but with a leaning toward the stand-point of Jacobi. He allows his philosophical stand-point rarely to appear. Buhle evinces great reading, and has, with critical insight, instituted valuable investigations, especially in the department of the history of the literature of philosophy. His "*Gesch. der neueren Philosophie*" contains many choice extracts from rare works. It forms the sixth part of the encyclopedical work: "*Gesch. der Künste u. Wiss. seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts.*"

Dagérando, *Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de la Philosophie*, Tom. I.-III., Paris, 1804; 2d edit., Tom. I.-IV., Paris, 1822-23. Translated into German by Tennemann, 2 vols., Marburg, 1806-1807.

Friedr. Aug. Carnus, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipsic, 1809. Fourth part of his posthumous works.

Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819. The work has never been wholly completed. It was to have filled thirteen volumes. The twelfth volume was to have treated of German theoretical philosophy from Leibnitz and Chr. Thomasius down to Kant, and the thirteenth of moral philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Tennemann's work is meritorious on account of the extent and independence of his study of authorities, and the completeness and clearness of his exposition; but it is

marred by not a few misapprehensions, most of which are the result of a one-sided method of interpretation from the Kantian stand-point. In his judgments, the measuring-rod of the Kantian Critique of the Reason is often applied with too little allowance to the earlier systems, although in principle, the idea, already expressed by Kant, of "the gradual development of the reason in its striving after science," is not foreign to him.

Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie für den akademischen Unterricht*, 1st ed., Leips. 1812; 5th ed., Leips. 1829; the last three editions revised by Amadeus Wendt. [English translation ("Manual of the History of Philosophy," etc.), by A. Johnson, Oxford, 1833. The same, revised, enlarged, and corrected by J. R. Morell, London, 1852.—Tr.] From this much too brief exposition, it is impossible to derive a complete understanding of the different systems; nevertheless it is of value as a repertory of notices concerning philosophers and their teachings; especially valuable are the perhaps only too numerous literary references, in respect to which Tennemann aimed rather at completeness than at judicious selection.

Jak. Friedr. Fries, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 vols., Halle, 1837-40. His stand-point, a modified Kantianism.

Friedr. Ast, *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie*, Landshut, 1807, 2d ed., 1826. He writes from Schelling's stand-point.

Thaddä Anselm Rixner, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie zum Gebrauche seiner Vorlesungen*, 3 vols., Sulzbach, 1822-23, 2d ed., 1829. Supplementary volume by Victor Phil. Gumposch, 1850. The stand-point is that of Schelling. Its numerous citations from original sources would render the book an excellent basis for a first study of the history of philosophy, if Rixner's work was not disfigured by great negligence and lack of critical skill in the execution of his plan. Gumposch, who brings the national element especially into prominence, proceeds far more carefully.

Ernst Reinhold, *Handbuch der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 parts in 3 vols., Gotha, 1828-30. *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Jena, 1836; 2d ed., 1839; 3d ed., 1849. *Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwicklung*, 5th ed., 3 vols., Jena, 1858. The presentation is compendious but not sufficiently exact. Reinhold thinks and often expresses himself too much in the modern way and too little in the style and spirit of the philosophers of whom he treats.

Heinr. Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829-53; Vols. I.-IV., new edition, 1836-38. [4 vols. translated. See below, *ad* § 7.—Tr.] The work reaches to and excludes Kant; the *Uebersicht über die Geschichte der neuesten deutschen Philosophie seit Kant* (Brunswick, 1853), supplements and completes it. Ritter adopts substantially the stand-point of Schleiermacher. His professed object is, while adhering strictly to facts, to present the history of philosophy as "a self-developing whole;" not, however, viewing earlier systems as stepping-stones to any particular modern one, nor judging them from the stand-point of any particular system, but rather "from the point of view of the general intelligence of the periods to which they belong, respecting the object of the intellectual faculties—respecting the right and the wrong in the modes of developing the reason."

Under Ritter's supervision, the following work of Schleiermacher was published, after its author's death: *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Berlin, 1839 (Schleiermacher's *Werke*, III., 4, a). The work is a summary, drawn up by Schleiermacher for his lectures. It is not founded in all parts on original historical investigation, but it contains much that is very suggestive.

G. W. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. by Karl Ludw. Michelet. 3 vols. (*Werke*, Vols. XIII.-XV.), Berlin, 1833-36; 2d ed., 1840-42. The stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above, § 3. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact,

has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has sometimes unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosophemes of Plato agreeably to his own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e. g. Locke); still further, he unjustifiably exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, observable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of philosophical systems, through the following assumptions:—

a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particular, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of philosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate; while, nevertheless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error and perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary reactions, and, on the other hand, many false anticipations);

b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of philosophy has found an absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make;

c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philosophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone, as appears from *Vorl. über die Gesch. der Philosophie*, Vol. I. p. 128, or with those of logic—and the philosophy of nature?—and mental philosophy, as is taught, *ibid.* p. 120, and Vol. III. p. 686 ff.

G. Osw. Marbach, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1 Abth.: *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, 2 Abth.: *Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Leipsic, 1838–41. Marbach's stand-point is the Hegelian; but he often makes a somewhat forced application of the categories of Hegel's system to material furnished him chiefly by Tennemann and Rixner—though in part drawn from the original sources—and but slightly elaborated by himself. The book has remained uncompleted.

Jul. Braniss, *Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant*, first vol., Breslau, 1842. The first volume, the only one published, is a speculative survey of the history of philosophy down to the Middle Ages. Braniss owes his philosophical stand-point chiefly to Steffens, Schleiermacher, and Hegel.

Christoph. Wilh. Sigwart, *Gesch. der Philosophie*, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1854.

Albert Schwegler, *Gesch. der Philos. im Umriss, ein Leitfaden zur Uebersicht*, Stuttgart, 1848, 7th edition, *ibid.*, 1870. Contains a clear presentation of the philosophical stand-points, but is seriously imperfect from the omission of the author to describe with sufficient minuteness the principal doctrines which belong specially to each system and to the subordinate branches of each system, by which means alone a distinct picture can be presented. Schwegler's Compendium has been translated into English, with explanatory, critical, and supplementary annotations, by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867; 2d ed. 1868. [American translation by J. H. Seelye, N. Y. 1856; 3d ed., 1864.—Tr.]

Mart. v. Deutinger, *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1st vol.: Greek Philosophy. 1st div.: Till the time of Socrates. 2d div.: From Socrates till the end of Greek philosophy). Regensburg, 1852–53.

Ludw. Noack, *Geschichte der Philosophie in gedrängter Uebersicht*, Weimar, 1853.

Wilh. Bauer, *Geschichte der Philosophie für gebildete Leser*, Halle, 1863.

F. Micheliis, *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf unsere Zeit*, Braunsberg, 1865.

Joh. Ed. Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1866; 2d ed. *ibid.* 1869–70.

F. Schmid (of Schwarzenberg), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis Schopenhauer, vom speculatio-monotheistischen Standpunkte*, Erlangen, 1867.

Conrad Hermann, *Gesch. der Philos. in pragmatischer Behandlung*, Leipsic, 1867.

J. H. Scholten, *Gesch. der Religion und Philosophie*, translated from the Dutch original into French by A. Réville, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861; German translation under the above title by Ernst Rud. Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868.

E. Dühring, *Krit. Gesch. der Philos.*, Berlin, 1869.

Victor Cousin, *Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie* and *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne* in the *Ouvres de V. C.*, Paris, 1846-48. *Fragments Philosophiques*, Paris, 1840-43. *Histoire Générale de la Philosophie depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à la fin du XVIII. siècle*, 5e éd., Paris, 1863.

J. A. Nourrisson, *Tableau des Progrès de la Pensée Humaine depuis Thalès jusqu'à Leibnitz*, Paris, 1858; 2e édition, 1860.

N. J. Laforêt, *Hist. de la Philosophie; première partie: Philos. Ancienne*, Brussels and Paris, 1867.

Robert Blakey, *History of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present time*, 4 vols., London, 1848.

George Henry Lewes, *A Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece down to the present day*, London, 1846. *The History of Philosophy from Thales to the present day*, by George Henry Lewes, 3d edition (Vol. I. Ancient Philosophy; Vol. II. Modern Philosophy), London, 1866.

Ed. Zeller, *Vorträge und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts*, Leipsic, 1865, containing:

1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks; 2. Pythagoras and the legends concerning him; 3. A plea for Xanthippe; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the succeeding time; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; 6. Wolff's banishment from Halle, the struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 8. Friedr. Schleiermacher; 9. Primitive Christianity; 10. The historical school of Tübingen; 11. Ferdinand Christian Baur; 12. Strauss and Rénan.

Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient till modern times), the following are specially worthy of mention:—

Ad. Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Vol. I. (History of the Doctrine of Categories), Berlin, 1846; Vol. II. (Miscellaneous Essays), *ibid.* 1855; Vol. III. (Misc. Essays), *ibid.* 1867.

On Religious Philosophy: Karl Friedr. Stäudlin, *Gesch. und Geist des Skepticismus, vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion*, Leipsic, 1794-95; Imman. Berger, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie*, Berlin, 1800.

On the History of Psychology: Friedr. Aug. Carus, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, Leipsic, 1808. (Third part of the posthumous works.) The same subject, substantially, is also treated of in Albert Stöckl's *Die specul. Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte*, Vol. I. ("Ancient Times"), Würzburg, 1858; Vol. II. ("Patristic Period," also under the title of *Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit*), *ibid.* 1859; and *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (continuation of the preceding works), Mayence, 1864-65, and in Friedr. Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, Iserlohn, 1866.

On the History of Ethical and Political Theories: Christoph. Meiners, *Geschichte der älteren und neueren Ethik oder Lebensweisheit*, Göttingen, 1800-1801. Karl Friedr. Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Moralphilosophie*, Hanover, 1823; and *Geschichte der Lehre von der Sittlichkeit der Schauspiele, vom Eide, vom Gewissen*, etc., Göttingen, 1823 ff. Leop. v. Henning, *Die Principien der Ethik in historischer Entwicklung*, Berlin, 1825. Friedr. v. Raumer, *Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Begriffe von Staat, Recht und Politik*, Leipsic, 1826; 2d ed.

1832: 3d ed. 1861. Joh. Jos. Rossbach, *Die Perioden der Rechtsphilosophie*, Regensburg, 1842; *Die Grundrichtungen in der Gesch. der Staatswissenschaft*, Erlangen, 1842; *Gesch. der Gesellschaft*, Würzburg, 1868 ff. Heinr. Lintz, *Entwurf einer Geschichte der Rechtsphilos.*, Danzig, 1846. Emil Feuerlein, *Die philosophische Sittenlehre in ihren geschichtlichen Hauptformen*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1857-59. P. Janet, *Histoire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique dans l'Antiquité et les Temps Modernes*, Paris, 1858. James Mackintosh, *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, London, 1830; new edition, ed. by Will. Whewell, London, 1863. W. Whewell, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, new edition, London, 1862. [Robert Blakey, *History of Moral Science*, second edition, Edinburgh, 1863.—Ed.] Jahnel, *De Conscientiæ Notione*, Berlin, 1862. Aug. Neander, *Vorlesungen über die Gesch. der christl. Ethik*, ed. by Dr. Erdmann, Berlin, 1864. W. Gass, *Die Lehre vom Gewissen*, Berlin, 1869.

On the History of Logic: Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Vol. I. (Development of Logic in Ancient Times), Leipsic, 1855; Vols. II.-IV. (Logic in the Middle Ages), *ibid.* 1861-70.

On the History of Æsthetics: Robert Zimmermann, *Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft*, Vienna, 1858; cf. the historico-critical portions of Vischer's *Aesthetik* and Lotze's *Gesch. der Aesthetik in Deutschland*, Munich, 1868.

More or less copious contributions to the history of philosophical doctrines may be found also in many of the works in which these doctrines are systematically expounded, as, for example, in Stahl's *Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht* (1st ed., Heidelberg, 1830 ff.), of which the first volume, on the "Genesis of the Current Philosophy of Law" (3d ed., 1853), is critico-historical, and relates particularly to the time from Kant to Hegel; cf. in like manner Immanuel Herm. Fichte's *System der Ethik*, the first or critical part of which (Leipsic, 1850) is a history of the philosophical doctrines of right, state, and morals in Germany, France, and England from 1750 till about 1850; the first volume of K. Hildenbrand's *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (Leips. 1860), treats minutely of the history of theories in classical antiquity; much historical material is also contained in the works of Warnkönig, Röder, Rössler, Trendelenburg, and others, on the philosophy of law. The works of Julius Schaller (*Gesch. der Naturphilosophie seit Baco*), Rob. v. Mohl (*Gesch. u. Lit. der Staatswissenschaften*, Erlangen, 1855-58), J. C. Bluntschli (*Gesch. des allg. Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 16 Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1864, etc.), and some others, relate to modern times. Cf. below, Vol. II. § 1.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIQUITY.

§ 5. THE general characteristic of the human mind in ante-Christian, and particularly in Hellenic antiquity, may be described as its comparatively unreflecting belief in its own harmony and of its oneness with nature. The sense of an opposition, as existing either among its own different functions and interests or between the mind and nature and as needing reconciliation, is as yet relatively undeveloped. The philosophy of antiquity, like that of every period, partakes necessarily, in what concerns its chronological beginnings and its permanent basis, of the character of the period to which it belongs, while at the same time it tends, at least in its general and most fundamental direction, upward and beyond the level of the period, and so prepares the way for the transition to new and higher stages.

For the solution of the difficult but necessary problem of a general historical and philosophical characterization of the great periods in the intellectual life of humanity, the Hegelian philosophy has labored most successfully. The conceptions which it employs for this end are derived from the nature of intellectual development in general, and they prove themselves empirically correct and just when compared with the particular phenomena of the different periods. Nevertheless, the opinion is scarcely to be approved, that philosophy always expresses itself most purely only in the universal consciousness of the time; the truth is, rather, that it rises above the range of the general consciousness through the power of independent thought, generating and developing new germs, and anticipating in theory the essential character of developments yet to come (thus, *e. g.*, the Platonic state anticipates some of the essential characteristics of the form of the Christian church, and the doctrine of natural right, in its development since Grotius, foreshadows the constitutionalism of the modern state).

§ 6. Philosophy as science could originate neither among the peoples of the North, who were eminent for strength and courage, but devoid of culture, nor among the Orientals, who, though susceptible of the elements of higher culture, were content simply to retain them in a spirit of passive resignation,—but only among the Hellenes, who harmoniously combined the characteristics of both. The Romans, devoted to practical and particularly to political problems, scarcely occupied themselves with philosophy except in the

appropriation of Hellenic ideas, and scarcely attained to any productive originality of their own.

The sacred writings and poetry of the various Oriental peoples, with their commentaries (Y-King, Chou-King; the moral treatises of Confucius and his disciples; the Vedas, the code of Manu, the Sakontala of the poet Kalidasa, the Puranas or Theogonies, the ancient commentaries;—Zoroaster's Zendavesta, etc.) are the original sources from which our knowledge of their philosophical speculations is derived. Of modern works, treating of the religion and philosophy of these peoples, we name the following:—

Friedr. Crenzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, 4 vols., Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1810-12; 2d ed., 6 vols., 1819 ff.; *Werke*, I. 1-4, 1836 seq. K. J. H. Windischmann, *Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte*, volume I., sections 1-4 (on the "Foundations of Philosophy in the East"), Bonn, 1837-54. Stühr, *Die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Völker des Orients*, Berlin, 1836-38. Ed. Rich, *Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie*, vol. I., Mannheim, 1846, 2d ed., 1862. (Röth's first volume is devoted to the speculations of the Persians and Egyptians, the second to the oldest Greek philosophy. The book, though written in a lively style, is drawn in large measure from inauthentic sources, and is not free from arbitrary interpretations and too hazardous comparisons. It contains more poetry than historic truth.) Ad. Wuttke, *Geschichte des Heidenthums*, 2 vols., Breslau, 1852-53. J. C. Bunsen, *Altasiatische Gottes- und Weltideen in ihren Wirkungen auf das Gemeinleben der Menschen*, fünf Vorträge, Nördlingen, 1866. Owing to the stability of Oriental ideas, expositions relating to modern times, such as *Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie centrale, par le comte de Gobineau* (Paris, 1865), may be profitably consulted by students of their earlier history. Cf. the mythological writings of Schwenck and others, and Wolfgang Menzel's *Die vorchristliche Unsterblichkeitslehre* (Leipzig, 1870), Max Duncker's *Gesch. der Arier* (3d ed., 1867), etc., and numerous articles in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (ed. by L. Krehl), and in other learned reviews.

G. Pauthier, *Esquisses d'une Histoire de la Philos. chinoise*, Paris, 1844; *Les Quatre Livres de Philos. Morale et Politique de la Chine, trad. du Chinois*, Paris, 1868; L. A. Martin, *Histoire de la Morale*, I.; *La Morale chez les Chinois*, Paris, 1862; J. H. Plath, *Die Religion und der Cultus der alten Chinesen*, in the Transactions of the Philos.-Philol. Div. of the Bavarian R. Acad. of Sciences, Vol. IX., pt. 3, pp. 781-969, Munich, 1868; *Confucius und seiner Schüler Leben und Lehren*, Trans. of the Munich Acad. of Sciences, XI. 2, Munich, 1867; T. Legge, *The Life and Writings of Confucius, with crit. and exeget. notes* (in the author's "Chinese Classics"), London, 1867 [New York, 1870].

Colebrooke, *Essays on the Vedas*; and *On the Philosophy of the Hindus*, in his *Miscellaneous Essays*, I. pp. 9-113, 227-419, London, 1867; partial translation in German by Poley, Leipzig, 1847; new ed. of the *Essays on the Rel. and Phil. of the H.*, London, 1858; A. W. v. Schlegel, *Bhagavad-Gita*, i. e., *Geheimes pikes, sive Krishnae et Arjuna colloquium de rebus divinis, Bharatas episodum. Text, rec., adn. adj.*, Bonn, 1820; W. v. Humboldt, *Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata*, Berlin, 1826. (Cf. Hegel's article in the *Berlin Jahrbücher, für Wiss. Kritik*, 1827.) Chr. Lassen, *Gymnosophisten sive Indicas philosophias documenta*, Bonn, 1832; cf. his *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, I.-IV., Leipz., 1847-61; Othm. Frank, *Die Philosophie der Hindu. Vānta Sara von Sadananda, sanskrit und deutsch*, Munich, 1835; Theod. Benfey, *Indien*, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encycl. sect. II.*, vol. 17, Leipzig, 1840; E. Roer, *Vedānta-Sara or Essence of the Vedānta*, Calcutta, 1845, and *Die Lehrsprüche der Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie von Kāṇḍa*, translated into the German from the Sanscrit, in the *Zeitschr. der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. XXI., 1867, pp. 809-420; Roth, *Zur Literatur und Geschichte des Wada*, 8 essays, Stuttgart, 1846; Alb. Weber, *Indische Literaturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1852; *Indische Skizzen*, Berlin, 1857; cf. *Indische Studien*, ed. by A. Weber, Vol. I. seq., Berlin, 1850 seq.; F. M. Müller, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der indischen Philosophie*, in the 6th and 7th vols. of the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 1852-58; cf. his *History of Ancient Indian Literature*, 2d ed., London, 1860; Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, Lond. 1866, N. Y. 1867; H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus, collected and edited by R. Fox*, Lond. 1861-62.

Eug. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844; C. F. Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857-59; W. Wassiljew, *Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur*, transl. into German by Th. Benfey, Leipzig, 1860; Barthélemy St. Hilaire, *Bouddha et sa Religion*, 2e éd., Paris, 1862; Jam. de Alwis, *Buddhism, its Origin, History, and Doctrine, its Scriptures and their Language*, London, 1867; Emil Schlagintweit, *Ueber den Gottesbegriff der Buddhismus*, in the Reports of the Bavar. Acad. of Sciences, 1864, Vol. I. 82-102; R. S. Hardy, *The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists compared with History and Science*, with Introductory Notices of the Life and System of Gotama Buddha, London, 1867.

K. E. Lepsius, *Das Totenbuch der Aegypter*, Leipz. 1842; *Die ägypt. Gotterkretze*, Berlin, 1851; M. Uhlenmann, *Thoth oder die Wissenschaft der alten Aegypter*, Göttingen, 1855; *Aegyptische Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1857-58; Chr. K. Josias von Bunsen, *Aegyptens Stelle in der Weltgeschichte*, Hamburg

and Gotha, 1845-57. Cf. also, among other works, the article by L. Diestel, which is well adapted as an introduction to the study of early Oriental religions: *Set-Typhon, Asael und Satan, ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte des Orients*, in the *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, edited by Nledner, 1860, pp. 159-217; further, Ollivier Bauregard, *Les Dieux de l'Égypte, leur Origine, leur Culte et son Expansion dans le Monde*, Paris, 1866.

J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage oder das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und Perser oder des Zendvolks*, Frankf. on the M. 1830; Martin Haug, *Die fünf Gáthá's oder Sammlungen von Liedern und Sprüchen Zarathustra's, seiner Jünger und Nachfolger*, Leipa. 1858 and 1860 (in the Transactions of the German Oriental Society); *Essay on Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees*, Bombay, 1863.

On the religious conceptions of the Jews, compare, among others, G. H. Ewald, in his *Gesch. des Volkes Israel bis auf Christus*, L. Herzfeld in his *Gesch. des Volkes Israel von der Vollendung des zweiten Tempels bis zur Einsetzung des Makkabäer's Schimon*, and Georg Weber in *Das Volk Israel in der alttestamentlichen Zeit*, Leipzig, 1867 (the first volume of the work by Weber and Holtzman, entitled: *Gesch. des Volkes Israel und der Entstehung des Christenthums*, 3 vols., Leipa. 1867). Alexander Kohut (among recent writers) treats specially of Jewish angelology and demonology in their dependence on Parseism, in the *Abhandl. für Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ed. by Herm. Brockhaus; his work also published separately, Leipzig, 1864.

The so-called philosophy of the Orientals lacks in the tendency to strict demonstration, and hence in scientific character. Whatever philosophical elements are discoverable among them are so blended with religious notions, that a separate exposition is scarcely possible. Besides, even after the meritorious investigations of modern times, our knowledge of Oriental thought remains far too incomplete and uncertain for a connected and authentic presentation. We omit, therefore, here the special consideration of the various theorems of Oriental philosophy, and confine ourselves to the following general statements.

The doctrine of Confucius (551-479 B. C.), as also that of his followers (Meng-tseu, born 371 B. C., and others), is mainly a practical philosophy of utilitarian tendency. Its theoretical speculations (which are based on the generalized conception of the antithesis of male and female, heaven and earth, etc.) are not scientifically wrought out. The rich but immoderate fancy of the Hindus generated, on the basis of a pantheistic conception of the world, a multiplicity of divinities, without investing them with harmonious form and individual character. Their oldest gods—of whom the Vedas treat—group themselves about three supreme divinities of nature, Indra, Varuni, and Agni. Later (perhaps about 1300 B. C.) supreme veneration was paid to the three divine beings, which constituted the Hindu Trimurti, viz.: to Brahma, as the original source of the world (which is a reflected picture in the mind of Brahma, produced by the deceiving Maja), to Vischnu, as preserver and governor, and to Siva, as destroyer and producer. The oldest body of Brahman doctrine is the Mimansa, which includes a theoretical part, the Brahnamimansa or Vedanta, and a practical part, the Karmamimansa. To the (universalistic) Mimansa ("Investigation") Kapila opposed the Sankhya ("Consideration," "Critique"—an individualistic doctrine, which denied the world-soul and taught the existence of individual souls only). We find already in the Sankhya a theory of the kinds and the objects of knowledge. To the authors of the Niaya-doctrine, which subsequently arose, the Syllogism was known. The age of these doctrines is uncertain. In opposition to the religion of Brahma arose (not far from 550 B. C.) Buddhism, which was an attempt at a moral reformation, hostile to castes, but the source of a new hierarchy. Its followers were required to make it their supreme aim to rise above the checkered world of changing appearance, with its pain and vain pleasure. But this end was to be reached, not so much through positive moral and intellectual discipline, as through another process, termed "entrance into Nirvana," whereby the soul was saved from the torments of transmigration and the individual was brought into unconscious unity with the All. The Persian reli-

gion, founded or reformed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), was opposed to the old Hindu religion, whose gods it regarded as evil demons. Over against the kingdom of light or of good was placed, in dualistic opposition, the kingdom of darkness or evil; after a long contest the former was to triumph. The Egyptians are credited with the doctrines of the judgment of departed souls and of their transmigration, which doctrines Herodotus (II. 53, 81, 123) supposes to have passed from them to the Orphists and the Pythagoreans. Their mythology seems scarcely to have exercised any influence on the Grecian thinkers. Somewhat more considerable may have been the influence on the Greeks of the early astronomical observations of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of their geological observations and speculations. Certain geometrical propositions seem rather to have been merely discovered empirically by the Egyptians in the measurement of their fields, than to have been scientifically demonstrated by them; the discovery of the proofs and the creation of a system of geometry was the work of the Greeks. The Jewish monotheism, which scarcely exercised an (indirect?) influence on Anaxagoras, became later an important factor in the evolution of Greek philosophy (i. e. from the time of Neo-Pythagoreanism and in part even earlier), when Jews, through the reception of elements of Greek culture, had acquired a disposition for scientific thought.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.

§ 7. THE sources of our knowledge of the philosophy of the Greeks are contained partly in the philosophical works and fragments which have come down from them to us, and partly in reports and occasional allusions. Modern historians have advanced gradually in the employment of this material from the method of mere compilation to a more exact historical criticism and a purer and more profound philosophical comprehension.

The earlier philosophemes are never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in the form of mere repetition with historic intent, but always as incidental to the end of ascertaining philosophical truth. Plato sketches, with historical fidelity in the essential outlines, though with a poetic freedom of execution, vivid pictures of the various philosophies, which had preceded his own, as also of the persons who had been their representatives. Aristotle proceeds rather with realistic exactness both in outline and in details, and only departs occasionally from complete historic rigor in his reduction of earlier points of view to the fundamental conceptions of his own system. The increasing restriction of later classical authors to simple narrative is not calculated in general to impart to their statements the advantage of greater fidelity, since they are generally lacking either in accurate knowledge of the proper authorities, or in full capacity for the clear comprehension of earlier philosophical opinions.

Plato characterizes in various dialogues the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, of Protagoras, Gorgias, and other Sophists, and especially those of Socrates and of individual disciples of Socrates. Next to him, Xenophon (especially in the *Memorabilia*) is the most important authority for Socrates and his teaching. Aristotle, in all his writings, makes it his principle to consider, first of all, in the discussion of any problem, what results obtained by his predecessors are tenable, and presents, in particular, in the introduction to his "first philosophy" (*Metaphysics*), a critical review of the principles of all earlier philosophers from Thales to Plato (*Met. I. c. 3-10*). In many places, also, Aristotle gives information concerning Plato's "unwritten doctrines," as delivered in the oral lectures of the latter. A number of minor works, in which Aristotle (according to *Diog. L., V. 25*) had treated of the doctrines of various previous philosophers (*περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, περὶ τῆς Ἀρχύτου φιλοσοφίας, περὶ τῆς Σπewσίππου καὶ Ξενοκράτους*, etc.) are lost; we find, however, in the Commentators many statements drawn from them. The like is true of the works of Theophrastus on earlier philosophers (*περὶ τῶν Ἀναξαγόρου, περὶ τῶν Ἀναξίμενου, περὶ τῶν Ἀρχελάου*, *Histories of Arithmetic, of Geometry, of Astronomy, περὶ τῆς Δημοκρίτου ἀστρολογίας, τῶν Διογένης συναγωγῇ, περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, Μεγακός*, etc., and his comprehensive work, *φυσικαὶ δόξαι*, of which fragments are extant; an abridgment of this work appears to have been used by later writers as a principal source of information, see *Diog. L., V. 42 seq.*; cf. Usener,

Analekta Theophrastea, Leips. 1858). Of Platonists, Speusippus (*περὶ φιλοσόφων, Πλάτωνος ἱγούμενον*), Xenocrates (*περὶ τῶν Παρμενίδου and Πυθαγόρεια*), and Heraclides of Pontus (*περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, πρὸς τὰ Ζήνωνος, Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεις, πρὸς τὸν Δημόκριτον ἐξηγήσεις*), and, later, notably Clitomachus (about 140 B. C., *περὶ τῶν αἰρέσεων*), and of Aristotelians, besides Theophrastus and Eudemus (*γεωμετρικαὶ ἱστορίαι, ἀριθμητικὴ ἱστορία, περὶ τῶν ἀστρολογουμένων ἱστορία*), Aristoxenus (*ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα, περὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτοῦ, Πλάτωνος βίος*), Dicaearch (*βίος Ἑλλάδος, also περὶ βίων*), Phanias of Lesbos (*περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν and πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστάς*), Clearchus, Strato, Duris of Samos, the pupil of Theophrastus (about 270 B. C.), and others either treated originally of earlier philosophers, or wrote works of more general content, or works pertaining to the history of special sciences, which contained material for the history of philosophy. Also Epicurus (*περὶ αἰρέσεων*) and his disciples, Hermarchus, Metrodorus, and Colotes (in polemical works), and Idomeneus (*περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν*), and the Stoics Cleanthes (On Heraclitus), Sphaerus (On Heraclitus, On Socrates, and On the Eretrian Philosophers), Chrysippus (On the Early Physiologists), Panaetius (On the Philosophical Schools or Sects, *περὶ τῶν αἰρέσεων*), and others wrote of philosophical doctrines and works. Of all these works, which served as authorities for later writers, we possess none.

The Alexandrians followed in their works the narratives of the authors above named. Ptolemy Philadelphus (*reg.* 285–247 B. C.) founded the Alexandrian Library (for which preparations had already been begun under his father by Demetrius Phalerens, who came to Alexandria about 296 B. C., and) in which the writings of the philosophers were brought together, though not a few spurious works were included among them. Callimachus of Cyrene (about 294–224 B. C.), while superintendent of this library (in which office he succeeded Zenodotus the Ephesian, who lived about 324–246 B. C.), drew up “tables” of celebrated authors and their works (*πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμπάντων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν*). Kratosthenes (276–194 B. C.), who received from Ptolemy Euergetes (*reg.* 247–222) the control of the Alexandrian Library, wrote concerning the various philosophical schools (*περὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἰρέσεων*), on which, as it seems, Apollodorus founded his (metrical) chronicle (composed in the second half of the second century B. C.), from which, again, Diogenes Laërtius and others drew a large part of their chronological data. Aristophanes of Byzantium (born about 264, died about 187 B. C., pupil of Zenodotus and Callimachus, successor, as librarian, of Apollonius, the successor of Eratosthenes, and teacher of Aristarchus, who lived about 212–140 B. C.) arranged most of the Platonic Dialogues in Trilogies, placing the others after them as separate works (a part of his supplement to the *πίνακες* of Callimachus; see Nauck's *Sammlung der Fragmente des Aristophanes von Byzanz*). Besides Eratosthenes, the following persons wrote either expressly or incidentally of the lives and succession of the philosophers and of their works and doctrines: Neanthes of Cyzicus (about 240 B. C., resided at the court of King Attalus I. in Pergamus, and wrote *μουσικά and περὶ ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν*), Antigonus Carystius (about 225, *βίος*, etc.), Hermippus (of Smyrna? about 200 B. C.), the Callimachean (and Peripatetic), who, like Aristophanes of Byzantium in other departments, furnished in his biographico-literary opuscles, which were only too abundant in fables (*περὶ τῶν σοφῶν, περὶ μάγων, περὶ Πυθαγόρου, περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους, περὶ Θεοφράστου, βίος*), a supplement to the *πίνακες* of Callimachus (from which Favorinus and, indirectly, Diogenes Laërtius drew largely), Sotion the Peripatetic (about 190 B. C., *περὶ διαδοχῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων*), Satyrus (about 180 B. C., *βίος*), Apollodorus of Athens (about 144 B. C., a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic, and author of the mythological *βιβλιοθήκη* and of the before-mentioned *χρονικά*, and perhaps also of the work *περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων αἰρέσεων*), and Alexander *Polyhistor* (in the time of Sulla, *διαδοχαὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων*). From the *διαδοχαὶ* of Sotion and the *βίος* of Satyrus, Heraclides Lembus (about 150 B. C.), the

son of Serapion, compiled extracts, which are often mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius (who distinguishes—V. 93, 94—fourteen persons named Heraclides). Antisthenes of Rhodes (about 150 B. C.), the historian, and contemporary of Polybius, was probably the author of the *φιλοσόφων διαδοχαί*, to which Diogenes Laërtius often alludes. Demetrius the Magnesian, a teacher of Cicero, wrote a critical work on Homonymous Authors (*περί ὁμωνύμων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων*), from which Diogenes Laërtius, perhaps through Diocles, drew many of his statements (cf. Scheurleer, *De Demetrio Magnete, diss. inaug.*, Leyden, 1858). Didymus Chalcenterus (in the second half of the first century B. C.) also labored in the field of the history of philosophy, as a compiler of sentences. Sosicrates wrote *διαδοχαί*, which Diogenes Laërtius often mentions. Diocles Magnes, a friend of Epicureanism and opponent of Sotion, the partisan of the philosophy of Sextius, in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, was the author of works entitled *βίαι φιλοσόφων* and *ἐπιδρομή φιλοσόφων*, from which Diog. Laërtius, at least in his account of the Stoics, and most likely also in that of the Epicureans, drew very largely. (According to Nietzsche, Diogenes derived most of his data from Diocles Magnes and Favorinus.)

Of the works of the ancients which have come down to us, those specially important for the history of philosophy are the works of Cicero, Lucretius, Seneca, Plutarch, the historian and Platonic philosopher, Galenus, the physician (born 131, died after 200 A. D.), Sextus the Sceptic (flourished about 200 A. D., a physician of the empirical school, and hence usually named Sextus Empiricus), the historical work (founded largely on the *ἀπομνημονεύματα* and *παντοδαπή ιστορία* of Favorinus) by Diogenes of Laërta (in Cilicia, about 220 A. D.), and the writings of numerous Neo-Platonists (but Porphyry's *φιλόσοφος ιστορία* is no longer extant) and commentators of Aristotle; of similar importance are the works of certain of the Church Fathers, especially those of Justin Martyr (*Apolog.* and *Dialog. cum Tryphone*), Clemens of Alexandria (*Exhortation to the Hellenes, Paedagogus, Stromata*), Origen (*Contra Celsum*, etc.), and Eusebius (*Præparatio Evangelica*), and in part those of Tertullian, Lactantius, and Augustine. Many materials for the history of philosophy are found in Gellius (about 150 A. D., in his *Noctes Atticæ*), Athenæus (about 200, *Deipnosophistæ*), Flavius Philostratus (about 200), Eunapius of Sardis (about 400), Johannes Stobæus (about 500), Photius (about 880, *Lexicon* and *Bibliotheca*), and Suidas (about 1000, *Lexicon*); the work *περί τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαλαμπάντων σοφῶν*, ascribed to Hesychius of Miletus, appears to be a compilation from Diogenes Laërtius and Suidas, dating from the 15th century (see Lehrs, in the *Rhein. Mus.* XVII., 1862, pp. 453–457). Cicero gives evidence in his writings of a tolerably extensive and exact acquaintance with the philosophical schools of his time, but his knowledge of Greek speculation was insufficient. A higher value belongs to most of the historical statements of the commentators of Aristotle, since these were founded on original works of the philosophers, which were then extant, or on various reports by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other authors, which have not come down to us.

Ciceronis Historia Philosophiæ Antiquæ ex Omnibus Illius Scriptis collegit Fr. Gedike, Berlin, 1782, 1801, 1814.

The works of Plutarch entitled *περί τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, περί Κυρηναίων, ἐκλογή φιλοσόφων*, and *στρωματεῖς ιστορικοί* are not preserved. Plutarch's "Moralia" contain valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, especially in what relates to the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines. The work entitled *Plut. de Physicis Philosophorum Decretis Libri Quinque* (ed. Dan. Beck, Leipsic, 1787, and contained also in Wyttenbach's and Dübner's editions of the "Moralia") is spurious.

Claud. Galeni Liber περί φιλοσόφων ιστορίας (in the complete ed. of the Works of Galen, ed. Kühn, vol. XIX.) The work is spurious. Leaving out the commencement, it agrees

almost throughout with the Pseudo-Plutarchic work above-mentioned, of which it is a recension somewhat abridged. In the genuine writings of Galen, however, there is found, in addition to their medical contents, much that concerns the history of philosophy.

Sexti Empirici *Opera, Pyrrhonicarum Institutionum Libri Tres* (πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις, Skeptical Sketches); *Contra Mathematicos sive Disciplin. Professores Libri sex, Contra Philosophos libri quinque*; the two also together under the title: *Adversus Math. Libri XI.* (Against the representatives of the positive sciences and against philosophical dogmatists.) Ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718; reprinted *ibid.* 1842. *Ex. rec.* Imm. Bekker, Berlin, 1841.

Flavii Philostrati *Vitae Sophistarum.* Ed. Car. Lud. Kayser, Heidelberg, 1838. *Opera* ed. Kayser, Zürich, 1844-46; *ibid.* 1853; ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1849.

Athenaei *Deipnosophistae.* Ed. Aug. Meineke, Leipsic, 1868-69.

Diogenis Laërtii *de Vita, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus Clarorum Philosophorum libri decem* (περί βίων, δογματῶν καὶ ἀποφθεγμάτων τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκμησάντων βιβλία δέκα). Ed. Hübner, 2 vols., Leips. 1828-31; Commentaries on the same, vols. I. and II., Leips. 1830-33, containing the notes of Ia. Casaubonus, Aeg. Menagius and others. The commentary of Menagius on Diogenes Laërtius appeared first in 1652. Diog. L. *De Vita*, etc., *ex Italici codicis nunc primum excussis recensuit* C. Gabr. Cobet. *Accedunt Olympiodori, Asmonii, Jamblichi, Porphyrii et aliorum Vitae Platonis, Aristotelis, Pythagorae, Plotini et Iuliori, Ant. Westermann, et Marini vita Procli, J. F. Boissonnadii edentibus. Graece et Latina cum indicibus*, Paris, 1850. Cf. Frdr. Bahnsch, *De Diog. L. Fontibus*, (diss.-inaug. Regimontanensis,) Gumbinnen, 1868; Frdr. Nietzsche, *De Laërtii Diogenis Fontibus*, in the *Rhein. Museum*, new series, XXIII. 1868, and XXIV. 1869. Diogenes Laërtius dedicated his work, according to III. 47, to a female admirer of Plato. His general attitude is that of an Eclectic, while in the different parts of his work he is influenced by the character of the sources from which he draws. Diogenes brings the history of Platonism down to Clitomachus, that of Aristotelianism to Lyco, that of Stoicism, in our text, to Chrysippus, though originally (as shown by Valentine Rose in the *Hermes*, vol. I., Berlin, 1866, p. 370 ff.) it was continued to Cornutus; he names the principal Epicureans down to Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Laco, Diogenes Tarsensis, and Orion; only the history of Skepticism is brought down by him to his own time, i. e., till near 220 A. D.

Clementis Alexandrini *Opera.* Ed. Reinhold. Klotz, Leipsic, 1830-34. *Origenis philosophēmena*, in Jac. Gronovii *Thesaur. Antiquitatum Graecarum*, tom. X., Leyden, 1701, pp. 257-292. *Compendium Historiae Philosophicae Antiquae sive Philosophumena, quae sub Origenis nomine circumferuntur*, ed. Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Hamb. 1706, 2d ed., *ibid.* 1716; also in the complete editions of Origen. *Ἀρχαίων φιλοσοφούμενα ἢ κατὰ πασῶν αἰρέσεων ἐλεγχος*, *Origenis Philosophumena, sive Omnium Haeresium Refutatio, e codice Parisino nunc primum* ed. Emman. Miller, Oxford, 1851. *S. Hippolyti Refutationis Omnium Haeresium Librorum Decem quae supersunt*, ed. L. Duncker et F. G. Schneidewin, *opus Schneidewino defuncto abeolit* L. Duncker, Gött. 1859, ed. Patricius Cruice, Paris, 1860. Of this work, the first book, which seems to be founded in large measure on the abridgment made in the Alexandrian period, of the *περί φυσικῶν* of Theophrastus, is identical with the *φιλοσοφούμενα*, which is all of the work that was known until recently. Books IV.-X., with the exception of the beginning of Book IV., were found in a cloister on Mount Athos in 1842. That Origen was not the author of the work is certain; that it was written by the Church Father, Hippolytus, who lived about 220 A. D., and was a pupil of Irenaeus, is extremely probable.

Eusebii *Praeparatio Evangelica*, ed. Viger, Paris, 1628; ed. Heinichen, Leips. 1842-43.

Eusebius draws very largely from *Pseudo-Plutarch de Placitis Philosophorum*, or more likely from a fuller edition of that work.

Eunapii Sardiani Vitae Philosophorum et Sophistarum. Ed. J. F. Boissonade, Amst. 1822; Paris, 1849.

Jo. Stobaei Florilegium, ed. Thom. Gaisford, Oxford, 1822; Leipsic, 1823-23; ed. Aug. Meinecke, Leipsic, 1855-57. *Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae*, ed. Arnold Herm. Lud. Heeren, Göttingen, 1792-1801; ed. Thom. Gaisford, Oxford, 1850; ed. Aug. Meinecke, vol. I., Leipsic, 1860, Vol. II., ib. 1864. The *Eclogae* agree with Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Placitis Philos.*, and Pseudo-Galen in those parts which relate to the same topics, but they contain, in passages, fuller extracts from the common source from which each of these writers drew. Many of the statements of the Bishop Theodoret, who died in 457, were drawn from this compilation.

Hermychii Milesii Opuscula, ed. Jo. Conr. Orelli, Leipsic, 1820.

Simplicii Comm. ad Arist. Physicas Auscultationes. Ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1526.

Michael Hissman, in the *Magazin für die Philosophie und ihre Geschichte*, 6 vols. Göttingen and Lemgo, 1778-83, brought together a number of essays taken from the *Annals* of various academies, many of which relate to ancient philosophy. Among these, attention may be directed to the articles on *Thales* and *Anaximander* by the Abbé de Canaye, on *Pythagoras* by De la Nauze and by Fréret, on *Empedocles* by Bonamy, on *Anaxagoras* by Abbé le Batteux and by Heinicus, on *Socrates* by Abbé Fraguier, on *Aristippus* by Le Batteux, on *Plato* by Abbé Garnier, on *Callisthenes* by Sevin, on *Euhemerus* by Sevin, Fourmont, and Foucher, on *Panaetius* and on *Athenodorus* by Sevin, on *Musonius* and on *Sextius* by De Burigny, on *Peregrinus* the Cynic by Capperonier, and on *Proclus* by De Burigny.

Christoph. Meiners, *Historia Doctrinae de Vero Deo*, Lemgo, 1780. *Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom*, Lemgo, 1781-82. *Grundriss der Gesch. der Weltweisheit*, Lemgo, 1786; 2d ed. 1789.

D. Tiedemann, *Griechenlands erste Philosophen oder Leben und Systeme des Orpheus, Pherecydes, Thales, und Pythagoras*, Leipsic, 1781.

Fr. Vict. Leberecht Plessing, *Histor. und philos. Untersuchungen über die Denkart, Theologie und Philosophie der ältesten Völker, vorzüglich der Griechen, bis auf Aristot. Zeit*, Elbing, 1785; *Mnemonium oder Versuche zur Enthüllung der Geheimnisse des Alterthums*, Leipsic, 1787; *Versuche zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Alterthums*, Leipsic, 1788.

Wilh. Traug. Krug, *Geschichte der Philosophie aller Zeit, vornehmlich unter Griechen und Römern*, Leipsic, 1815; 2d ed., 1827.

Zeller writes of what has been done in the department of the history of ancient philosophy since Buhle and Tennemann, in the *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart*, July, 1843.

Historia philosophiae Graeco-Romanae ex fontium locis contexta. Locos collegimus, disposuimus, notis auxerunt H. Ritter, L. Preller. Edidit L. Preller, Hamburg, 1838. *Ediit II. recogn. et auxit* L. Preller, Gotha, 1856. *Ed. III.* Gotha, 1864. *Ed. IV.*, 1869. (A valuable compilation.)

Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, ed. F. W. Mullach, Paris, 1860-67.

Christian Aug. Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie* (Part I.: Pre-Socratic Philosophy; Part II., 1st Div.: Socrates, the Imperfect Disciples of Socrates and Plato; Part II., 2d Div.: Aristotle; Part III., 1st Div.: Review of the Aristotelian System and Exposition of the Doctrines of his Immediate Successors, as transition to the third period of the development of Greek Philosophy), Berlin, 1835, '44, '53, '57, '60. *Geschichte der Entwicklungen der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirkungen im römischen Reiche*, first half (till Aristotle), Berlin, 1862, second half (from the Stoics and Epicureans to the Neo-Platonists, constituting, with the "*Ausführungen*," which appeared

in 1866, the 2d division of the 3d part of the "*Handbuch*") *ib.* 1864. An extremely careful, comprehensive, and learned investigation. The "*Geschichte der Entwicklungen*" is a shorter and compendious treatment of the subject.

Aug. Bernh. Krische, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie*. 1st Vol.: *Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, eine Prüfung der Darstellung Cicero's*, Göttingen, 1840.

Ed. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen, eine Untersuchung über Character, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung* (Part I.: General Introduction, Pre-Socratic Philosophy. Part II.: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. Part III.: Post-Aristotelian Philosophy), Tübingen, 1844, '46, '52. Second revised edition, with the title, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer gesch. Entwicklung dargestellt*. Part I., Tüb. 1856. Part II. (Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Plato and the Old Academy), Tüb. 1856. Part II. 2d Div. (Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics), Tüb. 1862. Part III. 1st Div. (Post-Aristotelian philosophy), 1st half, Leips. 1865; 2d half, with a Register, *ib.* 1869. Third Edition, Part I., *ib.* 1869. ["Socrates and the Socratic Schools" (London, 1868) and "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics" (Lond. 1869), are translations by Dr. Oswald Reichel from this work of Zeller.—*Tr.*] This work gives evidence of the most admirable combination of philosophical profundity and critical sagacity in the author. The philosophical stand-point of the author is a Hegelianism modified by empirical and critical elements.

Karl Prantl, *Uebersicht der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1854; new edition, 1863.

A. Schwegler, *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, ed. by C. Köstlin, Tübingen, 1859; second enlarged edition, *ib.* 1870 (1869).

Ludwig Strümpell, *Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, zur Uebersicht, Repetition und Orientirung bei eigenen Studien entworfen* (1st Div.: The Theoret. Philos. of the Greeks; 2d Div.: Their Practical Philosophy), Leipsic, 1854–61. The stand-point is Herbartian.

N. J. Schwarz, *Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne*, Liège, 1842; 2. 6d. Liège, 1846. Ch. Renouvier, *Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne*, Paris, 1845. Charles Lévêque, *Etudes de Philosophie Grecque et Latine*, Paris, 1864. L. Lenoel, *Les Philosophes de l'Antiquité*, Paris, 1865. M. Morel, *Hist. de la Sagesse et du Goût chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1865.

Franco Fiorentino, *Saggio Storico sulla Filosofia Greca*, Florence, 1865.

W. A. Butler, *Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy*, edited by W. H. Thompson, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1856; London, 1866. *Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philosophical Remains* of James Frederick Ferrier, ed. by Al. Grant and E. L. Lushington, 2 vols., Edinb. and London, 1866. [Ritter's *History of Ancient Philosophy*, translated from the first volumes of Ritter's general history, mentioned above, § 4, by Alex. J. W. Morrison, 4 vols., Oxford, 1838–46. Walter Anderson, *The Philosophy of Ancient Greece investigated in its Origin and Progress*, Edinb. 1791.—*Tr.*]

Of ancient physical theories, Th. Henri Martin treats in *La Foudre, l'Electricité, et le Magnétisme chez les Anciens*, Paris, 1866. Cf. also Charles Thurot, *Recherches Historiques sur le Principe d'Archimède* (*Extrait de la Revue Archéologique*), Paris, 1869.

On Greek and Roman theories of law and of the state, cf.—beside the work of K. Hildebrand, cited above, p. 13—A. Veder, *Historia Philosophiæ Juris apud Veteres*, Leyden, 1832; Herm. Henkel, *Lineamenta Artis Graecorum Politicæ*, Berl. 1847; *Studien zu einer Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat*, in the *Philologus*, Vol. IX., 1854, p. 402 seq.; *Zur Geschichte der griech. Staatswiss. (G. Pr.)* Salzwedel, 1863 and 1866, Stendal, 1867 and 1869. M. Voigt, *Die Lehre vom Jus Naturale, Aequum et Bonum und Jus Gentium der Römer*,

Leips. 1856. (On Greek theories, pp. 81-176.) Cf. also the extensive work of Ihering: *Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung*, Leips. 1852 seq.

Of the relation of Hellenic Ethics to Christianity, Neander treats in his *Wiss. Abhandlungen*, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851; cf. his above-cited "*Vorlesungen über die Gesch. der christlichen Ethik.*" W. Wehrenpffenig (*Progr. des Joachimsthal'schen Gymnasiums*, Berlin, 1856) writes of the diversity of ethical principles among the Hellenes and its causes. Ad Garnier, *De la Morale dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1865.

On ancient *Æsthetics*, see Eduard Müller, *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, Breslau, 1834-37. Cf. Zimmermann's *Gesch. der Aesthetik* and A. Kuhn, *Die Idee des Schönen in ihrer Entwicklung bei den Alten bis in unsere Tage*, 2d edit., Berlin, 1865.

On the doctrine of Unity, see Wegener, *De Uno sive Unitate apud Græcorum Philosophos*, *Realschul-Progr.*, Potsdam, 1863.

On ancient views of the Immortality of the Soul, see Karl Arnold, *Gymn.-Progr.*, Straubing, 1864.

Of the Philosophy of Language among the ancients, treat Lersch (Bonn, 1841), and H. Steinthal (*Geschichte der Sprachwiss. bei den Griechen und Römern*, Berlin, 1863-64). Cf. Schömann, *Die Lehre von den Redetheilen bei den Alten*, Berlin, 1862.

§ 8. The efforts of the poetic fancy to represent to itself the nature and development of things divine and human precede, excite to, and prepare the way for philosophical inquiry. The influence of the theogonic and cosmogonic notions of Homer and Hesiod on the development of the earliest Greek philosophy was only remote and inconsiderable; but perhaps certain Orphic poesies, as also the Cosmology of Pherecydes of Syros (who first wrote in prose, about 600 B. C.), and, on the other hand, the commencement of ethical reflection, which manifested itself in proverbs and poems, exercised a more direct and essential influence.

The numerous works relating to those phases of intellectual development, which preceded the advent of philosophy, can not here be named with any degree of fullness; it may suffice only to direct attention to K. F. Nagelbach's *Homer-Theologie* (Nuremberg, 1840) and his *Nachhomerische Theologie*, also to the works of Creuser and Voss, the first volumes of Grote's *History of Greece*, the *Populäre Aufstösse* of Lehrs, the works of Preller and others on Grecian Mythology, and various monographs, such as Ramdohr's *Zur Homertischen Ethik* (*Programm des Gymnas. zu Lüneburg*), etc. Cf. Lobeck, *De Carminibus Orphicis*, Königsb. 1824; *De Orphet Aetate*, ib. 1826; *Aglaophamus s. de Theol. Myst. Græcorum Causis*, 3 vols., ib. 1829; K. Elshoff, *De Onomacrito Atheniense*, *Gymn.-Progr.*, Elberfeld, 1840; C. Haupt, *Orpheus, Homerus, Onomacritus; sive Theologia et Philosophia Initia apud Græcos*, *Gymn.-Progr.*, Königsberg in Neumark, 1844; J. A. Hartung, *Die Religion und Mythologie der Griechen*, Leips. 1865 (Hartung detects in Epimenides, the Cretan, and Onomacritus a confusion in matters of belief, due to the introduction of Egyptian, Phœnician, and Phrygian superstitions); P. R. Schuster, *De veteris Orphicæ theogoniæ indole atque origine, accedunt Hellanici theogoniæ Orphicæ*, Lipsiæ, 1869. On Pherecydes, cf. Friedr. Wilh. Sturz (Gera, 1769; 1796). Leips. 1824; L. Preller, *Die Theogonie des Ph. v. S. in the Rhoia. Mus. f. Philol.*, new series, Vol. IV., 1846, pp. 377-389, and in Preller's *Ausgew. Aufh.*, ed. by R. Köhler, Berlin, 1864, pp. 380-381; R. Zimmermann, *Ueber die Lehre des Ph. v. S. und ihr Verhältnis zu aussergriechischen Glaubenskreisen*, in Fichte's *Zeitschr. f. Philos.* Vol. 24. No. 2, 1854, and Joh. Conrad, *De Pherecydis Syri Aetate atque Cosmologia* (*Diss. Bonnensis*), Coblentz, 1856.—Karl Ditthey, *Griech. Fragmente* (Part I.: Fragments by the seven wise men, their contemporaries, and the Pythagoreans), Darmstadt, 1836; H. Wiskemann, *De Lacedæmoniorum Philosophia et Philosophia deique Septem quos dicunt Sapientibus, Læc. disceptata et instituta*, Hersfeld. 1840; Otto Bernhardt, *Die sieben Weisen Griechenlands*, *Gymn.-Progr.*, Bonn, 1864; Fr. Aemil. Bohren, *De Septem Sapientibus*, Bonn, 1867.

The Homeric poems seem to imply an earlier form of religious ideas, the gods of which were personified forces of nature, and they recall in occasional particulars (e. g. *Il.* VIII, 19 sq., myth of the *σείρη χρυσείη*) Oriental speculations; but all such elements in them are without exception clothed in an ethical form. Homer draws thoroughly ideal pictures of human life, and the influence which his poetry in its pure *naïveté* exercised on the Hellenes (as also the less elevated influence of the more reflective poetry of Hesiod), was essentially ethical and religious. But when this education had accomplished its work in sufficient measure, the moral and religious consciousness of the race, increasing in depth and finding the earlier stadium insufficient, advanced to a more rigorously polemic attitude, and even proscribed the ideal of the past as a false, misleading, and pernicious agency (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato). After this followed a species of reconciliation which lasted during several centuries before the final rupture, but rested in part only on the delusive basis of allegorical interpretation. Greek philosophy made incomparably greater advances in that earlier polemic period than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and Hesiod.

At a later time, when renewed speculation was again inclined to concede to the most ancient poetry the highest authority, the belief of earlier times, that the Homeric poetry was preceded by another of more speculative character, namely, the *Orphic*, found much credit. According to the primitive legend, Orpheus was the originator of the worship of Bacchus among the Thracians. Cosmogonic poems were early ascribed to him (by Onomacritus, the favorite of the Pisistratidae, and others). Herodotus says (*II.* 53): "Homer and Hesiod framed the theogony of the Hellenes; but the poets, who are believed to have lived before them, in my opinion, were their successors;" in *II.* 81 (cf. 123), Herodotus declares the so-called Orphic and Bacchic doctrines to be Egyptian and Pythagorean. Those Orphic cosmogonies of which we have most precise knowledge date from an epoch much later still, and arose under the influence of the later philosophy. It is, however, susceptible of sufficiently convincing demonstration, that one of the Cosmogonies originated in a comparatively early period. Damascius, the Neo-Platonist, relates (*De Princ.* p. 382), that Eudemus, the Peripatetic, an immediate disciple of Aristotle, reported the substance of an Orphic theogony, in which nothing was said of the intelligible, owing to its being utterly inexpressible—so Damascius explains it from his stand-point—but the beginning was made with Night. We may certainly assume that Aristotle also was acquainted with this theogony (cf. also *Plat. Tim.*, p. 40 e). Now Aristotle says, *Metaph.*, XIV. 4, that the ancient poets and the latest (philosophical) *θεολόγοι* represented (pantheistically) what is highest and best as being not first, but second or subsequent in order of time, and resulting from a gradual development; while those, who (in point of time and in their modes of thought and expression) stood between the poets and the philosophers (*οἱ μεμνημένοι αὐτῶν*), like Pherecydes, who no longer employed exclusively the language of mythology, and the magi and some Greek philosophers, regarded (theistically) that which is most perfect, as first in order of time. What "ancient" poets (*ἀρχαῖοι ποιηταί*, whose time, for the rest, may reach down, in the case of some of them, into the sixth century B. C.) are here meant, Aristotle indicates only by designating their principles: *οἶον Νύκτα καὶ Οὐρανὸν ἢ Χάος ἢ Ὀκεανόν*. Of these *Χάος* is undoubtedly to be referred to Hesiod (*πάντων μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος κ. τ. λ. Theog. V.* 116 sq.; *ἐκ Χάος δ' Ἐρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νῦξ ἐγένοντο*, *ib.* 123), *Ὀκεανός* to Homer (*Ὀκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσσι καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, Il. XIV.* 201; *Il. XIV.* 240: *Ὀκεανός, ὡς περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτταται*), and *Νῦξ καὶ Οὐρανός*, therefore, to some other well-known theogony, and in all probability to the same Orphic theogony which was described by Eudemus; and in this case this theogony must have arisen, at the latest, in the sixth century before

Christ, since Aristotle reckons its author among the "ancient poets" (*ποιηταὶ ἀρχαῖοι*). But this theogony, and indeed all the theogonies, to which the Aristotelian testimony assigns a comparatively high antiquity, agree substantially, according to the same authority, with the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod in their religious conceptions. Zeus appears as the eternal ruler of all and as the soul of the world, in the following verse, which is, most likely, the *παλαιὸς λόγος* to which Plato refers in *Leg.*, IV. 715 e:—

Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται.

Pherecydes, of the island of Syros (about 600–550 B. C.), wrote a theogony in prose, which is cited under the title of *Ἐπτάμυχος*, probably from the folds (*μυχαῖς*) of his *κόσμος*. Diogenes Laërtius cites, as follows, the opening words of this work (I. 119): *Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος εἰς αἰὲ καὶ Χθὼν ἦν. Χθονὶ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας ἔδωκε*.

The cosmologist, Epimenides, who was nearly contemporary with Pherecydes, describes the world as coming forth from night and air, and belongs consequently to those whom Aristotle designates as *ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες θεολόγοι*. Acusilaus made Chaos first, Erebus and Night being its children. Hermotimus of Clazomenae appears to have been one of the theistical cosmologists (see below, § 24).

The so-called "Seven Wise Men," Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon; Cleomenes, Myson (or, according to others, Periander), and Chilon (Anacharsis, Epimenides, and others are also named), with the sayings attributed to them (Thales: "Know Thyself," or, "What is difficult? To know one's self; and what is easy? To advise another;" Solon: "Hold the beautiful and good more sacred than an oath;" "Speak not falsely;" "Practice diligently things excellent;" "Be slow in acquiring friends, but those thou hast taken, do not cast off;" "Learn to command by first learning to obey;" "Let thy advice be not what is most agreeable, but what is most honorable;" "Nothing in excess;" Bias: "The possession of power will bring out the man," cited by Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, V. 3, and "The most are bad," etc.; Anacharsis: "Rule thy tongue, thy belly, thy sexual desires," etc.), are representatives of a practical wisdom, which is not yet sufficiently reflective to be called philosophy, but which may pave the way for the philosophical inquiry after ethical principles. In the Platonic dialogue *Protagoras* (p. 343), the "Seven Wise Men" are spoken of as exponents of Lacedæmonian culture expressing itself in moral maxims. The Aristotelian Dicaearch (*ap. Diog. Laërt.*, I. 40) terms these men, with reason, "neither sages nor philosophers, but rather men of broad common sense, and lawgivers (*οἷτε σοφοὺς οἷτε φιλοσόφους. συνετοὺς δὲ τινὰς καὶ νομοθετικοὺς*). Thales, who is occasionally mentioned as the wisest of the seven sages, was at once an astronomer and the founder of the Ionic Natural Philosophy.

§ 9. The Periods of Development of Greek (and its derivative, Roman) philosophy may be characterized, in respect of the *object* of inquiry in each, as follows: 1st Period: Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward the universe of nature, or predominance of Cosmology (from Thales to Anaxagoras and the Atomists); 2d Period: Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward man, as a willing and thinking being, or predominance of Ethics and Logic—accompanied, however, by the gradual resumption and a growing encouragement of natural philosophy (from the Sophists to the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics); 3d Period: Prevailing direction of philosophical

inquiry to the subject of the divine nature and the relation of the world and man to it, or predominance of Theosophy, but not excluding physics, ethics, and logic (from Neo-Pythagoreanism till the exit of ancient philosophy in the Neo-Platonic school). As to the *form* of philosophy in the successive periods, the first period was characterized, in the main, by the immediate direction of thought to things, though not without some attempts at mathematical and dialectical demonstration; the second, by the introduction of the Definition as an organ of inquiry, and the third by the prevalence of the idea of mystical absorption in the Absolute. The germs of the peculiar content and also of the form of philosophy in each of the later periods are discernible partly at the culmination and partly at the termination of the period in each case next preceding; the most eminent thinkers of the second (in most of its representatives, prevails anthropological) period rose nearest to a comprehensive philosophy. In the first period, the persons representing the same or similar types of philosophy were, as a rule (though by no means without exception), of the same race (the earliest natural philosophy having arisen and flourished among the Ionians, while Pythagoreanism found its adherents chiefly among the Dorians). But in the second period philosophical types became independent of race-distinctions, especially after the formation at Athens of a center of philosophical activity. The home of philosophy was now coextensive with the Hellenic world, including in the latter those nations subjected to the Macedonian or Roman supremacy, in which the Hellenic type of culture remained predominant. In the third period, the Hellenic mode of thought was blended with the Oriental and the representatives of philosophy (now become theosophy) were either Jews under Hellenic influence, Egyptians and other Orientals, or men Hellenic in race who were deeply impregnated with Orientalism.

Diogenes of Laërta (whose arrangement is based on an unintelligent and exaggerated use of the distinction of Ionic and Italic philosophy) repeats (II. 56) an observation, which had been made by others before him, and which is worthy of note, to the effect that the first *λόγος* of the Greek philosophers was physical, while Ethics was added by Socrates, and Dialectic by Plato.

Brucker follows substantially the arrangement of Diogenes Laërtius, but begins a new period with philosophy under the Romans. In this period he includes, beside the Roman philosophers, the renewers of earlier schools, especially the Neo-Pythagoreans and the so-called "Eclectic Sect" (so termed by him after Diog. Laërt., I. 21, where Potamo is spoken of as founder of an eclectic school), i. e. the Neo-Platonists, and also the later Peripatetics, Cynics, etc., and the Jewish, Arabian, and Christian philosophers down to the end of the

Middle Ages, the restoration of the sciences, and the commencement of modern philosophy.

Tennemann divides Greek and Roman philosophy into three periods: 1. From Thales to Socrates—beginning in fragmentary speculations concerning the external world; 2. From Socrates to the end of the contest between the Stoa and the Academy—in which period speculation was called off from nature and directed to the human mind as the source of all truth; 3. From philosophy under the Romans and the New Skepticism of Ænesidemus to John of Damascus—the period of the marriage of the Western with the Oriental mind, when men looked outside of the mind for the source of certitude and declined into syncretism and fanaticism.

Similarly, H. Ritter distinguishes three periods of philosophical development: Pre-Socratic Philosophy, the Socratic Schools (among which he includes the earlier Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics) and the Later Philosophy down to Neo-Platonism. The first period includes "the first awakening of the philosophic spirit," the second, "the most perfect bloom of philosophical systems," the third, "the downfall of Greek philosophy." More precisely, the first period is characterized, according to Ritter, by the *one-sided* scientific interest, from which in it philosophical inquiry departs, its variety of direction being determined by variety of race; the second, by the complete *systematic* division of philosophy (or at least "of that which the Greeks generally understood by philosophy") into its various branches, the different races no longer philosophizing each in its own way, but "this philosophy being brought forth, as it were, from the intellectual totality of the Greek nation;" the third, by the loss of the sense of the systematic order essential to Greek philosophy, although the tradition of it was preserved, and by the decadence of the peculiarity and vigor of the Greek mind, while scientific discipline was gradually covering a greater range of experiences and being extended to a greater number of men. Ritter's classification is based essentially on Schleiermacher's estimate of the philosophical significance of Socrates, namely, that Socrates, by his principle of *knowledge*, rendered possible the union of the previously isolated branches of philosophical inquiry in an all-embracing philosophical system, which union Plato was the first to realize. In accordance herewith, Schleiermacher divides Greek philosophy, in his *Lectures* edited by Ritter, into two periods, entitled "Pre-Socratic Philosophy," and "Philosophy from Socrates to the Neo-Platonists;" yet he sometimes himself subdivides the latter period into two periods, one of bloom, the other of decay.

Brandis agrees, on the whole, with Ritter in his appreciation of the development of Greek philosophy, yet with the not immaterial difference, that he transfers the Stoics and Epicureans and the Pyrrhonic and Academic Skeptics from the second period of development ("the time of manly maturity") to the third ("the period of decline").

Hegel distinguishes three periods: 1. From Thales to Aristotle; 2. Grecian philosophy in the Roman world; 3. The Neo-Platonic philosophy. The first period extends from the commencement of philosophizing thought till its development and perfection into a scientific whole and into the whole of science. In the second period philosophical science becomes split up into particular systems; each system is a theory of the universe founded entirely on a one-sided principle, a partial truth being carried to the extreme in opposition to its complementary truth and so expanded into a totality in itself (systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism, of whose dogmatism Skepticism constitutes the negative face). The third period is, with reference to the preceding one, the affirmative period, in which what was before opposed becomes now harmoniously united in a divine ideal world. Hegel distributes the first period into three sections: a. From Thales to Anaxagoras, or from abstract thought, as immediately determined by its (external) object,

to the idea of thought as determining itself; b. Sophists, Socrates, and disciples of Socrates—thought which determines itself, is apprehended as present, as concrete in me—principle of subjectivity; c. Plato and Aristotle—thought objective, the Idea, occupies the whole sphere of being (with Plato, only in the form of universality, but with Aristotle, as a fact confirmed in every sphere of real existence).

Zeller's first period extends from Thales to the Sophists, inclusive. The second includes Socrates and his incomplete disciples, Plato and the Old Academy, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics. All Post-Aristotelian philosophy is included in the third. In the first period all philosophy takes an immediately objective direction. In the second period the fundamental notion is that of the objectivity of ideas or of thought as *per se* existing, in which Socrates recognized the supreme end of subjective endeavor, Plato the absolute, or substantial reality, and Aristotle not simply the essence, but also the forming and moving principle of the empirically real. In the third period all independent speculation centers in the question of the truth of subjective thought and the manner of life calculated to bring subjective satisfaction; thought withdraws from the object-world into itself. Even Neo-Platonism, whose essential character is to be sought in the transcendent theosophy which it embodied and for which Skepticism prepared the way, furnishes, in Zeller's opinion, no exception to the subjective character of the third period, since its constant and all-controlling concern is the inward satisfaction of the subject.

No division can be regarded as truly satisfactory, in which reference is not had, so far as practicable, at once to the prevailing object, the form and the geographical localization of philosophy in the different periods.

FIRST (PREVAILINGLY COSMOLOGICAL) PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

PRE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ 10. The first period of Greek Philosophy includes, 1) the earlier Ionic Natural Philosophers, 2) the Pythagoreans, 3) the Eleatics, 4) the later Natural Philosophers. The Ionic "physiologists," predisposed thereto by their racial character as Ionians, directed their attention to the sphere of sensible phenomena and inquired after the material principle of things and the manner of their generation and decay; for them, matter was in itself living and psychically endowed. The Pythagoreans, whose doctrines flourished chiefly among the Greeks of Doric race, especially in Lower Italy, sought for a principle of things which should account at once for their form and substance, and found it in number and figure. The philosophy of the Eleatics turned on the unity and immutability of being. The later natural philosophers were led by the antithesis in which the Eleatic speculation stood to the

earlier natural philosophy, to attempt a mediation; to this end, they admitted, on the one hand, the Eleatic doctrine of the immutability of being, but affirmed, on the other, with the Pre-Eleatic philosophers, its plurality, and explained its apparent changes as due to the combination or severance of immutable, primitive elements. With the last representatives of natural philosophy and, especially, in the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the independent existence and world-disposing power of the divine mind (Νοῦς), the way was already being prepared for the transition to the following period.

Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum (of the time before Socrates), ed. Fr. Guil. Mullach, Paris, 1860, Vol. II., *ibid.* 1867.

H. Ritter, *Geschichte der Ionischen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1831. Chr. A. Brandis, *Ueber die Reihenfolge der Ionischen Physiologen*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, III. pp. 103 seq. Mallet, *Histoire de la Philosophie Ioniennne*, Paris, 1842. K. F. Hermann, *De Philosophorum Iontoorum Aetatibus*, Göttingen, 1849.

Ed. Röhrlach, *Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie*, 2d vol. (Greek Philosophy. The earliest Ionic thinkers and Pythagoras), Mannheim, 1833. 2d ed., 1862.

Aug. Gladisch, *Die Pythagoreer und die Schinesen*, Posen, 1841; *Die Eleaten und die Indier*, *ibid.* 1844; *Die Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Breslau, 1852; *Empedokles und die Aegyptier*, Leipzig, 1858; *Heraclitus und Zoroaster*, Leipzig, 1859; *Anaxagoras und die Ionier*, Leipzig, 1864; *Die Hyperboreer und die alten Schinesen, eine historische Untersuchung*, Leipzig, 1866.

Max Schneidewin, *Ueber die Keime erkenntnistheoretischer und ethischer Philosopheme bei den Vorsokratikern*. *Denkern (G.-Progr.)*, Arnstadt, 1868, and in Bergmann's *Philos. Monatshefte*, Vol. II., Berlin, 1869.

As a result of the peculiar cosmological principles adopted by the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Ethics appeared already in germ among the former and Dialectic among the latter. Yet the Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophies are scarcely, for that reason, to be termed (with Schleiermacher) respectively ethical and dialectical in their fundamental character. These philosophies are, rather, like the speculation of the Ionians, essentially *cosmological*, and their ethical and dialectical tendencies result only from the manner in which they seek to solve the cosmological problem. The Pythagoreans brought, not ethics, but only the mathematico-philosophical theory of nature under a *scientific* form, and the Eleatics produced no *theory* of dialectics.

In his work entitled *Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren* (Berlin, 1819, p. 40 sq.), Boeckh compares the different types of Greek philosophy in the first period with the characteristics of the races, in which the several types were developed, with the following result. In the materialistic view of the principles of things and of the manifold life and activity of the material elements, as held by the Ionic philosophers, Boeckh finds an expression of the sensuousness of the Ionians, of their attachment to the external, of their sensibility to external impressions, and of their lively, mobile disposition. The Doric character, on the contrary, was marked by that inward depth, from which springs vigorous action, and by a quiet but persistent adherence to fixed and almost indestructible forms. This character manifested itself in the tendency to ethical reflection and speculation—although the latter never rose to the form of a developed theory—and more especially in the circumstance, that the Doric thinkers sought to explain the nature of things, by adducing, not a material, but a formal principle, a principle which should account for their unity and order. Thus Pythagoras was said to be the first to call the world *Cosmos*, and, in conformity with the peculiarity of the Doric character, in conformity even with the spirit of

the government under which they lived, the philosophy of the Dorians assumed, externally, the form of a confederation or order. Philosophy, says Boeckh, from its sensuous beginning among the Ionians, passed through the intermediate stage of Pythagoreanism (mathematical intuition) to the non-sensuous doctrine of Plato, who had in the Eleatics able but too one-sided predecessors, and who, by the Socratic method of criticism, limiting and correcting not only the Eleatic philosophy, but also the other philosophies, the one by the other, evolved from them the most perfect system which the Hellenic mind was capable of producing. Boeckh draws the following parallel between the successive theories held in regard to the principles of things, and the degrees of the dialectical scale given by Plato (see below, § 41): the poetic-mythical symbols of the period previous to the existence of philosophy proper, correspond with *eikasia*, the Ionians investigate the realm of things sensible, the *αἰσθητά*, the Pythagoreans investigate the mathematical order of things, the *διανοητά*, and the Eleatics the purely spiritual, intelligible, the *νοητά*. The influence of Eleaticism on the doctrines of the later natural philosophers has been especially pointed out by Zeller (who, however, still separates Heraclitus from the earlier Ionians).

To what extent the philosophy of this period (and hence the genesis of Greek philosophy in general) was affected by Oriental influences, is a problem whose definite solution can only be anticipated as the result of the further progress of Oriental and, especially, of Egyptological investigations. It is certain, however, that the Greeks did not meet with fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals. The only question can be whether and in what measure Oriental religious ideas occasioned in the speculation of Grecian thinkers (especially on the subject of God and the human soul) a deviation from the national type of Hellenic culture and gave it its direction toward the invisible, the inexperimental, the transcendent (a movement which culminated in Pythagoreanism and Platonism). In later antiquity, Jews, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, and Christians unhistorically over-estimated the influence of the Orient in this regard. Modern criticism began early to set aside such estimates as exaggerated, and critics have manifested an increasing tendency to search for the explanation of the various philosophemes of the Greeks in the progressive, inner development of the Greek mind; but, in their care not to exaggerate the results of external influences, they have verged perhaps too near to the opposite extreme. The labors of Röth and Gladisch mark a reaction against this extreme, both of them again laying stress on the influence of the Orient. But Röth's combinations, which by their audacity are capable of bribing the imagination, involve too much that is quite arbitrary. Gladisch concerns himself, primarily, rather with the comparison of Greek philosophemes with Oriental religious doctrines, than with the demonstration of their genesis; so far as he expresses himself in regard to the latter, he does not affirm a direct transference of the Oriental element in the time of the first Greek philosophers, but only maintains that this element entered into Greek philosophy through the medium of the Greek religion; Oriental tradition, he argues, must have been received in a religious form by the Hellenes in very early antiquity, and so become blended with their intellectual life; the regeneration of the Hindu consciousness in the Eleatics, of the Chinese in the Pythagoreans, etc., was, however, proximately an outgrowth from the Hellenic character itself. But this theory has little value. It is much easier either for those who deny altogether that any essential influence was exerted on the Greek mind from the East, or for those who affirm, on the contrary, that such an influence was directly transmitted through the contact of the earlier Greek philosophers with Oriental nations, to explain the resemblance, so far as it exists, between the different Greek philosophies and various Oriental types of thought, than for Gladisch, from his stand-point, to explain the

separate reproduction of the latter in the former. For the ethical and anthropomorphic character impressed by the Greek poets upon the mythology of their nation was of such a character as to efface, not merely all traces of the influence of different Oriental nations in the religion of the Greeks, but all traces of Oriental origin whatsoever. The hypothesis of a direct reception of Chinese doctrines by Pythagoras, or of Hindu doctrines by Xenophanes, would indeed belong to the realm of the fanciful. But that Pythagoras, and perhaps also Empedocles, appropriated to themselves Egyptian doctrines and usages directly from Egypt, that possibly Anaxagoras, or perhaps even Hermotimus, his predecessor, came in contact with Jews, that Thales, as also, at a later epoch, Democritus, sought and found in Egypt or in Babylonia material for scientific theories, that Heraclitus was led to some of his speculations by a knowledge of Parseeism, and that therefore the later philosophers, so far as they join on to these, were indirectly (Plato also directly) affected in the shaping of their doctrines by Oriental influences, is quite conceivable, and some of these hypotheses have no slight degree of probability.

§ 11. The philosophy of the earlier Ionic physiologists is Hylozoism, i. e., the doctrine of the immediate unity of matter and life, according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is inseparably connected with matter.

This development-series includes, on the one hand, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, who sought mainly the material principle of things, and, on the other, Heraclitus, who laid the principal stress on the process of development or of origin and decay.

Rud. Seydel, *Der Fortschritt der Metaphysik unter den ältesten Ionischen Philosophen*, Leipz. 1861.

In justification of the inclusion of Heraclitus in this series, cf. below, §§ 15 and 22.

§ 12. Thales of Miletus, of Phenician descent and born in or about Olympiad 35 (640 B. C.), is distinguished by Aristotle as the originator of the Ionic Natural Philosophy (and hence indirectly also of Greek philosophy in general). The fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of nature is thus expressed: Water is the original source of all things.

The later philosopher, Hippo of Samos, or of Rhegium, a physicist of the time of Pericles, also saw in water, or the moist, the principle of all things.

Some of the earlier historians of philosophy—as Brucker, notably—treat very fully of Thales, but without the requisite degree of criticism. The opusculum of the Abbé de Canaye on Thales may be consulted in the *Mémoires de Littérature*, t. X., or in German, in Michael Hissman's *Magasin*, Vol. I, pp. 309–444; cf. further J. H. Müller (Altd. 1719), Döderlin (1750), Ploucquet (Tub. 1768), Harless (Erlang. 1790–84), Flatt (*De Thalesi Mileto abjudicando*, Tub. 1785), Geo. Fr. Daß. Goess (*Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie, und über das System des Thales*, Erlangen, 1794), and, recently, F. Decker (*De Thalesi Mileto*, Inaugural Diss., Halle, 1865); cf. also, besides Ritter, Brandis, Zeller, and other historians, Aug. Bernhard Krieger, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philos.*, I, pp. 24–28. It remained for the most recent investigators to return to the testimony of Aristotle, and measure later testimony by his.

On Hippo, cf. Schleiermacher (*Untersuchung über den Philosophen Hippon*, read in the Berlin Acad.

of Sciences on the 14th of Febr., 1890; published in Schleiermacher's *Sämmtliche Werke*, Abh. III, vol. 3, Berlin, 1835, pp. 408-410, and Wihl. Uhrig (*De Hippone Atheo*, Glessen, 1848).

For determining the time of Thales' life, a datum is furnished in the report that he predicted an eclipse of the sun, which took place in the reign of the Lydian king Alyattes (Herod., I. 74). The date of this eclipse, according to the supposition of Bailly (*Philosoph. Transactions*, 1811) and Oltmanns (*Abh. der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1812-13), is September 30, 610 B. C., but, according to Bosanquet, Hind, Airy (*Philos. Trans.*, vol. 143, p. 179 sq.), and Jul. Zech (*J. Zech's Astron. Untersuchungen über die wichtigeren Finsternisse, welche von den Schriftstellern des class. Alterthums erwähnt werden*, Leipsic, 1853), May 28, 585 B. C.* The latter date is defended by P. A. Hansen (*Darlegung der theoret. Berechnung der in den Mondtäfeln angewandten Störungen, zweite abhandlung*, in the 7th vol. of the *Abhandlungen der math.-phys. Cl. der K. Sächs. Ges. der Wiss.*, Leips. 1864, pp. 379 sq.). With it agrees also the supposition adopted, according to Diog. Laërt. (I. 22), by Demetrius Phalereus in his List of Archons (*ἀναγραφὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων*), that Thales was named σοφός, while Damasias was

* Zech and others write 584; but the year denoted in astronomical usage by this number is the same as that designated in the ordinary and approvable practice of historians as 585 B. C., i. e., the 585th year before the conventional point of departure of our chronology, which lies about $183\frac{1}{2}$ years before the day of the Emperor Augustus's death (Aug. 19, A. D. 14). Zech follows the custom introduced among astronomers by Jacob Cassini (cf. Ideler's *Handbuch der Chronologie*, p. 75, and *Lehrbuch*, p. 89 sq.) of designating every year before the birth of Christ by a number one less than the usual one. This mode of designation (which is in so far defensible, as according to it the 25th Dec. of the year $\pm a$ is removed by $\pm a$ years from the beginning of the era) is, it is true, convenient for the purposes of astronomical calculation, but deviates from historic usage, and is even itself in so far less appropriate, as it (not to mention how few days of the year fall after the 25th of December, which, as the presumptive birthday of Jesus, itself formed the point of departure in the new division of the years, according to the original and *in principle* unchanged intention) makes the year $+ 1$ the *first year after* the beginning of the Christian era, but the year $- 1$, the *second year before* the beginning of this era; in the former every day is distant 0 years and a fraction, but in the latter 1 year and a fraction from the commencement of our era. According to this astronomical usage, the year, near the end of which the birth of Jesus is placed, is numbered 0, the whole of it, with the exception of the last days of December, falling before the birth of Christ. According to this reckoning, the year $- a$ is the year after which, without counting that year itself, a years are counted till the birth of Christ; the year $+ a$ ought consistently to be the year, up to which, without counting that year, a years are reckoned from the same date; and there ought, therefore, to be a year 0 after Christ, which the astronomer is nevertheless as far as the historian from positing. The historical usage is perfectly consequent in making the year 1 after the birth of Christ follow immediately on the year 1 B. C. as the first year of the era; this usage we follow here without exception.

The above are the Julian dates. It is customary to extend backward the Julian Calendar and not the Gregorian, in reckoning ancient time. Yet the reduction of all historical dates to Gregorian dates affords the by no means unessential advantage of making the equinoxes and solstices in the earliest historical times fall in the same months and on the same days as now. The historian, at least (who, for the rest, always deviates from the practice of the astronomer in the indication of years and days), ought to give ancient dates according to the Gregorian Calendar. In order to make the reduction, the provisions which were made at the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (in 1582, when the 15th of October was made to follow immediately upon the 4th) for the future, and with reference to a portion of the past (viz.: that in every 400 years three intercalary days of the Julian Calendar should fall away, namely, in the years whose numbers are divisible by 100 and not by 400 without remainder), must be applied also to the earlier past. For the eclipse of Thales the Gregorian date, thus determined, is May 22, 585 B. C.

In like manner the Julian dates in § 89, § 61, etc., should be reduced to the Gregorian. From the Julian date for the years 601 to 601 B. C. 6 days are to be subtracted, from 501 to 501 B. C. 5 days, 401 to 401, 4 days, 301 to 301, 3 days, 201 B. C. to A. D. 100, 2 days, A. D. 100 to 200, 1 day. For the years A. D. 300 to 500, one day is to be added, 500 to 600, 2 days, etc. Yet it would be, perhaps, still better to carry out Mädler's proposal and modify the Gregorian Calendar throughout, so that at the end of every 125 years an intercalary day of the Julian Calendar should fall away. The advantage of this reform would be greater exactness in the demarcation of the seasons of the year, less uncertainty in the citation of early historical dates, and perhaps also a diminution of the difficulty of harmonising the Russo-Greek and occidental calendars.

Archon at Athens (586-5 B. C.). Apollodorus, in his *Chronicle* (according to Diog. Laërt., I. 37), places his birth in Olympiad 35. 1 (640-639 B. C.).

It is possible that Thales had learned of the Saros, i. e. the period of the eclipses, discovered after prolonged observation by the Chaldeans, and covering 233 synodic months, or 6585½ days, or that he even knew of the greater period of 600 years. Yet on the basis of this Saros, eclipses of the moon only, and not eclipses of the sun, could be foreknown with a sufficient degree of probability, for any determinate locality, and the prediction ascribed to Thales is therefore probably only a legend, which arose perhaps from his scientific explanation of the eclipse of the sun after it had taken place. Cf. Henri Martin, *Sur quelques prédictions d'éclipses mentionnées par des auteurs anciens*, in the *Revue Archéologique*, IX., 1864, pp. 170-199.

Thales belonged (according to Diog. L., I. 22) to the family of the Thelides (ἐκ τῶν θηλιδῶν), whose ancestor was Cadmus the Phœnician, and who emigrated (according to Herod., I. 146) from Thebes to Ionia. Thales distinguished himself not only in the region of scientific investigation, but also in political affairs; he is reported, in particular, to have dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus (Herod., I. 75; 170; Diog. L., I. 25). The writings which were in later times attributed to Thales (ναυτικὴ ἀστρολογία and others), had (according to Diog. L., I. 23) already been declared spurious by some in antiquity. Aristotle speaks, probably, only from the reports of others, of his fundamental philosophical doctrine, and only conjecturally of the argumentation by which he supported it.

Aristotle says, *Metaph.*, I. 3: "Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed only material principles or elements, Thales, the originator of such philosophy (Θαλῆς ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας), taking water for his principle. He was led to this, probably, by the observation, that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated by moisture, and living beings live by it;—but that by which any thing is generated is its principle;—further, by the observation that the seed of all things is naturally moist; but the principle, in virtue of which the moist is moist, is water." In the same place and in *De Caelo*, II. 13, Aristotle reports that Thales represented the earth as floating on the water. It is possible that the geognostic observations (as of sea-shells in mountains) also lay at the bottom of Thales' doctrine.

Arist., *De Anima*, I. 2: "According to Thales, the magnet is animated, because it attracts iron." *Ibid.* I. 5: "Thales believed that all things were filled with gods" (πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι). Aristotle does not in this place affirm that the doctrine had been professed by Thales, that "soul is mixed with all things," but only says conjecturally, that perhaps such a conception was the ground of his belief in the universal presence of the gods. Cicero's conception of the doctrine of Thales (*De Nat. Deorum*, I. 10) is unhistorical: "Thales Milesius aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret," for the Dualism here expressed, which stands in direct opposition to Hylozoism, belongs, according to the express testimony of Aristotle (*Metaph.*, I. 3), to none of the earlier physiologists, Anaxagoras (and Hermotimus) being the first dualists.

Thales is said to have first taught geometry in Hellas. Proclus says (*Ad Euclid.*, p. 19) that arithmetic arose among the Phœnicians and geometry among the Egyptians, and adds: Θαλῆς δὲ πρῶτον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἔλθων μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς εὗρε, πολλῶν δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ἐφηγήσατο, τοῖς μὲν καθολικώτερον ἐπιβάλλων, τοῖς δὲ αἰσθητικώτερον. Proclus attributes to him, in particular, four propositions (following, for Nos. 3 and 4, according to his express statement, and probably also for Nos. 1 and 2, the authority of Eudemus, an immediate pupil of Aristotle): 1. That the circle is halved by its diameter (*ib.* p. 44); 2. That the angles at the base of an isosceles

triangle are equal to each other (p. 67); 3. That the opposite angles formed by intersecting lines are equal to each other (p. 79); 4. That two triangles are congruent, when one side and two angles of the one are equal to the corresponding parts of the other (p. 92). The report (Plutarch., *Conviv. Septem Sap.*, c. 2), that he taught the Egyptian priests how to measure at any time the height of the pyramids by their shadows presupposes that he was acquainted with the theorem of the proportionality of the sides of similar triangles. According to Diog. L., I. 24 sq., the proposition, that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle, was by some attributed to Thales, by others to Pythagoras. On the beginnings of geometry among the Egyptians, cf. Herod., II. 109; Plat., *Phaedr.*, p. 274; Arist., *Metaph.*, I. 1, p. 981 b, 23; Strabo, XVII. 3 (ed. Mein.).

The reason, according to Aristotle, why philosophy begins with Thales, is that in his attempt to explain the world, a *scientific* tendency is first manifested, in opposition to the *mythical* form, which prevailed in the works of the ancient poets, and, to a great extent, in those of Pherecydes also. Still, many problems remained too comprehensive for the immediate attainment of a strictly scientific solution.

Of Hippo (who, according to a Scholion to Aristoph., *Nub.*, 96,—cited by Th. Bergk, *Comm. de Reliquiis Comoediæ Att.*, Leips. 1838—was ridiculed by Cratinus in the *πανόπται*) Aristotle speaks seldom and not with praise. He calls him a very ordinary man (*σοφιστικώτερον*, *De Anima*, I. 2), and says that on account of his shallowness (*διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας*) he can scarcely be reckoned among the philosophers (*Metaph.*, I. 3).

§ 13. Anaximander of Miletus, born Olymp. 42.2 (= 611 B. C.), first, among the Greeks, composed a work "on Nature." He teaches: "All things must in equity again decline into that whence they have their origin; for they must give satisfaction and atonement for injustice, each in the order of time." Anaximander first expressly gave to the assumed original material substance of things the name of *principle* (*ἀρχή*). As such principle he posits a matter, undetermined in quality (and infinite in quantity), the *ἄπειρον*. From it the elementary contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, are first separated, in such manner that homogeneous elements are brought together. Through an eternal motion, there arise, as condensations of air, innumerable worlds, heavenly divinities, in the center of which rests the earth, a cylinder in form and unmoved on account of its equal remoteness from all points in the celestial sphere. The earth, according to Anaximander, has been evolved from an originally fluid state. Living beings arose by gradual development out of the elementary moisture, under the influence of heat. Land animals had, in the beginning, the form of fishes, and only with the drying up of the surface of the earth did they acquire their present form. Anaximander is said to have described the soul as *aëiform*.

Schleiermacher, *Ueber Anaximandros* (read in the Berlin Acad. of Sciences, Nov. 11, 1811), in the *Abh. der philos.* Cl., Berlin, 1816, and in Vol. II. of the 3d Div. of the *Complete Works of S.*, Berlin, 1838, pp. 171-236. Cf., besides the essay by the Abbé de Canaye (German in Hissmann's *Magazin*), Kriese's *Forschungen*, I, pp. 42-52, and Büngen, *Ueber das äneiper Anaximanders* (G. Pr.), Wiesbaden, 1867.

For determining the time of Anaximander's birth we have only the statement of Apollodorus to rest upon, who says (Diog. Laërt., II. 2), that in the second year of the 58th Olymp. (547-546 B. C.) Anaximander was 64 years old; according to this, he must have been born in Ol. 42.2 (611-610 B. C.). He occupied himself with astronomy and geography, made a geographical map (according to Eratosthenes, *ap.* Strabo, I. p. 7) and also an astronomical globe (*σφαῖρα*, Diog. L., II. 2), and invented the sun-dial (*γυόμενον*, Diog. L., II. 1), or rather, since this instrument was already in use among the Babylonians (Herod., II. 109), made it known to the Greeks and, in particular, introduced it into Lacedæmon. From a work of his, the following sentence (probably changed into the *oratio obliqua* by the narrator) is preserved (*ap.* Simplicius, *In Arist. Phys.*, fol. 6 a): ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτά γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεὼν δίδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ τίσιν καὶ δικρὴν τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. (Definite individual existence, as such, is represented as an *ἀδικία*, injustice, which must be atoned for by extinction.)

With the *ἄπειρον*, or "Infinite," of Anaximander are connected several disputed questions. The most important is, whether the *ἄπειρον* is to be understood as a *mixture* of all distinct elementary substances, from which the various individual things were mechanically sifted out (Ritter's view), or, as a simple and qualitatively indeterminate matter, in which the different material elements were contained only potentially (as Herbart and the majority of recent historians suppose). The Aristotelian references, taken by themselves, might seem to conduct to the former conclusion. Aristotle says, *Phys.*, I. 4: οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνοήσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι (λέγουσιν), ὥστερ' Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι καὶ οἱ δ' ἐν καὶ πολλὰ φασιν εἶναι, ὥστερ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας. The doctrine with which this is set in contrast, is (that of Anaximenes and other natural philosophers), that the manifold world of things was formed from the one original substance by condensation and rarefaction (*Arist. Metaph.*, XII. 2: καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἐν . . . καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρου). In *Metaph.*, I. 8 (§§ 19 and 20, *ed.* Schw.), Aristotle seems to attribute the theory of an *ἀόριστον*, or an indefinite, unqualified first substance, only to later, Post-Anaxagorean philosophers (with special reference to the Platonists). But the statement of Theophrastus, reported by Simplicius (*Arist. Phys.*, fol. 33), that, provided the mixture asserted by Anaxagoras be conceived as one substance, undetermined in kind and quantity, it forms an *ἄπειρον* like that of Anaximander (εἰ δέ τις τὴν μίξιν τῶν πάντων ὑπολάβοι μίαν εἶναι φύσιν ἀόριστον καὶ κατ' εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος,—φαίνεται τὰ σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα παραπληρώως ποιεῖν Ἀναξίμανδρῳ), is decidedly favorable to the second view. And this view alone accords with the logical consequence of the system. For the first would require, in addition to the mixture, a *νοῦς*, or controlling mind, which yet Anaximander does not assume; unmistakable witness is borne to his Hylozoism by Aristotle, in *Phys.*, III. 4, according to which passage he taught of the *ἄπειρον*, that itself was the Divine, and that it embraced and governed all things. It is probable that Anaximander expressed himself with as little distinctness respecting the nature of his *ἄπειρον* as did Hesiod respecting his Chaos, and that this accounts for the uncertainty in the statements of the different authorities.

A second question in dispute is whether or not the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander is a substance intermediate between air and water, as the ancient commentators of Aristotle supposed it to be. Aristotle says (*De Cælo*, III. 5), that all those who assume such a substance, represent things as having arisen from it by condensation and rarefaction; but he denies of Anaximander that he taught this process of evolution (*Phys.*, I. 4); hence he can not have regarded the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander as such an intermediate substance, and all the less so, if, as shown by the above citation, he supposed it to be only a mixture (*μῖγμα*). Who they are, that assumed a substance intermediate between air and water, and also who are meant by those who, according to *Phys.*, I. 4, assumed one intermediate between fire and

air, is unknown; but probably Zeller is right in referring the latter assumption to later physiologists, whose doctrine had grown out of that of Anaximenes, or perhaps out of that of Anaximander and of Empedocles.

§ 14. Anaximenes of Miletus, younger than Anaximander, and perhaps also one of his personal disciples, posits air as the first principle, and represents fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth as produced from it by condensation (*πύκνωσις*) and rarefaction (*μάνωσις* or *ἀραίωσις*). The earth, which is flat and round like a plate, is supported by the air. "As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so breath and air encompass the universe."

Diogenes of Apollonia, who lived in the fifth century before Christ, also sees in air the original essence and immanent ground of all things. So also Idæus of Himera.

Besides the historians of philosophy, Krische (*Forschungen*, I. pp. 52-57) treats especially of Anaximenes.

Schleiermacher, *Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia* (read in the Berlin Academy of Sciences, January 29, 1811), in the *Abh. der ph. Cl.*, Berl. 1814; reprinted in Schleiermacher's *Werke*, *Abth.* III. vol. 2, Berlin, 1838, pp. 149-170. F. Panzerbieter, *De Diogenis A. Vita et Scriptis*, Meiningen, 1923; *Diogenes Apolloniatæ*, Leipzig, 1830. Cf. Krische, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 168-177.

The birth of Anaximenes is placed by Apollodorus (Diog. Laërt., II. 2) in the 63d Olympiad (528-524 B. C.). Yet perhaps here the time of his birth has been confounded with the time when he flourished or with the year of his death. According to Suidas, he was living in the 55th Olympiad, in the time of Cyrus and Croesus. Diog. L. terms him (*ibid.*) a pupil of Anaximander. The dialect of his work was (according to the same *locus*) the pure Ionic.

Aristotle testifies (*Metaph.*, I. 3): "Anaximenes and Diogenes hold the air to be prior to water, and place it before all other simple bodies as their first principle." But this air, without detriment to its materiality, Anaximenes conceived, conformably to his hylozoistic stand-point, as animated. From the work composed by Anaximenes the following sentence is preserved (by Stobæus, *Ecl. Phys.*, p. 296): *ὅλον ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὐσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει*. It is not probable that Anaximenes discriminated fire from this animated air as something different and finer. On the contrary, he appears to have identified fire with the finest air, as was universally customary before Empedocles, as Heraclitus, in particular, explicitly conceives their relation, and as Diogenes of Apollonia, who followed Anaximenes in his speculation, did; then *πύκνωσις*, or condensation, was the first, and *ἀραίωσις*, rarefaction, the second process which it underwent. Anaximenes, according to the unanimous testimony of post-Aristotelian authorities, conceived this air as *infinite* in extent, so that we must include him among those referred to in Arist., *Phys.*, III. 4 (*ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ φυσιολόγοι, τὸ ἐξω σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου, οὐ ἡ οὐσία ἢ ἀὴρ ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ἀπειρον εἶναι*). Anaximenes taught that all things arose from air through condensation and rarefaction, which mode of origin he seems, according to Theophrastus (in Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 32), to have been the first to suggest; when Aristotle (*Phys.*, I. 4; *De Cælo*, III. 5) ascribes it also to those physiologists who assume, as a first principle, water or fire, or something between fire and air, or between water and air, it is probable that, beside Heraclitus, he has especially in view later philosophers; no

work by Thales was accessible to him, and it is hardly possible that any thing was known to him from any other source of such a doctrine as having been held by Thales. Anaximenes is in advance of his predecessors, partly in his doctrine of condensation and rarefaction, and partly because he chose for his principle, not a substance still imperfect and undeveloped, but that one which, as being the finest, might most naturally pass for the highest,—in which direction Heraclitus, in naming that substance fire, went still another step further.

We know nothing of Idæus of Himera, except from a passage of Sext. Empir. (*Adv. Math.*, IX. 360), in which he is associated with Anaximenes and Diogenes.

Of the work of Diogenes of Apollonia (in Crete,—a contemporary of Anaxagoras, *Diog. L.*, IX. 57) there exist a number of fragments, which Panzerbieter has collected together. The doctrine of Diogenes is apparently to be understood as an attempt to defend the stand-point of hylozoism in opposition to the dualism of Anaxagoras, and at the same time to render the doctrine of hylozoism more perfect in itself. When Diogenes declares air to be the finest of substances, and yet represents other substances as arising from it by condensation and rarefaction, it is obvious that this can not mean that the original air is rarefied, but only that the formative process in general depends on condensation and rarefaction, so that the former must have preceded the latter, just as, with Heraclitus, the "downward way" (*ὁδὸς κάτω*) goes before the "upward way" (*ὁδὸς ἄνω*). The proof of the unity of substance, Diogenes finds in the fact of the assimilation of the substances of the earth by plants, and of the vegetable substances by animals (*Simplic. Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 32 b).

§ 15. Heraclitus of Ephesus was probably younger than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, whom he names and combats, but older than Parmenides, who on his part makes reference to Heraclitus, and seems to have arrived at his own metaphysical principle while arguing against him. Through his doctrine of fire as the fundamental form of existence and his doctrine of the constant flux of all things, Heraclitus gives the most direct expression to the notion involved in the Ionic philosophy generally, the notion of a constant process, of the original, animated substance. Heraclitus assumes, as the substantial principle of things, ethereal fire, which he at once identifies with the divine Spirit, who knows and directs all things. The process of things is twofold, involving the transformation of all things into fire and then of fire into all other things. The latter movement is styled the "way downward," which leads from fire (identical with the finest air) to water, earth, and so to death; the former movement is the "way upward" from earth and water to fire and life. Both movements are everywhere intertwined with each other. All is identical and not identical. We step down a second time into the same stream and yet not into the same. All things flow. Finite things arise through strife and enmity out of the divine original fire, to which, on the contrary, harmony and peace lead back. Thus the Deity builds

the world innumerable times in sport, and causes it at the determined period to disappear again in fire, that he may build it anew.

Cratylus, the disciple of Heraclitus, and Plato's teacher at Athens, carried the views of Heraclitus concerning the flux of all things to the extreme.

The work of Heraclitus, on which numerous commentaries were written by the Stoics, and which was also, in the second and third centuries after Christ, much read by Christians, until it became suspected by the latter on account of its apparently favoring the Noëtian heresy, is now extant only in fragments. The "Letters of Heraclitus" are spurious.

Heracliti Epistolae quas feruntur, ed. Ant. Westermann, Lipsic, 1857 ("University Programme").

Schleiermacher, *Heraclitus, der Dunkle von Ephesus, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes, und den Zeugnissen der Alten*, in Wolf and Buttmann's *Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft*, Vol. I., 1837, pp. 513-533, and in Schleierm., *Sämmtl. Werke*, Abth. III., Vol. 2, Berlin, 1838, pp. 1-146. Cf. Th. L. Bachhoff, *Die Her.*, Mayence, 1894.

Jak. Bernays, *Heraclitus*, Bonn, 1843. *Heraclitische Studien*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, new series, VII. pp. 90-114, 1850; *Neue Bruchstücke des Heraklit*, *ibid.* IX. pp. 241-280, 1854; *Die Heraklitischen Briefe*, Berlin, 1868.

Ferd. Lassalle, *Die Philosophie Heraklitos des Dunkeln von Ephesus*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1858. (The most thorough monograph on the subject, but the author is at times too much given to Hegellianizing. Lassalle follows Hegel in styling the doctrine of Heraclitus "the philosophy of the logical law of the identity of contradictories.") Cf., in reference to Lassalle's work, Raffaele Mariano, *Lassalle e il suo Heraklio Sagitto di filosofia ephesiana*, Florence, 1865.)

A. Gladisch, *Heraclitus und Zoroaster*, Lipsic, 1859; cf. his essays "Über Aussprüche des Herakl.," in the *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1846, No. 121 sq. and 1847, 26 sq. Rüttig, *Ueber einen Ausspruch Heraklitos bei Plat. Conviv.* 187, *Ind. lect.*, Berne, 1865.

Heraclitus was a descendant of a noble Ephesian family. The rights of a βασιλεύς (king of sacrifices), which were hereditary in the family of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus and descendant of Codrus, he is reported to have resigned in favor of his younger brother. By the banishment of his friend Hermodorus, his aristocratic feeling was intensified into the bitterest hatred of the Demos. (On Hermodorus, cf. Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio et de Hermodoro Platonis discipulo*, Marb. 1859.) Heraclitus also expressed himself sharply respecting thinkers and poets whose opinions differed from his own, so far as he found them distinguished rather for multifarious knowledge than for rational discernment and ability to comprehend the all-directing reason. Thus he says (*ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 1): πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει (or οἶσι? as we read in Procl., *In Plat. Tim.*, p. 31). 'Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἀν' ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αἰθίς τε Ζενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταίον. His blame extended even to Homer: "'Homer,' he said, 'ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.'" It is, nevertheless, quite possible that those whom he censures exercised an essential influence on his opinions; at least, Heraclitus agreed with Xenophanes in the hypothesis that the stars were aerial phenomena, constantly being reproduced, and we might (as Susemihl remarks) suppose the Heraclitean doctrine of the world and of the fire-spirit related to the doctrine of Xenophanes, distinguishing the world, as something manifold and changeable, from the one immutable God: still the theological doctrines of these philosophers are very unlike, and their points of contact in natural philosophy are few. The surname of Heraclitus, ὁ σκοτεινός, "the Obscure," is found first in the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* (c. 5). Yet we find already in the third book of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* (c. 5) an intimation that the syntactical relation of words in Heraclitus was not always easy to determine, and Timon, the Sillograph (about 240 B. C.), terms him "a riddler" (αἰνυγής). Socrates is reported to have said, that it needed a Delian (excellent) diver to sound the meaning of his work. Heraclitus flourished, accord-

ing to Diog. L., IX. 1 (Diog. probably follows Apollodorus), in the 69th Olympiad (504–500 B. C.), or, according to another account (given by Eusebius, *Chron.*, ad Ol. 80.2 and 81.2), in Olymp. 80 or 81; with this latter account agrees, far better than with the former, the apparently trustworthy report (*ap.* Strabo, XIV. 1, 25; cf. Plin., *Hist. Natur.*, XXXIV. 5, 21), that Hermodorus of Ephesus, the friend of Heraclitus, assisted the Roman Decemvirs in their legislation (about Olymp. 82.1). Epicharmus (whose life falls between 556 and 460 B. C., according to Leop. Schmidt, *Quaest. Epicharm.*, Bonn, 1846) notices his doctrine. That Parmenides combats his ideas, and in doing so alludes clearly to specific propositions and words of Heraclitus (in particular, to his doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and of the ebbing and flowing harmony of the world, which Heraclitus compares to the form and motion of the bow and the lyre) has been shown by Steinhart (*Allg. Litt. Ztg.*, Halle, 1845, p. 892 sq., *Plat. Werke*, III., p. 394) and Jak. Bernays (*Rhein. Museum*, VII., p. 114 sq.), though Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.*, I., 2d ed., p. 495, 3d ed., p. 548 sq.) disputes this.

In view of these historical circumstances, the supposition is shown to be improbable, which has been held by some modern investigators, that the doctrine of Heraclitus originated in the endeavor to unite the members of the antithesis: *being* and *non-being*, which had been sharply distinguished and separated by the Eleatics (first by Parmenides). It can not be said with truth that the primary conception and the starting-point in the philosophy of Heraclitus was the abstract notion of *becoming*, as the unity of being and non-being, and that this notion was then only embodied in the concreter form of a physical conception or dogma. Heraclitus is from first to last a hylozoist, fire and soul are for him identical, the dry soul is the best, the moistened soul of the drunken is unwise. Having been first incited by Anaximenes, he then developed his doctrine independently. It is only correct to say that he attaches greater weight to the process of things than his predecessors had done, as would be natural, considering the nature of the element which he regarded as the principle of being. The advance of Parmenides to the conception of being, first made it possible to extract the conception of becoming from the Heraclitean notion of the flux of things or the transformations of fire. This abstraction is a mental achievement which was first accomplished, not by Heraclitus himself, but by Parmenides and Plato, in the critique of his opinions. (For this reason Heraclitus, although younger than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, must be considered in connection with the earlier Ionic natural philosophers, and that as the thinker who gave to the tendency of their school its most perfect expression.) Aristotle, in his historical survey of the course of development in the earlier Greek philosophy (*Metaph.*, I. 3 sq.), simply places Heraclitus among the earlier Ionians, without even noticing the actual diversity in stand-points; for, after speaking of the principles of Thales and of Anaximenes and Diogenes, he proceeds: *Ἰππασος δὲ πρῶτος ὁ Μεταποντινὸς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος*. The triad: fire (including air), water, earth, corresponds with the three "aggregate states" of matter (as they are now called): Empedocles (see below), separating air more distinctly from fire, first arrived at the distinction of the four so-called elements.

Plato (or rather some Platonist) says (*Soph.*, p. 242), after speaking of some of the earlier Ionians and of the Eleatics: *Ἰάδεος δὲ καὶ Σκελῆ καὶ τινες ἄλλοι ποιοῦσαι*. By this he must mean either that the Sicilian doctrine, i. e., the doctrine of Empedocles, was later than the Ionic, i. e., than that of Heraclitus, or (what is less probable) that both were later than the Eleatic; but in the latter case he could probably only mean: later than Xenophanes' doctrine of unity.

The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses and of their leaders the poets, probably had principal reference (aside from their political differences) to the popular mythology. The multitude know nothing of the one all-controlling divine fire-spirit. (*Ἐν τῷ*

οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ἥτε οἱ ἐγκυβερνήσαι [ἥτε οἷα κυβερνᾷ ἀεὶ? ἥτε οἰακίξει? κραδαίνει?] πάντα διὰ πάντων.) Of this γνώμη, this eternal reason, the mass of men are ignorant (τοῖς λόγοις τοῦδ', ἐόντος ἀεὶ, ἀξίνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται). Out of the primitive substance, which Heraclitus (in what is certainly a noticeable coincidence with Parsee conceptions, to which Gladisch is right in directing attention) conceives as the purest fire or light, and also as the Good, he represents individual objects as coming forth through the influence of strife or combat (which Homer, therefore, was wrong in wishing to see brought to an end). Thus with him is (Plut., *Is. et Os.*, 48) πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων, "strife the father of all things;" the world is the dispersed deity, the ἐν διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, but which, like the elastic frame of the bow and the lyre, in going apart comes together again (Plat., *Sympos.*, 187 a; cf. *Soph.*, 242 e). The universe is the elemental fire itself, which is now extinguished and now kindled again (Clem., *Str.*, V. 599: κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεῖζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρῳ καὶ ἀκωσβεννύμενον μέτρῳ). The double process of the (relative) materialization of the fire-spirit, and the re-spiritualization of earth and water, is constantly going on (πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός), water and earth are πυρὸς τροπαί, modes of fire; fire passes over into them in the ὁδὸς κάτω, or "downward way," and they pass over into fire in the ὁδὸς ἄνω, the "upward way," but both ways are inseparable: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μίη. The priests of Ormuzd (as Gladisch remarks) are actively on the side of the good principle, in the contest waged between good and evil; but Heraclitus, as a thinker, is controlled by a theoretical interest, that of discerning the ground of their antagonism, and this he finds in the παλιντροπία, the ἐναντία ποῆ (Plat., *Crat.*, 413 e, 420 a), the ἐναντιοτροπή (Diog. L., IX. 7), or ἐναντιοτρόμια (Stob., *Eclog.*, I. 60) of things, the γίνεσθαι πάντα κατ' ἐναντιότητα, and says: παλιντροπος ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου (Plut., *Is. et Os.*, 5); cf. Arist., *Eth. N.* VIII. 2: Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι. In other words, it is a law of the universe that in every thing contraries are united, as life and death, waking and sleeping, youth and old age, and each contrary passes into its opposite. Unexpected things await man after death. Sext. Emp., *Pyrh. Hypotyp.*, III. 230: ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνήσκει καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκωμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν, "while we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls are restored to life." When the power of peace and unity prevails in the All, all finite objects resolve themselves into pure fire, which is the Deity; but they come forth from it anew through variance. Schleiermacher (whom Ritter, Brandis, Bernays, and Zeller contradict in this point, while Lassalle agrees with him) was probably wrong in doubting that the doctrine of the periodical dissolution of the world in fire (ἐκπύρωσις) was held already by Heraclitus (and borrowed from him by the Stoics); Aristotle ascribes it to him (*Meteorol.*, I. 14, *De Coelo*, I. 10, *Phys.*, III. 5; cf. *Metaph.*, XI. 10: Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ἅπαντα γίνεσθαι ποτε πῦρ), and it is contained in the more recently discovered fragment in Hippolytus, IX. 10: πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρεῖναι καὶ καταλίσσεται.

In view of the dictum of Heraclitus, "all things flow," Plato (*Theaet.*, 181 a; cf. *Crat.*, p. 402 a: ὅτε πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει) terms the *Heracliteans* playfully τοὺς ῥέοντας, "the flowing," at the same time having in view and censuring their inconstant character, which rendered all serious philosophical discussion with them impossible. Cratylus, a teacher of Plato, went beyond Heraclitus, who had said that no one could step down twice into the same stream, by asserting that this was not possible even once (Arist., *Metaph.*, IV. 5),—an extreme, as the last logical consequence of which, Aristotle reports that Cratylus thought he ought to say nothing more, but simply moved his finger.

The changeable, which, for Heraclitus, is synonymous with the sum of all real things,

is reduced by Parmenides to sensuous appearance, and by Plato to the complex of individual objects subject to genesis and perceptible by the senses. But for the very reason that Heraclitus assumes no second province of reality, his cosmos is not identical with the mere world of the senses of later thinkers. Heraclitus does not distinguish from his cosmos the divine and eternal, as something separable from it. The λόγος or the eternal, all-embracing order (γνώμη, δίκη, εἰμαρμένη, τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ἐν καὶ φρονήσας, ὁ Ζεὺς) is, according to him, immanent, as the ξυνόν (κοινόν), or universal principle, in change itself, and he calls upon each individual to follow in his thought and action this universal reason (Heracl., *ap. Sext. Emp.*, VII. 133: διὸ δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἰόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. *Ap. Stob.*, *Serm.*, III. 84: ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν· ξὺν νόμῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὡς ὅσπερ νόμῳ πόδας καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπινον νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἑξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται). This is the same law with that which keeps the heavenly bodies in their courses; the sun, says Heraclitus, will not overstep its bounds, for, if it did, the Erinnyes, handmaids of δίκη, would find it again (*ap. Plut.*, *De Exilio*, 11). Without knowledge of the universal reason, the senses are untrustworthy witnesses. Mere abundance of knowledge profits nothing (Heracl., *ap. Sext. Emp.*, VII. 126: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὤτα βορβόρον ψυχὰς ἔχοντος [according to Bernays' conjecture, in place of the reading of the MSS.: βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων]; *ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 1: πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει; *ap. Procl.*, in *Tym.*, p. 31: πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ φέει). The rule for practical conduct is also contained in the law common to all, proximately in the law of the state, absolutely in the law of nature (Heracl., *ap. Clem. Alex.*, *Strom.*, IV. 478 b: δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ᾔδεσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν. *Ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 2: μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ νόμου ὅκως ὑπὲρ τείχους. *Ibid.*: ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννέειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν. *Ap. Stobaeus*, *Serm.*, III. 84: σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μέγιστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀλφειά λέγεται καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας).

The doctrine of Heraclitus may be termed monistic, inasmuch as it represents the eternal reason as immanent in the world of individuality and change; and hylozoistic, inasmuch as it conceives all matter to be animated. Plato ascribes to the ideal an independent existence, separate from the sensible. Aristotle combats this Platonic χωρισμός and affirms the immanence of the universal in the individual, of the ideal in the sensible; yet he too recognizes for mind (νοῦς) an existence apart from all matter. The Stoics, in their philosophy of nature and in their theology, reproduced the doctrine of Heraclitus,—in which also their ethics, notwithstanding its essentially Socratic and Cynic origin, found various points of union.

§ 16. Pythagoras of Samos, the son of Mnesarchus, was born about Ol. 49.3 = 582 B. C. According to some accounts he was a pupil of Pherecydes and Anaximander and acquainted with the doctrines of the Egyptian priests. At Crotona, in Lower Italy, where he settled in Ol. 62.4 = 529 B. C., he founded a society, whose aims and character were at once political, philosophical, and religious. All that can be traced back with certainty to Pythagoras himself is the doctrine of metempsychosis and the institution of certain religious and ethical regulations, and perhaps also the commencement of that mathematico-theological form of speculation, which was subsequently carried to a high degree of development.

Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, passes for the first Pythagorean who made public (in a written work) the philosophical system of the school. Of this work considerable fragments are still extant; yet it is very doubtful whether the work is genuine or a counterfeit, dating at the latest from the last century before Christ, and only possessing a certain importance as an authority in regard to ancient Pythagoreanism, from its having been partially founded on earlier authorities.

Of the earlier Pythagoreans, the most celebrated, beside Philolaus, were his disciples Siminnias and Cebes (who, according to Plato's Phædo, were friends of Socrates), Ocellus the Lucanian, Timæus of Locri, Echecrates and Acrio, Archytas of Tarentum, Lysis, and Eurytus. Alcmæon of Crotona (a younger contemporary of Pythagoras), who held with the Pythagoreans the doctrine of contraries, Hippasus of Metapontum, who saw in fire the material principle of the world, Ecphantus, who combined the doctrine of atoms with the doctrine of a world-ordering spirit, and taught the revolution of the earth on its axis, Hippodamus of Miletus, an architect and politician, and others, are named as philosophers, whose doctrines were related to those of Pythagoreanism. The comic poet Epicharmus, who occasionally alludes to disputed questions in philosophy, appears to have come under the influence of various philosophies, and among them, in particular, of Pythagoreanism.

The reputed writings of Pythagoras are spurious (*Carmen Aureum*, ed. K. E. Günther, Breslau, 1816; Th. Gaisford, in *Poetæ Minores Græci*, Oxford, 1814-20, Leipzig, 1828; Schneeberger, *Die goldenen Sprüche des Pythagoras*—German translation, with introduction and annotations—Münnerstadt, 1862). So also are the works ascribed to Ocellus Lucanus (*De Rerum Natura*, ed. A. F. Guhl, Rudolph, Leipzig, 1801; ed. Mullah, in *Aristot. de Melisso*, etc., Berlin, 1845) and Timæus Locrus (who is credited with a work *περί φύκας κόσμου*, which is only an abstract of Plato's *Timæus*, of late origin, ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 1836; cf. G. Anton, *De Origine Lib. inser. περί φύκας κόσμου και φύκους*, Berlin, 1852), and most probably, also all the philosophical fragments of Archytas of Tarentum (*Fragm.*, ed. Conr. Orelli, in the 2d vol. of the *Opuscula Græcorum veterum Sententiosa et Moralia*, Leipzig, 1829; cf. Petersen, *Histor.-Phil. Studien* Hamburg, 1892, p. 24; G. Hartenstein, *De Archytas Tarentini Fragmentis Philosophicis*, Leipzig, 1886; Petersen, in the *Zeitschr. für Alterthumswiss.*, 1886, p. 873; O. F. Gruppe, *Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer*, Berlin, 1840; F. Beckmann, *De Pythagoreorum Reliquiis*, Berlin, 1844 and '50; *Quæstiones Pythagor.*, I-IV, Braunsberg (*Lections-Katal.*), 1852, '53, '59, '66). The authenticity of the work of Philolaus, formerly sometimes questioned, but after Boeckh's collection of the fragments almost universally conceded, has been anew disputed, as to parts of the work, by Zeller and others, and wholly rejected by Val. Rose. Still more recently Schaarschmidt has undertaken to demonstrate the spuriousness of the work; yet cf., *per contra*, Zeller in the third ed. of Part I. of his *Philos. der Griechen*, p. 243 seq. The most complete collection of Pythagorean fragments is furnished by Mullah, in Vol. II. of his *Fragn. Philos. Gr.*, 1867, 1-129.

Jamblichus, *De Vita Pythagorica liber*; acced. Malchus sive Porphyrius, *de vita Pythagoræ*, ed. Kesseling, Leipzig, 1815-18; ed. Westermann, Paris, 1850. [English transl. of Jamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras*, by Taylor, Lond. 1818. "The Life of Pythagoras with his Golden Verses, together with the Life of Hierocles and his Commentaries upon the Verses" (Engl. transl. from the French of Dacier, with the exception of the Golden Verses, which are translated from the Greek) by N. Rowe, Lond. 1707.—Tr.]

Of the more modern writers on Pythagoreanism in general and on individual Pythagoreans, may be mentioned: Chr. Meiners, in his *Gesch. der Künste und Wiss. in Gr. u. Rom*, Vol. I., p. 178 sq.; Ang. Boeckh, *Diep. de Platonico systemate coelestium globorum et de vera indole astronomias Philolaicae*, Heidelberg, 1810, also with additions and supplement in his *KL. Schr.*, III., Leipzig, 1866, pp. 266-342; *Philolaus des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes*, Berlin, 1819; J. A. Terpstra, *De Societate Pythag. Origine, Conditione, et Consilio*, Utrecht, 1834; Heinrich Ritter, *Gesch. der Pythagoreischen Philosophie*, Hamburg, 1826; Ernst Reinhold, *Beitrag zur Erläuterung der Pythagoreischen Metaphysik*, Jena, 1827; Amadeus Wendt, *De rerum principiti secundum Pythagoreos*, Leipzig, 1827; Christ. Aug. Brandia, *Ueber die Zahlenlehre der Pythagoreer und Platoniker*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, 1828, p. 208 sq. and 558 sq.; Aug. Bernh. Kriesche, *De societate a Pythagora in urbe Crotoniatarum condita scopo politico commentatio*, Göttingen, 1830, cf. Kriesche's *Forschungen*, I. pp. 73-85; M. A. Unna, *De Alcmaeone Crotoniata*, in Chr. Petersen's *Philol.-hist. Studien*, Hamburg, 1832, pp. 41-57; A. Gladisch, *Die Pythagoreer und die Scholasten*, Posen, 1841; F. H. Th. Ailhyn, *De idea justi qualis fuerit apud Homerum et Hesiodum et quomodo a Dorienibus veteribus et a Pythagora exculata sit*, Halle, 1847; G. Grote, *History of Greece*, Vol. IV. (London), pp. 325-331; Val. Rose, *Comm. de Arist. Mor. ord. et auctor.*, Berlin, 1854, p. 2 (where the genuineness of the Philolaus fragments is denied); C. L. Heyder, *Ethices Pythagoreas vindictas*, Frankfurt-on-the-M. 1854; F. D. Gerlach, *Zuleukos, Charondas, Pythagoras*, Basel, 1853; L. Noack, *Pythag. und die Anfänge abendl. Wiss.*, in the "*Psyche*," Vol. III., 1860, No. 1; Monrad, *Ueber die Pyth. Philos.*, in "*Der Gedanke*" (ed. by Michelet), Vol. III., 1862, No. 8; Vermehren, *Die Pythag. Zahlen* (G.-Fr.), Güstrow, 1868; A. Laugel, *Pythagore, sa doctrine et son histoire d'après la critique allemande*, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, XXXIV. année, Par. 1864, pp. 969-989; C. Schaarschmidt, *Die angebliche Schriftstellerei des Philolaus und die Bruchstücke der ihm zugeschriebenen Bücher*, Bonn, 1864; Ed. Zeller, *Pythagoras und die Pythagorassage*, in his *Vortr. u. Abh.*, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 30-50; Georg Rathgeber, *Groesgræco-land und Pythagoras*, Gotha, 1866; Adolf Rothenbücher, *Das System der Pythagoreer nach den Angaben des Arist.*, Berlin, 1867; Mullach, *De Pythagora ejusque discipulis et successoribus*, in the *Fragm. Philos. Gr.*, II. 1867, pp. I.-LVII.; Eduard Baltzer, *Pyth. der Weis. von Samos*, Nordhausen, 1868 (adopts the theory of Eöth); Albert Freiherr von Thimma, *Die harmonikale Symbolik des Alterthums*, part I., Cologne, 1868; F. Latendorf, *Seb. Franci de Pyth. ejusque symbolis disputatio comm. ill.*, Berlin, 1868. (Cf. also L. Proke, *Ueber die Abhängigkeit des Copernicus von den Gedanken griechischer Philosophen und Astronomen*, Thorn, 1835, and the works by Ideler, Boeckh, and others, cited below (p. 47).

On Alcmaeon the Crotoniate, see Kriesche, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 68-78.

On Hippodamus of Miletus: C. F. Hermann, *De Hippod. Mileto, ad Arist. Pol.*, II. 5, Marburg, 1841; L. Stein, in Mohl's *Zeitschr. für Staatswissenschaft*, 1853, 161 sq.; Rob. v. Mohl, *Gesch. und Litt. der Staatswiss.*, Vol. I., Erl. 1854, p. 171; Karl Hildenbrand, *Gesch. u. System der Rechts- und Staatsphilos.*, Vol. I., 1860, p. 59 sq. On Hippodamus and Phaleas: Herm. Henkel, *Zur Gesch. der griech. Staatswiss.* (G. Progr.), Salzwedel, 1866.

Epicharmi fragmenta, coll. H. Polman Kruseman, Harlem, 1824; rec. Theod. Bergk, *Poëtas lyrici Graec.*, Leipzig (1843, 58) 1866; ed. Mullach, *Fragm. Ph. Gr.*, p. 185 seq.; cf. Gryssar, *De Dorienum comoedia*, p. 84 seq.; Leop. Schmidt, *Questiones Epicharmae, spec. I: de Epicharmi ratione philosophandi*, Bonn, 1846; Jac. Bernays, *Epicharmos und der αἰσχρολόγος λόγος*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, VIII. 1863, p. 250 sq.; Aug. O. Fr. Lorenz, *Leben und Schriften des Kōtes Ep. nebst einer Fragmentensammlung*, Berlin, 1864 (cf. Leop. Schmidt in the *Gött. gel. Anz.*, 1865, No. 24, pp. 981-986); G. Bernhardt, *Grundr. der griech. Litt.*, 2d revised ed., II. b, 1850, pp. 458-467.

"Of Pythagoreanism and its founder tradition has the more to tell us the farther it is removed in time from its subject, whereas it becomes more reticent in proportion as we approach chronologically nearer to that subject itself" (Zeller). Nevertheless, we possess several very old and entirely reliable data concerning Pythagoras. Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school, ridicules the doctrine of Pythagoras in the following lines (ap. Diog. L., VIII. 36):—

Καὶ ποτὲ μιν στυφελίζομενον σκύλακος παρίοντα
 φασὶν ἐπουκτεῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἐπος·
 Πάσαι, μὲν δὲ ῥάπτις, ἔπειθ' φίλον ἀνέρος ἐστὶ
 Ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνω φθελγμένης αἶων.

Heracitus says (ap. Diog. L., VIII. 6): "Of all men, Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, most practiced inquiry (ιστορίην ἡσκησεν); his own wisdom was eclectic and nothing better

than polymathy and perverted art." Herodotus (II. 81 and 123) traces the doctrine of metempsychosis and certain religious regulations of the (Orphists and) Pythagoreans back to the Egyptians, thus implying, apparently, that Pythagoras visited the Egyptians. Isocrates (*Laud. Busir.*, 28) is the first who expressly mentions such a visit. Cicero says of Pythagoras (*De Fin.*, V. 29, 87): "*Aegyptum iustravit*." For the fact that the mathematical sciences originated in Egypt and were there cultivated by the priests, we have Aristotle's testimony (*Met.*, I. 1). From that country Pythagoras, according to the evidence of Callimachus (*ap.* Diodorus Siculus, in the *Vaticanische Excerpte*, VII.-X. 35), brought much of his mathematical knowledge and transplanted it into Hellas, while other portions of it were discovered by himself. Among other things, the discovery of the relation between the hypotenuse and the sides of the right-angled triangle is ascribed to him by Diogenes Laërtius (VIII. 12), on the authority of a mathematician named Apollodorus. Diogenes cites in this connection the epigram:

'Ηνίκα Πυθαγόρης τὸ περικλεῆς εὐράτο γράμμα
Κεῖν', ἐφ' ὅτῳ κλεινὴν ἤγαγε βουδυσίην.

Whether Pythagoras really traveled in Egypt is a matter not wholly free from doubt. It may, nevertheless, be considered as very probable that he did. Many of the embellishments added by later writers to their accounts of the life and journeys of Pythagoras, are easily recognized as fables. Diogenes Laërtius relates (VIII. 3), following, apparently, the authority of Aristoxenus, that Pythagoras, hating the tyranny of Polycrates, emigrated to Crotona, in Lower Italy. According to Cicero (*Rep.*, II. 15; cf. *Tuscul.*, I. 16), Pythagoras came to Italy in Ol. 62.4 (529 B. C.). He united himself to the aristocratic party in Crotona, where, as we are told, the depression caused by a defeat, suffered not long before in a contest with the Locrians and Rhegians on the river Sagra, had made the population susceptible to moral influences, and he secured that party for his project of an ethical and religious reform. By this means the intimacy of the union of the members of the aristocratic party and their power in the state were very considerably increased.

The members of the Pythagorean society were subjected to a rigid ethico-religious regimen (the Πυθαγόρειος τρόπος τοῦ βίου, which is mentioned already by Plato, *Rep.*, X. p. 600 b). An examination as to fitness preceded admission. Disciples were bound for a long time to mute obedience, and unconditional submission to the authority of the doctrine propounded to them. Rigorous daily self-examination was required of all; the propagation among the people of the doctrines (in particular, probably, the theosophic speculations) of the school was prohibited. Further requirements imposed on members were moderation in the use of articles of food and simplicity in personal attire. The use of animal food was permitted, under certain limitations,—a fact attested by Aristotle and by Aristoxenus (*ap.* Diog. L., VIII. 19 and 20); Heraclides of Pontus incorrectly assumes the contrary; but certain Orphists and later Pythagoreans abstained wholly from the use of animal food. Aristoxenus (*ap.* Gellius, IV. 11) disputes the assertion that Pythagoras forbade the use of beans for food. According to Herod., II. 81, burial in woolen garments was forbidden in the Orphic-Pythagorean mysteries.

The democratic party (perhaps also, at times, an unfriendly aristocratic fraction) reacted against the growing power of the society. It is related of Pythagoras that, after having lived in Crotona nearly twenty years, and soon after the victory gained in 510 B. C. by the Crotoniates, on the river Traeis, over the Sybarites, who were living under the monarchical rule of Telys, he was banished by an opposition party under Cylon, and that he removed to Metapontum and soon afterward died there. Pythagoreanism found acceptance among the aristocracy of numerous Italian cities, and gave to their party an ideal point of support.

But the persecutions were also several times renewed. In Crotona, as it appears, the partisans of Pythagoras and the "Cylonians" were, for a long time after the death of Pythagoras, living in opposition as political parties, till at length, about a century later, the Pythagoreans were surprised by their opponents while engaged in a deliberation in the "house of Milo" (who himself had died long before), and, the house being set on fire and surrounded, all perished, with the exception of Archippus and Lysis of Tarentum. (According to other accounts, the burning of the house, in which the Pythagoreans were assembled, took place on the occasion of the first reaction against the society, in the life-time of Pythagoras.) Lysis went to Thebes, and was there (soon after 400 B. C.) a teacher of the youthful Epaminondas. Diog. L. (VIII. 7) ascribes to him the authorship of a work commonly ascribed to Pythagoras. This work, according to Mullach's conjecture (*Fragm. Ph. Gr.*, I. 413), was the "Carmen Aureum," a poem which, however, at least in its present form, is probably of later origin.—Not long after this time all the political consequence and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end. At Tarentum the Pythagorean Archytas was still at the head of the state in the time of Plato.

Among the authorities for the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, the indications furnished by Aristotle are the most important. Of still greater value for our knowledge of the Pythagorean system would be the fragments (collected by Boeckh) of the work of Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, in case their authenticity were assured. All other pretended philosophical writings and fragments of writings by ancient Pythagoreans, are decidedly spurious. The contents of the fragments attributed to Philolaus agree in many respects quite well with the testimony of Aristotle, and afford besides a much more concrete conception of the Pythagorean system; yet with them is mingled much that is of extraneous and later origin, and which is yet scarcely to be placed to the account of the authors in whom the fragments are found. Plato and Aristotle seem to have had no knowledge of any other than oral utterances of Philolaus. Only their statements and, in part, those of the earliest Aristotelians, but no later ones, are perfectly trustworthy. Timon the Sillograph (writer of satires, see below, § 60) says (Gell., *Noct. Att.*, III. 17) that Plato bought for much money a small book, on which he founded his dialogue *Timæus* (containing his natural philosophy); but it is very doubtful what work is meant (perhaps a work of Archytas). A spurious letter from Plato to Dio contains the commission to buy Pythagorean books. Neanthes of Cyzicus ascribes the first publication of Pythagorean doctrines to Philolaus and Empedocles. Hermippus says that Philolaus wrote a book which Plato bought in order to copy from it his *Timæus*; Satyrus speaks of three books. The three books, of which the fragments above mentioned have come down to us, are (as Schaarschmidt has shown) probably spurious, as also are the alleged writings of other ancient Pythagoreans and of Pythagoras himself.

Charmed by the apodictical nature of that knowledge which we have of the *mathematical order* immanent in things, the Pythagoreans exaggerated the power of the mathematical principle in their *numerical speculation*—a speculation which overstepped the limits of exact mathematical science.

The principles of numbers, limit and the unlimited, were viewed by the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle, not as predicates of another substance, but as themselves the substance of things; at the same time things were looked upon as images of these principles immanent in them. It does not appear that these two statements are to be referred to different fractions of the Pythagoreans; perhaps the mode of speech of some suggested the one interpretation, that of others the other. Yet the same persons might in a certain sense hold both of these doctrines. It is hardly supposable that any one of the ancient

Pythagoreans made use of the exact phraseology employed by Aristotle. Aristotle seems, rather, at times to be expressing in his own language conceptions which he only found implied in their doctrines. The scale of created objects was symbolized by the series of numbers, the numbers four (τετρακτίς) and ten (δεκάς) playing an especially prominent rôle.

Of the special doctrines of the Pythagoreans, their astronomical and musical doctrines are the most worthy of remark. That the theory of a counter-earth (*ἀντίχθον*) under the earth and the motion of both around a central fire, really belongs to the older Pythagoreans, we know (apart from the at least doubtful Philolaus-Fragments) from Aristotle (*De Cœlo*, II. 13, and *Metaph.*, I. 5). Diog. Laërt. says (VIII. 85) that the circular motion of the earth was first taught by Philolaus, though others ascribed the doctrine to Hicetas. The doctrine of the earth and the counter-earth is ascribed to the Pythagorean Hicetas by Pseudo-Plutarch (*Plac. Ph.*, III. 9); Cicero (*Acad.*, II. 39) attributes to him, on the authority of Theophrastus, the doctrine that the earth moves *circum axem*. The rotation of the earth on its axis is also ascribed (*Plac.*, III. 13; Hippol., *Adv. Haer.*, I. 15) to Ecphantus (according to Boeckh's supposition, a pupil of Hicetas), who assigned to the material atoms magnitude, figure, and force, attributing their arrangement to God; also to Plato's disciple, Heraclides of Heraclea on the Euxine, who (according to Stob., *Ecl.*, I. 440) held the world to be infinite. That the hypothesis of the sun's immobility and of the revolution of the earth around it agrees with the phenomena was shown later, 281 B. C., by Aristarchus of Samos, the astronomer; finally, Seleucus of Seleucia on the Tigris, in Babylonia (about 150 B. C.), taught the infinite extension of the world and propounded the heliocentric system as his astronomical doctrine. (See Plut., *Plac. Phil.*, II. 1, 13, 24; III. 17; Stob., *Eclog. Phys.*, I. 26; cf. Laud. Ideler, *Ueber das Verhältniss des Copernicus zum Alterthum*, in Wolf and Buttmann's *Mus. f. d. Alterthumswiss.*, II. 1810, pp. 393-454; Boeckh, *De Plac. syst.*, etc., 1810, p. 12 (*Kl. Schr.*, III. p. 273), *Philolaos*, p. 122, *Das Kosm. System des Plato*, p. 122 sq. and p. 142; Sophus Rugé, *Der Chaldäer Seleukos*, Dresden, 1865.) Yet accusations of heresy were not wanting even in antiquity for those who held the doctrine of the earth's motion. Witness Aristarchus of Samos, who was charged with impiety by Cleanthes the Stoic, on account of his astronomical opinions.

The doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (Arist., *De Cœlo*, II. 9) was grounded on the assumption that the celestial spheres were separated from each other by intervals corresponding with the relative lengths of strings, arranged to produce harmonious tones.

The soul was, according to the Pythagoreans, a harmony; chained to the body as a punishment, it dwelt in it as in a prison (Plat., *Phædo*, p. 62 b).

According to the statement of Eudemus, the Aristotelian, in his lectures on Physics (reported by Simplicius, *Ad Arist. Phys.*, 173 a), the Pythagoreans taught that in various cosmical periods the same persons and events return or are repeated: *εἰ δὲ τις πιστεύοιαι τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὡς πάντα τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῶ καὶ γὰρ μυθολογήσω τὸ βαβδίων ἔχων καθήμενος οὕτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἔξει*. (The same doctrine meets us again with the Stoics, but only in combination with the Heraclitean doctrine of *ἐκπύρωσις*; see below, § 54.)

Ethical notions bore among the Pythagoreans a mathematical form, symbols filling the place of definitions. Justice was defined by them (according to Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, V. 8; cf. *Magna Moral.*, I. 1; I. 34) as *ἀριθμὸς ἰσάνης λόγος* (square-number), by which it was intended to express the correspondence between action and suffering (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, ἰ. e. ὃ τὸ ἐποίησε, ταῦτ' ἀντιπαθεῖν), or, in other words, retribution.

Some of the Pythagoreans (according to Arist., *Met.*, I. 5) set forth a table of fundamental contraries, headed by that of limit and illimitation. The conceptions included in it

are not properly categories, because not absolutely universal, i. e., formal ground-conceptions, equally applicable to nature and mind. The table is as follows:—

Limit.	Illimitation.
Odd.	Even.
One.	Many.
Right.	Left.
Male.	Female.
At rest.	In motion.
Straight.	Bent.
Light.	Darkness.
Good.	Bad.
Square.	Oblong.

Alcmæon, the Crotoniate, was a physician, who (according to Arist., *Metaph.*, I 5) "was in the flower of his age when Pythagoras was an old man," and taught that the majority of human things were in twos [in contraries] (*εἶναι δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*), yet did not fix on a specific number of contraries, but only gave in each case those which happened to occur to him. He taught that the soul was located in the brain, whither all sensations were conducted through canals from the organs of sensation (Theophr., *De Sensu*, 25; Plut., *Plac. Ph.*, IV. 16, 17), and that the soul, like the stars, was the subject of eternal motion (Arist., *De An.*, I. 2).

Eurytus is mentioned, together with Philolaus, as among the Pythagoreans whom Plato met in Italy (D. L., III. 6). The system of numerical symbolism was further developed by Eurytus, whose speculations appear to have been delivered only orally (Ar., *Met.*, XIV. 5, 1092 b, 10). Philolaus and Eurytus are spoken of as residents of Tarentum (Diog. L., VIII. 46); Xenophilus, of Chalcis in Thrace, and the Phliasians Phanto, Echebrates, Diocles, and Polymnastus, pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus, and all personally known to Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, are said to have been the last of the Pythagoreans. Xenophilus is reported to have taught in Athens and to have died at an advanced age. The school disappeared (until the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism), although the Orphic-Pythagorean Orgies were continued.

Hippodamus of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, was (according to Arist., *Polit.*, II. 8), like Phaleas, the Chalcidonian (Ar., *Pol.*, II. 7), and (according to Diog. L., III. 37 and 57) Protagoras, the Sophist, a forerunner of Plato in the construction of political theories. According to Aristotle, Hippodamus was the first private citizen who undertook to say any thing respecting the best form of constitution for the state. The territory of the state, he taught, should be divided into three portions: a sacred portion for the service of the gods, a common domain for the support of the military order, and a third portion to be held as private property. The various courts of justice should be subject to one court of appeal. Whether, or to what extent, Hippodamus was connected with the Pythagorean school, are doubtful questions. Among the later forgeries under the names of early Pythagoreans, was one bearing the name of "Hippodamus the Pythagorean," and another ascribed to "Hippodamus the Thurian," by which the same person seems to be intended. Fragments of these forgeries are preserved in Stobæus (*Florileg.*, XLIII. 92-94, and XCVIII. 71). Phaleas desired that inequality of possessions among citizens should be prevented, affirming that it easily led to revolutionary movements; indeed, he is the first who expressly demanded that all citizens should have equal possessions (Arist., *Pol.*, II. 1 1266 b, 40).

Epicharmus of Cos, son of Eliothales (born about 550, died at Syracuse, about 460 B. C.), in the first of his poetical compositions cited by Diog. L. (III. 9-17), represents a man versed in Eleatic, Pythagorean, and especially in Heraclitean philosophy, engaged in conversation with one who was a stranger to philosophy and a partisan of the religious ideas of the ancient poets and the people. In another of the fragments preserved by Diogenes he discusses the difference between art and the artist, and between goodness and the man who is good, in terms which remind us of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. They are not to be taken, however, altogether in the Platonic sense, which respects the difference between the universal and the individual, but rather in the sense of the distinction between abstract and concrete. A third fragment concludes from instances of artistic skill in animals, that they, too, are possessed of reason. A fourth contains, in its expressions concerning the diversity of tastes, much to remind one of the verses of the Eleatic philosopher Xenophanes, on the diversity of human conceptions of the gods. A philosophical system can not be ascribed to Epicharmus. Plato says (*Theæt.*, p. 152 a), that the comic poet, Epicharmus, embraced, like Homer, that conception of the world to which Heraclitus gave the most general philosophical expression (the doctrine, which finds the real in what is perceptible and changeable). Classical aphorisms of Epicharmus are: *νᾶρε καὶ μένους ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν*, and *νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά*. The Roman poet Ennius composed a Pythagorizing didactic poem in imitation of one attributed to Epicharmus. Various forgeries under the name of Epicharmus were published at an early date.

The author of the work ascribed to Philolaus sees in the principles of numbers the principles of things. These principles are the limiting and illimitation. They converge to harmony, which is unity in multiplicity and agreement in heterogeneity. Thus they generate in succession, first, unity, then the series of arithmetical or "monadic" numbers, then the "geometrical numbers," or "magnitudes," i. e., the forms of space: point, line, surface, and solid; next, material objects, then life, sensuous consciousness, and the higher psychical forces, as love, friendship, mind, and intelligence. Like is known by like, but it is by number that things are brought into harmonious relations to the soul. The understanding, developed by mathematical study, is the organ of knowledge. Musical harmony depends on a certain numerical proportion in the lengths of musical strings. The octave, in particular, or harmony in the narrower sense, depends on the ratio—1:2, which includes the two ratios of the fourth (3:4) and the fifth (2:3 or 4:6). The five regular solids—the cube, the tetrahedron, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the dodecahedron—are respectively the fundamental forms of earth, fire, air, water, and the fifth element, which encompasses all the rest. The soul is united by number and harmony with the body, which is its organ, and at the same time also its prison. From the Hestia, i. e., from the central fire, around which earth and counter-earth daily revolve, the soul of the world spreads through the spheres of the counter-earth, the earth, the moon, the sun, the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars to "Olympus," the last sphere which includes all the others. The world is eternal, and ruled by the One, who is akin to it, and has supreme might and excellence. The director and ruler of all things is God; he is one and eternal, enduring and immovable, ever like himself, and different from all things beside him. He encompasses and guards the universe.

§ 17. The foundation of the Eleatic doctrine of unity was laid in theological form by Xenophanes of Colophon, metaphysically developed as a doctrine of being by Parmenides of Elea, dialectically defended in opposition to the vulgar belief in a plurality of objects

and in revolution and change by Zeno of Elea, and finally, with some declension in vigor of thought, assimilated more nearly to the earlier natural philosophy by Melissus of Samos.

The following authors treat especially of the *Eleatic* philosophers and their doctrines: Joh. Gottfr. Walther, *Eröffnete Eleatische Gräber*, 2d ed., Magdeburg and Leipzig, 1794; Geo. Gust Fülleborn, *Libri de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia Aristoteli vulgo tributi, passim illustr. commentario*, Halle, 1789; Joh. Gottl. Buhle, *Commentatio de ortu et progressu pantheismi inde a Xenophane primo ejus auctore usque ad Spinosum*, Göttingen, 1790, *Comm. soc. Gott.*, vol. X., p. 157 seq.; G. Ludw. Spalding, *Vindiciæ philosophorum Megaresorum subjecto commentario in primam partem libelli de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia*, Berlin, 1793; Fülleborn, *Fragmente aus den Gedichten des Xenophanes und des Parmenides*, in the *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos.*, "Stücke," 6 and 7, Jena, 1795; Amad. Peyron, *Empedocli et Parm. fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1810; Chr. Aug. Brandis, *Comm. Eleat. pars I. Xenophanis, Parmenides et Melissi doctrina et propriis philosophorum reliquiis exposita*, Altona, 1818; Vict. Cousin, *Xenophane, fondateur de l'école d'Élée*, in his *Nouveaux fragments philos.*, Paris, 1828, pp. 9-95; Rosenberg, *De El. ph. primordiis*, Berlin, 1839; Sim. Karsten, *Philosophorum Græcorum veterum operum reliquias*, Amsterdam, 1835 seq., vol. I., 1: *Xenophanis Colophonis carm. rel.*, L. 2: *Parmenidis*; Riaux, *Essai sur Parm. d'Élée*, Paris, 1840; Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 86-116; Theod. Bergk, *Commentatio de Arist. libello de Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia*, Marburg, 1843; Aug. Gladisch, *Die Eleaten und die Indier*, Posen, 1844; Frid. Guhl, Aug. Mullach, *Aristotelis de Melisso, Xenophanis et Gorgia disputationes, cum Eleaticorum philos. fragmentis*, Berlin, 1845, also in *Fragm. ph. Gr.*, I. p. 101 seq.; E. Reinhold, *De genuina Xenophanis dialectica*, Jena, 1847; Ueberweg, *Ueber den historischen Werth der Schrift de Melisso, Zenone, Gorgia*, in the *Philol.*, VIII., 1858, pp. 104-112 (where I sought to show that the second part of the work, i. e., chaps. 3 and 4, does not contain a reliable account respecting Xenophanes, but does so respecting Zeno; now, however, only my first, or negative, not the second, positive, thesis, seems to me tenable), also *ibid.* XXVI. 1868, pp. 709-711; E. F. Apelt, *Parmenidis et Empedoclis doctrina de mundi structura*, Jena, 1856; Conr. Vermeiren, *Die Autorschaft der dem Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Schrift xepi Bevoθάνov, xepi Zήνωνος, xepi Γοργίου*, Jena, 1862; Franz Kern, *Quæstionum Xenophanearum capita duo (Progr. scholæ Portensi)*, Naumburg, 1864; *Symbolæ criticæ ad libellum Aristotelicum de Xenophane, etc.*, Oldenburg, 1867; Θεοδόσιος xepi Μελισσου, in the *Philologus*, XXVI. 1863, pp. 271-289; Theodor Vatke, *Parm. Vellensis doctrina qualis fuerit (diss. inaug.)*, Berl. 1864; Heinrich Stein, *Fragm. des Parmenides, xepi φύσεως*, in the *Symbol. philologorum Bonnenstium in honorem Frid. Ritschellii coll.*, Leipzig, 1864-67, pp. 768-806; Paul Rüffer, *De ph. Xen. Coloph. parte morali, diss. inaug.*, Leipzig, 1868; Th. Davidson, *The Fragments of Parm.*, in the *Journal of Specul. Philos.*, IV. 1, St. Louis, Jan., 1870.

That the first part (*cap.* 1, 2) of the treatise *De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia*, transmitted to us among the writings of Aristotle, treats of Melissus and not of Xenophanes, Buhle has already demonstrated in the essay on pantheism above cited. In agreement with him and with Spalding—with whom Fülleborn, who had before been of a different opinion, expresses his accord in his above-cited "*Beiträge*"—the same is assumed by Brandis and all later investigators, since this result is made perfectly manifest by a comparison of the part in question with the doctrines of Melissus as known to us from other sources. It is uncertain to whom the second part (*cap.* 3, 4) relates, in the intention of the author, whether to Xenophanes or to Zeno; yet in no case are the contents of these chapters to be considered as historical.* The last part (*cap.* 5, 6) treats without doubt of Gorgias. Perhaps this

* The view supported by me in one of my earliest essays ("*Ueber den historischen Werth der Schrift de Melisso, Zenone, Gorgia*," in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, VIII. 1858, pp. 104-112), that the second part of the work (*cap.* 3, 4) relates to Zeno and contains a true report of his doctrine, I am now compelled to abandon, after more thorough comparison and exacter weighing of all the elements of the problem (assenting, as I do, substantially to the argumentation of Zeller in the 2d ed. of the first part of his *Ph. d. Gr.*, p. 886 seq.). I can only hold fast, therefore, to the negative opinion, that a trustworthy report respecting Xenophanes is not to be found in the work. The teachings there developed (that God is eternal, one, spherical, neither bounded nor unbounded, neither moved nor unmoved, might, in view of their dialectical form, and, in part also, in view of their nature, be more properly ascribed to Zeno than to Xenophanes). Both of these suppositions are, however, opposed, partly by other considerations, partly by the silence of Plato and Aristotle; of Xenophanes, Aristotle says directly (*Met.* I. 5), that he left the question

section was intended by the author to be the first in a reverted order (see *cap.* 6, *fin.*). The accounts respecting Melissus and Gorgias are substantially correct, though not so throughout. The whole can not have been composed by Aristotle, nor by Theophrastus, but only by some later Aristotelian.

The fragments preserved from the writings of the Eleatics are not very extensive, but they furnish us a fully authentic and, with respect to the fundamental ideas, a sufficiently complete view of the Eleatic philosophy.

§ 18. Xenophanes, of Colophon, in Asia Minor (born 569 B. C.), who removed later to Elea, in Lower Italy, combats in his poems the anthropomorphitic and anthropopathic representations of God presented by Homer and Hesiod, and enounces the doctrine of the one, all-controlling God-head. God is all eye, all ear, all intellect; untroubled, he moves and directs all things by the power of his thought.

Xenophanes, according to his own statement (*ap.* Diog. L., IX. 19), began his wanderings through Hellas (as rhapsodist) at the age of twenty-five years, and lived to be more than ninety-two years old. If (as may be assumed with some probability from one of his fragments given by Athen., *Deipnosoph.*, II. p. 54) it is true that he left his native country soon after the expedition of the Persians under Harpagus against Ionia (544 B. C.), he must have been born about 569 B. C. Apollodorus (*ap.* Clem. Al., *Strom.*, I. 301 c) gives Ol. 40 (620 B. C.) as the time of his birth; more probable is the report (*ap.* Diog. L., IX. 20) that he flourished Ol. 60 (540 B. C.). He outlived Pythagoras, whom he mentions after the death of the latter; he is himself named by Heraclitus. In his latter years he lived in Elea (Ἐλέα, Ἰτάλη, Velia), a Phocæan colony. Fragments of his poems, though only a few fragments of his philosophical poems, are extant. In a fragment of some extent, preserved by Athenæus (XI. p. 462), in which Xenophanes describes a cheerful feast, he demands first that the Deity (termed sometimes Θεός, sometimes Θεοί) be praised with pure and holy words, and that the banqueters be moderate and discourse of the proofs of virtue, and not of the contests of Titans and similar fables of the ancients (πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων); in another fragment (Ath., X. p. 413 seq.) he warns men not to think too highly of success in athletic contests, which he deems it wrong to prefer to intellectual culture (οὐδὲ δίκαιον, προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης).

That the God of Xenophanes is the unity of the world is a supposition that was early current. We do not find this doctrine expressed in the fragments which have come

of the ideal or material nature of the unity of God untouched, and said nothing definite concerning his limitation or non-limitation, whereas in chaps. 3 and 4 of the treatise *De Xen.*, etc., it is said, on the one hand, that the Eleate there in question ascribed to God the spherical form, and on the other that he taught (the antinomy) that God is neither bounded nor unbounded. It is scarcely to be doubted that this latter statement arose from a misunderstanding either of the report of Aristotle or more probably of a similar report by Theophrastus (which Stimplic., *In Phys.*, fol. 5b, has preserved for us). Whether the (probably late) author of the work intends to treat of Xenophanes or of Zeno, remains still a matter of doubt; the former supposition is, perhaps, attended with fewer difficulties than the latter. The author may have made use of a Pseudo-Xenophanean writing, or perhaps even of an inexact version of the doctrines and arguments of Xenophanes, which had been prepared partly on the authority of the misunderstood passage from Theophrastus, partly from other sources. The misinterpretation was most easily possible at a time when such antinomies had already taken the form of philosophical dogmas (cf., for example, Plotinus, *Ennead.*, V. 10, 11, who teaches that God is neither bounded nor unbounded). With this problem negative results are reached more easily and with greater certainty than positive ones.

down to us, and it remains questionable whether Xenophanes pronounced himself positively in this sense, in speaking of the relation of God to the world, or whether such a conception was not rather thought of to be implied in his teachings by other thinkers, who then expressed it in the phraseology given above. In the (Platonic?) dialogue, *Sophistes* (p. 242), the leading interlocutor, a visitor from Elea, says: "The Eleatic race among us, from Xenophanes' and even from still earlier times, assume in their philosophical discourses that what is usually called All, is One" (ὡς ἐνὸς οὗτος τῶν πάντων καλούμενων). The "still earlier" philosophers are probably certain Orphists, who glorified Zeus as the all-ruling power, as beginning, middle, and end of all things. Aristotle says, *Metaph.*, I. 5: "Xenophanes, the first who professed the doctrine of unity—Parmenides is called his disciple—has not expressed himself clearly concerning the nature of the One, so that it is not plain whether he has in mind an ideal unity (like Parmenides, his successor) or a material one (like Melissus); he seems not to have been at all conscious of this distinction, but, with his regard fixed on the whole universe, he says only that God is the One." Theophrastus says (according to Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 5 b): ἐν τῷ ἐν καὶ πᾶν Ξενοφάνην ὑποτίθεσθαι. Timon the Sillograph (*Sext. Empir.*, *Hypotyp. Pyrrhon.*, I. 224) represents Xenophanes as saying, that whithersoever he turned his view, all things resolved themselves for him into unity.

The following are all the philosophical fragments which have been preserved from the writings of Xenophanes. *Ap. Clem. Alex.*, *Strom.*, V. 601 c, and Euseb., *Praeparat. Evang.*, XIII. 13:

Εἰς θεὸς ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος οὔτε νόημα.

Ap. Sextus Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 144, cf. *Diog. L.*, IX. 19:

οὐλος ὁρᾷ, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

Ap. Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 6 a:

Αἰεὶ δ' ἐν τῷτῳ τε μένειν κινούμενον οὐδέν
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι μιν ἐπιτρέπει ἄλλοτε (or ἄλλοθεν) ἄλλῃ.

Ibid.:

'Ἄλλ' ἀπένευθε πόνου νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.

Ap. Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, V. 601 c, and Euseb., *Praeparat. Evang.*, XIII. 13:

'Ἀλλὰ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι θεοὺς γεννᾶσθαι (εἶδεν τε γ)
τὴν σφετέρην τ' αἰσθῆσιν ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.
'Ἄλλ' εἶται χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἢ λέοντες,
καὶ γράψαι χεῖρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελειν ἄπερ ἄνδρες,
'Ἴπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δὲ τε βουσίην ὁμοίας
καὶ κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἐγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ' οἷον περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἑκαστοι.

Of *Clem. Alex.*, *Strom.*, VII. p. 711 b.: ὡς φησιν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· Αἰθιοπῆς τε μέλανας σιμούς τε, Θράκῆς τε πυρρῶν καὶ γλαυκῶν (scil. τοὺς θεοὺς διαζωγραφοῦσιν), which is also reported by Theodoret., *Graec. Affect. curat.*, *Serm.* III. p. 49, ed. Sylb. *Ap. Sext. Empir.*, *Adv. Math.*, IX. 193:

Πάντα θεοὶ ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρὸς θ' Ἡσίοδός τε,
Ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν οὐεῖδα παῖ ψόγος ἐστίν,
κλέπτειν, μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

Ibid. I. 220:

Ὅμηρος δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος κατὰ τὸν Κολοφώνιον Ξενοφάνη·
Οἱ πλείστ' ἐφ' ἔγχεσαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
Κλέπτειν, μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεῦναι.

Arist., *Met.*, II. 23, p. 1399 b, 6: Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φέροντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. *Ibid.* 1400 b, 5: Ξεν. Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύοσι τῇ Δευκοθέρῃ καὶ Θρηνώσιν, ἢ μὴ, σπερβοῦλενας, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν.

[The verse, ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ, cited by Sext. Empir. (*Adv. Math.*, X. 313, but on the authority of others: "Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατ' ἐνίου,") and by Stobæus (*Eccl. Phys.*, I. p. 294, ed. Heeren) and others, seems to have been erroneously ascribed to Xenophanes. Aristotle testifies (*Met.*, I. 8, p. 989 a, 5): "No philosopher has regarded earth in the sense in which Thales regarded water, Anaximenes air, and Heraclitus fire, as a unique material principle. Meiners (*Hist. Doctr. de Vero Deo*, p. 327), and after him Heeren, Karsten, and others, have held this verse to be a forgery.]—*Ap.* Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 361; X. 313, and others:

Πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα.

Ap. Stobæus, *Florileg.*, XXIX. 41, ed. Gaisf., and *Eclog.*, I. p. 224:

Οἷτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς παρέδειξαν,
'Αλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

Ap. Plutarch., *Sympos.*, IX. p. 746 b:

Ταῦτα δεδόξασται μὲν τοῖς ἐκείνοις.

Ap. Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 49 and 110, VIII. 326, and others:

Καὶ τὰ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς ὅτις ἀνὴρ ἰδὲν οὐδὲ τις ἔσται
Εἰδώς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ὅσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἶπον,
Αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε· ὁόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

The most noteworthy of the physical theorems of Xenophanes, after his fundamental doctrine, that earth and water are the elements of all created things, is the opinion, combated by Empedocles (in the verses cited by Arist., *De Caelo*, II. 12, p. 204 a, 25: εἰπερ ἀέριον γῆς τε βάθος καὶ ἀσφύλος αἰθήρ, ὥς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσης ῥηθέντα ματαιῶς ἐκκέχυται σπομέτων ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων), that the earth extends without limit downward, and the air upward; the verses in which this view is expressed are communicated by Achilles Tatius in his *Isagoge ad Aratum* (*ap.* Petav., *Doctr. Temp.*, III. 76):

Γαίης μὲν τότε πείρας ἄνω παρὰ ποσσὶν ὄραται
Αἰθέρι προσπλάζον· τὰ κάτω δ' ἐς ἄπειρον ἰκάνει.

With this doctrine the assertion, sometimes attributed to Xenophanes (but perhaps only through the false transference to him of a Parmenidean theorem), that the Deity is spherical, does not agree. Xenophanes held the stars (according to Stob., *Eccl.*, I. 522) to be fiery clouds: the rainbow also was termed by him a νέφος. Xenophanes (according to Origen, *Philosophumena*, or rather Hippolytus, *Adv. Haereticos*, I. 14) explained the fact that sea-animals were found petrified in the mines of Syracuse, in the marble quarries on the island of Paros, and in many other places both inland and on mountains, by the hypothesis, that

the sea had once covered the land; and this hypothesis was immediately enlarged by him into the theory of a periodical, alternate mixing and separation of earth and water. Xenias of Corinth is incorrectly named (by Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VIII 53, *et al.*) as a disciple of Xenophanes.

§ 19. Parmenides of Elea, born about 515–510 B. C. (so that his youth falls in the time of the old age of Xenophanes), is the most important of the Eleatic philosophers. He founds the doctrine of unity on the conception of being. He teaches: Only being is, non-being is not; there is no becoming. That which truly is exists in the form of a single and eternal sphere, whose space it fills continuously. Plurality and change are an empty semblance. The existent alone is thinkable, and only the thinkable is real. Of the one true existence, convincing knowledge is attainable by thought; but the deceptions of the senses seduce men into mere opinion and into the deceitful, rhetorical display of discourse respecting the things, which are supposed to be manifold and changing.—In his (hypothetical) explanation of the world of appearance, Parmenides sets out from two opposed principles, which bear to each other, within the sphere of appearance, a relation similar to that which exists between being and non-being. These principles are light and night, with which the antithesis of fire and earth corresponds.

That Parmenides received through Xenophanes the philosophical impulses which gave direction to his own thinking, we must suppose, even setting aside later evidence, from the following language of the (Platonic?) dialogue *Sophistes* (p. 242): "the Eleatic race of philosophers dating from the time of Xenophanes (and even earlier)." Aristotle says (*Metaph.*, I. 5): "Parmenides is said (*λέγεται*) to have been his (Xenophanes') pupil." Here *λέγεται* is, perhaps, not to be taken as signifying an uncertainty on the part of Aristotle with respect to the personal relation of the two philosophers, but as pointing to the half-truth of the term "pupil" (*μαθητής*), since Parmenides may have been incited to his inquiries more by the writings of Xenophanes than by his oral instruction, and since he does not stand merely in the relation of a scholar to his predecessor, having himself first created the metaphysical principles of Eleaticism. Theophrastus expresses the relation in which Parmenides stood to Xenophanes by the use of the term *ἐπιγενόμενος* (in a passage in the first book of his *Physics*, as cited by Alexander Aphrodisia, *Schol. in Arist.*, ed. Brandis, p. 536 a, 10: *τούτω δὲ ἐπιγενόμενος Παρμενίδης Πύρρος ὁ Ελεάτης*). Plato, *Theaet.*, p. 180 e (cf. *Soph.*, p. 217 c) represents Socrates as saying that, while still very young, he met Parmenides, who was already advanced in years (*πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτης*), as the latter was expounding his philosophical doctrines. From this story the scenery in the (probably spurious) dialogue *Parmenides* is derived, while more specific statements are added as to the ages of Parmenides (65 years) and his companion Zeno (40 years) at the time alluded to by Socrates. Whether a meeting between Socrates and Parmenides really took place, or was only imagined by Plato, is doubtful; but the former supposition is by far the more probable, since Plato would scarcely have allowed himself the fiction here merely for scenic effect; still less would he have done so in the narrative introduced in the *Theaetetus*.

Even if it were only a fiction, Plato would be careful not to offer too great violence to chronological possibility. The report of Diog. Laërt. (IX. 23), that Parmenides "died" in OL 69 (504-500 B. C.), must, therefore, be erroneous; at that time he can scarcely have been more than a few years old. The probable reference of Parmenides, in his argumentation, to Heraclitus (see above, § 15), of itself implies that the former was younger than Heraclitus. Parmenides appears not to have written his "work" before about 475-470.

Parmenides is said to have exerted a salutary influence on the legislation and morals of his native city, where he supported the ethico-political doctrine and action of the Pythagoreans. (Diog. L. says [IX. 23]: λέγεται δὲ καὶ νόμον θείνει τοῖς πολίταις, ὡς φησι Σπείσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ φιλοσόφων.) For the moral character and the philosophy of Parmenides Plato expresses the highest respect. Aristotle places a lower estimate on his doctrine and argumentation, but admits that he was the ablest thinker among the Eleatics.

In his Didactic Poem (the fragments of which are found in Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 111; Diog. Laërt., IX. 22; Proclus, *Comm. to Plato's Timaeus*; Simplicius, *ad Arist. Phys.*, etc.), Parmenides represents the goddess of wisdom, to whose seat he is drawn by horses under the guidance of the virgin daughters of Helios, as opening up to him the double way, not only into convincing truth, but also into the deceptive opinions of mortals (χρεὼν δὲ σε πάντα πυνθέσθαι, ἡμεῖν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκέως ἦτορ, ἥ δὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς). Truth consists in the knowledge that being is, and non-being can not be; deception lies in the belief that non-being also is and must be. Parmenides describes the goddess as saying (in a fragment preserved by Proclus in his *Comm. on Plato's Timaeus*, II. p. 105 b, ed. Bas.):

Ἡ μὲν, ὅπως ἐστὶν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ μὴ εἶναι
Πεθεοῖς ἐστὶ κέλευθος, ἀληθεῖη γὰρ ὀπηρεῖ.
Ἡ δ', ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν τε καὶ ὡς χρεὼν ἐστὶ μὴ εἶναι,
Τῇν δὴ σοι φράζω παναπεθεά ἐμμεν ἀταρπὸν
Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ εἶν (οὐ γὰρ ἐφικτόν)
Οὔτε φράσαις.*

After this appear to have followed immediately the words (cited by Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, VI. p. 627 b, and by Plotinus, *Ennead.*, V. 1, 8):

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι.

I. e.: The predicate being belongs to thought itself; that I think something and that this, which I think, is (in my thought), are identical assertions; non-being—that which is not—can not be thought, can, so to speak, not be reached, since every thing, when it is thought, exists as thought; no thought can be non-existent or without being, for there is nothing to which the predicate being does not belong, or which exists outside of the sphere of being.—In this argumentation Parmenides mistakes the distinction between the subjective being of thought and an objective realm of being to which thought is directed, by directing his attention only to the fact that both are subjects of the predicate being. Says Parmenides (ap. Simplic., *Ad Phys.*, fol. 31, in the third line, we write οὐδ' ἦν instead of οὐδὲν, according to Bergk's conjecture, see *Ind. Lect. Hal.*, 1867-68):

* A metrical translation of all the Parmenidean fragments cited in this section may be read in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, St. Louis, Jan., 1870, Vol. IV., No. 1. The doctrine contained in them is fully explained in the text.—Tr.]

Τωῦτόν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα·
 Οὐ γὰρ ἀνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἐστίν,
 Εὐρήσις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδ' ἦν γὰρ ἡ ἐστιν ἢ ἐσται
 Ἄλλο παρὲκ τοῦ ἐόντος.

Not the senses, which picture to us plurality and change, conduct to truth, but only thought, which recognizes the being of that which is, as necessary, and the existence of that which is not, as impossible. Parm., *ap. Sect. Empir.*, VII. 111:

Ἄλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα,
 Μὴδὲ σ' ἐθος πολέπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
 Νομῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἡχῆσσαν ἀκουήν
 Καὶ γλώσσαν· κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδῃρην ἐλεγχον
 Ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Much severer still than his condemnation of the naive confidence of the mass of men in the illusory reports of the senses, is that with which Parmenides visits a philosophical doctrine which, as he assumes, makes of this very illusion (not, indeed, as illusion, in which sense Parmenides himself proposes a theory of the sensible, but as supposed truth) the basis of a theory that falsifies thought, in that it declares non-being identical with being. It is very probable that the Heraclitean doctrine is the one on which Parmenides thus animadverts, however indignantly Heraclitus might have resented this association of his doctrine with the prejudice of the masses, who do not rise above the false appearances of the senses; the judgment of Plato (*Theæt.*, p. 179) and Aristotle (*De Anímā*, I. 2, p. 405 a, 28: ἐν κινήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ἀκείνους ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί) agrees with that of Parmenides with respect to the matter in question. Parmenides says (*ap. Simplicius, Ad Phys.*, fol. 19 a and 25 a):

Χρή σε λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ'· ἐὼν ἔμμεναι· ἐστὶ γὰρ εἶναι,
 Μὴδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἀνωγα.—
 Πρῶτ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα,
 Αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣ δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
 Πλάζονται δίκρανοι· ἀμχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
 Στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον, οἱ δὲ φορεῖνται
 Κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε τεθηφότες, ἀκριτα φῦλα,
 Οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωῦτόν νενόμισται
 Κού τωῦτόν, πάντων τε παλίντροπὸς ἐστὶ κέλευθος·

Parmenides (in a passage of some length, given by Simpl., *Ad Phys.*, fol. 31 a b) ascribes to the truly existent all the predicates which are implied in the abstract conception of *being*, and then proceeds further to characterize it as a continuous sphere, extending uniformly from the center in all directions—a description which we are scarcely authorized in interpreting as merely symbolical, in the conscious intention of Parmenides. That which truly is, is without origin and indestructible, a unique whole, only-begotten, immovable, and eternal; it was not and will not be, but *is*, and forms a continuum.

Μόνος δ' ἐτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
 Λεῖπεται ὡς ἐστίν· ταύτῃ δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔσσι
 Πολλὰ μάλ' ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
 Οὐλον, μουνυγενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἥδ' ἀτέλεστον·*
 Οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδ' ἐσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
 Ἐν ξυνεχέι.

* Or ἀδέτηον, according to Bergk's conjecture.

For what origin should it have? How could it grow? It can neither have arisen from the non-existent, since this has no existence, nor from the existent, since it is itself the existent. There is, therefore, no becoming, and no decay (ὥς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβησται καὶ αἰσχος ὀλέθρος). The truly existent is indivisible, everywhere like itself, and ever identical with itself. It exists independently, in and for itself (τῶντῶν τ' ἐν τῶντῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτὸ τε κεῖται), thinking, and comprehending in itself all thought; it exists in the form of a well-rounded sphere (πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὅγκῳ μεσσοθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ).

The Parmenidean doctrine of the *apparent* world is a cosmogony, suggesting, on the one hand, Anaximander's doctrine of the warm and the cold as the first-developed contraries and the Heraclitean doctrine of the transformations of fire, and, on the other, the Pythagorean opposition of "limit" and "the unlimited" (ἀπειρον), and the Pythagorean doctrine of contraries generally. It is founded on the hypothesis of a universal mixture of warm and cold, light and dark. The warm and light is ethereal fire, which, as the positive and efficient principle, represents within the sphere of appearance the place of being; the cold and dark is air and its product, by condensation (see Euseb., *Praepar. Evang.*, I. 8, 7: λέγει δὲ τὴν γῆν τοῦ πυκνοῦ καταρρύνεντος ἀέρος γεγονέναι), earth. The combining or "mixing" of the contraries is effected by the all-controlling Deity (Δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνῶ), at whose will Eros came into existence as first, in time, of the gods (πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν κτίσαντο πάντων, Plat., *Symp.*, 178 b, where, as Schanz has shown, the words from 'Ἡαῦδ' ὡς ἡμολογεῖ, together with ὅς must be placed before φασί; Arist., *Metaph.*, I. 4, 984 b, 26). That which fills space and that which thinks, are the same; how a man shall think, depends on the "mixture" of his bodily organs; a dead body perceives cold and silence (Parm., *ap.* Theophrast., *De Sensu*, 3, where, however, in the sentence: τὸ γὰρ πλεον ἐστὶ νόημα, the words τὸ πλεον mean, not the preponderating, but the full, or space which is filled).

If the verse in the long fragment, *ap.* Simplicius, in *Phys.*, f. 31 a, *et al.* (also *ap.* Plat., *Theaet.*, p. 180): οὐκ ἀκίνητόν τ' εἶναι, τῷ πάντ' ὄνομα' ἐστίν, ὅσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, γίνεσθαι τε καὶ ὀλλυσθαι, etc., could be emended (as is done by Gladisch, who seeks in it an analogue to the Maja of the Hindus) so as to read: τῷ πάντ' ὄνομα' ἐστίν, Parmenides would appear as having explained the plurality and change attested by the senses, as a dream of the one true existence. But this conjecture is arbitrary; and the words cited in the *Soph.*, p. 242: ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, as also the doctrine of the Megarians concerning the many names of the One, which alone really exists, confirm the reading ὄνομα' of the MSS. The sense of the passage is therefore: "All the manifold and changing world, which mortals suppose to be real, and which they call the sum of things, *is* in reality only the One, which alone truly is."

In the philosophy of Parmenides no distinction is reached between appearance, or semblance, and phenomenon. The terms being and appearance remain with him philosophically unreconciled; the existence of a realm of mere appearance is incompatible with the fundamental principle of Parmenides.

§ 20. Zeno of Elea (born about 490–485 B. C.) defended the doctrine of Parmenides by an indirect demonstration, in which he sought to show that the supposition of the real existence of things manifold and changing, leads to contradictions. In particular, he opposed to the reality of motion four arguments: 1. Motion can not begin, because a body in motion can not arrive at another place until it has

passed through an unlimited number of intermediate places. 2. Achilles can not overtake the tortoise, because as often as he reaches the place occupied by the tortoise at a previous moment, the latter has already left it. 3. The flying arrow is at rest; for it is at every moment only in one place. 4. The half of a division of time is equal to the whole; for the same point, moving with the same velocity, traverses an equal distance (*i. e.*, when compared, in the one case, with a point at rest, in the other, with a point in motion) in the one case, in half of a given time, in the other, in the whole of that time.

C. H. E. Lohse, *De Argumentis, quibus Zeno Eleates nullum esse motum demonstravit*, Halle, 1794.
Ch. L. Gerling, *De Zenonis Eleatici paralogismis motum spectantibus*, Marburg, 1825.

Zeno, disciple and friend of Parmenides, is reported (by Strabo, VI. 1) to have joined his master in his ethico-political efforts, and at last (by Diog. Laërt., IX. 26, and many others), after an unsuccessful enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus (or, according to others, Diomedon), to have been seized and put to death amid tortures, which he endured with steadfastness.

In the (Platonic?) dialogue *Parmenides*, a prose writing (*σύγγραμμα*) of Zeno is mentioned, which was distributed into several series of argumentations (*λόγοι*), in each of which a number of hypotheses (*ὑποθέσεις*) were laid down with a view to their *reductio in absurdum*, and so to the indirect demonstration of the truth of the doctrine that Being is One. It is probably on account of this (indirect) method of demonstration from hypotheses, that Aristotle (according to Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 7, and Diog. Laërt., VIII. 57; IX. 25) called Zeno the inventor of dialectic (*εὐρετὴν διαλεκτικῆς*).

If the manifold exists, argues Zeno (*ap. Simplic.*, *Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 30), it must be at the same time infinitely small and infinitely great; the former, because its last divisions are without magnitude, the latter, on account of the infinite number of these divisions. (In this argument Zeno leaves out of consideration the inverse ratio constantly maintained between magnitude and number of parts, as the division advances, whereby the same product is constantly maintained, and he isolates the notions of smallness and number, opposing the one to the other.) In a similar manner Zeno shows that the manifold, if it exists, must be at the same time numerically limited and unlimited.

Zeno argues, further (according to Arist., *Phys.*, IV. 3; cf. Simplic., *In Phys.*, fol. 130 b), against the reality of space. If all that exists were in a given space, this space must be in another space, and so on *in infinitum*.

Against the veracity of sensuous perception, Zeno directed (according to Arist., *Phys.*, VII. 5, and Simplic. on this passage) the following argument: If a measure of millet-grains in falling produce a sound, each single grain and each smallest fraction of a grain must also produce a sound; but if the latter is not the case, then the whole measure of grains, whose effect is but the sum of the effects of its parts, can also produce no sound. (The method of argumentation here employed is similar to that in the first argument against plurality.)

The arguments of Zeno against the reality of motion (cited by Arist., *Phys.*, VI. 2, p. 233 a, 21 and 9, p. 239 b, 5 seq., and the Commentators) have had no insignificant influence on the development of metaphysics in earlier and later times. Aristotle answers the two first (*ibid.* c. 2) with the observation (p. 233 a, 11) that the divisions of time and space are the same and equal (*τὰς αὐτὰς γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἰσὰς διαίρεσεις ὁ χρόνος διαίρεται καὶ τὸ μέγεθος*)

for both time and space are continuous (*συνεχής*); that a distance divisible *in infinitum* can therefore certainly be traversed in a finite time, since the latter is also in like manner divisible *in infinitum*, and the divisions of time correspond with the divisions of space; the infinite in division (*ἀπειρον κατὰ διαιρέσειν*) is to be distinguished from the infinite in extent (*ἄπειρον τοῖς ἐσχατοῦς*); his reply to the third argument (c. 9) is, that time does not consist of single indivisible points (conceived as discontinuous) or of "nows" (p. 239 b, 8: *οὐ γὰρ σῶνται ὁ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων*). In the fourth argument he points out what Zeno, as it seems, had but poorly concealed, viz., the change of the standard of comparison (p. 240 a, 2: *τὸ μὲν παρὰ κινήσεων, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡρεμοῖν*). It can be questioned whether the Aristotelian answers are fully satisfactory for the first three arguments (for in the fourth the paralogism is obvious). Bayle has attacked them in his *Dictionnaire Hist. et Crit.* (Article, *Zénon*). Hegel (*Geschichte der Phil.*, I. p. 316 seq.) defends Aristotle against Bayle. Yet Hegel himself also sees in motion a contradiction; nevertheless, he regards motion as a real fact. Herbart denies the reality of motion on account of the contradiction which, in his opinion, it involves.*

§ 21. Melissus of Samos attempts by a direct demonstration to establish the truth of the fundamental thought of the Eleatic philosophy, that only the One is. By unity, however, he understands rather the continuity of substance than the notional identity of being. That which *is*, the truly existent, is eternal, infinite, one, in all points the same or "like itself," unmoved and passionless.

It is extremely probable that Melissus the philosopher is identical with Melissus the statesman and admiral, who commanded the fleet of the Samians on the occasion of their victory over the Athenians, 440 B. C. (Plut., *Pericl.*, c. 26; *Themist.*, c. 2; Thucyd., I. 117).

Several fragments of the work of Melissus, "On the Existent" (or "On Nature") are found in Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.* (fol. 7, 22, 24, and 34), and *Id.*, in *Arist. De Coelo* (fol. 137); with them agrees almost exactly the section on this philosopher in the Pseudo-Aristotelian work, *De Melisso*, etc. Cf. the works of Brandis, Mullach, and others cited above (§ 17).

If nothing were, argues Melissus, how were it then even possible to speak of it, as of something being? But if any thing is, then it has either become or is eternal. In the former case, it must have arisen either from being or from non-being. But nothing can come from non-being; and being can not have arisen from being, for then there must have been being, before being came to be (became). Hence being did not become; hence it is eternal. It will also not perish; for being can not become non-being, and if being change to being, it has not perished. Therefore it always was and always will be.

As without genesis, and indestructible, being has no beginning and no end; it is, therefore, infinite. (It is easy to perceive here the leap in argumentation from temporal infinity to the infinity of space, which very likely contributed essentially to draw on Melissus Aristotle's reproach of feebleness of thought.)

As infinite, being is One; for if it were dual or plural, its members would mutually limit each other, and so it would not be infinite.

As one, being is unchangeable; for change would pluralize it. More particularly, it is

* In my "*System der Logik*," 2d ed., Bonn, 1865, pp. 176, 387 seq., I have discussed these problems more thoroughly than was possible or appropriate in this place.

unmoved; for there exists no empty space in which it can move, since such a space, if it existed, would be an existing nothing; and being can not move within itself, for then the One would become a *divisum*, hence manifold.

Notwithstanding the infinite extension which Melissus attributes to being, he will not have it called material, since whatever is material has parts, and so can not be a unity.

§ 22. While the later Natural Philosophers asserted with the Eleatics the immutability of substance, they assumed, in opposition to the Eleatics, a plurality of unchangeable substances, and reduced all development and change, all apparent genesis and destruction, to a change in the relations of these substances to one another. In order to explain the orderly change of relations, Empedocles and Anaxagoras taught the existence of a spiritual force in addition to the material substances, while the Atomistic philosophers (Leucippus and Democritus) sought to comprehend all phenomena as products of matter and motion alone. The hylozoism of the earlier natural philosophers was thus superseded in principle by the severance of the moving cause from matter; yet its after-influence remained quite considerable, as seen chiefly in the doctrines of Empedocles, and also, but less prominently, in those of Anaxagoras and the Atomists. Anaxagoras (and Empedocles also, so far as love and hate are represented by him as independent forces, separate from the material elements) advanced in principle to a Dualism of mind and matter; while the Atomists proceeded to Materialism.

The earliest Greek philosophers advanced gradually but constantly from the sphere of sensuous intuition toward the sphere of abstractions. This movement culminated, with the Eleatic philosophers, in the most abstract of all conceptions, the conception of Being. But from the stand-point thus reached it was found impossible to furnish an explanation of phenomena; hence the tendency among the philosophers immediately subsequent to the Eleatics, so to conceive the principle of things that, without denying the unity and constancy of being, a way might yet be opened up leading to the plurality and change of the phenomenal world. In particular, they sought to account for the change and development or the *becoming* of things, which (like their being) remained unexplained in the conceptions of the earlier natural philosophers, by reducing the same to the *motion* (combination and separation) of elements, whose quality is invariable. The boundary-line, which separates the earlier from the later natural philosophy, lies in the Eleatic philosophy, or more precisely in the ontology of Parmenides—not in Xenophanes' theological doctrine of unity. Heraclitus, who taught later than Xenophanes, but earlier than Parmenides, belongs, by the character of his doctrine, to the earlier philosophers, and is not to be associated with the group formed by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists.

§ 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum, born not long after 500 B. C., posits in his didactic poem "On Nature," as the material principles or "roots" of things, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, to

which he joins as moving forces two ideal principles: love as a uniting, and hate as a separating force. The periods of the formation of the world depend on the alternate prevalence of love and hate. During certain periods all heterogeneous elements are separated from each other by hate; during others, they are everywhere united by love. We know things in their material and ideal elements by virtue of the like material and ideal elements in ourselves.

Special works on Empedocles are the following: Frid. Guil. Sturz, *De Empedocle Agrigentini vita et philosophia exposita, carminum reliq. coll.*, Leips. 1805; Amadeus Peyron, *Empedocle et Parmenide fragmenta*, Leips. 1810; H. Ritter, *Ueber die philosophische Lehre des Empedokles*, in Wolf's *Literarische Analekten*, Vol. II., 1820, p. 411 seq.; Lommatsch, *Die Weisheit des Empedokles*, Berl. 1830; Simon Karsten, *Emp. Agrig. carminum reliquias* (vol. 2 of the *Reliquias phil. vet. Græc.*), Amst. 1838; Th. Bergk, *Emp. fragmenta*, in the *Pöhl. lyr. Gr.*, Leips. (1848, '53) 1866; *De proemio Empedocle*, Berl. 1860; Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 116-129; Panzerbieter, *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erläuterung des Empedokles*, Meiningen, 1844, and *Zeitschr. f. A. W.*, 1845, pp. 888 seq.; Raynaud, *De Emp.*, Straßburg, 1846; Mullach, *De Emp. proemio*, Berlin, 1850; *Quæstionum Emp. specimen secundum*, ib. 1852; *Philos. Gr. fragm.*, XIV. seq., 15 seq.; Heinrich Stein, *Emp. Agrig. fragmenta ed., præmissa disp. de Empedocle scriptis*, Bonn, 1852; W. Hollenberg, *Empedocles*, Berlin, 1858 ("Gymnasial-Programm"); E. F. Apelt, *Parmenidis et Empedocle doctrina de mundi structura*, Jena, 1856; A. Gladisch, *Empedocles und die Aegypter, eine histor. Untersuchung, mit Erläuterungen aus den aegypt. Denkmälern* von H. Brugsch und Jos. Passalacqua, Leipzig, 1858; cf. Gladisch, *Emp. und die alten Aegypter*, in Nonck's *Jahrb. für speculat. Philos.*, 1847, Heft 4, No. 82, Heft 5, No. 41; *Das mythische vierseitige Rad bei den alten Aegyptern und Hellenen*, in the *Zeitschr. der deutschen morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, Vol. XV., Heft 2, p. 406 seq.; H. Winnefeld, *Die Philosophie des Empedokles* ("Donauschinger Gymn.-Programm"), Rastatt, 1862.

The testimony of Aristotle (*Met.*, I. 3) requires us to consider Empedocles as a contemporary of Anaxagoras, but younger than the latter philosopher, who was born, probably, about 500 B. C. According to Aristotle (*ap. Diog. L.*, VIII. 52, 74), he lived sixty years, so that we may (with Zeller) adopt 492 and 432 as the approximate dates of his birth and death, respectively. His family belonged to the democratic party, for which Empedocles, like his father Meton, labored successfully. He visited numerous cities in Sicily and Italy in the character of physician, sacrificial priest, and thaumaturgist, claiming for himself magical powers. Aristotle is said (*Diog. L.*, VIII. 57, IX. 25; *Sext. Emp.*, VII. 6) to have termed him the inventor of rhetoric, as he called Zeno the inventor of dialectic.

We know with certainty of only two works written by Empedocles: *περί φύσεως και θανάτου* (*Diog. L.*, VIII. 77); the *ιατρικὸς λόγος* (mentioned by *Diog.*, *ibid.*) may have been a part of the *φυσικά*, and of the tragedy, which was ascribed to him by some, others deny that he was the author (*Diog. L.*, VIII. 57).

Empedocles combats the hypothesis of absolute generation and decay: nothing, which previously was not, can come into being, and nothing existing can be annihilated. The phenomena usually referred to those heads result respectively from the commingling and separation of elements (*μῖξις διάλλαξις τε μυσγόντων*); actual origination (*γένεσις*) is a name void of objective meaning. The mingling of elements is the work of Love (*φιλότης, στοργή, Ἀφροδίτη*), their separation is effectuated by Hate (*Νεῖκος*); to the former Empedocles applies the predicate *ἐπιόφρων* (kindly disposed), the latter he terms destructive, baneful, furious (*ὀλομένην, λυγρόν, μανόμενον*), so that obviously the opposition of these two forces was in his mind in a certain sense identical with that of good and evil. The primitive material elements, which remain unchanged in all mixture and separation, are fire (*πῦρ, ἡλεκτωρ, ἥλιος, Ἡφαιστος, Ζεὺς ἀργήης*), air (*αἰθήρ, οὐρανός, Ἥρη φερέσβιος*), water (*ὕδωρ, δαμνρος,*

πόντος, θάλασσα, Νῆστος), and earth (γῆ, χθών, 'Αἰδωνεύς). Empedocles calls these elements roots (τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα).

In their original condition the elements are described by Empedocles as being all mingled together and forming one all-including sphere (σφαῖρος; Aristotle, following the sense of Empedocles, terms the σφαῖρος the *εὐδαιμονέστατος θεός*, *Met.*, III. 4, p. 1000 b, 3). In this sphere love is supreme and hate is powerless. By the gradual development, however, of the influence of hate the elements become separated and individual things and beings come into existence. When the extreme of separation is reached, when hate alone rules and love is inactive, individual existence disappears again. Then follows a period when love regains its power and unites what was separated, while individual existences appear anew, till at last, love becoming, as at first, sole ruler, individual things again disappear and the original condition is restored. The changes thus described are then repeated in the same order, and continue without end to follow each other in periodical succession. Cf. Arist., *Phys.*, VIII. 1; Plat. (?), *Soph.*, p. 242.

Of the members of the organic creation, the plants sprang first from the earth, while the latter was still in process of development. After them came the animals, their different parts having first formed themselves independently and then been joined by love; subsequently, the ordinary method of reproduction took the place of this original generation (Plutarch, *De Plac. Philos.*, V. 19, 26). At first eyes, arms, etc., existed separately; as the result of their combination arose many monstrosities, which perished; those combinations which were capable of subsisting, persisted, and propagated themselves. Empedocles, in Arist., *De Coelo*, III. 2, and Simpliç., *Comm. in De Coelo*, f. 144 b:

Ἡ πολλὰ μὲν κόρσαι ἀνάχενες ἐβλάστησαν,
 Γυμνοὶ δ' ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες ἐνιδέες ὤμων,
 Ὀμματα δ' οἱ ἐπλανῶτο πνευμένοντα μετώπων.
 — Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμων δαίμων,
 Ταῦτα τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκρυσεν ἕκαστα,
 Ἀλλὰ τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκές ἐξεγένοντο.

By the *δαίμονες* the elements are apparently to be understood, 'Αἰδωνεύς, Νῆστος, etc. This doctrine of Empedocles is thus expressed by Aristotle, *Phys.*, II. 8: *ἔκου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κὰν εἰ ἐνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτομάτου συστάτα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπύλλνται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα*, to which Aristotle replies, that the organisms constructed in apparent conformity to a plan, do not appear singly, as would be expected if their origin were fortuitous, but *ἡ αἰὲς ἡ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*.

Since the higher forms of life can only arise out of the lower, these latter must be regarded as the lower stages, through which the former must pass. Empedocles says (*ap. Diog. L.*, VIII. 77):

Ἡδὴ γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμενι κοῦρός τε κόρη τε
 Θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἄλλι ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.*

* This doctrine may be compared with the natural philosophy of Schelling and Oken and the theory of derivation as propounded by Lamarck and Darwin; still, according to the latter, the progress from lower to higher in the development of species is rather a result of successive differentiations of simple forms, while the Empedoclean doctrine views it as resulting from the combination of heterogeneous forms; but even this difference is only relative. Ernst Hæckel, an investigator who has adopted the theory of Darwin and contributed to its further development, traces (in his *Naturl. Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 2d ed., Berlin, 1870) the "genealogical tree of man" from the "monadic" forms of life down through primitive animals of one and of many cells, radiate infusoria, worms, fishes, reptiles, marsupials, apes and orang-outangs, ending, finally, with "speech-endowed man."

Empedocles explains the workings of distant bodies on each other, and the possibility of the mixture of elements, by the hypothesis of effluxes (*ἀπορροαί*) proceeding from all objects, and of pores (*πόροι*), into which these effluxes enter; some effluxes are adapted to specific pores, for which others would be too large or too small. By this theory Empedocles also accounts for sensuous perception. In the case of seeing, a twofold efflux takes place: on the one hand, effluxes pass from the objects seen to the eye (Plat., *Meno*, p. 76; Arist., *De Sensu et Sensibili*, c. 2, p. 438 a, 4: *ταῖς ἀπορροαῖς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὁραμένων*), while, on the other hand, effluxes from its own internal fire and water pass out through the pores of the eye (Emped. in Arist., p. 437 b, 26 seq.: "Delicate nets in the eye retain the mass of circumambient water, but the fire, wherever it extends, pierces through, as rays of light pass through a lantern,"—in reply to which Aristotle [p. 437 b, 13] objects, that we ought then to be able to see in the dark). The perceived image arises on the meeting of the two streams. Light needs a certain time in which to come from the sun to us (Arist., *De An.*, II. 6; *De Sensu*, c. 6; Aristotle controverts this theory). Sounds arise in the trumpet-shaped auditory passage on the entrance of air in motion. The sensations of *smell* and *taste* depend also on the penetration of fine particles of matter into the appropriate organs (Arist., *De Sensu*, c. 2, 4; Theophr., *De Sensu*, 9). Empedocles ascribed sensation and desire (as did also Anaxagoras and Democritus) to plants (Pseudo-Arist., *περὶ φυτῶν*, I. 1).

We know each element of things through the corresponding element in ourselves, or like by like (*ἡ γνώσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ*, Emped., *ap. Arist.*, *De Anima*, I. 2; *Metaph.*, III. 4, 1000 b, 6; *Sext. Empir.*, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 121, etc.):

γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργῇν. νεῖκος δὲ τε νεῖκεῖ λυγρῷ
ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάντα πεπῆγασιν ἀρμυροθέντα,
καὶ τοῖτοις φρονέουσι καὶ ἡδοντ' ἡδ' ἀνιώνται.

With the philosophemes peculiar to him, Empedocles united the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls (but modified and adapted to his system in the sense above indicated) and a doctrine similar to that of Xenophanes concerning the spirituality of the Deity (unless the *loci* in which this is affirmed are taken, say, from a work falsely attributed to Empedocles).

§ 24. Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ (in Asia-Minor), born about 500 B. C., reduced all origin and decay to a process of mingling and unmingling, but assumed as ultimate elements an unlimited number of primitive, qualitatively determinate substances, which were called by him seeds of things, by Aristotle, elements consisting of homogeneous parts, and by later writers (employing a term formed from the Aristotelian phraseology) Homœomeriæ. Originally there existed, according to Anaxagoras, an orderless mixture of these diminutive parts: "all things were together." But the divine mind, which, as the finest among all things, is simple, unmixed and passionless reason, brought order to them, and out of chaos formed the world. In the explanation of individual existence, Anaxagoras confined himself, according to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, to the search for mechanical

causes, and only fell back on the agency of the divine reason, when he was unable to recognize the presence of such causes.

Essentially the same doctrine of the world-ordering mind is ascribed, among earlier philosophers, to Hermotimus of Clazomense, and among the later, to Archelaus of Miletus (or, according to others, of Athens).

Of the legends of Hermotimus of Clazomenae treat Friedr. Aug. Carus, in Fülleborn's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philos.*, Vol. III., Art. 9, 1796, repr. in Carus' *Nachgel. Werke* (Vol. IV.: *Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.*), Leipzig, 1809, pp. 380-392; Ignat. Denzinger, *De Hermot. Clazomenio comment.*, Liege, 1825.

On Anaxagoras, cf. Friedr. Aug. Carus, *De Anax. cosmotheologiae fontibus*, Leipzig, 1797, and in Carus' *Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.*, Leipzig, 1809, pp. 639-762. *Anaxagoras aus Clazomenä und sein Zeitgeist*, in Fülleborn's *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos.*, Art. 10, 1799, and in Carus' *Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.*, pp. 395-478; J. T. Hemsen, *Anax. Clas.*, Göttingen, 1831; Ed. Schaubach, *Anax. Clas. fragm.*, Leipzig, 1837; Guil. Schorn, *Anax. Clas. et Diogenis Appollontatas fragmenta*, Bonn, 1829; F. J. Clemens, *De philosophia Anaxagoras Clazomenii*, Berlin, 1839; Fr. Breier, *Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras von Clazomenae nach Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1840; Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 60-68; C. M. Zévort, *Dissert. sur la vie et la doctrine d'Anaxagore*, Paris, 1848; Franz Hoffman, *Ueber die Gottesidee des Anaxagoras, Sokrates, und Platon*, Würzburg, 1860 ("Glückwunsch-Programm" to the University of Berlin), cf. Michelet, in "*Der Gedanke*," Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 38-44, and Hoffmann's reply in Fichte's *Zeitschrift für Ph. u. ph. Kritik*, new series, Vol. 40, 1862, pp. 1-48; Aug. Gladisch, *Anax. und die Israeliten*, Leipzig, 1864, cf. Gladisch on *Anax. und die alten Israeliten*, in Niedner's *Zeitschr. für histor. Theol.*, 1849, Heft 4, No. 14; C. Alexi, *Anax. u. s. Philosophie, nach den Fragmenten bei Simplicius ad Arist.* (G.-Fr.), Neu-Ruppin, 1867; Heinr. Beckel, *Anax. doctrina de rebus animatis* (diss.), Münster, 1868.

Anaxagoras was descended from a reputable family in Clazomenæ. From this city he removed to Athens. Here he lived a long time as the friend of Pericles, until, having been accused of impiety on account of his philosophical opinions by the political opponents of the great statesman, he found himself compelled to seek safety in Lampsacus, where he is said to have died soon afterward. The chronological data respecting him are in part discrepant. The accusation took place, according to Diodorus (IX. 38 sq.) and Plutarch (*Pericl.*, c. 38), in the last years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Allowing this date to be correct, it is inadmissible, with K. F. Hermann (*De Philos. Ionic. aetatibus*, Göttingen, 1849, p. 13 seq.), to place the birth of the philosopher in Olymp. 61.3 (534 B. C.); it is more probable that the version of Apollodorus (*ap. Diog. L.*, II. 7) is the correct one, and that Anaxagoras was born in Olymp. 70 (500-496). If he lived in all seventy-two years (as Diog., *ibid.*, reports), the date of his death must be Olymp. 88 (for which we read in Diog., 78—probably an error). In Athens he is said to have lived thirty years; the statement referred (by Diog. L., II. 7) to Demetrius Phalereus, that he began to philosophize in the twentieth year of his life at Athens, while Callias (Calliades?) was archon, probably arose from a misinterpretation of the report that he began to philosophize while Callias was archon at Athens. The statement of Aristotle (*Metaph.*, I. 3), that Anaxagoras was prior to Empedocles in point of age, but subsequent in respect of his (philosophical) performances (τῷ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὑστερος), is probably to be taken purely chronologically, and not as pointing to a relative inferiority or advance in philosophical insight. The difference of age can not have been great. Anaxagoras seems already to have known and to have accepted in a modified form the doctrines of Empedocles.

The written work of Anaxagoras (*περὶ φύσεως*) is mentioned by Plato (*Phaedo*, p. 97) and others.

In the place of the four elements of Empedocles, Anaxagoras assumes the existence of an infinite number of elementary and original substances. Every thing that has parts

qualitatively homogeneous with the whole, owes its origin, according to Anaxagoras (as reported by Aristotle, *Met.*, I. 3), to the coming together (*σύνκρισις*) of these parts from the state of dispersion among other elements, in which they had existed from the beginning. This combination of the homogeneous is, in his view, that which really takes place in what is called becoming or generation. Each primitive particle remains unchanged by this process. In like manner, that which is called destruction, is in fact only separation (*διάκρισις*). Every thing whose parts are homogeneous with the whole (e. g., flesh, blood, bones, gold, silver), Aristotle calls in his terminology *ὁμοιομερές*, in opposition to the *ἑτεροιομερές* (e. g., the animal, and, in general, the organism as a whole), the parts of which are of diverse quality. The expression *τὸ ὁμοιομερές*, *τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ* does not denote originally the homogeneous parts themselves, but the whole, whose parts are homogeneous with each other; but it can also be applied to the parts themselves as smaller wholes, since in that which has throughout the same quality the parts of every part must be homogeneous with one another. In *Metaph.*, I. 3, Aristotle calls the wholes, which, according to Anaxagoras, arise by the mingling together of homogeneous parts, *ὁμοιομερῆ*; in other places he gives the same name to the parts, e. g., *De Coelo*, III. 3: flesh and bones, etc., consist *ἐξ ὁμοίων ὁμοιομερῶν πάντων ἡθροισμένων*; cf. *De Gen. et Corr.*, I. 1: Anaxagoras represents those substances which have like parts, e. g., bones, etc., as the elementary substances (*τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὁστούν καὶ σάρακα καὶ μυελόν*). Lucretius says (I. 834 seq.) that, according to Anaxagoras, every *rerum homoeomeria*, e. g., bones, intestines, etc., consists of smallest substances of the same kind. The plural *ὁμοιομερείαι* is used by later writers (e. g., Plut., *Pericl.*, c. 4; *νοῖν ἀποκρίνοντα τὰς ὁμοιομερείας*) to designate the primitive, ultimate particles themselves (cf. Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, X. 25: *αἱ γὰρ ἀτόμους εἰσόντες ἡ ὁμοιομερείας ἢ ὀγκοῦς*, and Diog. L., II. 8: *ἀρχὰς τὰς ὁμοιομερείας*). Anaxagoras himself calls these original constituents of things "seeds" (*σπέρματα*), and also less precisely (like the objects which they constitute), "things" (*χρήματα*). But not every thing which appears to have like parts is held by Anaxagoras to possess them indeed. It is true that Aristotle in one place, immediately after referring to Empedocles, cites (*Met.*, I. 3) water and fire as examples of substances of homogeneous parts. But where he expresses himself more exactly concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras (*De Gen. et Corr.*, I. 1; *De Coelo*, III. 3), he says expressly that the latter regarded precisely those substances which with Empedocles passed for elementary,—fire, air, water, and earth,—as not internally homogeneous, but as compounds of numerous heterogeneous particles.

Anaxagoras finds the moving and shaping force of the world neither (with the old Ionians) in the nature of the matter assumed as principle itself, nor (with Empedocles) in impersonal psychical potencies, like love and hate, but in a world-ordering mind (*νοῦς*). (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in *Ar. Phys.*, fol. 35 a: *οὐκ οἶα ἐμελλεν εἶσθαι καὶ οὐκ οἶα ἦν καὶ ὥσα νῦν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ οἶα ἐστὶ, πάντα διεκόμηνε νοῦς*.) This mind is distinguished from material natures by its simplicity, independence, knowledge, and supreme power over matter. Every thing else is mixed with parts of all other things besides itself, but mind (*νοῦς*) is pure, unmixed, and subject only to itself. All minds, whatever their relative power or station, are (qualitatively) alike. The mind is the finest of things (*λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων*). Matter, which is inert and without order, it brings into motion, and thereby creates out of chaos the orderly world. There is no fate (*εἰμαρμένη*) and no chance (*τύχη*).

In the primitive condition of things the most heterogeneous substances were, according to Anaxagoras, everywhere intermingled (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in *Arist. Phys.*, fol. 33 b: *ὁμοῖ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἅπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα*, the first words of the work of Anaxagoras). When matter had thus remained inert during an indeterminate period,

the Mind worked upon it, communicating to it motion and order (Arist., *Phys.*, VIII. 1, p. 260 b, 24: *φρόνι γὰρ ἐκείνος* [Ἀναξαγόρας], *ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ ἡρεμούντων τὸν ἀπεριὸν χρόνον, κίνησεν ἐμπεριέσαι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διακρίναι*).

The Mind first effected a *revolving motion* at a single point; but ever-increasing masses were gradually brought within the sphere of this motion, which is still incessantly extending farther and farther in the infinite realm of matter. As the first consequence of this revolving motion, the elementary contraries, fire and air, water and earth, were separated from each other. But a complete separation of dissimilar and union of similar elements was far from being hereby attained, and it was necessary that within each of the masses resulting from this first act, the same process should be repeated. By this means alone could things originate, having parts really homogeneous, *e. g.*, gold, blood, etc. But even these consist not entirely, but only prevailingly, of like parts. In gold, for example, however pure it may seem, there are, says Anaxagoras, not merely particles of gold, but also particles of other metals and of all other things; but the denomination follows the predominant constituent.

In the middle of the world rests the earth, which is shaped like a short section of a cylinder, and is supported by the air. The stars are material; the moon is inhabited like the earth; the sun is a glowing mass of stone (*λίθος δέσπορος*, Diog. L., II. 12), and the stars are of like nature. The moon receives its light from the sun. The sky is full of stones, which occasionally fall to the earth, when the force of their revolving motion is relaxed; witness the meteor of Aegospotomos (Diog. L., II. 8-12). Plants have souls; they sorrow and rejoice. Plants and animals owe their origin to the fecundation of the earth, whence they sprung, by germs previously contained in the air (Theophrast., *Hist. Plant.*, III. 1, 4; *De Causis plantarum*, I. 5, 2). In our perception of things by the senses, like is not known by like, but by unlike, *e. g.*, heat by cold, cold by heat; that which is equally warm (etc.) with ourselves, makes no impression on us. The senses are too weak to know the truth; they do not sufficiently distinguish the constituents of things (Anaxagoras, *ap. Sextus Empir.*, *Adv. Math.* VII. 96: *ἡνὶ ἀπαυρόντερος αἰσὶν οἱ δυνατοὶ ἐπεὶν κρίναι τὰληθές*). By the mind we know the world of external objects; every thing is known to the divine reason (Anax., *ap. Simplic.*, in *Phys.*, f. 33: *πάντα ἐγὼ νοῶς*). The highest satisfaction is found in the thinking knowledge of the universe.

The explanation of phenomena sought by Anaxagoras was essentially the genetic and physical; he did not investigate the nature of their order, which he referred to the *νοῦς*. For this reason Plato and Aristotle (whom, in this particular, Plotinus follows, *Ennead.*, I. 4, 7) charge that his *νοῦς* plays a rather idle rôle. Plato, in the *Phaedo* (p. 97 a.), represents Socrates as saying that he had rejoiced to see the *νοῦς* designated as cause of the order of the world, and had supposed that as the reason why every thing is as it is, the fitness of its being so (the final cause) would be pointed out; but that in this expectation he had been fully deceived, since Anaxagoras specified only mechanical causes. Cf. *Leg.*, XII. 967 b. Aristotle praises Anaxagoras in view of his principle; in rising to the conception of a world-ordering mind, he was like a sober man coming among the drunken; but he knew not how to make the most of this principle, and employed the *νοῦς* only as a mechanical god for a make-shift, wherever the knowledge of natural causes failed him (*Metaph.*, I. 4). If, now, another thinker directed his attention only to that which the *νοῦς* really was for Anaxagoras, not to the word and the possible content of the concept, he must consider a *νοῦς* as cause of motion and distinct from material objects, to be unnecessary (following a line of thought similar to that of Laplace and others, in modern times, who ridicule the "God" of the earlier astronomers, as only "standing upon one side and giving things a push"). Such a philosopher would neces-

early deem it a more scientific procedure to reject the dualism of Anaxagoras, and find in things themselves the sufficient causes of their motions. It is thus that the doctrine of Democritus stands contrasted with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, the conception of the *νοῦς* might occasion a real investigation of the nature of mind, and consequently conduct beyond mere cosmology. In this way, though not till a later period, the Anaxagorean principle continued to exert an influence, not so much in the teachings of the Sophists, as, rather, in those of Socrates and his continuators.

Of Hermotimus, Aristotle says (*Metaph.*, I. 3) that the hypothesis of a world-ordering mind was ascribed to him; but that nothing certain or precise was known in regard to his doctrine. Later writers repeat many miraculous legends concerning the man. Probably he belongs to the ancient "theologians" or cosmogonists. (See above, p. 26.)

Archelaus, the most important among the disciples of Anaxagoras, appears to have interpreted the original medley of all substances as equivalent to air, and to have toned down the antithesis between mind and matter, thus receding again nearer to the older Ionic natural philosophy, and in this respect occupying a position relative to Anaxagoras similar to that of his contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia (mentioned above, § 14, pp. 37 and 38). The doctrine that right and wrong are not natural distinctions (*φύσει*), but depend on human institution, is ascribed to Archelaus.

Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically; by Zeus the *νοῦς* was to be understood, by Athene art (*τέχνη*).

The fine verses, in which Euripides (*ap. Clem. Alex., Strom.*, IV. 25, § 157), with unmistakable reference to Anaxagoras, sings the praises of the investigator, may here be cited:

Ὀλβιος δοτις τῆς ἱστορίας
 ἔσχε μάθησιν, μήτε πολιτῶν
 ἐπὶ πημοσύνας, μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους
 πράξεις δρῶν,
 ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
 κόσμον ἀγήρω, τίς τε συντέτη
 καὶ δπη καὶ δπως·
 τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐδέποτε αἰσχροῦν
 ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

§ 25. Leucippus of Abdera (or Miletus, or Elea) and Democritus of Abdera, the latter, according to his own statement, forty years younger than Anaxagoras, were the founders of the Atomistic philosophy. These philosophers posit, as principles of things, the "full" and the "void," which they identify respectively with being and non-being or something and nothing, the latter, as well as the former, having existence. They characterize the "full" more particularly, as consisting of indivisible, primitive particles of matter, or atoms, which are distinguished from one another, not by their intrinsic qualities, but only geometrically, by their form, position, and arrangement. Fire and the soul are composed of round atoms. Sensation is due to material images, which come from objects and reach the soul

through the senses. The ethical end of man is happiness, which is attained through justice and culture.

Of Democritus treat Schleiermacher, *Ueber das Verhältniss der Schriften des Demokrit bei Diog. L.* (IX. 45 seq.), read Jan. 9, 1815, and printed in his *Sämmtl. Werke*, 8d div., Vol. 3, pp. 223-306; Gellera, *Quaest. Dem.*, Göttingen, 1829; J. F. W. Burchard, *Democriti philosophiae de sensibus fragmenta*, Minden, 1880; *Fragmente der Moral des Abderiten Demokritus*, Minden, 1884; Papencordt, *De atomicoorum doctrina*, Berlin, 1832; Frid. Heimsoeth, *Democriti de anima doctrina*, Bonn, 1885; Kische, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 142-168; Frid. Gull. Aug. Mullach, *Quaestionem Democritearum spec. I-II.*, Berlin, 1885-42; *Democriti operum fragmenta coll., rec., verit., explic. ac de philosophi vita, scriptis et placitis commentatus est*, Berlin, 1848; *Fragm. ph. Gr.*, I. p. 230 seq.; B. ten Brink, *Anecdota Epicharmi, Democriti, etc.*, in the *Philologus*, VI. 1851, p. 577 seq.; *Democriti de se ipso testimonia*, ib. p. 569 seq., VII., 1862, p. 364 seq.; *Democriti Ueber wpi ἀσώπρωτον φύσιν*, ibid. VIII., 1853, p. 414 seq.; Ed. Johnson, *Der Sensualismus des Demokrit* (G.-Pr.), Plauen, 1868.

Of the age of Leucippus and the circumstances of his life little is definitely known; it is also uncertain whether he wrote any thing himself, or whether Aristotle and others drew their information concerning his opinions from the writings of his pupil Democritus. Aristotle commonly names him in connection with Democritus. The statement (Diog. L., IX. 30), that he heard Zeno, the Eleatic, receives confirmation from the character of his doctrine. That the principles of his philosophy were largely derived from the Eleatics is also testified by Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.*, I. 8, 325 a, 26.

Democritus of Abdera, in his work *μυρὸς Διάκοσμος*, said (according to Diog. L., IX. 41) that he wrote this work 730 years after the capture of Troy, and that he was forty years younger than Anaxagoras. He must, according to the latter statement, have been born about 460 B. C., with which date agrees the statement of Apollodorus (*ap. Diog. L., ibid.*), that he was born Ol. 80; according to Thraasyllus (*ibid.*), Ol. 77.3 = 470 B. C.; but for the date of the capture of Troy Democritus appears to have assumed, instead of 1184, the year 1150, whence we derive, as the date of the composition of the work named, the year 420 B. C. He is said to have died at a great age (ninety years old; according to others, one hundred, or even more). Desire for knowledge led him to undertake extended journeys, Egypt and the Orient being among the places visited by him. Plato never mentions him, and speaks only with contempt of the materialistic doctrine. Plato desired, according to the narrative of Aristoxenus, the Aristotelian (in his *ιστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα*, see Diog. L., IX. 40), that the writings of Democritus should be burned, but was convinced by the Pythagoreans Amyclas and Clinias, of the uselessness of such a proceeding, since the books were already widely circulated. Aristotle speaks of Democritus with respect.

Democritus wrote numerous works, among which the *μέγας Διάκοσμος* was the most celebrated. His style is greatly praised by Cicero, Plutarch, and Dionysius, for its clearness and elevation.

The Atomistic system was urged by Democritus, who perfected it and raised it to an acknowledged position, in opposition to the Anaxagorean (in the sense indicated above, at the end of § 24). The relation between Leucippus and Anaxagoras is uncertain. Since Democritus is called by Aristotle (*Metaph.*, I. 4) an *ἐταῖρος* (an intimate companion and disciple) of Leucippus, the difference between their ages can hardly have amounted to forty years, so that Leucippus must have been younger than Anaxagoras. If Anaxagoras did not make himself known by his philosophical productions in early life, it may be that Leucippus (who appears to be immediately associated with the doctrine of Parmenides by his polemic against it) preceded him in this respect; yet this is not very probable, and can by no means be concluded from certain passages of Anaxagoras, in which he combats opinions (in particular the hypothesis of empty inter-atomic spaces) that are, it is true,

found in the writings of the Atomists, but had already been propounded by earlier philosophers (especially by Pythagoreans), and had also been, in part, combated by Parmenides and Empedocles. In view of this uncertainty respecting Leucippus and of the undoubted reference which Democritus constantly makes to Anaxagoras, we place the exposition of the Atomistic system immediately after that of the Anaxagorean. Besides, the nature of the doctrine of Homœomeris, which is a sort of qualitative Atomism, places it in the middle between the four qualitatively different elements of Empedocles and the reduction by Leucippus and Democritus of all apparent qualitative diversity to the merely formal diversity of an infinite number of atoms.

In his account of the principles of the earlier philosophers, in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says (c. 4): "Leucippus and his associate, Democritus, assume as elements the *full* (πλήρες, στερεόν, βαστόν) and the *void* (κενόν, μανόν). The former they term being (ὄν), the latter, non-being (μὴ ὄν); hence they assert, further, that non-being exists as well as being." According to another account (Plutarch., *Adv. Col.*, 4), Democritus expressed himself thus: μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ("Thing is not more real than no-thing"), expressing by the singularly constructed word, δὲν, *something* ("thing"). The number of things in being (atoms) is infinitely great. Each of them is indivisible (ἀτομον). Between them is empty space. In support of the doctrine of empty space, Democritus alleged, according to Aristotle (*Phys.*, IV. 6), the following grounds: 1. Motion requires a vacuum; for that which is full can receive nothing else into itself; 2. Rarefaction and condensation are impossible without the existence of empty intervals of space; 3. Organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of bodies; 4. The amount of water which can be poured into a vessel filled with ashes, although less than the vessel would contain if empty, is not just so much less as the space amounts to, which is taken up by the ashes; hence the one must in part enter into the vacant interstices of the other.

The atoms differ (according to Arist., *Metaph.*, I. 4) in the three particulars of shape (σχῆμα, called ὁσμός by the Atomists themselves, according to Aristotle), order (τάξις, or, in the language of the Atomists, διαθήγη), and position (θέσις, Atomistic τροπή). As an example of difference in shape, Aristotle cites the Greek characters A and N, of order or sequence AN and NA, and of the difference of position Z and N. As being essentially characterized by their shape, Democritus seems to have called the atoms also ἰδέας and σχήματα (Arist., *Phys.*, III. 4; Plut., *Adv. Col.*, 8; Hesych., s. v. ἰδέα). These differences are sufficient, according to the Atomists, to explain the whole circle of phenomena; are not the same letters employed in the composition of a tragedy and a comedy (Arist., *De Gen. et Corr.*, I. 2)? The magnitude of the atoms is diverse. The weight of each atom corresponds with its magnitude.

The cause of the atoms is not to be asked after, for they are eternal, and hence uncaused (Arist., *Phys.*, VIII. 1, p. 262 a, 35: Δημόκριτος τοῦ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἀρχὴν ζῆρειν). (It was probably not the Atomists themselves, but later philosophers, who first hypostasized this very absence of a cause into a species of cause or efficient nature, τὸ αὐτόματον.)

Democritus is said also to have declared the motion of the atoms to be primordial and eternal. But with this statement we find united the other, that the weight of the larger atoms urged them downward more rapidly than the others, by which means the smaller and lighter ones were forced upward, while through their collision with the descending atoms lateral movements were also produced. In this way arose a rotatory motion (δίνη), which, extending farther and farther, occasioned the formation of worlds. In this process homogeneous elements came together (not in consequence of the agency of "love" and "hate," or an all-ruling "Mind," but) in obedience to natural necessity, in virtue of which

things of like weight and shape must come to the same places, just as we observe in the winnowing of grain. Many atoms having become permanently united in the course of their revolutions, larger composite bodies and whole worlds came into existence.

The earth was originally in motion, and continued thus, while it was yet small and light; but gradually it came to rest. Organized beings arose from the moist earth. The soul consists of fine, smooth, and round atoms, which are also atoms of fire. Such atoms are distributed throughout the whole body, but in particular organs they exercise particular functions. The brain is the seat of thought, the heart, of anger, the liver, of desire. When we draw in the breath we inhale soul-atoms from the air; in the expiration of breath we exhale such atoms into the air, and life lasts as long as this double process is continued.

Sensuous perception is explained by effluxes of atoms from the things perceived, whereby images (*εἰδῶλα*) are produced, which strike our senses. Through such *εἰδῶλα*, says Democritus, even the gods manifest themselves to us. Perception is not wholly veracious; it transforms the impressions received. The atoms are invisible on account of their smallness (only excepting, perhaps, those which come from the sun). Atoms and vacuity are all that exists in reality; qualitative differences exist only for us, in the sensuous phenomenon (Νόμῳ γλυκὴ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χροαί· ἐτεῖ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, Democritus, ap. Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 135). The assertion of Democritus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 72), that in reality we know nothing, etc. (ἐτεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ἰδμεν, ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια), must, as employed by him, probably be restricted to the case of sensuous phenomena; for in view of the assurance with which Democritus professes the doctrine of atoms, this skeptical utterance can not be supposed to bear upon that doctrine itself. Democritus (according to Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 138) also expressly distinguished from sensuous perception, which he called obscure knowledge (*σκορία*), the genuine knowledge (*γνησίη*) acquired by the understanding through investigation. That kind of philosophical thinking by which Democritus went beyond the results of sensuous perception and recognized in the atoms the reality of things, was not made by him itself a subject of philosophical reflection, and the manner in which such thinking is effected was left by him without special explanation; it is among the philosophers of the following period (with the earliest among whom Democritus was indeed contemporaneous) that reflection concerning the nature of thought itself begins. Yet it follows from the fundamental principles of Democritus that thought can not be independent of sensation or the *νοῦς* of the *ψυχὴ*, and this inference was expressly drawn by Democritus (Cic., *De Fin.*, I. 6; Plut., *De Pl. Philos.*, IV. 8; cf. Arist., *De An.*, III. 3). The only expression which Democritus appears to have given to his views concerning the origin of true knowledge, is that implied in the principle which he enounced in agreement with Anaxagoras, that we should proceed in our inferences from phenomena (*φαινόμενα*) to the unknown (*ἀόηλα*, see Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 140), and in his doctrine that thought arises when the motions of the soul are "symmetrical" (Theophr., *De Sensu*, 58).

The soul is the noblest part of man; he who loves its goods, loves what is most divine. He who loves the goods of the body, which is the tent of the soul, loves the merely human. The highest good is happiness (*εὐεστώ, εὐθυμία, ἀταραξία, ἀθαμβία*). This is attained by avoiding extremes and observing the limits fixed by nature (*μετρίωσθαι τέρψος καὶ βίαν ξυμμετρίῳ*). Not external goods secure happiness; its seat is the soul (*εὐδαιμονίῃ ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασι οἰκεῖ οὐδ' ἐν χρυσῷ, ψυχὴ δὲ οἰκητήριον δαιμόνος*). Not the act as such, but the will, determines moral character (*ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴδὲ ἐθέλειν—χαριστικὸς οὐκ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ ὅρῳ προσηρημένος*). The highest satisfaction comes from knowledge (Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XIV. 27, 3; Δημόκριτος

ἐπεὶ βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εἶρεν αἰτιολογίαν, ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι). The country of the wise and good is the whole world (ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἰσοθῆς πατρις ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος).

In the ethical theorems of Democritus, as also in those which relate to the difference between objective reality and our subjective apprehension of it, and which belong to the theory of cognition, the tendency to overstep the limits of cosmology becomes manifest—a tendency not wanting to any of the older philosophers and peculiarly natural in those standing on the borders of the first period. Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, but younger than he, went considerably farther in this direction than Anaxagoras or any other of the earlier thinkers.

The first disciples and successors of Democritus (among whom Metrodorus of Chios is the most important) seem to have emphasized more strongly and developed to a greater extent the skeptical elements, which were contained more particularly in his doctrine of sensuous perception.

SECOND (PREVAILINGLY ANTHROPOLOGICAL) PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SKEPTICS.

§ 26. To the Second Period of Greek Philosophy belong, 1) the Sophists, 2) Socrates, the imperfect disciples of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, 3) the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The Sophists, as speculators, regard mainly the phenomena of perception, representation, and desire. Socrates considers principally the phenomena and laws of logical thinking and moral willing, and thus recognizes the essential relation of man, the thinking subject, to the objective world; the more precise investigation of this relation is undertaken by Plato and Aristotle, who also redirect attention to physical philosophy, and who (as regards their political and ethical doctrines) regard man as essentially a social being, or the individual as an essential and a natural part of the body politic. The Stoics and Epicureans, while indeed laying more stress upon the independence of the individual, leave him nevertheless subject to norms of thought and will having universal validity. Finally, Skepticism, which likewise seeks its end in the satisfaction of the needs of the individual subject, prepares the way for a new period, through the dissolution of all existing systems.

The ethical and religious utterances of the poets, historians, etc., of this period contain philosophical matter, but not in philosophical form, and the exposition of them must be left to the historians of literature and of human culture in its more general development.

In this period Athens became the center of Hellenic culture and, especially, of Hellenic philosophy. Pericles (in Thucyd., II. 41) describes Athens as a school of civilization for Greece. In the Platonic dialogue *Protagoras* (p. 337 d), the Sophist, Hippias of Elis, terms Athens "the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Hellas." Isocrates says (*Panegyrr.*, 50): "the Athenian state has caused the name Hellenes to become suggestive rather of intellectual culture than of historical descent." The susceptibility of the Athenians for art and science, their disposition for philosophical reflection, and the consequent establishment of the philosophical schools at Athens, are the most important circumstances in the historic connections of the second period of Greek philosophy.

§ 27. In the doctrine of the Sophists the transition was effected from philosophy as cosmology to philosophy as concerning itself with the thinking and willing subject. Yet the reflection of the Sophists extended only to the recognition of the subject in his immediate *individual* character, and was incompetent, therefore, to establish on a scientific basis the theory of cognition and science of morals, for which it prepared the way. The chief representatives of this tendency were Protagoras the Individualist, Gorgias the Nihilist, Hippias the Polymathist, and Prodicus the Moralist. These men were followed by a younger generation of Sophists, who perverted the philosophical principle of subjectivism more and more, till it ended in mere frivolity.

On the Sophists, compare—in addition to the several chapters which treat of them in the above-cited works of Hegel, Brandis, Zeller, and others, and in Grote's *History of Greece* (V III. pp. 474-544), and K. F. Hermann's *Gesch. u. Syst. der Platon. Philosphie* (pp. 179 seq. and 296 seq.)—in particular, the following works: Jac. Geel, *Historia critica sophistarum, qui Socratis aetate Athenis floruerunt*, in the *Nova acta litt. societ. Rheno-Trajectinae*, p. II., Utr. 1628; Herm. Koller, *Die griechischen Sophisten zu Sokrates' und Plato's Zeit und ihr Einfluss auf Beredsamkeit und Philosophie*, Stuttg. 1889; W. G. F. Roscher, *De historicis doctrinas apud sophistas majores vestigia*, Gött. 1888; W. Baumbauer, *Quam vim sophistas habuerint Athenis ad aetatis suae disciplinam, mores ac studia immutanda*, Utrecht, 1844; H. Schildener, *Die Sophisten*, in Jahn's *Archiv für Philol.*, Vol. XVII., p. 885 seq. 1851; Joh. Frel, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Sophistik*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, VII. 1850, pp. 521-554, and VIII. 1853, pp. 263-279; A. J. Vitrings, *De sophistarum scholis, quas Socratis aetate Athenis floruerunt*, in: *Mnemosyne*, II. 1858, pp. 223-237; Valat, *Essai historique sur les sophistes grecs*, in *L'Investigateur*, Paris, 1859, Sept., pp. 257-267, Nov., pp. 821-836, Dec., pp. 358-361; Theod. Gomperz, *Die griech. Sophisten*, in the *Deutsche Jahrb.*, Vol. VII., Berl. 1868; N. Wecklein, *Die Sophisten und die Sophistik nach den Angaben Plato's*, Würzburg, 1865; Martin Schanz, *Beiträge zur vorsookratischen Philosophie aus Plato*, I. Heft: *Die Sophisten*, Göttingen, 1867; Mullach, *Fragmenta Ph. Graec.*, II., 1867, p. LVIII seq., and "Sophistarum Fragm.," *Ibid.* p. 120 seq.; H. Siebeck, *Das Problem des Wissens bei Sokrates und der Sophistik*, Halle, 1870.

The Sophists are historically of importance not only as rhetoricians, grammarians, and diffusers of various forms of positive knowledge, but also (as, in particular, Hegel has shown) as representatives of a relatively legitimate philosophical stand-point. Their philosophical reflection centered in man, was subjective rather than objective in direction, and thus prepared the way for ethics and logic. That the Sophists should turn their attention

primarily to the natural basis and condition of thought and will alone, i. e., to perception and opinion, to sensuous pleasure and individual desire and will, was natural and necessary; their error consisted in treating this natural basis, beyond which their reflective observation did not extend, as comprehending all the subjective powers and data, and in ignoring or misapprehending the higher. It is none the less true that the doctrine of the Sophists marks a progress in philosophical thought. The sensualistic subjectivism of Protagoras is in one respect superior to the philosophical thinking of Parmenides; for the latter is only concerned with being in general, not (or at least only incidentally) with perception and thought themselves. The sensualism of the Sophists is not itself sensuous perception, but, essentially, reflective thinking concerning perception and opinion, and consequently the next step to that speculation concerning thought as such, which was instituted by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Without those "Sophists," these "philosophers" could not have become what they did become. In considering the judgments expressed by Plato and Aristotle concerning the doctrine of the Sophists, not only should the great difference be borne in mind between the earlier and later generations of Sophists, but also the nature of the standard by which these philosophers judged them. Measured by the ideal principles of Plato, the thinking and the character of the Sophists appear reprehensible; but they were not opposed in principle to the opinions and practices of the times (the Sophists, as Plat., *Rep.*, 493, says, taught τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα), although many of the Sophists disputed in certain respects the authority of tradition. The Sophists, who cultivated chiefly rhetoric and much more rarely the pseudo-dialectical science of dispute ("Eristic"), only prepared the way for the dialectical destruction of naïve, traditional convictions. It was (as Grote correctly remarks) Socrates and his pupils, who first completed this work of destruction and at the same time undertook to furnish a positive substitute for what was destroyed.

If the teaching of the Sophists were only criticism, and had only accomplished the subversion of cosmological philosophy, we should be obliged to include it (as Zeller and others do) in the first period. But since it is essentially characterized by reflection on certain phases of subjective life, it belongs unquestionably to the second period. Even Zeller, who places it in the first, admits (*Ph. d. Gr.*, II. 1, 2d ed. p. 129; cf. also I. p. 725) that "the Sophists first conducted philosophy from objective investigation to ethics and dialectic, and transferred thought to subjective ground."

The essential point in which the Sophists were innovators was this: that they introduced a new kind of instruction, not in any special department, as music or gymnastics, but with a view to the development of a certain universality of culture, a culture which should embrace all the interests of life and which, in particular, should provide the recipients of it with political intelligence; that, further, this instruction was founded on speculations concerning the nature of human volition and thought, and that by it, rather than by tradition or common opinion, they caused the views and practices of the citizens to be determined. This new branch of instruction was by no means given up by Socrates and his disciples; it was only expanded and developed by them in another and more profound manner, so that, with all their opposition to the Sophists, they nevertheless stand with them on the common ground of subjective philosophical speculation (cf. Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles*, chap. 2).

§ 28. Protagoras of Abdera (born about 490), who figured as teacher of rhetoric in numerous Greek cities, especially at Athens, and was a contemporary of Socrates, although considerably older than

he, transferred and applied the doctrine of Heraclitus respecting the eternal flux of all things to the knowing subject, and asserted: Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not. Just as each thing appears to each man, so is it for him. All truth is relative. The existence of the gods is uncertain.

On Protagoras alone, cf. Geist, *De Protagora Sophista*, Giessen, 1827; Leonh. Spengel, *De Protagora rhetore ejusque scriptis*, in his *Zusatzwerk* rexyv, Stuttg. 1828, p. 52 seq.; Ludw. Ferd. Herbst, *Protagoras' Leben und Sophistik aus den Quellen zusammengestellt*, in *Philol.-hist. Studien*, ed. by Petersen, 1st part, Hamb. 1882, p. 88 seq.; Kriesche, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 130-142; Joh. Frei, *Quaestiones Protagoraeae*, Bonn, 1846; O. Weber, *Quaestiones Protagoraeae*, Marburg, 1880; Jak. Bernays, *Die Karabállon des Protagoras*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Phil.*, N. S., VII. 1860, pp. 464-468; A. J. Vitringa, *De Protagoras vita et philosophia*, Groningen, 1858; Friedr. Blass, *Die att. Beredsamkeit*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 28-29. Cf. the works cited, ad § 27.

Plato states (*Protag.*, 317 c, seq.) that Protagoras was considerably older than Socrates. According to a statement in the Platonic dialogue *Meno* (p. 91 e), from which the similar statement of Apollodorus (*ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 56) seems to have been copied, he lived about seventy years; according to another version (*ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 55), he lived more than ninety years. Probably he was born ca. 491, and died ca. 421-415 B. C. He called himself a σοφιστής, i. e., a teacher of wisdom (*Plat., Protag.*, p. 316 d: ὁμολγῶ τε σοφιστής εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἄνθρώπους). The word Sophist acquired its signification as a term of reproach especially through Aristophanes and afterward through the followers of Socrates, particularly Plato and Aristotle, who contrasted themselves, as "philosophers," with the "Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras stood in high consideration with the majority of cultivated people, as Plato's dialogue *Protag.* especially attests, although a respectable and well-to-do Athenian burgher could not himself have been a Sophist (man of letters), and earned money by public lessons. It is well known that at a later time rhetoricians were also called Sophists. Protagoras is said to have prepared the laws for the Athenian colony of Thurii (Heraclides, *ap. Diog. L.*, IX. 50). He was first at Athens between 451 and 445 B. C. (see Frei), next perhaps about 432, and again Ol. 88.3 = 422-421 B. C., and shortly before his death. It is probable that Plato in his dialogue *Protagoras* has with poetic license transferred single circumstances from 422 to 432. On the occasion of his last sojourn at Athens (about 416? or 411?) he was accused and condemned as an atheist. The copies of his work were demanded of their private owners, and burned in the marketplace; he himself perished at sea on his passage to Sicily. The supposition of Epicurus, that he had been a pupil of Democritus (*Diog. L.*, IX. 53; X. 8), is hardly consistent with the relation between their ages, and is improbable on other grounds. On the other hand, it is even affirmed that Democritus mentioned and opposed Protagoras in his writings (*Diog. L.*, IX. 42; Plutarch, *Adv. Coloten*, IV. 2).

In the doctrine of Protagoras Plato finds the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of Heraclitus (*Theaet.*, p. 152 seq.). He admits its validity with reference to sensuous perception (αἰσθησις), but objects to any extension of it beyond this province as an illegitimate generalization of the theory of relativity. (For the rest, there is contained in the proposition, that all that is true, beautiful, and good, is such only for the knowing, feeling, and willing subject, a permanent truth. This truth Protagoras only one-sidedly exaggerated by ignoring the objective factor.)

According to *Diog. L.*, IX. 51, the original words of the fundamental theorem of Protagoras ("Man the measure of all things") were as follows: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον

ἀνθρώπου, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. It remains uncertain how far the manner in which Protagoras established this proposition agreed with that which we find reported in Plato's *Theaetetus* (p. 152 seq.). Diog. L. says of Protagoras that "he first showed how theses might be defended and attacked," and "he first said that on every subject contradictory affirmations could be maintained." It is to the equivocal pseudo-dialectical mode of discussion which is implied in these quotations, and which Protagoras seems to have followed in his work *Ἀντιλογικά*, that Plato alludes in terms of censure in *Phaedo*, p. 101 d, e. Aristotle says (*Metaph.*, III. 2, 32, p. 998 a, 4): ὥστερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἔλθων τοὺς γεωμέτρους, οὐδ' αἱ κινήσεις καὶ ἑλκες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίαι, περὶ ὧν ἡ ἀστρολογία ποιεῖται τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ἀστροῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν, from which it appears that Protagoras sought to meet the objection urged against his sensualistic subjectivism on the ground of the universal validity of geometrical propositions independently of individual opinion, by retorting that, in the sphere of objective reality, simple points, straight lines, and geometrical curves nowhere exist. In this he confounded with mere subjective experience, abstraction when employed as a means of confining the attention to special phases of objective reality.

In illustration of the fundamental idea of Protagoras, a kindred utterance of Goethe may be compared, which will illustrate as well the relative truth of that idea, as the one-sidedness of disallowing an objective norm. "I have observed that I hold that thought to be true which is fruitful for me, which adjusts itself to the general direction of my thought, and at the same time furthers me in it. Now, it is not only possible, but natural, that such a thought should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor further him, perhaps even be a hindrance to him, and so he will hold it to be false; when one is right thoroughly convinced of this he will never indulge in controversy" (*Goethe-Zellercher Briefwechsel*, V. 354). Compare further the following in Goethe's *Maximen und Reflexionen*: "When I know my relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I possess the truth. And thus each may have his own truth, and yet truth is ever the same."

Protagoras won for himself considerable scientific distinction by his philological investigations. He treated of the right use of words (*ὀρθόπειρα*, Plat., *Phaedr.*, 267 c), and he first distinguished the different forms of the sentence which correspond with the moods of the verb (Diog. L., IX. 53: διὰ τε δὲ τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα· εὐχολῆν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολὴν). (But the use of the imperative in such passages as *Iliad*, I. 1: Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, where not a command, but a request, was to be expressed, threw him into a perplexity, from which he could only rescue himself by censuring the Homeric form of expression; v. Arist., *Poet.*, c. 19, p. 1456 b, 15). Protagoras also distinguished the genders of nouns. Those who would perfect themselves in the art of discourse were required by him to combine practice with theory (Stob., *Floril.*, XXIX. 80: Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε μηδὲν εἶναι μῆτε τέχνην ἀνευ μελέτης μῆτε μελέτην ἀνευ τέχνης).

A case, which would otherwise be lost, may be made victorious by the rhetorical art (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, Arist., *Rhet.*, II. 24; Gell., *N. A.*, V. 3). This utterance of Protagoras does not imply that the "weaker" side must necessarily be known to be unjust (as Aristophanes presupposes, who falsely attributes the doctrine to Socrates, *Nub.*, 113). Still, to the prejudice of the moral character of the art of rhetoric, the difference is left unnoticed which subsists between cases where just arguments, which would otherwise remain unremarked, are brought to light, and cases in which the unjust is clothed with the appearance of justice; the Protagorean principle of the identity of appearance and reality rendered such a distinction impossible.

The sentence: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος formed, according to Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 560, the beginning of the work entitled *Καταβάλλοντες* (sc.

λόγος). With the same sentence began also, according to Plat., *Theæt.*, p. 161 c, the *Ἀλήθεια*. No work bearing either of these titles is mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius in his list of the works of Protagoras (D. L., IX. 55). We must, therefore, either assume with Bernays (*Rhein. Mus.*, new series, VII. p. 467), that the *Ἀντιλογίαι* mentioned by Diogenes were identical with the *Καταβάλλοντες* or the *Ἀλήθεια*, or perhaps regard *Ἀντιλογίαι* or *Καταβάλλοντες* as having constituted the general title, while *Ἀλήθεια* was the special name given to the first book. According to the exaggerated and undoubtedly calumnious expression of the Aristotelian, Aristoxenus—whom Phavorinus followed (cited by Diog. L., III. 37 and 57)—Plato drew nearly all the positions of his theory of the ideal state from the *Ἀντιλογικά* (*Ἀντιλογίαι*) of Protagoras. This, while perhaps true of single positions, can not be true of the theory as a whole, owing to the difference of the fundamental principles assumed by Protagoras and Plato. Whether the myth, which Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name (p. 320 c, seq.), really belongs to him, is uncertain, though not improbable.

Of the gods, Protagoras (according to Diog. L., IX. 51) affirmed that he did not know whether they existed or not; for many things hindered this knowledge, such as the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life.

§ 29. Gorgias of Leontini (in Sicily), who came to Athens as ambassador from his native city in the year 427 B. C., was an elder contemporary of Socrates, whom he outlived. He taught chiefly the art of rhetoric. In philosophy he held a doctrine of nihilism, expressed in these three propositions: 1) Nothing exists; 2) If any thing existed, it would be unknowable; 3) If any thing existed and were knowable, the knowledge of it could nevertheless not be communicated to others.

The following works treat specially of Gorgias: H. Ed. Foss, *De Gorgia Leontino commentatio, interpositus est Aristotelis de Gorgia liber emendatius editus*, Halle, 1828; Leonh. Spengel, *De Gorgia rhetora*, 1828, in "Συναγωγή τεχνῶν," Stuttgart, 1828; *Oratores Attici*, ed. J. G. Baiter et Herm. Sauppe, fasc. VII., Zürich, 1845, p. 129 seq.; Frei, *Beitr. zur Gesch. der griech. Sophistik*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, VII. 1850, p. 527 seq. and VIII., 268 seq.; Franz Susemihl, *Ueber das Verhältniss des Gorgias zum Empedokles*, in the *N. Jahrb. für Phil.*, 1854, pp. 40-42; A. Baumstark, *Gorgias von Leontium*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Philol.*, XV. 1860, pp. 624-626; Franz Kern, *Kritische Bemerkungen zum 3. Theil der pseudo-Aristotelischen Schrift π. Ἠερ., π. Ζῆν., π. Γοργίου*, Oldenburg, 1869; Fried. Blass, *Die att. Bereds. von Gorg. bis zu Lysias*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 44-72.

That Gorgias, in Ol. 88.2 (in the summer of the year 427 B. C.), at the head of a Leontine embassy, sought to persuade the Athenians to send help against the Syracusans, is related by Diodorus (XII. 53; cf. Thucyd., III. 86). Plato compares him (*Phaedr.*, p. 261) to Nestor, on account of his oratorical talent, and having reference also, as is probable, to his great age. The approximate dates of his birth and death may (according to Frei) be assumed as respectively 483 and 375 B. C. According to the account given in Athenæus, XI. 505 d, he was still living when the Platonic dialogue *Gorgias* was written, and termed the author of it an *Archilocus redivivus*. He appears to have passed the last part of his life at Larissa, in Thessaly.

According to the Platonic dialogue *Meno* (p. 76 c) Gorgias agreed with Empedocles in the doctrine of effluxes from perceived objects and of pores; and appears to have been in general, a disciple of Empedocles in natural philosophy. Corax and perhaps also Tisias were his predecessors and patterns in rhetoric; the rhetorical manner of Empedocles

appears also to have exercised a powerful influence on him. Gorgias described rhetoric as the worker of conviction (*πειθοῦς δημιουργός*). He is said to have termed tragedy a salutary deception (Plut., *De Gloria Atheniensium*, cap. 5; cf. *De Aud. Poët.*, c. 1: Γοργίας δὲ τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἣν ὁ τε ἀπατήσας δικαίτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος). In his philosophical argumentations Gorgias made use of the contradictory propositions of the earlier philosophers, yet in such a manner as to degrade their earnest tendency into a rhetorical word-play.

In his *Gorgias* (p. 462 seq.) Plato defines sophistry (*σοφιστική*), in the narrower sense of the term, and apparently with special reference to the political and ethical doctrine of Protagoras as a corruption of the art of legislation, and rhetoric (as taught especially by Gorgias and his successors) as a corruption of justice (considered here in a narrower sense than in the *Rep.*, namely, as denoting retribution and reward, *ἀντιπεπονθός*); the characteristic feature in each being flattery (*κολακεία*); these corruptions, he affirms, are not arts, but simply forms of quackery. Plato parallelizes the two arts named, which are included by him under the one name of politics, and their corruptions, as having reference all of them to the soul, with an equal number of "businesses" (*ἐπιτηδεύσεις*), which have reference to the body, namely, the art of legislation with gymnastics, justice with the healing art, sophistry with the art of adornment, and rhetoric with the art of cookery. But in these depreciatory definitions and comparisons he refers less to the doctrines of Gorgias than to the practice of some of his successors, who were less scrupulous than Gorgias himself, about ignoring the dependence of true rhetoric on the knowledge of what is truly good and just, and who abandoned themselves exclusively to the chase after "joy and pleasure."

The main contents of the work of Gorgias, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως*, are found in Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII 65 seq., and in the last chapters of the treatise, *De Melisso, Xenophane (or Zenone) et Gorgia*. 1) Nothing is; for if any thing were, its being must be either derived or eternal; but it can not have been derived, whether from the existent or from the non-existent (according to the Eleatics); nor can it be eternal, for then it must be infinite; but the infinite is nowhere, since it can neither be in itself nor in any thing else, and what is nowhere, is not. 2) If any thing were, it could not be known; for if knowledge of the existent were possible, then all that is thought must be, and the non-existing could not even be thought of; but then error would be impossible, even though one should affirm that a contest with chariots took place on the sea, which is absurd. 3) If knowledge were possible, yet it could not be communicated; for every sign differs from the thing it signifies; how can any one communicate by words the notion of color, seeing that the ear hears not colors, but sounds? And how can the same idea be in two persons, who are yet different from one another?

In a certain sense every opinion is, according to Protagoras, true; according to Gorgias, false. But each of these positions leads equally to the negation of objective truth, and implies the complete substitution of mere persuasion for conviction.

§ 30. Hippias of Elis, one of the younger contemporaries of Protagoras, and distinguished more for rhetorical talent and for his mathematical, astronomical, and archæological acquisitions, than for his philosophical doctrines, exhibits the ethical stand-point of the Sophistic philosophy in the position ascribed to him by Plato, that the law is the tyrant of men, since it forces them to do many things contrary to nature.

On Hippias, cf. Leonh. Spengel, *De Hippias Elco ejusque scriptis*, in "*Συναγωγή νεκρῶν*," Stuttg. 1838; Omann, *Der Sophist Hippias als Archäolog*, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., II. 1848, p. 496 seq.; C. Müller, *Hippias Elci fragmenta coll.*, in *Fragmenta historica Graeca*, Vol. II., Paris, 1848; Jac. Mahly, *Der Sophist H. v. E.*, *Rh. Mus.*, N. S., XV. 1860, pp. 514-585, and XVI. 1861, pp. 38-49; F. Blass, *Die att. Bereds.*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 81-88.

In the congress of Sophists which Plato represents in his dialogue *Protagoras* as being held in the house of Callias, shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Hippias appears as a man in middle life, considerably younger than Protagoras. According to *Prot.*, p. 318, he gave instruction in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Cf. also Pseudo-Plat., *Hippias Major*, p. 285 c.

In *Prot.*, p. 387 c, Plato puts into the mouth of Hippias the doctrine above enunciated: *ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ἐν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται*. He finds it contrary to nature that differences of country and laws should estrange from each other men of education, who are united by a natural kinship (*φύσει συγγενεῖς*). In Xenophon (*Memor.*, IV. 4) he contends against the duty of respecting the laws by urging their diversity and instability. Yet in his ethical deliverances Hippias seems as little as other Sophists to have placed himself in conscious and radical antagonism to the spirit of the Grecian people; monitions and rules of life like those which in the dialogue, *Hippias Major* (p. 286 a), he represents Nestor as giving to Neoptolemus, may have been uttered by him with a fair degree of good faith.

§ 31. Prodicus of Ceos, by his parenetical discourses on moral subjects (among which "Hercules at the Cross-roads" is the one best known) and by his distinctions of words of similar signification, prepared the way for the ethical and logical efforts of Socrates. Yet he did not go materially beyond the stand-point of the older Sophists.

Cf. on Prodicus, L. Spengel, *De Prodicio Ceo*, in "*Συναγωγή νεκρῶν*," p. 46 seq.; F. G. Welcker, *Prodicus, der Vorgänger des Sokrates*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, I. 1838, pp. 1-30 and 688-648 (cf. IV. 1836, p. 355 seq.), and in Welcker's *Kl. Schr.*, II. pp. 398-541; Hummel, *De Prodicio sophista*, Leyden, 1847; E. Cougny, *De Prodicio Ceo, Socratis magistro*, Paris, 1858; Diemer, *De Prod. Ceo (G.-Pr.)*, Corbach, 1869; Kraemer, *Die Allegorie des Prodikos und der Traum des Lukianos*, in the *N. Jahrb. f. Ph. und Päd.*, vol. 94, 1866, pp. 439-448; F. Blass, *Die att. Bereds.*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 29-31.

Prodicus appears from Plato's *Protagoras* to have been younger than Protagoras, and of about the same age with Hippias. Socrates recommended his instruction in many instances to young men, though, indeed, only to such as he found ill-adapted for dialectical training (*Plat., Theaet.*, 151 b), and he sometimes terms himself (*Plat., Protag.*, 341 a; cf. *Charm.*, 163 d, *Crat.*, 384 b, *Meno*, 96 d), a pupil of Prodicus, though more sportively than seriously. Plato pictures him in the *Protag.* as effeminate, and as, in his distinctions of words, somewhat pedantic. Yet his most considerable philosophical merit is founded on his investigations of synonyms.

The men of the earliest times, said Prodicus, deified whatever was useful to them, and so bread was venerated as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, fire as Hephaestus, etc. (*Cic., De Nat. Deorum*, I. 42, 118; Sertus Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 18, 51 seq.).

Xenophon (*Memor.* II. 1. 21 seq.) has imitated the myth of Prodicus concerning the choice of Hercules between virtue and pleasure. Prodicus declared death to be desirable as an escape from the evils of life. His moral consciousness lacked philosophical basis and depth.

§ 32. Of the Later Sophists, in whom the evil consequences of granting exclusive recognition to the accidental opinion and egoistic will of the individual became more and more conspicuous, the best-known are Polus the rhetorician, a pupil of Gorgias; Thrasymachus, who identified right with the personal interest of those who have might, and the pseudo-dialectical jugglers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Many of the most cultivated men at Athens and in other Greek cities (as, notably, Critias, who stood at the head of the thirty oligarchical despots), favored Sophistic principles, though not themselves assuming the functions of Sophists, i. e., of instructors in eloquence and polite learning.

On the later Sophists, see Leonh. Spengel, *De Polo rhetore*, in his "*Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*," Stuttg. 1898, pp. 84-88; *Id. de Thrasymacho rhetore*, *ibid.*, pp. 93-98; C. F. Hermann, *De Thrasymacho Chalcedonense sophista* (*Ind. lect.*), Göttingen, 1848-49; Nic. Bach, *Critias Atheniensis tyranni carminum aliorumque ingenii monumentorum quas supersunt*, Lipsa. 1837; Leonh. Spengel, *De Critia*, in "*Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*," Stuttg. 1898, p. 120 seq. Cf. also Vahlen, *Der Sophist Lycophron, Gorgias; der Rhetor Polykrates*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., XXI., pp. 148-148.

Our information concerning the later Sophists is derived mainly from the descriptions of them given by Plato in his dialogues. Polus figures in the *Gorgias*, Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the *Euthydemus*. To these sources must be added a few notices in Aristotle and others, e. g., *Polit.*, III. 10, p. 1280 b, 10, where it is mentioned that the Sophist Lycophron called the law *ἐγγυητής τῶν δικαίων*. Yet in respect to some of the more important Sophists, still other accounts and even fragments of their writings have been preserved to us.

Critias declared (according to Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 54; cf. Plat., *Leges*, X., 889 e) that the belief in the existence of gods was the "invention of a wise statesman, who, by thus disguising truth in falsehood, aimed at securing a more willing obedience on the part of the citizens (*διδαγμάτων ἀριστον εἰσηγήσασθαι, ψευδεὶ καλῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ*). Critias regarded the blood as the seat and substratum of the soul (Arist., *De Anima*, I. 2).

According to the account given by Plato in the *Protag.* (p. 314 e, seq.), some of those who composed the circle of educated Athenians who met in the house of Callias, adhered particularly to Protagoras (such as Callias himself, Charmides, and others), others to Hippias (viz.: Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others), and still others to Prodicus (Pausanias, Agathon, etc.), although they could not be regarded as, properly speaking, the disciples of those Sophists, or as standing exclusively under their influence.

The Sophist Antiphon (apparently to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator) occupied himself with problems connected with the theory of cognition (*περὶ ἀληθείας*), with mathematics, astronomy, and meteorology, and with politics (see Arist., *De Soph. El.*, c. 11, p. 172 a, 2; *Phys.*, I. 1, p. 185 a, 17; Sauppe, in the *Oratores Attici*, on the orator Antiphon; J. Bernays, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, new series, IX. 255 seq.). Hippodamus of Miletus, the architect, and Phaleas, the Chalcedonian, also propounded political theories; see above, § 16.

Evemus of Paros, a contemporary of Socrates, is mentioned by Plato (*Apol.*, 20 a; *Phaedr.*, 267 a; *Phaedo*, 60 d) as a poet, rhetorician, and teacher of "human and political virtue." Cf. Spengel, *Συναγ. τεχνῶν*, 92 seq.; Bergk, *Lyr. Gr.*, 474 seq.

To the time and school of the Sophists belongs Xenias of Corinth, whom Sextus Empiricus (*Hypotyp. Pyrrhon.*, II. 18; *Adv. Math.*, VII. 48 and 53; VIII. 5) classes as a

Skeptic, representing that (in his skepticism) he agreed with Xenophanes the Eleatic. Xenocrates affirmed (according to Sext., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 53) that all was deception, every idea and opinion was false (πάντ εἶναι ψευδῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψευδεσθαι), and that whatever came into being, came forth from nothing, and whatever perished, passed into nothing. Sextus affirms (*Adv. M.*, VII. 53) that Democritus referred to Xenocrates in his works.

The dithyrambic poet, Diagoras of Melos, must not be included among the Sophists. Of Diagoras it was said that he became an atheist because he saw that a crying injustice remained unpunished by the gods. Since Aristophanes alludes to the sentencing of Diagoras,—in the "Birds" (v. 1073), which piece was represented on the stage in Olymp. 91.2,—we are led easily to the inference that the "injustice" referred to was the slaughter of the Melians by the Athenians (in 416 B. C.; see Thucyd., V. 116); the allusion of Aristophanes in the "Clouds" (v. 380) to the atheism of the Melian must, therefore, have been inserted in a second, revised edition of this comedy. Perhaps the prosecutions of religious offenders, which took place after the desecration of the images of Hermes, in the year 415, had some influence in bringing about the punishment of Diagoras. Diagoras is said to have perished by shipwreck, while attempting to escape.

§ 33. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, was born in Olymp. 77.1-3,—according to later tradition, on the 6th day of the month Thargelion (hence in 471-469 B. C., in May or June). He agreed with the Sophists in the general tendency to make man the special object of reflection and study. He differed from them by directing his attention not merely to the elementary functions of man as a logical and moral subject, viz., to perception, opinion, and sensuous and egotistical desire, but also to the highest intellectual functions which stand in essential relation to the sphere of objective reality, namely, to knowledge and virtue. Socrates made all virtue dependent on knowledge, *i. e.*, on moral insight; regarding the former as flowing necessarily from the latter. Virtue, according to Socrates, could be taught, and all virtue was one. Aristotle (whose testimony is confirmed by Plato and Xenophon) testifies that Socrates first introduced induction and definition, together with the dialectical art of refuting false knowledge, as instruments of philosophical inquiry. The foundation of the Socratic *Maieutic* and *Irony* was dexterity in the employment of the methods of inductive definition in conversations relative to philosophical and, in particular, to moral problems, in the absence of systematically developed, substantive knowledge. The "demonic sign," which was accepted by Socrates as the voice of God, was a conviction, resulting from practical tact, with reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness of given courses of action (including also their ethical relations). The world is governed by a supreme, divine intelligence.

The accusation of Socrates, which took place in the year 399 B. C. (Ol. 95.1), not long after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, and which was brought forward by Meletus, and supported by Anytus, the democratic politician, and Lycon, the orator, contained substantially the same charges which Aristophanes had made in the "Clouds." It ran thus: "Socrates is a public offender in that he does not recognize the gods which the state recognizes, but introduces new demoniacal beings; he has also offended by corrupting the youth." This accusation was literally false; but, considered with reference to its more profound basis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essential relationship between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and, in their common opposition to an immediate, unreflecting submission to the customs, law, and faith of the people and the state. But it mistook, on the one hand, what was legitimate in this tendency in general; and, on the other,—and this is the principal point,—it ignored the specific difference between the Socratic and Sophistic stand-points, or the earnest desire and endeavor of Socrates, in distinction from the Sophists, to place truth and morality on a new and deeper foundation.

After his condemnation, Socrates submitted his conduct, but not his convictions, to the decision of his judges. His death, justly immortalized by his disciples, assured to his ideal tendency the most general and lasting influence.

Dan. Heinsius, *De doctrina et moribus Socratis*, Leyden, 1627.

Frérot, *Observations sur les causes et sur quelques circonstances de la condamnation de Socrate*, an essay read in the year 1736, and published in the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, T. 47 b, 200 seq. (Combats the old uncritical view of the Sophists as instigators of the accusation and sentence of Socrates, and points out the political causes of these transactions.)

Sig. Fr. Dresig, *Epistola de Socrate juste damnato*, Leips. 1738. (As an opponent of the legality existing democracy, Socrates was justly condemned.)

M. C. E. Kettner, *Socrat. criminis majestatis accus. vind.*, Leipsic, 1788.

Joh. Luzzac, *Oratio de Socrate civis*, Leyden, 1796; cf. *Lect. Atticæ: De βίῳ αὐτῷ Socratis*, Leyden, 1809 (wherein the mutual antipathy of the Peripatetics and Platonists is pointed out as one among other impure sources of many unfavorable narrations respecting Socrates and his disciples).

Georg Wiggers, *Sokrates als Menek, Bürger und Philosoph*, Rostock, 1807, 2d ed., Neustrellitz, 1811.

Ludolph Dissen, *De philosophia morali in Xenophonis de Socrate commentariis tradita*, 1812, and in D.'s *Kleine Schriften*, Gött. 1839, pp. 57-68. (Dissen brings together in systematic order the Socratic thoughts contained in Xenophon, but considers the narrative of Xenophon inexact, on account of his having unjustly attributed to Socrates his own utilitarian stand-point.)

Friedr. Schleiermacher, *Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen*, read in the Berlin *Akad. der Wiss.*, July 27, 1815, published in the *Abh. der philos. Classe*, Berlin, 1818, p. 50 seq., and in Schleiermacher's *Sämmtl. Werke*, III. 2, 1838, pp. 287-308. (The idea of knowledge, says Schleiermacher, is the central point of the Socratic philosophy; the proof of this is to be found—in view of the discrepancy between the reports of the nearest witnesses, the too prosaic Xenophon and the idealizing Plato—in the different character of Greek philosophy before and after Socrates. Before him, single departments of philosophy, so far as they

were at all distinguished from each other, were developed by isolated groups of philosophers; while after him, all departments were logically discriminated and cultivated by every school. Socrates himself must, therefore, while having no system of his own, yet represent the logical principle which makes the construction of complete systems possible, i. e., the idea of knowledge.)

Ferd. Delbrück, *Sokrates*, Cologne, 1819.

W. Sßvern, *Ueber Aristophanes' Wolken*, Berl. 1826. (According to Sßvern, Aristophanes confounded Socrates with the Sophists.)

Ch. A. Brandis, *Grundlinien der Lehre des Sokrates*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. I., 1827, pp. 118-150.

Herm. Theod. Röscher, *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter*, Berlin, 1837. (In this work Röscher published for the first time in a detailed and popular form—particularly in the section on the "Clouds"—the Hegelian view of Socrates, as the representative of the principle of subjectivity, in opposition to the principle of "substantial morality," on which the ancient state, according to Hegel, was founded—and of the attack of Aristophanes and the subsequent accusation and condemnation of Socrates, as representing the conflict of these two principles. Röscher treats the narrative of Xenophon as the most impartial evidence in regard to the original teaching of Socrates. Cf. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 560 seq.; *Ästhetik*, III. p. 387 seq.; *Vorl. über die Gesch. der Phil.*, II. p. 81 seq.)

Ch. A. Brandis, *Ueber die vorgebliche Subjectivität der Sokratischen Lehre*, *Rhein. Mus.*, II. 1828, pp. 85-113. (In opposition to the view supported by Röscher, concerning the stand-point of Socrates and the fidelity of the accounts of Xenophon.)

P. W. Forchhammer, *Die Athener und Sokrates, die Gesetlichen und der Revolutionär*, Berlin, 1837. (Forchhammer goes to an altogether untenable extreme in his recognition of the justification of the Athenians in condemning Socrates, yet his special elucidation of the political circumstances is a work of merit. Cf. in reference to the same subject, Bendixen, *Ueber den tieferen Schriftsinn des revolutionären Sokrates und der gesetlichen Athener*, Haysum, 1838.)

C. F. Hermann, *De Socratis magistria et disciplina juvenili*, Marburg, 1837.

Ph. Guill. van Heusde, *Characterist. principum philosophorum veterum, Socratis, Platonis, Aristotelis*, Amsterdam, 1839. "On the Cosmopolitanism of Socrates," "On Xanthippe," "On the Clouds of Aristophanes;" in the *Verslagen en Med. of the K. Akad. van W.*, IV. 8, 1859; see the articles in the *Philologus*, XVI., pp. 383 seq. and 566 seq.

J. W. Hanne, *Sokrates als Genius der Humanität*, Brunswick, 1841.

C. F. Hermann, *De Socratis accusatoribus*, Gött. 1854.

Ernst von Lassaulx, *Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod, nach den Zeugnissen der Alten dargestellt*, Munich, 1857.

[J. P. Potter, *Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates and Plato*, London, 1845. R. D. Hampden, *The Fathers of Greek Philosophy* (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—articles reprinted from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*), Edinburgh, 1862. E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, translated from the German by O. Reichel, London, 1863.—Tr.]

E. A. Alberti, *Sokrates, ein Versuch über ihn nach den Quellen*, Göttingen, 1860.

The political bearings of the trial of Socrates are very comprehensively and exactly developed in G. Grote's *History of Greece*, chap. 63 (Vol. VIII. pp. 551-684).

Of the numerous lectures and essays on Socrates we name here the following: C. W. Brumbey, *S. nach Diag. L.*, Lemgo, 1800; Friedr. Aug. Carna, *Sokrates*, in his *Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.*, Leipzig, 1808, pp. 514-555; F. Lélut, *De Démon de Socrate*, Paris, 1836; Aug. Boeckh, *De Soc. rerum physicarum studio*, 1838; H. E. Hummel, *De Theologia Soc.*, Gött. 1839; J. D. van Hoëvell, *De Soc. philosophia*, Groningen, 1840; Zeller, *Zur Ehrenrettung der Xanthippe*, in the *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*, 1839, No. 265 seq., and in Zeller's *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1863, pp. 51-61; Hurndall, *De philos. mor. Soc.*, Heidelberg, 1838; C. M. Fleischer, *De Soc. quam dicunt utopia*, "Progr." of the Gymn. at Cleve, 1855; Hermann Köchly, *Sokrates und sein Volk, akadem. Vortrag gehalten 1855*, in Köchly's *Akad. Vortr. und Reden*, I., Zürich, 1859, pp. 219-398; cf. the review by K. Lehrs in the *N. Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Päd.*, Vol. LX XIX., 1859, pp. 555 seq.; Seibert, *Sokr. und Christus*, in the *Päd. Archiv*, ed. by Langbein, I., Stettin, 1859, pp. 291-307; L. Noack, *Sokrates und die Sophisten*, in *Psyche*, Vol. II., 1859; G. Mehring, *Ueber Sokr.*, in Fichte's *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, Vol. XXXVI., Halle, 1860, pp. 81-119; F. Ueberweg, *Ueber Sokr.*, in Geiser's *Protest. Monatsbl.*, Vol. XVI., No. 1, July, 1860; Steffensen, *ibid.*, Vol. XVII., No. 2; A. Böhlinger, *Der philos. Standpunkt des Sokrates*, Carlsruhe, 1860, *Ueber die Wolken des Aristophanes*, *ibid.*, 1863; H. Schmidt, *Sokrates, Vortrag gehalten in Wittenberg*, Halle, 1860; W. F. Volkmann, *Die Lehre des Sokrates in ihrer Meteor. Stellung*, in the *Abh. der Bhm. Ges. der Wiss.*, Fifth Series, Vol. XL., Prague, 1861, pp. 199-223; Bartelmann, *De Socrate (G.-Fr.)*, Oldenburg, 1862; Phil. Jak. Ditzgen, *Die epagogische oder inductivische Methode des Sokrates und der Begriff (G.-Fr.)*, Cologne, 1864; M. Carrière, *S. u. s. Stellung in der Gesch. des menschl. Geistes*, in Westermann's *Monatsbl.*, 1864, No. 92; Bourneville, *Socrate était-il fou? réponses à M. Bally, membre de l'acad. extr. du journal de méd. mentale*, June, 1864; Ch. H. Bertram, *Der Sokrates des Xenophon und der des Aristophanes*,

(*G.-Progr.*), Magdeb. 1865; Frans Dittich, *De Socratis sententia, virtutem esse scientiam, Index Lect. Lycet. Hasslari*, Braunsberg, 1868; Joh. Peters, *De Socrate qui est in Atticorum antiqua comœdia disput.* ("Progr." of the Gymn. at Beuthen), Leipzig, 1869; E. Chaignet, *Vie de S.*, Paris, 1869; P. Montée, *La philos. de S.*, Arras, 1869; H. Siebeck (see above, § 37).

On the intellectual development of Socrates and the relation thereto of Plat., *Phaedr.*, 95 e, seq., see Boeckh in the *Summer Catalogue*, Berlin, 1838; Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. p. 210; Busemihl in the *Philologus*, XX., 1863, p. 236 seq.; Ueberweg, *ibid.* XXI. 1864, p. 20 seq., and Volquardsen, *Rh. Mus.*, New Series, XIX. 1864, pp. 505-520.

On the "Demon" of Socrates, cf. Kühner, in his edition of the *Memorabilia*, (*Bibl. Græc.*, cur. F. Jacobs et V. Chr. F. Roet, *Sor. Orat. Ped.*), Vol. VIII., Gotha, 1841, pp. 18-25, where other earlier works are cited; of later writers, cf., besides Brandis, Zeller, and others, C. F. Volquardsen, *Das Dæmonium des Sokrates und seine Interpreten*, Kiel, 1863; L. Breitenbach, *Zeitschrift f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, XVII. 1863, pp. 499-511; Chr. Cron, in the *Eos, sidd. Zeitschr. für Philol. u. Gymnasialwesen*, ed. by L. Ulrichs, B. Stark, and L. v. Jan, L. Würzburg, 1864, pp. 169-179; P. W. Freymüller, *Progr.*, Metten, 1864; Ferd. Fridr. Hüglin, *Das Dæmonium des Sokrates*, Berna, 1864.

For determining the year of the birth of Socrates we find our surest data in the recorded year of his death and the number of years that he is known to have lived. Socrates drank the cup of poison in the month of Thargelion, in Ol. 95.1 (= 400-399), hence in May or June, 399 B. C. (on the 20th of Thargelion, acc. to K. F. Hermann, *De Theoria Delica*, in the *Index. Lect.*, Gott. 1846-47). At the time of his condemnation he was, according to his own account in Plat., *Apol.*, 17 d, more than seventy years old (*ἔτη γεγονὸς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα*). He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 469, or rather certainly before 469. In the Platonic dialogue *Crito* (p. 52 e), Socrates represents the laws of Athens as saying to him: "For the space of seventy years you have been at liberty, Socrates, to quit Athens, if you were dissatisfied with us." This also points to an age of more than seventy years. Hence Ol. 70.1 or 2 is to be assumed as the year of his birth. (Cf. Boeckh, *Corpus Inscript.*, II. p. 321, and K. F. Hermann, *Plat. Philos.*, p. 666, Note 522). The statement of Apollodorus (Diog. L., II. 44), that Socrates was born in Ol. 77.4, is accordingly inexact. The 6th of the month Thargelion is given (by Apollodorus, *op. Diog. L.*, *ibid.*, and others) as his birthday, and this day, like the 7th of the same month, as the birthday of Plato, was annually celebrated by the Platonists. But the immediate succession of these days one after the other, and still more their coincidence with the days on which the Delians celebrated the birth of (the maieutic) Artemis (6th of Thargelion) and Apollo (Thargelion 7th), are enough to make it probable that the birthdays assigned to both of these philosophers, or at least that of Socrates, are not historical, but were arbitrarily chosen for celebration.

The father of Socrates was a sculptor, and Socrates himself followed his father's occupation for a time; in the time of the Periegetes Pausanias (about A. D. 150), a work executed by Socrates (or at least ascribed to him), and representing the Graces attired, was standing at the entrance to the Acropolis. Plato makes him allude to his mother in *Theæst.*, p. 149 a, where he calls himself *υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης*, and says of himself that he also practices her art of midwifery, when he entices the ideas of his collocutors into the light of day, and examines whether they are genuine and tenable. Socrates received at Athens in his youth the education prescribed by the laws (Plat., *Crito*, 50 d), and made himself also acquainted with geometry and astronomy (Xen., *Memor.*, IV. 7). That he "heard" Anaxagoras or Archelaus is reported only by untrustworthy authorities. Plato accounts (*Phædo*, 97 f.) for his acquaintance with the opinions of Anaxagoras by supposing that he had read the work written by that philosopher. Socrates was also familiar with the doctrines of other natural philosophers (*Mem.*, I. 1. 14; IV. 7. 6), although he did not accept them; he read critically (according to Xen., *Mem.*, I. 6. 14; cf. IV. 2. 1 and 8) the writings of the early sages (*τοὺς θεστυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς λείπει*

κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχονται, καὶ ἂν τε ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα). The meeting with Parmenides, mentioned by Plato, is probably to be regarded as historic (see above, § 19). A material influence on his philosophical development was exercised by the Sophists, to whose discourses he sometimes listened, and with whom he often conversed, and to whom, also, he not unfrequently directed others (*Plat., Theaet.*, 151 b). He sometimes speaks of himself in Plato's works (*Protag.*, 341 a; cf. *Meno*, 96 d; *Charmides*, 163 d; *Cratyl.*, 384 d; *Hipp. Maj.*, 252 c) as a pupil of Prodicus, yet not without a shade of irony, aimed especially at the subtle word-distinctions of that Sophist. A Platonic testimony respecting the course of the intellectual development of Socrates may be regarded as contained substantially in *Phaedo*, p. 95 seq., although the Platonic conception and representation of Socrates is here, as everywhere, influenced by the, not Socratic, but Platonic doctrine of ideas (see Boeckh, in the *Sommer-Katalog. der Univ.*, Berlin, 1838, and my *Plat. Untersuchungen*, Vienna, 1861, pp. 92-94, and later works relative to the mental development of Socrates, cited above, p. 83). Plato transfers to Socrates from his own thought only that which (like the theory of ideas and the ideal of the state) would naturally follow from the views actually held by the historical Socrates; Plato can not have ascribed to Socrates the history of his own mental development, inasmuch as it was demonstrably other than that portrayed in the passage in question.

Socrates (according to *Pl., Apol.*, 28 e) took part in three military campaigns, viz.: in the campaigns of Potidæa (between 432 and 429, cf. *Pl., Sympos.*, 219 e, and *Charm., init.*), Delium (424, cf. *Symp.*, 221 a, *Lach.*, 181 a), and Amphipolis (422). He demonstrated his fidelity to the laws during his life under democratic and oligarchical rulers (*Apol.*, p. 32), and at last by scorning to save his life by flight (*Pl., Crito*, p. 44 seq.). Beyond this, Socrates kept himself remote from political affairs. His only vocation, as he believed, was to strive, by means of his dialectic, to quicken the moral insight and influence the moral conduct of individuals, as he was convinced that this form of activity was most advantageous for himself and his fellow-citizens (*Pl., Apol.*, p. 29 seq.).

In the writings of the disciples of Socrates, the latter appears almost always as a man already advanced in years, such as they themselves had known him. In their delineations of his character, the leading feature is the utter discrepancy between the interior and the exterior—which, to the Hellenic mind, accustomed to harmony, was an *ἀνόνον*—his similarity with Sileni and Satyrs in personal appearance and the homeliness of his conversational discourses, combined with the most sterling moral worth, the most complete self-control in pleasure and privation, and a masterly talent in philosophical dialogue (*Xen., Mem.*, IV. 4. 5; IV. 8. 11 et al.; *Sympos.*, IV. 19; V. 5; *Plat., Symp.*, pp. 215, 221).

In their account of the life of Socrates, the two principal authorities, Xenophon and Plato, substantially agree, although the Platonic picture is sketched with the more delicate hand. As to their reports of his doctrine, it is, first of all, unquestionably true that Plato in his dialogues generally presents his own thoughts through the mouth of Socrates. But in a certain sense his dialogues can, nevertheless, serve as authorities for the Socratic teaching, because the groundwork of the philosophy of Plato is contained in that of Socrates, and because it is possible, in general, though not in all cases in detail, to discriminate between the Platonic and Socratic elements. Plato took care not to be led by his love of idealization too far from historic truth; in some of his compositions (in the *Apology*, in *Crito*, and in part also in the *Protagoras*, *Laches*, etc.) he remains almost entirely faithful to it, and in others puts those doctrines which Socrates could not have professed into the mouth of other philosophers. Xenophon wrote the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium* (for the so-called "Apology of Xenophon" is spurious) not so much in the spirit of a pure historian as in that of an apologist; but his honorable defense of Socrates demands from us full confidence

in his historic fidelity, so far as his intension is concerned. But it must be acknowledged that as much can not be said of his intellectual qualification for an exact and comprehensive understanding of the Socratic philosophy. Xenophon appears to attribute too unconditionally to Socrates the tendency, natural to himself, to connect all scientific activity with a practical purpose, and he thus gives too small a place to the dialectic of Socrates, as compared with his ethical teachings. The brief statements of Aristotle respecting the philosophical doctrines of Socrates are very valuable, since they are purely historical, and relate to the most important points of his teaching.

We read in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (XIII. 4), that Socrates introduced the method of induction and definition (which sets out from the individual and ends in the definition of the general notion—*τοὺς ἑπ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου*). The field of investigation in which Socrates employed this method is designated by Aristotle as the ethical (*Metaph.*, I. 6). The fundamental conception of Socrates was, according to the same authority, the inseparable union of *theoretical insight* with *practical moral excellence* (Arist., *Eth. Nicom.*, VI. 13: *Σωκράτης φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς . . . λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι ἐπιστήμης γὰρ εἶναι πάσας*, cf. Xen., *Mem.*, II. 9. 4 seq.). We find these statements fully confirmed by Plato and Xenophon; only Aristotle may have described Socrates' ideas in more definite, technical language than was used by their author (Xen., *Memor.*, I. 1. 16: *αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἂν δεῖ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τίς ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδὼτας ἤγειτο καλοῦς ἀγαθοῦς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἄγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλιῆσθαι*. Ib. IV. 6. 1: *σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῖσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδεπώποτ' ἔλθεν*. Ib. III. 4. 9 seq.: *σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν . . . ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι*). Holding these opinions, Socrates was convinced that virtue was capable of being taught, that all virtue was in truth only one, and that no one was voluntarily wicked, all wickedness resulting merely from ignorance (Xen., *Memorab.*, III. 9; IV. 6; cf. *Sympos.*, II. 12; Plat., *Apol.*, 25 e, *Protag.*, p. 329 b, seq., 352). The good (*ἀγαθόν*) is identical with the beautiful (*καλόν*) and the useful (*ὠφέλιμον· χρησιμὸν*—*Mem.*, IV. 6. 8 and 9; *Protag.*, 333 d, 353 c, seq.). Better than good fortune (*εὐτυχία*), which is accidental, is a correct praxis, arising from insight and self-discipline (*εὐπραγία*, *Mem.*, III. 9. 14). Self-knowledge, fulfillment of the requirement of the Delphian Apollo, "Know thyself," is the condition of practical excellence (*Mem.*, IV. 2. 24). External goods do not advance their possessor. To want nothing is divine; to want the least possible, brings one nearest to divine perfection (Xen., *Memor.*, I. 6. 10). Cicero's well-known declaration (*Acad. post.*, I. 4. 15; *Tusc.*, V. 4. 10; cf. *Diog. L.*, II. 21), that "Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the cities and houses of men, compelling men to inquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil," indicates, in terms substantially correct, the progress of philosophy in Socrates from the cosmology and physics of his predecessors to anthropological ethics. Socrates, however, possessed no complete system of ethical doctrines, but only the living instinct of inquiry, and could, therefore, naturally arrive at definite ethical theorems only in conversation with others. Hence his art was intellectual midwifery (as Plato terms it, *Theaet.*, p. 149); he enticed forth thoughts from the mind of the respondent and subjected them to examination. With his confessed ignorance,—which yet, as reposing on a lively and exact consciousness of the nature of true knowledge, stood higher than the pretended knowledge of his colloquitors,—was connected the Socratic irony (*εἰρωνεία*), or the apparent deference of Socrates to the superior intelligence and wisdom of others, until these vanished into nothingness before that *dialectical testing*, in the course of which he compared the asserted general

truth with admitted particular facts. In this manner Socrates exercised the vocation which he believed had been indicated for him by the Delphic god, when, in reply to Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men—the vocation, namely, of *examining men* (ἐξέτασις, Plat., *Apol.*, p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of ἔρως, love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instrument in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of his listeners.

The fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority properly belongs to the intelligent (ἐπιστάμενος), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenoph., *Memorab.*, III. 9. 10; cf. III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to those whom he rules (the ποιμήν λαῶν, of Homer). His business, his "virtue," is to make them happy (τὸ εὐδαιμόνας ποιεῖν ὃν ἀν ἡγήται, *Mem.*, III. 2. 4; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found fault with the appointment of officers by popular suffrage and by lot (*Mem.*, I. 2. 9; III. 9. 10).

The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflection upon moral questions, his combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge. But since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in every specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of practical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain *practical insight* or *tact*, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man's peculiar work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his δαίμωνιον. In the *Apology* of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: "The reason of my remaining apart from public life is ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαίμωνιον γίγνεται," and he goes on to explain that from his youth up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. This voice he terms, in the *Phaedrus*, "his demonic and familiar sign" (τὸ δαίμονιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον). According to Xen., *Memor.*, IV. 8. 5, this δαίμωνιον interposed its warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, i. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, that he should give himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, than by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the occasional statement of Xenophon that Socrates was shown by the δαίμωνιον "what things he ought to do and what not" (ὃ ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ, *Mem.*, I. 4. 15; IV. 3. 12). The power from which this voice emanated is designated as "the God" (ὁ θεός, *Mem.*, IV. 8. 6), or "the Gods" (οἱ θεοί, *Mem.*, I. 4. 15; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men by the oracles.

Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use must be the work of intelligence (πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμῃς ἔργα εἶναι. *Memor.*, I. 4. 4 seq.; IV. 3. 3 seq.). The Wisdom (φρόνησις), says Socrates, which is present and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disposer of the universe (ὁ τὸν ὅλον

ἀποφιν συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων). The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make known their existence unmistakably by their operations (*Memor.*, IV. 3. 13).

Aristophanes, in the "Clouds" (which were first represented in 423 B. C.), attributes to Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, on the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had not remained without a considerable influence upon him, but more especially in the fact that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, he moved in the same general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by the peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to be found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest in his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely considered the significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his attention, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance.

The same opinion respecting Socrates which we find in Aristophanes, seems also to have been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato's *Euthyphron* (p. 2 b) as a young man, little known, and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic *Apologia* it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by Socrates' demonstration of the ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art (*ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἁχθόμενος*, *Apol.*, p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom Aristophanes mentions in the "Frogs" (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had returned fighting on the side of Thrasylbulus; Socrates says in the *Apologia* (p. 23 e) that he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians (*ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἁχθόμενος*), and in the *Meno* (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was displeased with the depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. According to the *Apology* of Pseudo-Xenophon (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates because the latter thought his son fitted for something better than the leather business, and had counseled him to educate this son for something higher. Lycon felt injured by what Socrates had said of the orators (*ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων*, *Apol.*, 23 e). The accusation ran as follows (*Apol.*, p. 24; Xen., *Mem.*, I. 1; Favorinus, *ap. Diog. La.*, II. 40): *τάδε ἐγράφατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μέλητου Πιπιδεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκον Ἀλωπεκίσθεν ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἑτέρα δὲ κακὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφροῦμενος, ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα· θάνατος.* The ordinary objections against all philosophers were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of the peculiar tendency or aim of his teachings (*Apol.*, 23 d). The particular charges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, *Novae Lectiones*, Leyden, 1858, p. 662 seq., seeks to demonstrate—yet cf. Büchenschütz, in the *Philologus*, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to have been taken, not from the speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the rhetorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The conduct of Socrates is described by Plato with historic fidelity in the essential outlines, in the *Apol.*, in *Crito*, and in the first and last parts of the *Phaedo*. The *Parrhesia* of Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrates

with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (cf. *Æschines, Ad. Timarch.*, § 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the condemnation was voted by only a small majority of voices; according to *Apol.* p. 36 a, he would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the judges had been of a different mind; so that of the probably 500 or 501 judges, either 253 or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minæ, he was (according to *Diog. L.*, II. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank the cup of poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that the death which was to attest his fidelity to his convictions would be most advantageous for him and for his work.

The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put to death, as later writers relate (*Diodorus*, XIV. 37; *Plut.*, *De Invid.*, c. 6; *Diog. L.*, II. 43, VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heracles on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out.

§ 34. In the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the problem for the successors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were of philosophical significance) the larger number, as "partial disciples of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the other part of this double problem; the Megaric or Eristic school of Euclid and the Elian school of Phædo occupying themselves almost exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippus treating, in different senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of pre-Socratic philosophy was continued and expanded. It was Plato, however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a comprehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as all the legitimate elements of earlier systems.

K. F. Hermann, *Die philosophische Stellung der älteren Sokratischer und ihrer Schüler*, in his *Gen. Abhandlungen*, Göttingen, 1849, pp. 227-255.

On *Æschines*, cf. K. F. Hermann, *De Assensu Socratico reliquis discip. acad.*, Göttingen, 1850.

On *Xenophon*, cf. A. Boeckh, *De similitudine, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur*, Berlin, 1811; Niebuhr, *Æt. Schriften*, I, p. 461 seq.; F. Delbrück, *Xenophon*, Bonn, 1829; Hirschig, *De discipulis*

Socrates in vitam et mores antiquorum vi et effusitate, in Xenophontis decem mille Græcos ex Asia eieptos in patriam reducentis exemplo manifesta, in: *Symbolæ litt.*, III., Amsterdam, 1889; J. D. van Hoëvell, *De Xenophontis philosophia*, Groning, 1840; J. H. Lindemann, *Die Lebensansicht des Xen.*, Comitz, 1843; *Die rel.-ëthl. Weltanschauung des Herodot, Thucydides und Xenophon*, Berlin, 1882; P. Werner, *Xenoph. de rebus publ. sententiæ*, Breslau, 1881; Engel, *X. polit. Stellung und Wirksamkeit*, Stargard, 1886; A. Garnier, *Histoire de la Morale: Xenophon*, Paris, 1887.

Cf. also the articles by A. Hug, *Philol.*, VII., 1882, pp. 688-695; and K. F. Hermann, *Philol.*, VIII., 387 seq.; and the opusculæ of Georg Ferd. Rettig, *Unt.-Pr.*, Bern, 1864, on the mutual relation of the Xenophontic and Platonic Symposia, and Arn. Hug's *Die Unschtheit der dem Xenophon zugeschriebenen Apologie des Sokrates*, in Herm. Köchly's *Akad. Vortr. u. Reden*, Zurich, 1859, pp. 480-489. See also H. Henkel, *Xenophon und Isocrates* (*Progr.*), Salzwedel, 1866 (cf. P. Sanneg, *De Scholia Isocrateæ*, diss., Halle, 1867); and A. Nicolai, *Xenophon's Cyropædie und seine Ansicht vom Staat* (*Progr.*), Bernburg, 1867.

Xenophon, who was born about 444 B. C. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. C., and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His *Cyropaedia* is a philosophical and political novel, illustrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the intelligent, who alone are qualified to wield it; but it is to be confessed that the "intelligent" man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, *Gesch. u. Syst. d. Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, I. p. 249), "rather a prudent and skillfully calculating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and Æschines are scarcely to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (*kalo-kainia*). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas.

The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combination of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero's affirmation is true of the other companions of Socrates (*De Orat.*, III. 16, 61): "*ex illius (Socratis) variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehendit*," Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity.

§ 35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates with the Eleatic theory of the One, to which alone true being could be ascribed. He teaches: The good is one, although called by many names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself. The supposition that Euclid, without detracting from the unity of the good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of virtue, also assumed a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid were Eubu-

lides the Milesian, and Alexinus—celebrated for the invention of the sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head; Diodorus Cronus—known as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible; and the disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of Cittium). Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric philosophy with the Cynic. He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed to him.

On the *Megarians*, cf. Georg Ludw. Spalding, *Vindictas philos. Megaricorum*, Berlin, 1798; Ferd. Deycks, *De Megaricorum doctrina*, Bonn, 1837; Heinr. Ritter, *Bemerkungen über die Philos. der Megarischen Schule*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Philol.*, II. 1828, p. 295 seq.; Henne, *École de Mégare*, Paris, 1843; Mallet, *Histoire de l'école de Mégare et des écoles d'Élée et d'Éretrie*, Paris, 1845; Hartenstein, *Ueber die Bedeutung der Megarischen Schule für die Geschichte der metaphysischen Probleme*, in the *Verhandl. der schol. Gesellsch. der Wiss.*, 1848, p. 190 seq.; Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, I. p. 88 seq.

Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathematician, who lived a century later) it is related (Gell., *Noct. Att.*, VI. 10) that, at the time when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the death of Socrates (*Phædo*, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they too might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy (Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euclid appears to have lived and to have remained at the head of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of the Socratic ethics, making the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid is treated of by Diog. Laërt., in his *Vitæ Philos.*, II. 108 seq.

The author of the dialogue *Sophistes* mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely unchangeable forms (*εἰδή*), accessible only to thought. Many modern investigators (in particular Schleiermacher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer this doctrine to the Megarians; others (especially Ritter, as above cited, Petersen, in the *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswiss.*, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, *ibid.* XXXIV.) dispute this. In defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle (*Metaph.*, I. 6 seq.; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid under any form. The passage in the *Sophistes* must, in case Plato was the author of that dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (cf. my *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften*, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.). But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has shown, cf. Ueberweg in Bergmann's *Philos. Mon.*, III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platonist, who modified the doctrine of

Plato, the passage in question is rather to be considered as referring to Plato's theory of ideas, or perhaps to an interpretation of it, which the author of the dialogue thought inexact. Cf. Schaarschmidt, *Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften*, Bonn, 1866, p. 210 seq.

The doctrine of Euclid (as given at the beginning of this section) is expressed by Diog. L., II. 106, in these words: οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀπεφαίνεται πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὴ γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεὸν καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνῆρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων. Such a principle was not capable of being positively developed into a philosophical system; it could only lead to a continued war with current opinions, which the Megarians sought to refute by a *deductio ad absurdum*. This is the philosophical meaning of the Megaric "Eristic."

Stilpo, who taught at Athens about 320 B. C., is said by Diog. L. (II. 119) to have assumed a polemical attitude with reference to the theory of ideas (ἀνῆρει καὶ τὰ εἶδη). Such an attitude would be in logical accordance with the exclusive doctrine of unity, which Stilpo held with the earlier Megarians (according to Aristotle, see Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XIV. 17. 1). Stilpo proclaimed insensibility (ἀπάθεια) as the proper end of all moral endeavor (cf. Senec., *Ep.* 9: *hoc inter nos (Stoicos) et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem*). The sage is so sufficient to himself, that not even friends are necessary for his happiness. One of Stilpo's disciples was Zeno of Cittium, the founder of the Stoic school (see below, § 52). On the other hand, the Skeptics, Pyrrho and Timon, seem also to have taken the doctrine of the Megarians for their point of departure (see § 60).

§ 36. Phædo of Elis, a favorite disciple of Socrates, founded, after the death of the latter, in his native city, a philosophical school, which appears to have resembled in tendency and character the Megaric school. Menedemus, who enjoyed the instructions of Platonists and Phædonists and of Stilpo, transplanted the Elian school to his native city, Eretria, whence his followers received the name of Eretrians.

L. Preller, *Phædons Lebensschicksale und Schriften*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Philol.*, New Series, IV., 1844, pp. 891-899, revised in Ersch and Gruber's *Encykl.*, Sect. III., Vol. XXI., p. 857 seq., and now published in Preller's *Kleine Schriften*, ed. by R. Köhler.

Phædo, the founder of the Elian school, is the same person whom Plato represents in the dialogue named after him, as recounting to Echecrates the last conversations of Socrates. According to Diog. L., II. 105, he was ransomed from the condition of a prisoner of war by Crito, at the instance of Socrates. He is said to have written dialogues; yet the genuineness of most of the dialogues which bore his name was disputed. Of his doctrines we know little.

Of Phædo's (indirect) disciple, Menedemus (who lived 352-276 B. C.), Heraclides (Lembus) says (*ap.* Diog. L., II. 135), that he espoused the opinions of Plato, but only sported with dialectic. Both statements are not to be taken in too rigorous a sense. Compare, however, Heinrich von Stein, *Gesch. des Platonismus*, II. Gött. 1864, p. 202 seq. Respecting his ethical tendency, Cicero says (*Acad.*, IV. 42, 129): *a Menedemo Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua rerum cerneretur*. Like the Megarians, he regarded all virtues as one, though called by different names. He defined virtue as rational insight, with which he seems, like Socrates, to have considered right endeavor as inseparably connected.

§ 37. Antisthenes of Athens, at first a pupil of Gorgias, but afterward of Socrates, taught, after the death of the latter, in the gymnasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called the Cynic school. Virtue, he taught, is the only good. Enjoyment, sought as an end, is an evil. The essence of virtue lies in self-control. Virtue is one. It is capable of being taught, and, when once acquired, can not be lost. The safest wall for a town is knowledge based on secure inferences. Virtue requires not many words, but only Socratic force. Antisthenes combats the Platonic theory of ideas. He grants the validity only of identical judgments. His assertion that contradiction is impossible, gives evidence of his lack of earnestness in the treatment of dialectical problems. The opposition to the political forms and the polytheism of the Hellenic race, which remained still undeveloped in Socrates, pronounced itself distinctly in the cosmopolitanism of Antisthenes and in his doctrine of the unity of God.

To the school of Antisthenes belong Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, Hipparchia, the wife of Crates, Metrocles, her brother, and others.

The Cynics are treated of and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach's *Fragm. Philos. Gr.*, II. pp. 281-295.

The fragments extant of the works of Antisthenes have been edited by Aug. Wilh. Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842. Cf. Krische, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 284-246; Chappuis, *Antisthènes*, Paris, 1854; Ad. Müller, *De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis* ("Progr." of the *Vitath.-G.*), Dresden, 1860.

On Diogenes, cf. Karl Wilh. Göttling, *D. der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats*, in his *Ges. Abhandl.*, Vol. I., Halle, 1851; Hermann, *Zur Gesch. und Kritik des Diogenes von Sinope (G.-Pr.)*, Heilbronn, 1883; Wehrmann, *Ueber den Cyniker D.*, in the *Pädag. Archiv.*, 1861, pp. 97-117.

On Crates, cf. Postumus, *De Crat.*, Gron. 1823. The 88 (spurious) letters ascribed to him are edited by Boissonade in *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, t. IX., Paris, 1837.

F. V. Fritzsche treats of the fragments by Demonax, in *De Fragm. Demonactis Philos.*, Rostock and Leipzig, 1866. Cf. Lucian, in his *Vita Demonactis*, and A. Recknagel, *Comm. de Demonactis philos.*, Nuremberg, 1887.

Antisthenes, born at Athens in Olymp. 84.1 (444 B. C.), was the son of an Athenian father and a Thracian mother (Diog. L., VI. 1). For this reason he was restricted to the gymnasium called Cynosarges. In the rhetorical form of his dialogical writings Antisthenes betrayed the influence of Gorgias' instruction. He went to Socrates first in later life, for which reason he is designated in the *Sophistes* (p. 251 b, where without doubt he is referred to) as the "late learner" (*ὀψιμαθής*). Plato (*Theæt.*, 155 e; cf. *Soph.*, 251 b, seq.) and Aristotle (*Metaph.*, XIII. 3) criticise him as lacking in culture. Before becoming a disciple of Socrates, he had already given instruction in rhetoric (Diog. L., VI. 2), an occupation which he also afterward resumed. He appears to have lived thirty years after the death of Socrates (Diodorus, XV. 76). In external appearance Antisthenes, most of all the disciples of Socrates, resembled his master, with whom he stood on terms of intimate personal friendship. The titles of numerous works by Antisthenes are given in Diog. L., VI. 15-18.

Antisthenes holds fast to the Socratic principle of the unity of virtue and knowledge. He emphasizes chiefly its practical side, though not wholly neglecting its dialectical bearings.

Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) first defined *definition* (λόγος) as the expression of the essence of the thing defined: *λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ ἀγλῶν* (where the Imperfect *ἦν* seems to point to the priority of objective existence before the subjective acts of knowing and naming). The simple, said Antisthenes, is indefinable: it can only be named and compared; but the composite admits of an exposition, in which the component parts are enumerated conformably to the actual order and manner of their combination. Knowledge is correct opinion based on definition (i. e., logically accounted for), *δόξα ἀληθὴς κατὰ λόγον* (Plat., *Theaet.*, p. 201 seq., where indeed Antisthenes is not named, but is probably meant; Arist., *Metaph.*, VIII. 3). According to Simplic., *Ad Arist. Categ.*, f. 66 b, 45, the following argument against the Platonic doctrine of ideas was attributed to Antisthenes: *ὁ Πλάτων, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δ' οὐχ ὁρῶ*, "O Plato, I see horses, but no horselessness" (because, Plato is said to have replied, you have no eye for it). According to Ammon. *Ad Porphyr. Isag.*, 22 b, Antisthenes said that the ideas were *ἐν ψαλαῖς ἐκπεισῖαι*, from which it is hardly to be inferred that Antisthenes attempted to transform the doctrine of ideas in a subjective sense (as the Stoics did later); he meant probably only to describe Plato's theory of ideas as an empty fancy. Somewhat sophistical is the doctrine attributed to Antisthenes in Arist., *Top.*, I. 11, and *Met.*, V. 29 (cf. Plat., *Euthyd.*, 285 e), that it is impossible to contradict one's self (*οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν*), together with the argument: either the same thing is subject of the two supposed contradictory affirmations—and then, since each thing has only one *οἰκείος λόγος*, these affirmations are equivalent, and not contradictory—or the affirmations relate to different subjects, and consequently there is no contradiction. The last result of this dialectical tendency was reached in the doctrine that only identical judgments are valid (Plat. ? *Soph.*, 251 b; Arist., *Metaph.*, V. 29).

According to Diog. L., VI. 104 seq., Antisthenes recognized virtue as the supreme end of human life; whatever is intermediate between virtue and vice was indifferent (*ἀδιάφορον*). Virtue is sufficient to secure happiness (Diog. L., VII. 11: *αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδεὶς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχῦος, τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων*). Pleasure is pernicious. A frequent saying of Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) was: *μαλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν*, "I would rather be mad than glad." The good is beautiful, evil is hateful (*ibid.* 12). He who has once become wise and virtuous, can not afterward cease to be such (Diog. L., VI. 105: *τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀναπρόβλητον ὑπάρχειν*; also in Xen., *Mem.*, I. 2. 19: *ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἀδίκος γένοιτο κ. τ. λ.*, the principal reference is probably to Antisthenes). The good is proper to us (*οἰκεῖον*), the bad is something foreign (*ξενικόν, ἀλλότριον*, Diog. L., VI. 12; Plat., *Conviv.*, p. 205 e; cf. *Charmides*, p. 163 c).

No actual or possible form of government was pleasing to the Cynic. The Cynic restricts his sage to the subjective consciousness of his own virtue, isolating him from existing society, in order to make him a citizen of the world (Antisthenes, *ap.* Diog. L., VI. 11: *τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς*. *Ibid.* 12; *τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἄπορον*). He demands that men return to the simplicity of a natural state. Whether it is to this position of Antisthenes that Plato refers in his picture of a natural political state (*Rep.*, II. 372 a)—which he yet terms a society of swine—and in his examination of the identification of the art of conducting men with the art of the shepherd (*Polit.*, p. 267 d-275 c), is doubtful; perhaps in the latter passage the only reference is (as suggested by Henkel, *Zur Gesch. der gr. Staatswiss.*, II., p. 22, Salzwedel,

1866) to the Homeric idea of the ποιμήν λαῶν, "shepherd of the people," which appears in various passages of Xenophon's *Memor.* and *Cyrop.* (cf. *Politicus*, p. 301 d, and *Rep.*, VII. p. 520 b, with *Xen., Cyrop.*, V. 1, 24, with reference to the comparison of the human ruler with the queen-bee). That Antisthenes can not have anticipated Plato in the doctrine of the community of women and children, follows from *Arist., Pol.*, II. 4, 1, where it is affirmed that Plato first proposed this innovation.

The religious faith of the people, according to the Cynics, is as little binding on the sage as are their laws. Says Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum*, I. 13, 32): *Antisthenes in eo libro qui physisus inscribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse (dicit)*. The one God is not known through images. Virtue is the only true worship. Antisthenes interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically and in accordance with his philosophy.

Diogenes of Sinope, through his extreme exaggeration of the principles of his teacher, developed a personality that is even comical. He is said himself not to have repelled the epithet "Dog," which was applied to him, but only to have replied that he did not, like other dogs, bite his enemies, but only his friends, in order that he might save them. He was also called "Socrates raving" (Σωκράτης μαινόμενος). With the immorality of the times he rejected also its morality and culture. As tutor of the sons of Xenias, at Corinth, he proceeded not without skill, on the principle of conformity to nature, in a manner similar to that demanded in modern times by Rousseau. He acquired the enduring love and respect of his pupils and of their father (Diog. L., VI. 30 seq., 74 seq.). Diog. L. (VI. 80) cites the titles of many works ascribed to Diogenes, but says that Sosicrates and Satyrus pronounced them all spurious. Diogenes designates, as the end to which all effort should tend, εὐτυχία καὶ ἥθος ψυχῆς (in opposition to mere physical force, Stob., *Florileg.*, VII. 18). Of the disciples of Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, a contemporary of Theophrastus the Aristotelian, is the most important (Diog. L., VI. 86 seq.); through his influence Hipparchia and her brother Metrocles were won over to Cynicism. Monimus the Syracusan was also a pupil of Diogenes. Menippus of Sinope, who seems to have lived in the third century before Christ, and is mentioned by Lucian (*Bis Accus.*, 33) as "one of the ancient dogs who barked a great deal" (cf. Diog. L., 99 seq.), was probably one of the earlier Cynics. There were probably several Cynics who bore the name Menippus.

Cynicism, in its later days, degenerated more and more into insolence and indecency. It became ennobled, on the other hand, in the Stoic philosophy, through the recognition and attention given to mental culture. The Cynic's conception of virtue is imperfect from its failure to determine the positive end of moral activity, so that at last nothing remained but ostentatious asceticism. "The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which is true freedom" (Hegel).

After Cynicism had for a long time been lost in Stoicism—which (as Zeller happily expresses it) "gave to the doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will the basis of a comprehensive, scientific theory of the universe, and so adapted the doctrine itself more fully to the requirements of nature and human life"—it was renewed in the first century after Christ under the form of a more preaching of morals. But it was accompanied in this phase of its existence by much empty, ostentatious display of staves and wallets, of uncut beards and hair, and ragged cloaks. Of the better class of Cynics in this later period were Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea Pætus, Cnemaus of Gadara (in the time of Hadrian), who (according to Euseb., *Praeparat. Evang.*, V. 18 seq.) attacked the system of oracles with special violence, and Demonax of Cyprus (praised by Lucian, born about A. D. 50, died about 150), who, though holding fast to the moral and religious principles of Cynicism, advocated them rather with a Socratic mildness than with the vulgar Cynic rudeness.

§ 38. Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic or Hedonic school, and termed by Aristotle a Sophist, sees in pleasure, which he defines as the sensation of gentle motion, the end of life. The sage aims to enjoy pleasure, without being controlled by it. Intellectual culture alone fits one for true enjoyment. No one kind of pleasure is superior to another; only the degree and duration of pleasure determines its worth. We can know only our sensations, not that which causes them.

The most eminent members of the Cyrenaic school were Arete, the daughter of Aristippus, and her son, Aristippus the younger, surnamed the "mother-taught" (*μητροδιδάκτος*), who first put the doctrine of Hedonism into systematic form, and was probably the author of the comparison of the three sensational conditions of trouble, pleasure, and indifference, to tempest, gentle wind, and sea-calm, respectively; also Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who taught that the particular pleasure of the moment was indifferent, and that constant cheerfulness was the end sought by the true sage, and his scholars Bio and Euhemerus, who explained the belief in the existence of gods as having begun with the veneration of distinguished men; further, Hegesias, surnamed the "death-counseling" (*πρωιθάνατος*),—who accepted the avoidance of trouble as the highest attainable good, despaired of positive happiness, and considered life to be intrinsically valueless,—and Anniceris (the younger), who again made the feeling of pleasure the end of life, but included in his system, in addition to idiopathic pleasure, the pleasure of sympathy, and demanded a partial sacrifice of the former to the latter.

The Cyrenaics are treated of, and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach's *Fragmenta Ph. Gr.*, II. pp. 397-438.

Amadeus Wendt, *De philosophia Cyrenaeica*, Gött. 1841; Henr. de Stein, *De philosophia Cyrenaeica*, Part I.: *De vita Aristippi*, Gött. 1855 (cf. his *Gesch. des Platonismus*, II. Gött. 1864, pp. 60-64).

On Aristippus, cf. C. M. Wieland, *Aristipp und einige seiner Zeitgenossen*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1800-1802; J. F. Thirgo, *De Aristippo philosopho Cyrenaeico atque Cyrenaeicis*, in his *Res Cyrenensis*, Copenh. 1803.

There exist early monographs on individual members of the Cyrenaic school, one, in particular, on Arete, by J. G. Eek (Leipzig, 1776), and another on Hegesias *πρωιθάνατος*, by J. J. Rambach (Quedlinburg, 1771). The fragments of the *ἡπεί ἀνυσσάφ* of Euhemerus have been collected by Wesseling (in *Diod. Sic. Bibl. Hist.*, tom. II., p. 623 seq.) Of Euhemerus, with special reference to Ennius, who shared in his views, Krahnert treats in his *Grundlinien zur Gesch. des Verfalls der röm. Staatsreligion* (*G.-Progr.*), Halle, 1887; cf. also Gansa, *Quaestiones Euhemericae* (*G.-Pr.*), Kempen, 1860, and Otto Bieroka, *De Euhemero* (*Diss. Inaug.*), Königsberg, 1869.

Aristippus of Cyrene was led by the fame of Socrates to seek his acquaintance, and joined himself permanently to the circle of Socrates' disciples. In criticism of an (oral) utterance of Plato, which he thought to have been too confidently delivered, he is reported to have appealed to the more modest manner of Socrates (*Arist., Rhet.*, II. 23, p. 1398 b, 29:

'Αρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα ὡς ᾤετο· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ' ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἐφη, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην). Perhaps, before the period of his intercourse with Socrates he had become familiar with the philosophy of Protagoras, of whose influence his doctrine shows considerable traces. The customs of his rich and luxurious native city were most likely of the greatest influence in determining him to the love of pleasure. That he, together with Cleombrotus, was absent in Ægina at the time of Socrates' death, is remarked by Plato (*Phædo*, 59 c), obviously with reproachful intent. Aristippus is said to have sojourned often at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii in Sicily; several anecdotes are connected with his residence there and his meeting with Plato, which, though historically uncertain, are at least not unhappily invented, and illustrate the accommodating servility of the witty Hedonist, occasionally in contrast with the uncompromising Parrhesia of the rigid moralist and idealist (Diog. L., II. 78 *et al.*). Aristippus seems to have taught in various places, and particularly in his native city. He first, among the companions of Socrates, imitated the Sophists in demanding payment for his instructions (Diog. L., II. 65). It is perhaps for this reason, but probably also on account of his doctrine of pleasure and his contempt for pure science, that Aristotle calls him a Sophist (*Metaph.*, III. 2).

According to the suppositions of H. von Stein (in the work cited above), Aristippus was born about 435 B. C., resided in Athens during a series of years commencing with 416, in 399 was in Ægina, in 389–388 was with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysius, and in 361 with the same at the court of the younger Dionysius, and, finally, after 356 was, apparently, again in Athens. Von Stein remarks, however (*Gesch. des Platonismus*, II., p. 61), on the uncertainty of the accounts on which these dates are founded. According to Diog. L., II. 83, Aristippus was older than Æschines.

The fundamental features of the Cyrenaic doctrine are certainly due to Aristippus. Xenophon (*Memor.*, II. 1) represents him as discussing them with Socrates; Plato refers probably to them in *Rep.*, VI. 505 b (perhaps also in *Gorg.*, 491 e, seq.), and most fully in the *Philebus*, although Aristippus is not there named. But the systematic elaboration of his doctrines seems to have been the work of his grandson, Aristippus *μητροδιδάκτος*. Aristotle names, as representing the doctrine of pleasure (*Eth. Nic.*, X. 2), not Aristippus, but Eudoxus.

The principle of Hedonism is described in the dialogue *Philebus*, p. 66 c, in these words: τὰ γὰρ ὅν ἐρίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ. Pleasure is the sensation of gentle motion (Diog. L., II. 85: τέλος ἀπέφανε (Ἀρίστιππος) τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἰσθησὶν ἀναδιδόμεν). Violent motion produces pain, rest or very slight motion, indifference. That all pleasure belongs to the category of things becoming (γένεσις) and not to that of things being (οὐσία), is mentioned by Plato in the dialogue *Philebus* (p. 53 c, cf. 42 d) as the correct observation of certain "elegants" (κομψοί), among whom Aristippus is probably to be understood as included. Yet the opposing of γένεσις to οὐσία is certainly not to be ascribed to Aristippus, but only probably the reduction of pleasure to motion (κίνησις), from which Plato drew the above conclusion. No pleasure, says Aristippus, is as such bad, though it may often arise from bad causes, and no pleasure is different from another in quality or worth (Diog. L., II. 87: μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, cf. *Phileb.*, p. 12 d). Virtue is a good as a means to pleasure (Cic., *De Offic.*, III. 33, 116).

The Socratic element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of *self-determination directed by knowledge* (the manner of life of the wise, says Aristippus, *ap.* Diog. L., 68, would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated), and in the *control* of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through *knowledge* and *culture*. The Cynics sought for independence through abstinence from enjoyment, Aristippus through

the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment. Thus Aristippus is cited by Stob. (*Flor.*, 17, 18) as saying that "not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being carried away, is master of his pleasures." Similarly, in *Diog. L.*, II. 75, Aristippus is said to have required his disciples "to govern, and not be governed by their pleasures." And, accordingly, he is further said to have expressed his relation to *Lais*, by saying: *ἔγω, οὐκ ἔχωμαι*. In a similar sense Horace says (*Epist.*, I. 1, 18): *nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor*. The Cynic sage knows how to deal with himself, but Aristippus knows how to deal with men (*Diog. L.*, VI. 6, 58; II. 68, 102). To enjoy the present, says the Cyrenaic, is the true business of man; only the present is in our power.

With the Hedonic character of the ethics of Aristippus corresponds, in his theory of cognition, the restriction of our knowledge to sensations. The Cyrenaics distinguished (according to *Sext. Empir.*, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 91) τὸ πάθος and τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ τοῖς παθος ποιητικόν (the affection, and the "thing in itself" which is external to us and affects us); the former exists in our consciousness (τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον); of the "thing in itself," on the contrary, we know nothing, except that it exists. Whether the sensations of other men agree with our own, we do not know; the affirmative is not proved by the identity of names employed. The subjectivism of the Protagorean doctrine of knowledge finds in these propositions its consistent completion. It is improbable that the motive of ethical Hedonism was contained in this logical doctrine; that motive must rather be sought, in part, in the personal love of pleasure of Aristippus, and in part in the eudaemonistic element in the moral speculations of Socrates, which contained certain germs, not only for the doctrine of Antisthenes, but also for that of Aristippus (see, in particular, *Xenophon*, *Memorab.*, I. 6. 7, respecting καρτερεῖν in immediate connection with the question, *ibid.* I. 6. 8: τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεῖν γαστρὶ μηδὲ ἑπνῷ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἶε τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τοῦτων ἡδύα). The essence of virtue lies, according to Socrates, in knowledge, in practical insight. But it is asked, what is the object of this insight? If the reply is, the Good, then the second question arises, in what the Good consists. If it consists in virtue itself, the definition moves in a circle. If in the useful, the useful is relative and its value is determined by that for which it is useful. But what is this last something, in whose service the useful stands? If *Eudaemonia*, then it must be stated in what the essence of *Eudaemonia* consists. The most obvious answer is: Pleasure, and this answer was given by Aristippus, while the Cynics found no answer not involving them in the circle, and so did not advance beyond their objectless insight and aimless asceticism. Plato's answer was: the Idea of the Good (*Rep.*, VI. p. 505).

Later Cyrenaics (according to *Sext. E.*, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 11) divided their system of doctrines into five parts: 1) Concerning that which is to be desired and shunned (goods and evils, αἰετὰ καὶ φευκτά); 2) Concerning the passions (πάθη); 3) Concerning actions (πράξεις); 4) Concerning natural causes (αἰτια); 5) Concerning the guaranties of truth (πίστις). Hence it appears that these later Cyrenaics also treated the theory of knowledge, not as the foundation, but rather as the complement of ethics.

As the control of pleasure aimed at by Aristippus was in reality incompatible with the principle that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, some modifications in his doctrine could not but arise. Accordingly we find Theodorus ὁθεός (*Diog. L.*, II. 97 seq.), not, indeed, advancing to a principle specifically different from pleasure, but yet substituting for the isolated sensation a state of constant cheerfulness (χαρά), as the "end" (τέλος). But mere reflection on our general condition is not sufficient to elevate us above the changes of fortune, since our general condition is not under our control, and so Hegesias πεισθάνωνος (*Diog. L.*, II. 93 seq.) despaired altogether of attaining that result.

Anniceris the Younger (*ibid.* 96 seq.; Clem., *Strom.*, II. 417 b.) sought to ennoble the Hedonic principle, by reckoning among the things which afford pleasure, friendship, thankfulness, and piety toward parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after honors; yet he declared all labor for the benefit of others to be conditioned on the pleasure which our good will brings to ourselves. Later, Epicureanism reigned in the place of the Cyrenaic doctrine.

Euhemerus, who lived (300 B. C.) at the court of Cassander, and favored the principles of the Cyrenaic school, exerted great influence by his work *ἱερὰ ἀνταρχία*, in which (according to Cic., *De Nat. Deorum*, I. 42; Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 17, and others) he developed the opinion that the Gods (as also the Heroes) were distinguished men, to whom divine honors had been rendered after their death. In proof of this opinion he referred to the tomb of Zeus, which was then pointed out in Crete. It is indisputable that Euhemerism contains a partial truth, but unjustly generalized; not only historical events, but natural phenomena and ethical considerations, served as a basis for the myths of the Gods, and the form of the mythological conceptions of the ancients was conditioned on various psychological motives. The one-sided explanation of Euhemerus strips the myths of the most essential part of their religious character. But for this very reason it found a more ready hearing at a time when the power of the ancient religious faith over the minds of men was gone, and in the last centuries of antiquity it was favored by many representatives of the new Christian faith.

§ 39. Plato, born in Athens (or Ægina) on the 7th of Thargelion, in the first year of the 88th Olympiad (May 26 or 27, 427 B. C.) or perhaps on the 7th of Thargelion, Olymp. 87.4 (June 5 or 6, 428), and originally named Aristocles, was the son of Aristo and Perictione (or Potone). The former was a descendant of Codrus; the ancestor of Perictione was Dropides, a near relative of Solon, and she was cousin to Critias, who, after the unfortunate termination of the Peloponnesian war, became one of the Thirty oligarchical Tyrants. From Olymp. 93.1 till 95.1 (408 or 407 to 399 B. C.) Plato was a pupil of Socrates. After the condemnation of the latter, he went with others of Socrates' disciples to Megara, to the house of Euclid. From there it is said that he undertook a long journey, in the course of which he visited Cyrene and Egypt, and perhaps Asia Minor, whence he seems to have returned to Athens; it is possible, however, that previous to this journey he had already returned to Athens and lived there a certain length of time. When he was about forty years old he visited the Pythagoreans in Italy, and went to Sicily, where he formed relations of friendship with Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I. Here, by his openness of speech, he so offended the tyrant, that the latter caused him to be sold as a prisoner of war in Ægina, by Pollis, the Spartan ambassador. Ransomed by Anniceris, he founded (387 or 386 B. C.) his philosophical school in the Academy. Plato undertook a second journey to Syracuse about 367 B. C., after

the death of the elder Dionysius, and a third in the year 361. The object of the second journey was to endeavor, in company with Dio, to bring the younger Dionysius, on whom the tyranny of his father had devolved, under the influence of his ethical and, so far as circumstances permitted it, of his political theories. The object of the third was to effect a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. In each case he failed to accomplish the desired results. Henceforth he lived exclusively devoted to his occupation as a philosophical teacher until his death, which took place Olymp. 108.1 (348-347, probably in the second half of the Olympiad year, near his birthday, hence in May or June, 347 B. C.).

Data relative to Plato's life were recorded in antiquity by some of the immediate disciples of the philosopher, in particular by Speusippus (Πλάτωνος ὑψίστου, Diog. L., IV. 5; cf. Πλάτωνος περιβόητος, Diog. L., III. 2, cited also by Apuleius, *De Habitudine Doctrinarum Plat.*), Hermodorus (Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.*, 84 b, 86 b; cf. Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6), Philippus the Opuntian (Suidas, s. l. c.), and Xenocrates (cited by Simplicius in the Scholia to Aristotle, ed. by Brandis, pp. 470 a, 27, and 474 a, 19). Aristotle, the Peripatetic, also wrote a life of Plato (Diog. L., V. 38). Of later writers, Favorinus (in the time of Trajan and Hadrian) wrote *sepi Πλάτωνος*, from which work Diogenes L. drew largely. All these works have been lost. The following are extant:—

Apuleius Madaurensis, *De doctrina et nativitate Platonis* (in the *Opera Apul.* ed. Oudendorp, Leyden, 1786; ed. G. F. Hildebrand, Leipzig, 1862, 1868).

Diogenes Laërtius, *De Vita et Doctr. Philos.* (see above). Book III. is entirely given to Plato; §§1-45 treat of his life.

Olympiodori Vita Platonis (in several of the complete editions of Plato's works, also in Didot's edition of Diog. L., and in the *Biographie*, ed. Westermann, Brunswick, 1848). This *Vita* forms the beginning of the *Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας*, ed. E. F. Hermann, in the sixth volume of Hermann's edition of Plato's works. Cf. Theophil Roeser, *Lectiones Abuipharagianas alteras: de Honaini, et fortis, vita Platonis* (Pr.), Dantzig, 1867.

More trustworthy than these and other late and unimportant compilations, is, in general (though not in all parts), the seventh of the *Lettera*, which have come down to us under the name of Plato. This letter is indeed inauthentic, like all the others, and perhaps was not even composed by an immediate disciple of Plato; but it dates from a comparatively early epoch, and was known to Aristophanes of Byzantium, by whom it must have been considered Platonic. Cf., besides other earlier investigations, in particular, Herm. Thom. Karsten, *De Platonis quas feruntur, epistolae, praecepis tertia, septima, octava, Traj. ad Elen.*, 1864, with whom, in his rejection of the authenticity of these letters, H. Sauppe agrees, in his review in the *Gött. Gel. Anzeigen*, 1866, No. 23, pp. 831-892. Farther, many passages in Plato's own writings, and in the works of Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, are important as furnishing data for the biography of Plato.


Of modern works on the life of Plato, those most worthy of mention are: Marcellus Ficinus, *Vita Platonis*, prefixed to his translation of Plato's writings. *Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato*, Edinb. 1760; German translation with annotations and additions by K. Morgenstern, Leipzig, 1797. W. G. Tennemann, *System der Platon. Philosophie*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1792-95. (The first volume begins with an account of Plato's life.) Friedr. Ast, *Plato's Leben und Schriften*, Leipzig, 1816. K. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, first part (the only one published), Heidelberg, 1829. (Pages 1-126, "On Plato's life and external relations;" pp. 127-240, "Plato's predecessors and contemporaries considered with reference to their influence on his doctrine;" pp. 241-718, "Plato's literary works as authorities for the interpretation of his system, sifted and arranged.") George Grote, *Plato and the other Companions of Socrates*, London, 1866, 2d ed. 1867. A critique of the traditional accounts of the life of Plato, in which the same are represented as almost altogether unhistorical, or at least as almost wholly untrustworthy, is given by Heinrich von Stein, in *Neuen Bücher zur Gesch. des Platonismus*, Part II. (Gött. 1864), in Section 17, on "The biographical myth and the literary tradition" (pp. 128-197): Schaarshmidt adopts these results, and goes still farther in his work: *Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften*, Bonn, 1866, p. 61 seq. On the basis of the transmitted records accepted without critical sifting, E. Weipser has written a novel (*Plato und seine Zeit, hist.-biograph. Lebensbild*, Cassel, 1866), the comparison of which with the traditional accounts may assist one to a clearer intelligence of the way in which

given facts are accustomed to be enlarged upon under the influence of a too luxuriant inventive faculty, and so to a more correct estimation of the value of tradition itself.

(Cf. the literature in §§ 40 and 41.)

That Plato was born in Olymp. 88.1 (427 B. C., when Diotimus was Archon) is directly affirmed by Apollodorus, *ἐν χρονικοῖς*, ap. Diog. L., III. 2 (i. e., if by Olymp. 88 the first year of that Olympiad is to be understood); cf. also Hippol., *Refut. Haer.*, I. 8. We are also conducted indirectly to this result by the statement of Hermodorus, an immediate disciple of Plato, given in Diog. L., II. 106, and III. 6,—a statement which gives rise to doubts in its transmitted form (cf., among others, Schaarschmidt, in the work above cited, p. 66), but which is yet the most trustworthy of all the chronological statements relating to this subject, and probably forms the basis of the statement of Apollodorus. The purport of it is that Plato, at the age of twenty-eight years, soon after the execution of Socrates, went to Megara, to the house of Euclid. But Socrates drank the hemlock in the second half of the month of Thargelion, Olymp. 95.1 (in May or June, 399 B. C.). For the year 429 (87.3, the year when Apollodorus was Archon) as the year of Plato's birth, we have the evidence of Athenæus (*Deipnosoph.*, V. 17, p. 217); for 428, we have the statement in Diog. L., III. 3, that Plato was born in the same Archontic year in which Pericles died (i. e., in the second half of the archonship of Epameinon, Ol. 87.4 = 429–428, in the first half of which Pericles died), and also the statement (Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vit. Isocr.*, 2, p. 836), that Isocrates was born seven years before Plato—assuming it to be established that Isocrates was born in Olymp. 86.1 (436–435 B. C.). That Plato was born on the 7th of Thargelion (Diog. L., III. 2) seems likewise to rest on the authority of Apollodorus, so that if the celebration of Plato's birth was transferred to this day on account of its being the birthday of the Delian Apollo, the change must have been made by the Academics soon after Plato's death. This day, in the Olympiad year 88.1, included—if Boeckh is correct in assuming that the octennial cycle was then in vogue at Athens—the time from the evening of May 26th to the evening of May 27th, 427 B. C. (or, if the Metonic cycle had already been adopted, May 29–30). Plato's birthplace was Athens, or, according to some, Ægina, whither his father had gone as a Kleruch (Diog. L., III. 3).

The following table represents the genealogy of Plato, so far as it is known to us (see *Charm.*, 154 seq., *Tim.*, 20 d, *Apol.*, 24 a, *De Rep.*, *inid.*, *Parm.*, *inid.*, et al.):—



It should be remarked that the second marriage of Perictione and the existence of Antiphon are facts known only on the evidence of the dialogue *Parmenides*—whose genuineness is, to say the least, very doubtful, and whose historical statements are therefore not to be taken as positively trustworthy—and on that of later writers (especially Plutarch), whose only authority was this dialogue. Pyrilampes appears, from *Charm.*, 158 a, to have been an uncle of the mother of Perictione.

Plato received his early education from teachers of repute. Dionysius (who is mentioned in the spurious dialogue *Anterastae*) is reported to have instructed him in reading and writing; Aristo of Argos, in gymnastics (*Diog. L.*, III. 4), and Draco, a pupil of Damon, and Metellus (or Megillus) of Agrigentum, in music (Plutarch, *De Mus.*, 17). The report concerning Aristo (who is said to have given to his pupil the name of Plato) seems to be historical; the others are more doubtful. Plato is said to have taken part in several military campaigns. By Athenian law he would be required to perform military service from his eighteenth year (409 B. C.). According to Aristoxenus (*ap. Diog. L.*, III. 8) he was engaged at Tanagra, Corinth, and Delium—an account which is unhistorical if reference is intended to the well-known battles at Tanagra and Delium; but perhaps it alludes to minor engagements in the years 409–405. In the battle at Corinth (394) Plato may have taken part. Perhaps, like his brothers, he was present and participated in an encounter which took place near Megara in the year 409 (*Rep.*, II. p. 368; *Diod. Sic.*, XIII. 65). The poetical essays of his youth were discontinued after he became more intimately acquainted with Socrates. Before that time he had been already instructed in the Heraclitean philosophy by Cratylus (*Arist., Metaph.*, I. 6). The intimacy of Socrates with Critias and Charmides may have led early to Plato's acquaintance with him; the philosophical intercourse of Plato with Socrates began, according to *Diog. L.* (III. 6), who, perhaps, follows the authority of Hermodorus, in Plato's twentieth year. A young man, endowed with a luxuriant fancy, he received the logical discipline to which Socrates subjected him as a kindness worthy of all gratitude; the moral force of Socrates' character filled him with awe, and the steadfastness with which he suffered death for the cause of truth and justice, finally transfigured, in his mind, into a pure ideal, the image of his master. We may assume that, while Plato was associated with Socrates, he also familiarized himself with other philosophical systems. But whether he had at that time already conceived the leading traits of his own system, founded on the theory of ideas, is uncertain; certain historical indications are wanting in regard to this subject. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian account of the genesis of the theory of ideas from Heraclitean and Socratic doctrines (see below, § 41) makes it very probable that Plato had this theory already in his mind during the period of his personal intercourse with Socrates; the doctrine of Euclid, the Megarian, may also have had its influence on him at the same period. Respecting the precise character of the intercourse between Socrates and Plato, we have no specific accounts. Xenophon (who recounts conversations of Socrates with Aristippus and Antisthenes) mentions Plato only once (*Mem.*, III. 6. 1), where he says that for his sake, as also for that of Charmides, Socrates was well-disposed toward Glaucon. According to *Plat., Apol.*, p. 34 a, 38 b, Plato was present at the trial of Socrates, and announced himself as ready to guarantee the payment of any fine; according to *Phaedo*, 59 b, he was ill on the day of Socrates' death, and was thereby hindered from being present at the last conversations of his master.

Plato found his life's vocation, not in participating in the political contests of the parties then existing at Athens, but in founding a philosophical school. This task demanded the unconditional application of his undivided powers, and in the execution of it Plato accomplished a work infinitely more advantageous for humanity than any which he could have

accomplished if he had chosen rather to exercise the civic virtues of a patriotic popular orator. Plato could consecrate himself to no political activity which failed to correspond with the sense and spirit of his philosophical principles. He could not, like Demosthenes, exhort the Athenians to maintain their democracy and to guard themselves against a foreign monarch, because democracy did not appear to him a good form of government; he could only consent to co-operate for the establishment of an aristocracy or a monarchy founded upon the philosophical education of the ruling class, for only a political activity directed to this end could seem to him useful or obligatory. A work of this latter kind he did once undertake, when the state of things in Sicily appeared to him (erroneously, it is true) favorable to the solution of the political problem as he conceived it. Cf. Ferd. Delbrück, *Verteidigung Plato's gegen einen Angriff* (Niebuhr's, in the *Rh. Mus. für Philol., Gesch. u. griech. Philos.*, I. p. 196) *auf seine Bürgertugend*, Bonn, 1828.

It is possible that the intercourse of Plato with Euclid of Megara also exercised a considerable influence on the formation of his own system. Whether Plato, after his sojourn with Euclid, next lived in Athens, and in the year 394 participated in the Corinthian campaign, is uncertain. He is said, when at Cyrene, to have visited Theodorus, the mathematician (Diog. L., III. 6), whose acquaintance he seems to have made at Athens shortly before the death of Socrates (*Theæt.*, p. 143 b, seq.); he remained, as we are credibly informed, a certain time at Cyrene, perfecting himself in mathematics under the direction of Theodorus. According to Cic., *De Fin.*, V. 22, Plato went to Egypt for the purpose of obtaining instruction from the priests in mathematics and astronomy, in which particular his example was followed by his pupil, Eudoxus, the astronomer, who for a considerable period took up his residence in Egypt, the land of ancient experiences. It is uncertain whether the accounts of Plato's visits to Cyrene and Egypt are historical or legendary. Their only basis may have been Plato's mention of Theodorus (in the *Theætetus*) and the references to Egypt in Plato's works (*Phaedr.*, p. 247 c; *Rep.*, IV. 435; *Tim.*, 21 e; *Leyes*, II. 656 d, 657 a, V. 747 c, VII. 799 a, 819 a; cf. *Pol.*, 264 c, 290 d). But even admitting this, the inference in favor, at least, of a journey to Egypt, has strong support. From the picture given by Plato of the Heracliteans in Ionia (*Theæt.*, 179 seq.), Schleiermacher (*Pl. W.*, II. 1, p. 185) infers that he had probably been in Asia Minor; but other evidence for this conclusion is wanting. Plutarch, in the dialogue *De genio Socratis* (*περί τοῦ Σωκράτους δαμονίου*), c. 7, p. 579, represents Simmias as saying: "At Memphis, the home of the prophet *Χένοπος*, we remained for a time philosophizing, Plato and *Ἐλλανίον* and I. When we had started on our return from Egypt, we were met near Caria by certain Delians, who requested from Plato, as a man acquainted with geometry, the solution of the problem proposed to them by Apollo, viz.: how to double a cubiform altar. Plato indicated as a condition of the solution of the problem, that they must find two mean proportionals, and directed the petitioners, for the rest, to Eudoxus of Cnidos and Helicon of Cysicum. He also instructed them that the god demanded not so much the altar, as that they should occupy themselves with the study of mathematics." But this narrative can not be regarded as historical; the whole dialogue is interspersed with free inventions from Plutarch's hand. Plato seems to have gone to Italy and Sicily (about 390?) from Athens (*Epist.*, VII. p. 326 b, seq.). It is uncertain whether he was at Athens about 394 B. C. and took part in the Corinthian campaign. On the occasion of his first arrival at Syracuse, he was, according to the 7th Letter (p. 324 b), about forty years old. Among the Pythagoreans Plato probably sought to acquire, not only a more exact knowledge of their doctrine, but also a view of their scientific, ethical, and political life in common, and their manner of educating their youth. At Syracuse he won over to his doctrines and to his theory of life, the youthful Dio, then about twenty years old, whose sister was married to Dionysius (the elder); but the tyrant himself

thought Plato's admonitions "senile" (Diog. L., III. 18), and revenged himself on him by treating him as a prisoner of war. The sale of Plato at Ægina (in case it is historical) must have taken place shortly before the end of the Corinthian war, 387 B. C. Anniceris is reported to have ransomed him and afterward to have refused to allow the friends of Plato to make up to him the price of the ransom, and so, as the story goes, the sum was applied to the purchase of the garden of the Academy, where Plato united around him a circle of friends devoted to philosophy. His instructions, as we must infer from the form of his writings and from an express declaration in the *Phædrus* (p. 275 seq.), were generally conveyed in the form of dialogues; yet he seems, besides, to have delivered connected lectures. Nothing but the hope of attaining an important political and philosophical result (*Epist.*, VII., p. 329) could determine Plato twice to interrupt his scholastic activity by journeys to Sicily. The object of Plato in undertaking his second journey to Sicily, not long after the accession of the younger Dionysius to power (367 B. C.), was to unite with Dio in an attempt to win over the young ruler to philosophy, and to move him to transform his tyranny into a legally-ordered monarchy. This plan was frustrated through the fickleness of the youth, his suspicion that Dio wished to get him out of the way in order to possess himself of supreme power, and the counter-efforts of a political party, who sought to maintain the existing form of government unchanged. Dio was banished, and Plato was left without influence. He undertook his third journey to Sicily in the hope of effecting a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. Not only did he fail to accomplish this result, but his own life came at last into danger through the mistrust of the tyrant, the intercession of the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum being all that saved it. Dio, supported by friends and pupils of Plato, undertook in Olymp. 105.3 (358-57) a successful expedition to Sicily against Dionysius, but was murdered in 353 by a traitor among his companions in arms, Callippus (who was himself put to death in 350). Dionysius, who had asserted his power successfully in Locri in Italy, was restored, in 346, to power in Syracuse, until, in 343, he was driven out by Timoleon. Returning to Athens (in 361 or 360), Plato resumed his doctrinal labors both orally and in writing. According to Dionys., *De Compos. Verb.*, p. 208, Plato labored till into his eightieth year in perfecting his writings. An account, perhaps based on numerical speculations, and reported by Seneca (*Epist.*, 58. 31), represents him as having died on his birthday, at the exact age of eighty-one years. Cicero says (*De Senect.*, V. 13): *uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus*, by which he may mean that Plato had just entered upon his eighty-first year. He died in the year when Theophilus was Archon (Olymp. 108.1).

In his "School of Athens," Raphael (as he is commonly interpreted—another interpretation is given by H. Grimm, *Neue Essays*, cf. *Preuss. Jahrb.*, 1864, Nos. 1 and 2) represents Plato as pointing toward heaven, while Aristotle turns his regards upon the earth. In the spirit of this representation, Goethe characterizes Plato as follows: "Plato's relation to the world is that of a superior spirit, whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is not so much his concern to become acquainted with it—for the world and its nature are things which he presupposes—as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and of which it stands in so great need. He penetrates into its depths, more that he may replenish them from the fullness of his own nature, than that he may fathom their mysteries. He scales its heights as one yearning after renewed participation in the source of his being. All that he utters has reference to something eternally complete, good, true, beautiful, whose furtherance he strives to promote in every bosom. Whatever of earthly knowledge he appropriates here and there, evaporates in his method and in his discourse." Cf. below, § 45, Goethe's characterization of Aristotle. "In Plato's philosophy," says Boeckh, "the expanding roots and branches of earlier philosophy are

developed into the full blossom, out of which the subsequent fruit was slowly brought to maturity."

§ 40. As works of Plato, thirty-six compositions (in fifty-six books) have been transmitted to us (the "Epistles" being counted as one); beside these, several works, which in ancient times were already designated as spurious, bear his name. The Alexandrian grammarian, Aristophanes of Byzantium, arranged several of the Platonic writings in Trilogies, and the Neo-Pythagorean Thrasyllus (in the time of the Emperor Tiberius) arranged all those which he considered genuine in nine Tetralogies. Schleiermacher assumes that Plato composed all his works (with the exception of a few occasional compositions) in a didactic order. This would necessarily presuppose a plan, of which the outlines were conceived and fixed at the beginning. Schleiermacher divides the works into three groups: elementary, mediatory or preparatory, and constructive dialogues. As Plato's first composition he names the *Phaedrus*, as his latest writings, the *Republic*, *Timæus*, and the *Laws*. K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, denies this unity of literary plan, and considers the writings of Plato separately as documents exponential of his own philosophical development. He assumes three "literary periods" in the life of Plato, the first reaching to the time immediately following the death of Socrates, the second covering the time of Plato's residence at Megara and of the journeys which he made directly afterward, and the third beginning with the return of Plato to Athens after his first journey to Sicily and extending to the time of his death. The earliest compositions of Plato were, according to him, the shorter ethical dialogues which most bear a Socratic type, such as *Hippias Minor*, *Lysis*, and the *Protagoras*; in designating the latest he agrees with Schleiermacher. He styles the *Phaedrus* (with Socher and Stallbaum) the "inaugural programme of Plato's doctrinal activity at the Academy." Ed. Munk judges that Plato intended in his writings to draw an idealized picture of the life of Socrates as the genuine philosopher, and that he indicated their order through the increasing age of Socrates in the successive dialogues. This view is incompatible with Hermann's principle, but, on the hypothesis of a single plan held in view from the beginning, is very plausible, though not the only possible view; it is, however, incapable of being maintained throughout without the aid of excessively violent suppositions.

In any case, the point of departure in inquiring into the genuine-

ness of the Platonic writings must be the passages in Aristotle in which these are alluded to. Judged by this standard, the works best attested as belonging to Plato are the *Republic*, *Timæus*, and the *Laws*, all of which are mentioned in Aristotle by their titles, with Plato's name. Next to these come, judged by the same standard, the *Phædo*, the *Banquet* (cited under the title of "Erotic Discourses"), *Phædrus*, and *Gorgias*, which are mentioned by Aristotle by their titles, and with evident reference to Plato as their author, although he is not expressly named. The *Meno*, *Hippias* (meaning *Hippias Minor*), and *Menezæus* (cited as the "Epitaphic" Discourse), are mentioned by Aristotle by their titles as extant, but not, apparently, with unquestionable reference to Plato as their author. Aristotle refers to passages in the *Theætetus* and the *Philebus*, which he cites as Plato's works, but without naming these titles; he also refers to doctrines contained in the *Sophistes*, but which seem rather to be cited as oral deliverances of Plato or (in some instances) as the doctrines of Plato's disciples. Without naming Plato or the titles, Aristotle appears also to refer to passages in the *Politicus*, the *Apologia*, *Lysis*, *Laches*, and perhaps the *Protagoras*; possibly also to passages in the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus*. Respecting the time of the composition of the dialogues, only a few data can be found which are fully certain. From an anachronism in the *Banquet*, it appears beyond question that that dialogue was written after (and probably very soon after) 385 B. C., and it is expressly stated by Aristotle that the *Laws* were composed later than the *Republic*. In view of the idealizing character of the Platonic dialogues, the only natural supposition is that Plato wrote none of them until after the death of Socrates. According to an ancient and not improbable, but also not sufficiently well-authenticated account, the dialogue *Phædrus* was the earliest of Plato's compositions. It is a matter of question whether the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* preceded or followed the *Phædrus*, but we may assume that the *Phædrus* was composed before the *Banquet*. It is most probable that Plato began to write his dialogues in about his fortieth year, on the occasion of the founding of his school in the garden of the Academy, and in the following order: *Phædrus*, *Banquet*, *Protagoras*, together with a number of shorter ethical dialogues, *Gorgias*, and then perhaps *Meno*; these dialogues were perhaps immediately followed by the *Republic*, together with the *Timæus* and the *Critias* fragment, then by the

Phædo, *Cratylus*, *Theætetus*, *Philebus*, and *Lysis*, which latter Plato is said to have left unfinished. The *Apology* appears to have been written soon after the trial of Socrates and in substantial agreement with his actual defense.

The works of Plato were published first in Latin in the translation of Marsilius Ficinus, Florence, 1469-1484, reprinted at Venice, 1491, etc. In Greek, they were first published at Venice, in 1513, by Aldus Manutius (with the co-operation of Marcus Masurius). This edition was followed by the edition of Johannes Oporinus and Simon Grynaeus, *Basilias apud Joh. Valderum*, 1534. Then came the edition *Basilias apud Henricum Petri*, 1554, and afterward that of Henriens Stephanus, with the translation of Joh. Serranus, 8 vols., Par. 1578. The paging and side-numbers of this edition are printed in all modern editions, and are those usually followed in citation. The edition of Stephanus was reproduced at Lyons, 1600, with the translation of Ficinus, and also, in Greek alone, at Frankfort, 1602. Subsequent complete editions are the edition published at Zweibrücken, in 1731-37 (instituted by the so-called Bipontines, G. Ch. Orell, Fr. Chr. Exter, and J. Val. Embser, and to which belong the *Argumenta dial. Plat. exposit. et ill. a. D. Tiedemann*, Zweibr., 1786), the Tauchnitz edition, edited by Chr. Dan. Beck (Leipzig, 1818-19, 1829 and 1850), and the editions of Bekker (Berlin, 1816-17, with Commentary and Scholia, *ibid.* 1823, and London, 1826), Ast (Leipzig, 1819-22), Gottfr. Staibbaum (Leipzig, 1821-25; 1828 seq., and in one vol., Leipzig, 1850 and 1867), and Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann (Zurich, 1839-42; 1861 seq.); Greek and German edition, Leipzig, 1841 seq., Greek and Latin edition, ed. by Ch. Schneider and R. B. Hirschig, Par. 1846-56, Greek alone, ed. K. F. Hermann, Leipzig, 1851-53.

Platon's Werke, by F. Schleiermacher (Translations and Introductions), I. 1 and 2, II. 1-3, Berlin, 1804-10; new and improved edition, *ibid.* 1817-24; III. 1 (*Republic*), *ibid.* 1823; 8d ed. of I. and II. and 9d ed. of III. 1, *ibid.* 1855-62. [Schleiermacher's *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, translated by W. Dobson, Cambridge and London, 1836.—Tr.] *Œuvres de Platon*, French translation by Victor Cousin, 8 vols., Par. 1825-40. Translated into Italian by Eng. Bonghi, *Opere di Platone nuovamente tradotte*, Milan, 1867. *Platon's Sämmtliche Werke*, translated by Hieron. Müller, with introductions by Karl Steinhardt, 8 vols., Leipzig, 1850-64. (Cf. Steinhardt's *Aphorismen über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Pl. Forschungen*, in the *Verh. der 25. Philol.-Vers. in Halle*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 54-70.) [There are two complete translations of the works of Plato in English: *The Works of Plato* (with notes, abstract of Greek Commentaries, etc.—nine of the dialogues translated by F. Sydenham), by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols., London, 1804; and *Plato* (in Bohn's Classical Library), translated by Cary, Davis, and Burges, 6 vols., London, 1838 seq.; cf. *Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues of Plato*, by Alfred Day (Bohn's L.), London, 1870.—Tr.]

For ancient Commentaries on Plato, see below §§ 63, 70. *Timæi Lexicon voc. Platonica*, ed. D. Ruhken, Leyden, 1769, 4t. ed., cur. G. A. Koch, Leipzig, 1823. For the works of Ast and K. F. Hermann on Plato, see above, § 39; cf. also Ast's *Lexicon Platonium*, Leipzig, 1834-39. Jos. Socher, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, Munich, 1820. Ed. Zeller, *Platonische Studien* (on the *Leges*, Menexenus, Hippias Minor, Parmenides, and on Aristotle's representation of the Platonic philosophy), Tübingen, 1839. Franz Susemihl, *Prodromus Plat. Forschungen* (Grotfno. IIab.-Schr.), Göt. 1852. By the same, *Die genet. Entwicklung der Platon. Philosophie, einleitend dargestellt*, 3 parts, Leipzig, 1855-60. Cf. his numerous reviews of modern works on Plato, in several volumes of Jahn's *Jahrbücher f. Phil. u. Päd.*, and his original articles in the same review and in the *Philologus*, especially his *Platonische Forschungen* in the second supplementary volume to the *Philologus*, 1863, and in the *Philologus*, Vol. XX., Göt., 1863, and also the introductions to his translations of several of Plato's dialogues. G. F. W. Suckow, *Die wiss. und künstlerische Form der Platonischen Schriften in ihrer bisher verborgenen Eigenthümlichkeit dargestellt*, Berlin, 1856. Ed. Munk, *Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1856. Sigurd Ribbing, *Genetisk framställning af Plato's ideellära jemte bifogade undersökningar om de Platoniska skrifternas äldst och inbördes sammanhang*, Upsala, 1858, in German, Leipzig, 1863-64. H. Bonitz, *Platon. Studien*, Vols. I. and II. (on the *Gorg.*, *Theæt.*, *Euthyd.*, and *Soph.*), Vienna, 1868-69; Friedrich Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften und über die Hauptmomente aus Plato's Leben*, Vienna, 1861; and *Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen Genetikern und Methodikern und dessen Vermittlung* (in the *Zeitschr. für Phil. u. philos. Krit.*, vol. 57, Halle, 1870). G. Grote, *Plato*, etc. (see above, § 39, p. 96); 2d edition, Lond., 1867. Cf. on this work by Grote, J. St. Mill, in the *Edinb. Review*, April, 1866; Paul Janet, in the *Journal des Savans*, June, 1866, pp. 361-395, and Feb., 1867, pp. 114-123; Charles de Rémusat, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. 73, 1868, pp. 43-77, and D. Peipers, in the *Gött. gelehr. Anz.*, 1869, pp. 81-120, and *ibid.*, 1870, pp. 561-610. Carl Schaarschmidt, *Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften, zur Scheidung der echten von den unechten untersucht*, Bonn, 1866.

Of the numerous editions and translations of and commentaries on single dialogues or collections of

Dialogues—all of which can not here be cited (see Engelmann's *Bibliotheca Script. Class.*, 6th ed., Leipzig, 1853, and also various lists of works in different volumes of the *Philologus*, and in works on the history of literature)—we may mention here:

Dialogi selecti cura Luulov. Frid. Heindorff, ad apparatusum Imman. Bekkeri loc. denovo emend. Phil. Buttmann, Berlin, 1802-28. *Dialogorum selectus ex rec. et cum lat. interpret. F. Aug. Wolfii* (*Euthyphron, Apologia Crislo*), Berlin, 1812. *Symposium*, ed. F. A. Wolf, Leipzig, 1783. *Phaedra*, ed. D. Wyttenbach, Leyden, 1810; Leipzig, 1834 [T. D. Woolsey], etc. The *Republic* has been edited by Ast, K. Schneider, and others, the *Leges* by Ast, Schultze, etc., *Euthydemus* and *Laches* by Badham, Jena, 1855.

Griechische Prosaiker in neuer Uebers. hrag. von C. N. v. Oelander und G. Schwab (containing Plato's works, translated by L. Georgii, Franz Susenmühl, J. Deuschle, and others), Stuttgart (J. B. Metzler), 1856 seq. *Pl.'s Works*, transl. by K. Prantl and others, Stuttgart (Karl Hoffmann), 1854 seq. *Pl.'s ausgewählte Schriften, für den Schulgebrauch erklärt*, by Christian Cron and Jul. Deuschle, Leipz. 1887 seq. *Pl.'s Phaedrus und Gastmahl, über mit einl. Vorwort von K. Lehra*, Leipz. 1870. The *Banquet* has also been translated and explained by (among others) Ed. Zeller (Marburg, 1857), the *Gorgias* by G. Schultze (new, revised edition by S. Vögeli, Zürich, 1867), the *Republic* by F. C. Wolf (Altona, 1799), Kleuker (Vienna, 1808), K. Schneider (Breslau, 1839), and others, [including Davies and Vaughan, *The Republic of Plato*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1868; cf. also, W. Whewell, *Platonic Dialogues for English Readers*, 3 vols., 1829-60.—Tr.].

On the *Phaedrus* compare the introductions of the various editors and translators of that dialogue, as also the appropriate parts in the comprehensive works of Ast, Socher, F. Hermann, Brandis, Zeller, Susenmühl, Munk, Grote, etc., and, in particular, A. B. Krüsch, *Ueber Pl.'s Phaedr.*, Gött. 1848; Jul. Deuschle, *Ueber den innern Gedankenmus. im Pl. Phaedrus*, in the *Zeitschr. f. die Alterthumswiss.*, 1854, pp. 25-44; *Die Pl. Mythen, insbes. der Mythos im Phaedr.*, Hanau, 1854; Lijpe, *De Phaedri consilio* (G.-Pr.), Wesel, 1856; C. R. Volquardsen, *Pl.'s Phaedrus, Pl.'s erste Schrift*, Kiel, 1869; F. Bresler, *Ueber den Pl. Phaedr.* (G.-Pr.), Dantzig, 1867; Rud. Kühner, *Pl. de eloquentia in Phaedro dialogo judicium* (G.-Pr.), Spandau, 1868; Carl Schmelzer, *Zu Pl. Phaedrus* (Progr.), Guben, 1868; L. R. Förster, *Quaestio de Pl. Phaedro*, Berlin, 1869. Cf. also Lehrs' Introduction to his translation of the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, Leipzig, 1860.

Of the Platonic *Symposium* treat (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, etc.): F. A. Wolf, in his *Vermischte Schr.*, pp. 258-329; Carl Fortlage, *Philosophische Meditationen über Plato's Sympos.*, Heidelberg, 1805; Ferd. Delbrück, *De Plat. Symposio*, Bonn, 1839; Albert Schwegler, *Ueber die Compos. des Pl. Symp.*, Tübingen, 1848; Ed. Wüster, *Blicks in Pl.'s Symp.*, in the *Philol.*, V. pp. 653 seq.; Franz Susenmühl, *Ueber die Compos. des Pl. Gastmahls*, in the *Philol.*, VI. 1851, pp. 177 seq., and VIII. 1853, pp. 158-159; Ed. Zeller, in his Translation of the *Symp.*, Marburg, 1859. On the relation of the Platonic to the Xenophontic *Symposium*, see Boeckh, *De similitudine, quam Plato cum Xenophontis exercitiae fortiter*, Berlin, 1811 (cf. Boeckh, in v. Raumer's *Antiquar. Briefe*, Leipz. 1851, p. 40 seq.); K. F. Hermann, *Nun Pl. an Xenoph. Convivium suum prius scripserit, atque de consilio horum libellorum*, Marb. 1804; *Vermuthung, dass Pl. Symposium älter sei als das Xenophontische, gerechtfertigt*, ib. 1841; *Zur Frage über das Zeitverhältniss der beiden Symposien*, in the *Philol.*, VIII. pp. 829-833. Arn. Hug argues on decisive grounds in favor of the priority in time of the *Banquet* of Xenophon, in the *Philol.*, VII. pp. 628-629; Georg Ferd. Rettig (argues in the same sense), *Progr.*, Berne, 1864.

Of the dialogue *Protagoras* write (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, Susenmühl, Grote, etc.) Conr. G. Fehmer, *Pl. Protag. nach seinem innern Zusammenhang entwickelt* (Progr.), Zeitz, 1839; W. Nitzmann, *De Pl. Protag.*, Emmerich, 1855; Kroschel, *Zu den chronol. Verh. des Pl. Protag.*, in the *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, XI. 1857, pp. 561-567; Richard Schöne, *Ueber Pl. Protag., ein Beitrag zur Lösung der Pl. Frage*, Leipz. 1862; Melnartius, *Wie ist Pl. Protag. aufzufassen?* (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1864; Waldeck, *Analyses des Pl. Protag.* (G.-Pr.), Corbach, 1868.

On the order of ideas in the *Gorgias* and the tendency of the dialogue compare, in particular, Joh. Bake, *De Gorg. Pl. consilio et ingenio*, in B's *Scholastica Hypomnemata*, III. pp. 1-28, Leyden, 1844; Herm. Bonitz, in his above-mentioned *Studien*; Ludw. Paul, *Ist die Scene für den Gorg. im Hause des Kallikles?* (*Festgruss an die 31 Philol.-Vers.*), Kiel, 1859. [The *Gorgias* of Plato, T. D. Woolsey, Boston, 1862, 2d edition, 1848.—Tr.]

In regard to the *Meno*, *Euthyphron*, *Cratylus*, and other minor dialogues, as the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophistes*, etc., it may suffice here to refer to the works of Schenarschmidt and Grote, of whom the former disputes, while the latter defends, the authenticity of all these dialogues. [Recent translations of three of these dialogues are: *Philebus, a Dialogue of Plato*, etc., translated by Edward Poste, London, (since) 1890; *The Sophistes of Plato*, translated and preceded by an Intr. on Ancient and Modern Philosophy, by R. W. Mackay, Lond. 1895; *Plato's Meno*, transl. by Mackay, with an Essay on the Moral Education of the Greeks, London, 1899.—Tr.]

The principal works relating to the *Republic* are cited *ad* § 42, and those relating to the *Timæus* and *Phædo*, *ad* § 42.

The spuriousness of all the *Letters* attributed to Plato has been demonstrated most decisively by Herm. Thom. Karsten (see above, § 88, p. 90).

The Aristotelian citations from Plato form the only sufficient external criterion and certificate of the genuineness of the works of Plato. Every dialogue which is unquestionably attested as Platonic by Aristotle, must be regarded as genuine, or has at least the most decided presumption in its favor. Of course, the converse is not true, that the silence of Aristotle proves the spuriousness of a dialogue, although under specific circumstances this silence is certainly to be considered as an important element in the evidence. The question of genuineness in connection with those dialogues which are not proved authentic by Aristotle's testimony, must be decided mainly on internal grounds. The libraries of Plato's pupils, while sufficient to assure the preservation of all that was genuine among the works attributed to Plato, were insufficient to assure the exclusion of all that was spurious. On the one hand, works published by immediate disciples of Plato (for example, *Leges*, *Epinomis*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus*), which were found in the libraries with no exact indication of the name of the author, or the name of the author having been lost, were early received as works of Plato; among these were some that were written in the spirit of Plato's doctrine and under his name, being founded on his posthumous literary remains or on his oral utterances; on the other hand, some works, which may have been composed from sixty to one hundred years after Plato's death (for example, a part of the *Letters*), were received into the Alexandrian Library as works presumably Platonic. Still others of Plato's "Works" are forgeries of even later date.

The trilogies, as arranged by Aristophanes of Byzantium are (according to Diog. L., III. 61.) the following: 1) *Rep.*, *Timæus*, *Critias*; 2) *Sophista*, *Politicus*, *Cratylus*; 3) *Leges*, *Minos*, *Epinomis*; 4) *Theæt.*, *Euthyphro*, *Apologia*; 5) *Crito*, *Phædo*, *Epistolæ*; besides these, there were other dialogues which Aristophanes received as genuine, and enumerated separately. It is not known which these were. The tetralogies proposed by Thrasyllus were (according to Diog. L., 56 seq.): 1) *Euthyphron*, *Apologia*, *Crito*, *Phædo*; 2) *Cratylus*, *Theætetus*, *Sophista*, *Politicus*; 3) *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Convivium*, *Phædrus*; 4) *Alcibiades I. and II.*, *Hipparchus*, *Anterastæ*; 5) *Theages*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*; 6) *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*; 7) *Hippias Major*, *Hippias Minor*, *Io*, *Menexenus*; 8) *Clitophon*, *Rep.*, *Timæus*, *Critias*; 9) *Minos*, *Leges*, *Epinomis*, *Epistolæ*.

As dialogues confessedly spurious, Diog. L. names the following: *Mido*, *Eryxias*, *Halcyo*, eight dialogues without an introduction (*ἀνέφαλοι η'*) *Sisyphus*, *Axiochus*, *Phaeacus*, *Demodocus*, *Chelidon*, *Hebdome*, *Epimenides*. Of these are preserved: 1) *Axiochus*; 2) Concerning what is just (one of the dialogues without exordium); 3) Concerning virtue (ditto); 4) *Demodocus*; 5) *Sisyphus*; 6) *Eryxias*; 7) *Halcyo* (which usually accompanies Lucian's works); to these are to be added the *Definitiones*, which are likewise spurious.

Schleiermacher places in the first, or elementary division of the Platonic works, as chief works: *Phædrus*, *Protagoras*, *Parmenides*; as adjuncts: *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphron*; as occasional writings: *Apologia* and *Crito*; and as semi-genuine or spurious: *Io*, *Hippias Minor*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alcibiades II.* In the second division, which contains the dialogues indirectly dialectical in form, dialogues devoted principally to the explanation of knowledge and of intelligent action, Schleiermacher classes as chief works: *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Phædo*, *Philebus*; as adjuncts: *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Convivium*; as semi-genuine or spurious: *Theages*, *Erastæ*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Menexenus*, *Hippias Major*, *Clitoph.* The third, constructive division, finally, contains, according to

Schleiermacher, as chief works the dialogues: Republic, Timæus, and Critias; and as an adjunct, the *Leges*.—Brandis agrees substantially with Schleiermacher, but holds that the Protagoras may have been composed before the Phædrus, and places (with Zeller) Parmenides immediately after Sophistes and Politicus.

K. F. Hermann includes in the first of the three development-periods which he ascribes to Plato, the following dialogues: Hipp. Min., Io, Alcib. I., Charm., Lysis, Laches, Protag., Euthyd. The Apol., Crito, Gorgias, Euthyphro, Meno, Hipp. Major belong to a "transition period." In the second, or Megaric period, he places Cratylus, Theæst., Soph., Politicus, Parmenides, and in the third period, the period of maturity, Phædrus, Menexenus, Convivium, Phædo, Phileb., Rep., Tim., Critias, Leges.

Steinhart (in his introductions to the Platonic dialogues accompanying Müller's translation) adopts substantially the arrangement of Hermann, modifying it only in a few minor points. Susemihl, who at first (in his *Prodromus Platon. Forschungen*) was more inclined to the view of Schleiermacher, approached subsequently nearer to that of Hermann, adopting an intermediate and conciliatory position between them. He holds that a definite plan underlies the Platonic writings, but that this was not wholly developed in Plato's mind at the very beginning of his literary activity. He believes that it was developed gradually, like his philosophy, during the first stadia of his literary activity, becoming constantly clearer and more complete. Susemihl differs from Hermann, in ascribing the development of philosophical doctrine in Plato's mind less to external influences and more to Plato's originality. Susemihl regards the Phædrus as earlier than the dialogues of Hermann's "Megaric period," or, at least, than a part of them.

Munk holds fast to the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher, that all the dialogues of Plato were composed with reference to a determinate plan, but believes that they were nearly all written after the death of Socrates. He emphasizes more the artistic side of this plan than the didactic, and supposes that Plato designed in the succession of his writings to present an idealized portrait of Socrates as the genuine philosopher; he believes, accordingly, that by the chronological succession of the scenes or "situations," and especially by the increasing age at which Socrates figures in the successive dialogues, Plato indicated the order in which he himself intended them to be studied, and that this order agrees in general with the time of their composition. Munk's theory is an hypothesis worthy of consideration. Many of the results of special investigation accord very well with it, while others seem to oppose it, though without being sufficient to set aside entirely the principle involved. But it is beyond question that the manner in which Munk has carried through and applied his principle in detail, is imperfect, and leaves room for numerous corrections. Munk has neglected the question of the genuineness of the dialogues, and has often either made too light work of the investigation of their chronological succession or conducted it from too exclusive a stand-point. He has, nevertheless, furnished many very valuable contributions to this department of special investigation. He distinguishes three series of writings: I. Socrates' consecration to philosophy and his contests against false wisdom; time of composition 389-384 B. C.: Parm. (time of the action, 446), Protag. (434), Charm. (432), Laches (421), Gorgias (420), Io (420), Hippias I. (420), Cratylus (420), Euthyd. (420), Sympos. (417). II. Socrates teaches true wisdom; time of composition, 383-370: Phædrus (410), Philebus (410), Rep., Tim., and Critias (409, see Munk in Jahn's Jahrb., 79, p. 791). III. S. demonstrates the truth of his teachings by the criticism of opposite opinions and by his death as a martyr; time of composition, after 370: Meno (405), Theæst. (on the day when the accusation was brought forward by Meletus), Soph. and Politicus (one day later), Euthyphron (the same day with Theæst.), Apolog. (one day after the embassy to Delos), Crito (two days before the death of Socrates),

Phædo (on the day of Socrates' death). These writings form, according to Munk, a *Cycnus* complete in itself; they were preceded by a few youthful compositions, viz.: *Alcib. I.*, *Lysis*, and *Hippias II.*, and followed by *Menæxenus* (composed after 387) and *Leges* (begun in 367).

Grote holds that all those dialogues which were considered genuine by Thrasyllus are really such, because it is to be presupposed that they were preserved in the Alexandrian Library as Platonic writings (which is, indeed, very probable), and because it is further to be assumed that this Library received them in the beginning from Platonists of the Academy (which is probably true of many of these writings, but scarcely of all), and that these Platonists possessed a complete and correct collection of the genuine Platonic writings. (This latter supposition, however, is very doubtful, and is not proved; for in those early times the productive philosophical interest generally took precedence of the literary and antiquarian; it is quite conceivable that among Plato's remains, as also in book-collections belonging to Platonists, were included copies of the dialogical writings of Plato's disciples—which, from all the indications, we must suppose to have been very numerous—some of them without precise indications as to their authorship, and that this gave occasion, earlier or later, to errors, and even to imposture. The supposition that a complete collection of the genuine writings of Plato was in the possession of the School, and that this served as the *norma* for the Platonic canon, would prove too much, since from it would follow the genuineness of the entire collection transmitted; but surely the genuineness of all the contents of that collection can not be satisfactorily defended, as, e. g., that of *Minos* and the *Epistles*, which are certainly spurious, yet belong to the writings considered genuine by Aristophanes of Byzantium.) Grote assumes, further, that all the dialogues of Plato and those of the other companions of Socrates were composed after the death of Socrates; he supports this altogether reasonable opinion with the most cogent arguments. Grote rejects the hypothesis of Schleiermacher and Munk, of a didactic or artistic plan comprehending, with few exceptions, all the dialogues; he denies all "peremptory and intentional sequence or interdependence;" each dialogue, he argues, is the product of the "state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed;" in the composition of the dialogues of research or inquiry, it is not necessary to suppose that Plato was already in possession of the solutions contained in the constructive dialogues; the disturbing of prejudices and pointing out of difficulties has in itself a very great worth; "the dialogues of research present an end in themselves." Here Grote seems to go too far. That, for example, in the *Protagoras*, the Platonic Socrates hypothetically develops opinions which were not held by Plato himself, and that this is intimated by Plato by the early age at which he brings forward Socrates in the dialogue named—thereby suggesting a more advanced and mature stadium in Socrates' life, to be set forth in other dialogues—all this would have to be admitted, even though Schleiermacher's and Munk's view of an artistic and didactic plan underlying all the dialogues, were justly rejected. Grote does not believe that the chronological sequence of most of the dialogues can be determined; he considers them in his work in the following order: *Apologia* (early, and essentially faithful), *Crito*, *Euthyphron*, *Alc. I.* and *II.*, *Hippias Major* and *Minor*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Theages*, *Erastæ*, *Ion*, *Lachæa*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, *Phædrus*, *Symposium*, *Parmenides*, *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus*, *Menæxenus*, *Clitopho* (which Grote defends as genuine, but fragmentary, and first made public after Plato's death), *Rep.*, *Tim.*, and *Critias*, *Leges*, and *Epinomis*. Grote's work is rich in suggestion and instruction; the author of the "*History of Greece*" maintains here his masterly superiority in historical presentation, but his acceptance as genuine of all the dialogues accredited by Thrasyllus has caused him to lose sight of the

essential unity present in Plato's thought and works, and to admit in its stead a multifariousness abounding in change and contradiction.

Scheerschmidt's investigations relate chiefly to the question of the genuineness or spuriousness of Plato's works, and incidentally only to that of their chronological order. The result he arrives at is, that the authenticity of the following dialogues only is fully assured: *Phaedrus*, *Protagoras*, *Banquet*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*, *Theaetetus*, *Phaedo*, *Laws*. In Plato's genuine works he sees dramatic dialogues, which are not intended to instruct the reader in the solution of the fundamental questions of philosophy themselves, but rather from the stand-point of the writer's own experience, to impress in a living, impressive manner on the heart of the reader that the dialectical labor necessary to the solution of those questions is the moral concern and duty of every man, and to offer, in the example of the most remarkable investigator of ideas, samples of the art by which one elevates himself into the ideal region and in its light contemplates the essence of the soul, the best form of the state, or even of the cosmos, as the expression of the most perfect harmony. The Socratic dialogue, which with Xenophon and other followers of Socrates served to recall their late master's discussions concerning ideas, was elevated by Plato, who used the greatest liberty in modifying its content as well as its shape, to a philosophical drama, in which Socrates and his collocutors acquire a typical character as representatives of various intellectual tendencies and ethical states.

In all the dialogues of Plato, Socrates appears to such a degree and in such a manner idealized, that it is impossible to suppose any of them to have been composed before that event of Socrates' death, which transfigured the image of Socrates in the mind of Plato. The *Apology* appears to have been written at an early period by Plato, and to present not merely the sense and spirit, but nearly the very words of Socrates's defense (as Schleiermacher assumes). Setting aside this dialogue (and the *Crito*?), the ideal picture of Socrates, as presented in those dialogues, in which Plato represents him as a man not yet advanced in years, approaches nearest to his historical figure. This is true without exception, if we set aside as spurious the dialogue *Parmenides*, which treats of the ideas, and the *One* (*ἓν*), which can neither be nor not be. The time of the action of this dialogue is about 450, and in it the early training of Socrates is depicted unhistorically, with a certain idealization, as in *Phaedo*, p. 85 e, seq., not conformable to the tendency, early characteristic of Socrates, to "examine" subjects dialectically and in their ethical bearings, nor in a manner which accords with the *Protagoras* and the other dialogues, but with a mixture of later ideas, and such as were foreign to Socrates. The unjustified reproach is here directed against Socrates, that he had in earlier life assumed the existence of ideas, for the purposes of preparatory dialectical exercises (conducted in the method of two-sided discussions respecting particular conceptions). Socrates appears as a man of middle age, probably not yet forty years old, and forcing the recognition of his mastership in philosophy, in discussions with *Protagoras*, who was by many years his senior (and incidentally also with *Hippias* and *Prodicus*), in the artistically very finished dialogue *Protagoras*. The date of this dialogue must be regarded as about 432 B. C., although it contains portions pointing anachronistically to a later period. It was certainly composed after the death of Socrates, and perhaps later than the *Phaedrus*. In the dialogue *Protagoras* the relation of virtue to knowledge, the unity or plurality of the virtues, and the cultivation of virtue are made subjects of investigation, and the conceit of the Sophists, in presuming to be wise and to make others wise, is annihilated by the *ἐστραγγ* of Socrates, whose dialectic is based on an earnest striving after truth and morality. A dialogue more peculiarly Platonic in content and form is the *Gorgias* (on the questions: What is rhetoric? conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, cc. 2-15; What worth

and what real power does rhetoric possess? conversation between Socrates and Polus, *cc.* 16-36; Is the proper business of life political rhetoric or philosophy? conversation between Socrates and Callicles, *cc.* 57-83; the whole is at the same time a justification by Plato of himself in adopting the philosopher's vocation). The time at which Plato would represent the conversations as being held, is probably 427 B. C., though anachronistic reference is made in them to events of a later date. In these dialogues, as also in the following, whose authenticity in part is not fully certified, Laches (on Courage), Lysis (on Friendship), Charmides (on Temperance), Euthyphro (on Piety), Hippias Minor (on Willful Wrong-doing), and in others, which are of very doubtful authenticity or are decidedly spurious, the specifically Platonic theory of ideas is contained only by implication, but not formally developed and established. This may be explained by supposing that Plato in these dialogues intentionally confined himself to mere suggestions or intimations, being guided in this by the didactic principle of a gradual exposition of his doctrines. Or, it may be explained by the hypothesis, that Plato had himself not yet arrived at the theory of ideas in its developed form (according to the principle of gradual development assumed by K. F. Hermann); but the circumstance that Plato in the Protagoras and also in Gorgias (and Laches, etc.) introduces Socrates as a man still in middle age, is decidedly favorable to the first supposition. The theory of ideas, with all the theoretical positions which it involves, is first expressly set forth in the Phaedrus and the Convivium, though in mythical form—not in the form of dialectical development. The dialogue Phaedrus criticises ostentatious eloquence (that of Lysias in particular) from the stand-point of philosophy, and the false art of instruction and education from the stand-point of that art which is true. It does this first by the collocation of discourses concerning love, the first Lysianic, the second in form only, and the third in both form and tendency, Platonic and Socratic, and then by a general consideration, founded on these examples, of the rhetorical and the philosophical or dialectical methods. But the examples, in respect of their subjects, are not arbitrarily chosen. They treat directly of the true end of life and of the way which conducts to it, love, taken in the philosophical sense, being here represented as the united striving of souls to reach the goal of philosophy, *i. e.*, the knowledge of ideas, and to attain to that practical conduct of life which corresponds with such knowledge; while an unphilosophical rhetoric is portrayed as pursuing ends altogether inferior. The Phaedrus is also a justification of Plato's doctrinal activity as a teacher. In it, philosophical authorship is represented as secondary to, and dependent upon oral schooling in dialectic. It is held that the former should follow the latter only as *ἐπὶ μνησιν*, and is nothing but a *παγκάλῃ παιδείᾳ*, a kind of philosophical poesy (cf. *Rep.*, p. 602), not to be compared with the serious earnestness of a life devoted, in common with others, to inquiry and to the work of education (a declaration, which, although its immediate occasion was Plato's poetical imitation of the Socratic dialectic, none the less implies beyond a doubt the existence already of a circle of companions of like mind with Plato, and also a circle of scholars and co-investigators, who recognized Plato as their leader). The *Convivium* contains a series of discourses respecting love, which set forth the various conceptions of the same, ending with the highest philosophical conception of love, as maintained by Socrates, and all in the form of encomia addressed to Eros. At last Alcibiades steps in, extolling Socrates as one who, in his relations with himself, had exemplified the genuine, pedagogical love in a manner fully commensurate with the requirement of philosophy. The *Convivium* was composed 385-384, or at least not earlier (as appears from an historical allusion contained in it); the action falls in the year 417. The relation of this dialogue to the *Symposium* of Xenophon is discussed on the one side by K. F. Hermann (*Progr.*, Marb. 1841; Göttingen 1844-45), who considers the

Platonic composition the earlier; on the other, by A. Hug (in the *Philol.*, VII. 1852, p. 638 seq., to which Hermann responds, *ibid.*, Vol. VIII.), G. Ferd. Rettig (*Progr.*, Berne, 1864), and Boeckh (*De similitudine, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur*, Berlin, 1811, and in v. Raumer's *Antiquar. Briefe*, Leipsic, 1851, p. 40 seq.). The *Phaedrus* appears to have been written not long before the Banquet; the time of the action in Plato's intention may be perhaps most surely determined from the circumstance that Isocrates (born 435) is named in it as a young beginner, of whom great expectations might justly be entertained; with this is to be joined the fact that Lysias, who is represented as living at Athens, is known from other sources to have returned thither from Lower Italy in the year 411; yet it is uncertain whether Plato knew and took into consideration this time of the return of Lysias, of which he nowhere makes mention himself. According to Diog. L., III. 38, the *Phaedrus* was Plato's earliest composition; yet this statement, though possibly correct, is not sufficiently well authenticated. The date of the composition of the *Phaedrus* falls undoubtedly within the years 396-384 B. C., according to the present state of investigations; but nearly all the data on which are founded the various attempts at a more exact determination of it are very uncertain. In case Plato made this dialogue first public on his return after long journeys, and wrote the *Protagoras*, as also the *Gorgias*, at a later period, it would seem beyond doubt that in these latter dialogues, which are filled with elementary inquiries in the field of dialectic and ethics, Plato consciously and with artistic intention represented the age of Socrates as such, that notwithstanding their possibly later composition, they could be used as preparatory for the development of ideas contained in the *Phaedrus*—each of the dialogues, of course, being considered in its relation to the ideal picture of the Platonic Socrates, as presented by all the dialogues taken together.

In a letter addressed to me, and which its author has kindly permitted me to publish, *Susemihl* expresses his belief that the date of the composition of the *Phaedrus* may be fixed at 389 or 388. He reasons as follows: "Isocrates must have been at that time a well-known author and perhaps also already a teacher of eloquence; but up to 392 he neither engaged in giving instruction as such a teacher, nor in any other occupation except the composition of judicial discourses, a work which he afterward entirely discontinued; and since the criticism of Lysias in the *Phaedrus* turns on one of the ostentatious discourses of that orator, it is hardly possible not to suppose that the Isocrates who is contrasted with him, had already begun to compose such discourses, when the dialogue was written. Now the oldest of these, the Encomium of Busiris, seems to date from 390-389. On the other hand, it is difficult to suppose that long after 390 or 389 Plato should not have become so undeceived respecting the character and merits of Isocrates, as to render it impossible for him still to express himself respecting him in such terms as those here employed by him. Spengel, indeed (*Isokr. und Pl.*, p. 15 seq.; 347 seq.), thinks that when Isocrates composed his work against the Sophists, which is beyond question to be considered as a sort of inaugural programme of his course as an instructor, he can have been at the most not more than forty years old, since he says in *Antid.*, § 196, that he wrote this work νεώτερος and ἀκμήων; but it is to be noticed, 1) that he there judges himself (§ 9) σπασίτερος only at the age of eighty-two years; 2) that if Isocrates opened his school at Athens as early as 496, he must at the same time have been writing judicial discourses during a period of at least two years, which contradicts the express testimony of Aristotle, in *Cic.*, *Brutus*, 12, 48 (*Fragm.*, 119, Rose)."

Of very uncertain authenticity are the *Hippias Major* (On the Beautiful), *Io* (Concerning Inspiration and Reflection), *Meno* (Can Virtue be Taught?), and *Menexenus* (a λόγος ἐπιτάφιος on fallen Athenians with Socrates as the speaker). It is possible that Plato early commenced writing on the dialogue on justice, which he afterward enlarged into the work

respecting justice in the life of the individual and in the state (The State, *Politeia*, *Republica*). This work was followed by the *Timæus* (containing Plato's natural philosophy, with *Timæus* the Pythagorean as spokesman) and *Critias* (a fragment of an unfinished work, containing an imaginary political story of the primitive times); the time of these dialogues falls in the year 409 B. C. The *Phædo*, which presents the dying Socrates demonstrating the immortality of the soul, seems to have been commenced later than the *Timæus* and to close up the *Cyclus*, by showing how the noblest and the abiding good for the immortal soul consists in philosophical knowledge and in action founded on such knowledge (somewhat as in the *Banquet*, where Plato advances from the praise of *Eros* to that of the person of the true *Erotic*). To the dialogues of late composition, the *Theætetus* (which stands in the closest relation to *Rep.*, V. 474 seq., and *Tim.*, p. 51) seems to belong. In this dialogue Plato shows how knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) differs from sense-perception (*αἰσθησις*, ch. 8-30), and from correct judgment or opinion (*δόξα ἀληθής*, ch. 31-38). The definition of *ἐπιστήμη* as *δόξα ἀληθής μετὰ λόγου* (ch. 39 seq.), he finds unsatisfactory on account of the ambiguity of the term *λόγος*. He thus indirectly props up the theory of ideas by maintaining that the difference between knowledge on the one hand, and sensuous perception and opinion on the other, is founded on a difference between the objects of knowledge and those of sensation and opinion (hence on the difference between the ideas and the individual objects existing in time and space). Of uncertain, yet extremely probable authenticity is the dialogue analogous in character to the *Theætetus*, entitled *Cratylus* (*περὶ ὁρθότητος ὀνομάτων*). Whether the names of things belong to them *φύσει*, by natural adaptation, or are given to them arbitrarily and by common consent); see, on the one hand, Schaarschmidt, *Ueber die Unechtheit des Dialogs Kratylus*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., XX. 1865, pp. 321-356; and his work: *Die Sammlung*, etc., p. 245 seq.; on the other hand, Alberti, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, XXI., 1866, pp. 180-209; and in the *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1867, pp. 721-758; and especially Benfey in the *Nachrichten von der Kgl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, No. 8, March 7, 1866; "*Auszug einer Abhandlung über die Aufgabe des Platon. Dialogs Kratylus*," or the work itself, which has since been published at Göttingen, 1866; also Lehrs, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., XXII. 1867, pp. 436-440. It is also questionable whether Plato himself, or, what would appear more probable, an early Platonist composed the *Euthydemus*, a dialogue richly spiced with pleasantry, and the subject of which Bonitz (*Platon. Studien*, Heft 2, Vienna, 1860, p. 32 seq.) happily describes as follows: "The vocation of philosophy, as the true educatrix of youth, is defended and justified in opposition to the seeming wisdom which seeks to take its place, in a contest in which each is brought forward in its own defense." Schaarschmidt attempts to demonstrate its spuriousness (in his work above cited, pp. 326-342). The *Philebus*, treating of the Good, is one of the latest compositions of Plato; in it we perceive already something of the Pythagorizing manner, toward which Plato inclined in his later years, and which prevailed still more among the first Academics. The *Sophistes* (on the Sophist and the field of his knowledge, the Non-Existent) and the *Politicus* (the Statesman and the field of his knowledge and action) were composed, in all probability, not by Plato, but by one of his scholars (see Schaarschmidt, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., XVIII. pp. 1-28, and XIX. pp. 63-96, 1862 and '63: yet cf. Hayduck, *Ueber die Echtheit des Soph. und Pol.*, I. (*Greifsw. Gymn.-Progr.*), 1864, and Ed. Alberti, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1866, No. 2, p. 130 seq.; and on the other side again, Schaarschmidt, *Die Sammlung*, etc., pp. 181-245). The dialogues *Sophistes* and *Politicus* are formally connected with the *Theætetus* of Plato, as constituting with it one whole. They purport to furnish that continuation of the inquiry begun in the *Theætetus*, which was declared necessary at the end of this dialogue, and in which the subject of Ideas was to be more especially treated of. But their relation to the *Theætetus*

is only superficial, and the continuation alluded to was furnished rather in the investigations conducted by Plato in the midst of his disciples and in the teachings he then and there communicated to them, the so-called *ἀγρὰ ἀγύματα*. The last work of Plato, made public, according to ancient accounts, by one of his disciples, Philip the Opuntian, from Plato's rough draught, is the *Leges* (Concerning the second-best state). By the guest from Athens, who leads in the conversation, Plato seems to have intended himself.

Adhuc sub judice lis est. The immediate problem is now the exact investigation of the composition of the dialogues taken singly, as introductory to which work, besides Schleiermacher's Introductions and the works of Brandis, Steinhart, Susemihl, and others, such essays as Trendelenburg's *De Plat. Philebi consilio* (Berlin, 1837), and Bonitz's *Platonische Studien* (Vienna, 1858-60), may be profitably consulted.

§ 41. The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic, though not expressly enunciated by Plato, was practically involved in his treatment of the different classes of philosophical problems in different dialogues, and may be made the basis of an exposition of his doctrine. We begin with the Dialectic of Plato.

The Platonic philosophy centers in the Theory of Ideas. The Platonic Idea (*ἰδέα* or *εἶδος*) is the pure, archetypal essence, in which those things which are together subsumed under the same concept, participate. *Æsthetically* and *ethically*, it is the perfect in its kind, to which the given reality remains perpetually inferior. Logically and ontologically considered, it is the object of the concept. As the objects of the outer world are severally known through corresponding mental representations, so the idea is known through the concept. The Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual objects, as such, but rather this essence conceived as perfect in its kind, immutable, unique, and independent, or existing *per se*. The idea respects the universal; but it is also represented by Plato as a spaceless and timeless archetype of individuals. The more Plato in his speculation and in his language gives place to his fancy, so much the more does he individualize his Ideas; the more he confines himself to pure cogitation, so much the more does he approach the apprehension of the idea under the form of universality. Let the individuals which share in the same essence or belong to the same class, be conceived as freed from the limits of space and time, from materiality and individual deficiency, and so reduced to a unity, which is the ground of their existence, and this unity (objective and real, not merely thought by us through abstraction) will be the Platonic idea.

To express the relation of individuals to their corresponding ideas,

Plato employs the term "participation" (*μέθεξις*), and also "imitation" (*μίμησις*, *ομοιώσις*). The idea is the archetype (*παράδειγμα*), individual objects are images (*εἰδῶλα*, *ομοιώματα*); the idea, though existing independently (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), has also a certain community (*κοινωνία*) with things; it is in some sense present (*παρουσία*) in them; but the specific nature of this community Plato has neglected more precisely to define.

The attribution to the ideas of independent, singular existence, or the hypostatizing of the ideas, implied a certain separation of them from individual things. Thus understood, the doctrine was described and combated by Aristotle as a *χωρίζεν* (separation of the ideal from the real). This view of the ideas seems to have grown upon Plato, so that at last we find him considering the ideas (and especially the highest among them, the idea of the Good) as efficient causes, which impart to individuals their existence and essence. Plato calls them figuratively (in the *Timæus*) Gods, and appears, in speaking of the World-Builder (the *Demiurgos*), who shapes all things for good, to intend the idea of the Good. The (unconsciously mythical) personification of the ideas became complete in the assertion, that movement, life, animation, and reason belonged to them; yet this doctrine (enounced in the dialogue *Sophistes*) can scarcely have been that of Plato himself, who held fast to the immutability of the ideas, but only of a portion of his disciples.

A plurality of ideas is assumed by Plato, corresponding with the plurality of concepts. All the relations which subsist between concepts find, according to Plato, their *analogia* in the relations of the ideas to each other. The higher or more general concept is related to the lower or less general ones ranged under it, as each of the latter is to the individual notions which it includes; accordingly, in Plato's view, that idea which is the object of the higher concept, is so related to those ideas, which are the objects of the lower concepts, as is each of these ideas to the group of individual objects corresponding to it.

The highest idea is the Idea of the Good. As the cause of being and cognition, it is as the sun in the kingdom of ideas. Plato appears to identify it with the supreme Deity. That the idea of the good, and not that of Being, should be conceived as the highest, is in consonance with the ethical character of the doctrine of ideas, according to which the idea is the perfect in its kind; and it is not in conflict with the logical and ontological purport of that doctrine,

because the good may be considered as an idea quite as universal as being, since every thing, in so far as it is truly existent, is also necessarily good.

As mathematical cognition holds a middle place between philosophical and sensible cognition, so mathematical objects form a mean between sensuous things and ideas.

The method of cognition by which the ideas are apprehended, is Dialectic, which proceeds in a twofold direction, rising first to the universal and then returning from the universal to the particular. A forerunner of dialectical cognition, and, in the event of the latter being unattainable, its substitute, is the mythical method in treating of the ideas.

The work of drawing up a complete system of the ideas was not accomplished by Plato. As a step in this direction, however, we may regard the reduction of the ideas to numbers, which Plato undertook in his old age, after having originally developed the theory of ideas apart from all consideration of the relations of numbers. Such also was the stoicheiology connected with this reduction, or the doctrine of the singular or limiting element, of the undetermined element determinable by the former, and of the third element resulting from the mixture of the first two,—the three constituting the elements of all that exists.

On the System of Plato in general, cf., in addition to the above-cited works of Tennemann and K. F. Hermann and the histories of Ritter, Brandis, and Zeller, the following: Phil. Guili. van Heusde, *Initiis Philosophiæ Platoniciæ*, Utrecht, 1827-28; ed. II., Leyden, 1842; C. Beek, *Plato's Philosophie im Abriss ihrer genetischen Entwicklung*, Stuttgart, 1838; A. Arnold, *System der Platonischen Philosophie als Einteilung in das Studium des Plato und der Philosophie überhaupt*, Erfurt, 1838. (Forms the third part of *Plat. Werke, einzeln erklärt und in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Erfurt, 1838 seq.)

On the whole Platonic philosophy in its relations to Judaism and Christianity, see Car. Frid. Staudlin, *De philosophiæ Platoniciæ cum doctrinâ religionis Judaicæ et Christianæ cognatione*, Göttingen, 1819; C. Ackermann, *Das Christliche in Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophie*, Hamburg, 1835 [translated by S. R. Asbury: *The Christian Element in Plato*, Edinburgh, 1861.—Tr.]; Ferd. Christ. Baur, *Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus*, in the *Zeitschr. für Theol.*, 1837, No. 3, pp. 1-154, and separately, Tübingen, 1837. (Baur shows how the practicable elements in the Platonic ideal state were realized by the Christian church, which result he attributes to the inner relationship of the two, as each recognizing the substantiality of the ideal; but Platonism, he adds, was wanting in the sense of the unity of the divine and the human, in positive or substantial import, and in a recognition of the phenomena of subjective consciousness. Baur's conception of "substantiality," however, wavers between that of unconsciousness [the ancient conception] and transcendence [a more modern one]. It may well be asked, whether more of "unity" is not visible in Plato's dialectic than in the dogmas of the church?) A. Neander, *Wiss. Abhandlungen*, ed. by J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851, p. 169 seq.; J. Döllinger, *Hellenismus und Judenthum*, Regensburg, 1857, p. 395 seq.; R. Ehlert, *De et ac potestate, quam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica, in doctr. apologetarum sæc. II. habuerit*, Göttingen, 1858; F. Michell, *Die Philosophie Plato's in ihrer innern Beziehung zur geoffenbarten Wahrheit*, Münster, 1860-61; Detrich Becker, *Das philos. System Plato's in seiner Beziehung zum christlichen Dogma*, Freiburg, 1863; Heinr. von Stein, *Stoben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus*, Parts I. and II., Göttingen, 1863-64; Alfred Fouillée, *La philosophie de*

Platon: *Exposition, Méthode et critique de la théorie des idées* (Ouvrage couronné par l'Acad. des Sciences Morales et Politiques), Paris, 1869. (Of the literature to § 43.)

Among the earlier monographs on Plato's theory of Ideas may be mentioned those of Jak. Brucker (1748), Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1786), Friedrich Victor Leberecht Plessing, Joh. Friedr. Dammann, Th. Fährse (1795); among the more recent, those of Joh. Friedr. Herbart (*De Platonici Systematis Fundamento* Götting, 1805, reproduced in Vol. I. of Herbart's *Alt. Schr.*, 1842, p. 61 seq., and in Vol. XII. of his *Compl. Works* 1852, p. 61 seq.; cf. Boeckh, *Jenaer Litt.-Zeitung*, 1808, No. 224.), Christ. Aug. Brandis (*Diatriba Academica de perititia Aristotelis libris de Ideis et de Bono*, Bonn, 1833), Ad. Trendelenburg (*Platonis de Ideis et Numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata*, Leipzig, 1836), H. Richter (*De Id. Pl.*, Leipzig, 1837), Ludolf Wienborg (*De primitivo id. Pl. sensu*, Altona, 1839), K. F. Hermann (*Marb. Lect.-Kat.*, 1832-1833 and 1839), Herm. Bonitz (*Disp. Platonicae duae: De Idea Boni; De Animae Mundanae apud Plat. Elementis*, Dresden, 1837), Zeiler (*Ueber die Aristot. Darstellung der Platon. Philosophie*, in *Z. f. Plat. Studien*, Tübingen, 1838, pp. 197-300), Frans Ebben (*De Pl. id. doctrina*, Bonn, 1849), J. F. Nourrisson (*Quid Pl. de ideis censuerit*, Paris, 1852), *Expos. de la théorie platonicienne des idées*, Paris, 1858), Graser (Torgau, 1861), S. Ribbing (see above, § 40), Th. Maguire (*An Essay on the Platonic Idea*, London, 1866), Herm. Cohen (*Die plat. Ideenlehre, psychologisch entwickelt*, in the "*Zeitschr. für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwiss.*" ed. by M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal, Vol. IV., Berlin, 1866, pp. 402-464); cf. Max Schneidewin's *Disquisitionem philoa. de Platonis Theateti parte prioris specimen* (*Inaug.-Diss.*), Göttingen, 1865, and other opusculi by the same author on the Theaetetus, Soph., Parm., etc., and Ad. Trendelenburg's *Des Ebonmanns, den Band der Verwandtschaft zwischen der griechischen Archaeologie und Philosophie*, Berlin, 1865. (The rising of the ideas above the phenomenal—which is in conformity with the tendency of nature herself—is illustrated by Trendelenburg by an example from the plastic art of the Greeks, where the facial angle of Camper exceeds, in its approach to a right angle, the limits actually observed in nature; in this sense, says T., the idea is "the fundamental form or type, elevated above the mutation of phenomena, the archetype, toward which all things tend.")

On the mathematical passages in Plato's writings, Theodorus of Soli (Plutarch, *De Def. Ora.*, ch. 32) and Theo. of Smyrna (*τὴν κατὰ μαθηματικὰς ὑποθέσεων εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀνάγινωσιν*) in ancient times, and in modern times Mollweide (Götting, 1805, and Leipzig, 1818), C. E. Chr. Schneider (*De Numero Plat.*, Breslau, 1832), J. J. Fries (*Pl.'s Zahl* [*Rep.*, 546], Heidelberg, 1822), C. F. Wex (*De loco mathem. in Platonis Menona*, Halle, 1836), Joh. Wolff. Müller (*Commentar über zwei Stellen in Pl.'s Meno u. Theaet.*, Nuremberg, 1797; *Prüfung der von Wex versuchten Erläut.*, *ibid.*, 1836), C. F. Hermann (*De Numero Platonis*, Marburg, 1838), E. F. August (Berlin, 1829 and 1844), and others, have written; Adolph Benecke appears to have given the correct explanation of the geometrical hypothesis advanced in the *Meno* in the *Progr. des Klinger Gymn.*, 1867. His merits in respect of the advancement of mathematics have been discussed (though, for the most part, without sufficiently critical investigation) by the historians of mathematics, especially by Montucla, Bossut, Chasles, Arneth, and in the monograph by C. Blass, *De Plat. mathematico* (*Diss.-Inaug.*), Bonn, 1861; cf. also Finger, *De primordiale geometrias apud Graecos*, Heidelberg, 1831, and Bretschneider, in his work on the Geometry of Euclid, Leipzig, 1870.

Of the Platonic Dialectic treat: Joh. Jac. Engel, *Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre aus Pl. Dialogen zu entwickeln*, Berlin, 1780; Joh. Jac. Heinr. Nast, *De meth. Pl. philoa. docendi dialogica*, Stuttgart, 1787; *Analysis logica dial. Pl. quæ inocr. Meno*, *ibid.*, 1792-98; Jac. Borellus, *De methodo Socr. docendi exemplo e dial. Plat. quæ inocr. Euthyphro illustrata*, Upsala, 1798; Fr. Hoffmann, *Die Dialektik Pl.'s*, Munich, 1832; Karl Kiesel, in *Gymn. Programmes*, Cologne, 1840, Düsseldorf, 1851 and 1868; Th. Wilh. Danzel (Hamburg, 1841, and Leipzig, 1845), K. Kühn (Berlin, 1843), K. Günther (in the *Philologus*, V. 1850, p. 38 seq.), Kuno Fischer, *De Parm. Plat.*, Stuttgart, 1851; Karl Eichhoff, *Logica trium dial. Pl. explicata* (*Meno, Crito, Phaedo*), G.-Pr., Duisburg, 1854; Ed. Alberti, *Zur Dial. des Pl., vom Theaet. bis zum Parm.*, Leipzig, 1856 (from Suppl., Vol. I., to the *N. Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Päd.*); H. Druon, *An fuerit interna e. exterior Pl. doct.*, Paris, 1860; Hülzer, *Grundzüge der Erkenntnislehre in Plato's Staat* (G.-Pr.), Cottbus, 1861; C. Martinus, *Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Plato's*, in the *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymn.-Wesen*, Berlin, 1866, pp. 97-119 and 497-516; Rud. Alex. Reinhold Kleinpaul, *Der Begr. der Erk. in Pl.'s Theaet.* (*Diss.-Lips.*), Götting, 1867; Josef Steger, *Plat. Studien*, I. Innsbruck, 1869; W. Weicker, *Amor Platonicius et disserenti ratio Socratica qua necessitudine inter eos continetur* (G.-Pr.), Zwickau, 1869; Karl Uphues, *Die philoa. Untersuchungen des Pl. Soph. u. Parm.* (Dissert.), Münster, 1869; *Elem. der Platon Ph. auf Grund des Soph. u. mit Rücksicht auf die Scholastik*, Soest, 1870.

On the use of myths by Plato, cf. C. Crome (*Gymn.-Progr.*, Düsseldorf, 1835), Alb. Jahn (Berne, 1869), Schwanitz (Leipzig, 1852, Jena, 1863, Frankf.-on-the-M., 1864), Jul. Deuschle (Hannau, 1864), Hahn (*Die pädagogischen Mythen Plato's*, G.-Pr., Parchim, 1860), A. Fischer (*Diss. Inaug.*, Königsberg, 1862).

On Plato's philosophy of language, cf. Friedr. Michelis (*De enuntiationis natura dia.*, Bonn, 1849), Jul. Deuschle (Marburg, 1852), Charles Lenormant (*Sur le Cratyle de Pl.*, Athens, 1941); cf. Ed. Alberti, *Die Sprachphilosophie vor Plato*, in *Philol.*, XI. Götting, 1856, pp. 361-705.

The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic (ascribed to Plato by Cic., *Acad. Post.*, I. 5, 19) was first formally propounded (according to Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 16) by Xenocrates, the pupil of Plato; but Plato, as Sextus correctly says, was potentially its originator (*ὀνύμει ἀρχηγός*). Several of Plato's dialogues were devoted to ethics (from the *Protag.* to the *Rep.*), one (*Timaeus*) was devoted especially to physics, and one (*Theaetetus*, with which *Cratylus*, on Language, and some other dialogues belong, if genuine) to the theory of cognition; these dialogues were supplemented by oral lectures on the ideas and their elements (*στοιχεῖα*), in which were communicated the "unwritten doctrines," which were taken down by Aristotle, Hermodorus, and others, and were probably used by the author of the *Soph.* and the *Pol.*

Of the genesis of the theory of ideas we find an account in *Arist.*, *Met.*, I. 6 and 9 (cf. XIII. 4 seq.). Aristotle describes this theory as the joint product of the Heraclitean doctrine of the constant flux of things and of the Socratic fondness for definition. The doctrine, says Aristotle, that the sensuous is subject to perpetual change, was derived by Plato from Cratylus the Heraclitean, and was ever afterward maintained by him. Accordingly, when Plato had learned through Socrates of conceptions which, when once rightly defined, remain ever invariable, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought in the sensuous world, but that there must be other existences which were the objects of conceptual cognition, and these objects he named ideas. The reduction of these ideas to (ideal) numbers is spoken of in *Met.*, XIII. 4, as a later modification of the original doctrine.—Aristotle here gives to the logical and metaphysical side of the theory of ideas a prominence which belongs equally to the no less essential ethical and æsthetic side; in this he was undoubtedly influenced by the prevalent shape assumed by the theory in the later phases of its development, in which the idea of that perfection, which transcends all experience, became gradually superseded by the idea of universality—so, already, in connection with the idea of table, in *Rep.*, X. 596.

In the *Phaedrus* of Plato the doctrine of ideas is presented symbolically, and yet in such form that the author of the dialogue must unquestionably have been already in possession of the theory in its logical form, although reserving its scientific presentation and demonstration for later dialogues. According to the myth in the *Phaedrus* (p. 247 seq.), the pure essences, or the ideas, sit enthroned in a place beyond the vault of heaven—in particular the ideas of justice, temperance, science, etc. They are colorless, without figure, imperceptible by any sense, and accessible only to the contemplative view of the reason (*νοῦς*). Plato portrays the process by which one rises to the knowledge of the ideas as an upward journey of the soul to the super-celestial region. In the *Conviv.* (p. 211 seq.) Plato defines the idea of the beautiful in opposition to individual beautiful objects, in a manner which may be taken as descriptive of the relation of each idea to the individual objects corresponding to it. In contradistinction to beautiful bodies, arts, sciences (*καλὰ σώματα, ἐκτελεσμάτων, μαθήματα*), he terms the idea of the beautiful, the beautiful *per se* (*αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*), and applies to it the predicates uncorrupted, pure, unmixed (*εἰλικρινές, καθάρον, ἄμικτον*). This Beautiful *per se* is eternal, without origin or decay, neither increasing nor decreasing, remaining absolutely like itself (*κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχον, μονοειδὲς αἰὲν ὄν*), not in one respect beautiful, but in another ugly; not now beautiful, but at another time not so; not beautiful in comparison with one object, but, in comparison with another, ugly; not appearing beautiful in one place or to certain persons, but in another place or to other persons ugly. Neither can it be represented by the fancy, as if it were a material thing; nor is it a (subjective) conception or a form of knowledge (*οὐδὲ τις λόγος, οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη*); it is not in any other object, nor in any living being, not on earth nor in the heavens, but it exists as a substance of and by itself (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲθ' αὐτοῦ*). Every thing else that is beautiful

participates in it (*ἐκείνων μετέχει*). According to *Rep.*, p. 523 seq., those sensible objects, which appear in one respect small, in another large, etc., and, in short, all those objects to which contrary predicates appear applicable, are the occasion of our calling in the aid of reason for their consideration; reason solves the contradiction, by *separating* those contraries which appear united (forming a *συγκεχυμένον*, *concretum*, a concrete object), conceiving Greatness as an idea by itself, and Smallness, in like manner, as another, and, in general, viewing the opposed predicates apart (*τὰ ὅσα κεχωρισμένα*). Analogous to this are the explanations given in the *Phaedo* (p. 102): Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, small in comparison with Phaedo; but the idea of largeness and also the property of largeness are never at the same time identical with smallness; on the contrary, the idea remains permanently what it is, and so does the quality, unless it ceases to exist. The idea has with the individual objects corresponding to it a certain community (*κοινωνία*), it is present with them (*παρουσία*); but the character of this community (which, according to the comparison in the *Republic* between the idea of the Good and the sun, may be conceived as analogous to the community between the sun and the earth, through the rays of the former extending to the latter) Plato declines more precisely to define (*Phaedo*, p. 100 d: *ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐκείνων τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία* [*εἶτε*] *ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη*, for which *προσγενομένου* is probably to be read). *Tym.*, p. 51 seq. (cf. *Rep.*, V. 474 seq.): If scientific cognition and correct opinion (*νοῦς* and *δόξα ἀληθής*) are two different species of knowledge, then there exist ideas which possess absolute being and are cognizable, not through sense-perception, but only by thought (*εἰδὴ νοούμενα*); but if, as it appears to some, both are identical, then the talk of ideas is mere talk (*λόγος*, or perhaps: ideas are nothing objective, they are simply subjective conceptions), and only the sensible exists. But in fact both are different, both in their origin (through conviction;—through persuasion) and in their nature (certainty and immutability;—uncertainty and change). There are, therefore, also two different classes of objects: the one includes that which remains perpetually like itself, has not become and can not pass away, never from any source receives any thing into itself, nor itself passes into any thing else (*οὔτε εἰς ταὐτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν, οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλὰ τι ἰόν*); the other class covers the realm of individual objects, which are homonymous (*ὁμώνυμα*) with the ideas and similar (*ὅμοια*) to them, which become and perish at definite places, and are always in motion (*πεπορευμένον ἄει*). The difference between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensible perception and correct opinion, on the other, is considered at length and demonstrated in the dialogue *Theaetetus*. The (fantastical) tendency, which in the Platonic theory of ideas accompanies the logically legitimate recognition of a relation in the subjective conception to objective reality, culminates in the *Sophistes* (p. 248), with the attribution to ideas of motion, life, animation, and reason. This tendency to hypostatize or give substance to that phase of objective reality, which is known through the concept, appears, however, not to have been pushed to this extreme by Plato, but by a fraction of his Pythagorizing disciples, who (according to *Soph.*, 248 b) were often disputing with an opposite fraction, and among whom the inclination to hypostatize and personify abstractions was strongest. From the standpoint reached in the Platonic exposition—which was marked by the free and natural interplay of fancy, even in the severest operations of thought, so that in it doctrines scientifically valid appear interwoven with poetic fiction—an advance in one of two directions was possible. Either the poetic element could be critically sifted out and the doctrine of ideas could be transformed into the doctrine of the essence or essential nature known through and corresponding with the concept (*ἡ κατὰ λόγον οὐσία*)—which was done by Aristotle—or the poetic element might, and did, become dogmatically fixed and, in scholastic fashion, seemingly rationalized, as by some of the Platonists, in the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, until its


inevitable replacement by Skepticism took place, as in the Middle Academy and in the dialogue *Parmenides*. This dialogue may have been composed in the time immediately following Plato's death, but perhaps not till the time of the Middle Academy, and it finds a tenable position neither in the admission nor in the rejection of the ideas and the One.

Myths, in which the truly existent was represented in the form of the perpetually becoming and the psychical in the form of the perceptible, were employed by Plato as a means of facilitating in his readers the subjective apprehension of his doctrines; they were also a necessary element in the poetico-philosophical style of Plato; but the dialectical method was considered as alone adequate to the object-matter of pure philosophical cognition. The allegorical or mythical style was possible in treating of the ideal itself, and for the representation of its relation to the sensible it was in so far necessary for Plato, as he was unable, on account of the (as Deuschle terms it) "not genetical, but ontical" (ontological) character of his doctrine of ideas, to conceive this relation in a purely scientific form; but the cognition and representation of the sensible was, according to Plato, necessarily not figurative, but only probable. Such were the *einōtes mēthoi* (*Tim.*, p. 59 *et al.*), with which Plato believed we must content ourselves in the department of natural philosophy, while dialectic in all its rigor could be applied only in the field of ethics and in the investigation of cognition and the ideas. Owing to the character which Plato thus ascribed to natural philosophy, the style appropriate to it was that of continuous discourse; hence in the *Timaeus* Plato could and was obliged to content himself with this style, which may have been already employed by the Pythagoreans.

It is impossible, according to the dialogue *Cratylus*, that the consideration of words should be of assistance in the investigation of the essence of things, because the constructors of language were not sufficiently acquainted with the true and permanent essence of things, but remained satisfied with the popular opinion, which Heraclitus afterward expressed in its most general form, but which, in fact, is true only of objects of sense, viz.: that all things are in constant movement.

The two cognitive processes, which together constitute the dialectical procedure, are described by Plato (*Phaedr.*, 265 seq.) as the collective consideration of separate individuals and their reduction to unity of essence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the resolution of unity into plurality, following the order that exists in nature. The first process finds its term in *definition*, or the knowledge of the essence of the thing defined (and accordingly in Plato, *Rep.*, VII. 534, he is termed a dialectician, who attains to this conception of the essence, τὸν λόγον λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας); the second is the *division* of the generic concept into its subordinate specific concepts. In *Rep.*, VI. p. 510, VII. p. 533, Plato contrasts *deduction*, which, from certain general presuppositions, that are, however, not necessarily ultimate or expressive of first principles, derives conclusions that depend on them, with the process of *rising to the unconditioned* (ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον, which principle, since it is absolutely the highest, can not serve as a basis for a further progress), a process which is accomplished by the suppression of all that is merely hypothetical. The former procedure rules, according to Plato, in the mathematics, the latter in philosophy. In the *Phaedo* (p. 101 d) it is recognized as legitimate in a philosophical investigation to base provisional inferences on *hypotheses*; but it is requisite that these hypotheses be themselves subsequently justified, by being deduced from others more general and more nearly approaching the nature of principles, till at last the investigation finds its legitimate terminus in the *καθόν*, viz., the absolutely highest and self-demonstrating conception.

Plato, recapitulating, schematizes as follows, *De Rep.*, VII. pp. 509 seq. and 533 seq. :



The highest object of knowledge (μέγιστον μάθημα) is the *idea of the good* (*Rep.*, VI. 505 a). This idea is supreme in the realm of νοούμενα and difficult of cognition; it is the cause of all truth and beauty. To it objects owe their being and cognoscibility and the mind its power of cognition (*Rep.*, VI. 508 seq.). It is superior to the Idea of Being, *Rep.*, VI. p. 509 b: καὶ τοῖς γνωσκόμενοις τοῖνον μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεισθαι (the power of being known) φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν (being, taken predicatively) ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ἔντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρᾶσθαι καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (the Idea of Good bestows not only cognoscibility, but also being; it is not identical with being, but, on the contrary, is exalted above it). Every thing which exists and is knowable, has received from God, who is the Idea of the Good, its existence and its ability to be known, because he knew that it was better that it should exist, than that it should not exist (cf. *Phaedo*, p. 97 c). (So far as we are to understand by "being," objective being or objective reality, ἀλήθεια, this being is not the most general idea, but is inferior in generality to the Good.) In the *Philebus* (p. 22) the Idea of the Good is identified with the divine reason. The general character of the Platonic teaching requires us to identify it also with the world-builder (δημιουργός), who (according to *Tim.*, 28 seq.), the absolutely good, contemplating the ideas (i. e., himself and the other ideas), makes all generated things, as far as practicable, also good.

Of the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, of which Aristotle speaks, some traces are found in certain of the later dialogues, mostly in the *Philebus*, in which the ideas are termed ἐνάδες or μονάδες, and (in Pythagorizing fashion) πέρας and ἀπειρον are considered as elements of things. Akin to this doctrine is the doctrine of the different elements of the world-soul, in the *Timaeus*, and of "the same" (ταὐτόν) and "the other" (θάτερον) in the *Sophistes*. According to the Aristotelian accounts (*Metaph.*, I. 6; XIV. 1, 1087 b, 12 *et al.*, also in the fragments of the works *De Bono* and *De Ideis*), as also according to Hermodorus (Simplic., *Ad Arist. Phys.*, fol. 54 b and 56 b), Plato posited two elements (στοιχεῖα) as present in the ideas and in all existing things, namely, a form-giving (πέρας) and a form-receiving, and, in itself, formless element (ἀπειρον), but the ἀπειρον, or infinite, which the Pythagoreans had already opposed to the πεπερασμένον, or the finite, was divided by Plato into a duad, namely, into the great and small (or more and less). In every class of objects (ideas, mathematical and sensible objects) Plato seems to have assumed such elements, and to have regarded the objects themselves as a mixture of both elements (μικτόν). In the things which are perceived by the senses the ἀπειρον appears to represent the matter which constitutes them (described in the *Timaeus*), and the πέρας their shape and quality. In the soul of the world the πέρας is the singular, self-identical (ταὐτόν) and indivisible (ἀμερές) element, and the ἀπειρον the heterogeneous (θάτερον) and divisible (μερίστον) one. In numbers and geometrical figures and in the ideas πέρας represents unity (ἐν), while of the ἀπειρον several kinds are distinguished: as being the "indefinite duad" (ἀόριστος δυάς),

the great and small constitute the form-receiving element or substratum (the *ύλη*), from which through the *έν* numbers are formed; long and short, broad and narrow, high and low, are the species of the great and small, from which the form-giving principle, whose nature is unity, produces lines, surfaces, and solids (Arist., *Metaph.*, XIII. 9). From the One and from the *άπειρον*, when divided into the duad of great and small, numbers arise, says Aristotle (*Metaph.*, I. 6), in a natural manner (*εὐφύως*); but the derivation of the ideas from these depends on the reduction of the ideas to numbers. From these (ideal) numbers Plato distinguishes the numbers of mathematics, which stand between the ideas and sensible things. The ideal numbers seem to have had with Plato essentially the sense of expressions to denote higher and lower degrees of generality and—what was for him the same thing—higher and lower degrees of worth; a relation of succession (a *πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*) subsisted among them, but they could not be added (*ἀξίμβλητοι*). The *έν* (the One) was identified by Plato with the idea of the good (according to Aristotle, *ap. Aristox.*, *Harm. Element.*, II. p. 30, *Μετ.*, cf. Arist., *Met.*, I. 6, XIV. 4).

§ 42. The world (*ὁ κόσμος*) is not eternal, but generated; for it is perceptible by the senses and is corporeal. Time began with the world. The world is the most beautiful of all generated things; it was created by the best of artificers and modeled after an eternal and the most excellent of patterns. Matter, which existed from eternity, together with God, being absolutely devoid of quality and possessing no proper reality, was at first in disorder and assumed a variety of changing and irrational shapes, until God, who is absolutely good and without envy, came forth as world-builder, and transformed all for ends of good. He formed first the soul of the world, by creating from two elements of opposite nature, the one indivisible and immutable, the other divisible and mutable, a third intermediate substance, and then combining the three in one whole, and distributing this whole through space in harmonious proportions. To the soul of the world he then joined its body. In thus bringing order and proportion to the chaotic and heaving mass of matter, he caused it to assume determinate mathematical forms. The earth arose from cubiform elements, and fire from elements having the shape of pyramids; between these two came, as intermediate terms of a geometrical proportion, water, whose elements are icosahedral in form, and air, with octahedral elements. The dodecahedron is related to the form of the universe. Plato knew of the inclination of the ecliptic. Of the elements of the world-soul, the better, *i. e.*, the unchangeable element, was distributed by the Demiurgus in the direction of the celestial equator. The other, the changeable element, he placed in the direction of the ecliptic. The divine part of the human soul, having its seat in the head, was made like the world-soul.

The first or indivisible element of this soul in man is, as in the soul of the world, the instrument of rational cognition, the other element is the organ of sensuous perception and representation. With the soul, whose seat is in the head, are combined in man two other souls, which Plato in the *Phaedrus* seems to conceive as pre-existing before the terrestrial life of man, but in the *Timæus* describes as tied to the body, and mortal. These are the courageous soul (τὸ θυμοειδές, irascibility), and the appetitive soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, disposition to seek for sensual pleasure and for the means of its gratification). Thus the whole or collective soul resembles the composite force of a driver and two steeds. The appetitive soul is possessed also by plants, and courage is an attribute of the (nobler) animals. The soul in general (according to the *Phaedrus*), or the cognitive soul alone (according to the *Timæus*) is immortal. With this doctrine Plato connects (in the *Phædo*, which contains his arguments for immortality) the ethical admonition to seek, through a life of purity and conformity to reason, the only possible deliverance from evil, and also a number of "probable arguments" in support of the doctrines of the transmigration of the soul through the bodies of men and animals for a cosmical period of ten thousand years, of the purification of those who were good citizens, but not philosophers, of the temporary punishments of sinners who are not past all healing, of the eternal damnation of incurable offenders, and of the blessedness of those whose lives were pre-eminently pure and pleasing to God.

The following authors (in addition to the editors and commentators of the *Timæus* and the historians of Greek philosophy) treat especially of the Platonic theology: Marullus Ficius (*Theologia Platonica*, Florence, 1482), Puffendorf (*De theol. Pl.*, Leipzig, 1658), Oetrichs (*Doctr. Pl. de deo*, Marburg, 1788), Hörstel (*Pl. doctr. de deo*, Leipzig, 1804), Theoph. Hartmann (*De diis Tim. Pl.*, Breslau, 1840), Krieger (*Forschungen I.*, pp. 181-204), J. Bilharz (*Ist Pl.'s Speculation Theismus?* Carlsruhe and Freiburg, 1842), Heinr. Schürmann (*De deo Plat.*, Münster, 1845), Ant. Erdtman (*De deo et ideis*, Münster, 1855), H. L. Ahrens (*De duodecim diis Pl.*, Hanover, 1864), G. F. Rettig (*airia im Philebus die persönl. Gottheit des Plato, oder: Plato kein Pantheist*, Berna, 1866), and Karl Stumpf (*Verhältnisse des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten*, in the *Ztschr. f. Philos.*, Vol. 54, Nos. 1 and 2, Halle, 1869, published also separately). Cf., also, the works on Plato's doctrine of ideas, cited above, § 41.

Plato's Natural Philosophy is discussed by the various editors and translators of the *Timæus*, among whom Chalcidius (of the fourth century A. D.; his translation, together with Cicero's translation of a part of the *Timæus*, is edited by Mullach, in Vol. 3 of his *Frugm. Philos. Græc.*, Paris, 1867, pp. 147-208), of ancient translators, and Martin (*Études sur le Timée de Platon*, 2 tom., Paris, 1841), among modern translators are the most important; also, in particular, by Aug. Boeckh (*De Plat. corporis mundant fabrica*, Heidelberg, 1809, and *De Plat. system. coelestium globorum et de vera indole astronomias Philolaicae*, ibid. 1810, both which works are printed in the third volume of the complete works of Boeckh, edited by F. Acherson, Leipzig, 1866, accompanied with many additions; see also B.'s *Untersuchungen über das kosmische System des Platon mit Bezug auf Gruppe's "Kosmische Systeme der Griechen."* Berlin, 1868), Reinganum (*Pl.'s Ansicht von der Gestalt der Erde*, in the *Ztschr. f. die A. Wiss.*, 1841, No. 90), J. S. Köntzer (*Ueber Verhältnisse, Form und Wesen der Elementarkörper nach Plato's Timæus*, Neu-Eupplin, 1844), Wolfgang Hoeheder (*Das kosmische System des Plato mit Bezug auf die neuesten Auffassungen der*

allen, *Progr.*, Aachhaburg, 1855; cf., *per contra*, Susemihl, in *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, Vol. 75, 1857, pp. 588-602), A. Hundert (*De Platonis altero rerum principio*, *Progr.*, Cleve, 1857), Felix Bobertag (*De materia Pl. quam fore coeant maiestata*, Breslau, 1864), Franz Susemihl (*Zur Platonischen Eschatologie und Astronomie*, in the *Philologus*, Vol. XV., 1860, pp. 417-484), G. Grote (*Plato's Doctrine respecting the Rotation of the Earth and Aristotle's Comment upon that Doctrine*, London, 1860; German transl. by Jos. Holzamer, Prague, 1861; cf., on this work by Grote, Heinr. v. Stein, in the *Gött. Anz.*, 1862, p. 1498, Friedr. Ueberweg, in the *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, Vol. XLII., 1863, pp. 177-182, and particularly Boeckh, in the third volume of his collected works, 1864, pp. 294-320), C. Goebel (*De coelestibus ap. Plat. motibus*, G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 1869).

On the *Psychology* of Plato: Aug. Boeckh (*Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele im Timaeus*, in Daub and Cramer's *Studien*, Vol. III., 1807, pp. 1-93, repr. with suppl. in the 3d vol. of his *Ge. kl. Schriften*, Leipz. 1864, pp. 109-180), Herm. Bonitz (*Disput. Plat. Duas: de an. mund. elem.*, see above, § 41), F. Ueberweg (*Ueber die Platonische Weltseele*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, Vol. IX., 1858, pp. 87-84), Franz Susemihl (*Platon. Forschungen*, III., in *Philologus*, Supplementband II., Heft 2, 1861, pp. 219-250), Chaignet (*De la psychologie de Platon*, Paris, 1862), J. P. Wohlschläger (*Materie und Weltseele in dem Plat. System*, Inaug.-Diss., Marburg, 1866), Hartung (*Auslegung des Märchens von der Seele*, L. Erfurt, 1866).

On the Platonic doctrine of immortality and the related doctrines of pre-existence and reminiscence: Joach. Oporinus (*Hidior. crit. doct. de immortalitate*, Hamb. 1735, p. 185 seq.), Chr. Ernst von Windheim (*Examen argumentorum Pl. pro immort. animas hum.*, Gött. 1749), J. C. Gottlieb (*Argum. aliquot in Pl. Phaedone de anim. immort. discussio, spec.*, I.-IV., Altdorf, 1765-67), Moses Mendelssohn (*Phädon*, 1st edition, Berlin, 1764), Gust. Fried. Wiggers (*Examen argum. Pl. pro imm. anim. hum.*, Rostock, 1803), F. Pettavel (*Disp. Acad.*, Berlin, 1815), Kunhardt (*Ueber Pl. Phaedon*, Lübeck, 1817), Adalb. Schmidt (*Argum. pro imm. anim.*, Halle, 1827; *Pl.'s Unsterblichkeitslehre*, *Progr.*, Halle, 1830), J. W. Braut (*Ueber die ἀνάμνησις*, Brandeb. 1832), C. F. Hermann (*De immortalitatis notionis in Plat. Phaed.*, Marb. 1835; *De partibus animas immortalibus sec. Platonem*, Gött. 1850), Ludw. Haase (*Pr.*, Magdeb. 1848), Voltzländer (*De animarum preexistentia*, Diss., Berlin, 1844), K. Ph. Fischer (*Pl. de immort. an. doct.*, Erlangen, 1845), Herm. Schmidt (*G.-Progr.*, Wittenb. 1845; Halle, 1850-52; *Zur Kritik und Erkl. v. Pl.'s Phaedon*, in the *Philol.*, V. 1850, p. 710 seq.; *Zeitschr. f. Gymn.-Wesen*, II. 1848, Nos. 10 and 11, and VI. 1852, Nos. 5, 6, 7; *Pl.'s Phaedon erkl.*, G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1854), Franz Susemihl (*Philologus*, V. 1850, p. 285 seq.; *Jahn's Jahrb.*, Vol. 73, 1856, pp. 236-240; *Philologus*, XV., and Suppl., Vol. II., 219 seq.), M. Speck (*G.-Pr.*, Breslau, 1858), L. H. O. Müller (*Die Eschatologie Plato's und Cicero's im Verhältnisse zum Christenthum*, Jever, 1854), K. Eibohoff (*G.-Pr.*, Dnlsburg, 1854, pp. 11-16), A. J. Kahlert (*G.-Pr. von Chernowits*, Vienna, 1855), Ch. Prince (*Pr.*, Neufchatel, 1856), Bucher (*Pl. spec. Bew. f. d. Unterbl. der menschl. Seele*, Inaug. Diss., Gött. 1861), Drosihn (*Die Mythen über Präd- und Post-Existenz*, G.-Pr., Challa, 1861), K. Silberbach (*Die Grundlehren Pl. über das Verhältniss des Menschen zu Gott und das Leben nach dem Tode in ihrer Beziehung zu den Mythen des Alterthums*, in the *Deutsche Mus.*, 1862, No. 41), F. Glöckl (*De argumentorum in Plat. Phaedone coherencia*, G.-Pr., Magdeb. 1863), Alb. Biehöff (*Pl.'s Phaedon eine Reihe von Betrachtungen zur Erklärung und Beurtheilung des Gesprächs*, Erlangen, 1864; cf. F. Mezger, in the *Zeitschrift für luth. Theologie*, 1863, No. 1, pp. 80-86), A. Boelke (*Ueber Pl.'s Beweise für die Unsterbl. der Seele*, Rostock and Berlin, 1866), Paul Zimmermann (*Die Unsterbl. der Seele in Plato's Phaedo*, Leipzig, 1869).

Plato opens the exposition of his physics in the *Tim.* (p. 28 seq.) with the affirmation that since the world bears the form of *γένεαις* (development, becoming) and not that of true being (*οὐσία*), nothing absolutely certain can be laid down in this field of investigation, but only what is probable (*εἰκρές μῦθος*). Our knowledge of nature bears not the characters of science (*ἐπιστήμη*) or of the knowledge of truth (*ἀλήθεια*), but those of belief (*πίστις*). Plato says (*Tim.*, p. 29 c): "What being is to becoming, that is truth to faith" (*ὅ, τι περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῖο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια*). What Plato says in the *Phaedo*, p. 114 d, explains his idea of the *probable*: "Firmly to assert that this is exactly as I have expressed it, befits not a man of intelligence; yet that it is either so or something like it (*ὅτι ἢ ταύτ' ἔστιν ἢ τοιαύτ' ἔσται*) must certainly be assumed."

Plato raises in *Tim.*, p. 28 a, the question whether the world is without origin, eternal *ἀέτιμον*, or whether it had a beginning, and answers it by saying, that on account of the visibility of the world, the second, and not the first, alternative must be adopted as the truth. But the world is the best of generated, as its author is of eternal existences.

God's goodness is the reason of the construction of the world. *Phaedrus*, p. 247 a: "Envy stands outside of the divine choir." *Timaeus*, p. 29 e: He (God) was good; but the good are never envious with regard to any thing. Being, therefore, without envy, he planned all things so that they should be as nearly as possible like himself: "ἀγαθὸς ἦν (ὁ δημιουργός, the supreme God, the constructor of the world), ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. τοῦτον δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα οὐκ ἄλλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ. (Cf. also Arist., *Metaph.*, I. 2, p. 983 b, 2. Yet the notion of the envy of the gods, which Plato and Aristotle combat, involves also an ethical and religious element in so far as by "envy" it is intended to indicate the reaction of the universal order against all individual disproportion or excess.)

The adaptation and order of the world have their ground in the world-constructing reason; whatever of blind necessity is manifest in it arises from the nature of matter. Mechanical causes are only *ξυναίτια* (concomitants) of the final causes.

When matter (as *δεξαμένη*, or form-receiving principle) assumed orderly shapes, there arose first the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Between the two extremes, fire and earth, of which the former was necessary for the visibility, the latter for the palpability of things, a bond of connection was needed; but the most beautiful of bonds is proportion, which in the present case, where solid bodies are concerned, must be twofold. (In the case of plane figures one intermediate term is sufficient; the side of a square, whose contents are the double of a given square, is determined by the proportion $1 : x :: x : 2$, where $x = \sqrt{2}$, the side of the given square being $= 1$; and this given square, whose contents $= 1 \times 1$, is to the rectangle, one of whose sides $= 1$, the other $= \sqrt{2}$, and whose contents therefore $= 1 \times \sqrt{2}$, as the latter is to the square whose contents $= \sqrt{2} \times \sqrt{2} = 2$. But in the case of solids, two intermediate terms are necessary; the length of the side of a cube whose contents $= 2$, is determined by the two proportions: $1 : x :: x : y$, and $x : y :: y : 2$, where $x = \sqrt[3]{2}$ and $y = \sqrt[3]{2^2}$, and the cube, whose contents $= 1 \times 1 \times 1$, is to the parallelepiped, whose contents $= 1 \times 1 \times \sqrt[3]{2}$, as the latter is to the parallelepiped $= 1 \times \sqrt[3]{2} \times \sqrt[3]{2}$; and the latter again stands in a like relation to the cube whose contents $= \sqrt[3]{2} \times \sqrt[3]{2} \times \sqrt[3]{2} = 2$. Whatever is true, in this respect, of squares and cubes, is applicable to all mutually similar forms, though only to such. A comprehensive and exact examination and explanation of all these relations is given by Boeckh in the *Comm. acad. de Platonica corporis mundani fabrica conflati ex elementis geometrica ratione concinnatis*, Heidelberg, 1809, reprinted in Boeckh's *Ges. kl. Schr.*, Vol. III., pp. 229-252, together with an annexed *Excursus*, pp. 253-265.) Fire must accordingly be related to air, as air to water, and air to water, as water to earth.

The distances of the celestial spheres from each other are proportioned to the different lengths of the strings which produce harmonious tones. The earth is at rest in the center of the universe. It is wound around the (adamantine) bar or distaff (*ἡλακάτη*), which Plato (according to Grote, doctrinally, according to Boeckh, mythically) represents as extending from one end of the axis of the world to the other; the sky and also the planets revolve around this distaff once in every twenty-four hours; but the planets have besides a motion peculiar to themselves, which is occasioned by the *σφόνδύλοι*, which lie about the spindle and together constitute the whorl, since these, while participating in the revolving motion of the heavens, rotate at the same time, but more slowly, in the opposite direction; the earth remains unmoved. If the distaff (*ἡλακάτη*) of the spindle (*ἀντακτος*) is conceived as motionless (as it is by Boeckh), the earth is to be regarded as simply rolled into a ball around it and firmly attached to it; but if it is included in the daily rotation of the heavens, the earth must not be conceived (as it is by Grote) as partaking in this motion, but the (absolute) rest of the earth must be explained by a (relative) motion of the same

around the diastaff in the opposite direction. If the distance of the moon from the earth is represented by 1, then that of the sun = 2, that of Venus = 3, that of Mercury = 4, that of Mars = 8, that of Jupiter = 9, that of Saturn = 27. The inclination of the ecliptic is explained by Plato as a result of the inferior perfection of the spheres underneath the sphere of the fixed stars. According to a statement of Theophrastus (see Plutarch, *Plat. Qu.* 8, cf. *Numa*, ch. 11), Plato in his old age no longer attributed to the earth (but to the central fire probably) the occupancy of the center of the world; this account, in itself altogether credible as an oral utterance of Plato, is nevertheless not easily reconciled with the fact that in the *Leges*—which was written after the *Rep.*, and beyond question also after the *Timaeus*, and that, too, according to late but apparently trustworthy tradition, not by Plato, but by Philip the Opuntian, from a sketch made by Plato—the doctrine contained in the *Timaeus* is reaffirmed. Cf. Boeckh, *Das kosmische System des Plato*, Berlin, 1852, pp. 144–150.

The soul of the world is older than its body: for its office is to rule, and it is not fitting that the younger should rule the older. It must unite in itself the elements of all orders of ideal and material existences, in order that it may be able to know and understand them (*Tim.*, p. 34 seq.). Plato says (*Tim.*, p. 35 seq.), that the Indivisible in the soul enables it to have knowledge of the ideas, while the Divisible mediates its knowledge of sensible objects. The third or mixed element may be considered as the organ of mathematical knowledge (or perhaps of all particular, distinct acts of cognition?) These cognitive faculties pertain exclusively to that part (*λογιστικόν*) of the human soul which resides in the head.

The hypothesis that the human soul has three parts (*ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμοειδές, λογιστικόν*) seems to have been framed in intentional correspondence with the natural gradation: plant, animal, man (*Tim.*, 77 b; *Rep.*, IV. 441 b); this distinction, however, of the orders of the natural kingdom was not so distinctly marked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. The supremacy of each of these different parts, taken in their order, is illustrated in the gain-loving Phenicians and Egyptians, the courageous Barbarians of the North, and the culture-loving Hellenes (*Rep.*, IV. 435 e to 436 a).

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is founded by Plato, in the *Phaedrus* (p. 245), on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion; in the *Rep.* (X. 609), on the fact, that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness, which yet, as the natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if any thing could effect this, to effect its destruction; in the *Tim.* (p. 41), on the goodness of God, who, notwithstanding that the nature of the soul, as a generated essence, subjects it to the possibility of destruction, can not will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dissolved; in the *Phaedo*, finally (pp. 62–107), this doctrine is supported, partly by an argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher, whose striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal existence, i. e., the desire to die, and partly on a series of objective arguments. The first of these arguments is founded on the cosmological law of the transition of contraries into each other, according to which law, just as the living die, so the dead must return to life: the second, on the nature of knowledge, as a species of reminiscence (cf. *Meno*, p. 80 seq., where the pre-existence of the soul is inferred from the nature of the act of mathematical and philosophical learning, whose only satisfactory explanation, it is argued, is found in the hypothesis of the soul's recollection of ideas which had been perceived by the intellect in a pre-terrestrial life); the third, on the relationship between the soul, as an invisible essence, and the ideas, as invisible, simple, and indestructible objects; the fourth argument, in reply to the objection (of Simmias), that the soul is perhaps only the *résultante* and, as it were, the harmony of the

functions of the body, is based partly on the previously demonstrated pre-existence of the soul, and partly on the qualification of the soul to rule the body, and on its nature as a substance, so that, says Plato, while one harmony can be more a harmony than another, one soul can not be more or less soul than any other, and the soul, if virtuous, may have harmony for its attribute; the fifth argument, finally, and the one which Plato himself deemed decisive, was in reply to the objection (of Cebes), that although the soul perhaps survived the body, it might yet be not absolutely indestructible, and was founded on the necessary participation of the soul in the idea of life, whence the inference that the soul can never be lifeless, a dead soul would be a contradiction, and consequently immortality and imperishableness must be predicated of it. In this argument, it is assumed that that, whose nature is such that, *so long as it exists*, it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist; this assumption is connected with the double sense in which *ἀθάνατος* is employed, *a.* in the sense, which results from the general tenor of the argument, viz.: not dead; *b.* in the sense corresponding to ordinary usage: immortal.

§ 43. The highest good is, according to Plato, not pleasure, nor knowledge alone, but the greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good. The virtue of the human soul is its fitness for its proper work. It includes various particular virtues, which form a system based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the human soul. The virtue of the cognitive part of the soul is the knowledge of the good, or wisdom (*σοφία*); that of the courageous part is valor (*ἀνδρία*), which consists in preserving correct and legitimate ideas of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared; the virtue of the appetitive part is temperance (moderation or self-control, self-direction, *σωφροσύνη*), which consists in the agreement of the better and worse parts of the soul, as to which should rule; justice, finally (*δικαιοσύνη*), is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfillment by each part of its peculiar function. Piety (*δαιοσύνη*) is justice with reference to the gods. One of the ramifications of wisdom is philosophical love, or the joint striving of two souls for the attainment of philosophical knowledge. Virtue should be desired, not from motives of reward and punishment, but because it is in itself the health and beauty of the soul. To do injustice is worse than to suffer injustice.

The state is the individual on a large scale. The highest mission of the state is the training of the citizens to virtue. In the ideal state each of the three principal functions and corresponding virtues of the soul is represented by a particular class of citizens. These are, 1) the rulers, whose virtue is wisdom; 2) the guardians or warriors, whose virtue is valor; and 3) the manual laborers and tradesmen, whose virtue is self-restraint and willing obedience. The rulers and

warriors are to labor only for the realization of the true and the good; all individual interests whatsoever are forbidden them, and they are all required to form in the strictest sense one family, without marriage and without private property. The condition of the realization of the ideal state is that philosophers should at some time become rulers, or that rulers should philosophize rightly. The *Laws* contains a later draught by Plato of the second-best form of the state, which, he says, it would be more easy to realize. In this scheme, the theory of ideas disappears from the programme for the education of the rulers, and the chief stress is laid on their mathematical schooling; the kind of religious worship here prescribed was also less alien to the general beliefs of the Hellenic people, and marriage and private property were allowed as a concession to individual interests.

In the Platonic state, that Art alone finds a place which consists in the imitation of the good. In this category are included philosophical dramas, such as Plato's own dialogues, the narration of myths (expurgated and ethically applied), and, in particular, religious lyrics (containing the praises of gods and also of noble men). All art which is devoted to the imitation of the phenomenal world, in which good and bad are commingled, is excluded. Art and the Beautiful hold their place in Plato's system only in subordination to the good. The Beautiful, whose essence lies, according to Plato, in the fitness and symmetry resulting from the relation of the concept to the plurality of phenomena, is nevertheless for him, though not the highest of ideas, yet that one which imparts to its sensible copies the highest brilliancy, since it, most of all ideas, shines through its copies.

The education of youth was regulated by Plato in accordance with the principle of a gradual advance to the cognition of the ideas and to the corresponding practical activity in the state, so that only the best-qualified persons could rise to the highest stations, while the rest were destined to exercise inferior practical functions. The cognition of the idea of the good was reserved as a final topic of instruction for the most mature.

The following authors, in addition to the authors cited above, *ad* § 41, treat of Plato's Ethics and Politics in their relation to the national character of the Greeks and to Christianity: Grotefend (*Commentatio in qua doctrina Platonis ethica cum christiana comparatur ita, ut utriusque tum consensus, tum dissimulatio asponatur*, Götting, 1821), I. Ogiński (*Pericles et Plato*, Breslau, 1838), Jul. Gull. Ludw. Mehlis (*Comparatio Plat. doctrinas de rep. cum christiana de regno divino doctrina*, Götting, 1845), K. F. Hermann (*Die hist. Elemente des Platon. Staatsideals*, Götting, 1849, pp. 132-159), P. F. Stuhlf. (*Vom Staatsleben nach Platon, Arist. und christlichen Grundsätzen*, Part I., Berlin, 1850), Ed. Kretschmar (*Der Kampf des Plato um die relig. und sittlichen Principien des Staatslebens*, Leipzig, 1852), W. Wehrenpfennig (*Die Verschiedenheit der ethischen Principien bei den Hellenen*, Berlin, 1854, p. 40 seq.), W. Wiegand

(*Einführung in Plato's Gottesstaat für Freunde der Akademie*, G.-Pr., Worms, 1865), Ed. Zeller (*Der Platon. Staat in seiner Bedeutung für das Folgeschick*, in Von Sybel's *Hist. Zeitschr.*, Vol. I., 1869, No. 1, pp. 109-126, and in Zeller's *Vorlr. u. Abh. gesch. Inhalt.*, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 63-81), Hildebrand (*Geoch. u. System der Rechte und Staatsphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1860, I. 151 seq., 156 seq., 166 seq.), S. Lommatzsch (*Quomodo Pl. et Arist. relig. ac resp. principia conjunguntur*, *Diss. Inaug.*, Berlin, 1863), E. E. Grandey (*De Plat. principis ethice*, *Diss. Inaug.*, Berlin, 1865); an essay on the leading characteristics of Plato's theory of the state is contained in Glaser's *Jahrb. für Gesellschafts- und Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. VI., No. 4, 1866, pp. 809-818; cf. also Bertrand Robidou, *La Rép. de Platon, comparée aux idées et aux états modernes*, Paris, 1869.

On Plato's doctrine of the highest good, cf. Ad. Trendelenburg (*De Pl. Philob. consilio*, Berlin, 1837), Theod. Wehrmann (*Plat. de summo bono doctrina*, Berlin, 1848), Wenkel (*Pl. Lehre vom A. G. und der Glückseligkeit*, G.-Pr., Biedersteiner, 1857), G. Loewe (*De bonorum apud Platonem gradibus*, *Diss. Halensis*, Berlin, 1861), Franz Susemihl (*Ueber die Gütertafel im Philæbus*, in the *Philologus*, Suppl., Vol. II., Göttingen, 1863, pp. 97-132), Rud. Hirzel (*De bonis in fine Philob. enumeratis*, *Diss. Berolinensis*, Leipzig, 1868).

On his doctrine of pleasure, cf. O. Kalmus (Halberstadt, 1857), H. Anton (in Fichte's *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, new series, Vol. 83, Halle, 1858, pp. 65-81 and 218-236), W. E. Kranichfeld (*Platonis et Arist. de theog. sententias quomodo tum consentiant, tum dissentiant*, Berlin, 1859), W. Krieger (in the *Progr. of the Sophien-gymnasium at Berlin*, 1868).

On his doctrine of justice: W. Opatenski (*Welches ist der Sinn des Platonischen τὰ δίκαια πράγματα?* *Progr.*, Trzemeszno, 1845), W. Jahne (*Inaug. Diss.*, Breslau, 1846), and J. F. Aman (*Pl. de justitiae doctrina*, G.-Pr., Berlin, 1854).

On his doctrine of *eupnoia*: K. Hoffmeister (Essen, 1827); and on his doctrine in regard to falsehood: Th. Kolch (*Disq. in Pl. de mendacis doctr.* [*De Rep.*, II. III.], Elbing, 1830).

On Plato's theory of the state, cf. Cri. Morgenstern (*De Plat. resp. commentationes tres*, Halle [Brunswick], 1794), C. L. Pöschke (*De Plat. postea s. rep. bene const. esse expall.*, Möncheng. 1806), G. de Gess (*Pol. Plat. princip.*, *Diss.*, Utrecht, 1810), Friedr. Köppen (*Politik nach Pl. Grundrissen*, Leipzig, 1813, *Rechtslehre nach Pl. Grds.*, *ibid.* 1819), Havestadt (*De eth. et pol. disciplinas in Pl. dial. coherentia*, *Inaug.-Dissert.*, Münster, 1845), Voigtland (*Die eth. Tendenzen des Pl. Staats*, G.-Pr., Schlesingen, 1853). On Plato's politics as compared with Aristotle's, see Gust. Huxner (*De ill. quas Ar. in Pl. Politia repr.*, Leipzig, 1822), and others (see below, ad § 50); the mutual relation of Plato's Politics and Ethics is also discussed in various compositions relating to the Platonic dialogue *De Republi.*, particularly in the Introductions to that dialogue by Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinbart, in Susemihl's work, Vol. II., p. 58 seq., and in monographs by A. G. Gernhard (in the *Act. soc. Graeca*, I., Leipzig, 1836; *Pr.*, Weimar, 1837; *ibid.* 1829, 1840), E. Manlius (G.-Pr., Schlesw., 1834), G. F. Rattig (*Prolegom. ad Plat. remp.*, Berne, 1845, and *Ueber Steinbart's, Susemihl's und Stallbaum's Einl. s. Pl. Staat*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 161-197), A. O. Wigand (*Das zweite Buch des Platon. Gottesstaates, oder Plato's eigene Ansicht vom dem Wesen der Gerechtigkeit*, Worms, 1846); also in writings relative to the *Politica*, especially the Introductions of the various editors, and in Deuschle's *Beiträge zur Ethik des Pl.* (G.-Pr.), Magdeb. 1857; cf. A. H. Raabe, *De poetica Pl. philoa. natura, praesertim in amoris expositione conspicua*, Rotterdam, 1846. Of the community of goods in Plato's theory, E. v. Voorthuysen has treated (Utrecht, 1850); cf. Thonissen (*Le Socialisme*, t. I., Paris, 1852, p. 41 seq.). On the principles of criminal law, according to Plato, see Platner, in the *Zeitschr. für Alterthumswiss.*, 1864, Nos. 85 and 86.

On Plato's aesthetics, cf. Ed. Müller (*Ueber das Nachahmende in der Kunst nach Plato*, Ratibor, 1861; *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei dem Alten*, Breslau, 1864, pp. 97-129), Arnold Ruge (*Die Plat. Aesthetik*, Halle, 1832), Wilh. Abeken (*De musices apud Platonem et Arist. notione*, Göt. 1836), Ransom (*Ueber die Beurtheilung des Homerischen Epos bei Plato und bei Aristoteles*, Stettin, 1850), Ch. Lévêque (*Platon, fondateur de l'esthétique*, Paris, 1867), K. Justi (*Die ästhet. Elemente in der Platonischen Philoa.*, Marburg, 1860), Th. Strüker (*Studien zur Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Heft 1: *Die Ideen des Schönen bei Plato*, Bonn, 1861; cf. Boumann's review of this work in Michelet's *Journal Der Gedanke*, Vol. VI., Berlin, 1865, pp. 14-25), Jos. Reber (*Pl. und die Poesia*, *Inaug.-Diss.*, Munich, 1864), Max Remy (*Pl. doch. de artibus liberal.*, Halle, 1864), A. H. Raabe (*De poetica Pl. philoa. natura, in amoris expositione conspicua*, Rotterdam, 1846), C. von Jan (*Die Tonarten bei Pl.*, in the *N. Jahrb. f. Ph. und Päd.*, 95, 1867, pp. 515-526).

On Plato's doctrine of education, cf. Anne den Tex (*De et musices ad escol. hom. s. sent. Plat.*, Utr. 1816), G. A. Blume (*De Platoni liberorum educ. disciplina*, Halle, 1818), Ch. Schneider (*De gymnastica in ois. Plat.*, Breslau, 1817), Ad. Bartholom. Kayser (*Fragments aus Plato's und Goethe's Pädagogik*, Breslau, 1821), C. Stoy (*De auctoritate in rebus paedag. a Plat. ois. principibus tributa*, Jen. 1823), Alexander Kapp (*Platon's Erziehungslahre*, Minden, 1835), Wiess (*In optima Plat. civitatis qualis est*

paucorum institutio, Prensler, 1884), E. Sæthlunge (*Das ethische Princip der Plat. Erziehung*, Berlin, 1884), W. Baumgarten-Crusius (*Disciplina juvenilis Plat. cum nostris comp.*, Meissen, 1886), K. H. Lachmann (*Plat. Vorst. von Recht und Erziehung*, Hirschberg, 1849), Arens (*Die relig. Erziehung des Plat. Staatbürgers*, Oldenburg, 1853), Bombach (*Entwicklung der Plat. Erziehungslehre*, Rottwell, 1884), Volquardsen (*Plat. Idee des persönl. Geistes und seine Lehren über Erziehung, etc.*, Berlin, 1860), Bonnard (*Quid apud Graecos de institutione paucorum censuit Plato*, Orleans, 1860), Bahr (*Die pädagog. Mythen Plato's*, Parchim, 1860), L. Wittmann (*Erziehung und Unterricht bei Plato*, Gießen, 1868), Cossu (*Pl. u. Arist. Ansichten über den pädagog. Bildungsgehalt der Künste*, in the *N. Jahrb. f. Philol. und Pädag.*, Vol. 96, 1868, pp. 581-586).

The possession of the Good, according to Plato, is happiness (*Sympos.*, 240 e: κτῆσαι γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες. *Sympos.*, p. 202 e: εὐδαίμονες τοὺς τὰγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀκτμημένους. Cf. *Gorg.*, p. 508 b.: δυνάμειν καὶ σφροδότην κτῆσαι εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὀφθαλμοί). Happiness depends on culture and justice or on the possession of moral beauty and goodness (*Gorg.*, p. 470 d). *Rep.*, IV. p. 420 b: "Our object in founding the state is, that not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." The ethical end of man is described by Plato as resemblance to God, the absolutely good, in *Rep.*, X. 613 a; *Theaet.*, 176. Through his psychological doctrine of the different faculties or parts of the soul, Plato was enabled to do what for other disciples of Socrates, such as Euclid and Antisthenes, was, as it seems, impossible, viz.: to demonstrate a plurality of virtues as comprehended within the one general conception of virtue. The parallel between virtue in the state and in the individual is introduced by Plato with the remark, that in the former we read, as it were, in larger characters the same writing, which in the latter is written in smaller ones (*Rep.*, II. p. 368).

The Platonic theory of the state borrows many of its special provisions from the Hellenic, and especially from the Doric legislation. But its essential tendency is not (as K. F. Hermann and others affirm) toward the restoration and intensification of the Old-Hellenic principle of the unreflecting subordination of the individual to the whole. It is rather an advance upon all Hellenic forms whatever and an anticipation of institutions which were afterward approximately realized, notably in the Hierarchy of the Middle Ages.*

* As Plato's theory of Ideas points beyond the sensible phenomenon and sees the truly real only in absolutely existent essences, exalted above time and space and figured as dwelling beyond the heavens, so Plato's ethico-political ideal points beyond the terrestrial ends of political society (on which, however, the genesis of the state originally depends, *Rep.*, II. p. 369 seq.) to the cognition and realization of a transcendent ideal good. The sensible may, indeed, participate in the ideal; the latter may shine through the former and lend it proportion and beauty (*Phaedr.*, *Sympos.*); but the ultimate and supreme duty of man is, nevertheless, to escape from the sensible world to the ideal (*Theaet.*, p. 176 a: περιπαθεῖν καὶ ἰδεῖν τὸ ἀσώτῃ φέροντι ὅτι τὰχιστα, by which is attained ἁμείνους θεῶν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν). Thus, while the class of philosophers in the state are not, indeed, to pass their lives in pure contemplation alone, and while they are not to have their own ideal good only in view, but are to have a care for their fellow-citizens who exercise the inferior functions, their supreme destination and at the same time their fullest satisfaction are to be found in contemplation itself, culminating in cognition of the Idea of the good (*Rep.*, VII. p. 519). Plato seeks to assure the supremacy of the Idea in the state, not by requiring the consciousness of all to be filled and permeated by it, and so developing a universal community of mind and spirit, but by providing a particular class, who are to live for it, and to whom the other classes owe unconditional obedience, the members of that class being alienated from sensible and individual interests by the extermination of these interests, as far as possible. Precisely the same motives gave rise, at a later epoch, to the Medieval Hierarchy. If it be assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to the development of that hierarchy, its influence must be conceived as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo-Platonists, and the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the ultra-phenomenal world. But an equally influential cause was the example of the Jewish hierarchy. Whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, and setting aside many specific differences, the general character of the Platonic state and that of the Christian Hierarchy of the Middle Ages are essentially the same. In the former the philosophers occupy nearly the same position with reference to the other classes which in the latter the priests occupied with reference to the laity. In ordering

In Plato's ideal state it was impossible that ancient Greek art, especially the Homeric poetry, which ran counter to Plato's rigid conception of moral dignity in the control of the passions, should find a place. If the phenomenal is an imitation of the ideal, that art, which in turn imitates the phenomenal, can only be of inferior worth. Only that art which imitates the good can be recognized as fully legitimate. Beauty is the shining of the ideal through the sensible. The Idea, which is the One as opposed to the plurality of phenomena, manifests itself in the phenomenal in the relations of proportion. The derivation of beauty from the ideal is emphasized by Plato in the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*, while its formal side is especially considered in dialogues of later composition (*Timæus* and *Philebus*; *Hippias Major* is probably spurious).

The various forms of government are ranked in the *Republic* as follows: The Ideal State (government of the philosophically cultivated), Timocracy (ascendency of the *θυμοειδής* over the *λογιστικόν*, of military prowess over culture), Oligarchy (participation in the government conditioned on the amount of one's possessions, which minister to *ἐπιθυμία*), Democracy (freedom, abolition of distinctions of worth), Tyranny (complete perversion of justice through the supremacy of the bad). In the *Politicus*, six forms are enumerated, in the following order: Monarchy (legal government of one individual), Aristocracy (legal government of the rich), Legal Democracy, Illegal Democracy, Oligarchy (lawless government of the rich), Tyranny (lawless government of one person). The character of the citizens corresponds naturally with the character of the government. To take part in the government of bad states is impossible for the philosopher, because it would degrade him. So long as such states continue to exist, he can only withdraw himself from public life, and lead, in the company of a few friends, a life of contemplation (*Theæt.*, p. 173 seq.; compare what is said, perhaps in opposition to Isocrates, in *Rep.*, VI. p. 487 seq., respecting the reason why the ablest philosophers could be of no service to the states as then actually constituted).

For the education of the children of the rulers and warriors of the ideal state, Plato provides in the *Rep.* as follows: From the 1st to the 2d year, care of the body; from 3 to 6, narration of myths; from 7 to 10, gymnastics; from 10 to 13, reading and writing; from 14 to 16, poetry and music; from 16 to 18, mathematical sciences; from 18 to 20, military exercises. Then follows a first sifting. Persons possessing an inferior capacity for science, but capable of bravery, remain simply warriors; the rest go on, until the age of 30, learning the sciences in a more exact and universal form than was possible in their earlier, youthful years. In this period, topics previously learned separately are apprehended in their mutual relations as parts of one whole; this at the same time furnishes the test of the talent for dialectic, for the dialectician must be able to comprehend many things in one view (*ὁ γὰρ ξυνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς ἔστιν*). Then comes a second sifting. The less promising are assigned to practical public offices. The rest pursue, from the age of 30 to 35, the study of dialectic, and then assume and hold positions of authority until the 50th year. After this they attain finally to the highest degree in philosophy, the contemplation of the idea of the good; at the same time they are received into the number of rulers and fill in turn the highest offices of the state, being charged with the superintendence of the entire government. Most of the time in this last period of their lives they are permitted to devote to philosophical contemplation.

the strict subordination of the individual to the whole, the Platonic state agreed no less with the Grecian state in its early historic form than with the Church of the Middle Ages. But in the kind and the sense of the subordination thus required it was more akin to the latter. For the subordination required by the Platonic state is by no means unreflecting, bounded by mere custom and subserving simply the power and greatness of the state. It rests on the authority of a finished system of doctrines, and its tendency is, in the highest degree, toward the promotion of purely spiritual ends.

§ 44. It is the custom of historians to distinguish, among the professed disciples of Plato, three, or, by a more circumstantial division, five consecutive tendencies or schools. These are the Old, Middle, and New Academies: the Old Academy including the first school, the Middle Academy including the second and third schools, and the New Academy, the fourth and fifth. To the first Academy belong: Speusippus, Plato's sister's son and the successor of Plato as Scholarch (which office he held from 347 to 339), who pantheistically represents the Best or Divine as first indeed in rank, but as chronologically the last product of development, and who finds the principle of ethics in the happiness of a life conformed to nature; Xenocrates of Chalcedon, who succeeded Speusippus in the directorship of the Academy (339-314), and who identifies ideas with numbers, and founds on the doctrine of numbers a mystical theology; Heraclides of Pontus, who distinguished himself especially in astronomy, teaching the daily rotation of the earth on its axis from West to East and the immobility of the firmament of the fixed stars; Philip the Opuntian, author of the *Epinomis* (which is a continuation of the *Laws* of Plato); Hermodorus, who was likewise one of Plato's immediate disciples, and who contributed to the spread of Plato's doctrines, especially his unwritten ones; and Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, who redirect attention chiefly to ethical inquiries. In the Middle Academy a skeptical tendency becomes more and more prominent. The heads of this Academy were Arcesilas (315-241 B. C.), the founder of what is called the second Academy, and Carneades (214-129), the founder of the third Academic school. The New Academy returned to Dogmatism. It commenced with Philo of Larissa, founder of the fourth school, who lived at the time of the first Mithridatic war. His pupil, Antiochus of Ascalon, founded a fifth school by combining the doctrines of Plato with certain Aristotelian and more particularly with certain Stoic theses, thus preparing the way for the transition to Neo-Platonism.

On the Old Academy, cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., II. a, pp. 641-698. On Speusippus, Ravaisson, *Speusipp. Plac.*, Paris, 1888; M. A. Fischer, *De Sp. vita*, Rast. 1846; Krieche, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 247-308. On Xenocrates: Wynperse, *Diatribe de Xenocrate Chalcedonio*, Leyden, 1822; Krieche, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 311-394. On Heraclides: Boulez, *De Vit. et Scriptis Heraclidis Pontici*, Louvain, 1828; E. Deswert, *De Heraclide Pont.*, ibid., 1880; Frans Schmidt, *De Heraclide Pont. et Dicaearchi Messeni dialogis deperditis (Dica. Inaug.)*, Breslau, 1867; cf. Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, II. p. 197 seq.; Krieche, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 324-326. On Eudoxus: L. Ideler, *Ueber Eudoxus*, in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1828, 1830; Aug. Boeckh, *Ueber die vierjährigen Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen*, Berlin, 1868; cf. George Cornwell Lewis, *Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy*, ch. III., sect. 3, p. 146 seq. On Eudoxus of Cnidus, the geographer (about 355 B. C.), who must be distinguished from Eudoxus the philoso-

pher, and who was the author of a *γῆς περίεξοδος*, as also on Geminus the astronomer (about 187 B. C.), cf. H. Brandt, in the *Jahrb. f. PA.*, LXIV. 1852, p. 258 seq., and in the *Jahrb. des Vereins für Erdkunde zu Leipzig*, Leipzig. 1864. On Hermodorus, cf. Ed. Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platensis discipulo*, Marb. 1850. On Crantor: F. Schneider, *De Crantoris Solensis philosophi Academicorum philosophias additæ libro, qui peri widoews inscribitur commentatio*, in the *Zeitschr. für die Alterthumswiss.*, 1834, Nos. 104, 108; M. Herm. Ed. Meier, *Ueber die Schrift des Crantor peri widoews*, Halle, 1840; Frid. Kayser, *De Crantoris Academicæ diss.*, Heidelberg, 1841. On the later Academics: Fr. Dor. Gerlach, *Commentatio exhibens Academicorum juniorum, imprimis Arcesilæ atque Carneadis de probabilitate disputationes*, Götting. 1815; I. Rud. Thorbecke, *In dogmaticis oppugnandis numquid inter academicos et scepticos interfuerit*, Zwollæ Batav., 1830; Rich. Brodersen, *De Arcesilæ philosopho academico*, Altona, 1831; Aug. Geffers, *De Arcesila (G.-Fr.)*, Götting. 1841; *Id.*, *De Arcesilæ successoribus*, *ibid.*, 1845; cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., III. a. p. 448 seq.; Boulez, *De Carneade, cancell. Gmæar.*, 1834-35; C. J. Grynæ, *Die Academicer Philo und Antiochus*, Cologne, 1849; C. F. Hermann, *Disputatio de Philone Larriensi*, Götting. 1851; *Disput. altera*, *ibid.*, 1855; Kriech, in the *Götting. Stud.*, II. 1845, pp. 128-200; Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., III. a. p. 522; David d'Allemant, *De Antiocho Ascalenita*, Paris, 1856; cf. Kriech, *Götting. Stud.*, II. 1860-170; Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., III. a. p. 530-540.

That Speusippus was the immediate successor of Plato in the leadership of the Academy is testified by Diog. L., IV. 1. Aristotle not unfrequently makes mention of his opinions, especially in the *Metaph.*, but often without naming him; he expressly ascribes to him, with the Pythagoreans, a doctrine of pantheistic character (*Metaph.*, XII. 7: *ὑπολαμβάνουσιν . . . οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπείσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἁριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυχῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων*). According to Stob., *Ecl.*, I. p. 58, he rejected the (Platonic) identification of the one (*ἐν*), the good (*ἀγαθόν*), and the reason (*νοῦς*). He assumed (like Pseudo-Philolaus, who perhaps followed his example, but who, however, illogically joined the doctrine of this assumption with other heterogeneous doctrines) a rising gradation of existences, positing the abstract as the earliest and most elementary, and the more concrete as later and higher. Aristotle says (*Met.*, VII. 2) that Speusippus, commencing with the "One" (*ἐν*), assumed a greater number of classes of essences than Plato, and that for each class, namely, for numbers, the geometrical figures, and the soul, he posited different principles. Speusippus seems to have denied the existence of Ideas (whereas Xenocrates identified them with mathematical objects). The soul was defined by him (Stob., *Ecl. Phys.*, I. 1; Plut., *De Anim. Procr.*, 22) as extension shaped harmoniously by number, hence, as in some sense, a higher unity of the arithmetical and the geometrical. According to Cic. (*Nat. D.*, I. 13) he assumed a *vis animæ, qua omnia regantur*. His ethical principle is thus expressed by Clem. Alex. (*Strom.*, II. 418 d): *Σπείσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, ἢ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν*.

Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396-314 B. C.) distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 147) three classes of essences: the sensible, the intelligible, and the intermediate, the latter being the objects of opinion (*δόξα*); the intelligible lay beyond the heavens (*ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ*), the sensible within the heavens (*ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ*), while the *δοξαστόν*, or matter of opinion, was identical with the heavens themselves, since these could be both perceived and scientifically contemplated. (To him are to be referred the words in Arist., *Met.*, VII. 2: *ἐναι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γράμματα καὶ ἐπιπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά*). Out of the "One" and the "Indefinite Duad" he constructed all existences (Theophrast., *Met.*, 3, p. 312). He defined the soul as self-moving number, *ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον* (Plut., *De An. Procr.*, 1, cf. Arist., *De An.*, I. 2, 4; *Analyt. Post.*, II. 4). In the symbolical use of the names of the gods, Xenocrates indulged in an almost childish play. Happiness was described by him (according to Clem., *Strom.*, II. p. 419 a) as resulting from our possession of the virtue proper to us (*οἰκίας ἀρετῆς*) and of power devoted to its service.

Among the earliest disciples of Plato belongs Endoxus of Cnidus, who was subsequently distinguished as a mathematician and astronomer (and lived about 406-353 B. C.). He heard Plato perhaps about 383, and went to Egypt probably about 378 (not first in 362) with a letter of recommendation from Agesilaus to King Nektanebus. At Heliopolis he studied astronomy; at Tarentum, under Archytas, geometry; and in Sicily, under Philistion, medicine (as Diog. L., VIII. 86, reports, following the *Πισιναί* of Callimachus). He afterward taught in Cyzicus and Athens, and finally returned to Cnidus, his native city, where he erected an astronomical observatory. At Athens Menaechnus and Helicon were among his pupils in geometry; Helicon accompanied Plato in his third voyage to Sicily (361 B. C.; see Pseudo-Plat., *Ep.*, XIII. p. 360 d; Plutarch, *Dion.*, ch. 19). In ethics Eudoxus maintained the Hedonic doctrine (Arist., *Eth. N.*, X. 2, 3).

Heraclides of Heraclea on the Pontus, to whom (according to Suidas) Plato intrusted the direction of the Academy during his last journey to Sicily, occupied himself, among other things, with the question thus propounded (according to Simplic., *In Arist. De Caelo*, f. 119) by Plato (in a form distinguished for its logical merits): *τίναν ὑποθέσειν ἐμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων διασώβῃ τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανημένων φαινόμενα*, or "what uniform and regulated motions can be assumed (to explain the phenomena of the universe), whose consequences will not be in contradiction with the phenomena." The form of this question gives evidence of a consciousness already very highly developed, of the correct method of investigation, and involves only the error of supposing that mathematical regularity as such necessarily belongs to the actual movements of nature, so that the research for real forces, from whose activity these motions arise, seemed unnecessary. Eudoxus is said to have proposed several hypotheses in reply to the above Platonic question, but decided in favor of the immobility of the earth. Heraclides, on the contrary (with Ephantus the Pythagorean, whom he also followed in his doctrine of atoms), decided for the theory of the revolution of the earth on its axis (Plut., *Plac. Philos.*, III. 13). Heraclides regarded the world as infinite in extent (Stob., *Ecl.*, I. 440).

Hermodorus was an immediate pupil of Plato, and we are indebted to him for a number of notices respecting the life and doctrines of his master (see above, § 39, p. 100, and § 41). From his work on Plato, Dercyllides (see below, § 65) borrowed data relative to the Platonic Stoicheiology. Perhaps it was these "unwritten doctrines" which constituted the *λόγος*, with which Hermodorus traded in Sicily, whence the saying to which Cicero alludes (*Ad Att.*, XIII. 21: *λόγισιν Ἐρμόδωρος ἐμπορεύεται*).

Philip the Opuntian, the mathematician and astronomer (cf. Boeckh, *Sonnenreise*, p. 34 seq.), is the reputed author of the *Epinomis*. The revision and publication of the manuscript of the *Leges*, which was left by Plato unfinished, are also ascribed to him (Diog. L., III. 37, and Suidas *sub voce φιλόσοφος*).

Polemo, who followed Xenocrates as head of the school (314-270), gave his attention mainly to ethics. He demanded (according to Diog. L., IV. 18) that men should exercise themselves more in right acting than in dialectic. Cicero gives (*Acad. Pr.*, II. 43) the following as his ethical principle: *honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini naturæ concidit*. To his influence on Zeno, Cicero bears witness, *De Fin.*, IV. 16, 45.

Crantor is termed by Proclus (*Ad Tim.*, p. 24) the earliest expounder of Platonic writings. As the living tradition of Plato's doctrines died out, his disciples began more and more to consult his written works. Crantor's work on Sorrow (*περὶ πένθους*) is praised by Cicero (*Tusc.*, I. 48, 115; cf. III. 6, 12). He assigns (in a fragment, *ap. Sert. Empir.*, *Adv. Math.*, XI. 51-58) the first place among good things to virtue, the second to health, the third to pleasure, and the fourth to riches. He combats the Stoic requirement that the natural feelings should be suppressed (in accord with Plat., *Rep.*,

X. 603 e). Crantor died before Polemo (Diog. Laer., IV. 27). Crates directed the school after Polemo.

The successor of Crates was Arcesilas or Arcesilaus, who was born, about 315 B. C., at Pitane in Æolia, and had at first attended upon the instructions of Theophrastus, but afterward became a pupil of Crantor, Polemo, and Crates. Of his habit of abstaining (*ἐποχή*) from judgment and of disputing on both sides, Cicero tells us (*De Orat.*, III. 18: *quem ferunt primum instituisse, non qui l'ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare*; cf. Diog. L., IV. 28: *πρώτος δὲ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησεν*). He is said (Cic., *Acad. Post.*, I. 12) to have taught that we can know nothing, not even the fact of our inability to know. But this (according to Sext. Emp., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 234 seq., and others) was only for the discipline and testing of his pupils, to the best-endowed of whom he was accustomed afterward to communicate the Platonic doctrines. Of this explanation (accepted by Geffers, disputed by Zeller) we may admit that, in view of the nature of the case, it is credible, in so far as a head of the Academy could hardly break at once and completely with the theory of ideas and the doctrines founded on it; only this explanation does not necessarily imply an unconditional assent to that theory and to those doctrines. According to Cic., *Acad. Post.*, I. 12, Arcesilas combated unceasingly the Stoic Zeno. He contested especially (according to Sext. Emp., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 233 seq., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 153 seq.) the *κατάληψις* and *συνακατάθεσις* of the Stoics (see below, § 53), yet recognized the attainability of the probable (*τὸ εἰλόγον*), and found in the latter the norm for practical conduct. Aristotle, the Stoic, parodying *Iliad*, VI. 181, said (according to Diog. L., IV. 33, and Sext. Emp., *Pyrrhon. Hypotypos.*, I. 232) that Arcesilas was:

πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὀπίθεν Πύρρων, μέσσοις Διόδωρος,

or, "Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus in the middle."

Arcesilas was followed in the leadership of the school (241 B. C.) by Lacydes, Lacydes (in 215) by Telecles and Evander, the latter by Hegesinus, and he by Carneades.

Carneades of Cyrene (214-129; he came as an ambassador to Rome in the year 155 B. C., together with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic) went still farther in the direction of Skepticism. He disputed, in particular, the theses of Chrysippus the Stoic. Expanding the skeptical arguments of Arcesilas, he declared knowledge to be impossible, and the results of dogmatic philosophy to be uncertain. His pupil, Clitomachus (who followed him in the presidency of the School, 129 B. C.), is related (Cic., *Acad. Pr.*, II. ch. 45) to have said: "it had never become clear to him what the personal opinion of Carneades (in ethics) was." Cicero (*De Orat.*, I. 11) calls Carneades, as an orator, *hominem omnium in dicendo, ut ferebant, acerrimum et copiosissimum*. While at Rome he is said to have delivered on one day a discourse in praise of justice, and on the next to have demonstrated, on the contrary, that justice was incompatible with the actual circumstances in which men live, and in particular to have hazarded the observation, that if the Romans wished to practice justice in their political relations, they would be obliged to restore to the rightful owners all that they had taken away by force of arms, and then return to their huts (Laetant., *Inst.*, V. 14 seq.). To the doctrine of cognition his most important contribution was the theory of probability (*ἐμφασις, πιθανότης*). He distinguished three principal degrees of probability: a representation may be, namely, either 1) probable, when considered by itself alone; or 2) probable and unimpeached, when compared with others; or 3) probable, unimpeached, and in all respects confirmed (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 166).

Philo of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus, came in the time of the first Mithridatic war to Rome, where Cicero heard him (Cic., *Brut.*, 89). He appears to have given his

attention chiefly to Ethics, and, in treating the subject, to have inclined toward the method of the Stoics, although remaining in general their opponent.

Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo's disciple, sought to show that the chief doctrines of the Stoics were to be found already in Plato (Sext. Emp., *Pyrrh. Hyp.*, I. 235). He differed from the Stoics in rejecting the doctrine of the equality of all vices, and in holding that virtue alone, though producing a happy life, is not productive of the happiest of lives; in other respects he agreed with them almost entirely (Cic., *Acad. Pr.*, II. 43).

§ 45. Aristotle, born 384 B. C. (Olymp. 99.1) at Stagira (or Stageiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for twenty years. After Plato's death (347) he repaired with Xenocrates to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia. He remained there nearly three years, at the expiration of which time he went to Mitylene and afterward (343) to the court of Philip, king of Macedonia, where he lived more than seven years, until the death of that monarch. He was the most influential tutor of Alexander from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years of the life of the latter (343-340). Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle founded his school in the Lyceum, over which he presided twelve years. After the death of Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party at Athens preferred an accusation against Aristotle, for which religion was called upon to furnish the pretext. To avoid persecution, Aristotle retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterward died, Olymp. 114.3 (322 B. C.) in the sixty-third year of his age.

On the life of Aristotle, compare Dionys. Hal., *Epist. ad Antimachus*, I. 5; *Diog. Laërt.*, V. 1-35; Suidas (the work edited by Menagius agrees in its biographical part word for word with the first and larger part of the article by Suidas; but there is appended to it a list of the writings of Aristotle, which reproduces, with some omissions and some additions, the catalogue of Diogenes Laërtius; cf. Curt Wachsmuth, *De Fontibus Suidas*, in *Symbola philol. Bonnensium*, I. p. 183); (Pseudo-) Hesychius; (Pseudo-) Ammonius, *Vita Arist.*, with which the *Vita e cod. Marciano*, published by L. Robbe, Leyden, 1861, agrees almost throughout; an old Latin work on the life of Aristotle, ed. Nunnez, Barcelona, 1804, Leyden, 1821, 1881, Helmsl. 1866, is a third redaction of the same *Vita*. The Biographies of Aristotle by Aristoxenus, Aristotle, Timotheus, Hermippus, Apollodorus, and others are lost. The chronology of Aristotle's life, as given by Diogenes L., is taken from the *χρονολ.* of Apollodorus; Dionys. Halic. appears to have drawn from the same source. J. G. Buhle, *Vita Aristotelis per annos digesta*, in the first volume of the Bipontine edition of the works of Aristotle. Ad. Stahr, *Aristotelis* (Part I., on the life of Aristotle of Stagira), Halle, 1880. George Henry Lewes, *Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of Science*, London, 1864 (translated into German by Victor Carus, Leipzig, 1865); the first chapter is on the life of Aristotle. Cf. Ang. Boeckh, *Hermias von Atarneus*, in the *Abh. der Akad. der Wiss. Hist.-phil.* Cl., Berlin, 1853, pp. 132-157.

On Aristotle's relations with Alexander, cf. K. Zell (*Arist. als Lehrer des Alexander*, in: *Fortsetzung*, Freiburg, 1896), Frid. Guil. Car. Hegel (*De Aristotele et Alexandro magno*, Berlin, 1837), P. C. Engelbrecht (*Ueber die wichtigsten Lebensumstände des Aristoteles und sein Verhältnis zu Alexander dem Grossen, besonders in Beziehung auf seine Naturstudien*, Eisleben, 1845), Rob. Geier (*Alexander und Aristoteles in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen*, Halle, 1856), Egger (*Aristotele considéré comme professeur d'Alexandre*, Caen, 1863, *Extrait des Mém. de l'Acad. de Caen*), Mor. Carrière (*Alexander und Aristoteles*, in Westermann's *Monatsh.*, Febr., 1865).

Not only Aristotle's father, but also his ancestors, were physicians; they traced their pedigree to Machaon, the son of Asclepius. The father, Nicomachus, resided as physician-in-ordinary at the court of the Macedonian king Amyntas at Pella. From a comparison of the statements respecting the time of Aristotle's death, and his age at that time, as also respecting the age of Aristotle at the time of his coming to Athens and the date of his connection with Plato, it appears probable that his birth occurred in the first half of the Olympiad year, hence in 384 B. C. Soon after the first arrival of Aristotle in Athens, Plato undertook his visit to Dio and the younger Dionysius, from which he returned three years later. Respecting the details of the early education of Aristotle we are not informed. It is easily supposable that he early, and while Plato was yet living, came to entertain opinions deviating from those of his master, and that he also gave open expression to them. It is possible that the anecdote is genuine which represents Plato as having said that Xenocrates needed the spur, but Aristotle the bridle. But it is improbable that Plato was himself the author of the comparison of Aristotle to a foal kicking at its mother; for Plato was not a partisan of the principle of authority, and was certainly not offended by opposition in argumentation. Plato is said to have called the house of Aristotle the reader's house, and Aristotle himself, on account of his ready wit, the soul of the school. It is probable that Aristotle did not set up a school of his own during the life-time of Plato. If he had done so, it is unlikely that he would have immediately afterward given it up. At that time he gave instruction, however, in rhetoric in opposition to Isocrates, and is reported to have said, in parody of a verse of Philoctetus: "It is disgraceful to be silent, and allow Isocrates to speak" (*αἰσχρὸν σιωπῆν, Ἰσοκράτη δ' ἔην λέγειν*, Cic., *De Orat.*, III. 35 & al.; Quinct., III. 1. 14). The stories of an offensive bearing of Aristotle toward Plato are refuted by the friendly relation which continued, after Plato's death, to subsist between Aristotle and Xenocrates, Plato's devoted disciple, when they went in company to Atarneus, at the invitation of Hermias. Some verses of an elegy by Aristotle on the early death of his friend Eudemus are also preserved (*ap.* Olympiodor. in *Plat. Gorg.*, 166), in which he calls Plato a man whom the bad might not even praise (*ἀνὴρ, ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις*), and who first showed by word and deed, how a man may be at once good and happy (*ὥς ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἄνθρωπος*). After the unhappy end of Hermias, as a Persian captive, Aristotle married Pythias, the niece (or adopted daughter) of Hermias. He was subsequently married to Herpyllis.

As the tutor of a prince, Aristotle was more fortunate than Plato; it must be confessed, however, that in this capacity he also labored under more favorable circumstances than Plato. Without losing himself in the pursuit of impracticable ideals, Aristotle seems to have fostered the high spirit of his ward. Alexander always retained sentiments of respect and love for his teacher, although in his last years a certain coldness existed between the two (Plut., *Alex.*, ch. 8).

Aristotle returned to Athens not long before the entrance of Alexander upon his Asiatic campaign (in the second half of Olymp. 111.2, or the spring of 334), perhaps in the year 335 B. C. He taught in a gymnasium called the Lyceum (consecrated to Apollo Λύκειος), in whose avenues of shade-trees (*περίπατοι*, whence the name Peripatetics) he walked, while communing with his more intimate disciples upon philosophical problems; for more promiscuous audiences he lectured sitting (Diog. L., V. 3). It is possible that he also again gave rhetorical instruction, as in the period of his first residence at Athens. Gellius says (*N. A.*, XX. 5): *ἐξωτερικὰ δίδεσαν, quas ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant; ἀποαρτικά autem vocabantur, in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitata.* For his investigations in natural science facilities are said to have been tendered him by Philip and, more especially, by Alexander

(Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, IV. 19; Athen., IX. 398 e; Plin., *Hist. Nat.*, VIII. 16, 44). The accusation brought against Aristotle was founded on the impiety (*astheneia*) which his enemies pretended to discover in his hymn in eulogy of Hermias; it was designated by them as a Pean, and its author was charged with having deified a man. But in fact this hymn (which is preserved in Diog. L., V. 7) is a hymn to virtue, and Hermias, who had suffered a death full of torments at the hands of the Persians, was only lauded in it as a martyr to virtue. Quitting Athens (late in the summer of 323), Aristotle is related to have said, alluding to the fate of Socrates, that he would not give the Athenians the opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy. His death was not caused (as some report) by a self-administered poison nor by his throwing himself into the Euripus (for which no cause existed), but by disease (Diog. L., V. 10, following Apollodorus; the disease appears to have been located principally in the stomach, according to Censorinus, *De Die Nat.*, 14, 16). His death (according to Gell., *N. A.*, XVII. 21, 35) occurred shortly before that of Demosthenes, hence late in the summer of 322 B. C.

Goethe (*Werke*, Vol. 53, p. 85) characterizes Aristotle, in contrast with Plato (cf. above, § 39), in these words: "Aristotle stands to the world in the relation pre-eminently of a great architect. Here he is, and here he must work and create. He informs himself about the surface of the earth, but only so far as is necessary to find a foundation for his structure, and from the surface to the center all besides is to him indifferent. He draws an immense circle for the base of his building, collects materials from all sides, arranges them, piles them up in layers, and so rises in regular form, like a pyramid, toward the sky, while Plato seeks the heavens like an obelisk or, better, like a pointed flame." This characterization of Aristotle is, indeed, not so happy as that of Plato, cited above. The empirical basis, the orderly rise, the sober, clear insight of the reason, and the healthy, practical instinct, are traits rightly expressed; but when Goethe seems to assume that knowledge was of interest to Aristotle only so far as it was of practical significance, he runs counter to the doctrine and practice of this philosopher. Further, the methods both of Plato and of Aristotle include, together with the process of ascending to the universal, the reverse process of descending by division and deduction to the particular.

§ 46. The writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, partly in acroamatic form; the latter in great part, and a very few fragments of the former, are all that have come down to us. Aristotle wrote most of the works of the latter class during his last residence in Athens. In point of subject-matter they are divided into logical, ethical, physical, and metaphysical works. His logical works have received the general title of *Organon*. The doctrine embodied in his metaphysical writings was called by Aristotle *First Philosophy* (i. e., the philosophy of first or ultimate principles). Of those works which relate to physics or natural science, the *Physics* (*Auscultationes Physicæ*), and also the *Natural History of Animals* (a comparative Physiology), are of especial philosophical importance. Still more important are his psychological works (three books on the Soul and several minor treatises). Among his ethical works the fundamental one is his *Ethics*, which treats of the duties of the individual,

and which exists in a threefold form: *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle's work), *Eudemian Ethics* (written by Eudemus), and *Magna Moralia* (consisting of extracts from the two first). The *Politica* is a theory of the state on the basis of the *Ethics*. The *Rhetoric* and *Poetic* join on partly to the logical, and still more closely to the ethical works.

The works of Aristotle were first printed in a Latin translation, together with the Commentaries of the Arabian philosopher, Averroës (about 1180), at Venice, 1495, and afterward, *ibid.* 1496, 1507, 1538, 1550-52, Basel, 1588, and often afterward; in Greek, first, *Venetis apud Aldum Manutium*, 1495-98; again, under the supervision of Erasmus and Simon Grynaeus, Basel, 1561, 1589, and 1550 (this third Basel edition is termed the *Isengriniana*, from Isengrin, one of its editors); other editions were edited by Joh. Bapt. Camotina, *Venetis apud Aldi Allos*, 1551-58; Friedrich Sylburg, Francf. 1564-87; Isaac Casaubonus, Greek and Latin, Lyons, 1590, etc. (1594, 1597, 1605, 1646); Du Val, Greek and Latin, Paris, 1619, etc. (1622, 1639, 1654); the last complete edition in the 17th century appeared (in Latin) at Rome, 1668. Single works, in particular the *Nicom. Ethics*, were very frequently edited till toward the middle of the seventeenth century; after this epoch editions of single works appeared but rarely, and no more complete editions were published till near the end of the eighteenth century, when an edition of the works of Aristotle in Greek and Latin was commenced by Buhle, *Biponti et Argentorat.* 1791-1800. This edition was never completed. The first volume contains several essays, which are still of value, particularly as relating to the various editions of Aristotle and to his Greek and Latin commentators. Until the rise of Cartesianism and other modern philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, more or less freely interpreted. It is true, in individual points, was received as the true philosophy. Logic, ethics, etc. were learned from his writings at Catholic universities throughout the second half of the Middle Ages, and at Protestant universities, almost in the same sense in which geometry was learned from the elements of Euclid. Afterward, Aristotelianism came to be widely considered as a false doctrine, and (after sustaining attacks of constantly increasing frequency and virulence, beginning from the close of the Middle Ages) became even more and more universally neglected, except where, as at the schools of the Jesuits, tradition retained unconditional authority. Thus the existing editions were quite sufficient to meet the diminished interest felt in their contents. Leibnitz endeavored especially to appreciate justly the measure of philosophical truth contained in the doctrines of Aristotle, disapproving equally the two extremes of unconditional submission to their authority, and of absolute rejection. But he made of his own monadic doctrine and of his religious convictions too immediate a standard of judgment. (See, among others, the monograph of Dan. Jacoby, *De Leibnitii studio Aristotelico, inest ineditum Leibnitii, Diss. Inaug.*, Berlin, 1867.) In the last decades of the eighteenth century the historic instinct became more and more awakened, and to this fact the works of Aristotle owed the new appreciation of their great value as documents exponential of the historical development of philosophy. Thus the interest in the works of Aristotle was renewed, and this interest has gone on constantly increasing during the nineteenth century up to the present day. The most important complete edition of the present century is that prepared under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, Vols. I. and II., *Aristoteles Graece ex rec. Imm. Bekkeri*, Berlin, 1831; Vol. III., *Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis, ibid.* 1831; Vol. IV., *Scholii in Aristotelem collegis Christ. Aug. Brandis, ibid.* 1836; Bekker's text was reprinted at Oxford in 1837, and Bekker has himself published the principal works of Aristotle separately, followed, with few exceptions, the text of the complete edition, but, unfortunately, without annexing the *Varietas lect.* contained in the latter. Didot has published at Paris an edition, edited by Dübner, Bussomaker, and Heitz (1848-60), which is valuable. Stereotyped editions were published by Tauchnitz, at Leipzig, in 1831-32 and 1842. German translations of most of Aristotle's works are contained in Metzler's collection (translated by K. L. Roth, K. Zell, L. Spengel, Chr. Walz, F. A. Krebs, Ph. H. Kûlb, J. Bieckher, and C. F. Schnitzer), in Hoffmann's Library of Translations (translated by A. Karsch, Ad. Stahr, and Karl Stahr), and in Engelmann's collection (Greek and German together). Of the editions of separate works the following may be mentioned:—

Arist. Organon, ed. Th. Walz, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1844-46. *Arist. Categor. gr. cum versione Arabica Isaac Honeini Al.*, ed. Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leipzig, 1846. *Soph. Eleucht.*, ed. Edw. Poste, London, 1866.

Arist. Eth. Nicom., ed. C. Zell, 3 vols., Heidelberg, 1890; ed. A. Cony, Paris, 1822; ed. Cardwell, Oxford, 1828-30; ed. C. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1822-25, 2d edition, 1848; further, separate editions of the text of Bekker, 1831, 1845, 1861; the edition of W. E. Jelf, Oxford and London, 1856, reproducing for the most part Bekker's text; the edition of Rogers, *edit. altera*, London, 1865, and *The Ethics of Aristotle illustrated with Essays and Notes*, by Sir Alex. Grant, London, 1856-58, 2d edition, 1866. Books VIII. and IX. (On

Friendship, published separately, Giessen, 1847, edited by Ad. Theod. Herm. Fritzsche, who also published an edition of the *Eud. Eth.*, Regensburg, 1850.

Polit., ed. Herrn. Conring, Helmsl. 1656, Brunswick, 1790, ed. J. G. Schneider, Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, 1809; C. Götting, Jena, 1824; Ad. Stahr, Leipzig, 1839; B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1837, 2d ed. 1843; I. Bekker, Berlin (1831), 1855; Eaton, Oxford, 1855; R. Congreve, London, 1855 and 1862; *Eth.*, ed. Spengel, Leipzig, 1867.

Poet., ed. G. Hermann, Leipzig, 1802; Frans Ritter, Cologne, 1839; E. Egger (in his *Essai sur l'histoire de la critique chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1849); B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1856; I. Bekker (*Ar. Rhet. et Polit. ab I. B. tartianum ed.*, Berlin, 1859); Frans Susemihl (*Poët.*, in Greek and German, Leipzig, 1866); Joh. Vahlen, Berlin, 1867; F. Ueberweg (with translation and commentary), Berlin, 1869.

The *Physics* of Aristotle has been published, Greek and German together, with explanatory notes, by C. Prantl, Leipzig, 1864; also the works *De Caelo* and *De Generatione et Corruptione* have been edited by the same, Leipzig, 1867. *Arist. über die Farben, uel. durch eine Uebersicht über die Farbenlehre der Alten*, von Carl Prantl, Munich, 1849. *Meteorolog.*, ed. Jul. Lud. Ideler, Leipzig, 1834-36. B. St. Hilaire has edited and published, in Greek and French, and with explanatory notes, the *Physica* of Arist., Paris, 1863; the *Meteorolog.*, Paris, 1867; the *De Caelo*, Paris, 1866; *De Gen. et Corr.*, together with the work *De Meteor.*, *Isophrana*, *Gorgias* (with an *Introd. sur les origines de la philos. grecque*), Paris, 1866. *De Animal. Histor.*, ed. J. G. Schneider, Leipzig, 1811. *Vier Bücher über die Theile der Thiere*, Greek and German, with explanatory notes, by A. v. Franz, Leipzig, 1833; ed. Bern. Langkavel, Leipzig, 1868. *Ueber die Zeugung und Entwickelung der Thiere*, Greek and German, by Aubert and Wimmer, Leipzig, 1860; *Thierkunde*, Greek and German, by the same, *ibid.*, 1863.

Arist. De Anima libri tres, ed. F. Ad. Trendelenburg, Jena, 1838; ed. Barth. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1846; ed. A. Toratnik, Berlin, 1862 (cf. E. Noetel's review in the *Z. f. G. W.*, XVIII, Berlin, 1864, pp. 181-144).

Arist. Metaph., ed. Brandis, Berlin, 1823; ed. Schwegler, Tüb. 1847-48; ed. H. Bonitz, Bonn, 1848-49.

Many valuable contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle's works are contained in those ancient commentaries and paraphrases which have come down to us, especially in those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the exegete (see below, § 51) of Dexippus and Themistius (see below, § 69), and of Syrianus, Ammonius, Hermias filius, Simplicius, and Philoponus (see below, § 70); also in the writings of Boethius (*ibid.*) and others. Scholia to Aristotle have been published by Brandis, Berlin, 1836 (in Bekker's edition of the text), to the *Metaphysica*, by Brandis, *ibid.*, 1837, to the *De Anima* (extracts from an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*), by Spengel, Munich, 1847, and a paraphrase of the *Soph. Elench.*, by Spengel, *ibid.*, 1842. An old Hebrew translation of the Commentary of Averroes on the *Rhetoric* was published by J. Goldenthal, at Leipzig, in 1843.

Of modern writers on the works of Aristotle, we name the following: J. G. Buhle, *Commentatio de librorum Aristotelis distributione in exotericos et acroamaticos*, Gött. 1788 (contained also in the first vol. of Buhle's edition of Aristotle, *Bipont.*, 1791, pp. 105-152), and *Ueber die Echtheit der Metaph. des Aristoteles*, in the *Bibl. f. alte Litt. u. Kunst*, No. 4, Gött. 1788, pp. 1-42; *Ueber die Ordnung und Folge der Aristot. Schriften überhaupt*, *ibid.*, No. 10, 1794, 33-47.

Am. Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote et sur les commentaires grecs ou arabes employés par les docteurs scolastiques*, Paris, 1819, 2d ed. 1843.

Franc. Nicol. Titze, *De Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione*, Leipzig, 1826.

Ch. A. Brandis, *Ueber die Schicksale der Aristotelischen Bücher und einige Kriterien ihrer Echtheit*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, I. 1837, pp. 236-254, 250-256 (cf. Kopp, *Nachtrag zu Br. Unters. über die Schicksale der Arist. Bücher*, *ibid.*, III. 1, 1839); *Ueber die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Arist. Organons und ihre griech. Ausleger*, in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1833; *Ueber die Arist. Metaphysik*, *ibid.*, 1834; *Ueber Aristoteles' Rhetoric und die griech. Ausleger derselben*, in the *Philologus*, IV., 1849, p. 1 seq.

Ad. Stahr, *Aristotelis*, Vol. II.: *Die Schicksale der Arist. Schriften*, etc., Leipzig, 1832; *Aristoteles bei den Römern*, *ibid.*, 1834.

Leonh. Spengel (On Aristotle's Poetics; On the 7th Book of the Physics; On the mutual relation of the three works on Ethics attributed to Aristotle; On the Politics of Aristotle; On the order of Aristotle's works in natural science; On the Rhetoric of Aristotle), in the *Abh. der bair. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1837, 1841, '42, '47, '48, '51; *Ueber ἀπορίαι τῶν παλαιῶν bei Arist.*, *ibid.*, Vol. IX. Munich, 1859; *Aristot. Studien: Nik. Ethik; Eudem. Ethik; gross. Ethik; Politik; Poetik*, in Vols. X. and XI. of the *Trans. of the Bavar. Acad. of Sciences*, Munich, 1833-46 (cf. Bonitz, in the *Zeitschr. f. östr.-Gymn.*, 1866, pp. 777-804).

Jacob Bernays, *Ergänzung zu Aristoteles' Politik*, in the *Rhein. Mus. für Ph.*, new series, VIII., 1853, pp. 561-596; *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie*, in the *Abh. der hist. philoa. Ges. zu Breslau*, Breslau, 1858; *Die Dialoge des Arist. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin, 1868. Cf. P. W. Forchhammer, *Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden*, Kiel, 1864.

Herrn Bonitz, *Arist. Studien*, I.-V., Vienna, 1860-1861.

Valentin Rose, *De Arist. librorum ordinis et auctoritate*, Berlin, 1854; *Aristoteles pseudoeptigraphus* (a collection of the fragments of the lost works, almost all of which are regarded by Rose as spurious), Leipzig, 1863.

Emil Heitsz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, Leipzig, 1865.

Rud. Eucken, *De Arist. dicendi ratione, pars I.: Observationes de particularum usu*, Götting, 1868 ("observations," which may be useful as assisting to determine the authorship of particular works and books, as e. g., the "observation" that the combination *καὶ εἰ*, where *εἰ* remains without influence upon the construction, is employed by Aristotle and Eudemos in cases where Theophrastus would use *καὶ εἰ διὰ τὸ*, and that Eudemos approaches, in general, much more nearly than Theophrastus to Aristotle in mode of expression, etc.; but cf. the review of Eucken's dissertation by Bonitz in the *Zeitschrift für d. class. Gymn.*, 1866, pp. 804-812); *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1869; *Beiträge a. Verst. des Arist. in die Neue Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Päd.* Vol. 99, 1868, pp. 243-268 and 817-820.

Of the *Logic* and logical writings of Aristotle write: Philipp Gumprecht, Leipzig, 1839, F. Th. Waitz, *De Ar. libri v. in quibus cap. decimo*, Marb. 1844, Ad. Textor, *De Herm. Ar.* (Inaugural Diss.), Berlin, 1870 (cf. § 47, below).

Of the *Metaphysics*: C. L. Michelet, *Examen critique de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intitulé Métaphysique, ouvr. cour. par l'acad. des sc. mor. et pol.*, Paris, 1836; Felix Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, Paris, 1837-46; Brummerstädt, *Ueber Inhalt und Zusammenhang der metaph. Bücher des Arist.*, Kassel, 1841; J. C. Glaeser, *Die Metaph. des Arist. nach Composition, Inhalt und Methode*, Berlin, 1841; Herrn. Bonitz, *Obsev. Criticæ in Arist. libros metaphysicos*, Berlin, 1849; Wihl. Christ, *Studia in Arist. libros metaph. collata*, Berlin, 1853. Cf. Krieger, *Vorlesungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie I.*, 1846, pp. 968-976; and Bonitz and Schwegler, in their commentaries on the *Met.* of Aristotle (cf. below, § 48).

Of Aristotle's physical works: C. Prantl, *De Ar. librorum ad Nat. animal. part. ordinis atque dispositionis*, Munich, 1848; *Symbolæ criticæ in Arist. phys. avunculationes*, Berlin, 1848; H. Thiel, *De Zool. Ar. I. ordine ac distrib.* (G.-Pr.), Breslau, 1850; Sonnenburg, *Zu Ar. Thiergeschichte* (G.-Pr.), Bonn, 1867; Ch. Thurrot, *Obsev. crit. on Ar. De Part. Animalium*, in the *Revue arch.*, 1867, pp. 233-242; on the *Meteorol.*, *ibid.*, 1869, pp. 415-420. Cf. various works by Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Jensen, and others (see § 49, below).

Of the *Ethics* and *Politics*: Wihl. Gottlieb Tennemann, *Bem. über die sogen. Ethik des Arist.*, Erfurt, 1798; F. Schielemacher, *Ueber die griech. Scholien zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Arist.* (read on May 16, 1816), in S.'s *Sämmtliche Werke*, III. 2, 1833, pp. 809-826; *Ueber die ethischen Werke des Aristoteles* (read December 4, 1817), *ibid.* III. 3, 1833, 806-838; W. Van Swinderen, *De Ar. Pol. Nibris*, Groningen, 1834; Herrn. Bonitz, *Obsev. Crit. in Arist. quas feruntur Magna Moralis et Eth. Eudemi*, Berlin, 1844; A. M. Fischer, *De Ethicis Nicom. et Eudemi*, Bonn, 1847; Ad. Trendelenburg, *Ueber Stellen in der Nik.-Ethik*, in the *Monatsschr. der Berliner Acad. d. Wiss.*, 1850, and in Trendelenburg's *Hist. Beitr. zur Philol.*, II., Berlin, 1853; *Zur Arist. Ethik*, in *Illust. Beitr.*, III., Berlin, 1847; Joh. Petr. Ninken, *De Arist. Politicorum Nibris* (diss. inaug.), Bonn, 1851; J. Bendixen, *Comm. de Ethicorum Nicomacheorum integritate*, Ploena, 1854; *Bemerkungen zum 7. Buch der Nikom. Ethik*, in the *Philol.*, X, 1855, pp. 199-210, 263-292; *Uebersicht über die neueste die Aristotelische Ethik und Politik betreffende Litt.* *ibid.* XI, 1856, pp. 351-378, 544-562, XIV, 1859, 332-372, XVI, 1860, 465-592; cf. XIII, 1858, pp. 264-301; H. Hampke, *Ueber das fünfte Buch der Nik. Eth.*, *ibid.* XVI, pp. 60-84; G. Teichmüller, *Zur Frage über die Reihenfolge der Bücher in der Arist. Politik*, *ibid.* pp. 184-166; Christian Fensch, *De Ethicis Nicom. genuine Arist. libro diss.*, Bonn, 1863 (cf. Trendelenburg's review of this work, and, in particular, his defense against Fensch of the genuineness of the 10th Book of the *Nicom. Ethics*, in the *Jahrb. für wiss. Kritik*, 1864, p. 353 seq., and Spengel, in the *Abh. der bair. Acad.*, III. p. 518 seq.); Chr. Fensch, *De Ar. Eth. Nic.*, VII. 12-15 and X. 1-5 (G.-Pr.), Eutin, 1858; H. S. Anton, *Quæ intercedit ratio inter Eth. Nic. VII. 12-15 et X. 1-5*, Dantzig, 1859; F. Münchsen, *Quærit. crit. et argut. in Arist. Eth. Nicom.*, Marburg, 1861; R. Noetel, *Quærit. Ar. (de libro V. Eth. Nic.)*, (G.-Pr.), Berlin, 1862; F. Hicker, *Das V. Buch der Nik. Ethik*, in the *Zeitschr. f. d. G.-W.*, XVI, pp. 519-560; *Beitr. a. Kritik u. Erkl. des VII. Buches der Nik. Ethik*, in the *Zeitschr. f. d. G.-W.*, Berlin, 1860 (cf. 1863); H. Rasseow, *Observationes criticæ in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1868; *Emendationes Aristotelis*, Weimar, 1841; *Beiträge zur Erklärung und Textkritik der Nik. Ethik des Arist.*, Weimar, 1862 and 1868; *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik des Aristoteles*, Weimar, 1864; Joh. Imelmann, *Obsev. cr. in Ar. K. N.* (Diss.), Halle, 1864; Moritz Vermehren, *Aristotelische Schriftstellen, Hft. I.: zur Nikom. Ethik*, Leipzig, 1844; W. Ocken, *Die Wiederbelebung der Arist. Politik in der abendländischen Litteratur*, in the *Festschrift zur Begrüßung der 24. Vers. deutscher Philol. u. Schwm. zu Heidelberg*, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 1-13; *Die Staatlehre des Arist.*, Leipzig, 1870; Saemann, *Zum ersten, zweiten und vierten Buche der Politik*, in the *Jahrb. f. Ph. u. Päd.*, Vol. XCIII, pp. 327-338, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. S., XX, 1863, pp. 504-517; XXI, 1866, pp. 551-573; and Zum & I. u. &

Isis, in the *Philologus*, XXV. pp. 385-415; XXIX. pp. 97-119; *De Arist. Politicorum Mbris I. & II.*, Greifswald, 1867; *Appendix*, *ibid.* 1869; *d. n. Lit. u. Ar. Pol.*, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, XCIX. pp. 592-610, and CL (1870), pp. 842-850; Ewald Böcker, *De quibusdam Pol. Ar. locis* (Inaug. Diss.), Greifsw. 1867 (cf. below, § 39).

To the *Poetic* and *Rhetoric* of Aristotle relate (beside the works already cited of Spengel, Bernays, and others) the following: Max Schmidt, *De tempore quo ab Arist. I. de arte rhet. conscr. et ed. sint*, Halle, 1867; Franz Basemühl, *Studien zur Aristotel. Poetik*, in the *Rh. Mus.*, XVIII. p. 366 seq., 471 seq., XIX. p. 197 seq., XXII. p. 217 seq.; cf. Jahn's *Jahrb.*, 89, p. 504 seq., and 95, pp. 159-184 and 221-226; Jak. Vahlen, *Zur Kritik Arist. Schriften* (Poetic and Rhetoric), Vienna, 1861, in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 59-148; also, *Arist. Lehre von der Rangfolge der Theile der Tragödie*, in the "*Gratulationschrift*," entitled *Symbola philologorum Bonnensium in honorem Frid. Ritschelti collecta*, Leipzig, 1864, pp. 155-184; *Beiträge zur Arist. Poetik*, Vienna, 1865-1867 (from the "*Sitzungsberichte*" of the Academy); Gust. Teichmüller, *Arist. Forschungen*, I.: *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Poetik des Arist.* (Halle, 1867), II.: *Arist. Philoa. der Kunst* (*ibid.* 1869), (cf. below, § 39).

Aristotle probably composed a number of works in dialogue during his first residence at Athens and in the life-time of Plato. Of this class was the dialogue *Eudemus*, some fragments of which are preserved (*ap.* Plutarch, *Dio*, 22; *Consol. ad Apol.*, ch. 27; Cic., *De Div.*, I. 25, 53, etc.; cf. J. Bernays, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Phil.*, new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 236-246). Eudemus was a member of the Platonic circle, a friend of Aristotle, and a participant in the campaign of Dio against Dionysius in Sicily, where he fell, 353 B. C. To his memory Aristotle dedicated the dialogue named after him, a work in imitation of Plato's *Phaedo*; in it Aristotle presented arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. The first twenty-seven volumes in the catalogue of the works of Aristotle, as given by Diog. Laërt., V. 22-27 (cf. *Anonym. Menag.*, 61 seq.) are writings in dialogue. They are: On Justice, On Poets, On Philosophy, Politicus, Gryllus, Nereithus, Sophist, Menaxenus, Eroticus, Symposium, On Riches, Protrepticus, etc. By subsequent writers these works were termed *exoteric*, and in distinction from them the more strictly scientific ones were termed *esoteric*. In Aristotle's works the word *esoterie* does not occur (yet cf. *Analyt. Post.*, I. 10, p. 16 b, 27, *ὁ ἐσω λόγος* as *ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*, in opposition to *ἐξω λόγος*); but *exoteric* is employed in the sense of "outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (*πρὸς ἑτέρον*)," arguing from what appears to him to be true, in contrast to that which interests the thinker who looks only at the essential (*τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ζητούντι κατ' αὐτὸν μέλει*; see *Top.*, VIII. 1, 151 b, 9; *Analyt. Post.*, I. 10, 76 b, 24; *Pol.*, VII. 3, 1325 b, 29, and compare Thurot, in Jahn's *Jahrb.*, 81, 1860, p. 749 seq., and in his *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1866, p. 214 seq.; cf. also G. Thomas, *De Ar. ἐξ λ. dogm. Ciceronis Aristotelio more*, Gött. 1860, and Stahlr. in his *Arist.*, II. pp. 235-279); sometimes Aristotle (as Jak. Bernays has shown, *Dialoge des Arist.*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 29-93) applies the epithet in question to his dialogical writings; yet he also employs it (*Phys.*, IV. 10, 217 b, 19) in reference to those explanatory parts of his strictly scientific works, with which, in conformity to his dialectical method, he usually prefaces the parts devoted to rigid demonstration (*ἀπόδειξις*), or to those parts which are rather "dialectical," i. e., controversial, than "apodictical," or purely scientific (*Pol.*, I. 5, p. 1254 a, 33). The general signification of the word is in both cases the same, the application only being different. Dialogues are also termed by Aristotle *ἐν κοινῷ γιγνόμενοι λόγοι* ("arguments carried on in common," i. e., by means of disputation with a respondent, whether in real *διαλεκταῖς συνόδοις*, *Top.*, VIII. 5, or in dialogical writings), or *ἐκτελούμενοι λόγοι*, i. e., *λόγοι* given to the public, in distinction from unpublished speculations, instituted primarily by the philosopher for his own benefit, and then communicated, whether orally or in writing, to the (private) circle of pupils associated with him in strictly scientific speculation. Rigidly philosophical speculations are termed by Aristotle, in *Pol.*, III. 12, p. 1282 b, 19 et al. (cf. *Eud. Eth.*, I. 8, 1217 b, 23), *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*,

and closely related to this is the expression *διδασκαλικοί λόγοι*, defined in *De Soph. Elenchis*, c. 2, p. 165 b, as *οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἐκάστου μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινόμενου δοξῶν συλλογιζόμενοι* (which latter *λόγοι*, although as *πειραστικοί* they must be classed as *exotéric*, do nevertheless not wander from the precise matter in hand, like the *ἐξωθεν λόγοι*, *Pol.*, II. 6, 1264 b, 39; cf. *Eth. Eud.*, VII. 1, 1235 a, 4 and 5, 1239 b, or the *λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος*, *Rhet.*, I. 1, 1354 b, 27, 1353 a, 2). The *ἐξωτερικά* are defined by Simplicius (*In Phys.*, 386 b, 25) as *τά κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδόξων περαινώμενα*, by Philoponus, as *λόγοι μὴ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς γησίους τῶν ἀκροατῶν εἰρημένοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ πᾶσιν ὁρμημένοι*. In view of the fact that Aristotle here and there in his strictly scientific writings addresses himself to the "hearers," and that at least many of these writings stand in the closest relation to his oral lectures (*ἀκροάσεις*, which were intended to be read publicly or were taken down from his extemporaneous lectures), they were called by later generations *acroamatic* or (metaphorically) *ἀκροάσεις*. Philosophical occupation with a specific group of objects was called a *πραγματεία*, and hence the rigidly philosophical writings, directed strictly and alone to the object of inquiry, leaving out all dialogical ornamentation, were termed by the successors of Aristotle "pragmatic." His works of this sort appear, either wholly or for the most part, not to have been made public by Aristotle himself, so long as he was engaged in lecturing on the subjects of which they treat, but to have been first published by his scholars—a part of them by Andronicus of Rhodes.

As secondary works and forerunners of his strictly scientific writings we must regard the *ἐπομνήματα*, or the *résumés* drawn up by Aristotle for his personal use, and some of which attained to publicity. Among the lost works of this kind belong abstracts of the writings of Archytas, of the Platonic *Republic*, of the *Leges*, the *Tim.*, etc., mentioned by Diog. L. in his list of Aristotle's works. The work *De Melisso, de Xenophane* (or *de Zenone*), *de Gorgia*, which has come down to us, bears also the character of a *ἐπομνήμα*, but its authenticity is at least doubtful (see above, § 17). In the same class belong also the works *De Bono* and *De Ideis*, of which fragments are extant, collected and edited by Brandis (Bonn, 1823); they are memoirs of Plato's oral teachings, written down from memory with the aid, perhaps, of transcripts of Plato's lectures made at or near the time of their delivery. Cf. the works of Brandis, Bournot, and others, cited above, § 41.

Aristotle's *logical* works are the *κατηγορίαι* (whose authenticity is not wholly certain, see Spengel, *Münchener Gel. Anz.*, 1845, No. 5, and Prantl, in the first volume of his *Gesch. der Logik*), on the fundamental forms of the mentally representable, and the corresponding fundamental forms of mental representations and words, or on the fundamental forms of "affirmations concerning the existent;" *περί ἑρμηνείας* (*De Interpretatione*, whose genuineness is disputed by Andronicus of Rhodes, though, apparently, on insufficient grounds), on the Proposition and the Judgment; *ἀναλυτικά πρότερα*, on the Syllogism; *ἀναλυτικά ὑστέρα*, respecting Proof, Definition, Division, and the Cognition of Principles; the *τοπικά*, on Dialectical or Examining Inferences, such as usually arise in disputations from provisional or probable premises (*ἐνδοξα*); and *περί σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων*, on the Fallacies of the Sophists in their refutations and on the exposure of the deceptive appearance in these fallacies. These works were termed by the Aristotelians *ὀργανικά*, i. e., works treating of method, the "organon" of investigation. In the *Topica*, VIII. 14, 163 b, 11, Aristotle remarks that it is an important aid (*ὄργανον*) to the attainment of scientific knowledge, to be able to draw the consequences which follow from each one of two contradictory propositions, and in *Met.*, IV. 3, 1005 b, 4, he adds that the study of the doctrine of the *ὄν ἢ ὄν* (or of being as such, i. e. the study of ontology or metaphysics, *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*) must not be commenced until one is already familiar with Analytics; these remarks of Aristotle indicate the origin and significance of the term "Organon," as above applied.

To the works on *πρώτη φιλοσοφία* some arranger of the works of Aristotle (Andronicus of Rhodes, as there is scarcely any reason to doubt), on the ground of certain didactic utterances of Aristotle respecting the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* and the *πρότερον φύσει*, or the "prior for us" and the "prior by nature," assigned a place after those on physics, and hence gave to them, as arranged in fourteen books, the general title, *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* (works coming after those relating to Physics), the books being numbered A, α, Β, Γ, etc., up to N = I, II., III., IV., etc., to XIV.; in determining the order of the books, he seems to have been guided chiefly by the citations contained in them. The "Metaphysics" is made up of an extended, connected, but not completely finished exposition of doctrine (Book I: Philosophical and historico-critical Introduction, and Books III.; IV.; VI., VII., VIII.; IX.), and of several smaller and in part spurious treatises. Some ancient authorities attribute the authorship of Book II. (α) to Pasicles of Rhodes, a son of a brother of Eudæmus and an auditor of Aristotle. According to others, Book I. (Α) was his composition (see Asclep., *Schol. in Arist. ed Br.*, p. 520 a, 6). Book V. (Δ) contains an inquiry *περὶ τὸν πᾶσιν*, respecting the various significations of philosophical terms, and is cited by this title in VI. 4, VII. 1, and X. 1. Book X. treats of the one and the many, the identical and the opposed, etc. Book XI. contains, in chaps. 1-3, p. 1065 a, 26, a shorter presentation of the substance of III., IV., and VI.; if genuine, it must be regarded as a preliminary sketch; if not, it is an abstract made by an early Aristotelian; chaps. 1 and 2 correspond with Book III. (*ἀπορίαι*, doubts, difficulties), 3-6 with IV. (the problem of metaphysics and the principle of contradiction), and 7 and 8, up to the place indicated, with VI. (introductory remarks on the doctrine of substance); the rest of Book XI. is a compilation from the Physics, and hence decidedly spurious. The first five chapters of Book XII. contain a sketch of the doctrine of substance (more fully detailed in Books VII. and VIII.) and of the doctrine of potentiality and actuality (discussed more fully in Book IX.); chaps. 6-10 are a somewhat more detailed, but still very compressed exposition of Aristotle's theology. The last two books (XIII. and XIV.) contain a critique of the theory of ideas and of the number-doctrine, which in parts (XIII. 4 and 5) agrees verbally with portions of the first book (I. 6 and 9). An hypothesis has been suggested by Titze, and modified and expanded by Glaser and others, to the effect that Books I., IX. chs. 1-8, and XII., constituted originally a shorter draught of the whole *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, of which the first book was retained by Aristotle in his larger work, while the rest were altered and enlarged; but this theory is very uncertain, and it is quite as possible that the whole of Book K (XI.) and at least the first part of Book Λ (XII.) are spurious. In the relation of Books I., XIII. and XIV., to each other and to the whole there is much that is puzzling; in particular, it would seem that Aristotle can not have intended the repetition of the critique of the theory of ideas. The parts of Book XIII. which agree with parts in the first book appear to have been written later than the latter, and not by Aristotle, but by some revising Aristotelian; the genuineness of Book XIII., as far as ch. 9, p. 1086 a, 21, is at least doubtful. The beginning of the *Metaph.* is said (by Albertus Magnus, see Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques*) to have been regarded by the Arabians as the work of Theophrastus. The natural termination of the *Metaphysics* is with the doctrine of God, or the theology of Aristotle (XII. 6-10).

The series of works on *natural science* opens with the *φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις* in eight books (called also *φυσικά* or *τὰ περὶ φύσεως*, of which V., VI., and VIII. treat specially of motion, while VII. seems not to belong in this connection, and was probably not written by Aristotle at all); to this should be joined *περὶ οὐρανοῦ* in four and *περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς* in two books; also the *μετεωρολογικά* (or *περὶ μετεώρων*) in four books, of which the fourth appears to be an independent treatise. The book *περὶ αἰθέρος* is spurious. The opuscula *περὶ χρομᾶτον* was composed in the Peripatetic school. The original work on plants is

lost; the one which exists under that title in our editions is spurious—perhaps the work of Nicolaus of Damascus. The History of Animals (*περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι*, of which the tenth book is spurious), together with certain related works on the parts, generation, and locomotion of animals (the *περὶ ζῳῶν κινήσεως* is not genuine), is preserved, but the Anatomy of Animals (*ἀνατομῆς*) is lost. To the three books *περὶ ψυχῆς* join on the opuscles: *περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν*, *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως*, *περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως*, *περὶ ἐνυπνίων*, *περὶ μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις*, *περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος*, *περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου* (with which the *περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως* of our editions must apparently be classed). The *φυσιογνωμικά* is spurious. The collection of *προβλήματα* is a conglomerate gradually brought together on the basis of Aristotle's notes (cf. Carl Prantl, *Ueber die Probleme des Arist.*, in the *Abh. der Akad. d. W.*, Munich, 1850). The *περὶ θανασίων ἀκουσμάτων* is spurious (cf. H. Schrader, *Ueber die Quellen der pseudo-arist. Schrift π. θ. ἀ.*, in the *Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Päd.*, Vol. 97, 1867, pp. 217–232); so, perhaps, is also the *περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν*.

Three works in our *Corpus Aristoteleum* treat of ethics in general: *ἠθικά Νικομάχεια* in ten books, *ἠθικά Εὐδήμεια* in seven books, and *ἠθικά μεγάλα* (perhaps corrupted from *ἠθικῶν κεφάλαια* or from *ἠθικῶν μεγάλων κεφάλαια*, according to Trendelenburg's conjecture, *Beiträge zur Philos.*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1855, p. 352 seq.). The three works on ethics correspond with each other in content as follows: *Eth. Nic.*, I., II., III. 1–7, *Eth. Eud.*, I., II., *Magn. Mor.*, I. 1–19, contain general preparatory considerations; *Eth. Nic.*, III. 8–15 and IV., *Eth. Eud.*, III., *Magn. Mor.*, I. 20–23, treat of the different ethical virtues, with the exception of justice; *Eth. Nic.*, V., with which *Eth. Eud.*, IV., is identical, and *Magn. Mor.*, I. 34, and II., *init.*, relate to justice and equity; *Eth. Nic.*, VI., with which *Eth. Eud.*, V., is identical, and *Magn. Mor.*, I. 35 (cf. II. 2, 3), relate to the dianoëtic virtues; *Eth. Nic.*, VII., identical with *Eth. Eud.*, VI., and *Magn. Mor.*, II. 4–7, to continence, incontinence, and pleasure; *Eth. Nic.*, VIII., IX., *Eth. Eud.*, VII. 1–12 (or 13 *init.*, where there is evidently a gap), and *Magn. Mor.*, II. 11–17, treat of friendship; *Eth. Eud.*, VII. 13 (where the text is full of gaps and alterations) treats of the power of wisdom (*φρόνησις*, practical wisdom); *Magn. Mor.*, II. 10, of the signification of *ὁρθὸς λόγος*, and of the power of ethical knowledge; *Eth. Eud.*, VII. 14, 15, and *Magn. Mor.*, II. 8, 9, of prosperity and *καλοκάγαθία* (honor, the union of the beautiful and the good); *Eth. Nic.*, X., of pleasure and happiness. That the so-called *Magna Moralia*, the shortest of these works, is not the oldest of them (as Schleiermacher believed), but that the Nicomachean Ethics (from which the citations in *Pol.*, II. 2, III. 9, and 12, IV. 41, VII. 1 and 13, are made) is the original work of Aristotle, while the Eudemian Ethics is a work of his pupil, Eudemus, based on the work of Aristotle, and that the *Magna Moralia* is an abstract from both, but principally from the Eudemian Ethics, has been almost universally allowed since Spengel's investigation of the subject (see above, p. 141); Barthélemy St. Hilaire, however (*Morale d'Aristote*, Paris, 1856), sees in the Eudemian Ethics not so much an original work of Eudemus, as rather a mere redaction of a series of lectures on Ethics by Aristotle, executed by one of his auditors (probably by Eudemus, who, it is supposed, wrote them down for his own use, as they were delivered); he is inclined to assign to the *Magn. Moral.* also the same date and kind of origin. But there can hardly be a doubt that this latter work belongs to a later period, such are the marks of Stoic influences in thought and terminology which it contains (see Ramsauer, *Zur Charakteristik der Magna Moralia* [*G.-Fr.*], Oldenburg, 1858, and Spengel, *Arist. Studien*, I., Munich, 1863, p. 17, and Trendelenburg, *Einige Belege für die nacharist. Abfassungszeit der Magna Mor.*, in his *Histor. Beitr.*, III. p. 433 seq.); the following citation contained in it (II. 6, 1201 b, 25): *ὥσπερ ἐφαπεν ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς*, is ground for the conjecture, that the author published it under the name of

Aristotle; still, other *Analytica* (paraphrases of the Aristotelian work) may be meant. Of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Spengel and Zeller, in particular, have shown that the author, though generally following Aristotle, has introduced original matter, which appears occasionally in the light of an intentional correction of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics appears to have been published after the death of Aristotle by his son Nicomachus. To which work the books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (*Nic.*, V.-VII., *Eud.*, IV.-VI.) originally belonged, is a matter of dispute. It may be shown, as well on internal grounds as from references in the *Politica*, that the first of these books (*Eth. Nic.*, V. = *Eth. Eudem.*, IV.)* was originally a part of the Nicomachean Ethics.† The present Book VI. of the *Nic. Eth.* (= B. V. of the *Eud.*) agrees in many respects better with the books belonging to the *Eud.* than with those which belong to the *Nic. Eth.* (cf. Alb. Max. Fischer, *De Eth. Nic. et Eud., diss. inaug.*, Bonn, 1847, and Fritzsche in his edition of the *Eud. Ethics*); yet at least a book of essentially similar content must have belonged originally to the *Nic. Eth.*, to which book Aristotle refers in *Metaph.*, I. 1, 981 b, 25. But the last of these identical books (*Eth. Nic.* VII. = *Eth. Eud.*, VI.) belongs very probably either wholly or at least in its last chapters (*Eth. Nic.*, VII. 12-15, which, like B. X. of the *Nic.*, though not altogether in the same sense, treats of pleasure) not to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and is also not to be viewed as an earlier draught of Aristotle's, but as a later revision, probably executed by Eudemus. The opusculum *περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* is probably spurious. The eight books of the *πολιτικά* join on to the Ethics. According to Barth. St. Hilaire and others the original order of the Books was I., II., III., VII., VIII., IV., VI., V.: yet the theory that Book V. and VI., have been made to exchange places, is improbable; Hildenbrand, Zeller, and others, oppose, while Spengel, and, in a recent work, Oncken (*Staatsl. des Arist.*, I. 98 seq.) defend it. That Books VII. and VIII. should follow immediately after III. is extremely probable, was long ago affirmed, among others, by Nicolas d'Oresme (died in 1382) and by Conring (who edited the Politics in 1656) to be the order intended by Aristotle. In B. I. Aristotle treats of the household, omitting, however, to give rules for the moral education and training of children, since these depend on the ends pursued by the state. In B. II. he criticises various philosophical ideals and existing forms of the state. In B. III. he discusses the conception of the state, and distinguishes, as the different possible forms of government, monarchy and

* With the possible exception of chs. 11, 12, 15.

† In the second half the order has been considerably disturbed. The section, c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23-1184 a, 15, must be misplaced; Hildenbrand conjectures that it belongs at the end of c. 8. This conjecture is opposed by the expression *εἰρηναίᾳ ἀνδρείῳ*, p. 1184 a, 24, which implies a greater separation from c. 8, and by the general plan evidently adopted by Aristotle in the whole work, in accordance with which the special and particularly the political bearings of each topic are not considered until each topic has been treated of in general terms; according to this method the passage in question should not come before c. 9, and perhaps not before c. 10. C. 15 must follow immediately after c. 13, and hence Zeller would place this chapter, with the exception of the last sentence, between cc. 12 and 13; but since c. 13 in respect of subject-matter (not formally, indeed; perhaps some words have fallen away from the beginning) joins on to c. 10 (Spengel asserts this conjecturally; Hermann Adolph Fechner, Hampke, and others are more positive), the correct order is rather to be restored by placing cc. 11 and 12 after 13 and 14. As the correct order, therefore, we would propose the following: cc. 8, 9, 10, excepting the section above indicated, 13, 14, then that section from c. 10, and finally 11, 12, 15. The defective arrangement may have arisen from the misplacement of a few leaves in an original codex. Originally, a leaf numbered, *a. g.*, *a.*, contained say c. 8 *post mod.* to c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23, leaf *a. + I.*, c. 10, 1185 a, 15 to c. 10, *An.*, p. 1186 a, 9, leaf *a. + II.*, c. 13 and 14, p. 1187 a, 4 to 1188 a, 8, leaf *a. + III.*, the passage now standing in c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23 to 1185 a, 15, leaf *a. + IV.*, cc. 11 and 12, p. 1186 a, 10 to 1187 a, 4, and, finally, leaf *a. + V.*, the conclusion of the whole book, c. 15, p. 1188 a, 4 to 1189 b, 14. The leaves then fell into the false order: *a. a. + III.*, *a. + I.*, *a. + IV.*, *a. + II.*, *a. + V.* The author of the *Magna Moralia* seems to have found this arrangement already existing. Perhaps at the place where this confusion arose, two books of the *Eud. Ethics* were inserted into the *Nic. Eth.* A different order is proposed by Trendelenburg, *Hist. Betr. sur Philos.*, III. pp. 418-425.

tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, *politiká* (a commonwealth of free citizens) and democracy. He then treats (III. 14-17) of the first of the above forms, which under certain conditions is reckoned by him as the best possible, and (III. 18, and its continuation: VII. and VIII.) of the good state, which is favored in respect of its external conditions, and is based on the supremacy of the best men, i. e., citizens who are virtuously educated. In Books IV. and V. follows the inquiry concerning the other forms of the state besides monarchy and aristocracy, B. V. being especially occupied with the investigation of the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; B. V. thus contains what, according to IV. 2, was to follow after the characterization and the description of the genesis of the different forms of the state, viz.: the science of Political Nology and Therapeutics. In B. VI. Aristotle treats supplementarily of the particular kinds of democracy and oligarchy and of the different offices in the state, the discussion having been very likely originally extended to other topics, including, in particular, the subject of laws. At least the second Book of the *Economics* is spurious. The *politeia*, a description of the constitution of some 158 states, is lost. The *Poetic* (*πρὸς ποικίλους*) is incomplete in its present form. The *Rhetoric*, in three books, has been preserved. The *Rhetor ad Alex.* is spurious (according to Spengel—who edited it in 1844—Victorinus, Buhle, and others, who found their rejection of it on Quintil., III. 4, 9).

The chronological order in which the works of rigidly philosophical form were written can be for the most part, though not in all instances, determined with certainty; the interest belonging to the investigation of this subject is rather one of method than of development, since Aristotle seems to have composed these works (except, perhaps, those on logic) during his second residence at Athens, hence at a time when his philosophical development was already substantially complete. Frequently one work is cited in another. But these citations are in so many cases reciprocal, that it is scarcely possible to infer any thing from them as to the historical sequence of the works; such inferences can be drawn with perfect certainty only when a work is announced as yet to be written. The logical writings were probably composed the earliest (in *Anal. Post.* II. 12, anticipatory reference is made to the *Physics*: *μᾶλλον δὲ φανερόν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου περὶ κινήσεως δεῖ λελθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν*), and in the following order: *Categories*, *Topica*, *Analytica*, and still later the *De Interpret.*, in which work the previous existence not only of the *Analytica*, but also of the *Psychology*, is affirmed by implication. Whether the *ethical* works (*Eth. Nic.* and *Polit.*) were written before (Rose) or after (Zeller) the physical and psychological, is questionable, though the former alternative is by far the more probable; *Eth. Nic.* I. 13, 1102 a, 26, presupposes only popular expositions of psychological problems (in the early dialogical works) and not the three books *περὶ ψυχῆς*, and VI. 4, *ἐκείν.*, points only to works of the same character on the difference between *ποιεῖν* and *πρᾶξις*; VI. 13, 1144 a, 9, on the contrary, appears to imply the previous existence of the *De Anima*; but this book was also apparently not written by Aristotle, but by Eudemus. Aristotle could compose his ethical works before his psychological works, because (according to *Eth. N.* I. 13), though θεωρητικὸν τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, yet this is necessary only ἐφ' ὅσον ἑαυτὸς ἐχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα, and ethics (*Eth. N.* II. 2) is not a purely scientific but a practical doctrine. The *Ethics* and *Politics* were followed by the *Poetic* (to which anticipatory reference is made, *Pol.*, VIII. 7), and the *Rhetoric* (which appears to be referred to, by anticipation, in *Eth.* II. 7, p. 1103 b, 6); according to *Rhet.* I. 11, p. 1372 a, 1; III. 2, p. 1404 b, 7, the *Poetic* preceded the *Rhetoric*. That the *Rhet.* was composed immediately after the logical works (Rose) is scarcely to be credited; it must have been preceded not only by the logical but also by the ethico-political works, in accordance with the Aristotelian dicta, *Rhet.* I. 2, 1356 a, 25, and 4, 1359 b, 9: τὸν ῥητορικὸν οἶον παραφύκει τὴν διαλεκτικὴν εἶναι καὶ τῇ περὶ

τὰ ἕδη πραγματείας ἢ διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ προσηγορεύειν πολιτικῆς, καὶ ἡ βιογραφικὴ ἀναγίνεται ἐκ τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐκπονήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἕδη πολιτικῆς. The works relating to physics were composed in the following order: *Acacul. physicae*, *De Codo*, *De Gener. et Corr.*, *Meteorologias*; then followed the works relating to organic nature and *psychical life*. That the *Metaphysics* is of later date than the *Physics* (which Rose incorrectly places after the former) follows with certainty from *Phys.*, I. 9, p. 192 a, 36: τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐστὶ διαρίσαι, ὥστε εἰς ταῖς τὸν καιρὸν ἀνακρίσθω; in it the *Analytics*, *Ethics*, and *Physics* are cited. According to the statement of Asclepius (*Schol. in Arist.*, p. 519 b, 33), the *Metaph.* was not first edited immediately after the death of Aristotle by Eudemus, to whom Aristotle is said to have sent it, but very much later, from an imperfect copy, which was completed by additions from other Aristotelian works. From this review it results inductively that Aristotle advanced in a strictly methodical manner in the composition of his works from the πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς to the πρότερον φέβει, in accordance with the didactic requirement, to which, with special reference to logic (analytics) and metaphysics (first philosophy), he gives expression in *Met.*, IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 4, namely, that one must be familiar with the former before "hearing" the latter.

According to Strabo (XIII. 1, 54) and Plutarch (*Vit. Sull.*, ch. 26) a strange fortune befell the works of Aristotle in the two centuries following the death of Theophrastus. The whole of the extensive library of Aristotle, including his own works, came first into the possession of Theophrastus, who left them to his pupil, Neleus of Skepsis in Troas; after his death they passed into the hands of his relatives in Troas, who, fearing lest the princes of Pergamus might seek to take them away for their own library, concealed them in a cellar or pit (διάρυς), where they suffered considerable injury from dampness. According to Athenaeus, *Deipnos.*, I. 3, this same library had been acquired by purchase for the Alexandrian Library in the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus; but this, at least, can not be true of the original MSS. of Arist. and Theophrastus. These manuscripts were finally discovered (about 100 B. C.) by Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy bibliophile, who bought them and carried them to Athens; he sought as well as possible to fill up the gaps, and gave the works to the public. Soon afterward, at the taking of Athens by the Romans (86 B. C.), the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sulla. A grammarian named Tyrannion, from Amisos in Pontus (on him see Planer, *De Tyrannione grammatico*, Berlin, 1852), made use of them, and from him Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic, received copies, on the basis of which he (about 70 B. C.) set on foot a new edition of the works of Aristotle, and drew up a catalogue of them. Strabo brings the narrative, at least in the text of the *Geographica* as we now possess it, only down to Tyrannion; what relates to Andronicus is found in Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch assume that in the period preceding their discovery by Apellicon, the principal works of Aristotle were inaccessible to students, or, in other words, that they existed only in the original manuscripts, and thus they explain the deviation of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle in doctrine; and by the numerous hiatuses in the badly disfigured manuscripts, which no one knew how to fill out correctly, they explain the unfortunate condition of the text of Aristotle in later times. But the supposition that all the philosophical works of Aristotle remained concealed from the public after the death of Aristotle is in itself scarcely credible, and is refuted by the traces (which Brandis, Spengel, Stahl, Zeller, and others have, with more or less of success, pointed out) of an acquaintance with some of the most important of the strictly philosophical works of Aristotle in the third and second centuries before Christ. The depictions of Strabo and Plutarch respecting the fortune of the manuscripts are, however, of unquestionable authority, and it is quite possible that not only some rough draughts made by Aristotle, which were not intended for publication, but also some of the larger

works, in particular the *Metaphysics*, and perhaps also the *Politica* were first made public after their discovery by Apellicon. (This is asserted in reference to the *Psychology* by E. Esen, in his *Der Keller zu Skepsis*, Stargard, 1866; the supposition is possible, that in the twofold recension in which parts of the second Book of the *Psychology* have come down to us, and in which perhaps the entire work at one time existed, we possess, on the one hand, the form which the work received from Alexandrian tradition, and, on the other, the form in which it appeared after its revision by Andronicus; still, it appears more probable that the one form is the Aristotelian, and that the other is the paraphrase of some Aristotelian.) The theory that several of the chief philosophical works of Aristotle were unknown in the time from Theophrastus and Nelenus to Apellicon and Andronicus, receives a certain confirmation from the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. L., V. 22-27, in case this list was (as Nietzsche argues) not derived from the work of Andronicus on the works of Aristotle, but, through the works of Demetrius Magnes, and Diocles, from the work of Hermippus the Callimachean (at least, for the most part, and aside from certain additions taken from authorities belonging to the time after Andronicus).

The edition set on foot by Andronicus gave new life to the study of the works of Aristotle. The Peripatetics of the following period distinguished themselves particularly as paraphrasts and commentators, as did also several of the Neo-Platonists, such as Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. From the Greeks the writings of Aristotle passed (with the exception of the dialogical works, which were suffered to perish) into the hands of the Syrians and Arabians (see below, §§ 95 and 96). In the Christian schools some of the logical works of Aristotle and various expositions of the Aristotelian Logic by Boëthius and others, were employed as text-books; St. Augustine's recommendation of dialectic served as an authority for their use. The principal works of Aristotle on logic were, however, not known even to the Scholastics until about the middle of the twelfth century, and then only in Latin translations. In the second half of the twelfth and in the course of the thirteenth century the physical, metaphysical, and ethical writings of Aristotle became also known in the Western world, at first (until near the year 1226) only through the agency of the Arabs, but afterward by means of direct translations from the Greek (see below, § 98); some works, in particular, the *Politica*, in place of which the Arabians knew only of spurious works on the same subject, became known only through the latter channel. The translations from the Arabian are distorted to the extent of being completely unintelligible; the direct translations from the Greek, and especially the translation of all or, at least, of very many of the works of Aristotle, which was made in about 1260-1270 by Wilhelm von Moerbeke, by request of Thomas Aquinas, are executed with such literal fidelity, as in many instances to enable us to infer from their form what was the reading of Codices on which they are based, but they are done without taste and not unfrequently express no meaning. The reading of the physical writings of Aristotle was forbidden in 1209 by a Provincial Council at Paris, on account of the doctrine of the eternity of the world and some other doctrines which they contained, but which, in fact, were misconceived and misrepresented; the reading of the physical and metaphysical writings was prohibited in 1215, by Robert of Courçon, the papal legate, on the occasion of his sanctioning the statutes of the University of Paris. This prohibition, which was renewed in a limited form in April, 1231, by Pope Gregory IX., remained formally in force until the year 1237 (according to the testimony of Roger Bacon, as cited by Emile Charles, *Roger Bacon*, Paris, 1861, pp. 314 and 412). But soon afterward, the judgment of the church concerning the works of Aristotle became more favorable. The Scholastics from this time on, depended, in philosophical respects, chiefly on the authority of Aristotle, although not abstaining from modifying in a measure some of his doctrines. In par-

secular, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which became the prevalent philosophy among the teachers of the church, was Aristotelianism, and even other Scholastic systems, as those of Scotus and Occam, which were opposed to the system of St. Thomas, remained substantially true to the teaching of Aristotle. In 1254 the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle were included among the topics to be taught by the Faculty of Arts at Paris. The *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle were likewise held in high estimation, although the *Politics* at least was studied with less zeal. At the revival of classical studies in the fifteenth century the renewal of Platonism detracted somewhat from the prestige and authority of Aristotle. Still the study of Aristotle received an essential impulse from the extending knowledge of the Greek language. New translations of his works, more correct, more intelligible, and expressed in purer Latin, supplanted the old ones, and soon numerous Latin and Greek editions of his works were published. At the Protestant universities the works of Aristotle were zealously studied, owing especially to the influence of Melancthon. In the sixteenth century nearly all of the works of Aristotle were frequently edited, translated, and commentated; in the seventeenth century considerably fewer, and during the greater part of the eighteenth century, with few exceptions, almost none. But toward the end of the eighteenth century a new interest in these works was awakened, an interest which still continues and seems even to be constantly increasing, and which manifests itself in numerous (above-cited) literary works.

§ 47. The divisions of philosophy, according to Aristotle, are theoretical, practical, and poetic. Theoretical philosophy is the scientific cognition of the existent, the end of the cognition being found in itself. Practical philosophy is that form of knowledge which relates to action or conduct, and which prescribes rules for the latter. Poetic philosophy is a form of knowledge having reference to the shaping of material, or to the technically correct and artistic creation of works of art. Theoretical philosophy, again, is subdivided into mathematics, physics, and "first philosophy" (ontology or metaphysics).

The analytical and dialectical investigations (in the "Organon") were apparently intended as a methodological propædæutic to philosophy, and not as a body of properly philosophical doctrine. Aristotle's conduct of them is, however, none the less for this reason strictly scientific.

The various species of mental representations and of "dicta" (or parts of speech) correspond, according to Aristotle, with definite forms of that which exists. The most universal forms of existence are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, passion. The forms of representations, and so of possible affirmations or "dicta respecting the existent," which are conditioned by these forms of the representable, are termed by Aristotle categories. The concept should represent the real essence of

the objects included under it. Truth in a logical judgment is the correspondence of the combination of mental representations with a combination of things, or (in the case of the negative judgment) the correspondence of a separation of representations in the mind with a separation of things; falsity in judgments is the variation of the ideal combination or separation from the real relation of the things to which the judgments relate. Inference, or the derivation of one judgment from others, has two forms, the syllogism, which descends from the universal to the particular, and induction, which rises to the universal from a comparison of the single and particular. A scientific inference or a proof is an inference from true and certain principles; a dialectical inference is a tentative inference from what appears true or even from mere (uncertain) indications; a sophistical inference is a paralogism or fallacy, depending on false premises or deceptive combination. The principle of contradiction and excluded middle is with Aristotle an ultimate metaphysical and logical principle, on which the possibility of demonstration and of all certain knowledge depends. Principles are known immediately by the reason. The prior and more knowable for us is the sensible, or that which in the order of conceptions is less general and hence less removed from the sphere of sensuous perception; but the really prior and more knowable are the principles, or at least those conceptions which are least removed in point of generality from principles.

Of the more modern works on the whole System of Aristotle may be named: Franz Biese, *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Vol. I, Logic and Metaphysics; Vol. II, The Special Sciences), Berlin, 1838-43; Chr. Aug. Brandis, *Aristoteles, seine akademischen Zeitgenossen und nächsten Nachfolger*, Berlin, 1858-57, or 2d div. of the 2d part of his *Handbuch der Gesch. der Griech.-Röm. Philos.*, and *Uebersicht über das Arist. Lehrgebäude*, 1st div. of the 8d part, Berlin, 1860; Ed. Zeller, *Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker*, Tübingen, 1861, 2d div. of the 2d part of the 2d ed. of his "*Philos. der Griechen*." Ch. Thurot (*Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860) treats of the Politics, Dialectic, and Rhetoric of Aristotle. Cf. F. Meunier, *Ar. a-t-il eu deux doctrines, l'une accessible, l'autre secrète?* Paris, 1864. Otto Caspari's *Die Irrthümer der ultiolem. Philosophie in ihrer Bedeutung für das philos. Princip* (Heidelberg, 1868) treats principally of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and in particular of the theory of ideas and the theory of knowledge. [Thomas Taylor, *Disc. on the Philos. of Aristotle*, London, 1818.—Tr.]

Of special works relating to the Aristotelian Logic may be named: F. J. C. Francke, *De Arist. de argumentandi modis, qui recedunt a perfecta syllogismi forma*, Rostock, 1834; Car. Weinholdt, *De Finibus atque Prelo Logicæ Aristotelicæ*, ib., 1835; Ad. Trendelenburg, *De Arist. categoriis proinde academicis*, Berlin, 1838, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, ib., 1846, pp. 1-195, 209-217, *Elementa logicae Aristotelicæ*, ib., 1854, 6th ed., 1866, *Erläuterungen zur Arist. Logik*, Berlin, 1864, 2d ed., 1861 (cf. on these works Max Schmidt and G. H. Heldtmann, in the *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, V. VI. VII. 1851-'56); Phil. Gassepoeh, *Ueber die Logik und die logischen Schriften des Aristoteles*, Leipzig, 1839; Herm. Rassow, *Aristoteles de notionis definitionis doctrina*, Berlin, 1848; H. Hettner, *De logica Aristotelica specialissime principio*, Halle, 1848; Car. Kühn, *De notionis definitionis qualem Arist. constituerit*, Halle, 1844; A. Vera, *Platonis, Aristotelis et Hegelii de medio terminis doctrina*, Paris, 1845; A. L. Gastmann, *De methodo philos. Arist.*, Göttingen, 1845; C. L. W. Heyder, *Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegel'schen Dialektik* (1 Bd., 1 Abth.: *die Methodologie der Arist. Philos. und der früheren Systeme*), Erlangen, 1845; G. Ph. Chr. Kaiser, *De logica Pauli Apostoli logica Aristotelica*

mundestrates (Progr.), Erlangen, 1847; Carl Prantl, *Ueber die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie*, in the *Abh. der Bair. Akad. der Wiss., hist.-phil. Classe*, Vol. VII., part 1st, pp. 129-211, Munich, 1888 (cf. the sections on the same topic in Prantl's *Gesch. der Logik*); H. Bonitz, *Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles*, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akad. der Wiss., hist.-philol. Cl.*, Vol. X., 1858, pp. 59-645; A. F. C. Kersten, *Quo jure Kantius Arist. categorias rejecerit* (Progr. of the *Realschule*, at Cologne), Berlin, 1888; E. Emsen, *Die Definition nach Aristoteles* (G.-Pr.), Stargard, 1864; J. Hermann, *Quas Arist. de ultimis cognoscendi principis docuerit*, Berlin, 1864; *Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistic Elenchi, with a translation and notes*, by Edward Poste, London, 1866; [*The Logic of Science, a treatise of the Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Introduct. and Notes*, by the same, London.—Tr.]; Willh. Schuppe, *Die Arist. Kategorien* (in the "Progr." of the Gleiwitz Gymn. on the occasion of the celebration of the founding of the institution, April 29, 1866), Gleiwitz, 1866; A. Wentzke, *Die Kategorien des Urtheils im Anschluss an Arist., erläutert und begründet* (G.-Pr.), Culm, 1868; Friedr. Zelle, *Der Unterschied in der Auffassung der Logik bei Arist. und bei Kant*, Berlin, 1870; Friedr. Kamppe, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des Arist.*, Leipzig, 1870.

Of the *Aristotelian conception* of philosophy we have treated above (p. 3 seq.). We find a division of the system of philosophy, not very different from that adopted by Plato in the *Topics* (I. 14, p. 105 b, 19): "Philosophical problems and theorems are either ethical, physical, or logical (*ἠθικά, φυσικά, or λογικά*)," where by "logical" theorems are to be understood such as have a universal reference, or in which the specifically physical or ethical character is left out of consideration; theorems, in other words, which belong to metaphysics (or ontology). But this division is given here by Aristotle only as a provisional sketch (*ὡς τίτω περιλαβεῖν*). Where Aristotle expresses his opinion more exactly, he divides philosophy (in the sense of scientific knowledge in general) in the manner indicated at the beginning of this paragraph, *Metaph.*, VI. 1: *πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ*. *Metaph.*, XI. 7: *ὅλον γοῖν, ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐστὶ· φυσικῇ, μαθηματικῇ, θεολογικῇ* (the latter identical with *πρώτῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ*, which with Aristotle culminates in theology). To each of the different branches of philosophy Aristotle assigns a definite rank, the first place being given to the theoretical sciences. Of these latter, again, he pronounces "theology" (*θεολογική*) to be the highest, because it has the highest of objects—following the principle, that the value of each science is in accordance with the value of its peculiar object: *βελτίον δὲ καὶ χεῖρον ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστηνόν* (*Metaph.*, XI. 7). Aristotelians divided practical philosophy into Ethics (in the narrower sense), Economics, and Politics (*ἠθ. Eudem.*, I. 8: *πολιτικῇ, οἰκονομικῇ καὶ φρόνησις*), and in like manner Aristotle (*ἠθ. Nic.*, VI. 9) co-ordinates *οἰκονομία* and *πολιτεία* with *φρόνησις* (moral insight, on which morality in the individual is held to depend). But where he defines himself more exactly, Aristotle describes Economics, together with Rhetoric and Generalship, as sciences auxiliary to Politics. By Politics, in the broader sense of the term, Aristotle understands the whole of the ethical sciences, among which Ethics and the Doctrine of the State (Politics in the narrower sense) are included (*ἠθ. N.*, I. 1; X. 10; *Rhet.*, I. 2). Poetic philosophy in its general conception is equivalent with Aristotle to technology in general, i. e., the doctrine of shapes or images in any material; but the special doctrine of the "imitative" arts, regarded in its philosophical bearings, is the same with our modern "Æsthetics," of which only the theory of Poetry (Poetics) was actually worked out by Aristotle. As Logic in the modern sense, or the Aristotelian Analytics, has no place in this division, Aristotle may be supposed to have regarded it only as a propædæutic doctrine. With this agrees his above-cited declaration (*Met.*, IV. 2) of the necessity of being acquainted with it before studying metaphysics, a declaration which indeed places logic in a propædæutic relation only to metaphysics (and in so far favors the supposition that Aristotle included it in *πρώτῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ*, as a formal introduction to the same), but which implies, nevertheless, a like propædæutic relation to ethics and physics, in so far as the logical method, with which the student of philosophy must be

previously familiar, is not only the method of metaphysics, but also of every philosophical discipline, including, therefore, ethics and physics. (This method is, of course, also the method of logic itself; on the circle thus resulting and its solution, cf. my *System of Logic*, § 4.)

The *Analytics* of Aristotle (together with the other works accompanying it) contain an exposition of the forms of inference and of cognitive thought in general, thought being resolved, as it were, into content and form, and the latter being made the special subject of consideration. Truth in knowledge is the agreement of knowledge with reality (*Categ.*, c. 12: τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὺς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὺς λέγεται). This dictum is thus particularized, in *Met.*, IV. 7, with reference to the various possible cases: "Affirming non-existence of the existent, or existence of the non-existent, is falsehood; but affirming existence of the existent, and non-existence of the non-existent, is truth." As the content, so also the forms of thought are viewed by Aristotle in their relation to reality. The various kinds of words or of expressions, considered apart from all grammatical connection (τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα, *De Cat.*, c. 4), represent so many ways of making "affirmations concerning the existent," or so many categories (γέννη τῶν κατηγοριῶν, κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος or τῶν ὄντων), and denote, accordingly, either 1) substance (οὐσία or τί ἐστι), as examples of which Aristotle mentions man, horse, or 2) quantity (ποσόν), e. g., two or three yards long, or 3) quality (ποιόν), e. g., white, grammatical, or 4) relation (πρός τι), e. g., double, half, greater, or 5) place (πού), e. g., in the Lyceum, in the market-place, or 6) time (πότε), e. g., yesterday, last year, or 7) position (κεῖσθαι), e. g., lies, sits, or 8) possession (ἔχειν), e. g., is shod, armed, or 9) action (ποιεῖν), e. g., cuts, burns, or 10) passion (πάσχειν), e. g., is cut, burnt. The correspondence of the forms of speech with the forms of being is expressly affirmed by Aristotle (*Metaph.*, V. 7: ὁσαυχὺς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταυχὺς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει). The forms of representations (or categories) and the parts of speech being alike conditioned on the forms of existence, the former correspond with the latter. Thus, in particular (according to Trendelenburg), the category of Substance corresponds with the Substantive (ὄνομα), while the other categories, collectively, correspond with the ῥήμα, in the wider sense (of Predicate) in which Aristotle employs this term; and, more particularly, the categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation with the Adjective and Numeral and certain Adverbs, the categories of place and time with the Adverbs (or Adverbial Expressions) of place and time, the category of Position with the Intransitive Verb, that of Possession with the Perf. Pass., that of Action with the Active Verb, and that of Passion with the Pass. Verb. While, however, this correspondence exists in a measure *de facto*, it is less evident that it was expressly indicated by Aristotle; least of all is it certain that the Aristotelian categories arose from the observation of the different parts of speech. The theory of the parts of speech is in its first beginnings with Aristotle, and was first developed by later writers; besides, the correspondence in question is not in all respects exact (Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, II. 2, 2d ed., p. 190 seq.). Aristotle seems to have had in view more the parts of the sentence than the different kinds of words, or rather he seems not yet to have distinguished between the two. (Cf., on the relation of the forms of reality to the forms of representations and the parts of speech, in the Aristotelian theory of categories, Ueberweg, *System der Logik*, § 47, 2d ed., Bonn, 1865, p. 92.) In all the works of Aristotle composed after the *De Cat.* (supposing this to be genuine) and the *Topica*, the number of categories is reduced from ten to eight, *κεῖσθαι* and *ἔχειν* being omitted, probably because Aristotle found that both might be subsumed under other categories. So *Anal. Post.*, I. 22, p. 83 a, 21 and b, 15 (in which latter passage there can be no doubt that a full enumeration was intended), *Phys.* V. 1 (where likewise completeness is necessarily implied), and *Met.*, V. 7. Prantl, in his *Gesch. der Logik* (I. p. 207), gives a schematized harmony of all

the passages in Aristotle where categories are mentioned. According to Prantl (p. 209), the essential import of the doctrine of categories is perceived, when we regard it, not as a complete enumeration of the forms of existence and thought, but as an expression of the truth that substance (*οὐσία*) appears, determined in respect of space and time (*ποῦ, ποτέ*) and quality (*ποιόν*), in the world of things numerable and measurable (*ποσόν*), and that within the sphere of manifold existence it shows itself active according to its determinate character (*ποιεῖν, πάσχειν, πρὸς τι*). In *Analyt. Post.*, I. 22, all the other categories are contrasted with Substance, as accidents (*συμβεβηκότα*). In *Met.*, XIV. 2, p. 1089 b, 23, three classes are distinguished: τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, substances, attributes, and relations. *Οὐσία*, as a category, denotes the independent, the substantial. But in another sense it signifies the essential; this latter is the object of the concept (*λόγος*). The concept is an expression of the essence of the objects which it denotes (*λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*, *Cat.*, 1; ὁ λόγος τὴν οὐσίαν ὀρίει, *De Part. Anim.*, IV. 5), and the essence corresponds to the concept (ἡ κατὰ λόγον οὐσία). That, in any thing, which is extraneous to the essence (*οὐσία*) of the thing—which exists, so to speak, as an appendage to the essence—is accidental (*συμβεβηκός*). Accidents are of two kinds, some being necessarily connected with the essential, so that we can deduce them apodictically from the latter, and others being not thus deducible; the former belong to the object, in which they inhere, as such, or to the conception of the object (*συμβεβηκός καθ' αὐτό*; thus it is a necessary accident of the triangle that the sum of all its angles should be equal to two right angles); the latter are truly accidental (*συμβεβηκός* in the ordinary sense). In Definition (*ὁρισμός*) we cognize the essence of the thing defined (*Anal. Post.*, II. 3). Through the combination (*συνπλοκή*) of representations determined according to the specified categories arise the Judgment and its expression, the Proposition (*ἀπόφανσις*), which latter may be either an affirmation (*κατάφασις*) or a negation (*ἀπόφασις*). Every proposition is necessarily either true or false; not so are the uncombined elements of the proposition (*De Cat.*, c. 4). Hence the Principle of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or Middle, in its logical form (*De Cat.*, c. 10): "Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing, the one is always false, the other true;" *Met.*, IV. 7: "Between the two terms of a contradiction there is no mean; it is necessary either to affirm or to deny every predicate of every subject." The metaphysical or ontological form of the principle of contradiction (i. e., as applied to Being itself), on which the validity of the logical form depends, is thus expressed (*Metaph.*, IV. 3): τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, "The same thing can not at the same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same thing." Of the principle in this form, no proof, according to Aristotle, is possible, but only a subjective conviction, that no one can deny it in thought. Τὸ ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι [the principle of excluded middle] is expressly declared by Aristotle (*Anal. Post.*, I. 11) to be the principle of indirect proof. He defines the Syllogism (*Top.*, I. 1; cf. *Anal. Pri.*, I. 1) as a form of ratiocination, in which, from certain premises and through the force of those premises, there follows necessarily a conclusion different from the premises (ἐστὶ δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἑτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων). He assumes (*Anal. Pri.*, I. 4-6, cf. 32; cf. the citations ad § 103 in my *System of Logic*) three syllogistic figures, according as the middle term (*ὅρος μέσος*) is either subject in one of the premises (*προτάσεις*) and predicate in the other (first figure), or predicate in both premises (second figure), or subject in both (third figure). A syllogism which is correct in form has either apodictic or dialectic validity, according to the relation of the premises to objective truth. *Top.*, I. 1: "Ἀπόδειξις [real demonstration] takes place when we conclude from true and ultimate premises, or at least from premises which have been proved true on the ground of other true and

ultimate premises; the Dialectic Syllogism, on the contrary, concludes *ἐξ ἐνδοξων* . . . and *ἐνδοξα* are principles which appear true to the mass of men, or to the educated, or to individuals whose opinion is specially worthy of respect." An additional form of inference is the Eristic Syllogism, which concludes from premises having only an apparent or alleged, but no real probability. With the dialectical syllogism agrees, in the want of a strictly scientific or apodictical character, the Rhetorical Syllogism, but it differs from the former in its use, the former being an instrument of examination, while the latter (which concludes "from probabilities or signs," and produces only a subjective conviction—*ἐξ εἰρηρῶν καὶ σημείων*) is an instrument of persuasion. In the province of demonstration rhetoric occupies the same place as dialectic in the province of examination, inasmuch as each is conversant with material which in some sense is the property of all men, and which belongs to no particular science (*κοινὰ τρόπον τὰν ἀνάντων ἐντὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστήμης ἀφορισμένης*), and as each deals only with the probable, whence Rhetoric forms the natural counterpart of Dialectic (*Rhet. I. 1: ἡ ρητορικὴ ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ*, cf. Cic., *Orat.*, c. 32: *quasi ex altera parte respondens dialecticæ*; Dialectic teaches *ἐξετάζειν καὶ ἐπὶ χεῖν λόγον*, and Rhetoric *ἀπολογισθῆναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν*). A form of investigation akin to the dialectical is the logical, i. e., the investigation of a topic in the light of universal conceptions alone (especially in the light of metaphysical conceptions, or such as belong to "first philosophy"), in distinction from that method which looks rather to the particular or to that which is peculiar (*οἰκεῖον*) to the subject of investigation, and which, therefore, in the department of physics, "investigates physically" (*φυσικῶς ζητεῖν*, *De Gen. et Corr.*, 316 a, 10, cf. ed.), in the department of analytics, "analytically" (*ἀναλυτικῶς ζητεῖν*), etc. (See Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860, p. 118 seq.) The Middle Term in that syllogism which is most important as an instrument of cognition, corresponds with and expresses an objective cause (*Analyt. Post.*, II. 2: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰτῶν τὸ μέσον*, cf. my *Syst. of Logic*, § 101). In Induction (*ἐπαγωγή*, ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς) we conclude from the observation that a more general concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter (*Anal. Pri.*, II. 23). Induction leads from the particular to the universal (*ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος*, *Top.*, I. 10). The term *ἐπαγωγή*, for Induction, suggests the ranging of particular cases together in files, like troops. The Complete Induction, according to Aristotle, is the only strictly scientific induction; the Incomplete Induction, which with a syllogism subjoined constitutes the Analogical Inference (*παράδειγμα*), is principally of use to the orator. Considered absolutely, the Syllogism proper, which arrives through the middle term at the major term as the predicate of the minor (*ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμὸς*), is more rigorous, prior in nature, and more demonstrative (*φύσει πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος*, *Anal. Pri.*, II. 23; *βαστακώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον*, *Top.*, I. 13); but the Inductive Syllogism easier for us to understand (*ἡμῖν ἐναργέστερος*, *Anal. Pri.*, II. 23; *πρόσθετον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν*, *Top.*, I. 12). Universally, "the prior and more cognizable for us" is what lies nearest to the sphere of sensation, but "the absolutely prior and more cognizable" is what is most remote from that sphere (*Analyt. Post.*, I. 2: *πρὸς ἡμῶς μὲν πρότερον καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερον καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὰ πορρώτερον*). The limits of knowledge are, on the one hand, the individual, on the other, the most general. In itself it is better—because more scientific—to pass from the "prior in nature" to the "prior for us," from the condition to the conditioned; but for those who can not follow this order, the inverse one must be employed (*Top.*, VI. 4). The most general principles are insusceptible of demonstration, because all (direct) demonstration presupposes, as its basis or premise, something more general than that which is to be proved; and some-

thing, also, which must be at least as obvious and certain, or even more so, than the thing to be proved; the most general truths, therefore, must be *immediately* certain (*Anal. Post.*, I. 2; cf. my *System of Logic*, § 135). The absolutely first truths in science must consist of indemonstrable definitions (*τὰ πρῶτα ὁρισμοὶ εἰσὶν ἀναπόδεικτοι*, *Anal. Post.*, II. 3). These principles (as they are called, or *ἀρχαί*) are the objects of reason (*νοῦς*); whatever is universally and necessarily derived from them is the object of science (*ἐπιστήμη*), while opinion (*δόξα*), whose characteristic is instability (*ἀβέβαιον*), is concerned with whatever is subject to variation (*Anal. Post.*, I. 33; II. 19).

§ 48. In the "First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently termed, the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, the principles common to all spheres of reality are considered. The number of these principles, as given by Aristotle, is four, viz.: Form or Essence, Matter or Substratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The principle of Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as the Platonic) view, that the Ideas exist for themselves apart from the concrete objects which are copied from them, affirming, however, on his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As the one apart from and *beside* the many the Idea does not exist; none the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present in the many. The word substance (*οὐσία*) in its primary and proper signification belongs to the concrete and individual; only in a secondary sense can it be applied to the Genus. But although the universal has no independent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in worth and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature and the proper subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common notion, but only of such notions as represent the Essential in the individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the specific attributes; they represent the essential Form, to denote which Aristotle employs the expressions *εἶδος*, *μορφή*, ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία and *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* [form, intelligible or notional essence.—*Tr.*]. The matter in which form inheres is not absolutely non-existent; it exists as possibility or capacity (*δύναμις*, *potentia*). Form, on the contrary, is the accomplishment, the realization (*ἐντελέχεια*, *ἐνέργεια*, *actus*) of this possibility. Relatively, however, matter may be styled non-existent, in so far as it denotes the as yet uneffectuated existence of the finished shape or thing (in which form and matter are united). The opposite of entelechy or actuality is deprivation, want, non-possession (*στέρησις*).

No matter exists altogether deprived of form; the idea of mere matter is a pure abstraction. But there does exist an immaterial form-principle, and this principle is the form which has "separable" or independent existence (*χωριστόν*), in distinction from the inseparable forms which inhere in matter. Form, in the organic creation, is at once form, end, and moving cause. Matter is the passive, determinable factor, and is the ultimate source of imperfection in things. But it is also the principle of individuation in things, form being not (as Plato asserts) the ground of unity, but only of homogeneous plurality. Motion or change (*κίνησις*) is the passage of potentiality into reality. All motion implies an actual moving cause. Now, in the sphere of existence we find included that which is perpetually moved and that which both moves and is moved; there exists, therefore, a *tertium quid*, which is always imparting motion but is itself unmoved. This *tertium* is God, the immaterial and eternal Form, the pure Actuality in which is no potentiality, the self-thinking Reason or absolute Spirit, who, as absolutely perfect, is loved by all, and into the image of whose perfection all things seek to come.

Scholia graeca in Arist. Metaphysica ed., Ch. A. Brandis, Berlin, 1887. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis commentarius in libros Metaphys. Arist.*, rec. Herm. Bonitz, Berlin, 1847.

On the metaphysical principles of Aristotle, as compared with those of Plato, the following authors may be consulted: Chr. Herm. Weisse, *De Platonis et Aristotelis in constituendis summis philos. principis differentia*, Leipzig, 1828; M. Carrière, *De Aristotele Platonis amico ejusque doctrinas justo censore*, Gött. 1887; Th. Waltz, *Plato und Aristoteles*, in the Transactions of the 8th Reunion of German philologists at Cassel, 1848; F. Michell, *De Aristotele Platonis in idearum doctrina adversarie*, Braunsberg, 1864; cf. Ed. Zeller, *Plat. Studien* (Tüb. 1887, pp. 197-800: On Aristotle's account of Plato's Philosophy), Ueberweg, *Platon. Untersuchungen* (Vienna, 1861, pp. 177-180), and W. Rosenkranz, *Die Plat. Ideenlehre und ihre Bekämpfung durch Aristoteles*, Mayence, 1869 (reprinted from Rosenkranz's *Wissenschaft des Wissens*, Mayence, 1868-1869). F. Brentano treats of the various significations of existence according to Aristotle (*Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1862). G. v. Hertling treats of the Aristotelian conception of the *One* (in a *Dias. Berl.*, Freiburg, 1864). Osc. Weissenfels, *De casu et substantia Arist. (dias. inaug.)*, Berlin, 1866. K. G. Michell, *Zur Erklärung von Arist. Metaph. Z., 9 (G.-Pr.)*, Neu-Strelitz, 1866. G. Heyne, *De Arist. casu et contingenti (dias. inaug.)*, Halle, 1866. On the form-principle, see F. A. Trendelenburg (*ὅτι ἐστὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ὅτι τί ἔστιν εἶναι* des Aristoteles, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, II. 1828, p. 457 seq.; cf. T.'s edition of the *De Anima*, pp. 192 seq., 471 seq.; *Gesch. der Kategorienlehre*, p. 84 seq.); see also the works by Biese, Heyder, Kühn, Lassow, Waltz, and Schwegler, already cited (the passages bearing on this subject are indicated by Schwegler in his edition of Aristotle's *Met.*, Vol. IV, p. 369 seq.), and C. Th. Anton, *De discriminatione inter Aristotelicum τί ἐστὶν et τί ἔστιν εἶναι (Progr.)*, Gölitz, 1847. A. de Roalder, *Les Pensées du jour et d'Aristotele, traité des trois substantiels*, Meaux, 1868. On the Aristotelian expression ὅτι ἔστιν εἶναι (which points to the substratum, or ὑποκείμενον, e. g.: ὅτι ἔστιν εἶναι περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐόντι, "whatever it may be [i. e., any object, such as a stone, a piece of wood, a point] that is involved in progressive motion"), see Ad. Torstrik, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, new series, XII. 1857, pp. 161-178. G. Engel writes of the εἶναι of Arist. in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, VII. 1860, pp. 391-418. On the *Entelechy* of Aristotle, see J. P. F. Anillon, *Recherches critiques et philosophiques sur l'entéléchie d'Aristote*, in the Transactions of the Berlin Acad. of Sciences, Philos. Class, 1804-11. On the Aristotelian doctrine of necessity, works have been published by Ferd. Küttner (*Dias.*, Berlin, 1858), and Eng. Pappenheim (*Dias. Halensis*, Berlin, 1856). Of his doctrine of *finality* treat M. Carrière (*Teleologiae Arist. Elementa*, Berlin, 1858), and Gustav Schneider

(*Quæ sit causæ finalis apud Arist. vis atque natura, diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1864, and more fully in his *De Causæ finalis Aristotelis*, Berlin, 1865; cf. Trendelenburg, *Log. Unterricht*, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1862, II. p. 65 seq.).

The *Theology* of Aristotle is discussed by Vater (*Vindictas theologias Arist.*, Halle, 1795), Simon (*De deo Arist.*, Paris, 1839), Kriehke (*Forschungen*, I. pp. 253-311), C. Zell (*De Arist. patrum religionum aestimator*, Heidelberg, 1947; *Arist. in seinem Verhältnis zur griech. Staatsreligion*, in *Festschriften*, new series, Vol. I, Heidelberg, 1857, pp. 291-392; *Das Verhältnis der Arist. Philos. zur Religion*, Mayence, 1863), E. Reinhold (*Arist. theologia contra falsam Hegelianam interpretationem defenditur*, Jena, 1848), O. H. Weichert (*Theologumena Aristotelis*, Berlin, 1852), F. v. Reinöhl (*Darstellung des Arist. Gottesbegriffs und Vergleichung desselben mit dem Platonischen*, Jena, 1854), A. L. Kym (*Die Gotteslehre des Aristoteles und das Christenthum*, Zurich, 1862), J. P. Romang (*Die Gottesl. des Ar. u. d. Chr.*, in the *Protest. Kirchenzeitung*, 1862, No. 42), F. G. Starke (*Aristotelis de unitate Dei sententia* [G.-Pr.], Neu-Ruppin, 1864), L. F. Goetz (*Der Arist. Gottesbegriff*, contained in *Festschrift, den alten Tricentum zur Einweihung des neuen Schulgeb. gewidmet*, etc., Dresden, 1866, pp. 31-67). Other works, both new and old, are cited by Schwegler in his edition of the *Metaphysics*, Vol. IV. p. 257. The *Pseudo-Aristotelian* work, *Theologia*, of Neo-Platonic origin, translated in the ninth century into Arabic, known to the Scholastics in a Latin re-translation, first printed at Rome in 1519, and included in Du Val's and other editions of Aristotle (1629, II. pp. 1085 seq. and 1639, pp. 608 seq.) is the subject of an essay by Haneberg in the Reports of the Munich Acad. of Sci., 1862, I. pp. 1-12; Haneberg treats (*ibid.*, 1863, I. pp. 261-288) of the book *De Causis*, included in the early Latin editions of Aristotle (*Peric.* 1496 and 1550-1552) as a work of Aristotle, but which in reality was extracted from Neo-Platonic works, and in particular from the *Instit. Theol.* of Proclus or one of his disciples. Cf. below, § 97.

Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge (*Metaph.*, I., cc. 1 and 2), Aristotle remarks that the experienced man (*ἐμπειρος*) is justly considered wiser than he whose knowledge is restricted to single perceptions and recollections; the man of theoretic knowledge (*ὁ τεχνίτης*), than the merely experienced; the director of an undertaking involving the application of art or skill, than he who is engaged in it merely as a manual laborer; and, finally, he whose life is devoted to science (which relates to being—*ὄν*—as art, *τέχνη*, does to becoming, *γενεσις*, *Anal. Post.*, II. 19), than he who seeks knowledge only in view of its application to practical uses: but in the sphere of scientific knowledge, he adds, that is the highest which respects the highest or ultimate reasons and causes of things: this highest in knowledge is "first philosophy," or wisdom, in the strict and absolute sense of the word (*σοφία*, see above, § 1, pp. 3 and 4).

The four formal principles of Aristotle, form, matter, efficient cause, and end, are enumerated in *Met.* I. 3 (cf. V. 2; VIII. 4; *Phys.*, II. 3), in the following terms: *τὰ αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὡν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φασὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, . . . ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τρίτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικείμενην αἰτίαν ταύτην, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰγαθόν, τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ' ἐστίν.* The oldest Greek philosophers, as Aristotle attempts in a comprehensive review of their doctrines (*Metaph.*, I. 3 seq.) to demonstrate, inquired only after the material principle. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he adds, inquired, further, after the cause of motion. The principle of essence or form was not clearly stated by any among the earlier philosophers, though the authors of the theory of ideas came nearest to it. The principle of finality was enounced by earlier philosophers only in a partial or comparative sense, and not as a complete and independent principle.

Aristotle opposes numerous objections (*Metaph.*, I. 9, XIII. and XIV.) to the Platonic theory of ideas, some of which relate to the demonstrative force of the arguments for that theory, while others are urged against the tenableness of the theory itself. The argument founded on the real existence of scientific knowledge, says Aristotle, is not stringent; the reality of the universal does indeed follow from the fact in question, but not its detached existence; did this follow, however, then from the same premises much else would follow, which the Platonists neither do nor can admit, such as the existence of ideas of

works of art, of the non-substantial, of the attributive and the relative; for these things, too, possess ideal unity (*τὸ νόημα ἓν*). But if the existence of ideas is assumed, the assumption is useless and leads to the impossible. The theory of ideas is useless; for the ideas are only an aimless duplication of sensible things (a sort of *αἰσθητὰ αἰδέα*, eternal sensibles), to which they are of no service, since they are not the causes of any motion in them, nor of any change whatever; neither do they help things to exist, nor us to know things, since they are not immanent in the common objects of our knowledge. But the hypothesis of the existence of ideas leads also to the impossible. It is affirmed of these ideas that they express the essence of their respective objects; but it is impossible that an essence and that of which it is the essence should exist apart (*δόξεον ἂν ἀδύνατον, εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία*); furthermore, the imitation of the ideas in individual objects, which Plato teaches, is inconceivable, and the expression contains only a poetic metaphor; to which must be added, finally, that since the idea is represented as substantial, both it and the individuals which participate in it must be modeled after a common prototype, *e. g.*, individual men and the idea of man (the *αἰσθανθρωπος*) after a third man (*τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, *Met.*, I. 9; VII. 13; cf. *De Soph. El.*, α. 22). The result of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic theory of ideas is, however, not merely negative. Aristotle is not, for example (as used often to be assumed), the author of the doctrine called Nominalism in the Middle Ages, the doctrine which explains the concept as a mere subjective product, and the universal as merely a subjective community in representation and grammatical designation. Aristotle admits that the subjective concept is related to an objective reality, and in this sense he is a Realist; but in place of the transcendent existence, which Plato ascribed to the ideas in contradistinction to individual objects, he teaches the immanence of the essence or the noumenon in the phenomenon. Accordingly he says (*Met.*, XIII. 2, 1086 b, 2-7): Socrates, through his efforts to determine the concepts of things (to define them), led to the creation of the theory of ideas; but he did not *separate* the universal from the individuals included under it, and in this he was right; for without the universal, knowledge is impossible; it is only its isolation apart from the world of real things, that is the cause of the incongruities which attach to the theory of ideas. (Cf. *Anal. Post.*, I. 11: *εἶδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἢ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἐσται· εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη. De Anima*, III. 4: *ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δύναμις ἑκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοητῶν. Ibid.*, III. 8: *ἐν τοῖς εἰδοῖς τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ ἐστίν.*) More negative is the critique which Aristotle directs against the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, and against the derivation of them from certain elements (*στοιχεῖα*, *Met.*, XIV. 1); in the efforts to effect this he finds very much that is arbitrary and preposterous: qualitative differences are construed as resulting from quantitative differences, and that which can only be a function or state (*πάθος*) of another thing, is made the principle or an element of the latter; thus the quantitative is confounded with the qualitative, and the accidental with the substantial, in a manner which leads to numerous contradictions.

The opinion of Aristotle, that the individual alone has substantial existence (as *οὐσία*), the universal being immanent (*ἐννέπαρχον*) in it, seems, when taken in conjunction with the doctrine that (conceptual or scientific) knowledge is of the *οὐσία* and, more particularly, that definition is a form of cognition of the *οὐσία* (*οὐσίας γνωρισμός*), to involve the consequence that the individual is the proper object of knowledge, while in fact Aristotle teaches that not the individual as such, but rather the universal and ultimate, is in logical strictness the object of science. This apparent contradiction is removed, if we bear in mind the distinction between the different meanings of *οὐσία*, viz.: "the individual substance," and "the essential." Substance, *οὐσία*, in the sense of the essential, is termed by Aristotle (*Metaph.*,

1.3 *et al.*), ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία, i. e., the essence which corresponds with and is cognized through the concept; but οὐσία in the sense of the individual substance is defined (*Metaph.*, V. 8; XIV. 5 *et al.*) as that which can not be predicated of any thing else, but of which any thing else may be predicated (namely, as its accident), or as that which exists independently and separately (χωριστόν). In *Categ.*, 5, individual things are called "first substances" (πρῶται οὐσίαι), and species, "second substances" (δεύτεραι οὐσίαι). In *Met.*, VIII. 2, Aristotle distinguishes in the sphere of οὐσία αἰσθητή (sensible being): 1) matter (ὑλη), 2) form (μορφή), 3) the product of both (ἡ ἐκ τούτων, the individual thing itself as a whole). The individual substance (the τόδε τι) is the whole (σύνολον) resulting from the union of the material substratum (ὑποκείμενον, ὑλη) with the ideal essence or form; it is the subject of mere states (πάθη) and relations (πρός τι), that are distinguished according to the nine categories which, together with οὐσία (individual substance), make up the system of ten categories. The more immediate subject of scientific inquiry is, indeed, the individual, but its ultimate and more appropriate subject is the universal in the sense of the essential. It is true that, according to Aristotelian principles, if the universal is the proper object of knowledge, it can only be such because it possesses reality in a higher sense than the individual; but such reality does belong to it, since it constitutes the essential in all individual substances. If the universal exists only in the individual, it follows, indeed, that the former can not be known without the latter, and that this was Aristotle's belief is confirmed by the importance which he concedes to experience and induction in his theory of cognition and in his actual investigations in all departments of inquiry; but it does not follow that the individual, considered on the side of its individuality, must be the object of knowledge, for it can very well be this in view simply of the universal, which is immanent in it. Knowledge is concerned pre-eminently with the ideal essence (κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία or τι ἦν εἶναι) of individual substances (τῶν οὐσιῶν, *Metaph.*, VII. 4, 1030 b, 5). In the case of the highest, i. e., the divine and immaterial sphere of being, however, this difference between the universal and the individual, according to Aristotle, does not exist.

The expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is with Aristotle the general formula for expressions of the following kind: τῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, so that the τί ἦν is to be considered as used substantively in the Dative. The use of εἶναι in these expressions, gives to them the force of abstract nouns, e. g., τὸ ἀγαθόν, the Good, τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, the being good, goodness. (Similarly in the formula: ἐστὶ μὲν ταῦτό, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτό [a. g., *Eth. Nic.*, V. 3 fin.], i. e., "the object is the same, but the ideal essence is not the same." So *De Anima*, III. 7: καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικὸν οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὐτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο). The Dative here is apparently the Dative of possession. The question τι ἐστὶ, "what is it?" can be answered by ἀγαθόν, ἐν, ἄνθρωπος, "good," "one," "man," or by any other concrete term (although Aristotle uses that interrogative formula in so comprehensive a signification, that it can also receive an abstract answer); then τί ἐστι is made to stand for the answer itself, and is hence employed as a general expression for ἀγαθόν, ἐν, ἄνθρωπος, and the like concrete terms. Now, as a general formula to represent combinations of single Datives with εἶναι, we might, perhaps, expect to find the expression τὸ τί ἐστι εἶναι; but since the putting of the question is to be conceived as already past, Aristotle chose the Imperfect ἦν. (Another explanation of this Imperfect attributes to it an objective signification, as denoting the originally, eternally existent, the *prius* of individual existence; but this Platonizing explanation can not be admitted, because the abstract, which finds its expression in εἶναι, ought then, according to this view, to precede the concrete, while here priority is in the expression τί ἦν, ascribed, if to either, to the concrete.) Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι denotes, accord-

ingly, the essence conceived as separate from its substrate, or, as Aristotle defines it (*Met.*, VII. 7, p. 1032 b, 14), *οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης*. The form of thought which corresponds with and may be said to express the *τί ἦν εἶναι*, is the Concept, *λόγος* (*Eth. N.*, II. 6: *τὸν λόγον τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*), whose content is given in the Definition (*ὁ ὁρισμός*, *Top.*, VII. 5: *Metaph.*, V. 8).

Of the four principles: matter (*ἡ ὕλη*), form (*τὸ εἶδος*), moving cause (*τὸ ὄθεν ἡ κίνησις*), and end or final cause (*τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα*), the three latter, according to *Phys.*, II. 7, are often one and the same in fact; for essence (form) and end are in themselves identical, since the proximate end of every object consists in the full development of its proper form (i. e., the *immanent* end of every object, by the recognition of which the Aristotelian doctrine of finality is radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian Teleology of later philosophers), and the cause of motion is at least identical in kind with the essence and the end: for, says Aristotle, man is begotten by man, and in general one fully developed organism begets another of the same species, so that though the *causa efficiens* is not the form itself, which is yet to be produced, yet it is a form of similar nature. In the organic creation, the soul is the unity of those three principles (*De An.*, II. p. 415^b, 9: *ὁμοίως δ' ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διαρισμένους τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία: καὶ γὰρ ὄθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῇ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς οὐσία τῶν ἐμφύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία*). In the case of products, whose causes are external to the products themselves (Mechanism), as, for example. In the construction of a house, the three causes which stand opposed to matter are distinguished from each other not only in conception, but in reality. Examined in their relation to the phenomena of generation and growth, matter and form are opposed to each other as potentiality (*δύναμις*), and actuality (or, as Aristotle terms it, "entelechy," *ἐντελέχεια*). Of entelechy in general, Aristotle distinguishes two species: "first entelechy," by which the state of being complete or finished is to be understood, and "energy," which denotes the real activity of that which is thus complete; yet in practice he does not bind himself strictly to the observance of this distinction (cf. Trendelenburg, *ad De Anima*, p. 296 seq., and Schwegler, *Met.*, Vol. IV., p. 221 seq.). Motion or development is the actualization of the possible, *quod possibile* (*ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, ἡ δυνατὸν ἐντελέχεια . . . κίνησις ἐστίν*, *Phys.*, III. 1). Especially worthy of notice is the relativity, which Aristotle attributes to these notions, when he employs them in concrete cases: the same thing, he says, can be in one respect matter and potentiality, in another, form and actuality, e. g., the hewn stone can be the former in relation to the house, the latter in comparison with the unhewn stone, the sensuous side of the soul (or *ψυχῇ*) can be the former in comparison with the intelligent mind (*νοῦς*), the latter when compared with the body. Thus the apparent dualism of matter and form tends at least to disappear in the reduction of the world to a *gradation* of existences.

The very highest place in the scale of being is occupied by the immaterial spirit, called God. The proof of the necessity of assuming such a principle is derived by Aristotle from the development in nature of objects whose form and structure indicate design, and is founded on Aristotle's general principle, that all transition (*κίνησις*) from the potential to the actual depends on an *actual* cause. (*Met.*, IX. 8: Potentiality is always preceded in time by some form of actuality, *ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος*. *De Gen. Animal.*, II. 1: *ὅσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνη, ἐκ' ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος*.) Every particular object which is the result of development, implies an actual moving cause; so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to the naturally passive matter which constitutes it. This principle, the first mover (*πρῶτον κινῶν*) must (according to *Met.*, XII. 6 seq.) be one, whose essence is pure energy, since, if it were in any respect merely potential, it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all things; it must be eternal, pure, immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened

with potentiality (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ἔλθῃ τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ). Being free from matter, it is without plurality and without parts. It is absolute spirit (νοῦς), which thinks itself, and whose thought is therefore the thought of thought (νόησις νοήσεως). Its agency as the cause of motion is not active and formative, but passive, for it remains itself unmoved; it acts by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving, for it is the Good *per se* and the end toward which all things tend (κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον· . . . κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον). Not at any given time did God shape the orderly world; he conditions and determines the order of the world eternally, in that he exists as the most perfect being, and all things else seek to become like him; the world as an articulate whole has always existed and will never perish. As being an "actual" principle, God is not a final product of development; he is the eternal *prius* of all development. Thought, which is the mode of his activity, constitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life (*Μεταφ.*, XII. 7: ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἀριστον· . . . καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ἐννύαρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή· . . . ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ). The world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as an absolute self-existent substance, like the general in an army. Aristotle concludes his theology (*Met.*, XII. 10 *fin.*) and marks his opposition to the (Speusippic) doctrine of a plurality of independent and co-existent principles, by citing the following line from Homer (*Iliad*, II. 204):

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.

In essential agreement with this scientific justification of the belief in God's existence, though differing from it in form, was the substance of the popular reflections contained in the third book of the dialogue "Concerning Philosophy." Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum*, II. 37, 95) has preserved from it a paragraph of some length, translated into Latin, and it may here be cited entire, as furnishing also a specimen of the style of Aristotle in his popular (exoteric) writings (to which is to be referred Cicero's praise in *Acad. Pr.*, II, 119: *flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles*; cf. Cic., *De Orat.*, I. 49, *Top.*, 1, *De Invent.*, II. 2, *Brut.*, 31, *Ad Att.*, II. 1, 1, *De Fin.*, I. 5, 14; Dionys. Halic., *De Verborum Copia*, 241, p. 187 of Reiske's edition, and *De Censura Vel. Script.*, 4, p. 430): "Imagine men who have always dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with statues and paintings and well furnished with every thing which is usually at the command of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to the surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and if they were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea and skies, and perceive the masses of the clouds and the violence of the winds; and if then they were to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that he is the author of day, in that he sheds his light over the entire heavens; and if afterward, when night had overshadowed the earth, they were to see the whole sky beset and adorned with stars, and should contemplate the changing light of the moon in its increase and decrease, the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, and their course to all eternity inviolable and unalterable: truly, they would then believe that Gods really exist, and that these mighty works originate with them."

§ 49. Nature is the complex of objects having a material constitution and involved in necessary motion or change. Change (μεταβολή) or motion (κίνησις), in the broader sense, includes, on the one hand,

origin and decay (or motion from the relatively non-existent to the existent, and conversely); and, on the other, motion in the narrower sense, which again is divisible into three species: quantitative motion, qualitative motion, and motion in space; or increase and decrease, qualitative transformation, and change of place; the latter accompanies all other species of motion. The universal conditions of all change of place and of all motion, of whatever kind, are place and time. Place (*τόπος*) is defined as the inner limit of the inclosing body. Time is the measure (or number) of motion with reference to the earlier and later. No place is empty. Space is limited; the world possesses only a finite extension; outside of it is no place. Time is unlimited; the world was always, and always will be. The *primum motum* is heaven. The sphere, to which the fixed stars are attached, has, since it is in immediate contact with the Deity, the best of all possible motions, namely, the motion of uniform circular rotation. Aristotle seeks to explain the movements of the planets by the theory of numerous spheres moved, in various senses, by unmoved, immaterial beings, who are, as it were, a sort of inferior gods. The earth, which is spherical, reposes unmoved at the center of the world. The five material elements—ether, fire, air, water, and earth—occupy in the universe determinate places, suited to their natures. The ether fills the celestial spaces, and of it the spheres and the stars are formed. The other elements belong to the terrestrial world; they are distinguished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, and also by their relative warmth or coldness and dryness or moisture; they are commingled in all terrestrial bodies. Nature, guided by the principle of finality and proceeding by the way of an ever-increasing subjection of matter to form, produces on the earth a scale of living beings. Each superior degree in this scale unites in itself the characters of the inferior degrees, adding to them its own peculiar and more excellent virtue. The vital force, or the soul, in the widest sense of this word, is the entelechy of the body. The vital force of the plant is nothing more than a constructing force; the animal possesses this, and the faculties of sensation, desire, and locomotion besides; man combines with all these the faculty of reason. Reason is partly passive, subject to determining influences and of temporary duration, partly active, determining, and immortal.

Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Quaestionum Naturalium et Moraliū ad Aristotelis philosophiam illustrandarum libri quatuor, ex recens. Leonh. Spengel, Munich, 1842.

The content of the writings of Aristotle on natural science is treated of by George Henry Lewes in his

Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of Science, London, 1864, German translation by J. V. Carus, Leipzig, 1865; cf. J. B. Meyer's account of the book in the *Gött. gel. Anz.*, 1865, pp. 1445-1474.

On the character of the Aristotelian Physics in general, cf. C. M. Zevori (Paris, 1846), Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in the *Introd.* to his edit. of the *Phys.*, Paris, 1862), Ch. Lévêque (*La Physique d'Aristote et la Science Contemporaine*, Paris, 1868). On Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, see the article by H. Stebeck, *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*, IX, 1866, pp. 1-38 and 181-184.

On the Arist. doctrine of space and time: G. E. Wölter (Bonn, 1848), and Otto Ull, on Aristotle's and Kant's doctrines of space (Halle, 1880); on the doctrine of time alone (*Phys.*, A. 10 seq.): Ad. Torstrik, *Philologus*, vol. 26, 1868, pp. 446-528; on the doctrine of continuity: G. Schilling (Gießen, 1840).

On the mathematical knowledge of Arist.: A. Burja (in *Mém. de l'Acad. de Berlin*, 1790-'91); on his mechanical problems: F. Th. Poeslger (in *Abh. der Berl. Akad.*, 1829), Euclle (*Étude sur un passage d'Aristote relatif à la mécanique*, in the *Revue Archéol.*, 1857, XIV, pp. 7-21); on his meteorology: J. L. Ideler (Berlin, 1832), and Suhle (*G.-Pr.*, Bernb. 1864); on his theory of light: E. F. Eberhard (Coburg, 1866), and Prantl (*Arist. über die Farben erläutert durch eine Uebersicht über die Farbenlehre der Alten*, Munich, 1849); on his geography: B. L. Königsmann (Schleswig, 1808-1806).

On the botany of Aristotle: Henschel (Breslau, 1824), F. Wimmer (*Phytologiae Arist. Fragm.*, Breslau, 1868), Jessen (*Ueber das Arist. Pflanzenwerk*, in the *Rh. Mus.*, new series, XIV, 1869, pp. 89-101). On the Zoology of A., cf., besides the annotations of J. G. Schneider in his edition of the *Historia Animalium*, (Leipz. 1811), the works of A. F. A. Wiegmann (*Observ. zoologicae criticae in Arist. Historiam animalium*, Berlin, 1826), Karl Zell (*Ueber den Sinn des Geschmacks*, in: *Festschriften*, 8. Sammlung, Freiburg, 1833), Joh. Müller (*Ueber den glatten Hart des Arist.*, *Akad.*, Berlin, 1842), Jürgen Bona Meyer (*De principis Arist. in distribut. animalium adhibita*, Berlin, 1854; *Arist. Thierkunde*, Berlin, 1855), Sonnenburg (*Zu Aristot. Thiergeschichte*, *G.-Pr.*, Bonn, 1837), C. J. Sundeval (*Die Thierarten des Aristot.*, Stockholm, 1868), Langkavel (*Zu De Part. An.*, *G.-Pr.*, Berlin, 1863), Aubert (*Die Cephalopoden des Arist.* in *zoologischer, anatomischer und geschichtlicher Beziehung*, in the *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Zoologie*, XII, Leipz. 1862, p. 373 seq.; cf. the edition with translation and notes of Aristotle's work on the Generation and Development of Animals, by H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer, Leipzig, 1860), Henri Philibert (*Le Principe de la Vie antique Aristote*, Chaumont, 1865; *Arist. philosophia zoologica, thes. Paralela*, Chaumont and Paris, 1865), Charles Thurot (*Observations critiques sur le traité d'Arist. De Partibus Animalium*, in the *Revue Crit.*, new series, 1867, pp. 223-242). The two following authors treat specially of Aristotle's doctrines of human anatomy and physiology: Andr. Westphal (*De anatomia Aristotelis, imprimis nunc cadavera occurrent humana*, Greifswald, 1745), and L. M. Philippson (*ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων, pars I.: de internarum humani corporis partium cognitione Aristotelis cum Platonis sententiis comparata; pars II.: philosophorum veterum usque ad Theophrastum doctrina de sensu*, Berlin, 1831). Of Aristotle's physiognomics treat E. Taube (*G.-Pr.*, Gleiwitz, 1866), and J. Henrychowaki (*Diss. Inaug.*, Breslau, 1868).

The following authors treat of the Psychology of Aristotle: Joh. Heinr. Deinhardt (*Der Begriff der Seele mit Rücksicht auf Aristoteles*, Hamburg, 1840), Gust. Hartenstein (*De psychol. vulg. orig. ab Aristotele repetenda*, Leipzig, 1840), Car. Phil. Fischer (*De principis Aristotelis de anima doctrinae diss.*, Erlangen, 1845), B. St. Hilaire (in his edition of the *De Anima*, Paris, 1846), Wilh. Schrader (*Arist. de voluntate doctrina*, *Progr. des Brandenb. Gymn.*, Brandenburg, 1847), and *Die Unendlichkeitstheorie des Aristoteles*, in *N. Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Päd.*, Vol. 51, 1860, pp. 89-104), W. Wolff (*Von dem Begriff des Arist. über die Seele und dessen Anwendung auf die heutige Psychologie*, *Progr.*, Bayreuth, 1845), Geell-Fels (*Psychol. Plat. et Arist.*, *Progr.*, Würzburg, 1854), Hugo Anton (*Doctrina de nat. hom. ab Arist. in scriptis ethicis proposita*, Berlin, 1852), and *De hominis habitu naturali quom. Arist. in Eth. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam*, Erfurt, 1860), W. F. Volkmann (*Die Grundzüge der Aristotelischen Psychologie*, Prague, 1858), Herm. Beck (*Arist. de sensuum actione*, Berlin, 1858), Panach (*De Aristotelis animas definitiones diss.*, Greifswald, 1861), Wilh. Biehl (*Die Arist. Definit. der Seele*, in *Verh. der Augsburger Philologen-Vers.* for the year 1862, Leipzig, 1863, pp. 94-102), J. Freudenthal (*Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Arist.*, Göttingen, 1868), A. Gratacap (*Arist. de sensibus doctrina, diss. ph.*, Montpellier, 1866), Leonh. Schneider (*Die Unendlichkeitstheorie des Aristoteles*, Passau, 1867), Eugen Kherhard (*Die Arist. Definition der Seele und ihr Werth für die Gygmaeart*, Berlin, 1868). [George Grote, in the Supplement to the third edition of *Bain's Senses and the Intellect*, London, 1869.—Tr.]

Aristotle's doctrine of the *voûs* is discussed in works by F. G. Starke (Neu-Buppin, 1838), F. H. Chr. Ribbentrop (Breslau, 1840), Jul. Wolf (*Arist. de intellectu agente et patiente doctrina*, Berlin, 1844), and others, and, recently, by Wilh. Biehl (*Gymn.-Pr.*, Linz, 1864), and Franz Brentano (*Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom voûs nous, nebst einer Beilage über das Wirken des Arist. Gottes*, Mayence, 1867). Cf., also, Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.*, I, p. 108 seq., and F. F. Kampe, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des A.*, Leipzig, 1870, pp. 8-80.

Aristotle designates (*Phys.*, II. 1) as the universal character of all which is by *nature*, that it has in itself the principle of motion and rest, while in the products of human art there is no tendency to change. All natural existences (*De Caelo*, I. 1) are either themselves bodies, or have bodies or are principles of things having bodies (e. g., body; man; soul). The word motion (*κίνησις*) is sometimes used by Aristotle (e. g., *Phys.*, III. 1) as synonymous with change (*μεταβολή*); but, on the other hand, he says (*Phys.*, V. 1), that though all motion is change, yet the converse is not true, all change is not motion, such changes, namely, as affect the existence of objects, i. e., generation and decease (*γένεσις* and *φθορά*) are not motions. Motion proper exists in the three categories of quantity (*κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον* or *κατὰ μέγεθος*), quality (*κατὰ τὸ ποιόν* or *κατὰ πάθος*), and place (*κατὰ τὸ ποῦ* or *κατὰ τόπον*): in the first case it is increase and decrease (*αύξησις καὶ φθίσις*); in the second, alteration (*ἀλλοίωσις*); in the third, change of place (*φορά*). Aristotle defines *τόπος** (*Phys.*, IV. 4, p. 212 a, 20), as the first and unmoved boundary of the inclosing body on the side of the inclosed (*τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον*). *Τόπος* may be compared to an unmoved vessel, containing the object whose *τόπος* it is. Aristotle understands, therefore, by *τόπος*, not so much the space through which a body is extended, as, rather, the limit by which it is bounded, and this conceived as fixed and immovable; his chief argument for the non-existence of an unfilled *τόπος* and for the non-existence of a *τόπος* outside of the world, is founded on the above definition, in accordance with which no void within or region without the world is possible. All motion must, according to Aristotle, take place in a *plenum* by means of an exchange of places (*ἀντιπερίσταςις*). The motion of the world, as a whole, is not an advancing, but simply a rotary motion. The definition of *time* [recited above] is worded as follows (*Phys.*, IV. 11, pp. 219 b, 1, 220 a, 24): *ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*. For the measure of time the uniform circular motion is especially appropriate, since it is most easily numbered. Hence time is represented (ch. 14) as connected with the motion of the celestial spheres, since by these all other motions are measured. But time is (ch. 11, p. 219 b, 8) the number which is reckoned, not that by means of which we reckon. Without a reckoning soul there would be no number, hence no time, but only motion, and in it an earlier and later.

All motion in nature is *directed to an end*. "God and nature do nothing in vain" (*ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν*, *De Caelo*, I. 4). Nevertheless, a certain room is left by Aristotle (*Phys.*, II. 4–6) for the play of the accidental (*αἰνόμενον*) or the advent of results, which were not intended, in consequence of some secondary effect following from the means used to bring about another end; under the *αἰνόμενον* falls, as a concept of narrower extension, chance (*ἡ τύχη*), the emergence of a result which was not (consciously) intended, but which might have been intended (e. g., the finding of a treasure while plowing the ground). Nature does not always attain her ends, on account of the obstacles offered by matter. The degree of perfection in things varies according as they are more or less removed from the direct influence of God (cf. § 48). God acts directly on the firmament of the fixed stars, which he touches, without being touched by it. (The notion of contact (*ἀφή*), which Aristotle (*Phys.*, V. 3) defines as the juxtaposition of *ἄκρα* or (*De Gen. et Corr.*,

* [*Τόπος* is the Greek word for space. It signifies, properly, however, rather place than space, and this is the signification which it has with Aristotle. Aristotle's conception of space is not that of indefinite extension. He disallows the idea of unfilled space, and as nothing can occupy space but the world, and as the world is, in Aristotle's view, a bounded sphere, it follows that space in general must be the "place" occupied by the world, and that its limits are the limits of the world. Aristotle remarks, however, that not the world, but only its parts, are in space—which follows from his definition. The place of any thing, he defines, is the inner surface of the body surrounding it, that surface being conceived as fixed and immovable. As nothing exists outside of the world, except God, who is pure thought and not in space, the world naturally can not be in space, i. e., its "place" can not be defined.—Tr.]

1. 6) *ἀστέρα*, is here intermediate in signification between contiguity in space and ideal affection.) God moves the world from its circumference. The motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is better than that of the planetary spheres; the obliquity of the ecliptic marks an imperfection of the lower regions; less perfect still are the motions which are accomplished on the earth. Each motion of a surrounding sphere is communicated to the spheres included in it, so, in particular, that of the sphere of the fixed stars to all the rest; when this effect ought not to be produced, as in fact it is not by the planetary spheres on those still inferior, retroacting spheres, or spheres with a counter-motion, are requisite. The whole number of spheres assumed by Aristotle is 47, or according to another construction, 55 (*Met.*, XII. 8).

The nature of the Ether (which extends from the heaven of the fixed stars down to the moon, *Meteor.*, I. 3) adapts it especially for circular motion; to the other elements, the upward motion (i. e., from the center of the world toward its circumference) or the downward (i. e., from the circumference to the center) is natural. Of these other elements, earth is the one to which the attribute of heaviness belongs, and its natural place in the world is, consequently, the lowest, viz.: the center of the world; fire is the light element, and its place is the sphere next adjoining the sphere of the ether. Fire is warm and dry, air is warm and moist (fluid), water is cold and moist (fluid), and earth is cold and dry. Ether is the first element in rank (*Meteor.*, I. 3; *De Coelo*, I. 3; cf. *De Gen. An.*, II. 3); but if we enumerate, beginning with the elements directly known by the senses, it is the fifth, the subsequently so-called *πέμπτον στοιχείον*, *quinta essentia*.

In all organic creations, even in the lowest animals, Aristotle (*De Part. An.*, I. 6) finds something admirable, full of purpose, beautiful and divine. The plants are less perfect than the animals (*Phys.*, II. 8); among the latter, those which have blood are more perfect than the bloodless, the tame than the wild, etc. (*De Gen. An.*, II. 1; *Pol.*, I. 5). The lowest organisms may arise by original generation (*generatio spontanea sive æquivoca*, i. e., by "generation" only homonymously so called [*ὁμωνύμως*], and consisting in evolution from the heterogeneous). But in the case of all higher organisms, like is generated by like; in those which have attained their full development, the germs of new organisms of the same name and species are developed (*Metaph.*, XII. 3: *ἐκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμων γίγνεται ἢ οὐσία . . . ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*). In the act of generation Aristotle teaches that the form-giving or animating principle proceeds from the male, and the form-receiving or material principle from the female.

The two general classes in which Aristotle includes all animals, namely, animals having blood and bloodless animals, correspond with what Cuvier termed the Vertebrates and the Invertebrates. The latter are classified by Aristotle as either Testacea, Crustacea, Mollusks, or Insects; and the former as Fishes, Amphibious Animals, Birds, and Mammalia: the ape is viewed by him as an intermediate form between man and other viviparous animals. Aristotle founds the division of his anatomical investigations on the distinction of *ὁμοιομερῆ*, i. e., organs, whose parts are not like the organs themselves (e. g., the hand; the hand does not consist of hands), and *ἑτερομερῆ*, i. e., substances, whose parts are like the substances themselves (e. g., flesh, blood; the parts of a piece of flesh or of a mass of blood are like the wholes to which they belong). Aristotle had a far more exact knowledge of the internal organs of animals than of those of the human body. The (physiological) work on the Senses and the work on the Generation and Development of Animals are followed in the "History of Animals" by a collection of observations on the habits of life, and, in particular, on the psychical functions of the different classes of animals.

Aristotle defines the *soul* as the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living and organic body (*De Anima*, II. 1: *ἐστὶν οὖν ψυχὴ ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωῶν ἔχοντος δύναμις τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὁργανικόν*). "First entelechy" is related to "second," as knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) to speculation (*θεωρεῖν*). Neither is mere potentiality; both are realized potentialities: but while knowledge may be ours as a passive possession, speculation is, as it were, knowledge in activity, or knowledge put to its most characteristic use; so the soul is not (like the divine mind) always engaged in the active manifestation of its own essence, but is always present, as the developed force capable of such manifestation. As the entelechy of the body the soul is at once its form (*principium formans*), its principle of motion and its end. Each organ exists (*De Part. An.*, I. 5) in view of an end, and this end is an activity; the whole body exists for the soul. The vegetable soul, i. e., the vital principle of the plant, is (according to *De An.*, II. 1 *et al.*) a nourishing soul, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the faculty of material assimilation and reproduction. The animal possesses in addition to this the sensitive, appetitive and locomotive faculties (τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, τὸ κινήτικόν κατὰ τόπον). The corporeo-psychical functions of animals (at least of the more highly developed animals) have a common center (*μεσότης*), which is wanting in plants; the central organ is the heart, which is viewed by Aristotle as the seat of sensation, the brain being an organ of subordinate importance. Sensuous perception (*αἰσθησις*) is the result of qualities which exist potentially in the objects perceived and actually in the perceiving being. The seeing of colors depends on a certain motion of the medium of vision (air or water). With sensuous perception are connected imaginative representation (*φαντασία*), which is a psychical after-effect of sensation (*De An.*, III. 3), or a sort of weakened sensation (*Rhet.*, I. 11, 1370 a, 28), and also (involuntary) memory (*μνήμη*), which is to be explained by the persistence (*μονή*) of the sensible impression (*De Memor.*, ch. 1; *Anal. Post.*, II. 19), and (voluntary) recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*), which depends on the co-operation of the will and implies the power of combining mental representations (*De Memor.*, ch. 2). Out of these theoretical functions, combined with the feeling of the agreeable and the disagreeable, springs desire (*ὄρεξις*); whatever, says Aristotle, is capable of sensation, is also capable of pleasure and pain and of the feeling of the agreeable and disagreeable, and whatever is capable of these, is capable also of desire (*De An.*, II. 3, p. 414 b, 4). The human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm (*De An.*, III. 8). The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is reason (*νοῦς*). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable (*De An.*, II. 2); but the *νοῦς* exists before the body, into which it enters from without as something divine and immortal (*De Gen. Animal.*, II. 3: *λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν, ἐπεισεῖναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον*). But the concept or notion is impossible without the representative image (*φαντάσμα*). This stands to the concept in a relation similar to that in which the mathematical figure stands to that which is demonstrated by means of it, and only by the aid of such an image, joined with the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable, can the reason act upon the appetitive faculty, i. e., become practical reason (*De An.*, III. 10). The *νοῦς*, therefore, in man, has need of a *δύναμις*, or what may be called an unfilled region of thought, a *tabula rasa*, before it can manifest its form-giving activity (*De An.*, III. 4: [*νοῦς ἰστί*] *γραμμάτειον, ὃ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐνεργείᾳ γεγραμμένον*). Accordingly, a distinction must be made between the passive reason (*νοῦς παθητικός*), as the form-receiving, and the active reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), as the form-giving principle; substantial, eternal existence belongs only to the latter (*De Anima*, III. 5: *ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμγήρῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεῖ, . . . ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός*). How the active reason is related, on the one hand, to individual existence, on the other, to God, is not made perfectly clear; a certain latitude is left for a naturalistic and pantheistic or for a more

spiritualistic and theistic interpretation, and each of these interpretations has found numerous representatives both in ancient and later times; yet it is scarcely possible to develop either of them in all its consequences, without running counter to other portions of Aristotle's teaching.

§ 50. The end of human activity, or the highest good for man, is happiness. This depends on the rational or virtuous activity of the soul throughout the whole of its life. With activity pleasure is joined, as its blossom and natural culmination. Virtue is a proficiency in willing what is conformed to reason, developed from the state of a natural potentiality by practical action. The development of virtue requires the existence of a faculty of virtue, and requires also exercise and intelligence. All virtues are either ethical or dianoetic. Ethical virtue is that permanent direction of the will (or state of mind), which guards the mean proper for us, as determined for us by the reason of the intelligent; hence it is the subordination of appetite to reason. Bravery is the mean between cowardice and temerity; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indifference; generosity, the mean between prodigality and parsimony, etc. The highest among the ethical virtues is justice or righteousness. This, in the most extended sense of the word, is the union of all ethical virtues, so far as they regard our fellow-men; in the narrower sense, it respects the equitable (*ἰσος*) in matters of gain or loss. Justice in this latter sense is either distributive or commutative; the former respects the partition of possessions and honors, the latter relates to contracts and the reparation of inflicted wrongs. Equity is a complementary rectification of legal justice by reference to the individuality of the accused. Dianoetic virtue is the correct functioning of the theoretical reason, either in itself or in reference to the inferior psychical functions. The dianoetic virtues are reason, science, art, and practical intelligence. The highest stage of reason and science is wisdom in the absolute sense of the term, the highest stage of art is wisdom in the relative sense. A life devoted only to sensual enjoyment is brutish, an ethico-political life is human, but a scientific life is divine.

Man has need of man for the attainment of the practical ends of life. Only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution. Man is by nature a political being. The state originated for the protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally upright living; its principal business is the development of moral

capacity in the young and in all its citizens. The state is prior to the individual in that sense in which in general the whole is prior to the part and the end prior to the means. Its basis is the family. He who is capable only of obedience and not of intelligence must be a servant (slave). The concord of the citizens must be founded on unanimity of sentiment, not on an artificial annihilation of individual interests. The most practicable form of the state is, in general, a government in which monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements are combined; but in all individual cases this form must be accommodated to the given circumstances. Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy (or a Republic) are, under the appropriate circumstances, good forms of government; Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are degenerate forms, of which the latter, as being the corruption of the most excellent form, is the worst. The distinguishing mark of good and bad forms of government is found in the object pursued by the rulers, according as this object is either the public good or the private interest of the rulers. It is right that the Hellenes should rule over the barbarians, the cultured over the uncultured.

Art is of two kinds, useful and imitative. The latter serves three ends: recreation and (refined) entertainment, temporary emancipation from the control of certain passions by means of their excitation and subsequent subsidence, and, last and chiefly, moral culture.

Of the ethics of Aristotle in general write Chr. Garve (*Uebers. und Erläut.*, Berlin, 1798-1802), Schleiermacher (in various passages of his *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre*, Berlin, 1808; cf. *Ueber die wiss. Behandlung des Tugendbegriffs*, in the *Abh. der Acad.*, Berlin, 1820), K. L. Michelet (*Die Ethik des Arist. in ihrem Verhältniss zum System der Moral*, Berlin, 1827; cf. his *Syst. der philos. Moral*, 1828, pp. 195-237), Hartenstein (*Ueber den wiss. Werth der Arist. Ethik*, in the *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der K. Sachs. Gesellsch. der Wiss. zu Leipzig, philol.-hist. cl.*, 1859, pp. 49-107, and in H.'s *Hist.-philos. Abh.*, Leipzig, 1870), Trendelenburg (*Ueber Herbarfs praktische Philos. und die Ethik der Alten*, in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad.*, 1856; cf. the 10th essay in T.'s *Hist. Beitr. zur Philos.*, Vol. II., Berlin, 1855, *Ueber einige Stellen im 5 u. 6. Buche der Nikomach. Ethik*, and the 9th article in Vol. III. of the same, Berlin, 1867; *Zur Arist. Ethik*, pp. 309-446), Diels (in *Quaestiones Aristotelicae*, Progr. of the *Sophien-gymn.*, Berlin, 1867).

Of the relation of Aristotle's ethics and politics to the corresponding doctrines of Plato, and of Aristotle's critique of the latter, treat Pinzger (Leipzig, 1822), H. W. Broecker (Leipzig, 1824), W. Orges (Berlin, 1848), St. Matthias (Greifswald, 1848), A. J. Kahlert (Czernowitz, 1854), W. Pierson (in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, XIII., 1858, pp. 1-48 and 209-247); also, Fr. Guhl, Engelhardt, *Loc. Platonici, quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse*, Dantzig, 1858; Siegr. Lommatsch, *Quomodo Plato et Arist. religionis et resp. principia conjunxerint*, Berlin, 1863; C. W. Schmidt, *Ueber die Einwirkung des Arist. in der Nik. Ethik gegen Plat. Lehre von der Lust (G.-Pr.)*, Bunzlau, 1864; Kalmus, *Dr. de volupt. doctr. (G.-Pr.)*, Pyritz, 1869; Rassew, *Die Rep. des Plato und der beste Staat des Arist.*, Weimar, 1866. Cf. the dissertations by Gust. Goldmann (Berlin, 1823), and Adolf Ehrlich (Halle, 1868), and the opusculum of Herm. Henkel on Plato's *Laos* and the *Politics* of Aristotle (*Gym.-Progr.*). Seehauser, 1869. On Kant's Ethics as compared with Aristotle's, see Traug. Brückner, *De tribus ethice locis, quibus differt Kantius ab Aristotele, diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1866, and Trendelenburg, *Der Widerstreit zwischen Kant und Arist. in der Ethik*, in his *Hist. Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Vol. III., 1867, pp. 171-214.

G. E. Luthart, *Die Ethik des Arist. in ihrem Unterschied von der Moral des Christenthums*, Leipzig, 1860. W. H. Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Arist. in hist.-pol. Umrissen*, Leipzig, 1870; *Ar. u. s. L. v. Staat*, in Virchow and Holtzendorff's *Sammlung gemeinverständliche wiss. Vorträge*, No. 108, Berlin, 1870.

Of the ethical and political principles of Aristotle treat Starke (Neu-Ruppin, 1863 and 1860), Holm (Berlin, 1858), Ueberweg (*Das Arist. Kunstische und Herbartische Moral-princip.*, in Fichte's Z., Vol. 24, Halle, 1854, p. 71 seq.); on the method and the bases of Aristotle's Ethics, cf. Eud. Eucken (*G.-Pr.*, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1870); on points of contact between the Ethics and Politics, J. Munier (*G.-Pr.*, Mayence, 1866), Schütz (Potsd. 1860); on the Highest Good, Kruhl (Breslau, 1833 and 1838), Afzelius (Holmias, 1838), Axel Nybläus (Lund, 1863), Wenkel (*Die Lehre des Arist. über das höchste Gut oder die Glückseligkeit*, *G.-Pr.*, Sondershausen, 1864); on the *Eudaimonia* of Arist., Herm. Hampke (*De Eudaimonia, Arist. moralis disciplinæ principio, diss. inaug. Berol.*, Brandenb. 1856), G. Teichmüller (*Die Einheit der Ar. Eudaimonia*, from the *Mélanges græco-romains*, I, II, St. Petersburg, 1859, in the *Bulletin hist.-phil.*, t. XVI, of the Imperial Acad. of Sciences, *ibid.* 1859); E. Laas (*Diss. Bri.*, 1859), Chr. A. Thilo (in the *Zeitschrift für exacte Philoa.*, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1861, pp. 371-382), Karl Knappe (*Grundzüge der Arist. Lehre von der Eudaim.*, *G.-Pr.*, Wittenberg, 1864-66); on A.'s conception of virtue, Nieldner (*G.-Pr.*, Herford, 1861); on the theory of Duties, Carl. Aug. Mann (*Diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1867); on the conceptions *μαρτυρία* and *ἀρετή*, G. Glogau (Halle, 1869); on the place of Sensation in Aristotle's doctrine, Roth (in *Theolog. Studien und Krit.*, 1850, Vol. I, p. 625 seq.); on Justice, A. G. Kästner (Leipzig, 1787), C. A. v. Droste-Hülshoff (Bonn, 1836), Herm. Ad. Fechner (*Breslauer Diss.*, Leipzig, 1856), Freyschmidt (*Die Arist. Lehre von der Gerechtigkeit und das moderne Staatsrecht*, *G.-Pr.*, Berlin, 1867), and Trendelenburg (in the above-cited works); cf. also the articles of H. Hampke (in *Philol.*, XVI, 1860, pp. 80-84) and F. Häcker (in Müntzell's *Zeitschr. für das Gymnasialwesen*, Berlin, 1862, pp. 518-540) on the fifth book of the *Nicom. Ethics*, which treats of justice; on the place given to practical prudence in A.'s doctrine, Lüdke (Stralsund, 1862); on the principle of division and arrangement followed in the classification of moral virtues in the *Nic. Eth.*, F. Häcker (*Progr. des Cöln. Real-Gymn.*, Berlin, 1863, and in Müntzell's *Zeitschr. für G.-W.*, XVII, Berlin, 1863, pp. 321-343); on the *Dianoetic Virtues*, Prantl (Munich, 1859), and A. Kühn (Berlin, 1860); on Imputation, according to Aristotle, Afzelius (Upsalæ, 1841); on Friendship, Breier (*De amia principium, ad Ar. Eth. Nic.*, 1158 a, *G.-Pr.*, Lubeck, 1858); on Slavery, W. T. Krug (Leipa. 1813), C. Güttling (Jena, 1821), Ludw. Schiller (Erlangen, 1847), S. L. Steinheim (Hamburg, 1858), and W. Uhde (*Diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1856); on the Arist. conception of Politics, Jul. Finselsen (*Diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1858); on Aristotle's Classification of Forms of Government, G. Teichmüller (*Progr. of the School of St. Ann at St. Petersburg*, St. Petersburg and Berlin, 1850); on Aristotle's Theory of the State, J. Bendixen (*Progr. der Pöbner Gelehrtenschule*, Hamburg, 1866); on the economic doctrines in the "*Politics*" of Aristotle, Ludwig Schneider (*Gymn.-Progr.*, Deutsch Crone, 1863).

Of the Arist. doctrine of poetry and art in general, treat Lessing (in his *Hamb. Dramaturgie*, *Silbök* 37 seq., 46 seq., 74 seq.), Ed. Müller (*G. d. Th. d. Kunst. b. d. A.*, II, pp. 1-183, 346-395, and 417), W. H. Schrader (*De artis apud Arist. notionis ac vi*, Berlin, 1843), Franz Susemihl (*Vortrag*, Griefsw. 1862), Th. Sträter (in Fichte's Z. f. Ph., new series, Vol. XL, pp. 219-247; Vol. XLI, pp. 204-223, 1862); of the conception of imitation, E. Müller (in the volume above cited, pp. 1-23 and 346-361; also, in *Die Idee der Aesthetik in ihrem historischen Ursprung*, Ratibor, 1840), and W. Abeken (Gött. 1836); of A.'s *Poetics* and modern dramatists, F. v. Raumer (read in the Berlin Acad. d. Wiss., 1938); of his doctrine of the tragedy, Löbel (Leipa. 1796), A. Boeckh (*Gea. II. Schriften*, I, p. 180 seq., a discourse delivered in 1830), Starke (Neu-Ruppin, 1860), G. W. Nitzsch (Kiel, 1846), Heinrich Weil (in *Verhandl. der 10 Versammlung deutscher Philologen*, Basel, 1848, pp. 131-141), Wassmuth (Saarbrücken, 1852), Klein (Bonn, 1856), Jakob Bernays (Breslau, 1858, see above, ad § 46, and in the *Rh. Mus.*, new series, XIV, pp. 367-377, and XV, p. 306 seq.), Ad. Stahr (*Arist. u. d. Wirkung der Trag.*, Berlin, 1856, and notes to his translation of the *Poetics*, Stuttgart, 1860), Leonh. Spengel (*Ueber die κάθαρσις τῶν παθῶν*, Munich, 1859, in Vol. IX, of the *Abh. der Münchener Acad. d. Wiss.*, pp. 1-50, cf. *Rh. Mus.*, new series, XV, pp. 458-462); of these works and of other works by Liepert (*Arist. und der Zweck der Kunst*, *G.-Pr.*, Passau, 1869), Geyer, and others, a critical account is given by F. Ueberweg (in Fichte's *Zeitschr. für Philoa.*, Vol. 34, 1860, pp. 260-291; a *poetics* complement to that article is furnished in my article on *Die Lehre des A. vom dem Wesen und der Wirkung der Kunst*, *ibid.*, Vol. 50, 1867, pp. 16-39, and in Notes 23 and 25 to my transl. of A.'s *Poetics*, Berlin, 1869), Franz Susemihl (in *N. Jahrb. für Philol. u. Pädag.*, Vol. 35, 1862, pp. 395-423, and in his edition and transl. of the *Poetics*), and A. Döring (in *Philol.*, XXI, 1864, pp. 496-534, and XXVII, 1868, pp. 669-723). Gerh. Zilligens, *Arist. und das deutsche Drama*, Würzburg, 1865. Paul Graf York von Wartburg, *Die Katharsis des Arist. und der Oedipus Colonus des Sophokles*, Berlin, 1866. Cf. also E. Wachsmuth, *De Arist. Studii Homericæ*, Berlin, 1868, and the contributions to the critique and elucidation of Arist.'s *Poetics*, by Vahlen, Susemihl, Teichmüller, and others (see above, p. 143). On Lessing's conception of the Aristotelian doctrine of Tragedy, cf. K. A. F. Sundelin, Upsalæ, 1868.

On the Rhetoric of Aristotle in its relation to Plato's *Gorgias*, cf. H. Anton (in *Rh. Mus. f. Ph.*, new

series, Vol. XIV., 1859), and in its relation to Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*, Georg Richard Wiechmann (*Platonis et Arist. de arte rhetorica doctrinæ inter se comparatæ, diss. inaug.*, Berlin, 1864), and Spengel (*Ueber das Studium der Rhetorik bei dem Allen*, in the *Abhandl. der Mönch. Akad. d. W.*, 1842, and *Ueber die Rhetorik des Arist.*, *ibid.*, 1851; cf. also Spengel, *Philol.*, XVIII. 1862, pp. 604-646 and the literature there cited by him, p. 605 seq. on the Pseudo-Arist., so-called *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, as the author of which, the rhetorician Anaximenes, a contemporary of Arist., is named by Victorius and, in modern times, by Spengel), Usener (*Quæstiones Anaximeneæ*, Gött. 1856), and others. Sal. Kalischer, *De Arist. Rhetor. et Eth. Nicom.* (*Diss. inaug.*), Halle, 1868.

On the Aristotelian Theory of Education, cf. J. C. Orelli (in his *Philol. Beitr. aus d. Schweiz*, Zürich, 1819, I. pp. 61-130), Alex. Kapp (*Arist. Staatspädagogik*, Hamm, 1837), Fr. Chr. Schulze (Naumburg, 1844), Sal. Lefmann (*De Arist. in hominum educatione principia*, Berlin, 1864), Frid. Alb. Janke (*Aristoteles doctrinæ pedagogicæ pater, diss. inaug.*, Halle, 1866).

In accordance with his general metaphysical doctrines respecting the relation of essence to end, Aristotle can determine the essence of morality only by considering what is the object or aim of moral activity; the fundamental conception of his Ethics is accordingly that of the highest good, or rather, since ethics relates to human conduct, of the highest practical good attainable by man as an active being (το πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν. *Eth. Nic.*, I. 2); it is unnecessary, he observes, for the purposes of ethics, to speculate, after the manner of Plato, about the idea of the Good (*ibid.* I. 4). The aim of all moral action, says Aristotle, is admitted on all hands to be happiness or *eudæmonia* (εὐδαίμονια, τὸ εὖ ζῆν or εὖ πράττειν). *Eudæmonia* results from the performance of the peculiar work which belongs to man as man (*Eth. Nic.*, I. 6; X. 7). The peculiar work of man can not consist in merely living, for plants also live, nor in having sensations, for these are shared by man with the brute creation; it can only consist in a life of action, under the control of reason (ζῶν πρακτικῇ τινι τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος). Since now it is in the sphere of the characteristic activity of each living being that we are to search for its peculiar excellence, it follows that man's rational activity (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον), and none other, is at the same time honorable and virtuous activity (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν; *Eth. Nic.*, II. 5: ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἰναι ἂν ἐξὶς ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδίδει). The greatest happiness is connected with the highest of the virtues (*Eth. Nic.*, I. 6; X. 7). Nevertheless, for complete happiness a sufficient provision of external goods is essential, since these are necessary for the active manifestation of virtue, just as the equipping of the chorus is necessary for the representation of a dramatic work of art (*Eth. Nic.*, I. 11).

Pleasure is the complement of activity, it is the end in which activity naturally discharges itself and comes to rest; pleasure is to activity what beauty is to the perfect physical development of youth (*Eth. Nic.*, X. 4: τελειῶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἐξὶς ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπεργιγμένον τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκαλοῖς ἡ ὄρα). Pleasure is united with *Eudæmonia*, and exists in the highest degree in connection with that highest *Eudæmonia*, which results from knowledge (*Eth. N.*, X. 7).

Morality presupposes freedom. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no obstacles and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or constraint (*Eth. Nic.*, III., *init.*).

The reason must, on the one hand, be obeyed by the lower functions (especially by the πάθη, the passions), and, on the other, must rightly develop its own activities; on this double requirement is founded the distinction of the two kinds of virtues, the practical or ethical and the dianoetic virtues (ἠθικαὶ and διανοητικαὶ or λογικαὶ ἀρεταί, or αἱ μὲν τοῦ ἔθους, αἱ δὲ τῆς διανοίας ἀρεταί). The inclusion of the dianoetic or intellectual in the sphere of virtue is explained by the broader signification of the latter term in Greek (as equivalent to *ability*). Ἡθος [whence the English *ethics*], which denotes originally the

natural bent of man in mind and disposition (temperament), signifies here the moral character.

Aristotle's [above-cited] definition of ethical virtue (or the virtue of character) is worded in the original as follows (*Eth. Nic.*, II. 6): *ἐξίς προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὀρισμένη* (the MSS., to judge from the earlier editions, appear to have had *ὀρισμένη*, and that is probably the correct reading, although Bekker retains the Nominative) *λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσκειν*. Virtue is a *ἐξίς* [usually translated *habitus* in Latin and *habitude* in English], and the latter is to *δύναμις* [power, potentiality] as proficiency is to endowment; the ethical *δύναμις* is originally undetermined and may be determined in either of the two opposite moral directions; its actual development must take place in a definite direction, and the *ἐξίς* then has the corresponding character. (According to the Aristotelian definition—from which the subsequent definition of the Stoics deviated—all *ἐξεις* were also *διαθέσεις*, but not all *διαθέσεις* were *ἐξεις*, *Categ.*, 8, p. 9 a, 10; *διάθεσις* is defined, *Met.*, V. 19, as *τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ' εἶδος*; the *ἐξίς* is changed with difficulty, while those *διαθέσεις*, which are pre-eminently so-called and are not *ἐξεις*, such as warmth, coldness, disease, health, are easily changeable, according to *Categ.*, ch. 8, p. 8 b, 35. Cf. Trendelenburg, *Gesch. der Kategorienlehre*, p. 95 seq., and *Comm. ad De Anima*, II. 5, 5.) The "*ἐξίς προαιρετικὴ*," direction of the will or the disposition. The function of the reason in connection with the desires, which are prone to err through excess or omission (*ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις*), on the side of the *too much* or the *too little*, is to determine the right proportion or the mean (*μεσότης*); in this connection Aristotle himself (*Eth. Nic.*, II. 6) recalls the Pythagorean doctrine (which was also adopted by Plato in another reference) of limit and the unlimited (*πέρας καὶ ἀπειρον*).

In enumerating the particular virtues, Aristotle follows the order of the rank or dignity of the functions to which they have reference, advancing from the necessary and useful to the beautiful (cf. *Pol.*, VII. 14, p. 1333 a, 30). These functions are 1) physical life, 2) sensuous, animal enjoyment, 3) the social life of man in its various relations (possession and honor, social community in word and action, and, above all, political community), 4) the speculative functions.

The ethical virtues are courage, temperance, liberality and magnificence, high-mindedness and love of honor, mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship, and justice (*Eth. Nic.*, II. 7; cf. the less rigorous exposition in *Rhet.*, I. 9).

Courage (*ἀνδρεία*) is a mean between fearing and daring (*μεσότης περὶ φόβου καὶ θάρρους*); but not every such mean is courage, at least not courage in the proper sense of the term. In the strict sense, he only is courageous who is not afraid of an honorable death (*ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδής*, III. 9), and, in general, he only who is ready to face danger for the sake of the morally beautiful (*καλόν*, *Eth. Nic.*, III. 10, p. 1115 b, 12: *ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομνεῖ (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὰ φοβερά) τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς*). Genuine courage does not flow from passionateness (*θυμός*), although the latter may co-operate with the former, but from giving to the befitting (which depends on the moral end) the preference over life. The extremes, between which courage is the mean, are represented by the foolhardy man and the coward (*Eth. Nic.*, II. 7, and III. 10).

Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) guards the proper mean in respect of pleasures and pains (*μεσότης περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπας*), but rather in respect of pleasures than of pains; and also not in respect of pleasures of every sort, but in respect of the lowest pleasures, which are common to man with the animal, those of touch and taste; and yet more particularly, in respect of the "enjoyment which arises wholly through the sense of touch, whether in meats, in drinks, or in what are termed venereal pleasures" (*ἀπόλαυσις, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι*

ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ ἐν στείροις καὶ ἐν ποταίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγόμενος, III. 13). The extremes are intemperance and insensibility (II. 7, and III. 14).

Liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) observes the proper mean in giving and receiving (μεσότης περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν), especially in giving, and in cases where it is a question of comparatively small values (IV. 1); when greater values are involved, the right mean is magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια, IV. 4) or "princeliness." The extremes are prodigality and stinginess (II. 7 and IV. 1), and meanness and vulgarity (bad taste, IV. 4).

The proper mean in matters of honor and dishonor (μεσότης περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν), in cases of importance, is highmindedness (μεγαλοψυχία, IV. 7); in cases of less consequence, ambition (φιλοτιμία), or, more exactly, the correct mean between ambition and indifference (ἀφιλοτιμία, IV. 10). The high-minded or high-spirited man (μεγαλόψυχος) is he, who, being indeed worthy of great things, holds himself to be worthy of them (ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἀξίως ὢν). He who erroneously holds himself to be worthy of great things, especially he who incorrectly thinks himself deserving of high honor, is vain (χαῖνος), while he who underrates his own worth is mean-spirited (μικροψυχος). The ambitious (φιλότιμος) and the unambitious err in regard to the measure and manner in which, the reason for which, and the time when honor should be sought. Praiseworthy is only the correct mean, which, in opposition to the one or the other extreme, is termed sometimes ambition, sometimes indifference.

Mildness (πραότης) is the proper mean in seeking for revenge (μεσότης περὶ ὀργήν, II. 7, and IV. 11). Ὀργή is the desire of revenge (τιμωρίας ὀρεξίς), it is the passion of the θυμός; the θυμός is the potentiality, which may be developed either into ὀργή or into πρᾶνσις (placability; metaphorically, θυμός denotes ὀργή itself). Excess in regard to anger is irascibility, when the anger quickly rises and goes quickly away (whereas those who are πικροί, bitter, in their wrath, cherish it a long time); deficiency in this respect is ἀοργησία.

Truthfulness (or sincerity), facility in social intercourse, and friendliness (ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπέλεια and φιλία) are means in the management of one's words and actions in society (μεσότητες περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν). The first of these three virtues regards veracity (the ἀληθές) in discourse and action; the other two end in the agreeable (ἡδύ), the one (εὐτραπέλεια), being in place in social pastimes (ἐν ταῖς παιδαίαις) and the other (friendship), in all other social relations (II. 7 and IV. 12-14). The obsequious man praises and yields, in order not to render himself disagreeable to his companions, and the flatterer (κόλας) does the same from motives of self-interest. The fretful and the cross man care not, whether their conduct is offensive to others. The right mean of conduct in this respect has no particular name. It most resembles friendship, from which, however, it is distinguished, in that it is to be followed not merely among acquaintances and friends (whom we love), but also, so far as is becoming, in our intercourse with all whom we may meet. The candid man holds the mean between the braggart (ἀλαζών) and the dissembler (εἰρων), in that he gives himself out for just what he is, and neither boasts nor belittles himself. Those who indulge in well-timed mirth, are witty and elegant; those who carry mirthfulness to excess, are buffoons and rude; while those who hate all mirth, appear uncultivated, clownish, and stiff.

Supplemental. Aristotle treats of certain other "means," which are not regarded by him as properly virtues, and, in particular, of shame (the ἥδος of the αἰδέμενος), which he considers as only relatively praiseworthy (ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπικυρῆς), and more becoming to youth than to riper age (IV. ch. 15). Shame is the fear of ill-repute (φόβος ἀδοξίας) and is rather a passive emotion (πάθος) than a developed virtue (ἔξῃς). The extremes are represented by the timid and the shameless. Nemesis, or just indignation, is a mean (a μεσότης περὶ τὰ πάθη), whose extremes are envy (φθόνος) and spitefulness (ἐπιχαίρεκακία).

To justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) he devotes a minute consideration (*Εἰς Ν., V.*). Justice in the most general sense is the practice of all virtue toward others (*τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον, V. 5*); it is "perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but with reference to others" (*ἀρετὴ μὲν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον, V. 3*). It is the most perfect virtue, because it is the perfect exercise of all (perfect) virtue (*ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστὶ τελεία· τελεία δ' ἐστίν, etc.*—for *τελεία* is to be repeated in this passage, 1129 b, 31; cf. the similar turn of expression in Cic. *Twscul.*, I. 45: *nemo parum diu vivit, qui virtutis perfectas perfecto functus est munere*), and because he, who possesses it, is able to practice virtue as well in regard to others as in regard to himself. But justice, viewed as a single virtue among others, respects the equal and the unequal (*ἴσον* and *ἀνίσον*), and is further divisible into two species (*εἶδη*), of which the one is applied in the distribution (*ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς*) of honors or possessions among the members of a society, while the other takes the form of commutation in intercourse or trade (*ἐν ταῖς συναλλάγμασι*). Commutation may be either voluntary or involuntary; the former is settled by contract, the latter by the principles of penal justice. Distributive justice (*τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς δίκαιον* or *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*) rests on a geometrical proportion: just as the persons in question, with their individual worth (*ἀξία*), are to each other, so also must that be, which is dealt out to each ($A : B = \alpha : \beta$, where $B = e \cdot A$, and $\beta = e \cdot \alpha$). Commutative justice (*τὸ ἐν ταῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον* or *τὸ διορθωτικόν, δ γίνεται ἐν ταῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίους καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίους*) is, indeed, likewise an equalizing principle (*ἴσον*), but proceeds by arithmetical and not by geometrical proportion, since it regards not the moral worth of the persons involved, but only the advantage gained or injury suffered by them; commutative justice removes the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession, as occasioned by loss (or gain), by causing an equal gain (or loss), the latter increasing (or diminishing) the amount of the possession by so much as the first loss (or gain) diminished (or increased) it. The amount as thus restored (undiminished and unaugmented) is a mean between the less and the greater according to arithmetical proportion ($\alpha - \gamma : \alpha = \alpha : \alpha + \gamma$). In connection with this doctrine of Aristotle, cf. Plato, *Leges*, VI. p. 757, where the geometrically proportional is recognized as the principle of political justice, but the arithmetically proportional, as a political principle, is rejected: it is this arithmetical equality whose place in the economy of trade is justly vindicated by Aristotle. (Trendelenburg directs attention to this difference, *Das Ebenmaass*, etc., p. 17.)

Equity (*τὸ ἐπιεικές*) is a species of justice, not mere legality, but an emendation of legal justice, or a supplementing of the law, where the latter fails through the generality of its provisions (*ἐκἀνόρθωμα νόμου ἢ ἑλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου*). The provisions of the law are necessarily general, and framed with reference to ordinary circumstances. But not every particular case can be brought within the scope of these general provisions, and in such instances it is the part of equity to supply the deficiencies of the law by special action, and that, too, in the spirit of the lawgiver, who, if he were present, would demand the same action.

The dianoetic virtues are divided by Aristotle into two classes. These correspond with the two intellectual functions, of which the one exercised by the scientific faculty (*τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*), is the consideration of the necessary, and the other, exercised by the faculty of deliberation (*τὸ λογιστικόν*), is the consideration of that which can be changed (by our action). The one includes the best or the praiseworthy *ἐξεις* of the scientific faculty, the other includes those of the deliberating faculty. The work of the scientific faculty is to search for the truth as such; the work of the practical reason (*δύναμις*), which subserves the interests of practical action or artistic creation, is to discover that truth, which corresponds with correct execution. The best *ἐξεις* or virtues

of each faculty are therefore those, through which we approach nearest to the truth. These are—

A. With reference to that which is capable of variation: art and practical wisdom (*τέχνη* and *φρόνησις*), which are related to each other as *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν*. *Πράττειν* (action, conduct) has its end in itself, while *ποιεῖν* (formation, creation) ends in a positive product (*ἔργον*) distinct from the productive act (*ἐνέργεια*, *Eth. Nic.*, I 1; VI 5). Hence the value of the products of art is to be found in these products themselves, while the worth of the works of virtue lies in the intention. Art, as a virtue, is creative ability under true intellectual direction (*ἐξίς μετὰ λόγον ἀληθοῦς ποιητική*, VI 4); practical wisdom (or *φρόνησις*) is practical ability, under rational direction, in the choice of things good and in the avoidance of things which are evil for man (*ἐξίς ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου πρακτική περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά*, VI 5).

B. With reference to that which can not be changed by our agency: science and reason (*ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς*), the latter directed to principles, the former to that which is demonstrable from principles. Science is a demonstrative *ἐξίς* (*ἀποδεικτική*, VI 3); reason apprehends the principles of science (*ἀρχή*, or *ἀρχαί τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ*, VI 6).

In connection with the dianoetic virtues, another conception, expressed by the word *σοφία* (wisdom), is considered by Aristotle. This word, however, does not denote with him a fifth virtue distinct from those already named, but the highest potencies of three of them, namely, of art, science, and reason. In the sphere of art, it has a *relative* signification (*σοφός τὴν ἀνδριαντοποιεῖν*, wise, skilled in the art of sculpture, etc.); in the sphere of science and reason, it is taken absolutely (*ὅλως, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφός*), and is defined as the science and the reason of those things which have by their nature the highest worth or rank (*ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει*, VI 7). In one passage (*Eth. Nic.*, VI 7) *σοφία*, in the relative sense of the word, is termed the "virtue of art" (*ἀρετὴ τέχνης*); but it does not follow from this, that art itself is not a virtue, nor that science and reason are not virtues until they rise to absolute wisdom, for all these *ἐξείς* participate necessarily in truth, and all, which do this, are virtues (*Eth. Nic.*, VI 2 seq.).

To practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*) belong prudence (*εὐβουλία*), which finds out the right means for the end fixed upon (VI 10), and understanding (*σύνεσις*), which is exercised in passing correct judgments on that respecting which *φρόνησις* gives practical precepts. *Σύνεσις* is critical (*κριτική*), *φρόνησις* is imperative (*ἐπειτακτική*); correct discrimination (*κρίσις*) is the function of the *εὐνόμῳ*, or the man of good sense (VI 11).

Εγκράτεια (of which Book VII of the *Nic. Ethics* treats) is moral strength or self-control. Where this is wanting, that discrepancy arises between insight and action, which would be impossible if (as Socrates taught) knowledge possessed an absolute power over the will. The occasion for self-control arises in connection with whatever is pleasurable or painful; in the latter case it is endurance (*καρτερία*).

Friendship (*φιλία*) is of three kinds, according as it is based on the agreeable, the useful, or the good. The last is the noblest and most enduring (*Eth. Nic.*, VIII and IX.). The love of truth should have precedence before love to the persons of our friends (*Eth. N.*, I 4, 1096 a, 16; cf. Plat., *Rep.*, X. 595 b, c).

The natural community, to which the individual primarily belongs, is the family. The domestic economy includes, when complete, husband, wife, children, and servants. To the servants the master of the house should be an absolute ruler, not forgetting, however, to temper his rule with mildness, so that the man in the servant may also be respected. To the wife and children he must be as one who rules over freemen; to the former as an archon in a free commonwealth, to the latter as a king by right of affection and seniority

(*Pol.*, I. ch. 4). It becomes him to care more for his family, as human beings, and for their virtue, than for gain (*Pol.*, I. 5).

The character of the family life is essentially dependent on the character of the civil government. Man is by nature a political animal (*Pol.*, I. 2). The state is the most comprehensive human society. This society should not be an undifferentiated unity, but an articulated whole (*Pol.*, II. 1 seq.). The end of the state is good living (*εὖ ζῆν*), i. e., the morality of the citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue (*Pol.*, VII. 8). The end of the state is of a higher order than are the actual causes which may have led to its existence (*Pol.*, I. 2: *ἡ πόλις . . . γινομένη μὲν οὐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*).

Since the highest virtue is intellectual, it follows that the pre-eminent duty of the state is, not to train the citizens to military excellence, but to train them for the right use of peace (*Pol.*, VII. 2).

The various Forms of Government are ranked by Aristotle (as he himself intimates, *Pol.*, IV. 2) in the same order as by the author of the *Politicus* (p. 302 seq.), whom he designates as *τις τῶν πρότερον* (one who, before Aristotle, had treated of the same subject, by whom he can scarcely mean Plato, but rather some Platonist). But the point of view from which he enumerates them is not (as in the *Politicus*) that of legality or illegality, but that of the measure in which, in each, the rulers seek the common advantage of all, or only their own profit. When the rulers seek rather the good of all, than their own profit, their government is good; otherwise it is bad. In either case three forms of government are possible, according as the number of rulers is one, a few, or many. Hence these six forms of government, whose names are monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (*πολιτεία*, "the common name for all polities"), on the one hand; and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, on the other (*Pol.*, III. 7). The placing of the government in the hands of all the citizens is justified by the principle, that power belongs to the free as such. The rule of the few, or of only one, may result either from wealth or from education, or both. For every particular state, that form must be sought which corresponds with the given conditions (*ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη*). The very best form of government, is the aristocracy of intellectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities, in their highest development, be found in a few persons, or only in one.

None but a brave people is capable of freedom, and only among cultured nations is a comprehensive and enduring political union possible. It is only where courage and culture are combined (as in the Hellenes, who are thus distinguished from the Northern and Oriental nations), that a state can exist at once large and free, and it is only in this case that a nation is justified in extending its rule over peoples less advanced (*Pol.*, VII. 7).

The laws must accord with the form of the government (*Pol.*, III. 11).

The lawgiver must care most of all for the education of the young (*Pol.*, VIII. 1 seq.). The supreme end of all discipline should be virtue. Things which are serviceable for external ends may, however, and should also be made a subject of instruction, except where they tend to render the learner vulgar (i. e., disposed to seek external gain on its own account). Grammar, gymnastics, music, and drawing are the general elementary topics of instruction.

Art (*τέχνη*), in the wider sense of the term, as signifying that skill in giving form to any material, which results from or at least depends on the knowledge of rules, has a twofold object: it has either to complete what nature has been unable to complete, or it may imitate (*Phys.*, II. 8: *ὅπως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, ὃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται*). Nature has left man naked and unarmed, but has imparted to him the ability to acquire nearly all varieties of artistic skill, and has given him the hand, as the instrument of instruments (*De Part. An.*, IV. 10). The useful arts subserve the ends of

practical life. Imitative art supplies a refined amusement (*διαγωγή*) and recreation (*ἀναστροφή συντροφίας ἀνάπαυσις*); it emancipates (*κάθαρσις*) the soul from the pressure of pent-up feelings, through a harmless (and in other respects positively beneficial) excitation of them (*Pol.*, VIII. 7). By *κάθαρσις* (purification) is not to be understood a purification of the feelings from the bad that is in them, but rather the temporary removal, discharge, nullification of the feelings or passions themselves (cf. *Pol.*, II. 1267 a, 5-7, where the satisfaction of a passionate desire is represented as producing a "healing effect"). While the representation draws to its artistic conclusion, the feelings excited in the susceptible spectator and auditor become, by a corresponding and natural movement, stilled. Works of art, in which subjects of more than ordinary beauty or elevation are imitated, may serve as a means of ethical culture (*παιδεία, μάθησις*); so, in particular, certain kinds of music and painting, and, unquestionably, certain descriptions of poetry also. Art attains its ends by imitation (*μίμησις*). That which it imitates, however, is not so much the particular, with which the accidental is largely connected, as, rather, the essence of its particular object, and, as it were, the tendency of nature in its formation; in other words, art must idealize its subjects, each in its peculiar character. When this requirement is rightly met, the resulting work of art is beautiful, although the object imitated may be not (as in the case of the Tragedy) more beautiful and noble than ordinary objects, but (as in the case of the Comedy) only equal or even inferior to the latter in these respects. The good, when as such it is also agreeable, is beautiful (*Rhet.*, I. 9). Beauty implies a certain magnitude and order (*Poët.*, ch. 7).

The Tragedy is defined by Aristotle as the imitative representation of a weighty, finished, and more or less extended action, in language beautified by various species of ornamentation [meter and song], which are distributed separately to the different parts of the work [the dialogical and choral], acted and not merely recited, and, by exciting pity and fear, purging the mind of such passions* (*ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἥδυσμένη λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μαρίοις ὁρώμενη καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἑλπίου καὶ φόβου παραινύουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*, *Poët.*, ch. 6). The definition requires that the subject-matter of the tragedy should be serious and morally elevated (*πράξεως σπουδαίας*), and that its form should be esthetically pleasing (*ἥδυσμένη λόγῳ*). The last words indicate the cathartic operation of tragedy: the fear excited in the spectator by the tragical events represented and the consequent flow of sympathy in him are followed by the satisfaction and subsidence of the tendency to foster such feelings (i. e., feelings of fear and pity).† The *παραινύειν πόδην* and the *κάθαρσις*,

* That, among other things, pity and also fear and menace should be included among the moral elements of the tragedy had already been said by Plato, *Phædr.*, p. 268, where the addition of the third element (menace, *ἀπειλητικαὶ φόβου*) indicates plainly that at least Plato did not contemplate the excitation in the spectator of fear on his own account—an interpretation erroneously given by Leasing to the "fear" of Aristotle. Cf. *Ar.*, *Poët.*, II, p. 1453 a, 38; 13, p. 1453 a, 4.

† The *κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων* is—as has been shown, in particular by J. Bernays—not a purification of the emotions, but a (temporary) emancipation of the individual from their influence; yet I would not define it, more specifically (with Bernays), as a relief from permanent emotional tendencies (fearfulness, sympathetic disposition, etc.), obtained by giving way to them for the time, nor (with Heinrich Weil, who regards τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων as the subjective Genitive, with man understood as the object) as merely a deliverance from the uselessness, which attends the want of, or the exhaustion which follows, emotional excitement, but rather (as shown by me in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, Vol. 26, 1860, and in an article on Aristotle's doctrine of the nature and effect of art, *Ibid.*, Vol. 50, 1867, and also by A. Döring, who argues from the medical use of the term, in the *Philol.*, XXI. 1864), as a temporary removal, elimination, nullification of the emotions themselves. In Plato, *Phædo.*, p. 69 c, *κάθαρσις τῶν ἡδονῶν* = a deliverance (of the soul) from lusts; the *καθαρίης ἱκανοῦν μαθήματα δεῖν* (*Soph.*, p. 280 c) is one who delivers from such opinions as obstruct one's advance to true insight; the same construction occurs in *Arist.*, *Met. Endm.*, VI. 12 (*αὐτὸς*

the excitation and the natural subsidence of the feelings and their final counterpoise, tranquillization, and emancipation, will be the more surely and completely accomplished in

catharsis), which passage is rightly cited by Döring (*Philol.*, XXI. p. 506) in illustration of the medical use of the term. Against Bernays' interpretation it may be urged that neither his argument for the rendering of *anapausis* as "relief obtained by giving way to," nor that for the rendering of *katapausis* as "emotional dispositions," can be regarded as demonstrative, and that, according to *Pol.*, VIII. 7, p. 1342a, 1 seq., it is not the *anapausis*, but the *katapausis*, a form of "motion" (*κίνησις*), which is spoken of as the object of *anapausis*. Where Plato aims at the permanent deliverance of man from the emotions by their extirpation, Aristotle proposes instead, a temporary relief, to be obtained through their very excitation (by artificial means) and subsequent subsidence. After hearing music, witnessing the representation of a tragedy, etc., the emotions excited in us are again quieted by their very exhaustion, are in a sense purged out of us (*καταίπεται*); but although it is only the emotions immediately excited by the given work of art which are thus affected directly, yet indirectly all other similar emotions, which fall into the same concept with them and into which the emotional tendency might have been developed had it not been thus diverted, are similarly purged away; we are temporarily freed (or "cleaned") from all of them, until the necessity arises anew for their excitation and exhaustion. The object is here not to extirpate the feelings (*πάθος*) once for all, nor to generate apathy or even moderated emotion, nor is it to effect a (qualitative) improvement (purification) of the emotions, but rather to bring about a provisional satisfaction of a regularly recurring emotional instinct, an instinct which is in itself altogether normal, but which by long continuance would become an impediment in the way of other functions, especially the *μάθησις* (or function of cognitive learning), for which reason it must be appeased (according to Aristotle, by allowing it just and proper satisfaction) and the soul freed or as if cleaned from it. This instinct is not entirely wanting in any man, not even in those in whom it is abnormally feeble, but its nature is most easily recognized in cases where it appears with abnormal strength (as in enthusiasts), whence Aristotle, in explaining the concept of Catharsis (*Pol.*, VIII. 7), begins with such cases. (Cf. *Plat. Leges*, VII. p. 790 seq.) With the Catharsis of the feelings is necessarily connected a degree of pleasure (*κυνδισθέναι μετ' ἡδονῆς*), whether the feeling itself was originally inspiring or depressing. (Cf. numerous utterances by poets respecting the relief which arises from the expression of the feelings—as, e. g., Goethe's words concerning the "divine word of tones and tears," concerning the emotional relief arising from the production of works of art, *Esch. Choeph. Parod.*, Str. 65: *δὲ αἰσὺς δ' ὑγυῖαις βόηκεται κλαίει*, etc. ["the heart fed with cries of pain"], and others.) The object of art is not to transform *actually* existing emotions (those of common life), but to excite and exhaust emotions existing only in *potentiality* in an audience which is not yet moved, but is already waiting to be moved. In itself the Catharsis may operate indifferently on emotions of a noble or ignoble character; but as the man of coarser type craves a coarser species of excitation, so the more refined craves an excitation of a nobler kind (*Arist.*, *Pol.*, VIII. 7: *ποιοῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἰκανοῦς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθεῖν*). Aristotle requires that the need of both classes of the public be satisfied. The proposed excitation of the emotions, regarded as a mere means of recreation, is termed *ἀρεσκὴ* or *ταῖδια*, but as a means of refined entertainment through the enjoyment of a work of art it is *δαιωτική*. *Δαιωτική* presupposes a degree of mental culture. Still, works of high art, which leave the uncultivated man unmoved at the moment when they afford the purest enjoyment to the cultivated, may serve as a means of culture for the former, accustoming him to be glad and to mourn as and when he ought (*χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ὁρθῶς* or *οἷς δεῖ*) and so refining his disposition. This effect can not be produced by every kind of art, but only by that which idealizes, i. e., which reproduces its objects in forms more excellent and more beautiful than those which they commonly or actually possess; nor can it be produced in every person, but only in one who is capable of cultivation, hence chiefly in the young. Aristotle terms this the ethical effect of art (*ὑπερ ἀρετὴν ταῖδια, μάθησις*). In this connection he lays particular stress on certain kinds of music. The Tragedy (like the Epope) bears, according to its definition (as *μίμησις ὑπὸ φωνῇ σπουδαία*), that elevated, noble character, which makes the "purification" effected by it subservient to "refined entertainment." This character renders it *capable* of serving the ends of *ethical culture*. Still, Aristotle has at least not expressly considered the Tragedy as a means of education for the young, but seems rather, in treating of it, to presuppose the existence of a public possessing in general a sufficient degree of culture (even though not wholly free from deficiencies in this respect) to appreciate it as a means of "refined entertainment" (*δαιωτική*); but in view of the variability in the mean degree of culture of this public, Aristotle can not have meant completely to exclude from among the effects of the Tragedy, its effect as an instrument of ethical discipline. With the "Catharsis" effected by any art are in reality always joined by a casual nexus the other effects of the same,—the latter effects flow from the "Catharsis," but are generically different from it. The cathartic, hedonic, and ethico-disciplinary effects are co-ordinate in conception, and any interpretation of "Catharsis," which includes in its conception the notion of "purification," "refinement," "emancipation from the goadings of low and selfish impulses," etc., is to be con-

the spectator, the more complete the work of art is in itself, or the more true it is to the objective norms, which are founded in the nature of the object represented, and, especially, the less it is wanting (in what Goethe demands in the interests of its cathartic operation, namely) in the element of a reconciling rounding off or *finale*. The feeling awakened by the tragedy, though painful, yet contains in itself an elevating and pleasurable element, inasmuch as it is a feeling of sympathy with what is noble. This mixed character of the feeling is not expressly affirmed by Aristotle in the parts of the *Poetica* which are now extant, but it is affirmed in the *Rhetoric* (I. 11, 1370 b, 24–28), where, in the threnody, Aristotle finds involved not only the sentiment of sadness, but also the pleasure of memory and, so to speak, the pleasure of bringing before the mind in the present those things which the hero did in his life, and what sort of a man he was.

Auxiliary and subordinate to Politics is *Rhetoric*, the art of persuasion (*δύναμις περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ θεωρήσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν*, *Rhet.*, I. 2). The business of Rhetoric is not so much to persuade, as to furnish a knowledge of those considerations which, in connection with any subject in hand, are persuasive. It is of no use to attempt to convince the masses of men by scientific arguments. The basis of one's argumentation must be that which is known to all (*κοινά*). The rhetorical art must indeed be able to give an appearance of equal credibility to contradictory assertions. But the intention (*προαίρεσις*) of the orator must be to arrive at the true and the just. The rhetorical faculty, which may be developed and applied either in a good or in a bad sense, should be employed by us only in the good sense. The possibility of being perverted to wrong uses, belongs to rhetoric in company with every thing that is good, except virtue; but this fact does not destroy its utility (*Rhet.*, I. 1).

§ 51. The disciples of Aristotle in the next two to three centuries after his death, particularly Theophrastus of Lesbos, Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus the Musician, Dicaearch, Clearchus of Soli, and also Strato the Physicist, Lyco, Aristo, Hieronymus, Critolaus, Diodorus, Staseas, and Cratippus (which latter was heard at Athens by Cicero's son Marcus), abandoned, for the most part, metaphysical speculation, and applied themselves either to the study of nature or to a more popular treatment of Ethics, at the same time modifying in many ways the teaching of Aristotle—mostly in a naturalistic direction. The later Peripatetics returned again to the peculiar conceptions of Aristotle; their merits are founded chiefly in their exegesis of his works. The most noteworthy exegetes were Andronicus of

sidered as un-Aristotelian, because it effaces the strongly-marked opposition in which Aristotle places *κάθαρσις* to *μύθσις*. (Cf., in confirmation, Arist., *Poet.*, VII. 6, 1441 a, 21: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴς ἡθικὴ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁρμηστικὴ, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῇ καιροὺς χρηστέον, ἐν οἷς ἢ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μύθησιν. *Ib.* 7, 1441 b, 26: φαίνεται δὲ οὐ μᾶς ἐνκεν ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεονεχον χάριεν· καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνκεν καὶ καθάρσεως, τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν, πρὸς ἀρεσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συνταξίας ἀνάπαιυσιν. *Ib.* 1442 a, 3: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρᾶμεν τοῦτους, ὅταν χρῆσινται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυχεύοντας καὶ καθάρσεως, ταῦτ' δὲ τοῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεγκτικούς καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὄλους (ὄλους τοὺς;) παθητικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐκάστῃ καὶ πᾶσι γινεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κομφέζεσθαι πρὸς ἡδονῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρῆχει χάριν ἀβλαβὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις).

Rhodes, the arranger of the works of Aristotle (about 70 B. C.), Boëthius of Sidon (who lived in the time of Cæsar), Nicolaus of Damascus (who taught at Rome under Augustus and Tiberius), Alexander of Aegæ (a teacher of Nero), Aspasius and Adrastus of Aphrodisias (about 120 A. D.), Alexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 A. D.), who was called the Exegete κατ' ἐξοχήν; and among the still later interpreters (of the school of the Neo-Platonists), Porphyrius (in the third century), Themistius (in the fourth), and Philoponus and Simplicius (in the sixth century after Christ).

A. Trendelenburg, *Ueber die Darstellung der Peripatetischen Ethik bei Stobæus*, pp. 155-158, in the Monthly Reports of the Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., February, 1858; H. Meurer, *Peripateticorum philosophia morum secundum Stobæum*, Weimar, 1859. Cf. Meineke, in Müllers's *Zeitschr. f. d. G.-W.*, 1859, p. 368 seq.

The extant works of Theophrastus were first printed with those of Aristotle at Venice, 1495-98. *Theophrasti Eresii quas supersunt*, ed. Jo. Gottlob Schneider, Lipsic, 1818-21; ed. Fr. Wimmer, Breslau, 1842; Lipsic, 1854; Paris, 1866. On the works of Theophrastus compare Herm. Usener (*Analekta Theophrastea* [*dis. Bonnensia*], Lipsic, 1853, and *Rh. Mus.*, XVI. pp. 259 seq. and 470 seq.); on his *Phytology* works have been published by Kurt Sprengel (*Altera*, 1822) and E. Meyer (*Gesch. der Botanik*, I. 8 seq.); on his *Psychology*, cf. Philippson (*ὅλη ἀνέκδοτος*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1831), on his *Theology*, Kriech (Forchungen, I., pp. 389-349); on his delineation of human "characters," cf., among later writers, Carl Zell (Freiburg, 1823-25), Piniger (Ratibor, 1833-39), H. E. Foss (*Progr.*, Halle and Altenburg, 1834, '36, '61), Fr. Hanow (*Dis. Bonn.*, Leipz. 1856); cf. also Th. Charact., ed. Foss, Leipz. 1858; ed. Eug. Petersen, Leipz. 1859; Jac. Bernays, *Theophrastus' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, ein Beitrag zur Religionsgesch., mit krit. und erkl. Bemerkungen zu Porphyrius' Schrift über Enthaltsamkeit*, Berlin, 1866; *Theophr. Charact. et Philodemus de Virtute lib. X.*, ed. T. L. Usang, Hanau, 1868.

On Eudemus, see A. Th. H. Fritzsche (*De Eud. Rhodii philosophi Peripatetici vita et scriptis*, in his edition of the *Eud. Ethica*, Regensburg, 1851). The *Fragments* of Eud. have been edited by Spengel (*Eudemii Rhodii Peripatetici fragmenta quas supersunt*, Berlin, 1866, 2d edition, 1870).

Fragments from the writings of later Peripatetics (Aristoxenus, Dicaearch, Phanias, Clearchus, Demetrius, Strabo, and others) have been collected together by Carl Müller in his *Fragm. Historicorum Græc.*, Vol. II., Paris, 1848.

Aristoxenus' Grundsätze der Rhythmik, Greek and German, ed. by Heinr. Fessner, Hanau, 1840; *Elem. rhythm. fragmentum*, ed. J. B. Bartels (*dis.*), Bonn, 1854; *Aristoxeni Harmon. quas supersunt*, in Greek and German, by Paul Marquard, Berlin, 1868. Of Aristoxenus treat W. L. Mahne (Amst. 1798), Hirsch (*Ar. u. s. Grundsätze d. Rhythm. G.-Pr.*, Thorn, 1850), Paul Marquard (*De Ar. Tarentini Elementis harmonicis, dis. inaug.*, Bonn, 1863). Carl von Jan (in the *Philol.*, Vol. 29, 1869, pp. 300-317), and Bernh. Brill (*Ar.'s rhyth. und metr. Messungen, m. ein. Vorw. v. k. Lehre*, Lipsic, 1870).

Dicaearchi quas supersunt, ed. Max. Fuhr, Darmst. 1841. Of Dicaearch treat Aug. Buttman (Berlin, 1802), F. Osann (in *Beitr. zur griech. u. röm. Literaturgesch.*, Vol. II., Cassel, 1839), A. F. Näge (in *Opuscul. philol.*, I. Bonn, 1842), Mich. Kutorga (in *Mélanges gr.-rom. de l'Acad. de St. Pétersb.*, I. 1850), and Franz Schmidt (*De Heraclidis Pontici et Dicaearchi Musei dialogi deperditi, dis. inaug.*, Breslau, 1867).

On Clearchus, cf. J. Bapt. Verraert (*De Clearcho Solensi*, Gandavi, 1828).

On Phanias of Eretria, cf. Aug. Voisin (Gandavi, 1824), I. F. Ebert (Königsberg, 1895), A. Boeckh (in *Corp. inscr. Græc.*, Vol. II., Berlin, 1848, p. 304 seq.).

On Demetrius of Phalerus: H. Dohrn (Kiel, 1825), Th. Herwig (Rinteln, 1850), Ch. Ostermann (Hersfeld, 1847, and Fulda, 1857); cf. Grauert (*Hist. u. philol. Analekten*, I. p. 310 seq.).

On Strato of Lampascus: C. Nauwerck (Berlin, 1836); cf. Kriech, *Forchungen*, I. pp. 349-355.

On Lyco: Creuser (in the *Wiener Jahrb.*, 1833, Vol. 61, p. 209 seq.).

On Aristotle of Ceos: J. G. Hubmann (in *Jahn's Jahrb.*, 3. Supplementbd., 1834, p. 103 seq.), F. Ritschl (in the *Rhein. Mus.*, new series, I. 1842, p. 198 seq.), Kriech (*Forchungen*, I. p. 405 seq.).

Later Peripatetics are treated of by Brandis (*Ueber die griech. Ausleger des Arist. Org.*, in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1833, p. 278 seq.), and Zumpt (*Ueber den Bestand der philos. Schulen in Athen*, *ibid.* 1842, p. 96 seq.). On Adrastus, cf. Martin, *Theo. Smyrnaeus Astronom.*, Paris, 1849, p. 74 seq.

On Nicomachus of Damascus, cf. Conrad Triebner (*Quæst. Læconicæ*, p. 1: *De Nicol. Dam. Læconicæ*, Diss. Götting., Berlin, 1867).

Some of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias were printed in the 3d volume of the Aldine edition of Aristotle, Venice, 1495-98. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de anima, de fato*, in *Themist. opera*, Venet. 1584; *De fato*, ed. Orelli, Zürich, 1884; *Quæst. nat. et mor.*, ed. L. Spengel, Munich, 1843; *Comm. in Arist. metaph.*, ed. H. Bonitz, Berlin, 1847. On Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Usener (*Alex. Aphr. quæ feruntur problemat. lib. III. et IV.*, Programm of the Joachimsth. Gym. of Berlin, 1859), and Nourisson (*De la liberté et du hasard, ess. sur Al. d'Aphr., extrait des traités du destin et du libre pouvoir*, trad. en fr., Paris, 1870).

Aristotle is reported (by Gell., *N. A.*, XIII. 5), shortly before his death, to have returned to the question, whom he considered worthy to succeed him in the office of instructor, the allegorical answer, that the Lesbian and Rhodian wines were both excellent, but that the former was the more agreeable (*ἡδιων ὁ Λέσβιος*); thus he is said to have decided as between Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Lesbos, in favor of the latter. During thirty-five years after the death of Aristotle, Theophrastus was the leader of the Peripatetic School, and as he died while retaining that office, at the age of eighty-five (Diog. L., V. 36, 40, 58), he must have been born in 373 or 372 B. C., and died in 288 or 287. His original name was Tyrtamus, and it is said that the name of Theophrastus was given him by Aristotle, on account of the charm of his discourse. Theophrastus and Eudemus, in their works, mainly supplement the works of Aristotle, although, in some cases, they attempt to correct him. Of the two, Eudemus seems to have followed Aristotle the more faithfully, and Theophrastus to have proceeded the more independently. In the details, in which they deviate from Aristotle, Eudemus shows rather a theological, Theophrastus a naturalistic bias; the affinities of the former are thus relatively Platonic, those of Theophrastus Stratonian. Subsequent writers (e. g., Proclus, in his work *On Euclid*) drew considerably from the lost work of Eudemus on the History of Mathematical and Astronomical Doctrines. In Logic, the doctrines of the problematical judgment and the syllogism were specially developed by Theophrastus and Eudemus. In Metaphysics and Psychology, Theophrastus manifests a certain leaning toward the hypothesis of immanence in connection with problems which Aristotle would have solved by the doctrine of transcendence; yet, on the whole, Theophrastus remained true to the ideas of Aristotle. Thus he, like Aristotle (according to Simpl., in *Phys.*, f. 225), treats the reason (*νοῦς*) as the better and diviner part of man, affirming that it is implanted in man from without in a perfect state, and is not developed from within: so also he admits the substantial existence (*χωρισμός*) nature of the reason. Yet he teaches that that faculty is in some sense congenital (*σύντροφος*) with man, but how, our reports do not clearly inform us. He, too, terms the activity of thought a species of motion (*κίνησις*), but not motion in space. In Ethics, Theophrastus laid great emphasis on the "Choregia" of virtue, or on external goods as essential to the cultivation of virtue; without such goods perfect happiness, he taught, was unattainable. The reproach was very often brought against him in later times (particularly by the Stoics), that he had approved the poetic maxim: *vitam regit fortuna non sapientia*; but this he applied, without doubt, only to the external life of man. Theophrastus held fast to the doctrine that virtue is worthy to be sought on its own account, and that without it all external goods are valueless (Oic., *Tusc.*, V. 9; *De Leg.*, I. 13). He held that a slight deviation from the rules of morals was permissible and required, when such deviation would result in warding off a great evil from a friend or in securing for him a great good: He opposed the sacrifice of animals. All ethical relations resulted, according to him (cf. *Ar., Eth. N.*, VIII. 1), from the community (*οἰκισμός*) which exists among all living beings. The principal merit of Theophrastus consists in the enlargement which he gave to natural science, especially to Botany (Phytology), in the fidelity to nature with which

he executed his delineation of Human Characters, and next to these things, in his contributions to the constitution and criticism of the history of the sciences.

Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the "Musician," is said to have renewed the theory condemned by Plato, but which received an essentially new signification through Aristotle's conception of entelechy, namely, that the soul is the harmony of the body (*animam ipsius corporis intentionem quandam esse; velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic et corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos*, Cic., *Tusc.*, I. 10. 20). He is chiefly of significance on account of his theory of music, which, however, was not founded on philosophico-mathematical speculations, but on the acute perceptions of the ear. Besides his *Elements of Harmonics*, he wrote, among other things, biographies of philosophers, particularly of Pythagoras and Plato.

Dicæarch of Messene (in Sicily) gave the preference to the practical as compared with the theoretic life (Cic., *Ad Att.*, II. 76). He devoted himself more to empirical investigation than to speculation. His *Bioi* 'Ελλάδος, of which some fragments have been preserved, was a geographico-historical description of Greece. According to Dicæarch, there exist no individual substantial souls, but only, in its stead, one universal, vital, and sensitive force, which is diffused through all existing organisms, and is transiently individualized in different bodies (Cic., *Tusc.*, I. 10, 21; 31; 37).

Strato of Lampsacus, the Physicist (who succeeded Theophrastus as the head of the School in 288 or 287 B. C., and continued to occupy that position for eighteen years), transformed the doctrines of Aristotle into a consistent Naturalism. Perception and thought are immanent in each other (Plut., *De Sol. Animal.*, ch. 3); there exists no *vev* absolutely separate, or separable from the body. The seat of thought is in the head, between the eyebrows; the (material) traces (*ἰκοναί*) of the images of perception remain there permanently; in the case of memory these traces become again active (Plut., *De Plat.*, IV. 23). The formation of the world is the result of natural forces (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 13. 36; *Acad. Pr.*, II. 38. 121).

Cicero names as other and later Peripatetics: Lyco, the pupil of Strato, Aristo of Ceos, the pupil of Lyco, Hieronymus, Critolaus, and Diodorus (*De Fin.*, V. 5), but does not attribute to them any great significance. A disciple and heir of Aristo of Ceos was Aristo of Cos (Strabo, XIV. 2. 19). Callipho, also, whom Cicero (*De Fin.*, V. 25), mentions as older than Diodorus, appears to have been a Peripatetic, who taught in the second century B. C. Besides these may be mentioned the more erudite than philosophical Alexandrians: Hermippus (perhaps identical with the Hermippus of Smyrna, mentioned by Athenæus, VII. 327; cf. A. Lozynski, *Hermippi Smyrnaei Peripatetici Fragmenta*, Bonn, 1832; Preller, in Jahn's *Jahrb.*, XVII. 1836, p. 159 seq.; Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, III. 36 seq.), whose *Bioi* appear to have been composed about 200 B. C.; Satyrus, who likewise wrote a collection of biographies; Sotion (of whom Panzerbieter treats in Jahn's *Jahrb.*, *Supplementb.* V, 1837, p. 211 seq.), the author of the *Διαδοχαὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων*, of which Diog. Laërtius made much use (date, about 190 B. C.), and Heraclides Lembus (see Müller, III. 167 seq.), who, about 150 B. C., compiled a book of extracts from the *Bioi* of Satyrus and the *Διαδοχαὶ* of Sotion. To the first century B. C. belong Staseas of Naples (Cic., *De Fin.*, V. 25; *De Orat.*, I. 22), and Cratippus, who taught at Athens (Cic., *De Off.*, I. 1 *et al.*).

Andronicus of Rhodes, the (above-mentioned, p. 149) editor and expositor of the Aristotelian writings (about 70 B. C.), Boethus of Sidon (together with Sosigenes, the mathematician, of the time of Julius Caesar), and Nicolaus of Damascus (under Augustus and Tiberius) were particularly influential in promoting the study and intelligent understanding of the works of Aristotle. Andronicus arranged the works of Aristotle and

Theophrastus according to their subject-matter (Porphyr., *Vita Plotini*, 24: 'Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διέλιξε τὰς αἰτίας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτον συναγαγόν). In his exposition of the doctrine of Aristotle (according to the testimony of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius) he set out with logic, as the doctrine of demonstration (*ἀπόδειξις*, or that form of philosophizing which is employed in all systems of philosophy, and must therefore be first known, cf. Arist., *Met.*, IV. 3, 1005 b, 11); the customary arrangement of the works of Aristotle (which in all probability originated with him), following this principle, begins with the Logic (Analytics) or "Organon." His pupil, Boethius (among whose friends belonged Strabo the geographer, an adherent of Stoicism), judged, on the other hand, that Physics was the doctrine most closely related to us and most easily understood, and maintained, therefore, that philosophical instruction should commence with it. Each of them held fast to the axiom, that the *πραγματεῖαι* (complexes of related bodies of investigation, hence separate bodies of philosophical doctrine, branch-sciences of philosophy) were to be arranged according to the principle of an advance from the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* (the prior for us) to the *πρότερον φύσει* (the prior by nature). Diodotus, the brother of Boethius, was also a Peripatetic philosopher (Strabo, XVI. 2. 24). Boethius seems, at least in some respects, to have been followed by Xenarchus, who taught at Alexandria, Athens, and Rome. Nicolaus of Damascus set forth the Peripatetic philosophy in compendia, following in the *Metaphysics* a different order from that followed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The Alexandrian Peripatetic, Aristo, who lived at about this same time, seems to have occupied himself chiefly with logic and physics. Apuleius (*De Dogm. Pl.*, III.) ascribes to him a computation of the syllogistic figures, and he may also have been the author of an exegesis of the *Categories*, which is mentioned by Simplicius, as also of a work on the Nile, mentioned by Strabo (XVII. 1, 5), and with which was connected a dispute between this Peripatetic and the eclectic Platonist, Eudorus, on a question of priority (see below, § 65).

In many of the Peripatetics of this later period we find an approximation toward Stoicism,—so in particular in the author of the work *De Mundo* (*περὶ κόσμου*), which contains many doctrines taken from the Stoic Posidonius, and was probably composed in the first century B. C., or near the time of the birth of Christ; and so, also, in other regards, in the work of Aristocles of Messene (in Sicily), the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Through this sort of Eclecticism the way was prepared for the later blending together of the leading systems in Neo-Platonism.

The principal merit of the Peripatetics of the times of the emperors rests on their exegesis of the works of Aristotle. Explanatory notes to the *Categories*, as also to the *De Coelo*, were written both by Alexander of Aegæ, who was one of Nero's teachers, and by Aspasius, and by the latter, also, to the *De Interpretatione*, the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Adrastus wrote concerning the order of the works of Aristotle (*περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συγγραμμάτων*), and an exposition of Aristotle's *Categories* and *Physics*, as also of the *Timæus* of Plato, and perhaps of the *Ethics* of Aristotle and Theophrastus; also a work on *Harmonics*, in three books, and a treatise on the sun, which may have constituted a part of the astronomical work from which Theo's Astronomy (see below, § 65) was, for the most part, borrowed. Herminus wrote commentaries on the *Categories* and other logical writings of Aristotle. Aristocles wrote an historical-critical work on philosophy. Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, expounded the Peripatetic philosophy at Athens, from the year 198 to 211, in the reign of Septimius Severus. He was a pupil of Herminus, of Aristocles of Messene, and of Sosigenes, the Peripatetic (not to be confounded with the astronomer of the same name, of the time of Julius Cæsar). He distinguished in man a material or physical reason (*νοῦς ὑλικός* or

φυσικός), and an acquired or developed reason (νοῦς ἐπικτητός or νοῦς καθ' ἑξῆς), but identified the νοῦς ποιητικός (the "active intellect"), through whose agency the potential intellect in man becomes actual, with God. Of Alexander's Commentaries there are still extant the Commentaries on Book I. of the *Analyt. Priora*, the *Topics*, the *Meteorology*, the *De Sensu*, and Books I.-V. of the *Metaphysics*, together with an abridgment of his commentary on the remaining books of the *Metaphysics*; his commentaries on several of the logical and physical works, and on the Psychology of Aristotle, are lost. Of his other writings the following are preserved: *περὶ ψυχῆς*, *περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, *φυσικῶν καὶ ἡθικῶν ἀποριῶν καὶ λύσεων*, *περὶ μίξεως*. The "*Problems*" and the work "On Fevers," are spurious. Some other works by him have been lost.

§ 52. Zeno of Citium (on the island of Cyprus), a pupil of Crates, the Cynic, and afterward of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of Xenocrates and Polemo, the Academics, by giving to the Cynic Ethics a more elevated character, and combining it with an Heraclitean physics and a modified Aristotelian logic, founded, about 308 B. C., a philosophical school, which was called, from the place where it assembled, the Stoic. To this school belonged Zeno's disciples: Persæus, Aristo of Chios, Herillus of Carthage, Cleanthes, Zeno's successor in the office of teacher and one of his most important disciples, and also Sphærus, from the Bosphorus, a pupil of Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, who succeeded Cleanthes as teacher of the school, and who first brought the Stoic doctrine to a state of complete systematic development, Zeno of Tarsus, the successor of Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, Antipater of Tarsus, Panætius of Rhodes, who was the principal agent in the propagation of Stoicism at Rome, and Posidonius of Rhodes, a teacher of Cicero. Of the Roman Stoics may be mentioned: L. Annæus Cornutus (first century after Christ) and A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist, L. Annæus Seneca, C. Musonius Rufus, the slave Epictetus of Phrygia, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in the second century after Christ, and others.

Writers on the Stoic Philosophy in general, are Justus Lipsius (*Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*, Antw. 1604, and later), Dan. Heinsius (in his *Orat.*, Leyden, 1627), Gataker (*De disciplina Stoica cum ecclæ aliis collata*, prefixed to his edition of the works of Antoninus, Cambridge, 1658), and others, of whom the most important is Dietr. Tiedemann (*System der stoischen Philosophie*, 8 vols., Leipz. 1776). A survey of the whole historical development of Stoicism is given by L. Noack (*Aus der Stoa zum Kaiserthum, ein Blick auf den Weltlauf der stoischen Philosophie*, in the *Psyche*, Vol. V., Heft 1, 1862, pp. 1-24). Cf. D. Zimmermann, *Quæ ratio philosophiæ Stoicæ sit cum religione Romana*, Erlangen, 1856; L. v. Arren, *Quid ad informandos mores valere potuerit priorum St. doctrina*, Colmar, 1859; F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur le Stoicisme*, Paris, 1856; F. Lefebrière, *Mémoire concernant l'influence du Stoicisme sur la doctrine des jurisconsultes romains*, Paris, 1860; J. Dourif, *Du Stoicisme et du Christianisme considérés dans leurs rapports, leurs différences et l'influence respectives qu'ils ont exercés sur les mœurs*, Paris, 1868. The most thorough investigation of the subject of Stoicism and its representatives, is that of Zeller *Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., III. 1, 1865, pp. 26-240, 498-522, 608-684. [See *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, translated from Zeller's *Philos. der Griechen*, by O. Reischel, London, 1869.—Tr.]

Zeno's works (on the State, the Life according to Nature, etc.), a list of which is found in Diog. Laërt., VII. 4, have all been lost. Of Zeno treat Hemlingius Forellus (Upsala, 1700), and G. F. Jenichen (Leipsa. 1724); on his theology, cf. Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 365-404.

There exist dissertations on *Aristo of Chio*, by G. Buchner (Leipsa. 1725), J. B. Carpzow (Leipsa. 1742), and J. F. Hiller (Viteb. 1761), and a more recent one by N. Saal (Cologne, 1852); on his theology, see Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 404-415.

On Hierillus, cf. W. Tr. Krug (*Hierill de summo bono sententia explosa, non explosenda*, in *Symph. ad hist. philos.*, p. III., Leipsa. 1822), and Saal (*De Aristote Chio et Hierillo Carthaginiensi*, Cologne, 1852). On Persæus, see Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 436-448.

The hymn of Cleanthes to the supreme God has been edited by H. H. Claudius (Gött. 1756), J. F. H. Schwabe (Jena, 1819), Petersen (Kiel, 1825), Sturz and Merzdorf (*Cleanthes hymnus in Joveum*, ed. Sturz, Leipsa. 1765, ed. nov. cur., Merzdorf, Leipsa. 1835), and others. The other works of Cleanthes (the titles of which are given by Diog. L., VII., 174 seq.) have been lost. Cf. Gottl. Chr. Friedr. Mohrke (*Cleanthes der Stoiker*, Vol. I., Greifswald, 1814), Wilh. Traugott Krug (*De Cleanthes divinitatis assertore ac predicatorum*, Lelpsa, 1819); Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 415-436.

On Chrysippus have written F. N. G. Baguet (Louvain, 1822), Chr. Petersen (*Phil. Chrysa. fundamenta*, Altona and Hamb. 1827; cf. Trendelenburg's review in the *Berl. Jahrb. f. wiss. Kritik*, 1827, 217 seq.), Kriech (*Forstungen*, I. 448-481), Th. Bergk (*De Chrysippi Hbris repi avoφαρμακων*, Cassel, 1841), and Nicolai (*De logicis Chrysippi Hbris*, Quedlinburg, 1859). The titles of the works of Chrysippus are recorded in Diog. Laërt., VII. 199 seq.

On Diogenes the Babylonian, cf. Kriech, *Forschungen*, I. pp. 482-491; on Antipater of Tarsus: A. Wallot (Leodil, 1824), and F. Jacobs (Jena, 1827); on Panætius: C. G. Ludovici (Leipsa. 1784), and also F. G. van Lynden (Leyden, 1802), whose work is the more complete of the two. The fragments of Posidonius have been edited by J. Bake (Leyden, 1810), and C. Müller (in *Fragn. Hist. Gr.*, III. Paris, 1819, p. 245 seq.). Paul Tüppelmann (in his *Diss. Bonn.*, 1867), and R. Schapig (*De Posidonio Apameensi, rerum, gentium, terrarum scriptore*, Berlin, 1870) treat of Posidonius.

Of Stoicism among the Romans, Hollenberg (Leipsa. 1798), C. Aubertin (*De sap. doctoribus, qui a Ota. moris ad Neronis principis Romas vig.*, Paris, 1837), and Ferraz (*De Stoica disciplina apud poetas Romanos*, Paris, 1868) have written. Cf. also, C. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'empire Romain, philosophes et poètes*, Paris, 1864, 2. éd., 1866; P. Montée, *Le Stoicisme à Rome*, Paris, 1865; Franz Knickenberg, *De rationis Stoica in Periti utriusque apparentia, diss. phil.*, Münster, 1867; Herm. Schiller, *Die stoische Opposition unter Nero* ("Programm" of the Wertheim Lyceum), Wertheim, 1867; Lud. Borchert, *Num Antiochus Laëus, auctor scholas Proculianorum, Stoicas philos. fuerit addidit* (*Diss. inaug. jur.*), Berlin, 1869.

Of the philosophical writings of L. Annaeus Seneca, the following are extant: *Quæstionum Naturalium Libri VII.*, and a series of moral and religious treatises, *De providentia*, *De brevitate vitæ*, and consolatory writings addressed *ad Helviam matrem*, *ad Marciam* and *ad Polybium*; also *De vita beata*, *De otio aut recessu sapientia*, *De animi tranquillitate*, *De constantia*, *De ira*, *De clementia*, *De beneficiis*, and the *Epistolæ ad Lucillum*. Editions of them by Gronovius (Amsterdam, 1662), Ruhkopf (Leipsa. 1797-1811), Schweighäuser (Zweibrücken, 1809), Vogel (Leipsa, 1829), Fickert (Leipsa, 1842-48), Haase (*ibid.*, 1852-59), and others. Cf. E. Caro (*Quid de beata vita senserit Seneca*, Paris, 1852), Werner (*De Senecæ philosophia*, Breslau, 1825), Wölfflin (in the *Philologus*, Vol. VIII., 1853, p. 184 seq.), H. L. Lehmann (*L. Annaeus Seneca und seine philos. Schriften*, *Philologus*, Vol. VIII., 1853, pp. 309-323), F. L. Böhm (*Annaeus Seneca und sein Werth auch für unsere Zeit*, Progr. of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn. of Berlin, 1856), C. Aubertin (*Sur les rapports supposés entre Sénèque et St. Paul*, Paris, 1857 and 1869), Fickert (*G.-Fr.*, Breslau, 1867), H. Dörigens (*Antonin. cum Sen. ph. compar.*, Leipsa. 1857), Baur (*Seneca und Paulus, das Verhältnis des Stoicismus zum Christenthum nach den Schriften Senecæ*, in the *Zelltechr. f. wiss. Theol.*, Vol. I., 1853, Nos. 2 and 3), Holzheir (*Der Philosoph Annaeus Seneca, "Rastatter Schulprogr."*, Tüb. 1859 and '60), Rich. Volkmann (*Zur Gesch. der Beurtheilung Senecæ*, in *Päd. Archiv*, I., Stettin, 1859, pp. 550-610), W. Bernhardt (*Die Anschauung des Seneca vom Universum*, Wittenberg, 1861), Stedier (*Die religiös-ethische Weltanschauung des Philosophen Lucius Annaeus Seneca, "Rastatter Schulprogr."*, Frankfurt, 1866). Cf. Bernhardt, *Grundr. der röm. Litt.*, 4th ed., p. 311 seq.; Octav. Gréard, *De litteris et litterarum studio quid censerit Seneca* (*Diss.*), Paris, 1867; Ed. Goguel, *Sénèque*, Strasbourg, 1868.

L. Annaei Phædrus (*Corrupti*), *De natura decorum I.* (*repi τῆς τὰς θῶν φύσεως*), ed. Frid. Omann; ed. J. de Villotson, *De theologia physica Stoicorum commentatio*, Gött. 1844. Cf. Martini, *De L. Annaeo Cornuto*, Leyden, 1825.

C. Musonii Rufi reliquias et apophthegmata, ed. J. Venhuizen Peerlkamp, Harlem, 1823, præf. *Patri Musoniorum diss. de Mus. Ruffo* (which appeared first in 1788). Cf. Moser, in Daub and Creuzer's *Studien*, VI. 74 seq.; Böhler in the *N. Schweizerisches Museum*, IV. 1, 1864, pp. 23-27; Otto Bernhardt, *De Mus. Rufus* (G.-Fr.), Bonn, 1866.

The teachings of Epictetus (recorded by Arrian) in the *Discourses* and the *Encheiridion* have been edited by Joh. Schweighäuser (Leips. 1799); the same, together with the commentary of Simplicius on the *Encheiridion*, *ibid.* 1800. German translations of the *Discourses* of Epictetus have been made by J. M. Schultz (Altona, 1801-3), and K. Enk (Vienna, 1806); Enk has also translated Simplicius' commentary on the *Manual*, Vienna, 1807 (1806). [*The Works of Epictetus*, Engl. transl. by T. W. Higginson, founded on Mrs. Carter's version, Boston, 1865.—Tr.] Works on Epictetus have been written by Beyer (Marburg, 1796), Perlett (Erfurt, 1796), Spangenberg (Hanan, 1849), Winnefeld (in the *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, new series, Vol. 49, 1866, pp. 1-32 and 193-236), and Gust. Grosch (*Die Sittenlehre des Epiktet*, G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 1867). With the *Encheiridion*, a work entitled *Tabula (viva)*, falsely attributed to the Cebes, who appears in Plato's *Phaedo*, but in reality a product of the later Eclectic Stoicism, has often been published (by Schweighäuser, Leipsic, 1796, and others).

The work entitled *à la lettre*, by the Emperor Marc. Aurelius Antoninus, has been edited by J. M. Schultz (Schleswig, 1802), and others. Cf. N. Bach, *De M. Aurel. Ant. imperatore philosophante*, H. Doerges (see above, ad Seneca), F. C. Schneider's translation of the *Meditations* (Breslau, 1857, 2d ed., 1865), M. E. de Suckau, *Étude sur Marc Aurèle, sa vie et sa doctrine* (Paris, 1858), M. Noël des Vergers, *Essai sur Marc-Aurèle* (Paris, 1860), Max Königsbeck, *De Stoicismo Marci Antonini* (Königsberg, Pr., 1861), Ed. Zeller, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (in Zeller's *Fortr. u. Abh.*, Leips. 1865, pp. 82-107), Arn. Bodak, *M. Aur. Ant. als Freund und Zeitgenosse des Rabbi Jehuda ha-Nasi* (Leips. 1868), and J. Schuster, *Ethica Stoica apud M. Aur. Ant. fundamenta* (in the *Schriften der Unt. zu Kiel aus dem Jahre* 1868, Vol. XV., Kiel, 1868). [Engl. translation of the *Thoughts* of Marcus Aurelius, Boston, 1864.—Tr.]

Besides the works and fragments of works by the Stoics themselves, the statements of Cicero, Plutarch, Diog. L. (Book VII.), Stobæus, and Simplicius, are especially useful as aids to the knowledge of Stoicism.

The Stoics classed themselves among the followers of Socrates; and they were, in reality, so nearly related to Socrates in their doctrines and their theory of life, and were to such a degree mere continuators of previous types of thought, that, although they may be distinguished from the previous schools, they can not be regarded as introducing a new period in Greek philosophy. "Socrates sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage; the Stoics strove earnestly to build up their inner man after the pattern of the virtuous wise man, whose lineaments they borrowed from the transfigured and lofty form of Socrates" (Noack, *Psyche*, V., 1., 1862, p. 13). The productive element in the Stoic philosophy is indeed not to be deemed insignificant, especially in the field of ethics, where their rigorous discrimination and severance of the morally good from the agreeable, and the rank of indifference to which they reduced the latter, mark at once the merit and the oneness of the Stoics. But this element is less characteristic of their philosophy as a whole, than is the fact that in the latter those elements of humane culture were conserved, which were bequeathed to the Stoics by their predecessors, and by their agency these elements gained a wider range of influence. The modifications introduced by the Stoics into the form and content of philosophy were, for the most part, only such as grew out of their tendency to philosophize for the many. But the extensive diffusion of a philosophy, together with the modifications of doctrine involved in such diffusion, is insufficient, when taken in connection with an inferior activity in the development of philosophic thought, to authorize us in regarding that philosophy as inaugurating a new period.

The life of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, falls nearly between 350 and 250 a. c.; for the exact determination of the dates our authorities are too contradictory. A son of Mnaseas, who was a merchant of Citium (an Hellenic city, but inhabited partly by Phœnicians), he too was occupied in his early life (according to Diog. L., VII. 1 seq., until his 30th, or, more likely, according to Persæus as cited by Diog. L., VII. 28, until his 22d year) in commerce. A shipwreck is said to have been the occasion of his residing for a while at Athens. The reading of works written by the disciples of Socrates (especially the reading of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and the Platonic *Apology*, see Diog. L., VII. 3, and Themist., *Orat.* 23, p. 295 e) filled him with admiration for the strength of character dis-

played in Socrates, and in Crates the Cynic he thought he had found the man who, of all men then living, most resembled Socrates. Accordingly he joined himself to Crates as his pupil. It is said that the writings of Zeno, especially the earliest of them, contained ideas which savored of the harshness and coarseness of Cynicism and for which later Stoics (probably Chrysippus, in particular) sought to substitute others more mild and refined. Of Zeno's work on the State, it was said (Diog. L., VII. 4) that he wrote it *ἐν τῇ τοῦ κυνὸς οὐρᾷ*. Not deriving permanent satisfaction from the Cynic philosopher, he is said to have addressed himself to Stilpo, from whom Crates in vain sought again to tear him away (Diog. L., VII. 24); then he heard Xenocrates, and after the death of the latter (Olymp. 116.3 = 314 B. C.), Polemo. Not long after 310 B. C. he founded his own philosophical school in the *Στόα παλαιή* (a portico adorned with paintings of Polygnotus), whence the school received the name of *Stoic*. According to Apollonius (*ap.* Diog. L., VII. 28), he taught 58 years, which agrees with the statement that he lived 98 years; but according to the testimony of Persæus (*ibid.*) he died at the age of 72 years (for which Zumpt reads 92, in view of Diog. L., VII. 9, where Zeno in a letter to Antigonus calls himself 80 years old). The Athenians held Zeno in high respect, and honored him (according to Diog. L., VII. 10) with a golden chaplet, a tomb built at the public expense, and (Diog. L., VII. 6) also with a monument of brass, on account of the virtues and temperance of which he gave proofs in his doctrine and life, and to the practice of which he directed the young. The titles of Zeno's works are cited in Diog. L., VII. 4.

Cleanthes of Assus in Troas was (according to Diog. L., VII. 168) originally a pugilist, and, while in attendance on the instructions of Zeno, earned his living by carrying water and kneading dough in the night. He grasped philosophical doctrines slowly and with difficulty, but held faithfully to that which he had once taken in, whence Zeno is said to have compared him to a hard tablet, on which it was difficult to write, but which retained permanently the characters once inscribed on it. According to Diog. L. (VII. 176), he remained nineteen years the pupil of Zeno, whom he then succeeded as director of the school. For the titles of his written works, see Diog. L., VII. 174, 175.

Noteworthy pupils of Zeno, besides Cleanthes, were Persæus of Cittium, to whom we owe several valuable literary notices (he repaired in 278 B. C., with his pupil Aratus of Soli, from Athens to the court of the Macedonian king Antigonus Gonatas); Aristo of Chios, who undervalued the theoretical, rejected logic as useless, and physics as a science beyond the reach of man, and declared all things except virtue and vice to be indifferent; and Herillus of Carthage, who, on the contrary, defined the chief business of man as knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), but recognized, besides it another secondary end (*ἑτοιμασία*, Diog. L., VII. 165): according to him, the gifts of fortune are treasures of the unwise, but the highest good of the wise man is knowledge.

Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus in Cilicia (282–209 B. C.), the successor of Cleanthes, became, through his elaboration of the system on all its sides, a sort of second founder of the Stoic school, so that it was said (Diog. L., VII. 183) that "without Chrysippus, the Stoa had not existed" (*Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στόα*). Yet in his works he was very diffuse. He is said to have written daily five hundred lines, and to have composed seven hundred and five books, which were largely filled with citations from other authors, especially from poets, and with numerous repetitions and corrections of what had gone before (Diog. L., VII. 180 seq.).

After Chrysippus, Sphærus from the Bosphorus was one of the most celebrated of the disciples of Cleanthes. The Stoic Boëthus appears to have been a contemporary and condisciple of Chrysippus (as may be inferred from Diog. L., VII. 54).

The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes the Babylonian (from

Seleucia on the Tigris), of whom Crates of Mallos, perhaps also Aristarchus and certainly Apollodorus, the author of the *Χρονικά* (written after 144 B. C.) and other works, were pupils. The next leader of the school after them was Antipater of Tarsus. Diogenes went (according to Gell., *N. A.*, XV. 11) in the year 155 B. C., together with Carneades, the Academic, and Critolaus, the Peripatetic, to Rome, as an ambassador of the Athenians, commissioned to procure the remission of a pecuniary fine which had been laid upon them. Through the public discourses of these philosophers Greek philosophy was first made known at Rome; but it was unfavorably received by the Senate. "The Peripatetic, Critolaus, fascinated the Roman youth by the cleverness and aptness of his style; the Academic, Carneades, by his forcible delivery and brilliant acuteness; the Stoic, Diogenes, by the mild and tranquil flow of his discourses." (On the sending of these men to Rome in the year 155 B. C., cf. Wiseman, *G.-P.*, Hersfeld, 1867.) The elder Cato was unwilling that the public policy of Rome, which for the Roman youth was the supreme norm of judgment and action, and was possessed of unconditional authority, should, through the influence of foreign philosophers, become subordinated in the consciousness of these youth to a more universal ethical norm. He insisted on the earliest possible dismissal of these ambassadors. In his view, the condemnation of Socrates, as the author of such corrupting speculation, was just and was well done. A decree of the Senate, in the year 150 B. C., ordered the banishment from Rome of all foreign philosophers and teachers of rhetoric.

Panætius of Rhodes (about 180–111 B. C.), a disciple of Diogenes, won over to Greek philosophy such members of the Roman aristocracy as Lælius and Scipio (the latter of whom, according to Cic., *Acad.*, II. 2. 5, *et al.*, he accompanied on his diplomatic journey to Alexandria, 143 B. C.). He toned down the harsher elements of the Stoic doctrine (Cic., *De Fin.*, IV. 28), aimed at a less rugged and more brilliant rhetorical style, and, in addition to the authority of the earlier Stoics, appealed also to that of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dicaearch. Inclined more to doubt than to inflexible dogmatism, he denied the possibility of astrological prognostications, combated all forms of divination, abandoned the doctrine of the destruction of the world by fire, on which Boëthius and other Stoics had already had doubts, and with Socratic modesty confessed that he was still far from having attained to perfect wisdom. His work *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* forms the basis of Cicero's *De Officiis* (Cic., *De Off.*, III. 2; *Ad Att.*, XVI. 11). With him begins the leaning of Stoicism toward Eclecticism (a change largely due to Roman influences). Among the disciples of Panætius were the celebrated jurist and Pontifex Maximus, Q. Mucius Scaevola (died 82 B. C.), who distinguished three theologies: the theology of the poets, the theology of the philosophers, and the theology of statesmen. The first was anthropomorphic and anthropopathic, and therefore false and ignoble. The second was rational and true, but impracticable. The third, on which the maintenance of the established cultus depended, was indispensable. (Of a similar nature were the opinions of M. Terentius Varro [116–25 B. C.], who, educated by Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academic, was, like the latter, an eclectic in philosophy, but interpreted the religious myths allegorically, as did the Stoics, and conceived God as the soul of the universe.)

Posidonius of Apamea (in Syria), whose school was located at Rhodes, —where, among others, Cicero and Pompey heard him,—was a disciple of Panætius, and was regarded as the man of the most comprehensive and thorough learning (*πολυμαθέστατος* and *ἐπιστημονικώτατος*) among all the Stoics. He returned again toward dogmatism, blended Aristotelian and Platonic with Stoic doctrines, and took such pleasure in high-sounding discourse, that Strabo (III. p. 147) avers he was "inspired with hyperboles." About the same time lived the Stoic Apollodorus Ephillus, or, rather, Ephelus (*ὁ ἐφηλος*, *lentiginosus*).

The Stoic Athenodorus of Tarsus was superintendent of the Pergamean Library, and

afterward a companion and friend of the younger Cato (*Uticensis*), who approved the Stoic principles by his life. Besides him, Antipater of Tyre, who died at Athens about 45 B. C., was also a teacher of the younger Cato. The Stoic Apollonides, a friend of Cato, was with the latter during his last days.

Diodotus was (about 85 B. C.) a teacher of Cicero, and afterward (until his death, about 60 B. C.) a member of his family and his friend. Athenodorus, the son of Sardon, and perhaps a pupil of Posidonius, was (together with Arius of Alexandria, who is probably identical with the eclectic Platonist, Arius Didymus) a teacher of Octavianus Augustus. The Stoic Heraclitus (or Heraclides), the author of the "Homeric Allegories" (ed. Mehler, Leyden, 1851), seems to have lived near or in the time of Augustus. Under Tiberius, Attalus, one of Seneca's tutors, taught at Rome. An instructor of Nero was Chseremon, who appears afterward to have presided over a school at Alexandria.

L. Annaeus Seneca, born at Cordova (in Spain), was the son of M. Annaeus Seneca, the rhetorician, and lived A. D. 3-65. In philosophy, his attention was mainly directed to Ethics, which science, however, assumed in his hands rather the form of exhortation to virtue than that of investigation into the nature of virtue. Seneca resembled the Cynics of his time in the slight worth which he attributed to speculative investigations and systematic connection. The conception of earnest, laborious inquiry, as an ethical end possessing an independent worth in itself, is absent from his philosophy; he knows only the antithesis: *facere docet philosophia, non dicere; philosophiam oblectamentum facere, quæ remedium sit*, etc., and thus illustrates the Stoic distaste for the Aristotelian conception of philosophizing, carried to its extreme. By his hopeless complaints over the corruptness and misery of human life, and by his indulgent concessions to human frailty, he is far removed from the spirit of the earlier Stoa.

L. Annaeus Cornutus (or Phurnutus) lived about A. D. 20-66 or 68 at Rome. He wrote in the Greek language. A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist (A. D. 34-62), was his pupil and friend. M. Annaeus Lucanus (39-65), the son of Seneca's brother, was also among his scholars. To the Stoic circle belonged, further, the well-known Republicans Thraseas Pæstus (Tac., *Ann.*, XVI. 21 seq.; *Hist.*, IV. 10, 40) and Helvidius Priscus (*Ann.*, XVI. 28-35; *Hist.*, IV. 5 seq.; 9, 53).

C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinii, a Stoic of nearly the same type as Seneca, was, with other philosophers, banished from Rome by Nero (Tacitus, *Annal.*, XV. 71). He was afterward recalled, probably by Galba. When Vespasian ordered the banishment of all philosophers from Rome, Musonius was allowed to remain. He stood also in relations of personal intimacy to Titus. His pupil Pollio (perhaps, according to Zeller, III. 1, 1865, p. 553, identical with Valerius Pollio, the grammarian, who lived under Hadrian) wrote ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου, from which, probably, Stobæus drew what he communicates respecting his teachings. Musonius reduced philosophy to the simplest moral teachings. One of his finest sayings is: "If thou doest good painfully, thy pain is transient, but the good will endure; if thou doest evil with pleasure, thy pleasure will be transient, but the evil will endure."

Epictetus of Hieropolis (in Phrygia) was a slave of Epaphroditus, who belonged to the body-guard of the Emperor Nero. He was afterward set free, became a disciple of Musonius Rufus, and was subsequently a teacher of philosophy at Rome, until the proscription of philosophers throughout Italy by Domitian in the year 94 (Gell., *N. A.*, XIV. 11: cf. Suet., *Domit.*, 10), after which he lived at Nicopolis in Epirus. There he was heard by Arrian, who recorded his discourses. Epictetus emphasizes chiefly the necessity of holding the mind independent of all external goods, since these are not under our control. To this end we should bear and forbear (ἀνέχου καὶ ἀνέχου). Man should invariably strive to find

all his goods in himself. He should fear most of all the god (*θεός* or *δαίμων*) within his own breast.

The Sentences of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius are founded largely on those of Epictetus. His predilection for solitary contemplation, "in which man is alone in the presence of his Genius," gives to his views a certain relationship with the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which was soon afterward to arise.

§ 53. The Stoics make Logic and Physics in reality ancillary to Ethics, although they generally ascribe to Physics (including Theology) a higher rank than to Ethics. Under Logic many of the Stoics include Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Stoic Dialectic is a theory of cognition. It is founded on the *Analytics* of Aristotle, which it supplements by certain investigations respecting the criterion of truth, the nature of sensuous perception, and certain forms of the syllogism (the hypothetical syllogism, in particular). Its changes in terminology, however, mark no scientific progress, their only use being perhaps to facilitate the work of elementary instruction; greater intelligibility was not unfrequently purchased at the cost of profundity. The fundamental criterion of truth, with the Stoics, is sensuous distinctness in the mental representation. All knowledge arises from sensuous perception; the soul resembles originally a piece of blank paper, on which representations are afterward inscribed by the senses. In place of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the conceptual essences of things, the Stoics teach the doctrine of subjective concepts, formed through abstraction; in the sphere of objective reality only concrete individuals exist. For the ten categories of Aristotle the Stoics substitute four class-conceptions, to which they attribute the highest generality, viz.: Substratum, Essential Attribute or Quality, Condition, and Relation.

The Stoic conception of *ἐπιδόσεις* is treated of by Boorda (Leyden, 1923, from the *Annales Acad. Lugdun.*, 1622-23), the Stoic doctrine of categories by Trendelenburg (*Gesch. der Kategorienlehre*, Berlin, 1846, pp. 217-222); cf. Prantl, in his *Gesch. d. Logik*, Zeller, in his *Ph. d. Gr.*, etc., also, J. H. Ritter, *De St. doct. prae. de eorum logica*, Breslau, 1849, and Nicolai, *De Log. Chrys. Mörts, G.-Pr.*, Quedl. 1856.

The three parts into which philosophy was divided by the Stoics corresponded with the three species of virtue (*ἀρετή*), which, according to them, the philosopher must seek to acquire, namely: thoroughness in the knowledge of nature, in moral culture, and in logical discipline (Plutarch, *De Plac. Philos.*, I. *Proöm*: ἀρετὰς τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς· φυσικὴν, ἠθικὴν, λογικὴν). The Stoics employed the term Logic to denote the doctrine of λόγος, i. e., of thought and discourse, and divided it into Dialectic and Rhetoric (Diog. L., VII. 41: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν εἶναι εἰς δύο διαμεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικὴν). Cleanthes enumerated six divisions of philosophy: Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, and Theology; he does not appear to have reduced these, in any case, to the three above-named. To illustrate the nature and mutual relation of logic, ethics, and

physics, the Stoics (according to Diog. L., VII. 40, and Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 17 seq.) compared the first to the bones and sinews of the body, the shell of an egg, or the fence inclosing a garden; ethics, to the flesh of the body, the white of the egg (and the trees in the garden?); and physics (especially when viewed as theology), to the soul, the yolk of the egg (and the fruits of the garden?); some, however (e. g., Posidonius), preferred the comparison of physics to flesh, the white of the egg, and the trees in the garden, and ethics to the soul, the yolk of the egg, and the fruits of the garden.

In Dialectic the Stoics included the doctrine of language (grammar), and the doctrine of that which language expresses, representations and thoughts (theory of cognition, including the Aristotelian Logic as modified by them). In Grammar the Stoics accomplished very meritorious results, but these are in part of more significance for the history of positive philological inquiry than for the history of philosophy. Cf. the above-cited works of Lersch and Steinthal (p. 24).

The fundamental question in the Stoic theory of cognition relates to the means by which truth is to be known as such (*κριτήριον*). A similar question was not unknown to Aristotle (*Metaph.*, IV. 6: *τίς ὁ κρινὼν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ δλωσ τὸν περὶ ἑκαστα κρίνοντα ὁρθῶς*); but he classed it with such idle questions as whether we are now awake or asleep. With the Stoics, on the contrary, and in Post-Aristotelian philosophy generally, the question as to the criterion of truth acquired a constantly increasing importance. The theories of the earliest Stoics respecting the conditions of the veracity of our cognitions, are rather indefinite. Zeno (according to Cic., *Acad.*, II. 47) likened perception to the outstretched fingers, assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to the hand half closed, the mental apprehension of the object itself (*κατάληψις*) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and knowledge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it was more completely and surely closed. With this accords the Stoic definition of knowledge as the certain and incontestable apprehension, through the concept, of the thing known (*κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου*, Stob., *Ecl. Eth.*, II. 128), together with the consequent definition of science as the system of such "apprehensions." The Stoic Boëthius (Diog. L., VII. 54) named, as criteria: reason, sensation, desire, and science. But Chrysippus, in opposition to Boëthius, and with him Antipater of Tarsus, Apollodorus, and others, proposed as a criterion the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*, i. e., that representation which, being produced in us by a real object, is able, as it were, to take hold of or grasp (*καταλαμβάνειν*) that object. The word *καταλαμβάνειν* is also used in the work ascribed to Philolaus, to denote the grasping of an object (*ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὁμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν*, see Boeckh, *Philol.*, p. 192), and in the same sense it is employed by Posidonius, the Stoic, as cited in Sext., *Adv. M.*, VII. 93: "light," he says, "is apprehended by the luminous eye, sound by the aeriform ear, and the nature of the All by the related λόγος in us;" the expression *φαντασία καταληπτικὴ* is therefore to be explained, not as signifying a representation by which the soul is taken possession of or affected, but one by which the soul grasps the object of representation (*τὸ ὑπάρχον*). In Sext. Emp., *Adv. M.*, VII. 244, the *φαντασία καταληπτικὴ* is defined as a representation coming from the object and agreeing with it, impressed and sealed on the mind and incapable of existing without the existence of its object (*ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος*). There remains, it is true, in every case the second question, whether a given representation is of the kind described or not; it depends on our free determination either to allow or to deny to a representation that assent (*συγκατάθεσις*), by which we declare it true, and in this none but the sage will be sure never to commit an error. The next distinguishing element of correct representations is sensuous distinctness (*ἐνάργεια*), which is usually wanting in representations which do not arise from an object, i. e., in the

mere images of the fancy (*φαντάσματα*). But since it sometimes happens that false representations appear with all the force of true ones, the later Stoics (according to Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 253) found themselves constrained to add that the above description applied only to those representations against which no contrary instance could be alleged (*μηδὲν ἔχοντι ἐνσῆμα*).

Representation (*φαντασία*) was defined by Zeno as an impression on the soul (*τύπσις ἐν ψυχῇ*), and Cleanthes compared it to the impression made by a seal on wax; but Chrysippus opposed the definition of Zeno, taken in its literal sense, and himself defined *φαντασία* as an alteration in the soul (*ἐτεροίωσις ψυχῆς*, Sext. Emp., *Adv. M.*, VII. 228 seq.). The *φαντασία* is a state (*πάθος*) produced in the soul, to which it announces both its own existence and that of its object (Plutarch, *De Plac. Philos.*, IV. 12). Through our perceptions of external objects and also of internal states (such as virtuousness and viciousness, see Chrysippus, reported in Plut., *De St. Repugn.*, 19, 2), the originally vacant soul is filled with images and as if with written characters (Plut., *De Plac. Ph.*, IV. 11: *ὥσπερ χαρτίον ἐνεργὸν εἰς ἀπογραφὴν*).

After perceiving an object, the memory (*μνήμη*) of it remains behind, though the object be removed. From the combination of similar memories arises experience (*ἐμπειρία*, defined as *τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν πλῆθος*). The concept (*ἐννοια*) is formed from single perceptions by generalization, which act may be either spontaneous and unconscious (*ἀνεπιτεχρήτως*) or conscious and methodical (*δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας*); in the former case "common ideas" or "anticipations" (*κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ* or *προλήψεις*) are formed, in the latter, artificial concepts. "Common ideas" are general notions developed in the course of nature in all men (*ἐστὶ δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἐννοια φυσικὴ τοῦ καθόλου*, Diog. L., VII. 54). These ideas (although termed *ἐμφυτοὶ προλήψεις*) were not viewed by at least the earlier Stoics as innate, but only as the natural outgrowth from perceptions. Rationality is a product of the progressing development of the individual; it is gradually "agglomerated" (*συναθροίζεται*) out of his perceptions and representations until about the fourteenth year of life. The technically-correct formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences depends on the observance of certain rules, which it is the business of Dialectic to teach.

In their theory of the concept the Stoics maintain the doctrine which was afterward denominated Nominalism (or Conceptualism). They hold that the individual alone possesses real existence, and that the universal exists only in us, in the form of subjective thought (Plut., *De Plac. Ph.*, I. 10: *οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδίας ἔχασαν*). That Zeno put forth this doctrine in express opposition to the Platonic theory of ideas, is affirmed by Stob., *Ecl.*, I. 332.

The four most general concepts (*τὰ γενικώτατα*), which with the Stoics take the place of the ten categories of Aristotle, are: 1. *τὸ ὑποκείμενον* (the substratum); 2. *τὸ ποῦν*, or, more exactly, *τὸ ποῦν ὑποκείμενον* (essential quality); 3. *τὸ πῶς ἔχον*, or, more exactly, *τὸ πῶς ἔχον ποῦν ὑποκείμενον* (accidental state or condition); 4. *τὸ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχον*, or more exactly, *τὸ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχον ποῦν ὑποκείμενον* (relation).

In their doctrine of the Syllogism the Stoics began with the hypothetical syllogism which (according to Boëth., *De Syllog. Hypoth.*, p. 606) was first considered by the two Aristotelians, Theophrastus and Eudemus (most fully by the latter). Chrysippus (according to Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, VIII. 223) placed at the head of his doctrine of the syllogism, five "non-apodictic syllogisms" (*συλλογισμοὶ ἀναπόδεκτοι*), in which the Major Premise (*λήμμα*) posited two terms as either standing or falling together, while the Minor Premise (*πρόσληψις*) categorically affirmed or denied one of these terms, and the Conclusion (*ἐκφορά*) stated what then resulted for the other term. Cf. Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, I. pp. 467-496; Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.*, 2d ed., III. p. 98 seq.

§ 54. Physics, with the Stoics, includes not only Cosmology, but also Theology. The Stoics teach that whatever is real is material. Matter and force are the two ultimate principles. Matter is *per se* motionless and unformed, though capable of receiving all motions and all forms. Force is the active, moving, and molding principle. It is inseparably joined with matter. The working force in the universe is God. The world is bounded and spherical. It possesses a general unity, while containing the greatest variety in its several parts. The beauty and adaptation of the world can only have come from a thinking mind, and prove, therefore, the existence of Deity. Since the world contains parts endowed with self-consciousness, the world as a whole, which must be more perfect than any of its parts, can not be unconscious; the consciousness which belongs to the universe is Deity. The latter permeates the world as an all-pervading breath, as artistically creative fire, as the soul and reason of the All, and contains the rational germs of all things (λόγοι σπερματικοί). The formation of the world takes place by the transformation of the divine original fire into air and water; of this water, one part becomes earth, another part remains water, and a third part is changed by evaporation to air, which, again, is subsequently rekindled into fire. The two denser elements, earth and water, are mainly passive; the two finer ones, air and fire, are mainly active. At the end of a certain cosmical period all things are reabsorbed into the Deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire in a general conflagration. The evolution of the world then begins anew, and so on without end. The rise and decay of the world are controlled by an absolute necessity, which is only another expression for the subjection of nature to law or for the divine reason; this necessity is at once fate (εἰμαμένη) and the providence (πρόνοια), which governs all things. The human soul is a part of the Deity, or an emanation from the same; the soul and its source act and react upon each other. The soul is the warm breath in us. Although it outlives the body, it is yet perishable, and can only endure, at the longest, till the termination of the world-period in which it exists. Its parts are the five senses, the faculty of speech, the generative faculty, and the governing force (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), which is situated in the heart, and to which belong representations, desires, and understanding.

Of the natural philosophy, psychology, and theology of the Stoics, treat Justus Lipsius (*Physiologia Stoicorum*, Antw. 1610), Jac. Thomasius (*De Stoic. mundi constitutione*, Lipsie, 1673), Mich. Sonntag (*De pallogenesis Stoic.*, Jena, 1700), Joh. Mich. Kern (*Stoicorum Dogmata de Deo*, Göt. 1761), Ch. Meiners

Annus. de Stoicorum sententiis de animarum post mortem statu et fatiis, in his *Verm. philos. Schriften*, Altp. 1775-76. Vol. II., pp. 265 seq.) Th. A. Busbedissen (*Cur pauci semper fuerint physiologae Stoicorum sectatores*, Cassel, 1818), D. Zimmermann (*Quae ratio philosophiae Stoicae sit cum religione Romana*, Erlangen, 1856), R. Ehlers (*Vie ac potestas, quam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica, in doctr. apologetarum sec. II. habuerit*, Götting. 1859), O. Heine (*Stoicorum de fato doctrina, eorum. Portensis*, Nuremberg. 1859)—cf. O. Heine (*Stobaei Eclog. loci nonnulli ad St. philoa. pertin. emend.*, G. Pr., Hirschberg, 1860)—C. Wachsmuth (*Die Ansicht der Stoiker über Mantik und Dämonen*, Berlin, 1860), F. Winter (*Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctr. ethicae quomodo sint inter se apta ac connexa*, G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1868).

Theology and all other doctrines which Aristotle included under metaphysics, were assigned by the Stoics, for whom every thing real was material, to physics. But although they accorded to physics, as comprehending speculative theology, the highest rank among the philosophical disciplines, yet it was cultivated by them in fact with less zeal than was ethics. This is specially evidenced by the fact that they proceeded more independently in logic and ethics than in physics, for which they went back substantially to the Heraclitean natural philosophy.

Instead of the four Aristotelian *ἀρχαί* or principles (matter, form, working cause, and final cause, which, indeed, Aristotle had himself already reduced, in a certain aspect, to two), the Stoics name two principles: *τὸ πασῶν* and *τὸ πάσχω*, or the active and the passive principles. These principles are regarded by them as inseparably united in all forms of existence, including the highest. Hence they conceive the human and even the divine spirit, not as immaterial intelligence (*νοῦς*), but rather as force, embodied in the finest and highest material substances. The Stoics, therefore, differ from Aristotle, as Aristotle differed from Plato, and as Theophrastus (in a measure) and more especially Strato of Lampsacus and his followers differed from Aristotle, namely, in the increased tendency which they manifest to substitute the idea of *immanence* for that of *transcendence*.

According to Diog. L., VII. 134, the Stoics defined the passive principle as unqualified substance (*ἀπλοὺς οὐσία*) or matter (*ὑλὴ*), and the active principle as the reason immanent in matter (*ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος*) or Deity (*ὁ θεός*). The former is the constituent, the latter the formative principle of things (Senec., *Epist.*, 65. 2: *dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiunt, causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult, versat; ex illa varia opera producit. Esse debet ergo, unde aliquid fiat, deinde, a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia*). The highest rational force dwells in the finest matter. The principle of life is heat (Cic., *De Nat. Deorum*, II. 9: [according to the doctrine of the Stoics] *omne quod vivit, sive animal, sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusionem in eo calorem. Ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem*). This vital heat the Stoics derived from *τὸ πνεῦμα διήκον δι' ὅλου κόσμου* (the spirit that pervades the whole world) or *τὸ πῦρ τεχνικόν* (the artistically creative or forming fire, in distinction from fire that consumes). Says Plutarch (*De Stoic. Repugn.*, 41): "Chrysippus teaches, in the first book of his *περὶ προνοίας*, that at certain periods the whole world is resolved into fire, which fire is identical with the soul of the world, the governing principle or Zeus; but at other times a part of this fire, a germ, as it were, detached from the whole mass, becomes changed into denser substances, and so leads to the existence of concrete objects distinct from Zeus." Again (*ibid.* 38): "There was a beginning to the existence of the sun and moon and the other gods, but Zeus is eternal." That part of the Deity which goes forth from him for the formation of the world, is called the *λόγος σπερματικός*, or "seminal reason" of the world, and is resolved into a plurality of *λόγοι σπερματικοί* (Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 101; Plutarch., *Plac. Ph.*, I. 7). That the Stoic Boëthius, and also Panætius and Posidonius, abandoned the dogma of the burning up of the world, and

affirmed its imperishability, and that Diogenes, the Babylonian, in his old age, advanced at least so far as to entertain doubts of that dogma, is asserted by the author of the work which goes under the name of Philo, and is entitled *περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου*, pp. 497 (ed. Mangey) and 502 (pp. 492-497 stand, in the manuscripts and published editions of the work, by several leaves too near the beginning, as is shown by J. Bernays in the *Monatsber. der Berliner Akad. d. W.*, 1863, pp. 34-40; this section should be advanced to p. 502).

Diog. L. (VII. 140) mentions, as doctrines of the Stoics, the unity, finiteness, and sphericity of the world. Beyond the world exists an unlimited void. Time (*ᾧδ᾽* 141) is the extension of the motion of the world (*διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως*). It is infinite both in the direction of the past and of the future.

All individual things are different from each other (Senec., *Epist.*, 113, 13: *exegit a se [divini artificis ingenium], ut, quae aia erant, et dissimilia essent et imparia*). No two leaves, no two living beings are exactly alike. This view was expressed subsequently by Leibnitz in his *principium identitatis indiscernibilium*, in connection with his Monadology.

The new world, which comes forth after each general conflagration, becomes, in consequence of the necessity which governs all things, in all respects similar to that which preceded it (Nemes., *De Nat. Hom.*, ch. 38). Yet not all of the Stoics seem to have understood this necessity in so rigorous a sense. Cleanthes, in his "Hymn to Zeus," excepts from the influence of the divinely determined Necessity, all evil actions, saying: "Nothing takes place without thee, O Deity, except that which bad men do through their own want of reason; but even that which is evil is overruled by thee for good, and is made to harmonize with the plan of the world." Cf. also Cleanthes, as cited by Epictetus, *Manual*, 52:

Ἄγρου δέ μ' ὃ Ζεῦ καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Περικλυμένη
Ὅποι ποθ' ἡμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος
Ὅς ἐφομαι γ' ὁκνός· ἦν δέ μὴ θέλῃ,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐφομαι.

Chrysippus sought (according to Cic., *De Fato*, 18), by distinguishing between "principal" and "auxiliary" causes, to maintain the doctrine of fate, and yet to escape from that of necessity, asserting that fate related only to auxiliary causes, while the *appetitus* remained in our own power.

The human soul, as defined by the Stoics, is an inborn breath (Diog. L., VII. 156: *τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα*), or, more explicitly, an inborn breath extending continuously through the whole body (Chrysippus ap. Galen., *H. et Plat. Plac.*, ed. Kühn, Vol. V., p. 287: *πνεῦμα σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον*). It is a part severed from the Deity (*ἀπόκασμα τοῦ θεοῦ*, Epict., *Diss.*, I. 14. 6). Its eight parts (the *ἡγεμονικόν*, or governing part, the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the generative force) are enumerated by Plutarch, *De Plac. Ph.*, IV. 4 (cf. Diog. L., VII. 157 seq.). That the *hegemonikon*, or governing part, was situated in the breast, and not in the head, was inferred by Chrysippus and others, chiefly from the circumstance that the voice, by which thoughts are expressed, arises from the breast. Yet on this point the Stoics were not all agreed (Galen., *Hipp. et Plat. Pl.*, III. 1, p. 290 seq.).

Cleanthes asserted (Diog. L., VII. 157) that all souls would continue to exist until the general conflagration of the world, but Chrysippus admitted this only for the souls of the wise. Panætius appears (according to Cic., *Tusc.*, I. 32) to have denied the doctrine of immortality altogether. But the later Stoics returned, for the most part, to the earlier doctrine.

As the most important document of the Stoic Theology, the "*Hymn of Cleanthes to Zeus*" (op. Stob., Ecl., I. p. 30) may here find a place:

Κρότος' ἀθανάτων, πολύννημε, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,
 Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμον μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
 Χαῖρε· σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν.
 Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἔσμεν, ἱὲς μίμημα λαχόντες
 Μοῖναι, δοῦα ζωεῖ τὸ καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαίαν.
 Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω, καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰέσω.
 Σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὁδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαίαν
 Πείθεται ἢ κεν ἄγχι καὶ ἐκὼν ὑπὸ σείο κρατεῖται.
 Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀκινήτοις ἐνὶ χερσίν,
 Ἀμφέκη, πυρόεντα, ἀεὶ ζῶντα κεραυνῶν,
 Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλῆγῃς φύσεως πάντ' ἐρρίψααν.
 Ὡς σὺ κατειθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
 Φοιτῇ μινύμενος μεγάλους μικροῖς τε φέσσει,
 Ὅς τόσους γεγαῶς ὑπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός.
 Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμων
 Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πῶλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ.
 Πλὴν ὅπσοι βέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
 Ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,
 Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ σὺ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.
 Ὡς γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα συνήρμακος ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
 Ὡς εἷς γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἔχοντα,
 Ὅν φεύγοντες ἔωσιν δοῖαι θνητῶν κακοὶ εἰσιν,
 Δύσμοροι, αἳ τ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες
 Οὔτ' ἐσθρῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν,
 Ὡς κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχουεν.
 Αὐτοὶ δ' αὐθ' ὀρμῶσιν ἐνευ καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα,
 Οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδᾷ δυσέρειστον ἔχοντες,
 Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
 Ἀλλὰ δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα.
 Ἀλλὰ Ζεῦ πάντοτε, κελαινεφέες ἀρχικέραυνε,
 Ἀνθρώπους μὲν βίου ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λαγρής,
 Ἦν σὺ, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, ὃς δὲ κυρῆσαι
 Γνώμης, ἣ πλίνους σὺ δικῆς μέτα πάντα κυβερνῆς,
 Ὅφρ' ἐν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβόμεσθά σε τιμῇ.
 Ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε
 Θνητὸν ἔσθν', ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον,
 Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δικῇ ἔμμεν.

§ 55. The supreme end of life, or the highest good, is virtue, i. e., a life conformed to nature (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν), the agreement of human conduct with the all-controlling law of nature, or of the human with the divine will. Not contemplation, but action, is the supreme problem for man. But action implies, as its sphere, human society. All other things exist for man and the gods, but man exists for society. Virtue is sufficient for happiness. It alone is a good in

the full sense of that word; all that is not virtue or vice is neither a good nor an evil, but a something intermediate; but among things intermediate, some are to be preferred and others to be rejected, while others still are absolutely indifferent. Pleasure follows upon activity, but should never be made the end of human endeavor. The cardinal virtues are practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*), courage, discretion, and justice. Only he who unites in himself all virtues can be said truly to possess virtue as such. To the perfect performance of duty (or *κατόρθωμα*), it is essential that one should do right with the right disposition, the disposition possessed by the sage; right action as such, without reference to disposition, is the befitting (*καθήκον*). The sage alone attains to the complete performance of his duty. The sage is without passion, although not without feeling; he is not indulgent, but just toward himself and others; he alone is free; he is king and lord, and is inferior in inner worth to no other rational being, not even to Zeus himself; he is lord also over his own life, and can lawfully bring it to an end according to his own free self-determination. The later Stoics confessed that no individual corresponded fully with their ideal, and that in fact it was possible only to discriminate between fools and those who were advancing (toward wisdom).

On the moral philosophy of the Stoics, cf. C. Scloppius (*Elementa Stoicas Philosophias Morales*, Mayence, 1606), Joh. Barth. Niemeyer (*De Stoicorum ἀρεταῖς*, Helmsl. 1679), Joa. Franz Budde (*De Erroribus Stoicorum in Philos. Morali*, Halle, 1695-96), C. A. Heumann (*De εὐσχεσία Philosophorum, maxime Stoicorum*, Jena, 1708), Joh. Jac. Dornfeld (*De fine hominis Stoico*, Leipzig, 1720), Christoph Meiners (*Ueber die Apathie der Stoiker*, in his *Verm. philos. Schriften*, Leipzig, 1775-76, 2d part, p. 180 seq.), Joh. Neeb (*Verhältnisse der Stoischen Moral zur Religion*, Mayence, 1791), C. Ph. Conz (*Abhandlungen über die Geschichte und das Eigenthümliche der späteren stoischen Philosophie, nebst einem Versuche über christliche, kantische und stoische Moral*, Tüb. 1794), J. A. L. Wegschneider (*Ethices Stoicorum recentiorum fundamenta cum principis ethicis Kantianis compar.*, Hamb. 1797), Ant. Kress (*De Stoicorum supremo ethico principio*, Witt., 1797), Christian Garve (in the Introductory Essay prefixed to his transl. of Aristotle's *Ethics*, Vol. I., Breslau, 1798, pp. 54-59), E. G. Lillie (*De Stoicorum philosophia morali*, Altona, 1800), Wilh. Traug. Krug (*Zenonis et Epicuri de summo bono doctrina cum Kantiana comp.*, Wittenb., 1800), Klippel (*Doctrinas Stoicorum ethicæ atque Christ. expositio*, Götting. 1823), J. C. F. Meyer (*Stoicorum doctrina ethica cum Christ. comp.*, Götting. 1823), Deichmann (*De paradoxo Stoicorum, omnia peccata paria esse*, Marb. 1828), Wilh. Traug. Krug (*De formulæ, quibus philosophi Stoici summum bonum definiunt*, Leipzig, 1834), M. M. a Baumhauer (*περί τῆς εὐλόγου ἡγεγυγῆς, veterum philos., præcipue Stoic., doctrina de morte voluntaria*, Utrecht, 1843), Munding (*Die Grundzüge der stoischen Moral*, Rottweil, 1846, "Programm"), F. Ravaisson (*De la morale des St.*, Paris, 1850), Guil. Giddonsen (*De eo quod Stoici naturas convenienter vivendum esse principium ponunt*, Leipzig, 1852), M. Heinze (*Stoicorum de affectibus doctrina*, Berlin, 1861), *Stoicorum ethica ad origines suas relata*, Naumburg, 1862), Winter (*Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctrinæ ethicæ quomodo sint inter se apta et connexa*, G.-Pr., Wittenb. 1868), Käster (*Die Grundzüge der stoischen Tugendlehre*, Progr. of the Werder-Gymn., Berlin, 1864).

According to Stob., *Ecl.* II. p. 122, the ethical end, as defined by Zeno, was *harmony with one's self* (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ συμφέρονος ζῆν), Cleanthes being the first to define it as conformity to nature (by adding τῇ φύσει τὸ ὁμολογουμένως).

Still, Diog. L. (VII. 87) says that Zeno, in his work *περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως*, expressed the principle of morals as *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*, and this statement is all the more credible, because Speusippus (agreeably to his naturalistic modified Platonism) had already defined happiness as a perfect *ἕξις* ("habitude") in things according to nature (according to Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, II. p. 418 d), and Polemo (according to Cic., *Acad. Pr.*, II. 42) had demanded that men live virtuously, enjoying the things provided by nature (*honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliat*), and Heraclitus also (*ap. Stob., Serm.*, III. 84, see above *ad* § 15, p. 42) had enounced the ethical postulate, that men should be guided by nature in their actions (*ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαλόντας*). The "nature," which we are to follow, is with Cleanthes principally the nature of the universe; Chrysippus, on the contrary, defines it as the nature of man and of the universe combined, our natures being parts of universal nature. The formula of Chrysippus was: "Live according to your experience of the course of nature (*κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων* or *ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*, Diog. L., VII. 87 seq.). A general leaning toward the anthropological conception of the principle of morals is manifest in the formulas employed by the later Stoics, especially in the following dictum of certain of the latest of them: "The end of man is to live agreeably to the natural constitution of man" (*τέλος εἶναι τὸ ζῆν ἀκολούθως τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ*, Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, II. p. 476). The formula of Diogenes Babylonius demanded the use of prudence and reason in selecting things according to nature (*τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ*); that of Antipater of Tarsus required the unvarying choice of things conformable, and rejection of things non-conformable to nature, to the end of attaining those things which are to be preferred (*ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγόμενους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηκεῶς καὶ ἀπαρabaύτως πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῶν προηγμένων κατὰ φύσιν*); Panætius recommended following the impulses of nature (*τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν τῆς φύσεως ἀφορμὰς*), and Posidonius required men to live, having in view the true nature and order of all things (*τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν*). Seneca was of opinion that the simple *ὁμολογουμένως* was sufficient, since wisdom consisted "in always willing and rejecting the same things," and that the limitation "rightly" was also unnecessary, since "it was impossible for one to be always pleased with any thing which was not right."

The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation (Diog. L., VII. 85, expressing the doctrine of the first book of the *περὶ τελῶν* of Chrysippus: *πρῶτον οἰκτεῖν εἶναι παντὶ ζῳῇ τὴν αὐτοῦ σὺστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν*). Pleasure is the natural result (*ἐπιγίννημα*) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony with our nature. Of the various elements of human nature, the highest is reason, through which we know the all-controlling law and order of the universe. Yet the highest duty of man is not simply to know, but to follow obediently the divine order of nature. Chrysippus (*ap. Plutarch., De St. Repugn.*, ch. 2) censures those philosophers who regard the speculative life as having its end in itself, and affirms that in reality they practice only a finer species of Hedonism. (This only proves that to Chrysippus, as to the most of his contemporaries, the earnest labor of purely scientific investigation had become unfamiliar and incomprehensible.) Nevertheless, the Stoics affirm that the right praxis of him, whose life is conformed to reason (*βίος λογικός*), is founded on speculation (*θεωρία*) and intimately blended with it (Diog. L., VII. 130).

Virtue (*recta ratio*, Cic., *Tusc.*, IV. 34) is a *διάθεσις*, i. e., a property in which (as in straightness) no distinction of more or less is possible (Diog. L., VII. 98; Simplic., *in Ar. Cat.*, fol. 81 b). It is possible to approximate toward virtue; but he who only thus approximates is as really unvirtuous as the thoroughly vicious; between virtue and vice (*ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία*) there is no mean (Diog. L., VII. 127). Cleanthes (in agreement with the

Cynics) declared that virtue could not be lost (*ἀναπόβλητον*), while Chrysippus affirmed the contrary (*ἀποβλητήν*, Diog. L., VII. 127). Virtue is sufficient for happiness (Cic., *Parad.*, 2; Diog. L., VII. 127), not because it renders us insensible to pain, but because it makes us superior to it (Sen., *Ep.*, 9). In his practical relation to external things, man is to be guided by the distinction between things to be preferred (*προηγμένα*) and things not to be preferred (*ἀπροπροηγμένα*, Diog. L., VII. 105; Cic., *De Fin.*, III. 50). The former are not goods, but things possessing a certain value and which we naturally strive to possess; among these are included the primary objects of our natural instincts (*prima naturae*). In our efforts to obtain them we are to be guided by their relative worth. An action (*ἐνέργημα*), which is conformed to the nature of the agent and which is therefore rationally justifiable, is befitting (*καθῆκον*); when it results from a virtuous disposition or from obedience to reason, it is *καθῆκον* in the absolute sense, or morally right action (*εὐεργέημα*, Diog. L., VII. 107 seq.; Stob., *Ecl.*, II. 158). No act as such is either praiseworthy or disgraceful; even those actions which are regarded as the most criminal are good when done with a right intention; in the opposite case they are wrong (Orig., c. *Cels.*, IV. 46; correct, by this passage in Origen, the statements of Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 194; *Pyrrh. Hyp.*, III. 245). Since life belongs in the class of things indifferent, suicide is permissible, as a rational means of terminating life (*εὐλογος ἔξαρσις*; cf. Cic., *De Fin.*, III. 60; Sen., *Ep.*, 12; *De Prov.*, ch. 6; Diog. L., VII. 130).

All virtues were reduced by Zeno to *φρόνησις*, practical wisdom, which, however, took in various circumstances the form of (distributive) justice, prudence, and courage (Plut., *De Stoi. Repugn.*, 7; Plut., *Virt. Mor.*, ch. 2: *ὁρίζμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀνευμερτοῦς δυναστοσύνῃ, ἐν δὲ ἀλπερούς σωφροσύνῃ, ἐν δὲ ὑπομεμερτοῦς ἀνδρίᾳ*). Later Stoics, adopting the Platonic enumeration of four cardinal virtues, defined moral insight as the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent; courage as the knowledge of things to be feared, of things not to be feared, and of things neither to be feared nor not to be feared; prudence (self-restraint) as the knowledge of things to be sought or avoided, and of things neither to be sought nor avoided; and justice as the distribution to every person of that which belongs to him (*summa cuique tribuere*). In every action of the sage all virtues are united (Stob., *Ecl.*, II. 102 seq.).

The emotions, of which the principal forms are fear, trouble, desire, and pleasure (with reference to a future or present supposed evil or good), result from the failure to pass the right practical judgment as to what is good and what evil; no emotion is either natural or useful (Cic., *Tusc.*, III. 9, and IV. 19; Sen., *Ep.*, 116).

The sage combines in himself all perfections, and is inferior to Zeus himself only in things non-essential. Seneca, *De Prov.*, 1: *Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt*. Chrysippus (according to Plut., *Adv. St.*, 83): "Zeus is not superior to Dio in virtue, and both Zeus and Dio, in so far as they are wise, are equally profited the one by the other." The fool should be classed with the demented (Cic., *Paradox.*, 4; *Tusc.*, III. 5). Without prejudice to his moral independence, the sage is a practical member of that community, in which all rational beings are included. He interests himself actively in the affairs of the state, doing this with all the more willingness the more the latter approximates to the ideal state which includes all men (Stob., *Ecl.*, II. 186).

The distinction between the wise and the unwise was conceived most absolutely by Zeno, who is said to have divided men peremptorily into two classes, the good (*εὐεργεταί*) and the bad (*φύλας*, Stob., *Ecl.*, II. 198). With the confession, that in reality no sage, but only men progressing (*προκόπουν*) toward wisdom could be found, goes hand in hand among the later Stoics (particularly from and after the time of Panætius) a leaning toward Eclecticism; while, on the other hand, elements of Stoic doctrine were incorporated into the speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians.

§ 56. Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) belonged to the Athenian Demos, Gargettos, and was a pupil of Nausiphanes, the Democritean. Adopting, but modifying, the Hedonic doctrine of Aristippus, and combining it with an atomistic physics, he founded the philosophy which bears his name. To the Epicurean school belong Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who died before Epicurus, Hermarchus of Mitylene, who succeeded Epicurus in the leadership of the school, Polyænus, Timocrates, Leonteus and his wife Themistia, Colotes of Lampsacus and Idomeneus, Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus, and his successor, Dionysius; also Basilides, Apollodorus, "the profuse," author of more than four hundred books, and his pupil, Zeno of Sidon (born about 150 B. C.), whom Cicero distinguishes among the Epicureans, on account of the logical rigor, the dignity, and the adornment of his style, and whose lectures formed the principal basis of the works of Philodemus, his pupil; two Ptolemies of Alexandria, Demetrius the Laconian, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phædrus, contemporary with Cicero, but older than he, Philodemus of Gadara in Coele Syria (about 60 B. C.), T. Lucretius Carus (95-52 B. C.), author of the didactic poem *De Rerum Natura*, and many others. Epicureanism had very many adherents in the later Roman period, but these were, for the most part, men of no originality or independence as thinkers.

Epicuri περί φύσεως β', α', in Herculanensium voluminum quas supersunt, tom. II., Naples, 1809; tom. X., 1850. *Epicuri fragmenta librorum II. et XI. de natura, voluminibus papyraceis ex Herculanensibus reperta. ex tom. II. eolum. Hercul. emendatiua*, ed. J. Conr. Orellius, Leips. 1818. New fragments from the same work (which serve in part to correct and complete passages of Book XI., previously published) are contained in the sixth volume of the *Hercul. eoll. collectio altera*, of which the first part appeared at Naples in 1866. *Metrodori Epicurei de sensationibus comm.*, in the *Hercul. eoll., Neapol.*, tom. VI., 1839. *Idomeni Lampsaceni fragmenta*, in *Fragm. Hist. Græcæ*, vol. II., Paris, 1848. Πλευροπέτου περί ἀλλόγου καταφασχόντος (in part well preserved) in the *Hercul.*, Vol. IV., Naples, 1832. *Phædrus Epicureus, vulgo Anonymi Herculanensis, De Natura Deorum fragmentum*, ed. Drummond (*Herculanensis*, London, 1810); ed. Petersen, Hamburg, 1833. (The title should be, rather: φιλοδήμου περί εὐσεβείας); cf. *Volum. Hercul. collect. alt.*, tom. II., 1862; Spengel, *Aus den Herculan. Rollen: Philod. περί εὐσεβείας*, from the *Trans. of the Munich Acad.* (1864), *Philol.-philos. Class.*, X. 1, pp. 151-167; Sauppe, *De Philod. libro De Pietate*, Göttingen, 1864.

Philodemi de Musica, de Virtute, and other works, in the *Herculanens. eolum.*, tom. I., III., IV., V., VI., VIII., IX., X., XI., 1798-1856. Φιλοδήμου περί κακίων, ἁρωγίων περί ὁπῆς, etc., in the *Herculanensium voluminum*, p. I., II., Oxford, 1824-25. Leonh. Spengel, *Das vierte Buch der Rhetorik des Philodemus in den Herculanensischen Rollen*, in the *Trans. of the Bavarian Academy (philos. Cl.)*, Vol. III., 1st div., p. 301 seq., Munich, 1840. *Philodemi περί κακίων liber dectimus, ad vol. Hercul. exempla Neapolitanum et Oxonienses distincti, supplementi, capituli Herm. Sauppe, Leips. 1853. Philod. Abh. über den Hochmuth und Theophr. Haush. u. Charakterbilder*; Greek text and German translation by J. A. Hartung, Leips. 1857. *Herculanensium voluminum quas supersunt collectio altera. Tom. I. seq.: Philodemi περί κακίων καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν, et: περί ὁπῆς, etc.*, Nap. 1861 seq. *Philodemi Epicurei de ira liber, e papyro Hercul. ad fidem exemplorum Oxoniensis et Neapolitani*, ed. Theod. Gomperz, Leips. 1864. *Herculanensische Studien*, by Theod. Gomperz, First Part: *Philodem über Inductioneslehre* (φιλοδήμου περί σπουδῶν καὶ σπουδαιότητος), nach der Oxforder und Neapolitaner Abschrift krag, Leips. 1865; Second Part:

Philodem über Frömmigkeit, *ibid.* 1866 (cf. Phaedr., above). *Theophrasti Characteres et Philodemi de vitis liber decimus*, ed. J. L. Ussing, Leipzig, 1868.

Recent editions of the *De Rerum Natura* of T. Lucretius Carus are those of C. Lachmann (Berlin, 1st ed., 1850, with Commentary), Jak. Bernays (Leips. 1852, 2d ed., 1857), and H. A. J. Munro (Cambr. 1866); translations (in German) by Kœbel (Leips. 1821, 2d ed., 1831), Gust. Bossart-Oerden (Berl. 1865), Brieger (Book I., 1-369, Posen, 1866), and W. Binder (Stuttgart, 1866), and (in French) by M. de Pongerville (Paris, 1866). [Engl. transl. by J. S. Watson and J. M. Good, in Bohn's Classical Library.—Tr.]

Besides the works of the Epicureans, the principal source of our knowledge of Epicureanism is Book X. of the historical work of Diogenes of Laërta, together with Cicero's accounts (*De Fin.*, I., *De Nat. Deorum*, I., etc.). Modern writers on Epicureanism are: P. Gassendi (*Exercitationum paradoxiarum ad Aristotelem, liber I.*, Grenoble, 1634; *II.* The Hague, 1659; *De vita moribus et doctrina Epicuri*, Lyons, 1647; *Animadv. in Diog. L., X.*, Leyd., 1649; *Synagoga philosophias Epicuri*, The Hague, 1655), Sam. de Sorbière (Paris, 1680), Jacques Rondel (Paris, 1679), G. Ploucquet (Tüb. 1755), Batteux (Paris, 1758), Warnekrus (Greifsw. 1795), H. Wygmans (Leyden, 1834), L. Preller (in the *Philol.*, XIV., 1859, pp. 66-90), and on the doctrine of Lucretius, in particular, A. J. Reissacker (Bonn, 1847, and Cologne, 1855), Herm. Lotze (in the *Philologus*, VII., 1852, pp. 696-732), F. A. Märker (Berlin, 1858), W. Christ (Munich, 1856), E. Haller (Jena, 1857), J. Gull. Braun (*L. de atomis do-ctr., diss. inaug.*, Münster, 1857), E. de Suckan (*De Lucr. metaph. et mor. doct.*, Paris, 1857), T. Montée (*Étude sur L. cons. c. moralité*, Paris, 1860), Susemihl and Brieger (in the *Philologus*, XIV., XXIII., and XXIV.), Hildebrandt (*T. Lucr. de primordiis doctrinae. G.-Pr.*, Magdeb. 1864), H. Sauppe (*Comm. de Lucretii cod. Victoriano*, Göttingen, 1864), Rud. Bouterwek (*Laurel. quaest. gramm. et crit.*, Halle, 1861; *De Lucr. codicis Victoriano*, Halle, 1865), E. Heine (*De Lucr. carminibus de rerum natura, diss. inaug.*, Halle, 1865), Th. Bindseil (*Ad Lucr. de rerum nat. carm. libr. I. et II., qui sunt de atomis, diss. inaug.*, Halle, 1865; *Quaest. Lucr.*, G.-Pr., Anclam, 1867). Cf., also, H. Purmann (*G.-Pr.*, Cothbus, 1867), Jul. Jessen (*Diss.*, Gött. 1868), and C. Martha (*Le Poème de Lucrèce*, Paris, 1868), and Bockemüller (*Lucretiana*, G.-Pr., Stade, 1865).

According to Apollodorus (*ap.* Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus was born Olymp. 109.3, during the archonship of Sosigenes, in the month of Gamelion (hence in December, 342, or in January, 341 B. C.). He passed his youth in Samos (according to Diog. L., X. 1), whither a colony had been sent from Athens, and it appears, also, that the place of his birth was not Athens, but Samos, since the colony was sent out in Olympiad 107.1 (352-51). His father, a school-teacher (*γραμματοδιδάσκαλος*), was drawn thither as a Kleruchos.* Epicurus is said to have turned his attention toward philosophy at the age of fourteen years, because his early instructors in language and literature could give him no intelligence respecting the nature of Hesiod's Chaos (Diog. L., X. 2). According to another and quite credible account (*ibid.* 2-4), he was at first an elementary teacher or an assistant to his father. At Samos Epicurus heard the Platonist Pamphilus, who, however, failed to convince him. Better success attended the efforts of Nausiphanes, the Democritean, who had also passed through the school of the Sceptics and who recommended a Sceptical bias, which should, however, do no prejudice to the acceptance of his own doctrine. According to Diog. L., X. 7 and 14, the Canonic (Logic) of Epicurus is founded on principles which he learned from Nausiphanes. Epicurus made himself acquainted with the writings of Democritus at an early age (Diog. L., X. 2). For some time he called himself a Democritean (Plut., *Adv. Colot.*, 3, after the accounts of Leonteus and other Epicureans); but he afterward attached so great importance to the points of difference between himself and Democritus, that he conceived himself justified in regarding himself as the author of the true doctrine in physics as well as in ethics, and in opprobriously designating Democritus by the name of *Ἀνρόκριτος* (Diog. L., X. 2). In the autumn of 323, when he was eighteen years old, Epicurus went for the first time to Athens, but remained there only a short time. Xenocrates was then teaching in the Academy, while Aristotle was in Chalcia. It was asserted by some that Epicurus attended the lessons of Xenocrates; others denied it

[* A Kleruchos was a settler, to whom colonial possessions had been allotted, and who retained abroad the rights of Athenian citizenship.—Tr.]

(Cic. *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 26). According to Apollodorus (*ap. Diog. L.*, X. 14), Epicurus commenced as a teacher of philosophy at the age of thirty-two (310 or 309 B. C.), in Mitylene, taught soon afterward at Lampsacus, and founded some years later (306 B. C., according to *Diog. L.*, X. 2) his school at Athens, over which he presided until his death in Olymp. 127.2 (270 B. C.).

A cheerful, social tone prevailed in the school of Epicurus. Coarseness was proscribed. But in the choice of means of amusement no excess of scrupulousness was observed. Aspersive gossip respecting other philosophers, especially respecting the chiefs of other schools, seems to have formed a favorite source of entertainment; Epicurus himself, as is known, did not hesitate uncritically to incorporate into his writings a mass of evil reports, which were, for the most part, unfounded. He embodied the principles of his philosophy in brief formulæ (*κύρια δόξαι*), which he gave to his scholars, to be learned by heart.

In the composition of his extremely numerous works, Epicurus was very careless, and so proved his saying, that "it was no labor to write." The only merit allowed to them was that they were easy to be understood (Cic. *De Fin.*, I. 5); in every other respect their form was universally condemned (Cic. *De Nat. Deorum*, I. 26; *Sext. Emp., Adv. Math.*, I. 1 *et al.*). They are said to have filled in all nearly three hundred volumes (*Diog. L.*, X. 26). A list of the most important works of Epicurus is given in *Diog. L.*, X. 27 and 28. Diogenes names, in particular, besides the *κύρια δόξαι*, 1) works directed against other philosophical schools, *e. g.*, "Against the Megarians," "On Sects" (*περὶ αἱρέσεων*); 2) logical works, *e. g.*, "On the Criterium or Canon;" 3) physical and theological works, *e. g.*, "On Nature," in thirty-seven books (of which considerable remains have been found at Herculaneum; a part of them are yet to be published), "On the Atoms and Empty Space," "On Plants," "Abridgment of the works on Physics," "Chaeredemus, or On the Gods," etc.; 4) works on moral subjects, *e. g.*, "On the End of Action" (*περὶ τέλους*), "On Upright Action," "On Piety," "On Presents and Gratitude," etc., besides several whose nature is not evident from their titles (such as "Neocles to Themista," "Symposion," etc.), and Letters. Some of the latter have been preserved by Diogenes Laërtius.

The most important of the immediate disciples of Epicurus was Metrodorus of Lampsacus. His works, which were largely polemical, are named in *Diog. L.*, X. 24. The other more considerable Epicureans (Hermarchus, etc.) are also named, *ibid.* X. 22 seq. In the very front rank of the Epicureans belongs the Roman poet Lucretius. Horace also subscribed to the practical philosophy of the Epicureans. In the time of the emperors the Epicurean philosophy was very widely accepted. (Whether in the passage, *Diog. L.*, X. 9, in which the Epicurean philosophy is spoken of as almost the only one still surviving, reference is intended to the time of Diogenes himself or to that of Diocles, his voucher, is doubtful.)

§ 57. Epicurus treats logic, in so far as he admits it at all into his system, as ancillary to physics, and the latter, again, as ancillary to ethics. He considers the dialectical method incorrect and misleading. His logic, termed by him *Canonic*, proposes to teach the norms (*Kanones*) of cognition, and the means of testing and knowing the truth (*criteria*). As *criteria* Epicurus designates perceptions, representations, and feelings. All perceptions are true and irrefutable. Representations are remembered images of past perceptions.

Beliefs are true or false, according as they are confirmed or refuted by perception. The feelings of pleasure and pain are criteria indicating what is to be sought or avoided. A theory of the concept and of the syllogism was omitted by Epicurus as superfluous, since no technical definitions, divisions, or syllogisms, could supply the place of perception.

On the *prolepsis* of Epicurus, cf. Joh. Mich. Kern (Gött. 1756) and Boorda (*Epicureorum et Stoicorum de Anticipationibus Doctrina*, Leyden, 1823, reprinted from the *Annal. Acad. Lugd.*, 1823-25). Gompertz, in his *Herulean Studien* (see above, § 56), treats of the Epicurean doctrine of the analogical and the inductive inference.

According to Diog. Laërt., X. 29, Epicurus divided philosophy into three parts: τὰ κανονικὰ καὶ φυσικὰ καὶ ἠθικὰ. Logic, or "Canonica," was placed before physics, as an introduction to the same (according to Diog. L., X. 30; Cic., *Acad.*, II. 30; *De Fin.*, I. 7; Sen., *Epist.*, 89).

Rejecting dialectic, Epicurus (according to Diog. L., X. 31) declared it sufficient: τὰς φυσικὰς χερεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους (that the investigators of nature should observe the natural names of things; cf. Cic., *De Fin.*, II. 2, 6: *Epicurum, qui crebro dicat, diligenter oportere exprimi, quae vis subjecta sit vocibus*). To the three criteria of Epicurus above mentioned (which were designated by him in a work entitled "Canon," in the following terms: κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, see Diog. L., X. 31), the Epicureans added: καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (the intuitive apprehensions of the intellect). [Rather the imaginative, i. e., representative operations of the intellect.—Ed.] This latter criterion appears, however, from Diog. L., X. 38, not to have been unfamiliar to Epicurus himself. No perception can be proved false, whether by other perceptions (whose authority can not be greater than that of the perception in question), or by reason, which is simply an outgrowth from perceptions. The hallucinations of the insane, even, and dreams are true (ἀληθῆ); for they produce an impression (κινεῖ γάρ), which the non-existing could not do (Diog. L., X. 32). It is obvious, in connection with this latter argument, that in Epicurus' conception of truth (ἀλήθεια), the latter, in the sense of *agreement of the psychical image with a real object*, is confounded with *psychical reality*.

Mental representations (προλήψεις) are general and permanent images preserved in the memory, or the remembrance of numerous similar perceptions of the same object (καθολικὴ νόησις, μνήμη τοῦ πολλὰκις ἐξωθεν φανέντος, Diog. L., X. 33). They emerge in consciousness when the words are employed which designate their respective objects. Opinion (δόξα) or belief (ὑπόληψις) arises from the persistence of the impressions made on us by objects. It relates either to the future (προσμένον) or to the imperceptible (ἀόρατον). It may be true or false. It is true, when perception testifies in its favor (ὅν ἐπιμαρτυρεῖται, as, e. g., when a correct assumption respecting the shape of a tower is verified by observing it near at hand), or, if direct evidence of this kind is impossible (as, e. g., in regard to the theory of atoms), when perception does not witness against it (ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται); in all other cases it is false (Diog. L., X. 33 seq.; 50 seq.; Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII. 211 seq.). Epicurus demanded that investigators should advance from the phenomenal to the search for the unknown (i. e., to the search for causes which do not fall under the observation of the senses, such as, in particular, the existence and nature of atoms, Diog. L., X. 38: περὶ τῶν ἀόρατων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινόμενων χρὴ σημειῶσθαι). But he did not develop more minutely

the logical theory of this path of investigation (which Zeno, the Epicurean, and Philodemus afterward attempted to do).

The feelings (*πάθη*) are the criteria for practical conduct (Diog. L., X. 34).

Epicurus treated only of the most elementary processes of knowledge with any considerable degree of attention; he neglected those logical operations which conduct beyond the deliverances of mere perception. Of the mathematical sciences he affirmed (according to Cic., *De Fin.*, I. 21, 71): *a falsis initiis profecta vera non possunt, et si essent vera, nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i. e., quo melius viveremus*. Cicero says further (*De Fin.*, I. 7, 22): "In another part of philosophy, which is called logic, our philosopher (Epicurus) seems to me weak and deficient; he rejects definition; he gives no instruction respecting division and distribution; he does not tell how reasoning is to be effected and brought to a right conclusion; nor does he show in what manner fallacies are to be resolved and ambiguities brought to light." Still, the work of Philodemus, recently published, *περί σμυλίων καὶ σμυλίσσεων*, which is founded on the lectures of Zeno the Epicurean, his teacher, contains a respectable attempt at a theory of analogical and inductive inference. (See Th. Gomperz, in the above-cited *Herculan. Studien*, No. 1, Preface, where an essay on the content and worth of this work is promised in the numbers yet to come.) The inference from analogy (*ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τρόπος*) is described as the way from the known to the unknown. Zeno requires that different individuals of the same genus be examined, with a view to discovering the constant attributes; these may then be ascribed to the other individuals of the same genus. According to Proclus, in *Eucl.*, 55, 59, 60, Zeno (who had also heard Carneades) disputed the validity of mathematical demonstration, while Posidonius the Stoic defended it.

§ 58. The Natural Philosophy of Epicurus agrees substantially with that of Democritus. According to Epicurus, every thing which takes place has its natural causes; the intervention of the Gods is unnecessary for the explanation of phenomena. Yet it is not possible in every particular instance to designate with complete certainty the real natural cause. Nothing can come from the non-existing, and nothing which exists can pass into non-existence. Atoms and space exist from eternity. The former have a specific form, magnitude, and weight. In virtue of their gravity, the atoms were originally affected with a downward motion, all falling with equal rapidity. The first collisions of atoms with each other were due to an accidental deviation of single atoms from the vertical line of descent; thus some of them became permanently entangled and combined with each other, while others rebounded with an upward or side motion, whence, ultimately, the vortical motion, by which the worlds were formed. The earth, together with all the stars visible to us, form but one of an infinite number of existing worlds. The stars have not souls. Their real and apparent magnitudes are about the same. In the intermundane spaces dwell the gods. Animals and men are products of the earth; the rise of man to the higher stages of culture has been gradual.

Words were formed originally, not by an arbitrary, but by a natural process, in correspondence with our sensations and ideas. The soul is material and composed of exceedingly fine atoms. It is nearly allied in nature to air and fire, and is dispersed through the whole body. The rational soul is situated in the breast. Its corporeal envelope is a condition of the subsistence of the soul. The possibility of sensuous perception depends on the existence of material images, coming from the surfaces of things. Opinion or belief is due to the continued working of impressions on us. The will is excited, but not necessarily determined by ideas. Freedom of the will is contingency (independence of causes) in self-determination.

The Epicurean physics is specially discussed by G. Charleton (*Physiologia Epicureo-Gassendo-Charltoniana*, London, 1654), and Ploucquet (*De cosmogonia Epicuri*, Tüb. 1755); the theology of Epicurus, by Joh. Fausti (Strasburg, 1685), J. H. Kronmayer (Jena, 1718), J. C. Schwarz (Cob. 1718), J. A. F. Bielke (Jena, 1741), Christoph Meiners (in his *Form. philos. Schriften*, Leipzig, 1775-76, II. p. 45 seq.), G. F. Schoemann (*Schediasma de Epicuri theologia. ind. schol.*, Greifswald, 1764); his doctrine of the mortality of the soul, by Jos. Reissacker (*Der Todesgedanke bei den Griechen, eine historische Entwicklung, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Epicur und den römischen Dichter Lucret. G.-Pr.*, Trier, 1862). Cf. also, F. A. Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* and his *N. Beiträge zur Gesch. des Nat.*, Winterthur, 1867.

At the head of his physics Epicurus places the principle: "Nothing can come from nothing," together with its correlate: "The existent can not become non-existent" (*οὐδὲν γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, and *οὐδὲν φθεῖρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν*, Ep., op. Diog. L., X. 38). Of things corporeal, some are composite and some (all others) are the constituent parts of which the former are compounded (*ib.*, 40 seq.). Continued division of the composite must at last bring us to ultimate indivisible and unchangeable elements (*ἀτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα*), unless every thing is to be resolved into the non-existent. All these indivisible and primitive elements are indeed of various magnitudes, but they are too small to be separately visible. They have no qualities beyond magnitude, shape, and gravity. Their number is infinite. Farther, if that which we call vacuum and space or place did not exist, there would be nothing in which bodies could exist and move. Whatever is material has three dimensions and the power of resistance (*τὸ τριχῇ διασταρὸν μετὰ ἀντεστηνίας*, Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, I. 21 et al.); empty space is intangible nature (*φύσις ἀναφής*, *ib.* X. 2; Diog. L., X. 40); it is *τόπος* ("place"), viewed as that in which a body is contained, and *χώρος* ("room"), viewed as that which admits the passage of bodies through it.

The most considerable of the points of difference between the Epicurean and the Democritean physics is, that Epicurus, in order to explain how the atoms first came in contact with each other, ascribes to them a certain power of individual or arbitrary self-determination, in virtue of which they deviated slightly from the direct line of fall (Lucret., II. 216 seq.; Cic., *De Fin.*, I. 6, *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 25, etc.). He thus attributes in some sort to atoms that species of freedom (or rather that independence of law) which he attributes to the human will.

The motion of the atoms is not directed by the idea of finality. The Empedoclean opinion (Arist., *Phys.*, II. 8, *De Part. Anim.*, I. 1), that among the numerous fortuitous creations of nature which first arose, only a few were capable of prolonged life and conserved their existence, while the rest perished, was renewed by the Epicureans. Lucretius says (*De Rerum Nat.*, I., 1020 seq.):

*Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt,
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto:
Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus et coetus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata.*

The theory of a divine guidance of the affairs of nature was also expressly denied by Epicurus himself. Says Epicurus (*ap. Diog. L., X. 76 seq.*): "It must not be supposed that the motions of the stars, their rising and setting, their eclipses and the like, are effected and regulated, or that they have been once for all regulated by a being possessing at the same time complete blessedness and immortality; for labor and care and anger and favor are not compatible with happiness and self-sufficiency."

A world (*κόσμος*) is a section of the infinite universe, containing stars, an earth, and every variety of phenomena (*περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἀστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα, ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου*, Epic., *ap. Diog. L., X. 88*). The number of such worlds is infinite; they are not eternal *ab initio*, nor will they endure forever (*ibid.* 88, 89).

The real and apparent magnitudes of the sun and the other heavenly bodies are the same; for if the effect of distance were to reduce (apparently) their (real) magnitude, the same must be true of their brilliancy, which nevertheless remains evidently undiminished. The gods of the popular faith exist, and are imperishable and blessed beings. We possess a distinct knowledge of them, for they often appear to men and leave behind representative images (*προλήψεις*) in the mind. But the opinions of the mass of men respecting the gods are false assumptions (*ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς*), containing much that is incongruous with the idea of their immortality and blessedness (Epic., *ap. Diog. L., X. 123 seq.*; Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 18 seq.). The gods are formed of the finest of atoms, and dwell in the void spaces between the different worlds (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, II. 23; *De Div.*, II. 17; Lucret., I. 59; III. 18 seq.; V. 147 seq.). The sage finds his motive for revering them, not in fear, but in admiration of their excellence.

The Soul is defined by Epicurus (*ap. Diog. L., X. 63*) as a *σῶμα λεπτομερές παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον* (see above, p. 206). It is most similar in nature to air; its atoms are very different from those of fire; yet in its composition a certain portion of warm substance is united with the aeriform. In death the atoms of the soul are scattered (Epic., *ap. Diog. L., X. 64 seq.*; Lucret., III. 418 seq.). After this resolution of the soul into its constituent atoms, sensation ceases; the cessation of which is death (*στέρησις αἰσθήσεως*). When death comes, we no longer exist, and so long as we exist, death does not come, so that for us death is of no concern (*ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, Epic., *ap. Diog. L., X. 124 seq.*; Lucret., III. 842 seq.). Nothing is immaterial except empty space, which can effect nothing; the soul, therefore, which is the agent of distinct operations, is material (Epic., *ibid.* X. 67).

The doctrine of material effluves from things and of images (*εἰδῶλα*), which were supposed necessary to perception, was shared by Epicurus with Democritus. These images, *ἥψες* (*ῥύποι*), were represented as coming from the surface of things and making their way through the intervening air to the visual faculty or the understanding (*εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν*; Diog. L., X. 46-49; *Epicuri fragm. libr. II. et XI., de natura*, Lucret., IV. 33 seq.).

There is no fate (*εἰμαρτυνῆ*) in the world. That which depends on us is not subject to

the influence of any external power (*τὸ κατ' ἡμῖν ἀδύνατον*), and it is our power of free self-determination which makes us proper subjects of praise and blame (Epic., *op. Diog. I., X. 133*; cf. Cic., *Acad.*, II. 30; *De Fato*, 10. 21; *De Nat. Deorum*, I. 25).

The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of theological explanations and the establishment of the naturalistic principle, and not on the determination of completed scientific truth.

§ 59. The Epicurean Ethics is founded on the Ethics of the Cyrenaics. In it the highest good is defined as happiness. Happiness, according to Epicurus, is synonymous with pleasure, for this is what every being naturally seeks to acquire. Pleasure may result either from motion or from rest. The former alone was recognized by the Cyrenaics; but this pleasure, according to Epicurus, is only necessary when lack of it gives us pain. The pleasure of rest is freedom from pain. Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily, but mental; for while the former are confined to the moment, the latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment. Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, others natural but not necessary, and still others neither natural nor necessary. Not every species of pleasure is to be sought after, nor is every pain to be shunned; for the means employed to secure a certain pleasure are often followed by pains greater than the pleasure produced, or involve the loss of other pleasures, and that, whose immediate effect is painful, often serves to ward off greater pain, or is followed by a pleasure more than commensurate with the pain immediately produced. Whenever a question arises as to the expediency of doing or omitting any action, the degrees of pleasure and pain which can be foreseen as sure to result, whether directly or indirectly, from the commission of the act, must be weighed and compared, and the question must be decided according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the foreseen result. The correct insight necessary for this comparison is the cardinal virtue. From it flow all other virtues. The virtuous man is not necessarily he who is in the possession of pleasure, but he who is able to proceed rightly in the quest of pleasure. But since the attainment of the highest possible amount of pleasure in connection with the smallest possible amount of pain, depends on a correct praxis, and since the latter, in turn, is dependent on correct insight, it follows that the virtuous man alone is able to attain the end described; on the other hand, the virtuous man will attain it without

failure. Virtue, then, is the only possible and the perfectly sure way to happiness. The sage, who as such possesses virtue, is consequently always happy. Duration of existence does not affect the measure of his happiness.

The Moral Philosophy of the Epicureans is specially treated of by Des Contreux (Paris, 1685, another edition, enlarged by Rondel, Hague, 1686), Battenx (Paris, 1758), and Garve (In connection with his transl. of Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I., Breslau, 1798, pp. 90-119); cf., also, E. Platner, *Ueber die stoische und Epicureische Erklärung vom Ursprung des Vergnügens*, in the *Neus Bibl. der schönen Wiss.*, Vol. 19.

Epicurus' own declarations respecting the principles of ethics may be read in Book X. of Diogenes L., especially in the letter from Epicurus to Menecæus (X. 122-135). Exactness in definition and rigid deduction do not there appear as arts in which Epicurus was pre-eminent. He utters his ideas loosely, in the order in which they occur to him, and with all the indeterminateness of unelaborated thought. He takes no pains to be exact and systematic, his only aim being to provide rules of easy practical application. The principle of pleasure comes to view in the course of the progress of his discussion in the following terms (X. 128): *ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι του μακαρίως ζῆν*, and in defense of it Epicurus adds (X. 129), that in pleasure we are cognizant of the good which is first among all goods and congenial to our nature (*ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικόν*), the beginning of all our choosing and avoiding, and the end of all our action, sensation being the criterion by which we judge of every good. But previously to the formulation of this doctrine, many rules of conduct are given, the various species of desires are discussed, pleasure and freedom from pain are discoursed upon, and, in particular, the principle, by which we are to be guided in our acts of choice or avoidance, is defined (X. 128) as health and mental tranquillity (*ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία*), in which happiness becomes complete (*ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστὶ τέλος*). Epicurus nowhere states in the form of a definition what we are to understand by pleasure (*ἡδονή*), and what he says of the relation of positive to negative pleasure (as the absence of pain) is very indefinite. In the letter referred to, after an exhortation to all men to philosophize in every period of life, to the end that fear may be banished and happiness (*τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*) attained (X. 122), follows, first (123-127), instruction respecting the gods and respecting death, and then (127) a classification of desires (*ἐπιθυμίαι*). Of the latter, we are told that some are natural (*φυσικαί*), others empty (*κεναί*). Of the natural desires, some are necessary (*ἀναγκαῖαι*), while the others are not necessary (*φυσικαὶ μόνον*). Those which are natural and necessary, are necessary either for our happiness (*πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*, which is obviously taken in a narrower sense than before), or for the preservation of the body in an untroubled condition (*πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχηλοσίαν*), or for life itself (*πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν*). (In another place, Diog. L., X. 149, the desires are classified simply as either natural and necessary, or natural and not necessary, or neither natural nor necessary: desires of the first class aim at the removal of pain; those of the second at the diversification of pleasure; and those of the third at the gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally. This classification is criticised with unjust severity by Cicero, *De F.*, II. ch. 9.) Proper attention to these distinctions, according to Epicurus (*ap. Diog. L.*, X. 128), will lead to the right conduct of life, to health and serenity, and consequently to happiness (*μακαρίως ζῆν*). For, he continues, the object of all our actions is to prevent pain either of the body or of the mind (*ὅπως μὴτε ἀλγῶμεν, μὴτε ταρβῶμεν*). We have need of pleasure (*ἡδονή*) then, when its absence brings us pain, and only then. Pleasure is, therefore, the starting-point and the end of happiness. (How the two statements: "Pleasure is the ethical principle" and "We

have need of it only when its absence brings us pain," can be reconciled, or how one is the consequence of the other, it is difficult to say; for if really the end of all our action is only to secure our freedom from pain, and if we have no need of pleasure except when its absence would be painful, pleasure is obviously not an end but a means.) After the (above-given) brief justification of the hedonic principle (X. 129), Epicurus labors to disprove the mistaken idea that all kinds of pleasure are worthy to be sought after. He admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences (*συμμέτρῃσι*), and that we then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result. In the light of this principle, Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, moderation, the accustoming of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and intemperate enjoyments, or, at most, only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished. To give greater force to his recommendations, he returns to the proposition, that the proper end of life is freedom from bodily and mental suffering (*μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα, μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν*). Right calculation is the essence of practical wisdom, which is the highest result of philosophy and the source of all other virtues (Diog. L., X. 132). It is impossible to live agreeably (*ἡδέως*) without living prudently, decently, and uprightly (*φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δίκαιως*). Conversely, it is impossible that a life thus directed should not be at the same time an agreeable one; the virtues and pleasure grow together inseparably (*συμπροϋκασιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως*, X. 132). Epicurus concludes his letter by portraying the happy life of the sage, who, concerning the gods, holds that opinion which is demanded by reason and piety, does not fear death, rightly values all natural goods, knows that there is no such thing as fate, but by his insight is raised above the contingencies of life, deeming it better to fail of his end in single instances after intelligent deliberation, than to be fortunate without intelligence (*κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίᾳς ἀνυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίᾳς εὐτυχεῖν*), the man who, in one word, lives like a god among men in the enjoyment of immortal goods (X. 133-135).

The Epicureans deny that the laws of ethics are innate in man, or that they were invented and violently imposed on him by his first rulers; on the contrary, they are the result of the judgment of eminent and leading men respecting what is useful (*συμφέρον*) to society (Hermarchus, *ap. Porphy.*, *De Abst.*, I. chs. 7-13; cf. Bernays, *Theophr. Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, Berlin, 1866, p. 8 seq.).

Epicurus distinguishes (*ap. Diog. L.*, X. 136) between two species of pleasure, viz.: the pleasure of rest, *καταστροφικὴ ἡδονή* (*stabilitas voluptatis*, Cic., *De Fin.*, II. 3), and the pleasure of motion, *ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή* (*voluptas in motu*, Cic., *ibid.*); the former is defined as freedom from trouble and labor (*ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία*), the latter as joy and cheerfulness (*χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη*). In his conception of the "pleasure of rest," Epicurus varies, sometimes identifying the latter with the momentary satisfaction which arises from the removal of a pain, and sometimes with the mere absence of pain. This uncertainty is the more unfortunate, since the term *ἡδονή* (like *voluptas* and "pleasure") never receives in the ordinary usage the signification of *absence of pain*; Cicero's severe censure (*De Fin.*, II. 2 seq.) of the carelessness and obscurity of Epicurus in the employment of this term is, therefore, not ungrounded. Yet Cicero's account appears to be not wholly free from misapprehensions. Thus it can only be ascribed to an inexact apprehension of the doctrine of Epicurus, that Cicero should suppose that Epicurus identified the highest pleasure with the absence of pain as such (*De Fin.*, I. 11; II. 3 seq.); Epicurus (*ap. Diog. L.*, X. 141) only says that the complete removal of pain is inseparably connected with the highest

intensification of pleasure (for which, indeed, it would be more exact to say that the latter always involves the former, but not conversely).

It would appear from the accounts of Cicero (*De Fin.*, I. 7 and 17; II. 30) that Epicurus derived all psychical pleasure from the memory of past or the hope of future corporeal pleasures. This doctrine is not to be found in any of the writings of Epicurus now at hand, and it is quite possible that in this point he has been misunderstood. Memory and hope are, indeed, according to Epicurus, the ground of the higher worth of psychical pleasure, but he can scarcely have taught that they were the only source of such pleasure. It is right to say only (according to Epicurus), that all psychical pleasure originates *in one way or another* in sensuous pleasure. In a letter quoted by Diog. L. (X. 22), Epicurus declares with reference to himself, that his bodily pains are outweighed in his old age by the pleasure which the recollection of his philosophical discoveries affords him.

The alleged averment of Epicurus in his work *περὶ τέλους* (see Diog. L., X. 6), that he did not know what he should understand by the good, if *sensuous* pleasures were taken away (*ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς*), is compatible not only with the doctrine that sensuous pleasures are the only real ones, but also with the doctrine that they are the necessary basis of all other pleasures, so that with them all others would disappear. If we adopt the latter as the doctrine of Epicurus, the word *ἀφαιρεῖν* in the passage above quoted must not be understood in the Aristotelian sense, as denoting merely mental abstraction, but as signifying an attempt (of course only in thought) at real removal. In what manner intellectual pleasures are dependent on sensuous pleasures is left undetermined.

Epicurus says expressly that no kind of pleasure deserves in itself to be rejected, though many a pleasure must be sacrificed on account of its consequences (Diog. L., X. 141, cf. 142). The conception of a distinction in the worth of different pleasures, as determined by their quality, according to which the one pleasure could be termed refined, the other less refined, or unrefined, finds no place in the Epicurean system. Hence the conception of *honor* remains inexplicable in the Epicurean theory, and in the praxis of the Epicureans it was, so far as possible, placed in the background. It was these deficiencies that occasioned the most weighty and annihilating objections of Cicero (*De Fin.*, II.) against Epicureanism. Yet these causes also secured for the system its most extensive acceptance at the time, when the thirst for pleasure and despotism had broken down the antique sentiment of honor.

In principle the Epicurean ethics is a system of egoism; for the advantage of the individual, which is treated as identical with the happiness of the individual, is required in all cases to furnish the law of action. Even Friendship is explained by this principle. Friendship, according to Epicurus, is the best means of assuring to man all the enjoyments of life. Some of the Epicureans (according to Cic., *De Fin.*, I. 20) added to this two other theories of friendship, some asserting that it began in the idea of profit, which in the natural progress of friendly intercourse became changed into a sentiment of unselfish good-will, and others affirming that a covenant among the wise men bound them to love each his friend as himself. Epicurus himself is the author of the aphorism (ascribed to him in Plutarch, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivere sec. Epicurum*, 16. 4): "It is more pleasant to do than to receive good" (*τὸ εἶ ποιεῖν ἥδυν τοῦ πάσχειν*). Yet through the great weight which, both in theory and in their actual life with each other, was laid by the Epicureans on friendship (a social development which only became possible after the dissolution of the bond which in earlier times had so closely united each individual citizen to the civil community), Epicureanism aided in softening down the asperity and exclusiveness of ancient manners and in cultivating the social virtues of companionableness, compatibility, friendli-

ness, gentleness, benevolence, and gratitude, and so performed a work whose merit should not be underestimated.

If we compare the Epicurean teaching with the Cyrenaic, we discover, along with their agreement in their general principle, the principle of Hedonism, two main differences (of which Diog. L. treats, X. 136, 137). The Cyrenaics posit only the positive pleasure which is connected with gentle motion (*λεία κίνησις*), where Epicurus posits not only this, but also the negative pleasure connected with repose (*καταστηματικὴ ἡδονή*). Farther, the Cyrenaics affirm that the worst pains are bodily, while Epicurus affirms them to be psychical, since the soul suffers from that which is past and from that which is to come; in like manner, to the former, bodily pleasure seems the greater; to the latter, psychical. The ethical teachings of the principal representatives of the Cyrenaic school after Aristippus were all incorporated into the Epicurean system. Thus Epicurus agreed with Theodorus that the ethical "end" was a general state rather than particular pleasures, with Hegesias, that the principal thing was to avert suffering, and with Anniceris, that the sage should zealously cultivate friendship.

That by which Epicureanism is scientifically justified, is its endeavor to reach objective knowledge by rigidly excluding (or attempting to exclude) mythical forms and conceptions. Its deficiency lies in its restriction to those most elementary and lowest spheres of investigation, in which alone, as things then were, knowledge having even the show of exactness and free from poetic and semi-poetic forms was possible, and in its explaining away whatever was not susceptible of scientific explanation in accordance with the insufficient hypotheses of the system. The indecisiveness of the struggle between Epicureanism and the more ideal philosophical schools, and the rise of Skepticism and Eclecticism, can be otherwise explained than by the hypothesis of an abatement of the desire for knowledge. They were rather (and to-day something of the same kind is being repeated) the natural result of the distribution of different advantages and deficiencies among these various schools: the idealistic philosophers sacrificed (as they still do to a great extent to-day), in many respects, scientific purity and rigor of form to an unconsciously poetical, or at least half-poetic, manner of apprehending the highest objects of knowledge; while Epicureanism (like all exclusively realistic systems), in its endeavor to present a perfectly clear and intelligible account of things on the principle of immanent natural causality, ignored largely the existence and importance of objects which were then incapable of explanation under a form so strictly scientific. Cf., further, respecting the significance of Epicureanism, the sections on this subject in A. Lange's *Gesch. des Materialismus*, Iserlohn, 1866, and in his *Neue Beiträge zur Gesch. des Materialismus*, Winterthur, 1867.

§ 60. The results of the great philosophical systems were not only reproduced or appropriated and developed in the schools which followed, but were subjected to a critical revision and re-examination, which led either to their being remodeled and blended together in new systems, or to doubt in regard to all of them and in regard to the cognoscibility of any thing, *i. e.*, to Eclecticism and Skepticism.

There appeared in succession three Skeptical schools or groups of philosophers: 1) Pyrrho of Elis (in the time of Alexander the Great) and his earliest followers; 2) the so called Middle Academy, or the second and third Academic Schools; 3) the Later Skeptics, beginning with *Ænesidemus*, who again made the teaching of Pyrrho the basis

of their own teaching. The skepticism of the Middle Academy, issuing from the Platonic Dialectic, was less radical than that of the Pyrrhonists, since it was directed principally against a determinate form of doctrine, namely, against the dogmatism of the Stoics, and was at least so far from absolutely denying the possibility of knowledge, that it admitted the existence of probabilities, of which various degrees were distinguished.

The earlier school of Skeptics, among whom, next to Pyrrho, Timon of Phlius, the Sillograph, was the most important, asserted that of every two mutually contradictory propositions, one was not more true than the other. They sought, by withholding their judgment in all cases, to secure peace of mind, and esteemed every thing except virtue indifferent. Among the later Skeptics, the most noteworthy was Ænesidemus, who went back to Pyrrho in philosophy, was the author of ten skeptical "tropes," and attempted, on the basis of Skepticism, to revive the philosophy of Heraclitus. Beside him we may mention, in particular, Agrippa, who reduced the ten tropes to five, Favorinus, who seems to have wavered between the Academic and the Pyrrhonic form of doubt, and Sextus, who belonged to the empirical school of physicians, and composed the works, still extant, entitled "Pyrrhonic Sketches" and "Against the Dogmatists."

Of the Skepticism of Pyrrho treat Joh. Arrhenius (Ups. 1706), G. Ploucquet (Tüb. 1759), Kindervater (*An P. doctr. omnis tollatur virtus*, Leipzig, 1759), J. G. Münch (*De Notione atque Indole Scepticismi, nominatim Pyrrhonici*, Altd. 1796), R. Brodersen (*De philos. Pyrrhonica*, Kiel, 1819), J. R. Thorbecke (*Quid inter academ. et scept. interf.*, Leyden, 1821); on Timon, see Jos. F. Langheirich (*Diss. tres de Timone sillographo, ac ejusdem fragmenta*, Leips. 1790-94), and, of more recent writers, Wachsmuth (*De Timone Philiæno ceterisque sillographis Græcis*, Leips. 1826); cf., respecting the general subject of *Sillogi* among the Greeks, Franz Anton Wölke (Warschau, 1830), and Friedr. Paul (Berlin, 1831). Fragments of the writings of Timon are found in the Anthology published by F. Jacobs, from the Palatine Codex (Leips. 1818-17). Cf. D. Zimmermann, *Darstellung der Pyrrh. Ph.*, Erl. 1841; *Ueber Urspr. u. Bedeutung der Pyrrh. Ph.*, ib. 1848; *Commentatio, qua Timonis Philæsti sillicorum reliquias a Sexto Empirico traditæ explicantur* (P.-Fr.), ib. 1865. Salanst treatise of Ænesidemus, in *Le Scepticisme: Aenesidème*, Pascal, Paris, 1867.

For the literature relating to the Middle Academy, see above, § 44, p. 184. For the editions of the two works of Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrhon. Institut. Libr. III.*, and *Contra Mathematicos Libr. XI.*), see above, § 7, p. 21. Cf. L. Kayser, *Ueber Sextus Empir.* Schrift nach *λογικόν*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, VII. 1860, pp. 161-190; C. Jourdain, *Sext. Empir. et la Philosophie Scolastique*, Paris, 1868.

Cf. Tafel, *Gesch. des Skepticismus*, Tübingen, 1884; Norman Maccoll, *The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus*, London and Cambridge, 1890.

Pyrrho of Elis (about 360-270 B. C.) is said (Diog. L., IX. 61, cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.*, VII. 18) to have been a pupil of Bryso (or Dryso), who was a son and disciple of Stilpo; yet this statement is very doubtful, since Bryso, if he was really a son of Stilpo, must have been younger than Pyrrho; according to other accounts, Bryso was a disciple of Socrates or of Euclid of Megara, Socrates' disciple. Perhaps this Bryso, disciple of Socrates, was the Bryso of Heraclea, from whose dialogues, according to Theopompus, *ap. Athenæus*, XI. p. 508, Plato was said to have borrowed considerably (perhaps, in particular, in the *Theæ-*

tetus?). He seems to have thought highly of the doctrines of Democritus, but to have hated most other philosophers, regarding them as Sophists (Diog. L., IX. 67 and 69). He accompanied Anaxarchus, the Democritean, of the suite of Alexander the Great, on his military campaigns, as far as India. He became of the opinion, that nothing was beautiful or hateful, just or unjust, in reality (*τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, Diog. L., IX. 61, for which we find *φίσει*, *id.* 101, and in Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, XI. 140); in itself every thing was just as much and just as little (*οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*) the one as the other; every thing depended on human institution and custom. Hence Pyrrho taught that real things were inaccessible to human knowledge or incomprehensible (*ἀκαταληψία*), and that it was our duty to abstain from judging (*ἐποχή*). The external circumstances of human life are all indifferent (*ἀδιάφορον*); it becomes the wise man, whatever may befall him, always to preserve complete tranquillity of mind, and to allow nothing to disturb his equanimity (*ἀταραξία*, Diog. L., IX. 61, 62, 66-68; cf. Cic., *De Fin.*, II. 13; III. 3 and 4; IV. 16: *Pyrrho, qui virtute constituta, nihil omnino quod appetendum sit, relinquit*). The Pyrrhonists were termed (according to Diog. L., IX. 69) doubters (*ἀπορητικοί*), skeptics (*σkeptικοί*), suspenders of judgment (*ἐπεκτικοί*), and inquirers (*ζηητικοί*). Pyrrho himself developed his views only orally (Diog. L., *Proem*, 16; IX. 102). It was thus easy for his name to become a typical one, and for many views to be ascribed to him by later disciples and writers, which were only the views of the school. The most correct reports of his doctrines are those which are derived from the writings of Timon, his disciple (termed by Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, I. 53: *ὁ προφήτης τῶν Πύρρωνος λόγων*).

As immediate disciples of Pyrrho, Diog. L. (IX. 67, 69) names, among others, Philo of Athens, Nausiphanes of Teos, the Democritean, who afterward became a teacher of Epicurus, and, as the most eminent of all, Timon of Phlius. Timon (born about 325, died about 235 B. C.), whom (according to Diog. L., IX. 109) Stilpo, the Megarian, had instructed before Pyrrho, was the author of satirical poems, *Σίλλικα*, in three books, in which he treated and reviled as babblers all the Greek philosophers, except Xenophanes, who, he said, had sought for the real truth, disengaged from useless subtleties, and Pyrrho, who found it. In opposition to the assertion, that the truth was known through the co-operation of the senses and the intellect, Timon, who held both to be deceptive, repeated the verse: "Attas and Numenius" (two notorious cheaters) "came together" (*συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήριος*). According to Aristocles (*ap. Euseb., Praepar. Evang.*, XIV. 18), Timon appears to have developed the main thesis of skepticism in the following manner: He who would attain to happiness must consider three things: 1) the nature of things, 2) how we are to conduct ourselves with reference to them, 3) the (theoretical and practical) result flowing from this conduct. There exist no fixed differences among things; all things are unstable and can not be judged of by us. Owing to the instability of things our perceptions and representations are neither true nor false, and can therefore not be relied upon. Adopting this view, we become non-committal (we decide, say nothing) or free from all theoretical bias (*ἀφασία*), and thus secure imperturbableness of mind (*ἀταραξία*). This state of mind follows our suspension of judgment (*ἐποχή*) as its shadow (*σκιὰς τρέπον*, Diog. L., IX. 107). The subject of doubt is not what appears (the phenomenon), but what is. Says Timon (*ap. Diog.*, IX. 105): "That a thing is sweet I do not affirm, but only admit that it appears so." In his work entitled *Πίθων*, Timon (according to Diog. L., IX. 76) explained his expression, *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, as equivalent to *μηδὲν ὀρίζειν* or *ἀπροσθετεῖν* (we determine nothing and assent to nothing). The grounds for every proposition and its contradictory opposite show themselves equally strong (*ισοσθένεια τῶν λόγων*). Another expression for the skeptical withholding of one's judgment is *ἀρρηξία*, or equilibrium (*id.* 74). The *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον* is intended by the Skeptics to be taken, not in the positive

sense of asserting real equality, but only in a privative sense (ὁ θετικῶς, ἀλλ' ἀναρρητικῶς), as when it is said, "Scylla exists no more than the Chimæra," i. e., neither exists (*ibid.* 75). All these principles, after being first applied against the assertions of the dogmatists, were finally to be applied to themselves, in order that in the end not even these principles should retain the character of fixed assertions; just as every other λόγος, or assertion, could be met by a contradictory assertion, so also could these (*ib.*, 76, given, apparently, as an affirmation of Timon). In this position, obviously, Skepticism, carrying its own principle to the extreme, at last destroys itself; besides, the Skeptics, while arguing against the force of logical forms, could not but employ them themselves, thus conceding to them in fact the force which their theory denied them (except, of course, in so far as the employment of them from the Skeptical stand-point was declared to be merely hypothetical, and intended merely to show that if they were valid they might be turned against themselves, and were thus self-destructive).

The later Skeptics, who styled themselves Pyrrhonists, were accustomed to define the difference between the members of the Middle Academy (see above, § 44) and the Pyrrhonic doubters, by saying that the Academics of the schools of Arcesilas and Carneades asserted that they knew only one thing, viz.: that nothing was knowable, while the Pyrrhonists denied even this one supposed certainty (Sext. Emp., *Hypoth.* *Pyrrhon.*, I. 3, 226, 233; cf. Gell., *N. A.*, XI. 5, 8). But this appreciation is incorrect in what concerns the Academics; for neither Arcesilas (Cic., *Acad. Post.*, I. 12, 45) nor Carneades (Cic., *Acad. Pr.*, II. 9, 28) ascribed to the theses of Skepticism complete certainty. It is correct only to say, in general, that the Skepticism of the Academics was less radical than that of the Pyrrhonists, but not for the reason above cited, but because it admitted a theory of probability (against which Sext. Emp. contends, *Adv. Math.*, VII. 435 seq.), and, in what concerns Arcesilas, because this philosopher (according to Sext. Emp., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 234, and others) employed his method of negative criticism only as a preliminary to the communication of Plato's teachings (provided, for the rest, that this statement is exact or referred to the right person). There existed besides a very important difference between the Academic and the Pyrrhonic Skeptics, in that the latter only, and not the Academics, saw in ataraxy the supreme end of philosophy.

After that the Academy (in the persons of Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, and their successors) had gone over to an eclectic dogmatism, the Skeptical doctrine of Pyrrho was renewed, especially by Ænesidemus. Ænesidemus of Cnossus appears to have taught at Alexandria in the first century after Christ. He wrote *Πυρρωνίων λόγων ἐκτὸς βιβλία* (Diog. L., IX. 116), of which Photius (*Bibl. cod.*, 212) prepared an abridgment, which is still extant, but is very brief. His stand-point is not that of pure Skepticism, since he proposed, by the employment of the skeptical principle, to lay the foundation for a renewed Heraclitism. He proposed (according to Sext. Emp., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 210) to show first that contradictory predicates appeared to be applicable to the same thing, in order to break the ground for the doctrine that such predicates were in reality thus applicable. With him doubt was not doctrinal, but directive (ἀγωγὴ). The ten ways (τρόποι) of justifying doubt, which, according to Sext. Empir., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 36, were traditional among the earlier Skeptics (παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις σκεπτικαῖς), appear to have been first enumerated in his work, and not in that of Timon; Sextus treats Agrippa as the first of the "Later Skeptics." The ten tropes (otherwise termed λόγοι or τόποι) were, according to Sext. Empir. (*Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 36 seq.) and Diog. L. (IX. 79 seq.) severally as follows: The first was derived from the different constitution of the various classes of animated beings, resulting in differences in their modes of apprehending the same objects, of which modes it was impossible to decide which, if either, was correct; the second was drawn

from the different constitution of different men, whence the same result as before; the third, from the different structure of the several organs of sense; the fourth, from the variability of our physical and mental conditions; the fifth, from the diversities of appearance due to position, distance, and place; the sixth, from the fact that no object can be perceived by itself alone, apart from all others; the seventh, from the various appearance of objects as determined by quantity, size of parts, and the like; the eighth, from the general relativity of all our knowledge (and this, as is correctly remarked by Sext. Empir. [*Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 39; cf. Gell., XI. 5, 7], is the substance of all skeptical tropes); the ninth, from the variations in our notions of objects, according as we perceive them more or less frequently; and the tenth, from diversities of culture, customs, laws, mythical notions, and philosophical theories.

The later Sceptics, beginning with Agrippa (the fifth successor of *Ænesidemus*), and including Sextus, the empirical, or, as he preferred to be called (see *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 236 seq.; *Adv. Math.*, VIII. 327), the methodical physician (about 200 A. D.), and his pupil Saturninus (Diog. L., IX. 11c), and others (with whom, among others, Favorinus of Arelate, the grammarian and antiquarian, who lived at Rome and Athens under Hadrian, and was the teacher of A. Gellius, seems to have agreed), enumerated, as reasons for "*ἐποχή*," or the suspension of judgment, five tropes (see Sext. Emp., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 164 seq.; Diog. L., IX. 88 seq.). The first of these was founded on the discrepancy of human opinions respecting the same objects; the second pointed to the regress *in infinitum* involved in proof, since whatever is proved, is proved by that which itself needs proof, and so on without end; the third was taken from the relativity of things, all of which vary in appearance according to the constitution of the percipient and according to their relations to other things with which they are combined; the fourth called attention to the arbitrariness of the fundamental principles of the dogmatists, who, in order to avoid the *regressus in infinitum*, set out in their proofs from some pre-supposition, whose truth they illegitimately assumed; the fifth pointed out the usual circle in demonstration, where that on which the proof rests must itself be established by that which is to be proved. According to Sext. Empir., *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, I. 178 seq., still later Sceptics maintained the two following tropes: 1) Nothing is certain of itself, as is proved by the discrepancy of opinions concerning all that is perceptible or thinkable; and, therefore, 2) nothing can be made certain by proof, since the latter derives no certainty from itself, and, if based on other proof, leads us either to a *regressus in infinitum*, or to a circle in demonstration.

To disprove the possibility of demonstration, Sextus advanced a series of arguments, of which the most noticeable was this (*Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II. 134 seq.), that every syllogism moves in a circle, since the major premise, on which the proof of the conclusion depends, depends for its own certainty on a complete induction, in which the conclusion must have been already contained. (Cf. Hegel, *Log.*, II. p. 161 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 190 seq., and the remarks in my *System of Logic*, under § 101.)

Of special interest and importance are the skeptical arguments against the validity of the notion of causality, reported, apparently after *Ænesidemus*, in Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 207 seq. A cause is a *relativum*, for it is not to be conceived without that which it causes; but the relative has no existence (*οὐκ ἵπάρχει*) except in thought (*ἐννοεῖται μόνον*). Further, in each case cause and effect must be either synchronous, or the former must precede or follow the latter. They can not be synchronous, for then cause and effect would as such be indistinguishable, and each could with equal reason be claimed as the cause of the other. Nor can the cause precede its effect, since a cause is no cause until that exists of which it is the cause. Lastly, the supposition that the cause follows its effect is without sense, and may be abandoned to those fools who habitually invert the natural

order of things. Other arguments against causality are also adduced by Sextus; the characteristic fact in connection with them is that that argument is not included among them, which in modern times (since Hume) has had most weight, namely, that the origin of the notion of causality can not be so accounted for, as to justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition. (Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 1st ed., III. p. 474; 2d ed., III. b, p. 38 seq.)

Theology, also, and especially the Stoic doctrine of providence, were among the objects of Skeptical attack in the later period of Skepticism. The arguments employed in this connection were derived especially from Carneades (Sext. Empir., *Adv. Math.*, IX. 137 seq.: *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, III. 2 seq.), and were drawn principally from the evil in the world, which God either could not or would not prevent, both of which suppositions were incompatible with the idea of God. Yet the Skeptics explained that their intention was not to destroy the belief in the existence of gods, but simply to combat the arguments and the pretended knowledge of the dogmatic philosophers.

§ 61. A tendency, more or less decided, toward Eclecticism, is manifest in all the dogmatic philosophy of the later portion of antiquity, and especially in the period of the propagation of Greek philosophy in the Roman world. The most important and influential representative of this tendency is Cicero, who, in what pertains to the theory of cognition, confessed his adhesion to the skepticism of the Middle Academy, took no interest in physics, and in ethics wavered between the Stoic and the Peripatetic doctrines.

The school of the Sextians, who flourished for a short time at Rome, about the beginning of the Christian era, seems to have occupied a position intermediate between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism.

Edward Zeller (in No. 24 of the first series of the *Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wiss. Vorträge*, ed. by Rud. Virchow and Fr. v. Holtzendorf, Berlin, 1866) treats of religion and philosophy among the Romans.

Among the earlier treatises on the philosophy of Cicero may be mentioned those of Jason de Norre (*Cic. Philus. de Vita et Moribus*, Padua, 1597), Ant. Bucher (*Ethica Ciceroniana*, Hamb. 1610), J. C. Waldin (*De philosophia Ciceronis Platonica*, Jena, 1758), Chr. Meiners (*Orak. de philoa. Ciceronis. ejusque in universam philoa. merita*, in his *Verm. philoa. Schr.*, Vol. I., 1775, p. 274 seq.), H. C. F. Hülsemann (*De indole philosophica Ciceronis*, Lüneb. 1799), Gedike's Collation of those passages in Cicero which relate to the history of philosophy (Berlin, 1768, 1801, 1814)—which is more valuable as an *exposé* of Cicero's philosophical conceptions, than as a contribution to the history of philosophy—and the annotations and discussions appended by Christian Garve to his translation of the *De Officiis* (Breslau, 1768, 6th ed., *ib.* 1819), as also Kriech's *Forschungen* (Gott. 1840, see above, p. 23) and Ritter's minute exposition of the philosophy of Cicero in his *Gesch. der Philos.*, IV. pp. 106-176 [Morrison's English translation of R.'s *Hist. of Philos.*, London, 1846, Vol. IV., pp. 99-160.—Tr.] More recent works worthy of mention are those of J. F. Hebart (*Ueber die Philos. des Cic.*, Werke, Vol. XII., pp. 167-189), Kari Salom. Zacharias (*Staatswissenschaftliche Betrachtungen über Cicero's wiedererfundenes Werk vom Staate*, Heidelb. 1828), Lothelsen (*Cicero's Grundsatze und Beurtheilung des Schönen*, Brielg. 1825), Raph. Kühner (*M. Tullii Ciceronis in philosophiam ejusque partes merita*, Hamburg, 1825), J. A. C. van Heusde (*M. Tullius Cicero φιλοσόφος*, Traj. ad Rhen. 1836), Baumhauer (*De Aristotelis et in Cic. scriptis*, Utrecht, 1841), C. F. Hermann (*De interpretatione Timaei dialogi a Cic. relicti*, Progr., Gött. 1843), J. Klein (*De fontibus Topicorum Ciceronis*, Bonn, 1844), Legay (*M. Tullius Cicero philosophus historicus*, Leyden, 1846), C. Crome (*Quid Graecis Cicero in philosophia, quid sibi debuerit*, G.-Pr., Düsseldorf, 1855), Havestadt (*De Cic. prius principis philosophiae moralis*, G.-Pr., Emmerich, 1857), A. Desjarlins (*De scientia civilis apud Cic.*, Beauvais, 1857), Burmeister (*Cic. als Neu-Akademiker*, G.-Pr., Oldenburg, 1860), Höflg (*Cicero's Ansicht von der Staatereligion*, G.-Pr., Krotoschin, 1848), C. M. Bernhardt (*De Ciceronis Graecae philosophiae*

interprete, "Progr." of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn., Berlin, 1865), F. Haeler (*Ueber das Verhältniss der heidnischen und christlichen Ethik auf Grund einer Vergleichung des Ciceronianischen Buches De Officiis mit dem gleichnamigen des heiligen Ambrosius*, Munich, 1866), G. Barzelotti (*Della dottrina filosofica nel Libri di Cicero*, Florence, 1867), J. Walter (*De An. Immort. quæ præc. Cic. trad.*, Pragur, 1867), G. Zietschmann (*De Tusc. qu. fontibus*, Diss., Halle, 1868). The inaugural dissertation of Hugo Jentsch (*Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica quaeritur quid habeat Cicero*, Berlin, 1866) contains noteworthy contributions to the solution of the question, to what extent Cicero had read and understood Aristotle.

On the philosopher Sextius, see De Burigny (*Memoires de l'Acad. des Inscrip.*, XXXI.), Lesteyrk (*Sentences de Sextius*, Paris, 1849), and Meinrad Ott (*Character und Ursprung der Sprüche des Philosophen Sextius*, G.-Pr., Rottwell, 1861, and *Die syrischen "ausbrannten Sprüche des Herrn Xistus Bischofs von Rom."* nicht eine Xistusschrift, sondern eine überarbeitete Sextiusschrift, G.-Pr., Rottwell and Tübingen, 1862 and 1863).

When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism. In the latter it would necessarily end, if the philosophizing subject retained a naïve confidence in his own "Unbefangenheit," i. e., in the directness of his natural perceptions of truth or in his sagacious tact in the appreciation of philosophical doctrines, while yet lacking the creative power requisite to the founding of a system. In particular, Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philosophy of the Romans was almost universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero.

M. Tullius Cicero (Jan. 3d, 106—Dec. 7th, 43 B. C.) pursued his philosophical studies especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth, he heard, first, Phædrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus the Stoic (who was afterward, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house, *Tusc.*, V. 39, *Epist.*, *passim*). He afterward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at Rhodes), Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. *Tusc.*, V. 2: *Philosophiae in sinum quum a primis temporibus ætatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compulisset, has gravissimis casibus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egressi magna jactati tempestate confugimus.*

Cicero gives a list of his philosophical writings in *De Div.*, II. 1. In his work entitled *Hortensius*, he had, as he here says, urged the study of philosophy; in the *Academica* he had indicated what he considered the most modest, consequent, and elegant mode of philosophizing (namely, that pursued by the Middle Academy); in the five books *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest good, and of evil, after which he had written the five books of *Tusculan Disputations*, in which he had shown what things were necessary to the greatest happiness in life; then had followed the three books *De Natura Deorum*, to which were to be joined the then unfinished work *De Divinatione* and the projected work *De Fato*. Among his philosophical works were also to be reckoned the six books *De Republica* (previously composed) and the works entitled *Consolatio* and *De Senectute*; to these might be added his rhetorical writings: the three books *De Oratore*, and *Brutus* (*De Claris Oratoribus*), constituting a fourth, and the *Orator*, constituting a fifth book on the same general topic.

Cicero composed the work *De Rep.* (in six books) in the years 54—52 B. C. About the third part of it has come down to us, most of which was first published by A. Mai, from

the Palimpsest in the Vatican (Rome, 1st ed., 1822); a part of Book VI., the dream of Scipio, is preserved in Macrobius. Complementary to this work was the *De Legibus*, begun in 52 B. C., but never finished, and now extant only in a fragmentary form. Possibly as early as the beginning of the year 46 B. C., but perhaps later, Cicero wrote the small work called *Paradoxa*, which is not mentioned by him in *De Div.*, II. 1. The *Consolatio* and *Hortensius* were composed in 45 B. C., of both of which only a few fragments remain to us; in the same year the *Academicæ* (now incomplete) and the *De Finibus* (which we possess entire) were written, and the *Tusculan. Disp.* and the *De Nat. Deor.* were begun; the two last-named works were not completed till the following year. The date of the *Cato Major sive De Senectute* falls in the beginning of 44 B. C.; that of the *De Divinatione* (above-cited, intended as a complement to the work on the Nature of the Gods) falls in the same year, as also do the *De Fato* (which has not come down to us entire), the lost work *De Gloria*, and the extant works: *Laelius s. De Amicitia* and *De Officiis*; the treatise *De Virtutibus* (not extant) was probably composed immediately after the *De Officiis*. Among the youthful works of Cicero were the translations (now lost) of Xenophon's *Æconomicus* and Plato's *Protagoras* (which latter was still existing in the times of Priscianus and Donatus); but his translation of Plato's *Timæus*, of which a considerable fragment is preserved, was written, after the *Academica*, in 45 (or 44) B. C. Of the rhetorical works, which are classed by Cicero himself with his philosophical works, the *De Oratore* was written in the year 55, and *Brutus* and the *Orator* in 46 B. C.

That Cicero in his philosophical writings depended on Grecian sources appears from his own confession, since he says of the former (*Ad Atticum*, XII. 52): ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore sunt, verba tantum affero, quibus abundo (yet cf. *De Fin.*, I. 2. 6; 3. 7; *De Off.*, I. 2. 6, where Cicero alleges his relative independence). It is still possible to point out the foreign sources of most of his writings (generally by the aid of passages in these writings themselves or in Cicero's Epistles). The works *De Rep.* and *De Legibus* are in form imitations of the works of Plato bearing the same names; their contents are founded partly on Cicero's own political experiences and partly on Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, and, to a not inconsiderable extent, on the writings of Polybius. The *Paradoxa* discuss certain well-known Stoic principles. The *Consolatio* is founded on Crantor's work περὶ πένθους, the (lost) *Hortensius*, probably on the Πρωτοπρεπτικός, which Aristotle had addressed to Themison, king in one of the cities of Cyprus (see Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Arist.*, p. 116 seq.), or, it may be, on the *Protrepticus* of Philo of Larissa, the Academic (see Krische, *Ueber Cicero's Academica*, *Gött. Studien*, II., 1845, p. 191); the *De Finibus* (the best of the extant philosophical writings of Cicero), on the works of Phædrus, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, as also on the results of the studies pursued by Cicero in his youth, when he listened to lectures and engaged in philosophical discussions; the *Academica*, on the writings and in part also on the discourses of the more distinguished of the Academics; the *Tusc. Disp.*, on the works of Plato and Crantor, and on Stoic and Peripatetic writings; the first book of the *De Natura Deorum*, on an Epicurean work, which has been discovered in the Herculanæan Rolls, and was at first considered to be a treatise of Phædrus περὶ θεῶν, but has now been recognized as the work of Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας; Cicero's critique of the Epicurean stand-point is founded on a work by Posidonius the Stoic; the second book of the *De Nat. Deor.* is founded particularly on the works of Cleanthes and Chrysippus; the third, on those of Carneades and Clitomachus, the Academics; the first of the two books *De Divinatione* is based on Chrysippus' work περὶ χρησμῶν, on the περὶ παντὸς of Posidonius, and on works composed by Diogenes and Antipater; the second book, on the works of Carneades and of Panætius the Stoic; the treatise *De Fato*, on writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Cleanthes, and Carneades; and the *Cato Major*, on writings of Plato, Xenophon, Hippocrates, and

Aristo of Chios. The *Lectius* of Cicero reposes especially upon the work of Theophrastus on Friendship, and also on the *Ethics* of Aristotle and the writings of Chrysippus; the two first books of the *De Officiis* were drawn principally from Panætius; the third, from Posidonius; but besides the writings of these men, those of Plato and Aristotle, and also those of the Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, and Hecato, were employed in the composition of the *De Officiis*.

From Skepticism, which Cicero was unable scientifically to refute, and to which he was ever being invited by the conflict of philosophical authorities, he was disposed to take refuge in the immediate certainty of the moral consciousness, the *consensus gentium* and the doctrine of innate ideas (*notiones innatae, natura nobis insitae*). Characteristic are such declarations as the following from the *De Legibus*, I. 13: *Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum Academiam hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem exoremus ut sileat, nam si invaserit in haec, quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimis edet ruinas; quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo*. In physics Cicero does not advance beyond the stadium of doubt; still he regards the field of physical investigation as furnishing agreeable "pastime" for the mind, and one not to be despised (*Acad.*, II. 41). That which most interests him in natural science is its relation to the question of God's existence. The following noticeable passage is directed against atheistic atomism (*De Nat. Deor.*, II. 37): *Hoc (viz., the formation of the world by an accidental combination of atoms) qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aereae vel quales libet aliquo conficiantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici*. Cicero would have mythology purged of every thing unworthy of the gods (the story of the abduction of Ganymede, for example, *Tusc.*, I. 26; IV. 33), but would, as far as possible, hold fast to that in which the beliefs of different peoples agree (*Tusc.*, I. 13); he is particularly attached to the belief in providence and immortality (*Tusc.*, I. 1. 2 seq.; 49 et al.), but is not altogether free from uncertainty on these subjects, and with dispassionate impartiality allows the Academic philosopher, in his *De Natura Deorum*, to develop the grounds of doubt with the same minuteness and thoroughness with which the Stoic develops his arguments for dogmatism. Cicero defines the *morally good* (*honestum*) as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy (*De Fin.*, II. 14; *De Off.*, I. 4), in accordance with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek *καλόν*. The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics, in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty of mankind often fills him with doubts; but then he reproaches himself for judging of the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy (*Tusc.*, V. 1). Cicero is not altogether disinclined (*De Fin.*, V. 26 seq.) to the distinction made by Antiochus of Askelon between the *vita beata*, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the *vita beatissima*, to which external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (*Tusc.*, V. 13) rejects it; but he contents himself with the thought that all which is not virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good or not, is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in comparison with it (*De Fin.*, V. 32; *De Off.*, III. 3). From this point of view the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, which Carneades (according to Cic., *De Fin.*, III. 12) had already declared it to be. Cicero is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of the *πάθη* (translated by Cicero *perturbationes*) to their right proportions; he demands, with the Stoics, that the sage should be without *πάθη*. But he makes his demonstration easier, by including in the concept *πάθος* (*perturbatio*) the mark of faultiness (*Tusc.*, V. 6: *quæra* g

recta ratione animi commotio), so that, in fact, he only proves what is self-evident, viz.: that what which is faulty is not to be suffered; but he misses the real point in dispute (*Tusc.*, IV. 17 seq.). In another particular, also, he stands on the side of the Stoics, namely, in regarding practical virtue as the highest virtue. Cf. *De Off.*, I. 44: *omne officium, quod ad conjunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia continetur*. *Ib.*, 45: *agere considerate plurius est, quam cogitare prudentur*.

Cicero's political ideal is a government made up of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. He finds it realized approximately in the Roman state (*De Rep.*, I. 29; II. 23 seq.). Cicero approves of auguries and the like, as an accommodation to popular belief, as also of deceiving the people by allowing them only the appearance of political liberty, since he regards the mass of men as radically unreasonable and unfit for freedom (*De Nat. Deor.*, III. 2; *De Divinat.*, II. 12, 33, 72; *De Leg.*, II. 7; III. 12 et al.).

Cicero is most attractive in those parts of his works, in which in an elevated rhetorical style, and without touching upon subtle matters of dispute, he sets forth the truths and sentiments which are universally affirmed by the moral consciousness of man. His praise of disinterested virtue, for example (*De Fin.*, II. 4; V. 22), is very successful; so, in particular, is the manner in which the idea of the moral community of mankind (on which idea, taken by Cicero from the spurious letter of Archytas, Plato founds in the *Rep.* his demand that philosophers should enter practically into the affairs of the state): *non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patriâ vindicat, partem amici*, etc. (*De Off.*, I. 7; cf. *De Fin.*, II. 14), and the Aristotelian doctrine of man as a "political animal" (*De Fin.*, V. 23) are presented. And, again, in his *Tusculan Disp.*, the weakness of Cicero's argumentation and the dullness of his dialectic, especially as compared with the Platonic dialectic which he makes his model, are not more marked than the rhetorical perfection of the passages in which he discourses of the dignity of the human mind (*Tusc.*, I. 24 seq.; cf. *De Leg.*, I. 7 seq.). So, too, his enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy (*Tusc.*, V. 2: *O vitas philosophia dua! O virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum*, etc.; cf. *De Leg.*, I. 22 seq.; *Acad.*, I. 2; *Tusc.*, I. 26; II. 1 and 4; *De Off.*, II. 2) contains much that is felicitous in thought and expression (e. g., *est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccanti immortalitati anteponendus*, etc.); and although it is somewhat defaced by rhetorical exaggeration, it was inspired by a conviction which was deeply rooted in Cicero's mind at the time when he wrote the works just cited.

Seneca (*Nat. Quaest.*, VII. 32) says of the school of the Sextians, that after having commenced its existence with great *éclat*, it soon disappeared. Q. Sextius (born about 70 B. C.) was the founder of the school, and Sextius, his son, Sotion of Alexandria (whose instructions Seneca enjoyed about 18–20 A. D.), Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and Papirius Fabianus, are named as his disciples. Q. Sextius and Sotion wrote in Greek. Sotion inspired his pupil, Seneca, with admiration for Pythagoras (*Sen.*, *Ep.*, 108); abstinence from animal food, daily self-examination, and a leaning toward the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, are among the Pythagorean elements in the philosophy of the Sextians. Their teaching seems to have consisted principally of exhortations to moral excellence, to energy of soul, and to independence with reference to external things. The sage, says Sextius, goes through life armed by his virtues against all the contingencies of fortune, wary and ready for battle, like a well-ordered army when the foe is near (*Sen.*, *Ep.*, 59). Virtue and the happiness which flows from it are not ideals without reality as they had come to be regarded by the later Stoics, but goods attainable by men (*Sen.*, *Ep.*, 64). (The collection of aphorisms, which has come down to us in the Latin translation of Rufinus, is the work of a Christian, who wrote not long before A. D. 200. It is first cited

by Orig., *c. Celsum*, VIII. 30, under the title: *Σέξρον γνῶμαι*. A Syriac version of it exists and is published in the *Analecta Syriaca* of P. de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1858. It appears to be founded on a few of the authentic sayings of Q. Sextius.)

THIRD (PREVAILINGLY THEOLOGICAL) PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

THE NEO-PLATONISTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN THEOSOPHICAL SPECULATION.

§ 62. To the Third Period of Greek philosophy, or the period of the predominance of theosophy, belong: 1) the Jewish-Greek philosophers, 2) the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Pythagorizing Platonists, 3) the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish-Greek philosophers sought to blend Judaism with Hellenism. The philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans, Pythagorizing Platonists, and Neo-Platonists was theosophic. To this the previous development of Greek philosophy itself was alone sufficient to conduct them, when physical and mental investigation had ended in Skepticism and Eclecticism. This state of Greek philosophy (especially, in view of the close contact in this period of the West with the East) could not but induce a greater susceptibility to Oriental influences than had hitherto existed, and such influences did operate, in no insignificant measure, to determine the form and substance of the speculation of the period.

On the Greek philosophers of this period, cf. the first section of E. W. Möller's *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes*, Halle, 1860 (pp. 5-111).

The influence of the Orient was an important co-operating factor in determining the character of the philosophy of this period (see Ritter, *History of Philosophy*, IV. p. 330 seq.); but there were also internal causes—to which Zeller rightly directs attention (*Ph. d. Gr.*, 2d ed., Vol. III. b, pp. 56 seq., 368 seq.)—which produced a leaning toward a mythical theology. "The feeling of alienation from God and the yearning after a higher revelation are universal characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world; this yearning was, in the first place, but an expression of the consciousness of the decline of the classical nations and of their culture, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called into life not only Christianity, but also, before it, pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism, and other related developments." But this same feeling of exhaustion and this yearning after extraneous aid, accompanied, as they were, by a diminished power of original thought, led, in religion, to the adoption of Oriental forms of worship and Oriental dogmas, and, above all, in speculation, to sympathy with the Oriental tendency to conceive God as the transcendent rather than as the immanent cause of the world, and to regard self-abnegation as

the essential form of morality, while, under the same influence, special emphasis was placed on the kindred elements in Greek, and especially in the Platonic philosophy. Neo-Platonism is a philosophy of syncretism. Its elements are partly Oriental (Alexandrian-Jewish, in particular) and partly Hellenic; its form is Hellenic. The religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same elements, but under an Oriental form. Robert Zimmermann rightly remarks (*Gesch. der Aesthetik*, Vienna, 1858, p. 123), that Plato's attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into scientific speculation, ends in Neo-Platonism with a re-translation of thought into images.

The traits common to the speculations of the Jewish-Greek philosophers and the Neo-Pythagoreans, the later Platonists and Neo-Platonists, are aptly enumerated by Zeller (*Philos. der Griechen*, 1st ed., III. p. 566 seq., 2d ed., III. b., p. 214) as follows: "The dualistic opposition of the divine and the earthly; an abstract conception of God, excluding all *knowledge* of the divine nature; contempt for the world of the senses, on the ground of the Platonic doctrines of matter and of the descent of the soul from a superior world into the body; the theory of intermediate potencies or beings, through whom God acts upon the world of phenomena; the requirement of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense, and faith in a higher revelation to man, when in a state called *Enthusiasm*." From Plato's own doctrine these later forms of Greek philosophy, notwithstanding all their intended agreement with and actual dependence on it, are yet very essentially distinguished by the *principle of revelation* contained in them. To the Neo-Platonists the writings of Plato, the "God-enlightened" (Procl., *Theol. Plat.*, I. 1), became a kind of revealed record. The most obscure and abstruse of them (e. g., the Pseudo-Platonic *Parmenides*, with its dry schematism and its sophistical play with the conceptions of One and Being) were to many of these philosophers the most welcome, and were regarded by them as the most sublime documents of Platonic theology, because they offered the freest room for the play of their unbridled imaginings concerning God and divine things.

Granting that theosophical speculation, in comparison with the investigation of nature and man, may appear as the higher and more important work, still Neo-Platonism remains decidedly inferior to its precursors in the earlier Greek philosophy, since it did not solve its problem with the same measure of scientific perfection with which they solved theirs.

§ 63. There is as yet no distinct evidence of a combination of Jewish theology with Greek philosophemes in the Septuagint, or in the doctrines of the Essenes. Such a combination existed, possibly, in the doctrine of the *Therapeutes*, who held certain doctrines and usages in common with the Pythagoreans, and certainly in the teachings of Aristobulus (about 160 B. C.), who appealed to (spurious) Orphic poems, into which Jewish doctrines had been incorporated, in support of the assertion (in which he agrees with Pseudo-Aristeas), that the Greek poets and philosophers borrowed their wisdom from a very ancient translation of the Pentateuch. The biblical writings, says Aristobulus (who interprets them allegorically), were inspired by the Spirit of God. God is invisible; he sits enthroned in the heavens, and is not in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power. He formed the world out of material previously existing. In de-

fending the observance of the Sabbath, Aristobulus employs a Pythagorizing numerical symbolism. The personification of the wisdom of God as an intermediate essence between God and the world, and pre-existing before the heavens and the earth, seems to have begun already with him. In the *Book of Wisdom* (of Pseudo-Solomon) wisdom is distinguished from the divine essence itself, as the power of God which works in the world. But Philo (born about 25 B. C.) was the first who set up a complete system of theosophy. With him the expounding of the books of the Old Testament is synonymous with the philosophy of his nation; but in his own exposition he allegorically introduces into those documents philosophical ideas, partly derived from the natural, internal development of Jewish notions, and partly appropriated from Hellenic philosophy. He teaches that God is incorporeal, invisible, and cognizable only through the reason; that he is the most universal of beings, the being to whom alone being, as such, truly pertains; that he is more excellent than virtue, than science, or even than the good *per se* and the beautiful *per se*. He is one and simple, imperishable and eternal; his existence is absolute and separate from the world; the world is his work. God alone is free; every thing finite is involved in necessity. God is not in contact with matter; if he were he would be defiled. He who holds the world itself to be God the Lord has fallen into error and sacrilege. In his essence, God is incomprehensible; we can only know that he is, not what he is. All names which are intended to express the separate attributes of God are appropriate only in a figurative sense, since God is in truth unqualified and pure being. God is present in the world only by his operations, not by his essence. The Logos, a being intermediate between God and the world, dwells with God as his wisdom (*σοφία*) and as the place of the Ideas. The Logos is diffused through the world of the senses as divine reason revealing itself in the world. This one divine rational potency is divided into numerous subsidiary or partial potencies (*δυνάμεις, λόγοι*), which are ministering spirits and instruments of the divine will, immortal souls, demons, or angels; they are identical with the general and specific essences, the ideas; but the Logos, whose parts they are, is the idea of ideas, the most universal of all things except God. The Logos does not exist from eternity, like God, and yet its genesis is not like our own and that of all other created beings; it is the first-begotten son of God, and is for us, who are imperfect, a God; the wisdom of God is its

mother; it is the older and the world is the younger son of God. Through the agency of the Logos, God created the world and has revealed himself to it. The Logos is also the representative of the world before God, acting as its high-priest, intercessor, and Paraclete. The Jews are the nation to whom God revealed himself; from them the Greeks borrowed their wisdom. Knowledge and virtue are gifts of God, to be obtained only by self-abnegation on the part of man. A life of contemplation is superior to one of practical, political occupation. The various minor sciences serve as a preparatory training for the knowledge of God. Of the philosophical disciplines, logic and physics are of little worth. The highest step in philosophy is the intuition of God, to which the sage attains through divine illumination, when, completely renouncing himself and leaving behind his finite self-consciousness, he resigns himself unresistingly to the divine influence.

On Judaism under the influence of Greek civilization, cf. the sections relating to this subject in Isaac Marcus Jost's *Gesch. des Judenthums* (Vol. I., Leips. 1857, pp. 99-108; 344-361, etc.), and in the comprehensive work of H. Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden* (Vol. III., Leips. 1886, pp. 298-342), as also in the works of Ewald (see above, p. 16) and others, and H. Schultz, *Die jüdische Religionsphilosophie bis zur Zerstörung Jerusalems* (in Gelzer's *Prot. Monatebl.*, Vol. 24, No. 4, Oct., 1864), and Wilhel. Clemens, *Die Therapeuten* (Progr. of the *Gymn. Fridericianum*, Königsberg, 1869).

Of Aristobulus and Aristæas treat Gerh. Jo. Voss (*De hist. Græcæ*, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1677, l. ch. 10; p. 55 seq.), Is. Voss (*De LXX. Interpret.*, The Hague, 1661; *Observ. ad Pomp. Mel.*, London, 1686), Fabric. (*Bibl. Gr.*, III., p. 409), Rich. Simon (*Hist. crit. d. V. T.*, Paris, 1678, II. 2, p. 189; III. 22, p. 479), Humfr. Hody (*Contra historiam Aristæas de LXX. interpretibus*, etc., Oxford, 1653, and *De bibliorum text. orig., versionibus*, etc., *ibid.* 1705), Nic. de Nourry (Paris, 1708), Ant. van Drie (Amsterdam, 1705), Ludov. Casp. Valckenær, *De Aristobulo Judæo philosopho Peripatetico Alexandrino*, ed. Jo. Luzac, Leyden, 1806; cf. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, I. p. 447; Matter, *Essai histor. sur l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1820, vol. II, p. 121 seq.; cf. also, the works of Gröner (II. 71 seq.) and Dähne (II. 73 seq.) cited below; Georgii, in Ilgen's *Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol.*, 1839, No. 3, p. 86, and Rob. Binde, *Aristobulische Studien* (*Gymn. Progr.*), Glogau, 1869.

On Pseudo-Phocylides (a poem of Jewish origin, devoted to moral philosophy), cf. Jak. Bernays, *Ueber das Phokylideische Gedicht, ein Beitrag zur hellenistischen Litt.*, Berlin, 1856; Otto Gorum, *De Pseudo-Phocylide*, in the *Philol.*, XIV., 1859, pp. 91-112; Leopold Schmidt, in Jahn's *Jahrb.*, Vol. 73, 1857, p. 510 seq. where Schmid seeks to point out separately the Hellenistic or Jewish-Alexandrian and the purely Jewish elements in the principal passage of the poem, and excludes all but the last-named as interpolated.

Philo's works have been edited by Thom. Mangey (London, 1742), A. P. Pfeiffer (Erlangen, 1788-92, 2d ed., 1820), and C. E. Richter (Leips. 1828-30), among others; a stereotyped edition was published at Leipsic in 1831-53; Philo's book on the creation of the world has been published, preceded by a careful introduction by J. G. Müller (Berlin, 1841); *Philonæ*, ed. C. Tischendorf, Leipsic, 1868. On Philo's doctrine, cf. especially, August Gröner, *Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie*, Stuttgart, 1831 (also under the title: *Kritische Geschichte des Christenthums*, Vol. I.); Aug. Ferd. Dähne, *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie*, Halle, 1834. See also Christian Ludw. Georgii, *Ueber die neuesten Gegenstände in Auffassung der Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie, insbesondere des jüd. Alexandrianismus*, in Ilgen's *Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol.*, 1839, No. 3, pp. 2-98, and No. 4, pp. 2-98. Grossman has written a number of works on Philo (Leips. 1829, 1830 seq.); other writers on the same subject are H. Planck (*De interpr. Phil. alleg.*, Gött. 1807), W. Scheffer (*Quæst. Philon.*, Marburg, 1829, 1881), Fr. Creuzer (in Ullman and Umbreit's *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, Jahrgang V., Vol. I., 1829, pp. 3-48, and in Creuzer's work, *Zur Gesch. der griech. u. röm. Litt.*, Darmst. and Leips. 1847, pp. 407-446), F. Keferstein (*Ph.'s Lehre von dem göttl. Mittelwesen*, Leips. 1846), J. Bucher (*Philonische Studien*, Tüb. 1848), M. Wolff (*Die Philonische Philosophie*, etc., Leips. 1849; 2d ed., Gothenburg, 1858), L. Noack (*Psychæ*, Vol. II., No. 5, 1850), Z. Frankel (*Zur Ethik des Philo*, in the *Monatschr. für Gesch. u. Wiss. des Judenthums*, July, 1867), and Ferd. Delaunay (*Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1867).

For us, the earliest document of Jewish-Alexandrian culture is the *Septuagint*. The oldest parts of it, among which the translation of the Pentateuch belongs, reach back into the earliest period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (who was king from 284 to 247 a. c.). Aristobulus says (*op.* Eusebius, *Præpar. Evang.*, XIII. 12, in a fragment of his dedicatory epistle to the king, who—according to Euseb., *Præpar. Ev.*, IX. 6, with which Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, I. p. 342, is to be compared—was Ptolemy Philometor), that before the time of Alexander, and also before the supremacy of the Persians in Egypt, the four last books of the Pentateuch had been already translated, Demetrius Phalereus taking the lead in the matter. According to a statement of Hermippus the Callimachean (*Diog. L.*, V. 78), Demetrius lived at the court of Ptolemæus Lagi only, but under Philadelphus was obliged to avoid the country. This account is not in contradiction with that of Aristobulus (and R. Simon, Hody, and others, are consequently at fault in arguing from the supposed contradiction, that the fragments of Aristobulus are spurious); we may, rather, conclude from the two reports that preparations were made for the translation by Demetrius during the life of Ptolemæus Lagi (but probably not till the last part of his reign), and that it may have then been begun, but that it was principally accomplished under Philadelphus; Josephus (*Ant.*, XII. 2) places the commencement of the translation in the year 285 a. c. Whether certain parts of the Pentateuch were really translated into Greek still earlier is doubtful, but they were certainly not translated at so early an epoch as that named by Aristobulus. The translation of the principal canonical writings may have been completed under Ptolemy Euergetes, the successor of Philadelphus, soon after his accession to the throne (247). Parts were added to the Hagiographa at least as late as 130 a. c. (according to the Prologue of Siracides), and without doubt also very much later. Dähne (*IL* pp. 1-12) professes to have discovered in the Septuagint numerous traces of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, which was subsequently more fully developed by Philo; according to him, the authors of this translation of the Bible knew and approved the principal doctrines of this philosophy, contrived to suggest them by apparently insignificant deviations from the original text, and, foreseeing the method of allegorical interpretation, which was subsequently to be adopted, endeavored by the construction of their translation to facilitate it. But the passages on which Dähne founds his argumentation by no means force us to this very doubtful hypothesis (see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, 1st ed., III., pp. 569-573, 2d ed., III. b., p. 215 seq.); we find only that, as a rule, the notion of the sensible manifestation of God is suppressed, anthropopathic ideas, such as the idea of God's repenting, are toned down in their expression, the distance between God, in his essence, and the world, is increased, and the ideas of mediating links between the two (in the form of divine potencies, angels, the divine *δόξα*, the Messias as a heavenly mediator) appear more fully developed than in the original text. In these peculiarities germs of the later religious philosophy may undoubtedly be seen, but not as yet this philosophy itself. It is scarcely necessary, either, to see in them a union of Greek philosophemes with Jewish ideas.

Such a union is first discoverable with certainty in the fragments of Aristobulus, the Alexandrian, who (according to Clem. Al. and Eusebius) was usually styled a *Peripatetic*. The passages in Eusebius, cited above, establish beyond a doubt that he lived under Ptolemæus Philometor (181-145 a. c.), notwithstanding several evidently erroneous authorities, which place him under Ptol. Philadelphus. He wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch, and dedicated it to Ptolemy (Philometor). Fragments of the same and of the dedicatory epistle are preserved in Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, I. (12 and) 25; (V. 20:) VI. 37, and in Euseb., *Præpar. Ev.*, VII. 13 and 14; VIII. 6 and 10; IX. 6, and XIII. 12. In the fragments furnished us by Eusebius, Aristobulus cites a number of passages purporting to have been taken from the poems of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Linus, but which were evidently brought into the

form in which they are cited by some Jew, and perhaps by Aristobulus himself. (Yet cf. Jost, *Gesch. des Judenthums*, I., p. 369 seq., who disputes the latter supposition.) The most extensive and important fragment is one which purports to be taken from the *ἑρμῆς ἑρμῆς* of Orpheus (Eus., *Praep. Ev.*, XIII. 12); the same fragment, in another form, has been preserved by Justin Martyr, *De Monarchia* (p. 37, Paris edition, 1742), so that it is still possible to point out precisely the changes made in it by some Jew. The main doctrines of the poem are thus recapitulated by Aristobulus: All created things exist and are upheld by divine power, and God is over all things (*διακρᾶσθαι θεῖς δυνάμει τὰ πάντα καὶ γενεῇ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι τὸν θεόν*). But in the God who accomplishes and rules over all things (*κόσμοιο τυπῶτης . . . αὐτοῦ δ' ὑπο πάντα τελεῖται, ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περιέσσυται*), Aristobulus recognizes not, with the Grecian poets and philosophers (especially the Stoics), the Deity himself, but only the Divine potency (*δύναμις*), by whom the world is governed; God himself is an extra-mundane being; he is enthroned in the heavens, and the earth is under his feet; he is invisible, not only to the senses, but to the eye of the human soul—the *νοῦς* alone perceives him (*οὐδὲ τις αὐτὸν εἰσὶν ὁρᾷ ψυχῶν θνητῶν, νῦ δ' εἰσὶν ὁρᾶται*). In these theological and psychological propositions it is possible to discover a reversion to the Aristotelian doctrine and a modification of the Stoic, and, in so far, a justification of the denomination *Peripatetic* as applied to Aristobulus; but they bear, at least to an equal extent, the impress of the religious faith of the Jewish nation. In interpreting the seven days' work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, metaphorically, the light, which was created on the first day, as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are illumined, which some of the (Peripatetic) philosophers had compared to a torch; but, he adds, one of his own nation (Solomon, *Prov.* viii. 22 seq.?) had testified of it more distinctly and finely, that it existed before the heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to show how the whole order of the world rests on the number seven: *ὅτι ἑβδομάδων δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος κελεῖται* (Aristob., *ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev.*, XIII. 12).

Aristeas is the nominal author of a letter to Philocrates, in which are narrated the circumstances attending the translation of the sacred writings of the Hebrews by the seventy (or seventy-two) interpreters (*ed. Sim. Schard, Basel, 1561; ed. Bernard, Oxford, 1692, and in the editions of Josephus; also in Hody, De Bibl. Text. Orig., Oxford, 1705, pp. i.-xxxvi.*). The letter states that Aristeas had been sent by the king of Egypt to Eleazar, the high-priest, at Jerusalem, to ask for a copy of the law and for men who would translate it. The letter is spurious, and the narrative full of fables. It was probably written in the time of the Asmoneans. In this letter, a distinction is made between the power (*δύναμις*) or government (*δυναστεία*) of God, which is in all places (*διὰ πάντων ἰσχύς, πάντα τόπον πληροῖ*), and God himself, the greatest of beings (*μέγιστος*), the lord over all things (*ὁ κυριεύων ἀπάντων θεός*), who stands in need of nothing (*ἀπροσδεής*), and is enthroned in the heavens. All virtue is said to descend from God. God is truly honored, not by gifts and offerings, but by purity of soul (*ψυχῆς καθαρότητι*).—The allegorical form of interpretation appears already brought to a considerable degree of perfection in Pseudo-Aristeas.

In the *Second Book of the Maccabees* (ii. 39)—which is an extract from the history of the Syrian wars, written by Jason of Cyrene—the distinction made between God himself, who dwells in the heavens, and the *divine power*, ruling in the temple at Jerusalem, recalls the similar Alexandrian dogma. Non-Alexandrian, on the contrary, are the belief in the resurrection, by divine favor, of the bodies of the just (vii. 9-14; xiv. 46), and in creation out of nothing (vii. 28), if, indeed, the latter doctrine is to be understood here in its strict dogmatic sense. Some have attempted, further, to point out analogies with Alexandrian doctrines in the third and fourth Books of Maccabees, in the third Book of Ezra, in the Jewish portions of the *Sibyllines*, and in the *Wisdom of Sirachides*. The Pseudo-Solomonite

Book of Wisdom, which appears to have been composed before the time of Philo, describes wisdom as the reflected splendor of the divine light, as a mirror of the divine efficiency, an efflux of the divine glory, and as a spirit diffused through the whole world, fashioning all things with art and uniting itself to those souls who are pleasing to God. The pre-existence of individual souls is taught (i. 20, in the words: ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἥλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμείανρον); the resurrection of all men, of the good to blessedness and of the bad to judgment, is taught, and men are referred for happiness to the future life. God created the world from a pre-existing matter (xi. 18).

At what time the society of *Essenes* arose in Palestine and of *Therapeutes* in Egypt, is uncertain. Josephus first mentions the Essenes in his account of the times of Jonathan the Maccabean (about 160 B. C.); there existed, he says, at that time, three sects (*αἱρέσεις*) among the Jews, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes (*Ant.*, XIII. 5). It seems necessary to regard the name of the Essenes as derived from *chaschah*, to be silent, mysterious (conservers of secret doctrines, mystics). They sought to attain to the highest degree of holiness by the most rigid abstemiousness (after the example of the Nazarites), and transmitted to their successors a secret doctrine respecting angels and the creation (from which, as it appears, the *Cabbala* subsequently arose; cf. below, § 97). The Therapeutes (who were more given to mere contemplation in monastic retirement) sprung from the Essenes (rather than the latter from the former). The doctrine of the Therapeutes was related to the Pythagorean, and more especially to the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine. That the body is a prison for the (pre-existent and post-existent) soul—also the doctrine of contraries which are everywhere present in the world, are tenets belonging to ancient Pythagoreanism; not so the Therapeutic inhibition of the oath, of bloody offerings, and of the use of meat and wine (at least, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, not the earliest Pythagoreans, but only the Orphists and a part of the Pythagoreans of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., abstained from the use of meat), and the recommendation of celibacy, the doctrine of angels (demons), magic, and prophecy—traits which reappear in Neo-Pythagoreanism, and are unmistakably of Oriental origin. It is conceivable that (as Zeller assumes) these doctrines and customs were derived from the East by the Orphists and Pythagoreans, that before the time of the Maccabees they passed from the latter to the Jews in Palestine (the Essenes), and that the latter again delivered them to the Jews in Egypt (the Therapeutes). Still, it is improbable that Pythagoreanism, at a time when it had become nearly or quite extinguished (cf. Zeller, I., 2d edition, p. 215, 3d edition, p. 251), could have exerted so powerful influence on a portion of the Jewish nation, and it is more natural to suppose (with Hilgenfeld) that the Therapeutic doctrine of abstinence was transmitted without Grecian intervention from the Parsees—after they, for their part, had submitted in their doctrine to a Buddhistic influence—to the Jews of Palestine and from the latter to the Egyptian Jews. The existence of the Therapeutic sect may, however, on its part, have been among the causes which induced the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism at Alexandria.

Philo the Jew lived at Alexandria, which he calls "our Alexandria" (*ἡμετέρα Ἀλεξάνδρεια*) in his work *De Legatione ad Cajum* (ed. Mangey, vol. II. 567). According to Josephus (*Ant.*, XVIII. 8; XX. 5), he was descended from one of the most illustrious families of the country; Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, II. 4) and Hieronymus (*Catal. Scriptorum Eccles.*) report that he belonged to a sacerdotal family. His brother held the office of *Alabarches* (superintendent of the Jews at Alexandria). In the first half of the year 40 Philo was at Rome as an ambassador from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor Caius; he was then already advanced in years (*De Legat. ad Cajum*, ed. Mang., II. 592), and at the period when he wrote his account of this embassy—probably soon after the death of Caius (A. D. 41) and during the

reign of Claudius—he classed himself among the old men (*γέροντες*). His birth falls, consequently, in the third decade before Christ.

The allegorical method of interpreting the sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was adopted by Philo without restriction. His principle, that the prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit which spoke through them, was favorable to the freest use of this mode of exegesis. Philo criticises the attitude of those who merely hold fast to the literal sense of Scriptures as low, unworthy, and superstitious; he denies, in opposition, obviously, to a claim of the orthodox, that this is "unvarnished piety without ostentation" (*ἀκαλλώπιστον εὐσέβειαν μὲρὰ ἀνυσίας*), affirming this honorable description as applicable, rather, to his mystical method of interpretation, and describing his opponents as being affected with the incurable disease of word-picking, and blinded by the deceptive influence of custom (*De Cherubim*, ed. Mang., I. 146). God can certainly not be said properly to go to and fro, or to have feet with which to walk forwards, he, the uncreated author of all things, who fills all, etc.; the anthropomorphic representations of Scripture are only permitted as an accommodation to the wants of the sensuous man, while for the discerning and spiritual it declares that God is not like a man, nor like the heavens, nor like the world (*Quod Deus sit immutabilis*, ed. Mang., I. 280 seq.). Philo does not reject the literal sense in every case; he often, especially in the case of historical statements, assumes both this and the higher or allegorical sense as equally true; but the latter, in his view, is never absent. Yet, with the same positiveness with which Philo combats the literalists, does he also oppose those Symbolists, who advanced to a consequence which threatened to overthrow the positive content of Judaism, by ascribing not only to the doctrines, but also to the commands, of the ceremonial law, a merely figurative character, and by teaching that the literal observance of the latter was superfluous, and that it was only necessary to observe the moral precepts, which alone they were intended to inculcate. Philo recognizes, it is true, that even in the commands of Scripture the literal sense is always accompanied by another, more profound and higher; but, he says, they are to be observed according to the former as well as the latter sense, since both belong together, like soul and body. "Although circumcision properly symbolizes the removal of all passion and sensuality and impious thoughts, yet we may not therefore set aside the practice enjoined; for in that case we should be obliged to give up the public worship of God in the temple, and a thousand other necessary solemnities" (*De Migratione Abrahami*, ed. Mang., I. 450). Yet the inference rejected by Philo appeared later in the doctrine, that (Christian) faith, even without the works of the law, was sufficient to salvation. That the idea of God, which was alone worthy of Him, would one day create for itself another and more adequate "body" than that of the Mosaic ceremonial law, was a conviction to which Philo was unable to attain.

The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. While Philo contends that God is to be worshipped as a personal being, he yet conceives Him at the same time as the most general of existences: *τὸ γενικώτατον ἐστὶν ὁ θεός* (*Legis Alleg.*, II.). God is the only truly existent being, *τὸ ὄν* (*De Somn.*, I. 655, Mang.). But Philo, similarly to the Neo-Platonists of a later epoch, advances upon the Platonic doctrine by representing God as exalted not only above all human knowledge and virtue—as Plato had done—but also above the idea of the Good—(*κρείττων τε ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ κρείττων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κρείττων ἢ αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, *De Mundi Opificio*, I. 2, ed. Mang.)—with which Plato identifies Him—and by teaching that we do not arrive at the Absolute by scientific demonstration (*λόγῳ ἀποδείξει*), but by an immediate subjective certainty (*ἐναρτηρία*, *De post. Caini*, 48, p. 258 Mang.). Still, a certain kind of knowledge of God, which, however, is only second in rank, results from the aesthetic and teleological view of the world, as founded on the Socratic

principle that "no work of skill makes itself" (οὐδὲν τῶν τεχνικῶν ἔργων ὀπαιτομασίζεται). God is one and simple: ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἐστὶ καὶ ἓν, ἐν σῆμαμα, φύσις ἀπλή . . . τέταται οἷς ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν μονάδα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡ μονὰς κατὰ τὸν ἑνα θεόν (*Legis Alleg.*, II.; *ed. Mang.*, I. 66 seq.). God is the only free nature (ἡ μόνη ἐλευθέρα φύσις, *De Somn.*, II.), full of himself and sufficient to himself (αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ πλήρες καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἰκανόν, *De Nom. Myst.*, I. 562). Notwithstanding the pantheistically-sounding notions which Philo applies to God, he ascribes to him the purest blessedness: "He is without grief or fear, not subject to evils, unyielding, painless, never wearied, filled with unmixed happiness" (*De Cherubin.*, I. 154). God is everywhere by his power (τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος, ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ρεῖναι), but in no place with his essence, since space and place were first given to the material world by him (*De Linguarum Conf.*, I. 425). Speaking figuratively, Philo describes God as enthroned on the outermost border of the heavens in an extra-mundane place (τόπος μετακόσμος), as in a sacred citadel (*Genes.*, 28. 15; *De Vit. Mos.*, II. 164, etc.). God is the place of the world, for it is He that contains and encompasses all things (*De Somn.*, I.).

In creating the world, God employed as instruments incorporeal potencies or ideas, since he could not come in contact with polluting matter (ἐξ ἐκείνης (τῆς οὐσίας) πένον ἔγεννησαν ὁ θεός, οὐκ ἐφαιπτόμενος αὐτὸς· οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις ὑπεῖρχειν καὶ πεφουρμένους ὕλης φράσαι τὸν ἰδμονα καὶ μακάριον· ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν, ὡς ἐννομεν ὄνομα αἱ ἰδέαι, παρεχρόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ γένος ἑκαστον τὴν ἐρμύττουσαν λαβεῖν μορφήν, *De Sacrificantiis*, II. 261). These potencies surround God as ministering spirits, just as a monarch is surrounded by the members of his court. The highest of the divine potencies, the creative (*ποιητικῇ*), bears also, according to Philo, in Scripture the name of God (*θεός*); the second or ruling (*βασιλικῇ*) potency, is called Lord (*κύριος*, *De Vita Mos.*, II., 150 *et al.*). These are followed by the foreseeing potency, the law-giving, and many others. They are all conceived by Philo, not only as of the nature of divine qualities, but also as relatively independent, personal beings, who can appear to men and who have favored some of them (e. g., Abraham) with their more intimate intercourse (*De Vita Abrah.*, II. 17 seq.).

The highest of all the divine forces is the Logos (Word). The world of ideas (ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος) has its place (*τόπος*) in the divine Logos, just as the plan of a city is in the soul of the master-builder (*De Mundi Opificio*, I. 4). Philo also uses sometimes the name Sophia (Wisdom), which with Aristobolus and other earlier speculators was the name for the highest of the potencies intermediate between God and the world (e. g., *Legis Alleg.*, II.: ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ σοφία, ἣν ἄρα καὶ ἐμμενίστην ἐνεμεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων), but Logos is the term more commonly employed by him. Sometimes he seems to conceive Sophia as the highest of the potencies into which the Logos is divided, and as the source of all the rest. For the Logos is two-fold in its nature, and that, too, in man as well as in the All. In man there is a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and a λόγος προφορικός; the former is the reason which dwells in man, the latter is the spoken word; the former is, as it were, the source, the latter the out-flowing stream. (Cf. *Plat.?* *Soph.*, 263 e: δύνουσι is the interior discourse of the mind, and *Arist.*: ὁ ἐσω λόγος, see above, p. 143.) But of the Logoi which belong to the All, the one which corresponds with the ἐνδιάθετος in man, dwells in the incorporeal and archetypal ideas of which the intelligible world consists; the other, corresponding with the προφορικός in man, is diffused in the form of germs (the λόγος σπέρματικός) in the things which are seen, and which are imitations and copies of the ideas, and constitute the world of sensuous perception (*De Vita Mos.*, III., *ed. Mang.*, II. 154). In other words: in God dwells reason, thought (*ἐννοια* as *ἐννοιασμένη νόησις*), and its expression (*διανοήσις* as *νόησις διέφοδος* or *ῥῆμα θεοῦ*, *Quod Deus sit immut.*, I. 278, *ed. Mang.*, in commenting on *Genesis*, vi. 8). This reason is God's wisdom (Sophia). Yet, in other passages, Philo

calls Sophia the mother of the Logos (*De Profugis*, 562, Mang.). He sees the symbol of the two-fold Logos in the double breast-plate (*δισπλοῦν λογιῶν*) of the high-priest. Ordinarily, however, he speaks only of the divine Logos without qualification or distinction, styling him Son and Paraclete, the Mediator between God and man, etc. (*De Vita Mosis*, II. 146, ed. Mang.; *Quis Rerum Divin. Haeresis*, I. 501 seq., et pass.).

The creation of the world was due to God's attribute of love. He created it, through the instrumentality of the Logos, out of unqualified matter, which is therefore of the nature of the unreal (*ὁ θεὸς αἰῶνα, οὐκ ὄργανον, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον δι' ὄργάνου μὲν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰῶνα πάντως γίγνεται· εὐφραδὲς αἰῶνα τοῦ ἀδοκίμου τὸν θεόν, ὄργανον δὲ λόγον θεοῦ, ἔλην δὲ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα*).

The business of man is to follow and imitate God (*De Caritate*, II. 404, et pass.). The soul must strive to become the dwelling-place of God, his holy temple, and so to become strong, whereas it was before weak, and wise, whereas before it was foolish (*De Somn.*, I. 23). The highest blessedness is to abide in God (*πέρας εὐδαιμονίας τὸ ἀκλινὲς καὶ ἀρρεπὺς ἐν μόνῳ θεῷ στήναι*).

Philo traces the doctrine of ideas back to Moses: *Μωυσῆος ἐστὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔμὸν; ὅτι, he says, Moses teaches (Gen., i. 27) that God created man in the image of God, and if this is true of man, it must certainly be true also of the entire sensible cosmos (De Mundi Opificio, Mang., I. 4). Obvious as are the signs of Platonic influences in Philo's doctrine of ideas (Philo himself names Plato, and testifies his esteem for him), and of Stoic influence in his Logos-doctrine, yet in fact the transformation of the ideas into divine thoughts, having their seat in the Logos of God, is an outcome of Philo's religious conceptions, and the doctrine, thus transformed, may therefore be said to come from "Moses." (This transformation of the Platonic theory of ideas not only exercised a controlling influence on the philosophy of later thinkers, but it has also interfered with the correct historical comprehension of Platonism even down to our own times.)*

As in what he says of the ideas and forces generally, so also in his utterances respecting the Logos, Philo wavers between the attributive and substantive conception of it; the latter, according to which the Logos is hypostatized to a person, is already developed in his doctrine to too firm a consistency for us to suppose that the personification was for Philo's own consciousness a mere poetic fiction (all the more, since in Plato the ideas are not mere attributes, but possess an independent and almost a personal existence), and yet not to a consistency of so absolute a character that Philo could be interpreted as teaching, as a positive doctrine, the existence beside God of a second person, in no way reducible to a mere attribute or function of the first person. Yet so far as Philo personifies, whether it be poetically or doctrinally, he owns to a certain subordinationism. The Logos is for him, as it were, a chariot-driver, whom the other divine forces (*δυνάμεις*) must obey; but God, as the master of the chariot, prescribes to the Logos the course which is to be maintained. Philo vacillates consequently between the two conceptions, the analoga of which reappear later in the Christian church in Monarchianism and Arianism; but a doctrine analogous to Athanasianism is entirely foreign to him, and would contradict his religious as well as his philosophical consciousness. It was impossible that he should conceive of the Logos as incarnated, on account of the impurity of matter in his view—a consideration revived at a later epoch by the Docetans—and for this reason, if for no other, it was impossible for Philo to go farther and identify the Logos with the expected Messiah, to which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved by the practical and spiritual interest connected with redemption through the Messiah. The incarnation of the Logos in Christ forms the fundamental speculative, as the invalidity of the positive Mosaic law and the new commandment of love form the fundamental practical, doctrine by

which Christianity separated from Alexandrian theosophy. The representatives of this theosophy being, for the most part, men of more theoretical culture than force of will, could not accept the doctrine of the incarnation without a sense of their infidelity to their principles, and did not possess the martyr's courage—which is rarely developed in the lap of material and intellectual wealth—necessary for the practical renunciation of the ceremonial law, although this course was demanded as a logical consequence of their own views.

§ 64. Cicero names as the first renewer of Pythagoreanism, P. Nigidius Figulus, who appears to have lived in the first half of the last century before Christ, at Alexandria. In the time of Augustus there originated several works falsely attributed to the earlier Pythagoreans, but containing Neo-Pythagorean ideas. About the same time Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, the Pythagorizing Eclectic, lived at Alexandria. The chief representatives of Neo-Pythagoreanism are Apollonius of Tyana, in the time of Nero, Moderatus of Gades, also in the time of Nero, and Nicomachus of Gerasa, in the time of the Antonines. Also, Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) appears to be by his own doctrine not far removed from this group of philosophers.

To Neo-Pythagoreanism relates in fact the greater part of the literature cited above, *ad* § 16, pp. 48 and 44. Cf. also Hieron. Schellberger, *Die goldenen Sprüche des Pyth. in's Deutsche übertragen mit Einl. u. Anm.* (G.-Pr.), Münsterstadt, 1862, and, respecting the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, in general, Vermehren, *Die pyth. Zahlen*, Güstrow, 1868. Zeller, in *Ph. d. Gr.*, III., 2d edition, p. 85 seq., gives a summary of the pseudonymous literature (after Beckmann, Mullach, and Orelli).

On the subject of the general revolution of philosophy among the Greeks in this period from Skepticism to Mysticism, cf. Heinr. W. J. Thiersch, *Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnisse zur Religion unter Trajanus, Hadrianus und den beiden Antoninen*, Marburg, 1858, and Zeller, as cited above, *ad* § 62.

Lutterbeck (*Die neuest. Lehrbegriffe*, Vol. I., 1852, p. 370 seq.) treats of Nigidius Figulus and the Neo-Pythagorean school. Cf. also Bücheler, in the *Rh. Mus.*, new series, XIII., p. 177 seq., and Klein, *Diss.*, Bonn, 1861.

Philostrophorum quas superest omnia: vita Apollonii Tyanensis, etc. Accedunt Apollonii Tyan. epistolae, Eusebii liber de Hieroclem, etc., ed. Godofr. Olearius, Lipsic, 1709; ed. C. L. Kayser, Zürich (1844, 1846), 1858: ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1848. Iwan Müller, *Comm. qua de Philostr. in componenda memoria Apollonii T. fide quaeritur*, Zweibrücken, 1858-60. Of Apollonius treat: J. C. Herzog (Leipz. 1719), S. G. Klose (Viteb. 1738-34), J. L. Mosheim (in his *Comment.*, Hamb. 1751, p. 247 seq.), J. B. Lüdewald (Halle, 1798), Ferd. Chr. Baur (*Apollonius und Christus*, *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theol.*, 1832), A. Wellaur (in Jahn's *Archiv*, Vol. X., 1844, pp. 418-467); Neander (*Gesch. der Christl. Religion*, Theil I., p. 172), L. Noack (in his *Psychol.*, Vol. I., No. 2, Giessen, 1856), P. M. Mervoyer (*Étude sur A. de T.*, Paris, 1862), A. Chassang (*Le merveilleux dans l'antiquité, A. de T., sa vie, ses voyages, ses prodiges, par Philostrophate, et ses lettres, ouvrages traduits du grec, avec introduction, notes et éclaircissements*, Paris, 1862, 2d ed. 1864); cf. Iwan Müller (*Zur Apollonius-Literatur*, in the *Zeitschr. für luth. Theol. u. Kirche*, ed. by Dellitzsch and Guericke, Vol. 24, 1865, pp. 412-423 and p. 592).

Nicomachi Geraseni arithmeticae, lib. II., ed. Frid. Ast, in his edition of *Jamblichii Chalcidensis theologiae arithmeticae*, Leipz. 1817. (An earlier edition of this work, Νικομάχου Γερασενίου ἀριθμητικῆς βιβλία δύο, was published at Paris in 1588.) Νικομάχου Γερασενίου Πυθαγορικῶς ἀριθμητικῆς εισαγωγῆς. *Nicomachi Geraseni Pythagorae introductionis arithmeticae lib. II. rec. Ricardus Hoche, accedunt codicis Caesariensis problematis arithm.*, Leipz. 1866. *Ἰωάννου γραμματικοῦ Ἀλεξανδρείας (τοῦ Φιλονόου) eis to πρῶτον τῆς Νικομάχου ἀριθμητικῆς εισαγωγῆς. Primum ed. Rich. Hoche, Leipzic, 1864; in lib. II. Nic. introd. arithm. ed. idem (G.-Pr.), Wesel, 1867. The Ἐγχειρίδιον ἀριθμητικῆς of Nicomachus has been edited by Melhom in his *Musici Graeci*. In the *Bibl. of Photius* (cod. 187) there is an extract from a work purporting to have been written by him, and entitled "Theologumena Arithm."*

Secundi (Atheniensis Sophistae) Sententiae, ed. Lucas Holstenius, together with the *Sentences of Demophilus and Democrates*, Leyden, 1689, p. 310 seq.; ed. J. A. Schier (together with the *Bios Zen. φιλοσόφου*), in *Demophilii, Democr. et Sec. Sent.*, Lipsa., 1754, p. 71 seq.; *Gr. et Lat.*, ed. J. C. Orelli, in *Opuscula Græcorum vet. sententiosa et moralia*, Lipsa. 1819-21, Vol. I., p. 208 seq. Tischendorf has recognized a part of the *Bios Zenokleov φιλοσόφου* on a sheet of papyrus discovered in Egypt, and belonging, as T. supposes, to the second, or, at the latest, to the third century of the present era; cf. Hermann Sauppe, in the *Philol.*, XVII., 1861, pp. 149-154; Rud. Reicke has published an old Latin translation of this Life, from a Codex in the Königsberg Library, in the *Philologus*, Vol. XVIII., 1862, pp. 522-524.

The return to older systems was, at Alexandria, a result in part of the learned investigations carried on in connection with the Library, and in this respect Neo-Pythagoreanism stands side by side with the renewal at Alexandria of the Homeric form of poetry. A consideration of more essential significance is, that a philosophy which conceived the divine under the form of the *transcendent* (or which at least admitted this conception side by side with the conception previously prevalent and gave to the former a constantly increasing weight) corresponded far better with the autocratic form of government and the Oriental conception of life than did the systems of the period next preceding, systems which presuppose a certain freedom in social and political life, and which at the time now under consideration had already been shaken to the foundation, even in their merely theoretical bearings, by the spirit of doubt. The satisfaction which was not found either in nature or in the individual subject, was now sought in an absolute object, represented as beyond the spheres of both. But for the purposes of this search, Pythagoreanism and also Platonism offered the appropriate points of support. Added to this, finally, was the influence of Oriental religious ideas, Egyptian, Chaldaic, and Jewish (the influence of the latter being the most important) arising through the meeting of various nationalities at the same place and in the same political union.

Of P. Nigidius Figulus, who was also a grammarian (Gell., *N. A.*, XIX. 4), Cicero tells us (*Tim.*, 1) that he renewed the Pythagorean philosophy; but he cannot have exerted a very considerable influence, since Seneca (*Quæst. Nat.*, VII. 32) knew nothing of the existence of a Neo-Pythagorean School. The school of the Sextians has been already mentioned (§ 61). That the predilection of the Libyan king Iobates (probably Juba II. of the time of Augustus) for Pythagorean writings gave occasion to forgeries, is reported by David the Armenian (*Schol. in Arist.*, p. 28 a, 13). Philo cites, already, the work attributed to Ocellus Lucanus. The work entitled *πρὸς τοὺς ἀπεχουμένους τῶν σαρκῶν* mentioned by Porphyry and written by Sextius Clodius, the teacher of Marcus Antonius the Triumvir, seems to have been directed against those Neo-Pythagoreans who abstained from the use of meat (see Jac. Bernays, *Theophr. Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, Berlin, 1866, p. 12).

A fragment from the work of Apollonius of Tyana on *Sacrifices* is preserved in Eusebius (*Præp. Ev.*, IV. 13). In it Apollonius distinguishes between the one God, who exists *separate* from all things, and the other gods; to the former no offerings whatever should be brought, nay, more, he is not even to be named with words, but only to be apprehended by the reason. All earthly things are, on account of their material constitution, impure, and unworthy to come in contact with the supreme God. To the inferior gods Apollonius seems to have required the bringing of bloodless offerings. The work on Apollonius of Tyana, written by Flavius Philostratus (at the instance of the Empress Julia Domna, the wife of Septimius Severus), is a philosophico-religious romance, in which the Neo-Pythagorean ideal is portrayed in the person of Apollonius, and is claimed to be superior to that of other schools and sects (referring especially to Stoicism, and, as it would appear, to Christianity).

Moderatus of Gades, who was nearly contemporaneous with Apollonius, sought to

justify the incorporation into Pythagoreanism of Platonic and neo-theological doctrines, through the hypothesis that the ancient Pythagoreans themselves intentionally expressed the highest truths in signs, and for that purpose made use of numbers. The number one was the symbol of unity and equality, and of the cause of the harmony and duration of all things, while two was the symbol of difference and inequality, of division and change, etc. (Moderatus, *ap. Porphy. Vit. Pythag.*, 48 seq.).

Nicomachus of Gerasa, in Arabia, who seems to have lived about 140 or 150 A. D., teaches (in *Arithm. Introduct.*, I. 6) the pre-existence of numbers before the formation of the world, in the mind of the Creator, where they constituted an archetype, in conformity with which He ordered all things. Nicomachus thus reduces the Pythagorean numbers, as Philo reduces the Ideas, to thoughts of God. Nicomachus defines number as definite quantity (*πλῆθος ἀσμενόν*, I. 7). In the *Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικά*, Nicomachus, according to Photius, *Cod.*, 187, expounded the mystical signification of the first ten numbers, according to which the number one was God, reason, the principle of form and goodness, and two, the principle of inequality and change, of matter and evil, etc. The ethical problem for man, he teaches, is solved by retirement from the contact of impurity and reunion with God.

To Secundus of Athens, the silent philosopher, who lived under Hadrian, are ascribed (in the *Vita Secundi*, a work of the second century after Christ, much read in the Middle Ages) certain answers (which he is reported to have made in writing) to philosophical questions raised by the Emperor, answers conceived in an ascetic and fantastic spirit, which is akin to the spirit of Neo-Pythagoreanism.

§ 65. Among the Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists, who, through their renewal and further development of the Platonic principle of transcendence, in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism and Epicurean Naturalism, became the precursors of Neo-Platonism, the best-known are Eudorus and Arius Didymus (in the time of Augustus), Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (in the time of Tiberius), Theon of Smyrna and Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Trajan's time), Maximus of Tyre (under the Antonines), Apuleius of Madaura (in Numidia), Alcinous, Albinus, and Severus (of nearly the same epoch), Calvisius Taurus and Atticus, Galenus, the physician (131-200 A. D.), Celsus, the opponent of Christianity (about 200 A. D.), and Numenius of Apamea (toward the end of the second century of the present era).

On Eudorus, cf. Röper, in the *Philologus*, VII, 1852, p. 584 seq.; on Arius Didymus, Meineke, in *Musei Petropolitani Zeltachr. für das Gymn.-W.*, Berlin, 1859, p. 568 seq.; on Thrasyllus, Sévin (*Mém. de l'acad. des inscriptions*, tom. X.), K. F. Hermann (*Ind. Schol.*, Göt. 1852), and Müller (*Frugm. hist. Gr.*, III, 541); on Plutarch, among others, E. Klehmann (*Gymn.-Progr.*, Elberfeld, 1888), Theod. Hilmar Schreiter (*Doctr. Plutarcho et theologos et moralis*, in Ilgen's *Zeltachr. für hist. Theol.*, Vol. VI, Leipz. 1886, pp. 1-163), Ed. Müller (in his *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1887, pp. 207-234), G. W. Nitzsch (*Ind. Lect.*, Kiel, 1849), Pohl (*Die Dämonologie des Plutarch*, G.-Pr., Breslau, 1861), Bazin (*De Plutarcho Stoicorum Adversario, Thesis Parisiensis*, Nice, 1866), O. Gréard (*De la Morale de Plutarque*, Paris, 1867), Rich. Volkmann (*Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch*, 3 parts, Berlin, 1868); on Apuleius, Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik*, I., pp. 576-591). Editions of Albinus' work on Plato have been published by Schneider (*Ind. Lect.*, Breslau, 1852), and K. F. Hermann (in Vol. VI. of his edition of the works of Plato) and editions of Alcinous' work on the same by Orelli (in *Alex. Aphrod. de Fato*, etc., 1824), and K. F. Hermann (in Vol. VI. of Plato's works). The philosophical treatises of Plutarch, Apuleius, and Galen are found

in the complete editions of their works, Plutarch's *Moralia* in Didot's collection, edited by Dübner, Paris, 1841 (as Vols. III. and IV. of his works), and separately, ed. Wyttenbach (Oxford, 1795-1880, Leips. 1798-1834). On Calvisius Taurus, cf. Böder, *La Philosophie de Taurus*, Havre, 1869. On the philosophical opinions of Galen, cf. Kurt Spengel, *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Medicin*, I. 117-195. On Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, cf. F. A. Philippi, *De Celsi, adversarii Christianorum, philosophandi genere*, Berlin, 1856. C. W. Blindemann, *Ueber Celsus und seine Schrift gegen die Christen*, in the *Zeitschr. für hist. Theol.*, 1842. G. Baumgarten-Crusius, *De Scriptoribus ecclesiis, II. p. chr., qui novam religionem impugnaverunt*, Meissen, 1845. Redepenning, *Orig.*, Vol. II., Bonn, 1844, pp. 120-154. F. Chr. Baur, *Das Christenthum in den drei ersten Jahrh.*, pp. 388-395, and Von Engelhardt, *Celsus oder die älteste Kritik bibl. Gesch. u. Christl. Lehre vom Standpunkte des Heidenthums*, in the *Dorpater Zeitschr. f. Th. u. Kirche*, Vol. XI. 1869, pp. 281-344.

Eudorus of Alexandria (about 25 B. C.) wrote commentaries on the *Timæus* of Plato and also on works of Aristotle, and a work on the Parts of Philosophy (*διαίρεσις τῶν μετὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγων*), in which (as in the Pseudo-Plutarchic *Placita Philos.*, a work founded, as is likely, in part on the works of Eudorus and Arius) the views of different philosophers on the various problems (*προβλήματα*) of philosophy are brought together (Plutarch, *De Anim. Procreat.*, 3; Simplic., *Ad Arist. Categ.*, *Schol.*, ed. Br., p. 61 a, 25 et al.; Stob., *Ecl.*, II. 46 seq.). This Platonist wrote also concerning the Pythagorean doctrine (Simplic., in *Phys.*, 39 a, where, notwithstanding the duality of the elements assumed by the Pythagoreans, namely, the number One and the "indefinite dual," the doctrine is ascribed to them that the One is the principle of all things).

Arius Didymus, a learned Academic of the time of Augustus and a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon, wrote *περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων Πλάτων* and other works (Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XI. 23; XV. 15 seq.). Stobæus cites (*Florileg.*, 103. 28) "from the *Epitome* of Didymus," a passage concerning the Peripatetic doctrine of *Eudæmonia*, and his account of the Peripatetic Ethics (*Ecl.*, II. pp. 242-334), in which this passage is again cited, and also his account of the Stoic doctrine, and other things, which were probably taken from the *Epitome* of Arius (see Meineke, as above cited, and Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*, III. a, 2d ed., 1865, p. 546). In this account the Peripatetic Ethics is assimilated to that of the Stoics, in the same manner in which, according to Cicero, this was done by Antiochus of Ascalon. Didymus wrote also *περὶ Πυθαγορείης φιλοσοφίας*.

Thrasyllus, known as the arranger of the Platonic dialogues, was a grammarian, who lived in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and died A. D. 36, while holding the office of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a Neo-Pythagorean numerical speculation and the practice of magic, after the manner of the Chaldeans. *Schol. in Iusen.*, VI. 576: *Thrasyllus multarum artium scientiam profectus postremo se dedit Platonicæ sectæ, et deinde mathesi, quæ præcipue viguit apud Tiberium*. The *mathesis* here spoken of was a superstitious, mystical doctrine, founded on speculations with numbers, and combined with astrology. Albinus (*Introd. in Platon. Dialogos*, ch. 6), names, besides Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, as one of the authors of the division of the Platonic dialogues into Tetralogies; the first tetralogy, at least (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo), was arranged by Dercyllides. According to Porphyry, *ap. Simplic. ad Arist. Phys.*, f. 54 (*Schol.*, ed. Brandis, p. 244 a), Dercyllides composed a work on Plato's philosophy, in the eleventh book of which he cited, from Hermodorus on Plato, a passage representing that Plato reduced matter, and the infinite or indefinite, to the More and Less (Magnitude and Smallness, etc.). The problem here discussed relates to one of the most important points of contact between Platonism and Pythagoreanism.

Theon of Smyrna (in the second century A. D.) wrote a work, which is still extant, explaining the mathematical doctrine of Plato (ed. Bulliadius, Paris, 1644; ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 1827; *ejusdem Lib. de Astronomia*, ed. Th. H. Martin, Paris, 1848). He

was more a mathematician than a philosopher. His astronomical doctrines were for the most part borrowed from a work by Adrastus the Peripatetic.

Plutarch of Chæroneæ (born about 50, died about 125 A. D.), a pupil of Ammonius of Alexandria, who taught at Athens under Nero and Vespasian, developed his philosophical opinions in the form of an exposition of passages from Plato. In this exposition he believed that he had reproduced Plato's meaning, and only that, just as subsequently the Neo-Platonists believed in regard to their work; but his doctrines are far less removed from pure Platonism than theirs. He opposed the monism of the Stoics, and had recourse to the Platonic hypothesis of two cosmical principles, namely, God, as the author of all good, and matter, as the condition of the existence of evil. For the formation of the world it was necessary, he taught, that the "monad" (*μονάς*) should be combined with the "indefinite duad" (*δυνας ἀόριστος*), or the form-giving with the form-receiving principle. The Ideas, according to him, were intermediate between God and the world; matter was the chaotic substrate of creation, the ideas were the patterns and God the efficient cause (*ἡ μὲν οὖν ὕλη τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀτακτότατον ἔστιν· ἡ δ' ἰδέα τῶν παραδείγματων κάλλιστον· ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῶν αἰτίων ἀριστος*, *Quæst. Conv.*, VIII. 2. 4). God's essence is unknown to us (*De Pyth. Orac.*, 20); he sees, but is not seen (*De Is. et Osir.*, 75), he is one and free from all differentiation (*ἑτερότης*), he is the existent (*ὄν*), and has no genesis (*De EI apud Delph.* 20; *De Is. et Osir.*, 78). Only God's workings can be known by us. In itself matter is not bad, but indifferent; it is the common place for good and evil; there is in it a yearning after the divine; but it also contains another principle, the evil world-soul, which coexists with the good one, and is the cause of all disorderly motions in the world (*De Is.*, 45 seq.; *De An. Procreant.*, ch. 6 seq.). The gods are good. Of the demons (who are necessary as mediators between the divine and human), some are good and others are evil; in the human soul both qualities are combined. Besides the one supreme God, Plutarch recognizes as real the popular divinities of the Hellenic and Non-Hellenic faiths. The moral element in Plutarch is elevated and without asperity.

Maximus of Tyre, who lived about one half-century after Plutarch, was more favorable to Syncretism in religion and to a superstitious demonology.

Apuleius of Madaura, born probably between 126 and 132 A. D., taught that, besides God, the Ideas and Matter were the original principles of things. He discriminates as belonging to the sphere of the supra-sensible, or truly existent, God and his reason, which contains the ideal forms, and the soul; from these are contradistinguished all that is sensible or material. The belief in demons receives the same favor from him as from Maximus. The third book of his work *De Dogmate Platonis* contains logical theorems, in which Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended together. Marcianus Capella, who between A. D. 330 and 439 (and probably between 410 and 439) wrote a manual of the "seven liberal arts" (edited by Franz Eyssenhardt, Leipsic, 1866), also Isidorus, (see below, § 88), borrowed much from this work of Apuleius.

Aldinous, who lived probably at about the same time with Apuleius, likewise names in his outline of the Platonic teaching (*εἰς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόγματα εἰσαγωγή*), God, the ideas, and matter as the first principles. He uncritically mixes Aristotelian and Stoic with Platonic opinions.

Albinus (whose instruction Galenus sought at Smyrna, in 151-152 A. D.) wrote an introduction to the Platonic Dialogues, which is of little value, and also commentaries on some of the works of Plato. Cf. Alberti, *Ueber des Alb. Isagoge*, in the *Rh. Mus.*, new series, XIII. pp. 76-110.

Severus, from whose writings Eusebius (*Pr. Ev.*, XIII. 17) has preserved us a fragment, combated single doctrines of Plato. In particular, he denied the genesis of the world

(*Procl. in Tim.*, II. 88), and affirmed the soul to be simple, like a mathematical figure, and not compounded of two substances, the one capable the other incapable of being acted upon. With his Platonism were blended Stoic doctrines.

Calvisius Taurus (who taught at Athens about 150 A. D.) wrote against the Stoics and on the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (A. Gellius, *N. A.*, XII. 5; Suidas, s. v. *Ταῦρος*). Gellius (born about 130), who was his pupil (in about the year 160), often mentions him.

Atticus (said to have flourished about 176 A. D.) opposed the combination of Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristotle (Euseb., *Praep. Ev.*, XI. 1 *et al.*). He held to the literal sense of the *Timaeus* (especially as to the doctrine of the temporal origin of the world). In his interpretation of the ethics of Plato, he seems to have assimilated it to that of the Stoics. A pupil of Atticus was Harpocration (*Procl., in Tim.*, II. 93 b).

Claudius Galenus (in the second half of the second century), the well-known teacher of medicine, cultivated also philosophy, and occupied himself with the minute exposition of works of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. Galenus extols philosophy (which with him is identical with religion) as the greatest of divine goods (*Protrept.*, ch. 1). In logic he follows Aristotle. The fourth syllogistic figure, named after him, was not first brought to light or "discovered" by him, but was obtained by a repartition into two figures of the modes included by Theophrastus and Eudemus in the first figure. In metaphysics, Galenus added to the four Aristotelian principles, matter, form, moving cause, and final cause, a fifth principle, namely, the instrument or means (*δὲ οὗ*), which by (Plato and) Aristotle, as it appears, had been subsumed under the concept of the moving cause. With all his inclination to assent to the Platonic views respecting the immateriality of the soul, he was unable, in regard to this question, and, in general, in regard to all questions which conduct beyond the limits of experience, to overcome his tendency to doubt. The thing of principal importance, in his estimation, was to have a religious conviction of the existence of the gods and of an over-ruling providence.

Celsus (perhaps about 200), the opponent of Christianity, whose arguments were controverted by Origen, was a Platonist; he cannot have been an Epicurean. He does not deny the influence of the gods on the world, but only that God works directly on the world of sense. In antagonism to the divine causality stands that of matter, which latter is the source of an irresistible physical necessity. From this Celsus is to be distinguished the Epicurean of the same name, who lived about 170 A. D., and is mentioned by Lucian in the *Pseudomantis*.

Numenius of Apamea in Syria, who lived in the second half of the second century after Christ, combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such manner that, while himself conceding to Pythagoras the highest authority and asserting that Plato borrowed the essential parts of his teachings from him, he made in fact the Platonic element predominant in his doctrine. Numenius traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the wisdom of the Orientals, and calls Plato an Attic-speaking Moses (*Μωϋσῆς Ἀττικίζων*, Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, I. 342; Euseb., *Praep. Ev.*, XI. 10). He was without doubt well acquainted with the doctrines of Philo and with the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in general. He wrote, among other things, *περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀπορρήτων*, *περὶ τὰ θεῶν*, and *περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως* (Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XIII. 5; XIV. 5). The most noteworthy deviation of Numenius from Plato (but which was not recognized by him as such) consists in this: that he (following, perhaps, the precedent of the Christian Gnostics, especially the Valentinians, and indirectly influenced by the distinction made by the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophers between God himself and his power working in the world, the

Logos) distinguished the world-builder (*δημιουργός*) as a second God, from the highest deity. The first God is good in and through himself; he is pure thought-activity (*νοῦς*), and the principle of being (*οὐσίας ἀρχή*, Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XI. 22). The second God (*ὁ δεύτερος θεός ὁ δημιουργός θεός*) is good by participation in the essence of the first (*μετοχῇ τοῦ πρώτου*); he looks toward the supersensuous archetypes and thereby acquires knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*); he works upon matter and thus forms the world, he being the principle of genesis or becoming (*γενέσεως ἀρχή*). The world, the production of the Demiurgeos, is the third God. Numenius terms the three Gods, respectively, father, son, and grandson (*πάτρις, υἱόγονος, and ἀνέγονος*, Procl., in *Plat. Tim.*, II. 93). Numenius ascribes this doctrine not only to Plato, but also even to Socrates (Euseb., *Pr. Ev.*, XIV. 5). The descent of the soul from its incorporeal pre-existent condition into the body implies, according to him, previous moral delinquency. Cronius, who is often named in connection with Numenius, and is described by Porphyry (*De Antro Nymph.*, 21) as his friend (*ἑταῖρος*), seems to have shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Himeric poems an allegorical and mythical interpretation. Harpocration also followed Numenius in his doctrine of the three highest gods.

The writings of the pretended Hermes Trismegistus (ed. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1854: cf., respecting him, Baumgarten-Crusius, *Progr.*, Jena, 1827; B. J. Hilgers, Bonn, 1865, and Louis Ménard, *Hermès Trismégiste, traduction complète, précédée d'une étude sur l'origine des livres hermétiques*, Paris, 1866, 2d ed., 1868), which in religious and philosophical regards bear an entirely syncretistic character, belong to the time of Neo-Platonism.

§ 66. Among the adherents of Neo-Platonism, a system founded on the principle of the transcendence of the Deity, and in which, notwithstanding its filiation upon Plato, the whole of philosophical science was brought under a new systematic form, belong, 1) the Alexandrian-Roman school of Ammonius Saccas, the originator of the whole Neo-Platonic movement, and of Plotinus, who was the first to develop the system on all its sides, 2) the Syrian School of Jamblichus, who favored a fantastical theurgy, 3) the Athenian school of the younger Plutarch, and of Syrianus, and of Proclus and his successors,—in whose doctrines the theoretical element became again predominant,—together with the later Neo-Platonic commentators.

On Neo-Platonism in general may be compared the essays or works of G. Olearius (annexed to his translation of Stanley's *History of Philosophy*, Leips. 1711, p. 1206 seq.), J. A. Dietelmayer (*Programm, quo ostendit eorum in schola Alexandrina doctorum exposit.*, Altd. 1740), the *Histoire critique de l'école néoplatonisme ou des nouveaux Platoniciens* (Avign. 1766), Meiners (Leips. 1782), Kell (Leips. 1783), Oelrichs (Marb. 1788), Fülleborn (in *Beitr. sur Gesch. d. Ph.*, III. 3, p. 70 seq.), I. H. Fichte (*De Philos. Novas Platon. Origine*, Berlin, 1818), F. Bouterwek (*Philosophorum Alexandrinorum ac Neoplatonicorum recensio accurata*, in *Comm. Soc. Reg. Gotting. rec.*, vol. V., pp. 227-238, Göttingen, 1821), Tzschirner (*Der Fall des Heidenthums*, Leips. 1829), K. Vogt (*Neoplatonismus und Christenthum*, Berlin, 1836), Matter (*Sur l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1830, 2d ed., 1840-48), Jules Simon (*Histoire de l'école d'Al.*, Paris, 1842-45, cf. *Emile Salicrú in Revue des Deux Mondes*, Sept. 1, 1844), J. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (*Sur le concours ouvert par l'Acad. des sciences morales et politiques sur l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1845), E. Vacherot (*Histoire critique de l'école d'Al.*, Paris, 1846-51), Steinbart (*Neoplat. Philosophie*, in Panly's *Recht-encycl. des class. Alterthums*). Cf. also, Heinr. Kellner, *Hellenismus und Christenthum oder die geistliche Reaction des antiken Heidenthums gegen das Christenthum*, Gelnhausen, 1866, and Franz Eitner, *Neoplaton. Studien*, in the *Veröffentlichungen für hochl. Theol.*, Vienna, 1868 (and separately).

It will scarcely be necessary to remark that the Neo-Platonic philosophy, although it sprang up after Christianity, belongs in its characteristics to the pre-Christian era.

§ 67. The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus. Ammonius expounded his doctrine only orally, and its exact relation to that of Plotinus cannot be determined with certainty. The affirmation that no essential difference existed between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is referred to him; yet the correctness of this reference is also uncertain.

Of the disciples of Ammonius, the most important, after Plotinus, are Origen the Neo-Platonist, Origen Adamantius the Christian, Erennius, and Longinus the philologist.

Dehaut, *Essai historique sur la vie et la doctrine d'Ammonius Saccas*, Brussels, 1884. G. A. Heigl, *Der Bericht des Porphyrius über Origenes*, Regensburg, 1885. *Dionys. Longinus: De Sublimitate*, ed. S. F. N. Morus, Leips. 1769, ed. B. Wiese, Leips. 1809. *Longini vel Dionysii peri ύψους*, ed. L. Spengel, in *Rhetores Graeci*, I., Leips. 1828; ed. Otto Jahn, Bonn, 1867. *Longini quae supersunt*, ed. Wiese, Oxford, 1820; ed. A. E. Egger, Paris, 1837; Dav. Ruhnken, *Disa de Vita et scriptis Longini*, Leyden, 1776, also in his *Opusc.*, Leyden, 1807, pp. 306-347. E. Egger, *Longin est-il véritablement l'auteur du traité du sublime?*—in *Egger's Essai sur l'histoire de la critique chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1849, pp. 524-533. Louis Vacher, *Etudes critiques sur le Traité du Sublime*, Geneva, 1854. Emil Winkler, *De Longini qui fertur Hübello* n. 5., Halle, 1870.

Ammonius, who lived about 175-250 A. D., was brought up by his parents in the belief of Christianity, but returned afterward to the Hellenic faith (Porphyry, *ap. Euseb. Hist. Eccl.*, VI. 19: 'Αμμώνιος μὲν γὰρ Χριστιανὸς ἐν Χριστιανοῖς ἀνατραφεὶς τοῖς γονεῦσι, οὗτε τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἥφατο, εὐθὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ νόμους πολιτεῖαν μετεβήκετο). The surname Σακκάς (the sack-bearer) was derived from the occupation by which Ammonius originally gained his living. Later writers (notably Hierocles) gave him the surname θεοδιδάκτος (divinely taught). The report that he declared the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines essentially identical, originated with Hierocles (*ap. Phot., Bibl. Cod.*, 214, p. 172 a, 173 b; *Cod.* 251, p. 461 a, Bekk.); Hierocles belonged to the Athenian school of Neo-Platonists, who, perhaps, only imputed to Ammonius their own desire to reconcile the teachings of the two philosophers. Nemesius (*De Nat. Hom.*, ch. 2) makes some statements concerning the doctrine of Ammonius respecting the immateriality of the soul; still, it may be questioned whether he has not ascribed to Ammonius opinions held by others. Whether the doctrine that the One, the absolutely Good, is exterior to the world of Ideas and the divine understanding—a doctrine of fundamental importance in the system of Plotinus—was already enunciated by Ammonius, is uncertain. It was (according to Procl., *Theol. Plat.*, II. 4, *init.*) not held by Origen, the condisciple of Plotinus; what was the position of Longinus on this point cannot be determined, since the point disputed between him and Longinus, whether the Ideas subsist outside the Nous, is not necessarily connected with the one now in question.

That Origen the Christian is to be distinguished from Origen the Neo-Platonist (although G. A. Heigl asserts their identity), is beyond doubt; for the works of the Christian Church-Father were known by Porphyry (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, VI. 19), who complains of his adherence to Christianity in spite of his Hellenic education ('Οργάνος δὲ Ἕλληγιν ἐν Ἕλλησι πρᾶξις λόγος πρὸς τὸ βάρβαρον ἐξώκειλε τόλμημα), and yet says of Origen the Platonist, that (apart from his commentary on the *Proemium* of the Platonic *Timaeus*,

which Proclus mentions, *ad Plat. Theol.*, II. 4) he wrote only on the two following subjects: *περὶ δαιμόνων* and *ὅτι μόνος ποιητὴς ὁ βασιλεὺς* (Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*, ch. 3). The latter work treated, it is most probable, of the identity of the world-builder with the supreme God. (Cf. G. Heflerich, *Unters. aus dem Gebiet der class. Alterthumswiss. G.-Pr.*, Heidelberg, 1860.) Origen the Christian (185–254 A. D.) appears to have attended the school of Ammonius in about the year 212.

Porphyry relates (*Vita Plotini*, ch. 2) that "Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus made a mutual promise not to divulge the doctrine of Ammonius; but, Erennius having broken this agreement, Origen and Plotinus felt themselves also no longer bound by it; still, Plotinus wrote nothing till quite late in life." Of Erennius, tradition says that he explained the term "metaphysics" as denoting what lies beyond the sphere of nature (see Brandis in the *Abh. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1831, p. 34 seq.),

Longinus (213–273 A. D.), known as a grammarian and writer on æsthetics, upheld, in opposition to Plotinus and his followers, the doctrine that the ideas exist separate from the Nous. Porphyry also, who was for a time a pupil of Longinus, sought, in a work directed against Plotinus, to demonstrate the same doctrine (*ὅτι ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ ἰδέσθαι τὰ νοητά*), but was afterward led by Amelius to abandon it, whereupon he was attacked by Longinus (Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.*, ch. 18 seq.). At a still later period Plotinus admitted that Longinus was still the ablest critic of his times (*Vita Plot.*, ch. 20: *τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς κριτικωτάτου γενομένου*); but he contended (perhaps because Longinus, in opposition to him, insisted on the—real or supposed—literal sense of the Platonic writings) that he was only a philologist and no philosopher (*ap. Porphyry, Vita Plotin.*, ch. 14: *φιλόλογος μὲν ὁ Λογγίνος, φιλόσοφος δὲ οὐδαμῶς*). This judgment was, at all events, too severe. It is true that Longinus did not, like Plotinus, contribute to the positive development of theosophy. But he participated, nevertheless, in the philosophical investigations connected with this subject, and really enriched the science of æsthetics by his work on the Sublime (*περὶ ὑψους*), which is full of fine and just observations.

§ 68. Plotinus (204–269 A. D.), who first developed the Neo-Platonic doctrine in systematic form, or, at least, was the first to put it in writing, was educated at Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas, and afterward (from A. D. 244 on) taught at Rome. His works were revised in point of style by Porphyry, and published in six Enneads.

Plotinus agrees with Plato in the doctrine of "sensibles" (*αἰσθητά*) and "intelligibles" (*νοητά*) and intermediate or psychical natures. But he differs from him radically (though unconsciously—for Plotinus believed that his own doctrine was contained in Plato's writings), inasmuch as he teaches that the One or the Good, which with Plato was the highest of the Ideas, is elevated above the sphere of the Ideas and above all the objects of rational apprehension, and that the Ideas, to which Plato ascribed independent existence, are emanations from this "One," the soul an emanation from the Ideas, and so on, the Sensible being the last in the series of emanations; he differs from him, further, in teaching that the Ideas are in the Nous, while Plato in the *Timæus*, with a phraseology which indi-

exhibits a wavering between the tendency to poetic personification and the dogmatic, doctrinal tendency, styles the Ideas gods and the highest Idea the Idea of the Good, the highest god; and the author of the *Sophiastes* ascribes to them, in unqualified, dogmatic form, motion, life, and reason.

The primordial essence, the original unity, the One (*ἓν*) or the Good (*ἀγαθόν*), is neither reason nor an object of rational cognition (neither *νοῦς* nor *νοητόν*), because excluded, by virtue of its absolute unity, from and exalted above both the terms thus contrasted. From the excess of its energy it sends forth an image of itself, in like manner as the sun emits rays from itself. This image, turning with an involuntary movement toward its original, in order to behold it, becomes thus Nous, mind (*νοῦς*). In this Nous the Ideas are immanent, not however as mere thoughts, but as substantially existent and essential parts of itself. They constitute in their unity the Nous, just as the theorems of a science constitute in their unity that science. It is to them that true being and life really belong. The same ideal reality is thus at once the truly existent or the true object of knowledge, and knowing subject or Reason; in the former aspect it is considered as at rest, in the latter, as in motion or active. The Nous in turn produces as its image the soul, which exists in it, as itself exists in the One. The soul has affinities both for the ideal and the sensible. The body is in the soul, and depends on it; but the soul, on the contrary, is absolutely separable from the body, not only in respect of its thinking power, but also in its lower faculties, memory and sensuous perception, and even in the formative force through which it molds and builds up its material environment. It precedes and survives the body. The matter, which is in the objects of sensuous perception, is only generically similar to the matter, which is in the Ideas (*i. e.*, both fall under the same general concept of matter); but the former is specifically differentiated from the latter by the attributes of extension in space and solidity. The former is *μὴ ὂν*, non-existent, essenceless, and can only be reduced to form and order by higher forces, non-derivable from itself. The forms and the formative forces, the powers of nature (*λόγοι*), which enter into it, come from the Ideas, or the Nous. The same categories are not applicable to the ideal and the sensible. The business of man is to return to God, whom he, as a sensuous being, has estranged from himself. The means by which this return is to be accomplished are virtue, philosophic

thought, and, above all, the immediate, ecstatic intuition of God and the becoming one with Him.

Of the disciples of Plotinus, the most noteworthy are Amelius, one of his earliest disciples, and Porphyry, the reviser, arranger, and editor of his works.

The works of Plotinus were first published in the Latin translation of Marsilius Ficinus (Florence, 1492; Saligniet, 1540: Basel, 1559), and then in Greek and Latin (Basel, 1580, 1615); editions with the translation of Ficinus annexed have been published by Dan. Wyttienbach, G. H. Moser, and Fr. Creuzer (Oxford, 1835), by Creuzer and Moser (Paris, 1856), and by A. Kirchhoff (Leips. 1856). Plotinus' treatises on the virtues and against the Gnostics were edited and published by Kirchhoff in 1847, and the latter of those works, by Heigl (Regensb. 1882). *Enn. I. 6*, has been published separately by Creuzer: *Plotini Lth. de Pulchritudine*, Heidelb. 1814. The eighth book of the third Ennead (concerning nature, contemplation, and the One) has been translated and explained by Creuzer (in Daub and Creuzer's *Studien*, Vol. I., Heidelb. 1806, pp. 23-108), the first Ennead, by J. G. V. Engelhardt (Erlangen, 1820). Parts of Plotinus' works have been translated into English by Th. Taylor (London, 1787, 1794, 1817), and all have been translated into French and provided with a commentary by Bouillet (Paris, 1857-60).

Of modern works on Plotinus we name those of Gottl. Wilh. Gerlach (*Diap. de differentia, quas inter Plotini et Schellingii doctrinam de numine summo intercedit*, Witt., 1811), Lindeblad (*Plot. de Pulchro*, Lund, 1890), Steinhart (*De dial. Plotini ratione*, Halle, 1829; *Meletemata Plotiniana, diss. Part.*, Naumburg, 1840; and *Art. Plotin*, in Pauly's *Real-enc. d. cl. Alt.*), Ed. Müller (in his *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, II., pp. 286-315, Berlin, 1887), J. A. Neander (*Ueber Ennead. II. 9: Gegen die Gnostiker*, in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad.*, Berlin, 1843, p. 299 seq.), F. Creuzer (in the *Prolegom.* to the Paris edition of the works of Plotinus), Ferd. Gregorovius (in Flehto's *Zeitschr. f. Ph.*, XXVI., pp. 112-147), Rob. Zimmermann (*Gesch. der Aesth.*, Vienna, 1858, pp. 122-147), C. Herm. Kirchner (*Die Philosophie des Plotin*, Halle, 1854), Starke (*Plotini de amore sententia*, Neu-Ruppin, 1854), R. Volkmann (*Die Höhe der antiken Aesthetik, oder Plotin's Abh. vom Schönen*, Stettin, 1860), Emil Brenning (*Die Lehre vom Schönen bei Plotin, im Zusammenhang seines Systems dargestellt, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Göttingen, 1864), A. J. Vitrina (*De egregio quod in rebus corporeis condidit Plotinus pulchri principio*, Amst. 1864), Valentiner (*Plotin und seine Enneiden nebst Uebersetzung von Enn. II. 9*, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1864, p. 118 seq.), Arthur Richter (*Neuplat. Studien; Heft 1: über Leben und Geistesentwicklung des Plotin; Heft 2: Plotin's Lehre vom Sein und die metaphys. Grundlage seiner Philosophie; Heft 3: die Theologie und Physik des Plotin; Heft 4: die Psychologie des Plotin; Heft 5: die Ethik des Plotin*, Halle, 1864-67), Herm. Ferd. Müller (*Ethices Plotinianae Nomenclata Diss.*, Berlin, 1867), E. Grucker (*De Plotinianis libris, qui inscribuntur περι τοῦ καλοῦ et περι τοῦ νοητοῦ καλλοῦ*, Diss., Strasbourg and Paris, 1868).

Porphyrii Vita Plotini, composed in 308, appeared first in connection with the Basel editions of the *Enneads* in 1580 and 1615, then in *Fabric. Bibl. Gr.*, IV. 2, 1711, pp. 91-147, and in the Oxford edition of the *Enneads* in 1885, but not in the Paris edition, again in Kirchhoff's edition, Leips. 1856, and in Cobet's *Diog. Laert.*, Paris, 1850, *append.* pp. 102-118, ed. Ant. Westermann. *Porphyrii Vit. Pyth.* ed. Kessling, in the ed. of *Jambli. de Vit. Pythagorica*, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, in Cobet's *Diog. L.*, Paris, 1850, *app.* pp. 87-101. *Porphyrii ἀποφαισι πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ*, ed. L. Holstenius, with the *Vita Pythag.*, Rome, 1680, and in the Paris edition of Plotinus (1655). *Porphyry. Epist. de Diti Daemonibus ad Anabonem*, in connection with *Jambli. de Myst.*, Venice, 1497, and in Gale's ed. of the same work, Oxford, 1678. *Porphyry. de quinque vocibus eius in categor. Aristotelis introductio*, Paris, 1548; the same is prefixed to most editions of the *Organon*, and is published in Vol. III. of the *Berl. Akad.*'s edition of Aristotle. *Porphyry. de abstinencia ab esu animalium l. quatuor*, ed. Jac. de Rhoer, Utrecht, 1767. *Porphyry. epist. ad Marcel. law.*, ed. Angelus Maïna. Milan, 1816 and 1881, ed. J. C. Orellius, in *Opusc. Græc. Sententiosæ, tom. I.*, Leips. 1819. *Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae*, ed. Gust. Wolff, Berlin, 1856; cf. G. Wolff, *De novissima oraculorum astata*, Berlin, 1854; *Porphyry. de abstinencia et de antro nympharum*, ed. Rud. Hercher (together with Aelian's *De Nat. Animal.*, etc.), Paris, 1858; *Porphy. pñdica. Platonici opuscula tria rec.*, Aug. Nauck, Leips. 1860; Ullmann, *Parallelen aus den Schriften des Porphyry's zu newest. Stellen*, in the *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, V. 1, 1882, pp. 876-894. On Porphyry, cf. Lucas Holsten (*De vit. et scr. P.* in the preface to his editions of Porphyry's works, Rome, 1680, Cambridge, 1685, and in *Fabric. Bibl. Gr.*, IV. p. 2 ch. 27), Brandis (*Abh. d. Berl. Ak. d. Wiss., ph.-hist. Cl.*, 1833, p. 2:9 seq.), and Gust. Wolff (*Ueber das Leben des Porphyry und die Abfassungszeit seiner Schriften*, prefixed to Wolff's ed. of *Porphy. de pñdica. ex oraculis*, etc., pp. 7-18, 14-27); on his rank among the representatives of Neo-

Platonism, cf. N. Bouilliet (*Porphyre, son rôle dans l'école néoplatonicienne, sa lettre à Marcella, traduite en fr., Extr. de la Revue Crit. et Bibliogr.*, Paris, March, 1864); on his relation to Christianity, see Kellner (In Kuhn's *Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1865, No. 1), Jak. Bernays (*Theophrastos Schrift über Frömmigkeit, ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte, mit kritischen und erklärenden Bemerkungen zu Porphyrios' Schrift über Enthaltensmässigkeit*, Berlin, 1866), and Adolf Schäfer (*De Porphyrio in Plat. Tim. commentario, Diss.*, Bonn, 1868). *Porphyr von der Enthaltensmässigkeit, a. d. Griech. m. Anm.*, by E. Baltzer, Nordhausen, 1880.

The native city of Plotinus was Lycopolis in Egypt (Eunap., *Vit. Soph.*, p. 6, Boiss. et al.). He himself was unwilling even to name his birthplace or his parents, or the time of his birth, for, says Porphyry, his disciple (*Vit. Plot.*, ch. 1), he despised these as terrestrial matters, and he seemed to be ashamed of being in the body. Porphyry states (*ibid.*, ch. 2) that Plotinus died near the end of the second year of the reign of Claudius (269, assuming, as we may, that the year of his reign began with the civil year; otherwise, 270), and that (according to information given to Eustochius, his own fellow-disciple) he was then sixty-six years old; from these data Porphyry derives 204 (205?) as the birth-year of Plotinus. In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus applied himself to philosophy, and listened to the instructions of the men then famous at Alexandria, but none of them was able to satisfy him, till at last he came to Ammonius, in whom he found the teacher he had sought. He remained with Ammonius till the year 242 or 243, when he joined himself to the expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the Persians, that he might learn the Persian philosophy. He was prevented from accomplishing this purpose by the unfortunate issue of the expedition, and was obliged to flee for his life to Antioch.

The inference of some historians (Brucker, for example, see above, p. 27) that Plotinus was a disciple and adherent of the Potamo who is mentioned in Diog. L., I. 21, as the founder of an eclectic sect, is incorrect. Suidas says (*s. v. Ποτάμων*): Ποτ. Ἀλεξανδρεὺς γεγονώς πρὸ Αὐγούστου καὶ μετ' αὐτόν, "Potamo, the Alexandrian, living before and after the time of Augustus," and he adds that he was the author of a commentary on Plato's *Republic*. If the statement of Suidas is correct, Diogenes Laërtius must simply have copied the words of his authority (Diocles) without thought, and the reference in the words πρὸ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐκλεκτικῆς τις αἵρεσις εἰσῆλθῃ ὑπὸ Ποτάμωνος must be to the time of Augustus. This Potamo appears to be identical with the person mentioned by Plutarch (*Alex.*, 61) as "Potamo the Lesbian," one of the teachers of Sotion the Sextian.

At the age of forty years (243 or 244 A. D.) Plotinus went to Rome (Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.*, ch. 3). He succeeded there in finding disciples, and, later still, he won over to his doctrine the Emperor Gallienus, as also his wife Salonina, so that he ventured to entertain the idea of founding, with the approval and support of the Emperor, a philosophers' city in Campania, which was to be called Platonopolis, and whose inhabitants were to live according to the *Laws* of Plato. He proposed to live in it himself, with his disciples. Gallienus was not indisposed to grant the philosopher the desired permission, but he was dissuaded from so doing by his counselors, and the plan remained unexecuted. Plotinus remained in Rome till the first year of the reign of M. Aurelius Claudius (268 A. D.), and then retired to Campania, where he died in the year 269, near Minturnæ, at the country-seat of Castricius Firmus, his admirer.

It is evident from his writings that Plotinus had obtained an exact knowledge of the doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, by reading their principal works; that, in particular, he had studied Aristotle with scarcely less zeal than he had studied Plato, is expressly certified by Porphyry (*Vita Plot.*, ch. 14). The works of Numenius exerted a powerful influence on him. Porphyry recognizes in Numenius a forerunner of Ammonius and Plotinus, but agrees with Amelius and Longinus in repelling the charge raised by some against Plotinus, that he merely reproduced the teachings of Numenius;

on the contrary, he says, Plotinus developed the Pythagorean and Platonic principles with far greater exactness, thoroughness, and distinctness, than any one of his predecessors (*Vita Plot.*, chs. 17 seq.; 20 seq.). At the Synousiai Plotinus caused not only the writings of the Platonists Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius, and Atticus, but also those of the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander (of Aphrodisias?), and Adrastus, to be read, and with these he connected his own speculations (Porphyry, *Vita Plot.*, ch. 14).

Plotinus began the written exposition of his doctrines in his fiftieth year (253 A. D.). His manuscript was revised after his death and given to the public by his disciple Porphyry; yet a few copies made from the original had previously come into the hands of his more familiar disciples. There existed also in ancient times an edition by Eustochius, respecting which the notice has come down to us that in it the psychological investigations contained in *Ennead*. IV. 3-5, and which belong together, were divided otherwise than in the Porphyrian revision, the third chapter coming nearer the commencement of the *Ennead* in the former than in the latter edition. All the manuscripts now extant are based on the edition of Porphyry.

The works of Plotinus lack the artistic form of the Platonic Dialogues, and still more their dialectical force; yet they possess a certain attractiveness from the earnest self-abandonment of the writer to his thought and the unction of his style. Porphyry ascribes to the Plotinic diction terseness and wealth of ideas (*σύντονος καὶ πολύνους*) and sees in many parts rather the language of religious inspiration (*τὰ πολλὰ ἐνθουσιῶν καὶ ἐκπαθῶς φράζων*) than the tone of instruction. Longinus, who combated many of the doctrines of Plotinus, confesses, nevertheless (in a letter to Porphyry, given in the latter's *Vita Plotin.*, ch. 19) his high appreciation of the Plotinic style of thought and expression (*τὸν δὲ τύπον τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰνδρὸς τὴν περικνύτητα καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον τῆς τῶν ζητημάτων διαθέσεως ὑπερβάλλοντος ἀγαμαὶ καὶ φιλεῖ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐλλογισμάτων ἀγεῖν τὰ τοῦτον βιβλία φαῖναι εὖ δεῖν τοὺς ζητητούς*).

The subjects of the fifty-four opuscles of Plotinus, which Porphyry arranged together in six *Enneads*—following, as he himself says (*Vita Plot.*, ch. 24), the method of Andronicus the Aristotelian, in bringing together those which related to similar subjects, and beginning with what was easiest to be understood—are the following:

First Ennead. 1. What is meant by ζῶν, or living being, in general, and the nature of man (in chronological order the 53d treatise). 2. Concerning the virtues (chronologically the 19th). 3. Concerning dialectic, or on the three steps in the process of rising to the intelligible (20). 4. On happiness (46). 5. Whether happiness increases with its duration (36). 6. On the beautiful (1). 7. Concerning the first good (*primum bonum*) and the other goods (54). 8. What objects evils are and what is the origin of evil (51). 9. On the unlawfulness of suicide (16). Porphyry designates (*Vita Plot.*, ch. 24) the topics of the first *Ennead* in general as ethical (*τὰ ἠθικώτερα* or *τὰς ἠθικώτερας ὑποθέσεις*). The place assigned to them, however, is in scientific regards inappropriate, and is also scarcely justifiable on didactic grounds; for Plotinus everywhere makes the ethical doctrine of the subjective elevation of the individual to goodness dependent on the previously developed doctrines of that which is good in itself, of being and of the soul (cf., in particular, *Ennead*. I. 3, 1 *seq.*).

Second Ennead (*τῶν φυσικῶν συναγωγή*). 1. On the heavens (40). 2. On the revolution of the heavens (14). 3. Whether the stars exert influences (52). 4. On the two kinds of matter (12). 5. On potentiality and actuality (25). 6. On quality and essence (17). 7. On the possibility of complete mixture (37). 8. Why a distant object appears to the eye smaller than it really is, while a near one appears with its actual magnitude (35). 9. Against the (Christian) Gnostics, who give out that the world and its author, or the Demiurge, are evil (33).

Third Ennead (τρεὶς τὰ περὶ κόσμου). 1. On fate (3). 2 and 3. On providence (47 and 48). 4. Concerning the Demon charged to watch over us (15). 5. Concerning love (59). 6. On the impassibility of the immaterial (26). 7. Concerning eternity and time (46). 8. On nature, contemplation, and the One (30). 9. Various considerations respecting the relation of the divine Nous to the ideas, and respecting the soul and the One (18).—Porphyry says (*V. Pl.*, ch. 26), that he placed the seventh chapter here διὰ τὰ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου and the eighth διὰ τὸ περὶ φύσεως καφάλαιον, but he omits to say anything of the other not less important contents of these chapters.

Fourth Ennead (τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς). 1. On the essence of the soul (4). 2. How the soul holds the middle place between indivisible and divisible substance (21). 3–5. On various psychological problems (27–29). 6. On sense-perception and memory (41). 7. On the soul's immortality (2). 8. On the descent of the soul into the body (6). 9. On the question, whether all souls are one (8).

Fifth Ennead (τὰ περὶ νοῦ). 1. On the three original hypostases: the First Being, the Nous, and the Soul (10). 2. On the genesis and order of that which comes after the First Being (11). 3. Respecting the cognitive substances and that which is above and beyond them (49). 4. Respecting the One and the manner in which all things descend from it (7). 5. That the νοητά (Intelligibles) do not exist outside of the Nous; also, on the Nous and on God as the absolutely good (32). 6. That that which transcends being is not a thinking essence, and what it is that possesses thought originally and what possesses it derivatively (24). 7. Whether there exist ideas of individual objects (18). 8. Respecting intelligible beauty (31). 9. On the Nous, the ideas, and the existent (5).—Porphyry confesses that no one of these chapters treats exclusively of the Nous.

Sixth Ennead (concerning the existent and the Good or the One). 1–3. Of the genera of the existent (the Categories) (42–44). 4 and 5. That the existent, since it is one and the same, is also everywhere entire (22, 28). 6. On numbers (34). 7. On the plurality of the truly existent and concerning the Good (38). 8. On human and divine freedom (39). 9. On the Good or the One (9).

The chronological order of these fifty-four treatises is (according to Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.*, chs. 4–6) the following: From A. D. 253 to 262: *Enn.*, I. 6. (On the beautiful; yet, in respect to this one Porph. (ch. 26) expresses himself in doubt), IV. 7, III. 1, IV. 1, V. 9, IV. 8, V. 4, IV. 9, VI. 9, V. 1, V. 2, II. 4, III. 9, II. 2, III. 4, I. 9, II. 6, V. 7, I. 2, L. 3, IV. 2. From 262 to 267: VI. 4 and 5, V. 6, II. 5, III. 6; IV. 3–5, III. 8, V. 8, V. 5, II. 9, VI. 6, II. 8, I. 5, II. 7, VI. 7, VI. 8; II. 1, IV. 6, VI. 1–3, III. 7. 267–268: I. 4, III. 2, and 3; V. 3, III. 5. 268–269: I. 8, II. 3, L. 1, I. 7. Another composition, written at about the same time as V. 6, is mentioned by Porphyry (*Vit. Plot.*, ch. 5), but the title is not given, and it is not included by Porphyry in any of the *Enneads*.

Philo of Alexandria, the Jew, had introduced the distinction between God and his world-building forces, which latter constituted together the divine Logos; Plutarch of Chaeronea had treated of God as unknowable in his essence, and cognizable only in his world-constructing activity; Numenius of Apamea had hypostatized God himself and the Demiurge into two different beings, with whom the world was to be classed as a third; and Plotinus went further in the like direction. With Plato, he styled the Supreme Essence the One, the Good *per se*, but denied to it—what it still retained in the doctrine of Philo and Plutarch—the epithet of Being (τὸ ὂν), for he taught that it transcended Being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, cf. *Plat., Rep.*, VI. 509, see above, p. 122); he also denied to it the faculty of thought—in opposition to Numenius—affirming that it was also exalted above the rational nature (ἐπέκεινα νοήσεως).

Plotinus pays particular attention to the demonstration of his fundamental doctrine,

that the One is exalted above the Nous. The treatise classed by Porphyry as the eighth in the third *Ennead*, but which on didactic grounds might properly be placed at the beginning of the whole work, opens with the proposition with which the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle begins ("All men naturally seek after knowledge"), but in a modified and expanded form, viz.: "All things tend toward thought" [*θεωρία*, of which *speculation* is the etymological English equivalent.—Tr.]. He first introduces this assertion as a sort of playful proemium, and then proceeds to justify it by serious and extended argumentation. Nature, he says, is the unconscious, or, as it were, the sleeping Logos, and she gives form to matter, that she may rejoice in that which she has formed, as in a magnificent drama; the soul of the All and the souls of men find their highest end in thought; action is only debility of thought (*ἀσθένεια θεωρίας*) or a result of it (*παρακολούθημα*), the former when it takes place without previous reflection, the latter when it is preceded by independent thought; for which reason, says Plotinus, those boys who are the least gifted, and are too stupid for purely intellectual activities, resort to manual labor. Thought can be directed in a rising succession to nature, the soul, and the Nous, becoming ever more and more united with the object of thought; but there remains ever involved in it the dual distinction of the act of knowing and the object of knowledge, and this must be true not only of the human Nous but of every Nous, even the divine (*παντὶ νῷ συνέστηκεν τὸ νοητόν*). But duality implies unity, and this unity we must seek to discover (*εἰ δὲ δύο, δεῖ τὸ πρὸ τῶν δύο λαβεῖν*). The Nous cannot itself be the unity sought, since it is necessarily subject to the duality above pointed out. Separate the Nous (intellect) from the νοητόν (intelligible) and it will no longer be Nous. Hence that which is prior to duality is above and beyond the Nous (*τὸ πρότερον τῶν δύο τούτων ἐπέκεινα δεῖ νοῦ εἶναι*). The One can no more be νοητόν than Nous; for the νοητόν is also inseparably united with the Nous. If, therefore, it can neither be Nous nor νοητόν, it must be that from which each alike is derived. It is not, however, for this reason irrational, but supra-rational or transcending reason (*ὑπερβεβηκὸς τὴν νοῦ φύσιν*). It is to the Nous what light is to the eye (*Ennead*. VI. 7). It is more simple than the Nous, since the producing is always simpler than the produced. Just as the unity of the plant, of the animal, of the soul is the highest element in these existences, so unity in itself is that which is absolutely first in ontological regards. It is the principle, the source, and the power from which true being descends.—Plotinus here hypostatizes the last result of abstraction, and makes of it a being, existing apart from other beings. He then regards it as the principle of that from which it was abstracted, and accordingly identifies it with the Deity.—Just as he who has looked at the heavens and seen the lustre of the stars, thinks of and seeks to discover the artist who fashioned the heavens, so must he who has beheld and known and admired the intelligible world (*τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον*), seek for its artist, and asks who then it is that has called into existence this more glorious world of the Intelligible (*νοητόν*) and the Intellect (*νοῦς*).

The difference between the fundamental doctrine of Plotinus and the corresponding doctrine of Plato is very clearly expressed in the comparisons instituted by each. Plato compares the idea of the good, as the highest in the world of ideas, to the sun, as that which is highest in the sensible world; Plotinus compares the same idea as the *creator* of the ideal world to the *creator* of the sensible world. With another application of the Platonic figure, Plotinus compares the One to light, the Nous to the sun, and the soul to the moon (*Ennead*. V. 6. 4). Plotinus, nevertheless, believed himself in agreement not only with Plato, but also with the oldest philosophers. He says (*Ennead*. V. 1. 8) that with Plato the Nous was the Demiurgos, hence the Cause (*αἰτιον*), but that Plato maintained the existence of a father to this Cause, and that this father was the Good (*ἀγαθόν*), which is superior to both reason and being (*τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας*). Plato, he con-

tinues, applies the term Idea to Being and Nous, and must, therefore, have considered the idea as having the Good for its source. Plotinus overlooks, in this connection, the fact that Plato terms the Good, in some places, "the Idea of the Good," an expression which is avoided by Plotinus, who, on the contrary, distinctly affirms that the principle of the Ideas is itself not ideal, but exalted above ideality (*Ennead. V. 5, 6; VI. 7. 32: ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνείδεον, οὐ τὸ μορφῆς δεόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσα μορφὴ νοεῖται*); by the *οὐσία*, Being, to which Plato conceives the Good as superior, Plotinus understands not the Idea of Being, but the sum of all Ideas. These dogmas, continues Plotinus, were touched upon already before the time of Plato by Parmenides, who rightly identified the existent and the Nous, and separated them from the Sensible; but when he proceeded to see in this unity of being and thought the highest of all unities, he proceeded inexactly and laid himself open to criticism, which must still recognize in this pretended unity a real plurality. But the Parmenides of the Platonic Dialogue, says Plotinus, discriminates more exactly (*Ennead. V. 1. 8*). Nor did Anaxagoras, who posited the Nous as first and simplest, with his antique manner hit upon the precise truth. The same may be said of Aristotle, for whom, wise, the Nous was first in rank. Plotinus seeks, nevertheless, to show that his own doctrine is the inevitable consequence of certain Aristotelian teachings. In Heraclitus and Empedocles he discovers at least a separation of the intelligible from the sensible; but of all the philosophers before Plato, he finds the Pythagoreans and Pherecydes most friendly to his conceptions (*Ennead. V. 1. 9*). The Pythagoreans saw that the One, as exalted above all contrariety, admitted only of negative determinations, and that even unity could be ascribed to it only in the sense of the negation of plurality, for which reason they give it the symbolical name of Apollo (*Ennead. V. 6. 4*). Plotinus considers himself, therefore, justified in drawing the general conclusion that his doctrine, so far from being new, was known even to the earliest philosophers, though insufficiently developed by them, and in the development supplied by himself he pretends to furnish merely an exegesis of what these, his predecessors, had already taught (*τοὺς ἑν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι, Ennead. V. 1. 8*).

In what manner the Many, or plurality, was evolved from the One is a problem on whose solution Plotinus does not venture without a preliminary prayer to the Deity for the gift of correct discernment (*Ennead. V. 1. 6*). He rejects the attempted pantheistic solution, according to which the One is at the same time All; the One, he says, is not all things, but before all (*Ennead. III. 8. 8*). The One is at once nothing and all things; the former, since all things are posterior to the One, the latter, inasmuch as all are derived from it (*Ennead. VII. 7. 32*). It is not by division that all things are derived from it, since then it would cease to be One (*Ennead. III. 8. 9*). Remaining itself in repose, its products arise from it as if by radiation (*περιλαμψίς*), just as the sun emits from itself the brightness which surrounds it (*Ennead. V. 1. 9*). But many difficulties remain in the way of this hypothesis, which Plotinus will not conceal. Was the plurality, which the One has discharged from itself, originally contained in the One or not? If the affirmative be true, then the One was not strictly one; if the negative, how could the One give that which it did not possess? The solution of this difficulty is found in the transcending power of the One, which latter, as the superior, can send forth from the superabundance of its perfection the inferior, without having contained the latter, as such, in itself (*Ennead. V. 2. 1: ἐν γὰρ τέλει οἷον ὑπερέρρη, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες οὐτοῦ πεποικν ἄλλο*). More especially, the possibility of the genesis of all things from the One is grounded in the circumstance that the One is both everywhere and yet in no place. If it were simply everywhere, it would be all things and so not one; but since it is also nowhere, it follows that while all things exist through the One, in virtue of its being everywhere, they exist as differentiated from the One, in virtue of its being nowhere (*Ennead. III. 9. 3*).

The immediate product of the One is the Nous (*Ennead*. V. 1. 6 and 7). The latter is an image (*εἰκών*) of the former. As the product of the One, the image turns toward the One in order to grasp and comprehend it, and through this very turning (*ἐπιστροφή*) it becomes Nous (reason), for all theoretical comprehension is either *αἰσθησις* or *νοῖς* (sense-perception or rational apprehension); it is the former only when the object of comprehension is sensible, hence when this object is supra-sensible it is *νοῖς*. The Nous is in distinction from the One subject to differentiation (*ἐτερότης*), in that the duality of knowing and known is inherent in it; for even when both these terms are, in fact, identical (in self-knowledge), the ideal difference remains. The Nous includes in itself the world of Ideas (*Ennead*. III. 9: V. 5). The Ideas have their material constitution, but it is a supra-sensible nature (*Ennead*. IV. 4. 4: *εἰς δὲ μορφή, ἔστι καὶ τὸ μορφούμενον, περὶ δ' ἡ διαφορά, ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ὕλη ἢ τὴν μορφήν δεχόμενη καὶ αὖτις τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ νοητός· ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔκειναι, οὗτος δὲ συνθετός καὶ ἐκ ὕλης, καὶ αὖτις δὲ ὕλην εἶναι*). That the Ideas are immanent in the Nous and do not exist externally to it (*ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά*) is the second cardinal point of the Plotinian doctrine. Plotinus cites Plato's utterance in the *Timaeus*, that the Nous looks at the Ideas, which are in "the Living" (*ἐν τῷ ὄντι ζῶντι*), and says that from this it might appear that the Ideas were prior to the Nous; but if that were so, the Nous would only possess in itself representations of the truly existent, and not the latter itself, hence not the truth, which would then lie beyond its sphere. Plato can only have intended, therefore, to assert the identity of the Nous with that intellectual world in which exist the Ideas (the *κόσμος νοητός* or the *ὄντι ζῶντι*). The intelligible (*νοητόν*) is not substantially, but only ideally, distinguishable from the Nous; the same existence is intelligible, in so far as it possesses the attributes of repose and unity (*στάσις, ἐνότης, πρῶσις*), and Nous, in so far as it exercises the act of knowing (*Ennead*. III. 9: 1). The Nous, i. e., the divine and true Nous, cannot err; if it had not the truth in itself, but only images of the truth, it would err (*τὰ ψευδῆ ἔξει καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές*), it would not participate in the truth (*ἀμειρος ἀληθείας*), and would yet be subject to the false belief that it possessed the truth; it would then not be Nous at all, and no place whatsoever would remain for the truth. It is, therefore, incorrect to seek for the Ideas (*τὰ νοητά*) outside of the Nous (as did Longinus), or to suppose that the Nous contains only images or impressions (*τυφαί*) of that which exists: on the contrary, one must confess that in the true Nous the Ideas are immanent (*Ennead*. V. 1. 1 and 2).*

The Soul is the image (*εἰκών*) and product of the Nous; just as the Nous is of the One (*Ennead*. V. 1. 7: *ψυχὴν γεννᾷ νοῖς*). As being only the image of the Nous, the soul is necessarily of inferior rank and character, though none the less really divine and endowed with generative force. The soul turns in a double direction toward the Nous, its producer, and toward the material, which is its own product. Coming forth from the Nous, the soul extends itself, as it were, into the corporeal, just as the point, extended, becomes a line; there is, therefore, in the soul (and this is in accordance with Plato's teaching in the *Timaeus*) an ideal, indivisible element, and a divisible element which goes to produce the material world. The soul is an immaterial substance, not a body, nor the

* Neither the doctrine of Longinus nor that of Plotinus is identical with Plato's doctrine: Plato represents the Nous of the world-artist as immanent in the Idea of the Good, and in the dialogue *Soph.* (p. 248)—where what was probably in the beginning a poetic personification has already become a matter of doctrine—motion, life, animation, and reason are ascribed to the Ideas, so that their relation to the Nous is neither that of immanence nor that of transcendence, but the Nous is immanent in them. That the Ideas transcend the human Nous is justly recognized as Plato's doctrine both by Plotinus and Longinus. It followed obviously from the argument of Plotinus that he must either refuse to man a knowledge of the Ideas or else make them also immanent in the human Nous.

harmony, nor the entelechy of the body and inseparable from the latter, since not only the Nous, but also memory, and even the faculty of perception and the psychical force, which molds the body, are separable from the body (Plotin., *ap. Euseb., Praepar. Ev.*, XV. 10). There exists a real plurality of souls; the highest of all is the soul of the world; but the rest are not mere parts of the world-soul (*Ennead.* IV. 3. 7; IV. 9). The soul permeates the body as fire permeates air. It is more correct to say that the body is in the soul than that the soul is in the body; there is, therefore, a portion of the soul in which there is no body, a portion to whose functions the co-operation of the body is unnecessary. But neither are the sensuous faculties lodged in the body, whether in its individual parts or in the body as a whole; they are only present with the body (*παρεῖναι, παρουσία*), the soul lending to each bodily organ the force necessary for the execution of its functions (*Ennead.* IV. 3. 22 and 23). Thus the soul is present not only in the individual parts of the body, but in the whole body, and present everywhere in its entirety, not divided among the different parts of the body; it is entirely in the whole body, and entirely in every part. The soul is divided, because it is in all the parts of its body, and it is undivided, because it is entirely in all parts and in every part (*μεριστή, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὅποιον αὐτοῦ ὕλη, Ennead.* IV. 2. 1). The soul is *per se* indivisible, being divided only as related to the bodies into which it enters, since these could not receive it if it remained undivided (*ibid.*). (It is obvious that Plotinus sought by this qualification to escape the objection of Severus to the Platonic doctrine of the mixed nature of the substance of the soul.) The soul is essentially in the Nous, as the Nous is in the One; but the soul contains the body (*Ennead.* V. 5. 9). The Divine extends from the One to the soul (*Ennead.* V. 1. 7).

The soul, in virtue of its mobility, begets the corporeal (*Ennead.* III. 7. 10; cf. IV. 3. 9; I. 8. 5). That material bodies possess a *substratum* (*ὑποκείμενον*), which, itself unchanged, is the subject of manifold changing forms, is inferable (as Plato teaches) from the transition of various kinds of matter into each other, whereby it is made obvious that there are no determinate forms of matter which are original and unchangeable, such as, for example, the four elements of Empedocles, but that all determination arises from the union of form (*μορφή*) and unqualified matter (*ὑλη*). Matter, in the most general sense of the word, is the basis or "depth" of each thing (*τὸ βάθος ἐκάστου ἢ ὑλη*). Matter is darkness, as the Logos is light. It has no real being (it is *μηδὲν*). It is the qualitatively indeterminate (*ἄπειρον*), which is rendered determinate by the accession of form; as deprived of form, it is evil (*κακόν*), as capable of receiving forms, it is of an intermediate nature between good and bad (*μέσον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ*). But the matter in the ideas is only in so far similar to that which is in sensible objects, as both fall under the general designation of "the dark depth;" in other respects, the difference between these two kinds of matter is as great as that which exists between ideal and sensible form (*διάφορόν γε μὴν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τὸ τε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ τε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχον, διάφορός τε ἡ ὑλη, ὅσον καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπικείμενον ὁμοῖον διάφορον*); as that form (*μορφή*) which is perceived by the senses is only an image (*εἰδῶλον*) of ideal form; so also the substratum of the sensible world is only an image or shadow of the ideal substratum; this latter has, like the ideal form, a true existence, and is rightly called *οὐσία*, substance, while the designation of the substratum of sensible things as substance is incorrect (*Ennead.* II. 4).

Plotinus subjects the Aristotelian and also the Stoic doctrine of categories to a minute criticism, of which the fundamental idea is that the ideal and the sensible do not fall under the same categories. He then offers, himself, a new doctrine of categories. In agreement with the (Platonic?) Dialogue *Sophistes* (p. 257 seq.), he designates as fundamental forms of the ideal: being, rest, motion, identity, and difference (*ὄν, στάσις, κίνησις,*

ταυτότης, and ἑτερότης). The categories which apply to the sensible world, taken in the sense here given to them, are not the same with those of the ideal world, yet they are not entirely different; they are homonymous with the latter, but are to be understood only in an analogous sense (δεῖ . . . ταῦτ' ἀναλογία καὶ ὁμωνυμία λαμβάνειν). Plotinus seeks to reduce the Aristotelian categories to these *analogia* of the ideal categories (*Ennead.* VI. 1-3).

The essence of beauty consists not in mere symmetry, but in the supremacy of the higher over the lower, of the form over matter, of the soul over the body, of reason and goodness over the soul. Artistic representation imitates not merely sensible objects, but, in its highest development, the ideas themselves, of which sensible objects are images.

In consequence of their descent into corporality, the souls of men have forgotten their divine origin and become unmindful of the Heavenly Father. They wished to be independent, rejoiced in their self-lordship (τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ), and fell constantly farther and farther from God, forgetting their own dignity, and paying honor to that which was most contemptible. Hence the need of man's conversion to that which is the more excellent (*Ennead.* V. 1. 1). Man has not lost his freedom; the essence of freedom—says Plotinus, in agreement with Aristotle—is the absence of constraint, combined with knowledge (μὴ βία μετὰ τοῦ εἰδέναι, *Ennead.* VI. 8. 1). Some men remain buried in the sensuous, holding pleasure to be the only good and pain the only evil; they seek to attain the former and to avoid the latter, and this they regard as their wisdom. Others, who are capable of rising to a certain point, but are yet unable to discern that which is above them, become only virtuous, and devote themselves to practical life, aiming merely to make a right choice from among those things, which are after all only of an inferior nature. But there is a third class of men of divine nature, who, gifted with higher power and keener vision, turn toward the radiance which shines from above and rise into its presence; they rise above the region of obscuring mists and, despising all that is of the earth, sojourn there, where is their true fatherland and where they become partakers of true joy (*Ennead.* V. 9. 1). Virtue is defined by Plotinus, with Plato, as resemblance to God (θεῶ ὁμοιωθῆναι, *Ennead.* I. 2. 1), and sometimes, also, as activity conformed to the nature of the agent (ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), or obedience to reason (ἐπακτεῖν λόγον), definitions which recall the doctrines of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plotinus distinguishes between civil and purifying virtues and virtues which render their possessor like God. The civil virtues (πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί) are practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, the latter in the sense of "attention to one's own business, whether as a ruler or a subject" (οἰκωπραγία ἀρχῆς περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι); the purifying virtues (καθάρσεις) deliver man from all sin (ἁμαρτία), by making him to flee from whatever pertains merely to sense, while the third class of virtues end, not in deliverance from sin, but in identification with God (οὐκ ἐξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι). In the virtues of the last class those of the first are repeated in a higher sense (ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἰς πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὁ βλέπει, ἀπαθὲς δὲ τὴν φύσιν, . . . πρὸς νοῦν ἡ δρασὶς σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, *Ennead.* I. 2).

The last and highest end for man is *ecstatic elevation* to the one truly Good. This elevation is not effectuated by thought, but by a higher faculty; the intellectual cognition of the Ideas forms to it only a stepping-stone, which must be passed and left behind. The highest point which can be reached or aspired to is the knowledge of, or rather contact with, the Good itself (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰτε γνῶσις εἰτε ἐπαφή); for the sake of this the soul despises even thought itself, which she yet prefers to all things except this; thought is a form of motion (κίνησις), but the soul desires to be unmoved, like the One itself (*Ennead.* VI. 7. 25 and 26). The soul resembles God by its unity (*Ennead.* III. 8. 9) and by its pos-

session of a centre (*τὸ ψυχῆς οἶον κέντρον*, *Ennead.* VI. 9. 8), and hence arises the possibility of its communion with the One (*Ennead.* VI. 9. 10). When we look upon God we have reached our end and found rest, all disharmony is removed, we circle around God in the movements of a divinely-inspired dance (*χορεία ἐνθεος*), and behold in him the source of life, the source of the Nous, the principle of being, the cause of all good, the source and principle of the soul, and we enjoy the most perfect blessedness (*Ennead.* VI. 9. 8 and 9). Yet this is not a beholding (*θέαμα*), but another manner of knowing; it is ecstasy, simplification, contact with Good (*ἐκστασις, ἀπλῶσις, ἀφή*, *Ennead.* VI. 9. 11). Not always are we able to abide in this blessed state; not yet completely loosed from the bonds of the earthly, it is only too easy for the earthly to win back our regards, and only rarely does the direct vision of the supreme God fall to the lot of the best of men, the virtuous and wise, the god-like and blessed (*Ennead.* VI. 9. 10 and 11).

According to the testimony of Porphyry, his disciple, Plotinus attained to this unification with God only four times in the six years which Porphyry spent with him (*Porphyry, Vit. Plot., c. 23*).

One of the earliest disciples of Plotinus at Rome (246 seq.) was Amelius (Gentilianus, the Tuscan, from Ameria), who at the same time allowed also great authority to Numenius. He distinguished in the Nous three hypostases, which he styled three Demiurges or three kings: *τὸν ὄντα, τὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν ὁρῶντα*. Of these the second participated in the real being of the first, and the third in the being of the second, enjoying at the same time the vision of the first (*Procl., in Plat. Tim., 93 d*). Amelius maintained the theory (opposed by Plotinus) of the unity of all souls in the world-soul (*Jamblich., ap. Stob., Ecl., I. 886; 888; 898*).

The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry. Born at Batanea, in Syria, or perhaps at Tyre, in the year 232 or 233 A. D., he received his education at Tyre. His original name was Malchus, which Longinus, whose pupil he was for a time (252-262), is said to have translated into Porphyrius (*Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 7, Boiss.*). At Rome, in the year 262, he became a pupil and follower of Plotinus, and here, after having passed the years 267-270 in Sicily, he is said to have lived and died (about 304 A. D.). Porphyry lays claim less to the rank of an originator in philosophy than to that of an expositor and defender of the doctrine of Plotinus, which he regards as identical with that of Plato and substantially also with that of Aristotle. Porphyry wrote a work in seven books, entitled *περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν* (according to Suidas, s. v. *Πορφύριος*), and also expositions of Plato's *Timaeus* and *Sophistes* and of Aristotle's *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione*, and the still extant *Εἰσαγωγή εἰς τὰς (Ἀριστοτέλους) κατηγορίας (περὶ γένους καὶ εἶδους καὶ διαφορᾶς καὶ ἰδίου καὶ συμβεβηκότος)*, which is usually printed in the beginning of the *Organon*. An epitome, by Porphyry, of the Plotinic system, expressed in a series of aphorisms, is likewise now extant. Besides these, Porphyry wrote a number of original works. Eunapius (*Vita Porphyry., p. 8, Boiss.*) ascribes to Porphyry, as his principal merit, that by his perspicuous and pleasing diction he brought within the range of the understanding of all men the doctrine of Plotinus, which in the language of its author had seemed difficult and obscure. The doctrine of Porphyry is, however, distinguished from that of Plotinus by its more practical and religious character; the end of philosophizing, according to Porphyry, is the salvation of the soul (*ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρία*, *Porphyry., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., IV. 7, et al.*). The cause of evil is to be found in the soul, in its desires after the low and base, and not in the body as such (*Ad Marcellam, c. 29*). The means of deliverance from evil are self-purification (*κάθαρσις*) through asceticism and the philosophical cognition of God. To divination and theurgical initiations Porphyry concedes only a subordinate significance; in his later years, especially, he was instant in

warning his followers against their misuse (see, in particular, his epistle to Anebo, the Egyptian Priest). Porphyry recommends abstinence from animal food on religious grounds (see Bernays, *Theophr. Schr. über Frömmigkeit, mit hr. u. erkl. Bem. zu Porph. Schr. über Enthalt.*, pp. 4-35). Porphyry appears to have taught (in his six books *περὶ ἰλας*) more distinctly than Plotinus the doctrine of the emanation of matter from the super-sensuous (and proximately from the Soul; Procl., in *Tim.*, 109, 133, 139; Simplic., in *Phys.* f. 50 b). The doctrine that the world is without beginning in time was defended by Porphyry against the objections of Atticus and Plutarch (Procl., in *Tim.*, 119). During his residence in Sicily, Porphyry wrote a work *κατὰ χριστιανῶν*, distributed into fifteen Books, in which he attacked the doctrines of the Christians, and especially the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus. This work is often mentioned by the Church Fathers (Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.* VI. 19; *Demonstr. Evang.*, III. 6; Augustin., *Civ. Dei*, XIX. 23 et al.). In the twelfth book Porphyry declared the prophecies in the Book of Daniel (which appears to have been composed about 164 or 163 B. C.) to be prophecies after the event (*valetia ex eventu*). Methodius, Eusebius of Caesarea, Apollinarius, and Philostorgius wrote works in reply to Porphyry's. But neither these works, nor the work of Porphyry (which was burned by order of the Emperor Theodosius II., in the year 435) have come down to us. Cf. J. Bernays, *Theophr.*, etc., p. 133 seq.

§ 69. Jamblichus (died about 330 A. D.), a native of Chalcis in Cœle-Syria and pupil of Porphyry, employed the Neo-Platonic philosophy simply as a means for confirming the polytheistic cultus. He attempted the speculative justification of superstition. He imitated Pythagoras more than Plato, his philosophy resting rather on mystical speculations with numbers, than on Platonic ideas. In his system not only did all the gods of the Greeks and Orientals (excepting the Christian God) and the gods of Plotinus find a place, but he also took a quite peculiar pleasure in adding to the number of superior divinities from the resources of his own fancy.

For the disciples of Jamblichus, chief among whom were Ædesius, Chrysanthius, Maximus, Priscus, Eusebius, Sopater, Sallustius, and Julian the Apostate (who was Emperor from December, 361, to June, 363), and others, the practice of theurgy had in general more interest than philosophical speculation. Theodorus of Asine, one of the earliest of the disciples of Jamblichus, is the only one who labored for further development of the system. The immoderate and even deifying veneration of the heads of schools, and especially of Jamblichus, increased in proportion as the philosophic achievements of their disciples became more insignificant. Those in this period who did most for philosophy were the commentators of the works of the ancient philosophers, Themistius being the most noteworthy among them.

Jamblichē Chalcedensis de Vita Pythagorica Liber, ed. Theoph. Kieseiling; *accessit Porphyri de vita Pythag.*, etc., Lipsæ 1815-16: *Jambli. de Pythagorica Vita*, ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1850, in Cusset's edition of *Diogenes Laërtius*. *Jambli. Adhortatio ad Philosophiam*, ed. Kieseiling, Lipsæ 1813:

Jambli. περί τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης λόγος τρίτος (in Villmann's *Anecd. Graec.*, II., pp. 133 seq., Venice, 1781). *Jambli. Theologumena Arithmeticae*; *acedunt Nicomachi Gerusani Arithmeticae Libri 11.*, ed. F. Ast, Leips. 1817. (*Jamblich's*?) *de Mysteriis liber*, ed. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1837. G. E. Hebenstreit (in *De Jamblichi, philosophi Syri, doctrina Christianus religioni, quam imitari studeo, notitia*, Leips. 1764) treats of the doctrine of Jamblichus. Of the author of the *De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum* treat Meisners (in the *Comment. Soc. Gottling.*, IV. p. 50 seq., 1788). Harless (*Das Buch von den ägyptischen Mythen*, Munich, 1856), and Heinr. Kellner (*Analyse der Schrift des Jamblichus De Mysteriis, als eines Verzeichnisses, eine neue Theologie des Heidenthums herzustellen*, in the *Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1867, No. 3, pp. 359-396).

Dracuppi in Arist. categorias dubitationes et solutiones primum, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1856.

Μαθίων φιλοσόφου περί καταρχών, ed. Gerhardina, Leips. 1820.

Juliani Imp. Opera, ed. Petrus Petavins and Car. Cantoclarus, Paris, 1568 (ed. Dion. Petavins), Paris, 1690; ed. Spanheim, Leips. 1696. *Libanias, ἐπιτάφιος ἐν Ἰουλιανῷ*, in *Lid. Op.*, ed. Relake, Altenburg, 1791-97. *Epistolas*, ed. L. H. Heyler, Mayence, 1623. Of modern writers on Julian may be mentioned Gibbon (chaps. XXII.-XXIV. of his History), Aug. Neander (*Ueber den Kaiser Julian und sein Zeitalter*, Leipsic, 1812), G. F. Wiggers (*De Jul. Apost.*, Diss. Rostock, 1810, and in Illgen's *Zeitschr. f. hist. Theol.*, Leips. 1887), H. Schulze (*Progr.*, Strals. 1699), Teuffel (*Diss.*, Tüb. 1844), D. F. Strauss (*Jul. der Abtrünnige, der Romantiker auf dem Thron der Cäsaren*, Mannheim, 1847), Auer (*Kaiser Julian der Abtr.*, Vienna, 1856), Willh. Mangold (*Jul. der Abtr., Vortrag, gehalten in Marburg*, Stuttg. 1862), Carl Semisch (*Jul. der Abtr., ein Charakterbild*, Breslau, 1862), Fr. Lübker (*K. Julians Kampf und Ende*, Hamburg, 1864), Eugène Talbot (*Julien, œuvres complètes, traduction nouvelle accompagnée de sommaires, notes, éclaircissements*, etc., Paris, 1868), Baur (*Die christl. Kirche vom 4.-6. Jahrh.*, pp. 17-43), and Philip Schaaf (*History of the Ancient Church*, New York, 1859-67, German edition, Leipsic, 1867, §§ 186 and 141, and in the *Zeitschr. f. hist. Th.*, h. v. Kahnis, 1867, pp. 408-444).

Sallustii philosophi de diis et mundo lib. ed. Leo Alatius, Rome, 1688; ed. J. C. Orelli, Zürich, 1821.

Themistii opera omnia; *paraphrases in Aristot. et orationes, cum Alexandri Aphrodisiensis libri de anima et de fato* ed. Vict. Trinoceus, Venice, 1584. *Them. paraphrases Arist. librorum, quas supersunt* ed. Leon. Spengel, Leipsic, 1866. Cf. Valentin Rose, on a supposed paraphrase by Themistius (of the *Prior Analytics*) in the *Hermes* (Review), Vol. II. 1867, No. 3, pp. 359-396 (Rose ascribes this paraphrase conjecturally to Sophonias, a monk of the fourteenth century).

On Hypatia, cf. Jo. Chph. Wolf (in *Fragmenta et elegia mulierum Graecarum, quas orat. proae vane sunt*, Göt. 1739), Jo. Ch. Wernsdorf (Wittenberg, 1747-5), Rich. Hoche (*Hypatia, die Tochter Theons*, in the *Philol.* XV., 1860, pp. 435-474).

Jamblichus heard first the Neo-Platonist Anatolius, a disciple of Porphyry, and afterward Porphyry himself (Eunap., *Vit. Jambli.*, p. 11, Boiss.). He died in the reign of Constantine, and was not living when the latter caused Sopater, one of his disciples, to be executed (Eunap., *Vit. Eusebii*, p. 20). Some even of the immediate disciples of Jamblichus believed in the miraculous acts attributed to this philosopher, who was called by his reverers "the divine" (very often in Proclus), or, sometimes, "most divine" (Julian, *Epist.*, 27). Besides his commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, and his *Χαλδαϊκὴ τελειότης θεολογία* (the 28th book of which is cited by Damasc., *De Princ.*, ch. 43 *init.*), he composed, among other things, the following works, still extant: *περί τοῦ Πυθαγορικῷ βίου, λόγος προπρεπτικὸς εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, περί κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης, περί τῆς Νικوماχοῦ ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς* and the *θεολογούμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς*. Whether the work *De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum* is from the pen of Jamblichus is doubtful; Proclus is reported to have ascribed it to him; at all events, it was composed either by Jamblichus or by one of his disciples. The pretended Epistles of Julian to Jamblichus, still extant, are supposititious; the hypothesis (of Brucker and others), that the Emperor addressed them to the nephew of the head of the school, who bore the same name, is not in harmony with the character of these letters.

Above the One of Plotinus, Jamblichus assumes still another absolutely first One, superior to all contraries and, as being wholly without attributes, elevated even above the Good. Under and next to this utterly ineffable first essence (*ἡ πᾶντ' ἀρρήτος ἀρχή*, according to Damasc., *De Princ.*, ch. 43 *init.*) stands that One, which (as Plotinus had taught) is

identical with the Good. Its product is the intelligible world (*κόσμος νοητός*), from which the intellectual world (*κόσμος νοερός*) is an emanation. The intelligible world includes the objects of thought (the ideas), while the intellectual world includes all thinking beings. The elements of the intelligible world are "limit" or "subsistence" (*πέρας* or *ὑπαρξίς*, termed also "father," *πατήρ*), "illimitation" or "possibility of subsistence" (*ἄπειρον* or *δύναμις τῆς ὑπάρξεως*), and the union of these two or the realization of the given "possibility" (*μικτόν* or *ἐνέργεια* or *νόσις τῆς δυνάμεως*). The members of the intellectual world are likewise three in number; they are Nous, Power (*δύναμις*), and the Demiurge, which, however, Jamblichus seems to have subdivided into seven. Then follows the *psychical* sphere, containing again three parts: the supra-mundane Soul and two other souls, which, according to Jamblichus (*ap. Procl., in Tim., 214 seq.*), emanated from the first. Within the world exist the souls of the gods of the popular polytheistic religion, and of angels, demons, and heroes in multitudes, whose numbers Jamblichus (Pythagorizing) determines according to a numerical *schema* and whom he ranks in a fantastical order. The last place in the order of existence is filled by the sensible world.

The work *De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum* (*Ἀβάμμωνος διδασκάλου πρὸς τὴν Πυρφηρίον πρὸς Ἀνεβὼ ἐπιστολὴν ἀποκρίσις καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπορημάτων λύσις*) claims supra-rationality not only (as was done by Plotinus) for the supreme, supra-existential essence, but for all the gods, on the ground that the principle of contradiction does not apply to them (I. 3 *et al.*); this speculative doctrine is then employed in justification of the crudest absurdities, with no lack in any instance of apparently rational grounds.

One of the immediate disciples of Jamblichus was Theodorus of Asine, who is said also to have listened to the instructions of Porphyry. He drew up a triadic system still more complicated than the system of Jamblichus, thus assisting the transition to the doctrine of Proclus. He posits (with Plotinus and Porphyry) only a single first being, not (with Jamblichus) a first and a second, as being above the sphere of the intelligible, but designates it (with Jamblichus) as the Ineffable and as the cause of good. Between the first being and the psychical realm he places a trinity of essences, the intelligible, the intellectual, and the demiurgic.

Other disciples of Jamblichus were Sopater of Apamea, who was suspected by Constantine the Great of having deprived a fleet laden with grain of favorable winds by magical agencies, and was consequently put to death, Dexippus, Aedesius of Cappadocia, the anonymous author of a compendium of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, and Eustachius of Cappadocia. Aedesius was the successor of Jamblichus and teacher of Chrysanthius of Sardis (who instructed Eunapius), and of Maximus of Ephesus, Priscus of Molossi, and Eusebius of Myndus, by whom Julian was instructed. With Julian agreed in philosophy Sallustius, one of his youthful friends. Scientific demonstration was a matter of small consequence with the most of these men; the practice of theurgical arts was better suited for their lofty intellects. The attempt to foment a reaction against Christianity absorbed the best forces of the school.

In the course of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century lived and taught Themistius (born about 317, died after 387; he was the son of Eugenius of Paphlagonia, was educated at Constantinople, became a Peripatetic and Eclectic Platonist, gained reputation as a commentator of Aristotle and Plato, and was honored by his contemporaries, on account of his excellent style, with the surname *ὁ Εὐφραδής*; his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics, Physics, and Psychology of Aristotle is still extant), Aurelius Macrobius, the author of the *Saturnalia*, and, at Alexandria, the elder Olympiodorus, and the female philosopher Hypatia, who was murdered by the Christians in the month of March, 415, a martyr to polytheism. Marcellinus Capella (see above, § 65) lived probably about 430 A. D.

§ 70. After the failure of the practical contest waged against Christianity and in behalf of the renovation of the ancient cultus and the ancient faith, the representatives of Neo-Platonism applied themselves with new zeal to scientific labors, and especially to the study and exegesis of the works of Plato and Aristotle. To the Athenian School belong Plutarch, the son of Nestorius (died about 433 A. D.), Syrianus, his pupil, who wrote commentaries on works of Plato and Aristotle, Hierocles the Alexandrian, and Proclus (411-485), the pupil of (the elder) Olympiodorus and of Plutarch and Syrianus. Proclus is the most important of the later Neo-Platonists, "the Scholastic among the Greek philosophers." He collated, arranged, and dialectically elaborated the whole body of transmitted philosophy, augmented it by additions of his own, and combined the whole in a sort of system, to which he succeeded in giving the appearance of a rigidly scientific form. Other adherents of the same school were Marinus, Proclus' pupil and successor, Asclepiodotus, a fellow-pupil of the latter, Ammonius, the son of Hermias, Zenodotus, Isidorus, the successor of Marinus, and his successor, Hegias, all immediate pupils of Proclus; also Damascius, who was the president of the school at Athens from about 520 A. D., until the closing of the same in 529 by an edict of the Emperor Justinian, interdicting the giving of instruction in philosophy at Athens. Hellenic philosophy succumbed, partly to the intrinsic weakness into which its own vagaries had led it, and partly to the pressure of Christianity. Still, both at and after the time of this event service was rendered to philosophy through the composition of commentaries on the works of Aristotle and Plato, in which the latter were transmitted to later generations. Among those who distinguished themselves in this connection may be mentioned, especially, Simplicius and (the younger) Olympiodorus, as also Boëthius and Philoponus the Christian.

Syrian Comment. in libros III., XIII., XIV., metaphys. Aristot. lat. interpret. H. Bagolino, Venice, 1858. On Syrianus cf. Baeh, *De Syriano philosopho neo-platonico*, Part I., G.-Fr., Leuban, 1862.

Hierocles Alexandrinus Commentar. in Aur. Carm. Pyth. ed. Jo. Curterius, Paris, 1593; *De Providentia et Fato*, ed. F. Morellius, Paris, 1597; *Quæ supersunt*, ed. Pearson, London, 1655 and 1673; *Comm. in Aur. Carm. Pyth.* ed. Thom. Galeford, in his edition of Stobæus, Oxford, 1850; ed. Mullach, Berlin, 1858.

Procli in Plat. Tim. Comm. et in libros De Rep. Basel, 1584. (Published as a supplement to the Basel edition of the Works of Plato. The Commentary on the *Rep.* is incomplete. Respecting certain later, partially complementary, publications, see Bernays. In the appendix to his work, entitled "*Arist. über Wirkung der Tragödie*," No. 18, ad p. 163.) *Procli in Theologiam Platonis libri sex una cum Marini otta Procli et Procli Instit. Theolog.* ed. Aemil. Portus et Fr. Lindenbrog, Hamburg, 1618; *Excerpta ex Procli scholæ in Plat. Cratylum*, ed. J. F. Boissonade, Leipzig, 1890; *In Plat. Alcib. comm.* ed. Fr. Creuser, Frankfurt, 1890-95; *Procli Opera*, ed. Victor Cousin, Paris, 1820-25; *Procli Comm. in Plat. Parm.* ed. G. Stallbaum, in his edition of the *Parm.* Leipzig, 1899, and separately, Leipzig, 1840; *In Plat.*

Timæum, ed. C. E. Chr. Schneider, Breslau, 1847; *Procli philoa. Platonici opera inedita, quas primus olim e codicibus mscr. Parisiis Italiciisque vulgaverat, nunc secundis curis emend. et aucti* Victor Cousin, Paris, 1864. The Medicean Codex of the works of Proclus on the *Rep.* of Plato is incomplete, but contains an index of the complete Commentary; cf. Val. Rose, in the *Hermes* II. 1867, pp. 96-101. A Codex, formerly in the possession of the Salviati at Florence, but now at Rome, contains the sections which are wanting in the Medicean Cod., yet with many gaps; cf. Mai, *Spicil. Rom.* VIII., *Præf.* p. XX. and p. 664, in the copy of one of the "works" which is given by Mai.

Marini Vita Procli, ed. J. F. Fabricius, Hamburg, 1709; ed. J. F. Boissonade, Leipzig, 1814, and in the Collet edition of Diog. L., Paris, 1850. Cf. A. Berger, *Proclus, Exposition de sa Doctrine*, Paris, 1846; Hermann Kirchener, *De Procli neoplatonici metaphysica*, Berlin, 1846; Steinhart, *Art. Proclus*, in *Pauly's Real-Enc. d. cl. Alt.*, Vol. VI., pp. 63-76.

Ammonii, Hermias filii, comment. in prædicamenta Aristotelis et Porphyrii Isagogæ, Venice, 1645 seq., *De Fato*, ed. J. C. Orelli in his edition of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias and others concerning *Fate*, Zürich, 1824.

Damascii, philosophi Platonici, quaestiones de primis principis, ed. Jo. Kopp, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1826. Cf. Ruelle, *Le philosophe Damascius, étude sur sa vie et ses ouvrages*, Paris, 1861.

Simplicii comment. in Arist. categorias, Venice, 1499; Basel, 1561; in *Arist. physica*, ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1526; in *Ar. libros de coelo*, ed. id. *ibid.* 1528, 1548 etc., in *Ar. libros De Anima cum comment. Alex. Aphrod.* in *Arist. lib. De Sensu et Sensibilib.*, ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1527; *Simpl. comm. in Epicteti Enchiridion*, ed. Jo. Schweighäuser, Leipzig, 1800; German by K. Enk, Vienna, 1867 (1866). *Simpl. Comm. in quatuor libros Aristotelis De Cælo ex rec. Sim. Karstenii mandato regiae acad. disciplinarum Nederlandicae editus*, Utrecht, 1865. On Simplicius, cf. Jo. Gottl. Buhle, *De Simplicii vita, ingenio et meritis*, in the *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1784, p. 1777 seq.

Olympiodori comm. in Arist. Meteorolog. Gr. et Lat. Camotio interpretæ, Venet. Ald. 1550-'51; *Vita Platonis*, see above, p. 99; *σχόλια eis τὰς Πλάτωνα, σπουδῇ Ἀνδρ. Μουστοφίδου και Δημ. Σχίνα*, in: *Συλλογὴ Ἑλληνικῶν ἀνεκδότων ποιητῶν και λογογράφων*, Venice, 1816, Part IV.; *σχόλια eis Θαίωνα*, *ibid.* Part V.; *Comm. in Plat. Alcibiadem.* ed. F. Creuser, in his edition of the *Comm.* of Proclus on the *Alcib.* II. Frankfurt, 1821; *Scholæ in Pl. Phædonem*, ed. Chæto. Eberh. Finckh, Heilbronn, 1847; *Schol. in Pl. Gorgiam* ed. Alb. Jahn, in Jahn's *Archiv.* Vol. XIV., 1848.

Joannis Philoponi Comm. in Arist. libros De Generatione et Interitu, etc., Venice (Ald.), 1527; in *Ar. Analyt. Post.*, Venice (Ald.), 1584; *contra Procl. de Mundi Aeternitate*, ed. Trincavellus, Venice, 1585; *Comm. in primos quatuor libros Arist. de Nat. Auscultatione*, ed. Trincavellus, Venet. 1585; *Comm. in Arist. libros De Anima*, ed. Trincavellus, Venice, 1585; *Comm. in Arist. Anal. Priora*, ed. Trincavellus, Venice, 1586; *Comm. in prim. Meteorolog. Arist. lib.*, etc., Venice (Ald.), 1551; *Comm. in Arist. metaph. lat. ex interpret. F. Patricii*, Ferrara, 1538; *Comm. in Neomachi Arithm.* ed. R. Hoche, Leipzig, 1864 (See above, § 64.)

For the literature relative to Boethius, see below, ad § 58. Cf., further, C. Jourdain, *De l'origine des traditions sur le Christianisme de Boèce*, Paris, 1861; G. Friedlein, *Gerbert, die Geometrie des Boethius und die indischen Ziffern*, Erlangen, 1861 (cf. Jahn's *Jahrb.*, Vol. LXXXVII. 1863, pp. 426-427); M. Cantor, *Math. Beitr. zum Culturleben der Völker*, Halle, 1863, Sect. XIII.

Plutarch of Athens, the son of Nestorius, born about 350, died 433, and surnamed by later Neo-Platonists "the Great," in distinction from the historian and Platonic philosopher, who lived in the reign of Trajan, and from others of the same name, was, perhaps, a pupil of Priscus, who (according to Eunap., *Vit. Soph.*, p. 102) was still teaching at Athens after the death of Julian. Plutarch (according to Procl., *In Parm.*, VI. 27) distinguished between the One, the Nous, the Soul, the forms immanent in material things, and matter, and in so far seems not to have departed from the Plotinian form of doctrine. His son Hierius and his daughter Asclepigeneia taught with him at Athens.

Syrianus of Alexandria, pupil of Plutarch and teacher of Proclus, regarded the Aristotelian philosophy as a stepping-stone to the Platonic. He recommended, therefore, the study of the works of Aristotle as a preparation (*πρωτέχεια και μικρά μυστήρια*) for the Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy or theology (a prelude to the scholastic employment of the Aristotelian philosophy as a handmaid to Christian theology). This view and use of Aristotle continued among the pupils of Syrianus, and in the same spirit Proclus calls Aristotle *δαίμων*, or, of demonic rank, but Plato (and Jamblichus) *θεός*, divine. In his

commentary on the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, Syrianus seeks to defend Plato and the Pythagoreans against the attacks of Aristotle. His commentaries to Plato are no longer in existence.

Hierocles of Alexandria (about 430, to be distinguished from the Hierocles who was governor of Bithynia under Diocletian and figured as an opponent of Christianity) was another pupil of Plutarch (Phot., *Bibl. Cod.*, 214). Since he ascribes to Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism, the demonstration that Plato and Aristotle agreed substantially with each other, we may presume that he too was occupied with the endeavor to prove the same agreement. In the fragmentary remains of his writings he appears more particularly in the character of a moralist. A disciple of Syrianus was Hermias of Alexandria, who afterward taught at the Museum in Alexandria, and was married to *Ædesia*, likewise an adherent of Neo-Platonism, and a relative of Syrianus. Another pupil of Syrianus was Dominus, the mathematician.

Proclus, born at Constantinople about 411, of Lycian descent, and brought up at Xanthus, in Lycia (whence his surname "Lycius"), was in philosophy a pupil of Olympiodorus (the elder) at Alexandria, of the aged Plutarch at Athens, and afterward of Syrianus. He taught at Athens, where he died, A. D. 485. Oppressed by the great mass of transmitted doctrines, all of which he nevertheless attempted to work into his system, he is said often to have expressed the wish that nothing had been preserved from antiquity, except the Oracles (*λόγια χαλδαϊκά*, on which Proclus wrote very full allegorical commentaries) and the *Timæus* of Plato.

The principal moments in the dialectical process by which, according to Proclus, the formation of the world was accomplished, are the issuing of a thing from its cause and its return to the same. That which is brought forth is at the same time like and unlike its cause: in virtue of its likeness it is contained and remains in the cause (*μὲν*); in virtue of its unlikeness it is separated from it (*πρόδος*); it must return to its cause (*ἐπιστροφή*) by becoming like it, and in this return the same stadia are involved as in the previous forward or out-coming movement (*Procli στοιχείσεις θεολογικῆς*, chs. 31–38). All reality is subject to this law of *triadic development*. But the oftener the process is repeated the less perfect is the result. What is first is highest, the last is the lowest in rank and worth. The development is a *descending* one, and may be symbolized by the descending course of a spiral line (while the Pythagorean and Speusippic development, and in modern times the Hegelian, is an *ascending* one).

The primordial essence is the unity, which lies at the foundation of all plurality, the primal good, on which all good depends, the first cause of all existence (*Instit.*, ch. 4 seq.). It is the secret, incomprehensible, and ineffable cause of all things, which brings forth all things and to which all tend to return. It can only be defined by analogy; it is exalted above all possible affirmation or negation; the conception of unity is inadequate fully to express it, since it is exalted even above unity, and so also are the conceptions of good and of cause (it is *ἀνατίως αἰτιῶν*; *Plat. Theol.*, III. p. 101 seq.; *In Parm.*, VI. 87; *In Tim.*, 110 e; it is *πάσης σιγῆς ἀρρητότερον καὶ πάσης ὑπάρξεως ἀγνωστότερον*, *Plat. Theol.*, II. p. 110).

Out of this first essence Proclus represents, not (with Plotinus) the intelligible world, nor (with Jamblichus) a single One, inferior to the first, but a plurality of unities (*ἐνάδες*) as issuing, all of them exalted above being, life, reason, and our power of knowledge. The precise number of these unities (*ἐνάδες*) is not given by Proclus, but they are less numerous than the Ideas, and they so exist in each other as, notwithstanding their plurality, to constitute together but one unity. While the absolute, first essence is out of all relation to the world, these unities operate in the world; they are the agents of providence (*Instit.*

Theol., 113 seq.). They are the gods (*θεοί*) in the highest sense of this word (*ibid.*, 129). The rank of the different unities is determined according to the greater or less nearness in which they stand to the first essence (*Inst.*, 126).

The unities are followed by the triad of the *intelligible*, *intelligible-intellectual*, and *intellectual* essences (*τὸ νοητὸν; τὸ νοητὸν ἅμα καὶ νοερόν, τὸ νοερόν*, *Plat. Theol.*, III. 14). The first of these falls under the concept of being (*οὐσία*), the second under that of life (*ζωή*), the third under that of thought (*Inst.*, 103 and 138; *Plat. Theol.*, III. p. 127 seq.). Between these three essences or classes of essences there exists also, notwithstanding their unity, an order of rank; the second participates in the first, the third in the second (*Plat. Theol.*, IV. 1). The Intelligible in the narrower sense of the term, or Being (*οὐσία*) includes three triads, in each of which the two first terms are "limit" (*πέρας*) and "illimitation" (*ἀπειρος*), the third terms being, in the first triad, the "union" of the two first, or "being" (*μικτόν* or *οὐσία*), in the second, "life" (*ζωή*), and in the third, "ideas," or "that which has life in itself" (*ἰδέαι* or *αὐτόζωον*). In each of these triads, the first or limiting term is also denominated by Proclus (who follows in this particular the precedent of Jamblichus) "Father" (*πατήρ*), the second or unlimited term is called "Power" (*δύναμις*), and the third or mixed term, "Reason" (*νοῦς*). The *intelligible-intellectual* sphere, falling under the concept of life (*ζωή*), contains, according to Proclus, feminine divinities, and is subdivided into the following triads: One, Other, Being (*ἓν, ἕτερον, ὄν*), the triad of original numbers; One and Many, Whole and Parts, Limit and Illimitation, the triad of "gods who hold together" (*συνεκτικοὶ θεοί*); and *ἡ τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχουσα ιδιότης, ἡ κατὰ τὸ τέλειον* and *ἡ κατὰ τὸ στήμα*, the triad of "perfecting Gods" (*τελειουργοὶ θεοί*, *Procl., In Tim.*, 94; *Theolog. Platon.*, IV. 37). The *intellectual essences*, lastly, falling under the concept of reason (*νοῦς*), are arranged according to the number seven, the two first terms in the triadic division, or the terms which correspond respectively with Being and Life, being each subject to a threefold subdivision, while the third term remains undivided. By a further, sevenfold division of each of the seven terms (or "Hebdomads") thus obtained, Proclus obtains seven intellectual Hebdomads, with the members of which he connects by allegorical interpretation some of the deities of the popular faith and certain Platonic and Neo-Platonic fictions, e. g., with the eighteenth of the forty-nine members, which he calls the "source of life" (*πηγὴ ψυχῶν*), the mixing-vessel in the *Timæus* of Plato, in which the Demiurgos combines the elements of the substance of the soul with each other.

The Psychical emanates from the intellectual. Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its activity related to time. The soul of the world is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substance, its parts being arranged in harmonious proportions. There exist divine, demoniacal, and human souls. Occupying a middle place between the sensuous and the divine, the soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power of the soul to turn back toward the divine. Whatever it knows it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements in itself; it knows the One through the supra-rational unity present in itself.


Matter is in itself neither good nor evil. It is the source of natural necessity. When the Demiurgos molds it according to the transcendent, ideal prototypes, there enter into it forms which remain immanent in it (*λόγος*, the *λόγος υπερμαρτυρεῖ* of the Stoics, *Procl. in Tim.*, 4 c, seq.; *In Parmen.*, IV. 152). Proclus only repeats here the Plotinic doctrines.

Under Marinus (of Flavia Neapolis or Sichem in Palestine), the successor of Proclus, it is related that the Neo-Platonic school at Athens sunk very low (Damasc., *Vita Isidor.*, 228). Marinus seems to have occupied himself with theosophical speculations less than Proclus, but more with the theory of ideas and with mathematics (*ibid.*, 275). Disciples with Marinus were Asclepiodotus, the physician, of Alexandria, who afterward

lived at Aphrodisias, and the sons of Hermias and Ædesia, Heliodorus and Ammonius, who afterward taught at Alexandria; such also were Severianus, Isidorus of Alexandria, Hegias, a grandson of Plutarch, and Zenodotus, who taught with Marinus at Athens. Isidorus, who had also heard Proclus and who became the successor of Marinus in the office of Scholarch, paid greater attention to theosophy, but soon gave up his office and returned to Alexandria, his native city. The next Scholarch at Athens was Hegias, and the next after Hegias and the last of all was Damascius of Damascus (from about 520 on). The special object of the speculation of Damascius respecting the *first essence* was to show (in agreement with Jamblichus and Proclus) that the same was exalted above all those contraries which inhere in the finite.

Damascius did not long enjoy the liberty to teach. The Emperor Justinian, soon after his accession to the throne (A. D. 527), instituted a persecution directed against heretics and non-Christians, and in 529 forbade instruction to be given in philosophy at Athens, and confiscated the property of the Platonic school. Soon afterward (531 or 532) Damascius, Simplicius of Cilicia, the industrious and exact commentator of Aristotle, and five other Neo-Platonists (Diogenes and Hermias of Phœnicia, Eulamius or Eulalius of Phrygia, Priscianus, and Isidorus of Gaza) emigrated to Persia, where, from the traditions of the country, they hoped to find the seat of ancient wisdom, a people moderate and just, and (in King Khosroes) a ruler friendly to philosophy (Agathias, *De Rebus Justinianis*, II. ch. 30). Undeceived by sorrowful experiences, they longed to return to Athens, and in the peace concluded between Persia and the Roman Empire in the year 533, it was stipulated that they should return without hindrance and retain complete liberty of belief; but the prohibition of philosophical instruction remained in force. The works of the ancient thinkers never became entirely unknown in Greece; it is demonstrable that, even in the period immediately following, Christian scholars of the *artes liberales* at Athens studied also philosophy; but from this time till the *renaissance* of classical studies, Hellenic philosophy (except where, as in the case of Synesius and Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, it assumed a Christian exterior) remained scarcely more than a subject of mere erudition (as in the cases of the Christian commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who was nearly contemporaneous with Simplicius, and David the Armenian, who flourished about 500 A. D.; see below, § 96); gradually it, and especially the Aristotelian philosophy, won a growing influence on the scholastic and formal treatment of Christian theology, and in part also on the substance of theological doctrines.

One of the last Neo-Platonists of antiquity was Boëthius (470–525, educated at Athens, 480–498), who, through his *Consolatio*, as also through his translation and exegesis of some of the logical writings of Aristotle and through his annotations to his own translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and to that of Marius Victorinus (a rhetorician and grammarian, who lived about 350), became the most influential medium for the transmission of Greek philosophy to the Occident during the first centuries of the Middle Ages. His *Consolatio* is founded on the Platonic and Stoic idea, that the reason should conquer the emotions. "*Tu quoque si vis lumine claro cernere verum tramite recto carpere callem: gaudia pelle, pelle timorem spemque fugato ne dolor adsit: Nubila mens est vinctaque frenis, hæc ubi regnant!*" (Cf. below, § 88).



PART II.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 71. The religious facts, ideas, and doctrines of Christianity gave a new impulse to philosophical investigation. The philosophic thought of Christian times has been mainly occupied with the theological, cosmological, and anthropological postulates of the biblical doctrine of salvation, the foundation of which is the consciousness of the law, of sin, and of redemption.

On the whole philosophy of Christian times, see Heinrich Ritter, *Die christliche Philosophie*, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1858-59; cf. the more minute exposition in Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. V. seq., Hamburg, 1841 seq., as also the volumes relating to this subject in the works of Brucker, Buhle, Tennemann, Hegel, and others mentioned above, p. 8 seq. J. G. Musmann's *Grundriss der allg. Gesch. der christl. Philosophie* (Halle, 1880) may also be mentioned here. Ferd. Baur, in Vol. V. of the *Theolog. Jahrb.* (Tübingen, 1846, pp. 29-115 and 188-238) treats in a very comprehensive manner of the nature of Christian philosophy, and of the principal stages in the history of its development, with special reference to the opinions of Ritter; cf., *per contra*, Heinr. Ritter, in *Theol. Studien u. Kritiken*, Jahrg. XX., Vol. 2, 1847, pp. 557-648. Cf. also, the works on ecclesiastical history and the history of dogmas, cited below, § 73, p. 268.

§ 72. The primitive creative epoch in the history of Christianity was followed in the Middle Ages by a period especially characterized by the evolution of the consciousness of opposition between God and the world, priests and laity, church and state, and, in general, between the human spirit, on the one hand, and God, the human spirit itself and nature, on the other, and hence by the evolution of the sense of the limitation and bondage of man. The period of Modern Times, on the contrary, is marked, in the main, by the development of the consciousness of restored unity, and hence of the reconciliation and freedom of the human spirit. In the patristic period, philosophic thought stands in the closest union with theological speculation, and co-operates in the development of Christian dogma. In the Scholastic period it passes into the service of theology, being employed merely to reduce to scientific form a body of dogmatic teaching for

the most part already at hand, by introducing a logical arrangement and bringing to its support philosophical doctrines from ante-Christian antiquity. In Modern Philosophy it gradually acquires, with reference to Christian theology and ancient philosophy, the character of an independent science, as regards both form and content.

Rightly to discriminate between that which belongs to the history of philosophy and that which belongs to the history of theology, in the Patristic and Scholastic periods, is a work of no little difficulty. The same difficulty also arises in attempting to distinguish between what pertains to the history of philosophy and what to the history of the natural sciences in modern times, when these sciences are so closely interwoven with philosophy. Yet the definition of philosophy as the science of principles furnishes a sufficiently accurate criterion. It is necessary that the exposition of the philosophy of early Christian times should be preceded and introduced by a consideration of the religious and theological bases on which society then newly reposed, and the presentation of the beginnings of Christian philosophy itself must necessarily include fundamental portions of the history of dogmas, unless the living organism of the new development of religious thought introduced by Christianity is to be arbitrarily dealt with, by separating, as was afterward done, a "*theologia naturalis*" from "*theologia revelata*." It is only thus that an insight into the genesis and connection of Christian ideas becomes possible.

The dogmas of the Church were developed in the course of the contest waged by its defenders against Jews and Greeks, against Judaizers, Gnostics, and heretics of all sorts. To this development philosophical thought lent its aid, being employed before the Council of Nice in elaborating and perfecting the fundamental doctrines, and subsequently in expanding them into a comprehensive complex of dogmas. Whatever was new and peculiar in the doctrine of Augustine was the result of the contest in which he was engaged, either inwardly or outwardly against the doctrines of the Manicheans, Neo-Platonists, Donatists, and Pelagians. But when the belief of the Church had been unfolded into a complex of dogmas, and when these dogmas had become firmly established, it remained for the School to systematize and verify them by the aid of a corresponding reconstruction of ancient philosophy; in this lay the mission of Scholasticism. The distinction between the Patristic and the Scholastic philosophy is indeed not an absolute one, since in the Patristic period, in proportion as the dogmas of the Church became distinctly developed, thought was made subservient to the work of arranging and demonstrating them, while, on the other hand, in the Scholastic period, these dogmas, not having previously become completely determined in every particular, received a certain additional development, as the result of the then current theologico-philosophical speculation.

Still, the close relation of the two periods does not set aside the difference between them, but only serves to demonstrate what is found to be verified in detail, namely, that the beginnings of the scholastic manner of philosophizing recede into the time of the Church Fathers (witness Augustine, who in several passages of his writings enunciated the Scholastic principle that that which faith already holds to be certain should also be comprehended, if possible, by the light of the reason, while, in the work *De Vera Religione*, he asserts the unity of philosophy and true religion, and in none of his writings excludes reason as a way to faith), and that, on the other hand, the most important Scholastics may, in a certain, though inferior, measure, be regarded as fathers of the Church and of its doctrines (some of which men have indeed received from the Church this title of honor; cf. below, § 76).

FIRST PERIOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ 73. The Patristic Period is the period of the genesis of Christian doctrine. It may be regarded as extending from the time of the Apostles to that of Charlemagne, and may be divided into two Sections, separated by the Council of Nice (A. D. 325). The first section includes the time of the genesis of the fundamental dogmas, when philosophical and theological speculation were inseparably interwoven. The second covers the period of the further development of the doctrines of the Church on the basis of the fundamental dogmas already established, in which period philosophy, being used to justify these dogmas and co-operating in the further development of new ones, begins to assume a character of independence with reference to the dogmatic teaching of the Church.

The works of certain of the Church Fathers were among the earliest books printed. Desiderius Erasmus (lived 1467-1536), especially, did a service to Patrology by his editions (published at Basel) of Hieronymus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, and Augustine. Afterward, mostly upon the initiative of Ecclesiastical Orders, complete editions were set on foot, the earlier of which contained, for the most part, only the works of comparatively little magnitude, while in the later editions greater completeness was constantly aimed at. We may mention here the editions of Margaritus de la Bigne (*Patris*, 1575-79; 6th ed. 1654, 17 vols. fol.), Andr. Gallandius (Venice, 1765-71, 14 vols. fol.), and J. P. Migne (*Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Paris, 1840 seq.). The edition of Grabe (*Spicilegium Patrum et Hæreticorum ævæ. I.-III.*, Oxford, 1698), and Bunsen's *Analecta Ante-Nicæna* (London, 1854) are confined to the works of the first three centuries. Compare, further, the *Corpus scriptorum eccl. Latinorum ed. consilio et impensis academias lit.*, Casareus Vindobonensis (Vol. I.: *Sulpicius Severus* ex rec. C. Halmi, Vienna, 1866; Vol. II.: *Minucius Felix et Firmicus Maternus*, ex rec. C. Halmi, *ibid.* 1867). Extracts and chrestomathies have been published by Rösel (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, 10 vols. Leips. 1776-86), Augusti (*Chrestomathia Patristica*, Leips. 1812), Gersdorf (*Bibl. patr. eccl. Lat. æv.*, Leips. 1835-47), and others. A German translation of numerous works of the Church Fathers has been published at Kempten, 1880 seq. Ante-Nicæne Christian Library: translations [into English] of the writings of the Fathers down to A. D. 325, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1867 on; New York. Scribner.

Basse, *Grundriss der christl. Litteratur*. Münster, 1838. J. G. Dowling, *Notitia scriptorum & Patrum aliorumque veteris ecclesie monumentorum, quæ in collectionibus anecdotorum post annum chr. MDCC. in lucem edita continentur*, Oxford, 1839.

Mühler's *Patrologia*, Vol. I. (first three centuries), ed. by F. X. Reithmayr, Regensburg, 1840. *Institutiones Patrologiæ continens* Jos. Fessler, Innsbruck, 1850-51 (to Gregory the Great). Deutinger, *Geist der christl. Überlieferung*, Regensburg, 1850-51 (to Athanasius). C. Werner, *Gesch. der apologetischen und polemischen Litteratur der christl. Theol.*, Schaffhausen, 1861 seq. Joh. Alzog, *Grundriss der Patrologie oder der ältern christl. Litteratürgesch.*, Freiburg in Br., 1866. Cf. the works on the history of doctrines and ecclesiastical history by Münscher, Augusti, Neander, Gieseler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hase, Klee, Hagenbach, Baur, Niedner, Böhrlinger, etc., Dörner's *Entwicklungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi*, Stuttgart, 2d ed., 1845-58; Baur's *Christliche Gnosis*, Tübingen, 1855, *Christliche Lehre von der Veröhnung*, *ibid.*, 1858, and *Christl. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes* *ibid.*, 1841-48, and many other theological writings.

Alb. Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit*, Wurnburg, 1880.

Joh. Huber, *Die Philos. der Kirchenväter*, Munich, 1858.

§ 74. Of all the nations of antiquity, the religious sense of the distinction and antagonism between holiness and sin was most prominent among the Hebrews. The ethical ideal of the Hebrews was, however, inseparably connected with their ritual law, and the revelation of God was supposed by them to be confined to the chosen people of the children of Israel. The Alexandrian philosophy, which arose through the contact of Judaism with Hellenic culture, prepared the way for the breaking down of the barriers which restricted the moral and religious life of the people, and Christianity completed the work. At the time when Greek culture had destroyed the intellectual exclusiveness, and the Roman Empire had annihilated the political independence of the nations, there arose in Christianity, in opposition to the reality of the kingdom of the world, the idea of a kingdom of God, founded on purity of heart. The expectation of the Messiah among the Jewish people was spiritualized, repentance and moral improvement were recognized as the condition of the salvation of the soul, and the principle of all commandments was found in the *law of love*, whence the ceremonial law, and with it all national, political, and social distinctions lost their earlier positive significance; to the poor the gospel was preached, participation in the kingdom of heaven was promised to the oppressed, and the consciousness of God as the Almighty Creator, the holy law-giver, and just judge was completed by the consciousness of redemption and divine sonship, through the working and indwelling of God in Christ and in the community of believers.

For the literature of this topic we must here refer particularly to the theological manuals. Cf.—besides the Introductions to the Biblical writings, by De Wette, Hug, Reusa, etc.—especially, Carl August Credner's *Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanon*, ed. by G. Volkmar, Berlin, 1860, and Adolf Hilgenfeld's *Der Kanon und die Kritik des Neuen Testaments in ihrer geschichtlichen Ausbildung und Gestaltung*, Halle, 1863; and, on the other hand, the numerous works on the didactic forms and the logical doctrines of the New Testament, as also monographs like those of Carl Niese on the Johannean Psychology (*Progr. of the "Landesschule"* at Pforta, Naumburg, 1865), and R. Böhricht, *Zur johanneischen Logiklehre*, in *Theol. Studien u. Kritiken*, 1868, pp 299-314.

Neander (*Christl. Dogmengesch.*, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1857, and often in others of his writings; cf., also, Neander, *Ueber das Verhältniss der hellenischen Ethik zum Christenthum*, in his *Wissensch. Abhandlungen*, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851), consciously adopting the views of Schleiermacher and not uninfluenced, whether consciously or not, by Hegelian conceptions, sees the peculiarity of Christianity in the idea of "redemption, the consciousness of the unification of the divine and human," and remarks with reference to the relation of Christianity to Judaism and Hellenism (*ibid.*, p. 36): "The religious stand-point of Judaism represents in general the positive consciousness of alienation from God and of the schism in man's nature, while Hellenism, on the contrary, is the embodiment of youthful natural life, as yet unconscious of its opposition to God. For those occupying the former

stand-point Christianity aims at removing the sense and the fact of opposition and discord, through redemption: for those occupying the stand-point of Hellenism, it first brings to consciousness the sense of discord, and provides for the communication of divine life to humanity, through the removal of this discord." (In the same place Neander designates as the fundamental trait of Orientalism, in the Hindoo and other natural religions, the "schism and unrest of the human mind, as manifested in the language of sorrow and melancholy, in view of the limits of human nature, and in uncontrolled longings after the infinite and for absorption into God.") Cf. above, § 5.

In his own teaching, which was expressed especially in aphorisms and parables, Jesus laid chief emphasis on the necessity of rising above the legal righteousness of the Pharisees (Matt. v. 20) to the ideal completion of the law through the principle of love, and to the real fulfillment of the law as thus completed. The commandments and prohibitions of Moses (including those of the ceremonial law), and even many of the injunctions of his successors, were thus left substantially untouched (although in the matter of things purely external and of no immediate ethical or religious significance, such, in particular, as the observance of the Sabbath and various forms of purification and sacrifice, actual observance was made by the Messiah no longer obligatory for the subjects of his "kingdom of God," Mark ii. 23-28; vii. 14-23, etc.); but that which Moses had allowed on account of the hardness of heart of his people remained no longer lawful, but was to be regulated in accordance with the ideal ethical law, which took cognizance of the intentions of men. Thus the peremptoriness of the requirements of ethics was made to appear not in the least relaxed, but rather increased. (Hence the declaration in Matt. v. 18—true, of course, only in a figurative sense—that till the end of the world no jot or tittle of the law should be abrogated, if indeed this verse, in the form here given, is authentic and has not been emphasized by the reporter, in opposition to a party of Pauline or ultra-Pauline Antinomians, so as to make the declaration more positive than it was as delivered by Jesus, and more in accordance with the sentiment of the Jewish Christians, who required that even the Messias should keep the whole law.) It is not that Moses had given *only* a ceremonial law and that Christ had recognized *only* the moral law; the law of love was taught, although in more limited form, already by the former (Lev. xix. 18; cf. Deut. vi. 5, xxx. 16, on love to God, and such passages as Is. lviii. 7, in the writings of the prophets who foreshadowed and prepared the way for the ideality of the Christian law), and the ritual retains a certain authority with the latter (at least, according to the Gospel of Matthew; Mark and Luke do not affirm the continuing authority of the Law). But the relative importance of the two elements becomes reversed in consequence of the radical significance attached by Christ to the law of love (Matt. xxii. 34 seq.; Mark xii. 28 seq.; Luke x. 25 seq.) and also in consequence of the name of Father, by which he (in a manner at most only suggested in the Old Testament) indicated that the relation of man to God should be one of friendly intimacy. Sometimes Jesus appeals directly to passages of the Old Testament (such as 1 Sam. xv. 22 and xxi. 6, Hos. vi. 6, in Matt. ix. 13, xii. 3); the prophetic picture of the Messianic kingdom, in which peace and joy were to reign, and strife should no longer dwell (Is. ix. *et al.*), involved the idea of actualized, all-embracing love; the Nazarite's vow of the Old Testament implied the insufficiency of common righteousness and the necessity of exceeding it by the practice of abstinence; and perhaps also the principles and regimen of the Essenes exerted (through John the Baptist) some influence on Jesus (cf. A. Hilgenfeld, *Der Essäismus und Jesus*, in the *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, X. 1, 1867, pp. 97-111). Jesus, the disciple of John, feeling himself, from the time of his baptism by John, the herald of the Messiah, to be himself the Messiah, not inferior even to Moses in dignity (according to Deut. xviii. 15), and intrusted by God with imperishable authority and an eternal king-

dom (Dan. vii. 13, 14), believed himself called and had the courage to found a kingdom of God, to gather about him the weary and heavy-laden, to advance beyond all established forms, and to teach and live rather in accordance with the suggestions of his own moral consciousness and the wants of the people, with whom he was in sympathy, than according to traditional institution. The principle of pure love to man prevailed over conceptions of Oriental derivation and in spite of the lack of developed notions of labor, and of independence, property, right, and state, as reposing on labor. In the love with which he worked for his friends, in his unconditional opposition to the previous leaders of the people and to all other hostile powers, and in his death thus brought about, yet willingly accepted in the confident expectation that he should return, and while fearlessly avowing, in the face of death, his Messianic authority, the life of Jesus appears as a picture of perfect righteousness. His prayer that God might forgive his judges and enemies involved the unshaken conviction of his absolute right, and the same conviction continued after his death among his disciples. In the kingdom of God founded by the Messiah, blessedness was to dwell together with holiness. Jesus prayed that God's name might be sanctified, his kingdom come, his will be done, and that earthly need might be removed, together with sin. To the weary and heavy-laden relief was promised through the removal of the weight of external tyranny and of personal poverty, sickness, and sinfulness, and through the confirmation in the relation of sonship to God and in the hope of eternal blessedness of all such as belonged to the kingdom of God. Jesus presupposed for those, to whom his preaching was addressed, the same immediate possibility of elevation to purity of heart and to moral perfection, i. e., to the image of the perfect God, the Heavenly Father, of which he was conscious in his own case.

The moral doctrine and life of Jesus involved, as logical consequences, the obsolescence of the Mosaic law of rites, and with this the overthrow of the national barriers of Judaism. These consequences were first expressly enunciated by Paul, who in proclaiming them was always conscious of his dependence on Christ ("not I, but Christ in me," Gal. ii. 20). On the ground of his own personal experience, from which he dogmatically drew general conclusions for all men, Paul declared that the power necessary for the fulfillment of the purely moral law and the way to true spiritual freedom were to be found only in faith in Christ. Paul denies the dependence of salvation on law and nationality or on anything whatever that is external (here "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female," Gal. iii. 28; cf. vi. 15: *οὐτε περιτομή οὐτ' ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ καὶ καρὴ κτίσις*, and also Rom. x. 12; 2 Cor. v. 17). Positively, he makes it dependent on the free grace of God, the appropriation of which on the part of the individual is effected through faith in Christ as the Redeemer. The law was the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ (*παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*, Gal. iii. 24). Through faith the inner man is built up (*ὁ θεὸς ἀνθρώπου*, Rom. vii. 22; Ephes. iii. 16; cf. Rom. ii. 29; 1 Pet. iii. 4; cf. also *ὁ ἐνὶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος* in Plat., *Rep.* IX., p. 589 a—where, however, this expression is based on a developed comparison—and *ὁ θεὸς λόγος* in opposition to *ἐξω λόγος* in Arist., *Analyt. Post.* I. 10). The law furnishes no deliverance from the schism between the spirit, which wills the good, and the flesh, which does what is evil; but through Christ this schism is removed, the impotence of the flesh is overcome by his Spirit dwelling in us (Rom. vii. and viii.). Faith is reckoned to man by God as righteousness, and by making man a recipient of the Spirit of Christ, it restores to him the power, lost since the time of Adam's fall, truly to fulfill the moral law. With consecration to Christ, the Redeemer, there arises, in place of the servile condition of fear in view of the penalty threatened against the transgressor of the law, the free condition of sonship, of communion with God in love, the state of justification by faith. The believer, says Paul, has put on Christ in baptism; Christ is to be formed in him; as Christ descended

into death and rose again, so the believer, by virtue of his union with him, dies unto sin, crucifies the flesh, with its lusts and desires, and rises to a new moral life in the spirit, the fruits of which are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance (Gal. ii. 17; iii. 27; iv. 19; v. 22-24; Rom. vi. 1; viii. 12 seq.; xiii. 14). But the believer has in this life only the first-fruits of the Spirit (*ἀπαρχὴ τοῦ πνεύματος*, Rom. viii. 23); we are indeed saved, but only in hope, and we walk in patience (Rom. viii. 24 seq.); we walk still by faith, not by sight (*διὰ πίστεως περιπατοῦμεν, οὐ δὲ ὁδοῦς*, 2 Cor. v. 7). The new life is (according to 1 Cor. xv. 23) to be introduced by the second coming of Christ (when, according to 1 Thess. iv. 17, the living and those raised from the grave are to ascend on clouds to the presence of the Lord, cf. John's Rev. xi. 12). Paul, like Christ, sees in love the substance of the moral law (Gal. v. 14: *ὁ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ πληροῦται, ἐν τῷ ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς ἐαυτόν*, Gal. vi. 2: *τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, Rom. xiii. 8-10: *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἑτερον, νόμον πεπλήρωκε . . . πλήρωμα οὐκ νόμον ἢ ἀγάπην*, cf. 1 Cor. ix. 21; Rom. iii. 27; viii. 2). Love is the last and supreme word of Christianity; it is superior even to faith and hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13). Love is the active expression of faith (Gal. v. 6: *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*). The Pauline doctrine of the relation between faith and love was of a nature calculated powerfully to stimulate thought with reference to the question as to the bond connecting these two elements of the religious life. If love or a morally perfect will is logically involved in the very conception of faith (as may be inferred from Gal. iii. 26; v. 6; Rom. vi. 3 seq.; viii. 1 seq.; 1 Cor. xii. 3), and if, therefore, the justification which is by faith means the divine recognition of an essential righteousness contained in it (i. e., in other words, if the divine justifying sentence—to follow, as may be and has been done, the Kantian terminology—is an “*analytical judgment*” respecting the subjective moral quality of the believer”), then, on the one hand, the necessary connection of essential moral goodness with the historic and dogmatic elements involved in faith in Jesus as the Messiah and the son of God, is not demonstrated, and, on the other, we seem rather to be led to the non-Pauline sequence of faith, beginning of regeneration and sanctification, and relative justification in proportion to the degree of sanctification already attained, than to the Pauline one of faith, justification, and sanctification. But if, on the contrary, faith does not necessarily involve love (as may appear from Rom. iv. 19; x. 9, etc.), and enters only as a new statutory element, a Christian substitute for Jewish offerings and ceremonies (i. e., if God's justification of believers is only a “*synthetic judgment*,” an imputation of another's righteousness), then the improvement of the will and life remains indeed a thing required, but no longer appears as a necessary consequence of faith, and the moral advantage possessed by him who believes in the real death and resurrection of Christ, and considers himself redeemed from guilt and punishment by the merit of Christ, over those who are not of the same faith, can only be arbitrarily asserted, since it is by no means verified in all instances by the facts of experience. It follows also, in case the believing sinner, to whom righteousness has been imputed, fails to advance to real righteousness, that the divine justification of the morally unimproved believer, together with the condemnation of others, must appear arbitrary, partisan, and unjust, and unrestricted liberty is left to men for the frivolous misuse of forgiving grace as a license to sin. At a later period, when attempts were made to transform the half-mystic and half-religious ideas of Paul respecting dying and rising again with Christ into dogmatic conceptions, this difficulty of interpretation (which in recent times Schleiermacher sought to solve by defining justifying faith as the appropriation to one's self of the perfection and beatitude of Christ, i. e., as the giving up of one's self to the Christian ideal) appeared with increasing distinctness, and gave occasion to manifold theological and philosophical attempts at explanation, as the Epistle of James may witness.

The Early Catholic Church went forward to the point of making the moral law and theoretical dogmatic faith co-ordinate, while in Augustinism, in the Reformation, and again in the theological and philosophical ethics of modern times, the dialectic resulting from the Pauline conceptions has repeatedly reappeared in ever-varying form.

Although Paul recognized love (which, first implied in the requirement to give to the poor and in the principle of community in the possession of goods, rose subsequently, through idealization and generalization, to the rank of a pure conception) as the highest element in Christianity, he nevertheless treats in his Epistles chiefly of faith, as of that by which the law is abolished. In the Epistles of John, on the contrary, and in the (fourth) Gospel, which bears his name, love occupies the central position. God, says John, is love (1 John iv. 8, 16). His love has been made known in the sending of his Son, in order that all who believe on Him may have eternal life (1 John iv. 9; John's Gosp. iii. 16). He who abides in love abides in God and God in him. The new commandment of Christ is love. He who loves God must love his brother also. Our love to God is manifested when we keep his commandments and walk in the light (John xiii. 34; xv. 12; 1 John i. 7; iv. 16, 21; v. 2). Believers are born of God. They are hated of the world; but the world lies in wickedness (John xv. 18 *et al.*; 1 John v. 19). In place of the contest waged by Paul against single concrete powers, especially against the continued validity of the Mosaic law, we have here a contest against the "world" in general, against all tendencies opposed to Christianity, against unbelieving and hostile Jews and Gentiles. The distinction between the chosen Jewish people and the heathen is that between believers in Christ, who walk in the light, and unbelievers and children of darkness, and the temporal distinction between the present period and the future is changed into the ever-present distinction between the world and the kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of the Spirit and of truth. The belief that Jesus is the Christ is made the power that overcomes the world. That the law came by Moses, but grace and truth by Jesus (John i. 17) appears already as an assured conviction. The law is abrogated, religious life is no longer to be nourished and filled up with offerings and ceremonies; and into the place thus left vacant enters, together with the practical activity required by love, a form of theoretical speculation arrived at through the development of the doctrine of faith.

In the Gospel named after Matthew, Jesus is styled the Messiah, the Son of David, who as such is also the Son of God; this phraseology is here employed with immediate reference to the expectations of the Jewish nation. In the Gospel according to Mark, he is generally spoken of as the Son of God, the expression "Son of David" being employed only once (x. 47 *seq.*, in the mouth of the blind man of Jericho). In this Gospel the continuing validity of the Jewish law is no longer affirmed. The recognition of Christ as the Son of God in the Epistles of Paul and in the Gospel of Luke, which bears the impress of Pauline ideas, is an expression of the sense of the universal or absolute character of the Christian religion. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (which is likewise Pauline in character and was possibly written by Barnabas or Apollos) the superiority of Christianity in dignity to Judaism and of the New Covenant to the Old Covenant, with its laws, which are no longer binding on Christians, is expressed by the affirmation of the personal exaltation of Jesus above Moses and above the angels, through whose agency the law was given. In this Epistle it is said of Christ as the Son of God, that by him the world-periods (*aiōnes*) were created, that he is the brightness of the divine glory, the image of the divine nature (*ἀπαύρασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*), the eternal high-priest after the order of Melchisedek, king of priests, to whom even Abraham made himself subject, and to whom therefore the Levites, as children of Abraham, are also inferior. Repentance and turning away from dead works, and faith in God, are reckoned by the author of this Epistle as the elementary requirements

of Christianity, as the milk or foundation from which it is necessary to advance to "strong meat" or "perfection." This Epistle contains already the seeds of the later Gnostic doctrines. The fourth Gospel, named after the Apostle John, teaches the pure spirituality of God's nature, and demands that God should be worshiped in spirit and in truth. It recognizes in Christ the Logos become flesh, who was from eternity with God and through whom God created the world and reveals himself to man; the Logos became flesh and "of his fullness (*ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ*) have all we received, and grace for grace."

Yet, however weighty and pregnant may have been the conceptions which Christ's immediate and indirect disciples may have formed of his person, it is, nevertheless, not true that "the proper basis and the vital germ of Christian doctrine" are to be sought in them (see Huber, in his excellent work entitled *Philosophie der Kirchenväter*, Munich, 1859, p. 8; on p. 10 Huber affirms, adopting the sentiment expressed by Schelling in his *Philos. der Offenbarung*, Werke, II. 4, p. 35, that "Christ was not the teacher and founder, but the content of Christianity"); this basis and this germ are contained rather in Jesus' ethical requirement of inward righteousness, purity of heart, and love, and in his own practice of the things he required (and Huber, on p. 8 of the work cited above, justly acknowledges that the source of those conceptions [of Christ's person] was the life and doctrine of Jesus—which acknowledgment, however, involves an essential limitation of Huber's assent to Schelling's doctrine).

Without prejudice to the essential originality and independence of the principles of Christianity, it must be admitted that previous to their formal enunciation they had been foreshadowed and the ground had been prepared for them partly in the general principles of Judaism, and partly and more particularly in connection with the attempt among the Jews to revive the ancient gift of prophecy (a movement to which Parsee influences contributed, and which lay at the foundation of Essenism) and (after the time of Paul and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and especially after the first development of Gnosticism and the production of the fourth Gospel) in the religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews, which arose through the contact of Judaism with Hellenism. The essential object of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture and of theosophy was to spiritualize the ideas contained in the Old Testament. The sensible manifestations of God were interpreted as manifestations of a divine power distinct from God and operating in the world. As in Aristobulus and in the Book of Maccabees (iii. 39) the power (*δύναμις*) of God, which dwells in the world, is distinguished from God in his extra-mundane, absolute existence, and as in the Proverbs (viii. 22 seq.) and the Book of Wisdom (vii. seq.) the Wisdom of God is distinguished from God himself, so Paul proclaims Christ as the power and wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24: *κρίνομεν Χριστὸν Θεοῦ Δύναμιν καὶ Θεοῦ Σοφίαν*). Philo terms God the cause (*αἰτεον*) of the world, by (*ὑπὸ*) whom it had its origin, distinguishing from him the Logos, through (*διὰ*) whom he formed it, and the four elements which constitute it materially; in like manner, in the Epistle to the Hebrews the Son of God is represented as he through whom (*δι' οὗ*) God creates, and according to the Gospel of John all things that were created were created through (*διὰ*) the Logos (John i. 3 and 10: *δι' αὐτοῦ*). But the Alexandrian theosophy did not admit the possibility of the incarnation of the divine Logos, nor could it admit this, since, according to it, matter was impure, and the descent of the soul into a mortal body was the penalty of moral delinquency on the part of the former. For the adherents of this theosophy, therefore, the identification of the Messiah with the divine Logos was impossible. They were waiting for the coming of the Messiah at the time when Jesus recognized himself as the Messiah already come. They did not perceive in the commandment of love to man the radical and positive expression for the spiritualization of the law. They did not draw from their spiritualization of the law, the (Pauline)

consequence, that now, since the Messiah had appeared, the ancient law in its literal sense was no longer binding on those who believed in him. They did not suffer the ceremonial worship of the God revealed to the Jews to be replaced by the worship of God in spirit and in truth. These radical differences indicate that the Alexandrian philosophy belongs to the ante-Christian period, and it can only be regarded as one of the stepping-stones, although it must at the same time be received as the last and nearest stepping-stone, to Christianity. Cf. above, § 63.

Monotheism as a world-religion could only go forth from Judaism. The triumph of Christianity was the triumph over polytheism of the religious idea of the Jewish people, stripped of its national limitations and softened and spiritualized. This triumph was completely analogous to that won by the Hellenic language, and by Hellenic art and science, in the kingdoms founded by Alexander the Great and afterward reduced under Roman supremacy, only that the struggle in the field of religion was all the more severe and wearisome, as the elements of permanent worth which were contained in the polytheistic religions were more numerous. When national exclusiveness had once given way to the active commerce of nations and to the unity of the world-empire, it was necessary that, in place of a plurality of forms of culture existing side by side, one of them should gradually become dominant, which was strongest, most elevated, and most developed, or, in other words, that Greek language, art, and science, Roman law (and also, for the West, the Roman language), and either Greco-Roman or the (universalized, denationalized) Jewish religion should become predominant. The Jews—especially those outside of Palestine—although still holding on to monotheism, had begun to feel the unfitness of the further maintenance of the positive law, and the circumstances of the time even necessitated its abrogation. So soon, therefore, as an authority for such abrogation—an authority at once satisfactory to the religious consciousness of the Jews and not repugnant to non-Jews (who would have nothing to do with Judaism as traditionally constituted)—was found in the divine-human Messiah, the superior of Moses and Abraham (albeit that the Messiah, while on earth, had not pronounced this abrogation, perhaps had not willed it, and had only furnished for it a possible *point d'appui* through his new commandments, which went beyond the requirements of mere positive legality), so soon as this condition was met, as it was by the Apostle Paul, it was inevitable that the contest of religions should begin. It was necessarily more difficult for the new tendency to make headway within the sphere of Judaism and among those believers who held fast to the letter of the commandments of the Messiah who had personally lived among them, than within the sphere of Hellenism, although the latter did not yield to it without violent opposition, and, when it finally yielded, so filled the new movement with essential elements of its own, that in a certain sense Christianity, although sprung from Judaism, can justly be called the synthesis and product of both Judaism and Hellenism—a synthesis superior to either of its elements. These two factors, under the influence of new motives that afterward arose, were at a later period again arrayed in opposition within the fold of Christianity, and primitive Catholicism was the first victorious reconciliation of them.

As contrasted with Judaism, Christianity was marked by its greater spirituality, and hence struck the positivists of the ancient faith, who could not bring themselves to approve the Pauline abrogation of the law, as a free-thinking scandal (*σκάνδαλον*, 1 Cor. i. 23). To the cultivated Hellenes the doctrine of a crucified God of Jewish race was a superstitious folly (*μωρία, εἰδωλ.*), for which reason not many of high station accepted it (1 Cor. i. 26 seq.). But the weak, the heavy-laden, and oppressed heard gladly the tidings of the God who had descended to their low condition and the preaching of a future resurrection to bestial life. Not the religion of cheerful contentment, but consolation in mis-

fortune, was what their wants demanded. Their opposition to their oppressors found in faith in Christ a spiritual support, and the commandment of love furnished to the principle of mutual help a powerful motive. And now after the destruction of the political independence of the cities and nations which had before been either constantly engaged in feuds and wars with each other, or else had existed entirely apart from each other, far greater importance was attached than before to the material and spiritual interests of the individual, to personal morality and happiness. The union of men of like mind from among the most different peoples and civil communities in one religious society now first became possible, and acquired a higher spiritual charm. The existence of a world-monarchy was favorable to the idea of religious unity and to the preaching of concord and love. A religion which in its theoretical as well as its positive groundwork should rest, not on ancient national conceptions, but on the more comprehensive, less poetic, and more reflective consciousness of the present, became a necessity. It could not be otherwise than that the more simple and popular doctrine of the Gospel should triumph over such artificial attempts in the interest of an intellectual aristocracy and foreign to the popular belief, among the later Stoics and the Neo-Platonists, as were made to furnish new interpretations and combinations of pagan doctrines. The authors of these attempts did not dare, and were unable to guard unchanged the Old-Hellenic principle in the presence of Christianity; for the allegorical interpretation of the myths of Paganism was only a proof that those who professed to believe them were ashamed of them, and thus prepared the way for the triumph of Christianity, which openly rejected them. But after the dissolution of the ethical harmony which characterized the bloom of Hellenic antiquity, and as a consequence of the increasing moral degeneracy of the times, moral health, salvation, was held to depend primarily on self-purification through renunciation of the world, on the "crucifixion of the lusts and desires," and on self-consecration to an ethical ideal, whose characteristic was not that it artistically transfigured the present natural life, but that it elevated the spirit above it. With many the fear of the threatened pains of hell and the hope of the promised salvation and blessedness of the members of the kingdom were very powerful motives. It should also be added that the blood of the martyrs became, through the attention and respect transferred from their persons to their cause, a seed of the church.

§ 75. The opposition between Judaism and Hellenism reappeared, though in a sense and in a measure which were modified by the community of the opposing parties in Christian principle, within the circle of Christianity itself, in the division of the Jewish from the Gentile Christians. Jewish Christianity united with faith in Jesus as the Messiah the observance of the Mosaic law. Gentile Christianity, on the contrary, arose from the Pauline conception of Christianity as consisting in justification and sanctification through Christ, without the works of the law. But both parties agreeing in the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah and in the adoption of the moral law of love as promulgated by him, this opposition yielded to the desire for Christian unity (which sentiment was most powerful in mixed churches, like that at Rome). A canon of the writings of all the Apostles, differing but little from our own, was constituted, in which the Johannine

Gospel was added to the three first of our Gospels, all others being rejected, and with these a collection of Apostolical writings was combined. Finally, the early Catholic Church was founded, which conceived Christianity as essentially contained in the new law of love; the Mosaic law of ceremonies was abolished, as no longer binding on those who should believe in Christ, and in connection with the development and completion of a new hierarchical constitution, a rule of faith was established, having the form of a law. The rule of faith related chiefly to the objective conditions of salvation. The conceptions of God, and of his only-begotten Son and of the Holy Ghost—conceptions which, chiefly through the formula of baptism, were becoming universally fixed in the Christian consciousness—lay at its basis, and it was directed against Judaism, on the one hand, and, on the other, against those speculations of the Gnostics, which were not in correspondence with the common sentiment of the Christian churches.

Ang. Neander, *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche*, 2d ed., Gotha, 1856; *Gesch. der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel*, Hamburg, 1833, 5th ed., Gotha, 1863; *Christ. Dogmengesch.*, hreg. von J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 1837. Rich. Rothe, *Die Anfänge der christl. Kirche und ihrer Verfassung*, Vol. I., Wittenberg, 1837. Ferd. Christian Baur, *Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi*, Tübingen, 1845; *Lehrbuch der christl. Dogmengesch.*, 2d ed., Stuttgart, 1858; *Vorlesungen über die neutestamentl. Theologie*, hreg. von Ferd. Friedr. Baur, Leipz. 1864; *Vorl. über die christl. Dogmengesch.* (posthumous publication), Tübingen, 1865; *Das Christenthum und die christl. Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 2d ed., *ibid.*, 1868; *Die christl. Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrhunderts*, 2d ed., *ibid.*, 1868. Albert Schweigler, *Das nachapostolische Zeitalter in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung*, Tübingen, 1846. Albrecht Ritschl, *Die Entstehung der alt-katholischen Kirche*, 2d ed., Bonn, 1857. Ad. Hilgenfeld, *Das Urchristenthum in den Hauptwendepunkten seines Entwicklungsganges*, Jena, 1855. Cf. the numerous articles of Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, and Heinrich Holtzmann's *Judenthum und Christenthum*, Leipz. 1867. Ph. Schaff, *Geschichte der Apost. Kirche*, 2d ed., Leipz., 1864; *Geschichte der alten Kirche*, 3 vols., 2d ed., Leipz., 1869. [The same in English, New York.]

The early Catholic Church, although numbering both Jewish Christianity and Paulinism among its antecedents, and containing certain elements derived from both, was nevertheless more immediately an outgrowth from the latter, or from Gentile Christianity. In the abrogation of the Mosaic law and of national barriers on the ground of the new principle of faith in Christ, it was in material agreement with Paulinism. But in form it was less removed from Judaism and from Jewish Christianity, on account of the legal character with which it invested the Christian principle in matters of faith, charity, and church order. For it Christianity was essentially a new law (John xiii. 34: *ἐντολὴ καρπῆ*; cf. Gal. vi. 2, where Paul speaks of that love which manifests itself in acts of mutual assistance, as the "law of Christ," in distinction from the Mosaic law, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, 2 Cor. iii. 6, and Heb. viii. 13: *κατὰ διαθήκην*, *Epist. Barnabae*, II. 4; *nova lex Jesu Christi*). The predilection for the legal form in matters of faith, practice, and constitution, may be explained partly by the influence which the legal religion and hierarchy of the Old Testament, however modified and idealized by Christianity, could not but exert on the Gentile Christians (and thus, too, without conscious "concessions" to the opposing party, which were only

made incidentally and far more by a fraction of the Jewish Christians than by the Gentile Christians), as also by the influence of early Christian tradition, especially that of the *λόγια Κυριακά*, or "Words of the Lord," and partly by the ecclesiastical necessity which existed of advancing from the subjective conceptions of Paul to objective norms and by the moral reaction which took place against ultra-Pauline Antinomianism.* In like manner, precisely, the transition from Luther's faith to Luther's articles of faith, and, later, to the symbols of the Lutheran Church, was due partly to the surviving influence of the old Church, in spite of all the opposition which was directed against it, and partly to the inherent necessity of objective norms and to the reaction excited by extreme reformatory attempts.

The Jewish Christians, who united with the observance of the Mosaic law a belief in the Messianic dignity of Jesus, were divided, after the commencement of Paul's ministry, into two factions. The more rigid of them denied the apostolic character of Paul, and refused to recognize as members of the Messiah's kingdom those Christians who were born in heathenism, except upon the condition of their being circumcised; the less rigid of them, on the contrary, conceded the authority of Paul to labor among the Gentiles, and only demanded of believers converted from heathenism the observance of those things which had been prescribed by the Jews for the proselytes of the gate (in accordance with the so-called decree of the Apostles, Acts xv. 29: ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ κνικτοῦ καὶ πορνείας, whereas in Gal. ii. 10 only the contribution for the poor at Jerusalem

* Neander designates, in addition to the fact of the diminished power and purity of the religious spirit in the post-Apostolic times, the example of the Old Testament, whose influence was first and most directly manifest in the constitution of the Church, as the cause of the development of a new discipline of law in the early Catholic Church. Baur and Schweigler emphasize most the idea of the successive development and reconciliation of the opposition between Jewish Christianity and Paulinism, but both of them (and especially Schweigler) ascribe to Jewish Christianity (which is chiefly of historical importance only as having directly preceded Paulinism) in the post-Pauline period (in which, under the name of Ebionitism, it continued to be powerful until near the year 135, after which it was scarcely more than a rapidly-declining remnant of the past) perhaps a more widespread acceptance and influence than are actually demonstrable or internally probable. Albert Ritschl, on the other hand, is a prominent representative of those who argue that Catholic Christianity was not the result of a reconciliation effected between Jewish and Gentile Christians, but a stage in the history of Gentile Christianity alone. The transformation of Paulinism into Catholic Christianity was occasioned, says Ritschl, by the need in the Church of norms of thought and life which should possess universal validity. With Paul the theoretical and the practical were blended, with a touch of mysticism, in the conception of faith, and this blending was in harmony with the peculiarities of his character and experience. What with Paul, therefore, was living and mobile, the church sought to express in fixed formulas, a result which could only be attained at the expense of the peculiar warmth and elevation of the Christianity of Paul (Ritschl, *Entstehung der allkath. Kirche*, 1st ed., p. 273). In the second edition of his work Ritschl maintains that the question is not whether the early Catholic Church was developed on the basis of Jewish Christianity or on that of Paulinism, but whether it was developed out of Jewish or out of Gentile Christianity. The peculiar marks of Gentile Christianity, as he further remarks, were the rejection of Jewish customs and the entertainment of the belief that they, the Gentile Christians, had entered into the place of the Jews in the covenant relation with God (both of which were rendered possible only through the initiative taken by Paul), and he continues: "The Gentile Christians needed first to be instructed concerning the unity of God and the history of his covenant-revelation, concerning moral righteousness and judgment, sin and redemption, the kingdom of God and the Son of God, before they could begin to attend to the dialectical relations between sin and law, grace and justification, faith and righteousness" (2d ed., p. 273); they accepted the equal authority of all the Apostles, including Paul, but they involuntarily interpreted the teachings of the Apostles so as to find in them Christ represented as a lawgiver and the believer's religious relation to him as involving simply the acceptance of the "rule of faith" and the fulfillment of Christ's law (*ibid.*, p. 580 seq.). Ritschl's meritorious work appears only to need, for its completeness, a more minute inquiry into the historical development of dogmas, and more particularly into the development of the Johannine doctrine, of Gnosticism, and of the reaction against the latter.

is mentioned, the only condition to which Paul could assent without favoring a relapse into the legality against which he made war). The milder fraction, which granted toleration to the Gentile Christians, had in the time of Justin already sunk to the condition of a tolerated party (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 47). The more exacting fraction lost its hold in proportion as the antagonism between Christians and Jews became more pronounced. The decree issued after the suppression of the rising under Bar Kochba (135 A. D.), which forbade the Jews to remain in Jerusalem, excluded also all Jewish Christians living according to Jewish law from this center of Christendom, and permitted only a Christian community which had renounced the Mosaic law to exist there, under a bishop chosen from among the Gentile Christians; and finally the primitive Catholic Church, whose constitution was effected with the recognition of a complete apostolic canon (about 175 A. D.), excluded from its fold all Jewish Christians as heretics (so that henceforth they continued to exist only as a sect), while it rejected, on the other hand, as false, a one-sided, ultra-Pauline Antinomianism and Gnosticism, which threatened to lead to the destruction of morality itself and to the dissolution of the connection of Christianity with its Old Testament basis.

These differences among the early Christians were among the causes which led to the beginnings of Christian philosophical speculation (for which reason they could not remain unmentioned here).

FIRST SECTION.

PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY TILL THE TIME OF THE COUNCIL OF NICE.

§ 76. Among the teachers of the Church who were received as immediate disciples of the Apostles, and were called Apostolic Fathers, Clement of Rome, who was probably the author of the first of the two *Epistles to the Corinthian Church*, which have come down to us under his name, and the authors of the *Epistles* ascribed to Barnabas, to Ignatius of Antioch, and to Polycarp of Smyrna, as also the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus*, represent Gentile Christianity at the time of its development into the early Catholic Church. The *Shepherd* of Hermas bears a very un-Pauline character, and is by no means free from Judaizing elements. The work entitled *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* represents the doctrines of the milder fractions of Jewish Christians. A Jewish-Christian stand-point is apparent in the pseudo-Clementine *Recognitions* and *Homilies*. In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers we see, principally, the fundamental doctrines, theoretical and practical, of Christianity being developed in the struggle with Judaism and paganism, the distinction between Jewish and Gentile Christianity gradually disappearing, and each

extreme becoming constantly more and more separated from the Church, as the latter becomes united on the basis of the equal authority of all the Apostles (including Paul).

Patrum Apostolicorum Opera, ed. Coteller, Paris, 1672, ed. II., ed. Clericus, Amsterdam, 1724, since reproduced by Gallandius and by Migne; ed. Car. Joa. Hefele, Tübingen, 1889, etc.; ed. Albert Drossel, Leips. 1857, 2d ed., 1868. *Novum Testamentum extra Canonem receptum* (1. *Clem. Rom. Epist.*, 2. *Barnabas*, 3. *Hermas*, 4. *Librorum Deperd. Fragmenta: Ev. sec. Hebr., sec. Petrum, sec. Aegyptios, Mattheas tradit.*, *Petri et Pauli praedicationis et actuum*, *Petri apocalypsoes*, etc., *quae supersunt*), ed. Ad. Hilgenfeld, Leips. 1866. *Clementis Romani quae feruntur Homiliae. Textum recognovit, versionem lat. Cotelleri repet. pass. emend., selectas Cotelleri, Davisi, Clerici atque suas annotationes addidit Albertus Schweigler*, Stuttgart, 1847. *Clem. Rom. quae feruntur Homiliae viginti nunc primum integrae*, ed. Dressel, Gött. 1853. *Clementina*, ed. Paul de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1865. *S. Ignatii quae feruntur Epist. una cum ejusdem Martyrio*, ed. Jul. Petermann, Leipsic, 1849. Cf. Rich. Rothe, *Ueber die Echtheit der Ignatianischen Briefe*, in the Supplement to his work on the Beginnings of the Christian Church, Vol. I., Wittenberg, 1837; Ad. Schlitzmann, *Die Clementinen*, Hamburg, 1844; Ad. Hilgenfeld, *Die Clementinischen Recognitionen und Homilien*, Jena, 1848, and *Die apost. Väter*, Halle, 1868; G. Uhlhorn, *Die Hom. u. Recogn. des Clemens Romanus*, Göttingen, 1854; also Bunsen's, Baur's, Alb. Ritschl's, Volkmar's and others' investigations.

The "Apostolic Fathers" begin the list of "Church Fathers" in the wider signification of this expression, i. e., of those ecclesiastical writers who, next to Christ and the Apostles, were most influential in establishing the doctrine and constitution of the Church. (The expression is founded on 1 Cor. iv. 15.) As "Church Fathers" in the narrower sense, the Catholic Church recognizes only those whom she has approved as such on account of the pre-eminent purity in which they preserved the faith of the Church, the erudition with which they defended and established the faith, the holiness of their lives, and their (relative) antiquity. In respect of time, three periods are generally assumed in the list of Church Fathers, the first extending to the end of the third century, the second to the end of the sixth century (or, more exactly, to the year 604, in which Gregory the Great died, and in the Grecian Church perhaps to the time of John of Damascus), and the third either extending to the thirteenth century or limited only by the duration of the Church itself. Among its "Fathers" the Catholic Church has especially distinguished with the name of *Doctores Ecclesiae*, in the Eastern Church the following: Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Chrysostom, and also John of Damascus; and in the Western Church (by a decree of Pope Boniface VIII. in the year 1298): Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Augustine, Gregory the Great; at subsequent epochs, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura; and finally Saint Bernard and Hilarius of Poitiers were raised by Papal bulls to the rank of Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Those men who do not fully meet the requirements of the above criteria (and especially that of orthodoxy) are called, not *Patres*, but simply *Scriptores Ecclesiastici*. Among these are Papias, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Eusebius of Caesarea, and others.

In regard to the person of Clement of Rome (who must be distinguished not only from Clement of Alexandria, but perhaps also from the Clement of Philippi, mentioned in Phil. iv. 3, with whom Origen, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and others identify him) accounts are contradictory. According to the Pseudo-Clementine *Recognitions*, Clement was the son of a well-born Roman named Faustinianus; that he might become acquainted with the Christian doctrine, he made a journey to Caesarea in Palestine, where he found Peter, and was instructed by him in the principles of Christianity. According to the spurious Epistle of Clemens to the Apostle James, Peter chose him as his successor in the chair of the Roman Bishop. According to Tertullian, he was the immediate successor of Peter in that office; according to

Irenæus, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and others, he was the fourth Roman Bishop, Linus and Anicetus having occupied that office between Peter and himself. Eusebius and Hieronymus represent him as at the head of the Roman Church from A. D. 92 to 100. With the Flavius Clemens, of consular rank, who was executed under Domitian in the year 95 as a Judaizing atheist (probably, therefore, as a Christian), tradition has not identified him. A division, which had arisen in the Church at Corinth (in the time of Domitian, according to that Hegesippus who lived in the middle of the second century, see Euseb., *E. H.*, III. 16), is represented as the occasion of the letter, written in the name of the Roman Church, which has come down to us as the first (probably genuine, though revised, yet in Volkmar's opinion spurious) *Epistle of Clemens* (composed about A. D. 125). The ideas expressed by Clemens are those contained in the Pauline Epistles and in the Epistle to the Hebrews. We are made righteous, he says, not by ourselves, nor by our wisdom, knowledge, piety, or works, but by faith. But we are not for that reason to be slow to good works, nor to abate our love, but we must accomplish every good work with joyful zeal, just as God himself, the Creator, rejoices in his works. Where love reigns, no divisions can continue to exist. Have we not one God and one Christ and one Spirit of grace, which is poured out upon us, and is there not one calling in Christ? Christ was sent by God, and the Apostles were sent by Christ; filled with the Holy Ghost by the resurrection of Christ, they proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of God, and ordained the first believers as overseers and ministers (*ἐπισκοποι καὶ διακονοί*, cf. Phil. i. 1) of the rest. To the overseers we owe obedience; to those who are most aged, reverence. Clemens defends the incipient Christian hierarchy by pointing to the orders of the Old Testament, the symbolical understanding of which he calls *γῶσις* (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 8; Heb. v. and vi.). He seeks to silence the doubt of many as to the second coming of Christ and the resurrection, by adducing natural analogies, such as the succession of day and night, the growth of the seed sown in the earth, and the (supposed) revivification of the bird Phoenix. The second *Epistle*, in which teachers are admonished to walk worthily of their vocation, as also the *Epistles to Virgins* (ascetics of both sexes), which Wettstein first discovered in a Syriac version, and published in 1752, are probably spurious. The Apostolic *Constitutions* and *Canons*, which were ascribed to Clemens Romanus, date in their present form from the third and fourth centuries after Christ, though some parts are older.

The so-called *Recognitions* and *Homilies* of Clemens were composed under his name by Jewish Christians. The *Recognitions*, founded on an older Judaizing work, the "*Kerygma of Peter*," and written about 140 or 150 A. D., though in their present form probably of later date, combat Gnosticism, as represented by Simon the Magian, and defend the identity of the Creator of the world with the only true God; but they distinguish from Him (after the manner of Philo) the Spirit, as the organ through which he created, the Only-begotten, of whom he himself is the head. The true worshiper of God is he who does His will and observes the precepts of the law. To seek after righteousness and the kingdom of God is the way in which to arrive in the future world at the direct vision of the secrets of God. The written law cannot be rightly understood without the aid of tradition, which, starting from Christ, the true prophet, is carried forward by the Apostles and teachers. The essential part of the law is contained in the ten commandments. The Mosaic institution of offerings had only a provisional significance; in its place Christ has instituted the ordinance of baptism. For the non-Jews who believe in Christ those commands are binding which were laid on the proselytes of the gate. The Jews must believe in Christ, and the Gentile who believes in Christ must fulfill the law in its essential and permanent requirements (*Recogn.*, IV. 5: *debet is, qui ex gentibus est et ex Deo habet ut diligat Jesum, proprii habere propositi, ut credat et Moyse; et rursus Hebræus, qui ex Deo habet,*

ut credat Moysi, habere debet et ex proposito suo, ut credat in Jesum). The *Homilies*, which are probably a revision of the *Recognitions*, made about 170 A. D., represent in general the same stand-point with the *Recognitions*, teaching that the fundamental doctrines of Christ, the true prophet, who was God's Son, but not God, are, that there is one God, who made the world, and who, because he is just, will give to every one according to his works; yet they contain a greater number of speculative elements than the *Recognitions*. Their fundamental theoretical principle is, that God, the One, has arranged all things according to contraries. God stands to his wisdom, the creatress of the All, in the double relation expressed by *συνολή*, in virtue of which he forms with it a unity (*μὴνός*), and *ἐκτασις*, in virtue of which this unity is separated into a duality. The contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, form the basis of the four different elements, into which God divided the originally simple matter of which he made the world. Man alone is endowed with freedom of will. The souls of the godless are punished with annihilation. The true prophet has appeared at various times, under different names and forms, first in Adam, last in Christ. Through Christ the Gentiles have become participants in the benefits of the revelation of God. That part of the law which he abrogated (in particular, the requirement of offerings) never really belonged to it, but arose from the corruption which the genuine tradition of the revelation made to Moses underwent on the occasion of its being written down in the books of the Old Testament. He who believes in but one of the revelations of God is well-pleasing to God. Christianity is the universal form of Judaism. When he who was born a Gentile fulfils the law in the fear of God, he is a Jew, otherwise he is a Gentile (*Ἕλλην*).—The chronological relation between the *Recognitions* and the *Homilies* is a matter of dispute. Uhlhorn, among others, holds the *Homilies* to be the earlier work, Hilgenfeld, the *Recognitions*; the former is supported by F. Nitzsch, among others, in his *History of Dogmas*, I. 49; but Nitzsch admits that, in the *Recognitions* (composed at Rome), certain parts of the traditional material common to both works appear in a simpler and more primitive form than in the *Homilies*. There exists also an *Epitome of the Homilies*, which has been several times edited (most recently by A. Dressel, Leips. 1859).

The work entitled "*Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*," which may here be mentioned with this pseudonymous literature, was probably written near the middle of the second century. Its author belonged to that Jewish-Christian party which did not demand that the Gentile Christians should be circumcised. In it the Epistles of Paul and also the Acts of the Apostles are reckoned among the Holy Scriptures. It teaches that the high-priesthood of Christ completed and replaced the Levitical service of the temple; that the Spirit of God descended on Jesus at his baptism, and wrought in him holiness, righteousness, knowledge, and sinlessness; that the Israelites who were scattered abroad are to be gathered together and converted to Christ, and that the fear of God, with prayer and fasting, is a shield against temptation, and gives strength for the fulfillment of the divine commands.

The work entitled "*The Shepherd*," purports to have been written in the time of Bishop Clement. It was probably composed about the year 130, and is ascribed to one Hermas, who is described in the Muratori-Fragment as the brother of Pius, the Bishop of Rome from 140 to 152. In any case, it cannot have been the work of the Hermas in Romans xvi. 14. The work contains a narrative of visions vouchsafed to Hermas. A guardian spirit in shepherd's clothing, sent by an adorable angel, communicates to him certain commandments for himself and his Church, and interprets parables for him. The purport of the commandments is that they to whom they are addressed should believe in God and walk in the fear of Him. The Old Testament law is not mentioned, but the precepts which are given respecting abstinence, fasting, etc., betray simply the legal stand-

point, and even the doctrine of supererogatory works is put forward. After baptism a second opportunity is allowed for repentance. Christ is styled the first-created angel, who was from the beginning only the organ of the Holy Ghost. God is compared to the master of a house, the Holy Ghost to his son, and Christ to the most faithful of his servants. Hermas, having acquired perfection through repentance and good works, is surrounded by twelve ministering virgins, who represent the various powers of the Holy Ghost. He is made a building-stone in the edifice of the Church.

The date of the so-called *Epistle of Barnabas*, is, according to Hilgenfeld (*Das Urchristenthum*, p. 77, and *Nov. Test. extra Can. rec.*, II., p. xiii.), A. D. 96 or 97. Volkmar, reasoning from the passage in ch. 16, on the restoration of the temple by the aid of the Romans, concludes with greater probability that it was written in 118–119, by some one who was not a Jew but who was familiar with the Alexandrian philosophy (ch. 16: *ἦν ἡμῶν τὸ κατοικητήριον τῆς καρδίας πλήρες εἰδωλολατρείας*), and whose intention was perhaps to write in the name and according to the doctrine of Barnabas, as of one whose doctrine was the same with Paul's. But where Paul and the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* recognize two covenants, objectively distinct (the *παλαιά* and the *καινὴ διαθήκη*), the author of the *Epistle of Barnabas* sees rather only a subjective difference between successive modes of apprehending the divine revelation. The Jews, he says, through their devotion to the letter, failed to perceive the true sense of God's covenant-agreement with them and by their sins forfeited salvation; for this they were reproved by the prophets, who taught that obedience was better than sacrifice; the Christians have entered into the inheritance originally intended for the Jews and have become the true covenant people; their work is to fear God and keep his commandments, not the ceremonial law, but the new law of Jesus Christ (*nova lex Jesu Christi*), which requires the self-consecration of man to God (cf. Rom. xii. 1), and does not impose a yoke of bondage (cf. Gal. v. 1). Insight into the true sense of Scripture, attained by the aid of the allegorical method of interpretation, is termed, in the *Epistle of Barnabas*, *γνῶσις*, knowledge (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 1 seq.; Hebr. v. vi.), which is related to faith (*πίστις*) as higher to lower. Yet no aristocratic separation from the church is to be allowed on the part of those who have risen to this higher attainment (cf. Hebr. x. 25). The (Judaistic) opinion, that the Testament of the Jews, as understood by them, is also of authority for Christians, is denounced by the author of the *Epistle of Barnabas*, as a very great error; he warns: *ἵνα μὴ προσερχώμεθα ὡς ἐπληῖται τῷ ἐκείνων νόμῳ* (*ut non incurramus tanquam proselyti ad illorum legem*, ch. 3; *ne similetis iis, qui peccata sua congerunt et dicunt: quia testamentum illorum et nostrum est*, ch. 4). (The *Codex Sinaiticus*, discovered by Tischendorf, gives the original Greek of the first four chapters, which were before known only in a Latin translation; reprinted in Dressel's *Patr. Apost.*, 2d edition, 1863; cf. Weizsäcker, *Zur Kritik des Barnabasbriefs, aus dem Codex Sinaiticus*. Tübingen Univ. Programm, 1863).

The *Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians*, which was written between 147 and 167, and perhaps in the year 150, is probably for the most part genuine; but there are so many grounds for suspecting the authenticity of the *Epistles* ascribed to Ignatius of Antioch (who was torn in pieces by leopards as a despiser of the gods, on the 20th of December, A. D. 115, not at Rome, as we have almost conclusive reason for believing, but at Antioch, soon after the earthquake at Antioch, which took place during Trajan's sojourn in that city; cf. G. Volkmar, in the *Rhein. Museum*, new series, XII., 1857, pp. 481–511), or for supposing that extensive interpolations were made in them at various times, that they cannot be confidently relied on as documents exponential of the development of religious thought in the post-apostolic age. An *Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians* is mentioned by Irenæus (*Adv. Hæc.*, III. 3); but with that one the *Epistle* now extant is only partially identical.

Whether the brief Syriac recension (found in an Egyptian cloister, and first published by W. Cureton at London, in 1845) of the three Epistles of Ignatius to the Ephesians, to the Romans, and to Polycarp, contains the earlier text, or is an abridgment of the Greek text, is uncertain; though the former supposition is the more probable. The character of these Epistles is Pauline, and in the case of those of Ignatius, partly Johannean. But the hierarchical tendency is visible in all of them, especially in the Epistles of Ignatius. Polycarp (died 167) admonishes those to whom his Epistle is addressed (ch. 5), to be obedient to their presbyters and deacons, as to God and Christ, and the Epistles of Ignatius contain the basis of a hierarchical system. The Ignatian Epistles, especially that addressed to the Romans, breathe forth love for martyrdom, which the author represents as shortly awaiting himself. In the later ones, the hierarchical tendency becomes constantly more prominent. Nothing but steadfast loyalty to God, Christ, the bishop, and the commandments of the apostles can protect one from the temptations of the heretics, who mix Jesus Christ with poison (*Ad Trallianos*, ch. 1 seq.). In the Epistles to the Ephesians, to the Trallians, and to the Smyrneans, it is chiefly the Docetes, and in the Epistles to the Magnesians and Philadelphians it is the Judaizing Christians, who are combated. Cf. Bunsen's *Die drei echten und die vier unechten Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochien*, Hamburg, 1847; *Ignatius von Antiochien u. s. Zeit*, *ibid.* 1847; Baur's *Untersuchungen über die ign. Briefe*, Tübingen, 1848; cf. also the investigations of Uhlhorn, Hilgenfeld and others (according to whom, the Syriac text is an abridgment of the Greek), Friedr. Böhringer (*Kirchengesch. der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 2d edition, Zürich, 1861, pp. 1-46), who gives an exact analysis of the Epistles, Richard Adalbert Lipsius (*Ueber das Verhältniss des Textes der drei syrischen Briefe des Ignatius zu den übrigen Recensionen der Ignatianischen Literatur*, Leipsic, 1859; also in *Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, published by the *Deutsche morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, and edited by Herm. Brockhaus, Leipsic, 1859 and 61, where Lipsius argues in favor of the priority of the Syriac recension), and further (for the opposite view), A. Merx's *Meletemata Ignatiana* (Halle, 1861). According to Volkmar, the three first Martyr-Epistles were composed in about 170, the next four about 175-180, at which time he judges that the spurious passages were added to the genuine Epistle of Polycarp.

The (anonymous) *Epistle to Diognetus* (who was probably the favorite of Marcus Aurelius, mentioned by Capitolinus, *Vit. Ant.*, ch. 4) is included, sometimes among the writings of Justin, sometimes among those of the Apostolic Fathers, although in style and dogmatic stand-point it differs materially from the works of Justin (see Semisch, *Justin*, I. p. 178 seq.). Its composition by an immediate disciple of the Apostles is by no means certain, since the author seems rather to appeal to the Catholic principle of the "*traditio apostolorum*." The Epistle contains a spirited Christian apology. (It has been published by Otto with the works of Justin, see below, § 78, and separately by W. A. Hollenberg, Berlin, 1853.) Its stand-point is akin to that of the Johannean Epistles and the fourth Gospel. Judaism is rejected. To pretend to find in circumcision an evidence of one's election and of God's especial favor, is treated by the author as a boastful assumption, deserving to be met with scorn. He considers the sacrificial cultus to be an error, and anxious strictness in the choice of meats and in the solemnization of the Sabbath to be without reason. Yet he is no less decided in his opposition to paganism. The Greek gods are for him inanimate images of wood, clay, stone, and metal, and the worship offered to them is senseless. In the ages before Christ God had left man subject to the disorderly play of his sensuous desires, in order to show that it is not by human strength and merit, but simply through the mercy of God, that eternal life can be attained. The moral superiority of the Christians is portrayed by the author in glowing colors. Their manner of life, he says, is most admirable and excellent. They dwell as strangers in their native lands. They perform all

duties like citizens, and endure all that is inflicted upon them, as if they were foreigners. Every land, however foreign, is fatherland for them, and every fatherland is foreign. They marry, like all men, and beget children, but they do not expose those whom they have begotten. They have their meals, but not their wives, in common. They are on the earth, but their life is in heaven. They love all men, and are persecuted by all. They are not known, and yet are condemned. They are killed, and yet live. They are poor, yet make many rich. What the soul is in the body, that are the Christians in the world. That which produces in them this manner of life is the love of God, which has been manifested in the sending of the Logos, who formed the world, and is ever being born anew in the hearts of the saints (*πάντοτε νέος ἐν ἁγίων καρδίαις γεννώμενος*).

§ 77. The so-called Gnostics, in their endeavor to advance from Christian faith to Christian knowledge, made the first attempt to construct a religious philosophy on the Christian basis. The Gnostic speculation was less logical than imaginative, the various abstract elements of religious belief being realized in the form of personal beings, forming a Christian or rather a semi-Christian mythology, underneath which lay hidden the germs of a correct historical and scientific appreciation of Christianity. In this latter regard the first problem in importance was the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and this problem was solved by the Gnostics by translating into its equivalent theoretical expression the practical attitude assumed by the ultra-Paulinists with reference to Judaism. The next problem was the relation of Christianity to the various heathen and, in particular, to the Hellenic religions. The ideas of the Gnostics were partly those of the Old Testament and of Christianity, and in part Hellenic and pagan. It is with reference to these problems and this range of ideas that we must distinguish the separate stadia and forms of Gnosticism, which from simple beginnings resulted in very complicated systems. Christianity was removed from Judaism by a constantly-increasing interval in the doctrines of Cerinthus, Cerdo, Saturninus, and Marcion, of whom the three former distinguished the God of Moses and of the prophets from God, the Father of Jesus Christ, while Marcion, an enemy to all external legality, assigned to Christianity, as the one absolutely independent, unconditional, and absolute religion, a position of complete isolation from the Old Testament revelation, the author of which was, in his opinion, merely a just but not a good being. The speculations of Carpocrates, a Christian Platonist and Universalist, of the Ophites or Naasenes and Perates, who saw in the Serpent a wise and good being, and of Basilides the Syrian and Valentinus and his followers, concerned in part the relation of

paganism to Christianity, and were more or less pervaded by pagan ideas. Basilides the Syrian taught that the highest of the divine potencies were located in a supra-mundane space, that the God worshiped by the Jews was a being of limited power, but that those who believed in Christ were illuminated and converted by a gospel, of which the true and supreme God was the author. The Gnosticism of Valentinus and his numerous followers, on the other hand, was in essential particulars affected by Parsee influences. According to this system, there emanated first from the original Being, or Father, a number of divine, supra-mundane Æons, constituting the "fullness" (Pleroma) of the divine life. Wisdom (Sophia), the last of these Æons, through its unregulated yearning after the original Father, became subject to the law of effort and suffering, and gave birth to an inferior Wisdom, represented as tarrying in a region outside of the "Pleroma" and named Achamoth; she also brought forth the psychical and material realms, together with the Demiurge. The Valentinians taught, further, that three redemptive works were wrought, the first in the world of Æons, by Christ, the second in the case of Achamoth, by a Jesus who was produced by the Æons, and the third on earth, by Mary's Son Jesus, in whom dwelt the Holy Ghost or the divine wisdom. Bardesanes, the Syrian, simplified the doctrines of Gnosticism. He taught that man's superiority consisted in the freedom of his will. The Dualism of Mani was a combination of Magianism and Christianity, for which Gnostic speculations furnished the connecting link.

The sources from which our knowledge of Gnosticism is derived are—if we except the Gnostic work: *Pistis Sophia* (a cod. Coptico descr. lat. editis M. G. Schwartze, ed. J. H. Peterman, Berlin, 1851) and several fragments—exclusively the works of its opponents, especially Irenæus' *ἡλεγχος τῆς ψευδοκρίτου γνῶσεως* (ed. Stieren, Leipzig, 1858; Vol. I, pp. 901-971: *Gnosticorum, quorum meminit Irenæus, fragmenta*) and Pseudo-Origenes' (Hippolytus') *ἡλεγχος κατὰ τῶν αἰρετικῶν* (pr. ed. Emm. Miller, Oxford, 1851), the works of Pseudo-Ignatius, Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alex., Origen, Eusebius, Philastrius, Epiphanius, Theodoret, Augustine, and others, and the treatise of Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist, against the Gnostics, *Ennead.*, II. 9. Of modern writers on this subject, the following may be mentioned: Neander, *Genes. Entw. der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme*, Berlin, 1818 (cf. *Kirchengesch.*, I. 2, 2d ed., p. 681 seq.); J. Matter, *Hist. crit. du Gnosticisme*, 1828, 2d ed., 1848; Möhler, *Ursprung des Gnosticismus*, Tüb. 1831; Ferd. Chr. Baur, *De gnosticorum christianismo treat.*, Tüb. 1827; *Die christl. Gnosis oder Religionphilosophie*, Tüb. 1835; *Das Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 2d ed., Tüb. 1860, pp. 175-284; J. Hildebrandt, *Philosophias gnosticas origines*, Berlin, 1839; J. L. Jacobi, in Herzog's *Real-encyc. für Theol. und Kirche*, Vol. V., Stuttg. and Hanib. 1836; R. A. Lipsius, in Ersch und Gruber's *Encycl.*, I. 71, publ. sep., Leipzig, 1840, and in many portions of his work entitled: *Zur Quellenkritik des Epiph.*, Vienna, 1846; Wih. Möller, *Gesch. der Kosmologie in der griech. Kirche bis auf Origenes*, Halle, 1860, pp. 189-478; Hilgenfeld, *Der Gnosticismus und die Philosophie*, in the *Ztschr. für vrie. Theologie*, V., Halle, 1862, pp. 400-464. In Bunsen's *Analecta Anti-Nicæna*, 8 vols., London, 1864, may be found the extracts made by Clement of Alexandria from the works of Theodotus the Valentinian, edited by Jac. Bernays (Vol. I., pp. 205-278). [A clear and full view of Gnosticism and its several schools is presented in Schaaf, *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. I., pp. 321-351.—Tr.]

"Gnosticism was the first comprehensive attempt to construct a philosophy of Christianity; owing, however, to the immense reach of the speculative ideas which pressed themselves on the attention of the Gnostics, but with which they were wholly lacking in scientific ability to cope, this attempt ended only in mysticism, theosophy, mythology, in short, in a thoroughly unphilosophical system" (Lipsius, in the *Encycl. der Wissensch. und Künste*, ed. Ersch. and Gruber, I. 71, Leipsic, 1860, p. 269). The classification of the forms of Gnosticism must (in agreement with Baur, *Das Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrh.*, p. 225, though not altogether in the manner adopted by him) be founded on the religions whose various elements affected the content of Gnosticism.

The conception of *γνῶσις*, in the wider sense of religious knowledge, is older than the development of the systems of Gnosticism. The allegorical interpretation of the Holy Scriptures by the Jews who were educated at Alexandria was in substance Gnosis. In Matt. xiii. 11, Christ after having spoken to the multitude in parables, interprets what he had been saying to his disciples, since to them was given the ability, denied to the multitude, of knowing (*γινῶναι*) the mysteries of the kingdom of God. Paul (1 Cor. i. 4, 5) thanks God that the Corinthians are rich "in all utterance and all knowledge" (*γνώσει*); the rational view of the use of meats offered to idols he terms Gnosis (1 Cor. viii. 1 seq.), and among the gifts of the Spirit he mentions (1 Cor. xii. 8) the "word of wisdom" and the "word of knowledge" (*λόγος γνώσεως*) as distinct from faith (*πίστις*)—where the word *γνῶσις* seems, like the expression "strong meat" (*στερεὰ τροφή*) in the Epistle to the Hebrews (v. 14), to refer especially to the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures (cf. 1 Cor. x. 1-12; Gal. iv. 21-31).^{*} In Rev. ii. 24, a "knowledge of the depths of Satan" is spoken of, probably in opposition to some who laid claim to a knowledge of the depths of the Godhead. Both Jewish Christians (as, for example, the author of the *Clementines*) and Gentile Christians, orthodox as well as heterodox, appropriated and started from the primitive Christian conception of *γνῶσις*, in their attempts to increase the depths of their Christian knowledge; the Alexandrian Church Fathers, in particular, laid great stress on the distinction between faith and knowledge (*γνῶσις*). The author of the *Epistle of Barnabas* seeks to instruct his readers, to the end "that with their faith they may also have perfect knowledge" (*ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως τελείαν ἔχητε καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν*), and by this "knowledge" is meant an acquaintance with the typical or allegorical sense of the Mosaic ceremonial law. But those who first extended the allegorical method of interpretation to the books of the New Testament were men who sought (either consciously or unconsciously) to pass beyond the sphere of ideas contained in them; this extension of the principle of allegorical interpretation appeared first among the heretical Gnostics and especially among the Valentinians, but was afterward also accepted by the Alexandrian members of the Church and others. Of the various sects which are usually comprehended under the name of Gnostics, it is reported (Hippol., *Philos.*, V. 6, and Epiphani., *Haeres.*, 26) that the Ophites or Naasenes, in particular, gave themselves this name (*φάσκοντες μόνον τὰ βάθη γινώσκειν*).

The idea that Judaism was but a preparation for Christianity was expressed in the doctrine of Cerinthus (*Κήρυθος*)—who lived in Asia Minor ca. 115 A. D., and was perhaps educated at Alexandria (*Philos.*, VII. 33: *Αἰγυπτίων παιδείᾳ ἀσκηθεὶς*)—in the form of a distinction between the God worshiped by the Jews and who created the world, and

* [But allegorical interpretation, provided it rests on a rational principle, is not gnostic. Much less does it follow that the words *γνῶσις*, *γινῶναι*, when used in the New Testament in contrast with faith, as meaning explanation or rational interpretation, lent any sanction to the gnostic tendencies against which, in their germinant beginnings, the apostolic teachings and warnings are distinct and earnest (Col. ii. 18; 1 Tim. i. 4; Tit. iii. 9; 1 John iv. 8; Jud. 4 seq.)—Ed.]

the supreme and true God. The latter, according to Cerinthus, caused the *Æon* Christ to descend on Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism; this *Æon* Christ proclaimed through Jesus the true God, but left Jesus before his death and had no part in his passion (*Iren.*, I. 26; Hippol., *Philos.*, VII. 33). In Epiphanius, *Hæres.*, 28, a partial leaning toward Judaism (*προσέχειν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ἀπὸ μέρους*) is ascribed to Cerinthus and his followers. By this it is scarcely probable that we are to understand that, the doctrines of the Church having already been brought to a relatively advanced stage of development, a regressive Judaizing movement was begun in the doctrine of Cerinthus (a misapprehension into which early historians fell, for reasons easily understood), but simply that in his doctrine vestiges were visible of the original intimate union of Christianity with Judaism; the theosophy of Cerinthus shows throughout a very decided tendency to pass over all the barriers of Judaism. Cerinthus must have been influenced in his doctrine by the Pauline doctrine of the law as a preparation for Christianity, a *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*, and by such ideas as prevail in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Employing the Philonic distinction between God and His world-creating *power*, he went on to define the difference between Judaism and Christianity as arising from the non-identity of the divine beings worshiped by each.

The Nicolaitans, mentioned in the Revelation of John, are described by Irenæus (III. 11) as forerunners of Cerinthus. Such they may have been, in so far as they, carrying out to its logical conclusion the Pauline principle that the law was made void through faith, objected to the imposition on themselves of the laws which were ordained for the Proselytes of the Gate, and which, according to the conciliatory proposition reported in the Acts of the Apostles, were to be observed by the Gentile Christians. As the Book of Revelation is opposed to the Nicolaitans, so, according to Irenæus (III. 11), the Gospel of John was directed against the doctrine of Cerinthus; this statement contains in so far an element of truth, as it is true that the Gospel in question (which may have been written about 100 A. D., before the time of Cerinthus), in teaching that the world was created by God's *Logos*, opposes the doctrine that the world-creating God of the Jews was other than the true and supreme God,—a doctrine maintained by Cerinthus, but afterward far more completely developed by other Gnostics.

It is quite uncertain with how much reason the beginnings of heretical Gnosis have been ascribed to Simon Magus (mentioned in Acts viii. 9-24). Simon is said to have pretended that he was a manifestation of God, and that Helena, whom he took about with him, was an incarnation of the divine reason (Justin, *Apol.*, I. 26, 56; *Iren.*, I. 23). But much has been unhistorically ascribed to him which belongs either to Paul or to later individuals. There existed a sect of Simonians (*Iren.*, I. 23). The most important disciple of Simon is said to have been Menander of Samaria (*Iren.*, I. 23), under whose influence Saturninus of Antioch and Basilides are reported to have stood (*Iren.*, I. 24). The doctrine of Cerdo is said to have been connected with that of Simon and the Nicolaitans (*Iren.*, I. 27; *Philos.*, VII. 37).

Saturninus of Antioch, who lived in the reign of Hadrian, taught (according to *Iren.*, I. 24; *Philos.*, VII. 28) that there existed an unknowable God, the Father, who had created the angels, archangels, and various other forces and powers; that the world, including man, was created by seven angels, and that the superior power, in whose likeness man was formed, communicated to the latter a spark of life, which after death returned to its source, while the body was resolved into its original elements. The Father, he taught, was without origin, bodiless, and formless, and had never in reality appeared to men; the God of the Jews was only an angel. Christ came to abolish the power of the God of the Jews, to save the believing and the good, and to condemn the wicked and the demons.

Marriage and procreation were the works of Satan. All prophecies were inspired either by the angels who made the world or by Satan, who worked in opposition to those angels and especially in opposition to the God of the Jews.

Cerdo, a Syrian, came (according to the testimony of Irenæus, I. 27.1 and III. 4. 3) to Rome while Hyginus (the successor of Telesphorus and predecessor of Pius) was Bishop, hence shortly before 140. He, like Cerinthus, distinguished between the God of Moses and the prophets and God the Father of Jesus Christ; the former could be known, the latter could not be known; the former was just, but the latter was good (Iren., I. 27; Hippol., *Philos.*, VII. 37).

Marcion of Pontus taught (according to Iren., III. 4. 3) at Rome after Cerdo, in the time of Bishop Anicetus (the successor of Pius and predecessor of Soter), hence about 160 A. D. He had previously taught at Sinope about the year 138, and in 140 was excommunicated at the same place. In ethical respects he maintained, as an Antinomian, an extreme Paulinism. Of the Gospels, he accepted only the Gospel of Luke, in a revised form adapted to his own stand-point. After giving himself up to Gnostic speculations, he carried to an extreme before unknown those theoretical fictions, in which the practical attitude assumed by his party with reference to the Jewish law, had found a fantastic theological expression. Not content simply to distinguish the Creator of the world, whom the Jews worshiped, from the supreme God, and to declare the former inferior in rank to the latter, he affirmed (judging certain statements of the Old Testament from the stand-point of his own Christian consciousness, and thus rejecting the method of allegorical interpretation) that the God of the Jews, though just (in the sense of one who, in executing the law, spares no one), was not good, since he was the author of evil works, and was bloodthirsty, changeable, and full of contradictions. In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, Jesus, he taught, was sent by the Father, the supreme God, in human form to Judea, to abrogate the law and the prophets and all the works of the God who created and ruled the world (the *κοσμοκράτωρ*). It is a part of our struggle against the Creator of the world that we abstain from marriage (Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, III. 3. 4). Only the soul can attain to eternal blessedness; the earthly body cannot survive death (Iren., I. 27; Hippol., *Philos.*, VII. 29). That the Marcionites regarded light and darkness as eternal principles, and Jesus as a third being reconciling their antagonism, and that they also distinguished the "Creator of the world" from the "God of Light," and preached asceticism as an aid in the contest with evil, are affirmations contained in the *Führer* (see Flügel, *Mani*, Leipzig, 1862, p. 159 seq.). Cf. Lipsius, *Die Zeit des Marcion und des Herakleon*, in the *Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol.*, X., 1867, pp. 75-83.

In direct contrast to this anti-Judaistic tendency was the ethical and philosophical Judaism of the *Clementina* (see above, § 76), which opposed strenuously the distinction of the highest God from the Creator of the world.

In distinguishing the highest God, from whom Christ descended, from the Demiurge and Lawgiver, Carpocrates, Basilides, Valentinus, and others, agreed with the Gnostics thus far named; but their doctrines betrayed to a more considerable extent the influence of Hellenic speculation. These Gnostics treated, in part, expressly of the relation of Paganism to Christianity. Valentinus and, to a much greater extent, Mani transplanted Parsee conceptions into the field of Christianity.

Carpocrates of Alexandria—among whose followers was one named Marcellina, who came to Rome during the bishopric of Anicetus (about 160 A. D.)—taught perhaps as early as the year 130, and maintained a species of universalistic rationalism. His followers kept before them images of the persons to whom they paid the greatest reverence, among whom were included not only Jesus and Paul, but also Homer, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and

others. In regard to the relation of Christianity to Judaism, Carpocrates agreed substantially with Cerinthus and Cerdo, and more particularly with Saturninus, with whom he taught that the world and all that it contains were created by angels far inferior to the uncreated Father. With the Ebionites, Carpocrates taught that Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary, but, in opposition to the Ebionites, viewed him not as the perfect Jew, on whom, in consideration of his perfect fulfillment of the law, the Messianic dignity had been conferred, but, rather, simply as the perfect Man. Carpocrates taught that it was because Jesus, in spite of his Jewish education, had the sense to despise Judaism, that he became the Redeemer and the Deliverer of man from the sufferings laid upon him for his discipline; every soul which, like Jesus, was able to despise the powers which govern the world, would receive the same power which he received. In support of this position, Carpocrates made use of dogmas which he undoubtedly borrowed from Platonism. The souls of men existed before they descended into their earthly bodies; they, together with the unbegotten God, had gazed, while the world revolved, on that which exists eternally beyond the arch of heaven (meaning, evidently, the Ideas, which are represented in the myth of the *Phaedrus* as situated above the heavens); the more energetic and the purer a soul is, the better able is it in its earthly existence to recall what it saw in that previous state, and he who is able to do this receives from above a power (*δύναμις*), which renders him superior to the powers that rule the world. This "power" passes from the locality beyond the heavens, where God is, through the planetary spheres and the world-ruling potencies that inhabit them, and strives, freed from their influence, to reach those souls which are like itself, as the soul of Jesus was. He who has lived in perfect purity, unspotted by transgression, goes after death to God, but all other souls must expiate their crimes by passing successively into various bodies. At last, after sufficient atonement has been made, all are saved and live in communion with God, the Lord of the angels, who made the world. Jesus had a special, secret doctrine for those who were worthy of it and obedient. Man is saved through faith and love; every work is, as such, indifferent, and is only good or bad in human opinion. The Carpocratians not merely occupied themselves with speculation, but practiced a highly-developed cultus peculiar to themselves, which their ecclesiastical opponents called magic (Iren., I. 25; Hippol., *Philos.*, VII. 32; by this latter reference the inaccuracies of the Latin text of Irenæus and the misapprehensions of Epiphanius, *Haeres.*, 27, which many in modern times have shared in, are to be corrected; cf. Theodoret, *Haer. Fab.*, I. 5). Epiphanius, the son of Carpocrates, carrying his father's principle to the extreme, and influenced probably by the doctrines of Plato's *Republic*, maintained an anarchical communism (Clem., *Strom.*, III. 2).

The Naassenes or Ophites, who called themselves Gnostics, taught that the beginning of perfection was the knowledge of man, and its end the knowledge of God (*ἀρχὴ τελείωσης γνώσις ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ δὲ γνώσις ἀπηρτισμένη τελείωσις*, Hippol., *Philos.*, V. 6). The first man, Adam, was, according to them, androgynous (*ἀρσενόθηλυς*), uniting in himself the spiritual, the psychical, and the material (*τὸ νοερόν, τὸ ψυχικόν, τὸ χοϊκόν*), and the same character descended on Jesus, the son of Mary (Hippol., *Philos.*, V. 6). Embracing the principle of tradition, these Gnostics traced their doctrine back to James, the brother of the Lord (*Ibid.*, ch. 7). Irenæus and Epiphanius ascribe to them a relatively complete system, similar to that of the Valentinians; probably this system belonged to the later Ophites. Akin to the Ophites in doctrine were the Perates, who asserted that through their knowledge they were able to overcome the liability to decay (*διελθεῖν καὶ περᾶσαι τὴν φθοράν*, *Philos.*, V. 16). They distinguished three principles: the unbegotten, the self-begotten, and the begotten Good. All the forces of the terrestrial world, the world of change and development, descended from the upper worlds, and so Christ descended from the unbegotten principle,

Christ the Saviour, the Son, the Logos, the serpent, who mediates between the motionless Father and matter, which is subject to motion. The serpent present at the fall of man (*ὁ ὀφίτης τῆς Εὐας λόγος*), the serpent lifted up by Moses, and Christ, are identical (*Philos.* V. 12 seq.). The Ophitic Systems have been recently reviewed by Lipsius in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. für wiss. Theologie*, 1863 and 1864. Cf. Joh. Nep. Gruber, *Ueber die Ophiten, Inauguraldiss.*, Würzburg, 1864. On the Perates, cf. Baxmann, *Die Philosophumena und die Peraten*, in Niedner's *Zeitschr. für histor. Theol.*, 1860, pp. 218-257.

Basilides (*Βασίλειδος*), who, according to Epiphanius, was of Syrian origin, taught about the year 130 at Alexandria. Irenæus (I. 24) and Hippolytus (*Philos.* VI. 20 seq.) treat specially of his doctrine; cf. Jacobi, *Basilidis philocephali gnostici sentent.*, Berlin, 1852; Bunsen, *Hippolytus und seine Zeit.*, Leips. 1852, I. p. 65 seq.; Uhlhorn, *Das basilidianische System*, Gött. 1855; Hilgenfeld, *Das System des Gnostikers Basilides*, in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1856, p. 86 seq., and *Die jüdische Apokalypthik, nebst einem Anhange über das gnostische System des Basilides*, Jena, 1857, pp. 287-299; Baur, *Das System des Gnostikers Basilides und die neuesten Auffassungen desselben*, in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1856, p. 122 seq., and *Das Christentum der drei ersten Jahrh.*, 2d ed., 1830, pp. 204-213; Lipsius, *Zur Quellenkritik des Epiphanius*, Vienna, 1865, p. 100 seq.; cf., also, articles in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. für wiss. Theologie*. Irenæus represents the system of Basilides as more nearly allied to the Valentinian, while Hippolytus, on the contrary, ascribes to it a more original character. According to Irenæus, Basilides taught that the Nous [reason personified] was an emanation from the unbegotten Father, that the Logos [Word] was an emanation from the Nous, Phronesis [practical wisdom] from the Logos, Sophia [wisdom] and Dynamis [power] were from Phronesis, and that the Virtues (or Forces, *virtutes*) and the "chiefs" and Angels—termed by him also *primi*—emanated from Sophia and Dynamis. These angels made the first heaven. From them emanated other angels, who made the second heaven, in the likeness of the first. From the second series of angels emanated still another series, who made a third heaven, and so on, the whole number of heavens (or heavenly spheres) being 365, and all being under the rule of Abraxas or Abrasax, whose name was the Greek expression for 365 ($1 + 2 + 100 + 1 + 60 + 2 + 200$, according to the numerical significance of the Greek letters). The lowest heaven is seen by us, and the angels to whom it belongs are also those who formed and govern the terrestrial world; their chief is the God whom the Jews worshiped. This God desired to make all other nations subject to his chosen nation; but all the other heavenly powers arrayed themselves against him, and all the other nations against his nation. Seized with compassion, the unbegotten Father now sent his first-born Nous, who is Christ, to deliver the believing from subjection to the powers that rule the world. This Nous appeared in human form, yet did not suffer himself to be crucified, but substituted in his place Simon the Cyrenian. He who believes on the crucified One is still under the dominion of the rulers of the world. It is necessary to believe in the eternal Nous, who was only in appearance subjected to the death of the cross. Only the souls of men are immortal; the body perishes. The Christian who sacrifices to the gods is not thereby defiled. He who has knowledge knows all others, but is himself not known of others. Knowledge is the possession of but few among thousands.—According to Hippolytus, the Basilidians pretended to derive their system from the secret teachings of Christ, transmitted to them by Matthew. Basilides, he says, taught that, originally, there existed absolutely nothing. Out of this condition of non-being, the seed of the world was first made to come forth by the non-existing God, who by his will, which was no will (not by emanation) called forth from the non-existing the unity, which contained in itself this seed or *πενταπερμία* (or, according to Clem. Alex., the *σύνχρσις ἀρχαῖς*) of the entire world. In the seed was a tripartite sonship; the first rose instantly to the non-

existing God, the second, less fine and pure, was, as it were, provided with wings by the first, receiving from it the Holy Ghost, while the third sonship, needing purification, remained behind with the great mass of the *πανοπερμία*. The non-existing God and the two first sonships (*υἱότητες*) are in the supra-mundane space, which is separated from the world that it surrounds by a fixed sphere (*σπερίωμα*). The Holy Ghost, after having risen with the second sonship to the supra-mundane region, returned to the middle point between the supra-mundane space and the world, and thus became *πνεῦμα μεθόριον* (or "boundary-spirit"). In our world dwells the ruler of the world, who cannot ascend above the *σπερίωμα*, and fancies that he is the highest God and that there is nothing over him; under him is the lawgiving God, and each of these two has begotten a son. The first of these two rulers (*ἀρχόντες*) dwells in the ethereal kingdom, the *Οὐδοας*; he ruled on earth from Adam to Moses. The second dwells in the world under the moon, the Hebdomas, and ruled from Moses to Christ. When now the Gospel came, or the knowledge of supra-mundane things (*ἡ τῶν ὑπερκosμίων γνῶσις*), through the son of the world-ruler receiving, by the agency of the Spirit, enlightenment from the supra-mundane sonship, the world-ruler learned of the supreme God, and was seized with fear; but fear became for him the beginning of wisdom. He repented of his boasting, and so did the God who was subordinated to him, and the Gospel was announced to all dominions and powers in the 365 heavens. By the light emanating from the supra-mundane sonship, Jesus also was enlightened. The third sonship now attained to that purification, of which it had need, and raised itself to the place where the blessed sonship already was, namely, to the non-existing God. When all things have been brought into their proper places, the lower orders become ignorant (*ἀγνοοῖ*) of the higher, in order that they may be free from longing. The accounts of Irenæus and Hippolytus agree in the fundamental idea that the God worshipped by the Jews had only a limited sphere of influence (like the gods of the heathen), and that the redemption accomplished by Christ originated with the supreme God. They vary most essentially in their account of the intermediate beings, who, according to Irenæus, were Nous, Phronesis, Sophia, and Dynamis, etc., but, according to Hippolytus, were the three sonships. Which of the two reports is based on the teachings of Basilides himself, and which on those of his followers, may be disputed. Baur considers the report of Hippolytus to be the more authentic, requiring us to assume that Hippolytus, elsewhere less well-informed than Irenæus, his teacher and model, sometimes, and particularly in reference to Basilides, possessed better sources of information than he did. Hilgenfeld, on the contrary, holds, apparently with reason, that his own investigations, in particular, and also the investigations of Lipsius, have demonstrated that the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus represent only a late and degenerate form of Basilidianism. The son and disciple of Basilides, Isidorus, defined the ethical work of man to be the extirpation of those traces of the lower grades of life which still cling to us (as *προσαρτήματα* or appendages). The influence of Aristotle, from whose doctrine Hippolytus seeks to derive that of Basilides, scarcely extended farther than to the external form in which his doctrines were presented, and to his astronomical opinions; the observation, on the other hand (Hippol., *Philos.*, I. 22), that the doctrine of the sonship furnished with wings was borrowed from Plato, is undoubtedly correct. The substance of the system was derived principally from the comparison of Christianity with the religions before Christ (which took the form of a comparison of the deities of various religions).

The most comprehensive of all the Gnostic systems is that of Valentinus, the master of Heracleon, Ptolemæus, Secundus, Marcus, and many others. Valentinus lived and taught till near 140 in Alexandria, and afterwards at Rome. He died in Cyprus about the year 160. Irenæus testifies (III. 4. 3, Greek ap. Euseb., *E. H.* IV. 11) that "Valentinus

came to Rome in the time of Hyginus, flourished in the time of Pius, and remained till the time of Anicetus." The chief sources from which our knowledge of the Valentinian System must be derived are, the work of Irenæus against false Gnosis, which is principally directed against the doctrine of Valentinus and Ptolemæus, and Hippol., *Philos.* VI. 29 seq., as also Tertullian's work, *Adversus Valentinianos*, and numerous passages and extracts in Clemens Alexandrinus. Cf. also, among others, Rossel, in his *Hinterlassene Schriften*, Berlin, 1847, Vol. II. pp. 250-300. At the summit of all existence, the Valentinians placed a single timeless and spaceless being, an uncreated, imperishable, and incomprehensible Monad (μονὰς ἀγέννητος, ἀσπαρτος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἀπερινόητος, γόνιμος, Hippol. VI. 29). The epithets which they applied to it were Father (πατήρ, Hippol., *ibid.*), Forefather (προπάτωρ, Iren., I. 1. 1), Depth (βυθός, Iren., *ibid.*), Ineffable (ἀρρήτος), and the "perfect Æon" (τέλειος αἰών). Valentinus himself (Iren., I. 11. 1), and many of the Valentinians, associated with this being, Silence (σιγή) or Thought (ἐννοια), as a female principle; but others (according to Hippol.) opposed the notion that a feminine principle was associated with the Father of all things, and were inclined to represent the latter as superior to the distinction of sex (Iren., I. 2. 4). The original father of all things was moved by love to beget them (Hippolyt., *Philos.*, VI. 29: φιλέρημος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἀγάπη γὰρ, φησὶν, ἣν ὅλος, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγάπη, εἰν μὴ ἡ τὸ ἀγαπώμενον). The two first products of the supreme principle were reason (νοῦς) and truth (ἀλήθεια), which, together with the generative and parturient principles, "depth" (βυθός) and "silence" (σιγή), constitute the τετρακτὺς or quaternary of "roots" of all things (ρίζα τῶν πάντων). To Nous they gave the predicate of only-begotten; the Nous was for them (Iren., *ibid.*) the "father and principle of all things." Nous (and truth) gave birth to Logos and life, and the latter to man and church (ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκκλησία). All these form together an Ogdoas. Ten more Æons descended from Logos and life, and twelve from man and church; the youngest of these twelve Æons, and hence the youngest of the whole thirty Æons, was Wisdom (Sophia), a feminine Æon. The sum of these Æons constitute the Pleroma, the kingdom of the fullness of divine life (πλήρωμα), which is divided into the above-named ogdoad, and into a decad and a dodecad. The Saviour (σωτήρ, to whom they did not apply the predicate Lord), lived thirty years in obscurity, to indicate the mystery of the thirty Æons. Wisdom desired, ostensibly from love, but in reality from presumption, to come into immediate nearness to the first Father and to comprehend his greatness, as the Nous, and it alone, comprehended it; in this attempt she would have wasted all her energies, had not ὅρος (limit) with great pains convinced her that the supreme God was incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος). Desiring (according to the doctrine of certain Valentinians), like the supreme principle, to bring forth progeny alone, without the co-operation of her masculine mate, and not being truly able to do this, she gave birth to an imperfect being, which consisted of matter without form, since the masculine shape-giving principle had not co-operated with her, an οὐσία ἀμορφος, an abortion (ἐκτρώμα). Pained with this result, Wisdom turned imploringly to the Father, who caused her to be purified and comforted by ὕψος, and restored to her place in the Pleroma, after putting an end to her striving (ἐνθιμύσας) and her suffering. At the command of the Father, Nous and truth now occasioned the emanation of Christ and the Holy Ghost; Christ gave form and being to that which Wisdom had brought forth, and then hastened back into the Pleroma and instructed the Æons respecting their relation to the Father, while the Holy Ghost taught them gratitude and brought them to rest and blessedness. As a thank-offering, the Æons, contributing for the purpose each his best, brought to the Father, with the approval of Christ and the Holy Ghost, a glorious form, Jesus, the Saviour, who is also called patronymically the Christ and Logos. He is the common fruit of the Pleroma (κοινὸς τοῦ πληρώματος

καρπός), and the great high-priest. He was sent by the Pleroma to deliver the ἐνθόμους of the superior Wisdom, who was wandering without the Pleroma, and was an inferior Wisdom, called Achamoth (אֶחָמוֹת from אֶחָד, אֶחָדָה), from the sufferings which she endured in her search for Christ. Her emotions (πάθη) were fear, sadness, need, and entreaty (φόβος καὶ λύπη καὶ ἀπορία καὶ δέησις or ἰκετεία). Jesus removed these πάθη from her and made of them separate existences; fear he turned into a psychical desire, sadness into a material desire, need into a demoniacal one, and prayer or entreaty into conversion, repentance, and restitution of the psychical nature. The region inhabited by Achamoth is an inferior one, the Ogdoas. This region is separated from that of the Æons by "limit" (ὄρος τοῦ πληρώματος) and by the "cross" (σταυρός). Underneath the Ogdoas is the Hebdomas, the region of the Psychical and of the World-builder (δημιουργός), who formed bodies for souls out of material substance. The material man (ὁ ὑλικὸς ἄνθρωπος) is inhabited sometimes by the soul alone, sometimes by the soul and by demons, and sometimes by the soul and the rational powers (λόγοι); the latter are disseminated in this world by Jesus, the joint product of the factors of the Pleroma, and by Wisdom (σοφία), and they enter into the soul when it is not occupied by demons. The law and the prophets were given by the Demiurgos; but when the time for the revelation of the mysteries of the Pleroma had come, Jesus, the son of the Virgin Mary, was born. He was made not merely like the children of Adam, by the Demiurgos, alone, but by him and (the inferior) Wisdom (Achamoth), or by him and the Holy Ghost, who imparted to him a spiritual nature, so that he became a heavenly Logos, begotten by the Ogdoas through Mary. The Italian school of Valentinians, and among them Heracleon (who wrote a commentary on the Gospel according to Luke, about 175 A. D., and on the Gospel according to John, about 196) and Ptolemæus (who made much use in his writings of the Gospels, including the fourth Gospel, which he, too, ascribed to the Apostle John, as appears from his letter to Flora, cited by Euseb., *Haeres.*, XXXIII., and who interpreted them for the most part allegorically), in particular, taught that the body of Jesus was of a psychical nature, but that the spirit, which animated him, descended upon him at the time of his baptism. But the Eastern school, Axionicus and Ardesianes (Bardesanes?), in particular, taught that the body of Jesus was pneumatic, having been endowed with the Spirit from the time of his conception and birth. Just as the Christ, who emanated from his source at the will of Nous and truth, and Jesus, the product of the Pleroma, were world-restorers and saviors, the one in the world of Æons, the other in the Ogdoas for Achamoth, so Jesus, the son of Mary, is the Redeemer for this terrestrial world. The redeemed become, through him, partakers of the Spirit; they know the mysteries of the Pleroma and the law given by the Demiurgos is no longer binding on them. The most perfect blessedness is reached through Gnosis; those psychical men, who do not advance beyond mere faith (πίστις), become partakers only of partial blessedness. For these, works are essential, in addition to faith, for their salvation; but the Gnostic is saved without works, like a spiritual man. This doctrine was used as an excuse for immorality, and especially for sexual excesses, by Marcus and his followers, with whom speculation was gradually lost in eccentricities and absurdities (Iren., I. 13 seq.).

The Valentinian doctrine of the error, suffering, and redemption of Wisdom lies at the basis of the work entitled *Pistis Sophia*, in which the story of the sufferings of this "Sophia" is spun out at still greater length, and her songs of penitence and complaint are given. (Cf. Köstlin, *Das gnostische System des Buches Πίστις Σοφία*, in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübingen, 1854.)

Bardesanes ("the son of Deisan," i. e., born on the river Deisan in Mesopotamia), was born about 153 A. D., and died soon after 224. He simplified the doctrines of Gnosticism,

rendering them less repugnant to the doctrine of the Church. Yet he, too, associated with the Father of life, a female deity, in order to explain the work of creation. That evil is not made necessary, either by natural propensity or by fate, as the astrologers pretended, but is a consequence of the freedom of the will, which God imparted to man conjointly with the angels, as a high prerogative, is clearly and impressively argued by a disciple of Bardesanes in the dialogue concerning fate ("Book of the Laws of the Lands"), published by Cureton in his *Spicilegium Syriacum*, London, 1855. As the soul dwells in the body, so the spirit dwells in the soul. (Cf. Aug. Hahn, *Bardesanes gnosticus Syrorum primus hymnologus*, Leipsic, 1819, and the passages from the *Führer*, in Fluegel's *Mani*, Leipsic, 1862, pp. 161 seq. and 356 seq.; also, A. Merx, *Bardesanes von Edessa*, Halle, 1863, and Hilgenfeld, *Bardesanes, der letzte Gnostiker*, Leipsic, 1864.)

The religion introduced by Mani, the Persian (who, according to the most probable supposition, was born in 214, first publicly proclaimed his doctrine in 238, and, after nearly forty years of public activity, fell a victim to the hatred of the Persian priests), was a disorderly medley of Gnostic-Christian and Zoroastrian conceptions. Its philosophical interest is derived almost exclusively from its dualistic principle, its co-ordination of a primæval evil being with the good principle, and from the ascetic character of the ethics developed on the basis of that dualism. Augustine, who was for a time an adherent of Manichæism, afterward opposed it in several of his writings. (Cf. J. de Beausobre, *Histoire crit. de Manichée et du Manichéisme*, Amsterdam, 1734-39; K. A. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, *Die Theologie des Magiers Manes und ihr Ursprung*, Frankfort, 1825; A. F. V. de Wegnern, *Manichæorum indulgentias cum brevi totius Manichæismi adumbratione, e fontibus descripsit*, Leip. 1827; F. Chr. Baur, *Das Manich. Religionssystem*, Tübingen, 1831; F. E. Coldit, *Die Entstehung des Manich. Religionssystems*, Leipsic, 1831; P. de Lagarde, *Titus Bostreni contra Manich. libri quatuor Syriace*, Berlin, 1859; Flügel, *Mani und seine Lehre*, Leipsic, 1862.)

In opposition to the aristocratic Separatism of the Gnostics, on the one hand, and to the one-sided narrowness of the Judaizing Christians on the other, the Catholic Church continued to develop itself, always engaged in controversy, but, at the same time, being thereby incited to new positive advances. Its fixed intermediate position in matters of doctrine was marked by the rule of faith (*regula fides*), which grew up gradually out of the simpler outlines given in the baptismal confession.

§ 78. Flavius Justinus, of Flavia Neapolis (Sichem) in Palestine, flourished about 150 A. D. He learned first Greek philosophy, particularly the Stoic and Platonic, but was afterward led to embrace Christianity, partly by the respect and admiration which the steadfastness of the Christians extorted from him, and partly by his distrust of the power of human reason. Thenceforth he defended Christianity, now against heretics, now against Jews and pagans. The chief works by him, which have come down to us, are the Dialogue with Tryphon the Jew, and the greater and lesser Apologies. Whatever of truth is to be found in the works of the Greek philosophers and poets, and elsewhere, must be ascribed, says Justin, to the workings of the divine Logos, which is present among all men in the germ, while in Christ it appeared in its complete fullness. Yet the revelations made by this divine Word are not all equally direct; to Pythagoras and Plato it

spoke through Moses and the Prophets. Justin conceives Christianity as essentially contained in the new law of Christ, the incarnate Logos, who abrogated the ceremonial law, and substituted in its place the moral law. Future rewards and punishments are to be eternal. The body will be raised again. The millennial reign of Christ is to precede the final judgment.

Justin's works have been published by Rob. Stephanus, 1551 (this edition was completed by Heinrich Stephanus through the addition of the *Oratio ad Græcos*, Paris, 1592, and the *Epistle to Diognetus*, 1596), Friedrich Sylburg, with a Latin translation (which first appeared at Basel, 1566) by Lang. Heidelberg, 1598, Morellus, Cologne, 1694, Prudentius Maranus, Paris, 1742 (included also in Gallandi's *Bibl. Vet. Patr.*, Vol. I. 1763, and in the *Opera Patr. Gr.*, Vols. I.-III. 1777-79). The best modern edition is that of Joh. Car. Theod. Otto (*Corpus apologetarum Christianorum sæculi secundæ*, Vol. I.: *Justinus apolog., I. et II.*; Vol. II.: *Justinus cum Tryphone Judæo dialogus*; Vol. III.: *Justinus opera adhibita cum fragmentis deperditorum actibus martyrii*; Vols. IV. and V.: *Opera Just. subditiça*, 1st edition, Jena, 1842 seq.; 2d edition, Jena, 1847-51). In J. P. Migne's *Patrologiæ Cursus Completus*, Justin's works constitute Vol. VI. of the Greek Fathers. On Justin cf. Karl Semisch, *Justin der Märtyrer*, 2 vols., Breslau, 1940-42 (the earlier literature is cited by Semisch, Vol. I. pp. 2-4), and L. Anbé, *St. Justin, Philosophe et Martyr*, Paris, 1861. Cf. also Böhringer in the second edition of his *Kirchengesch. in Biographien*. On the time of Justin, see Volkmar, *Theolog. Jahrb.*, 1853, pp. 227 seq. and 412 seq.; on his Cosmology, Wilh. Müller, *Die Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes*, Halle, 1860, pp. 112-138; on his Christology, H. Wambert de Pulseau, Leyden, 1864; and on his Theology, C. Weissäcker in the *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theolog.*, XII. 1. 1867, pp. 60-119.

Justin opens for us the line of those Fathers and Teachers of the Church who are not included among the "Apostolic Fathers." His teaching corresponds essentially with the doctrine of the early Catholic Church. He is not the first author of an Apology for Christianity, but he is the first whose apologetical writings have come down to us. Quadratus of Athens and Aristides of Athens were older than Justin, and presented their Apologies (in which they laid stress upon the difference between Christianity and Judaism) to Hadrian. The Apology of Quadratus is reported to have produced to some degree an effect which was favorable for the Christians. But Quadratus probably did not make use of philosophical arguments in his defense of Christianity, though Aristides, perhaps, did. The arguments of Justin were chiefly philosophical.

There can hardly be any doubt that the Decree of Hadrian, as given by Justin at the close of his *Greater Apology*, is genuine, but it is not to be understood as condemning the Christians on account of common crimes rather than on account of their Christian faith. The class of actions contrary to law, mentioned in the decree of Hadrian, included undoubtedly the refusal to bring to the gods and to the Genius of the Emperor the customary offerings. The well-known decree of Trajan, which indeed forbade the official searching for Christians, but yet recognized a capital offense in the permanent confession of a belief in Christianity and in the refusal to make the sacrifices required by law, remained unrepealed, but a milder practice was introduced through the express interdiction of all tumultuous proceedings, and still more by the heavy punishments with which accusers were menaced who should be unable to make good their charges. Under Antoninus Pius, the practice of the government, based on the unrepealed decree of Trajan, became again more severe, and this was the occasion of Justin's *Apologies*. The decree was most vigorously executed under Marcus Aurelius, owing to his intense personal dislike of Christianity.

In his first *Apology* Justin describes his circumstances in life, and in the *Dialogue with Tryphon* speaks more particularly of his intellectual history. He was born of Grecian parents, who, as it seems, had joined the colony which Vespasian, after the Jewish war,

sent to the desolated Samaritan city of Sichem (from that time called Flavia Neapolis, now Nablus). It appears that for his intellectual discipline he repaired to Greece and Asia Minor. The place where his "Dialogue with Tryphon" took place was, according to Eusebius (*E. H.*, IV. 18), Ephesus; one passage in it (*Dial. c. Tr.*, ch. 1, p. 217, d) may suggest Corinth as the locality. The instructions of his Stoic teacher left him unsatisfied, because they did not afford him the desired explanation of the nature of God. The Peripatetic disgusted him by his haste in demanding payment, which he thought unworthy of a philosopher, and he was frightened away from the Pythagorean by the requirement of the latter that he should first go through the mathematical sciences before commencing the study of philosophy. The Platonist alone was able, in all respects, for a time to satisfy him. Afterward, the objections raised by an aged Christian against the Platonic doctrines led him to doubt the truth of all philosophy and to accept Christianity. In particular, the arguments of the Christian against the natural immortality of the soul and in favor of the belief that immortality was a gift due alone to divine grace, appeared to him irrefutable. But how, he asked himself, could this view of the case have escaped the attention of Plato and Pythagoras? Whence can we hope for succor if such men as they are not in possession of the truth? While he thought and felt thus, the only alternatives open to Justin were either to remain a skeptic or to accept the idea that knowledge is the product of a gradual development, depending on continued investigation, or, finally, if he felt it necessary to find absolute truth somewhere, to recognize the same as immediately given by divine revelation in sacred writings. Justin adopted (just as, in their way, the Neo-Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans did in the sphere of Hellenism) the last-named alternative. The Prophets—so said the aged man to Justin—are authenticated as organs of the Holy Ghost by their antiquity, their holiness, their miracles, and their fulfilled prophecies. They must simply be believed, for they demonstrated nothing, but spoke simply as witnesses of the truth, possessing so complete a title to our confidence that they needed not to demonstrate any thing. They proclaimed the Creator of the world, God the Father, and the Christ who was sent by him. The ability to understand their words is a gift of God's grace, for which supplication must be made in prayer. These words of the old man kindled in Justin a love for the prophets and for the men who were called friends of Christ, and in their words he found what he believed to be the only certain and salutary philosophy. Of the works which have come down to us under his name, only the two *Apologies* and the *Dialogue with Tryphon* are of indubitable authenticity. The first and larger *Apology* was written (as Volkmar has shown) in the year 147; the second and smaller one was simply supplementary to and continuative of the larger one. The *Dialogue with Tryphon* took place and was written down at a later date, not far from A. D. 150. Justin had previously composed—in about the year 144—a polemical work directed against the Heretics and especially against Marcion. He suffered death by martyrdom somewhere between 150 and 166, perhaps in the year 166 (*Chron. Alex.*, ed. Rader, p. 606).

Even after his conversion to Christianity Justin held the philosophy of the Greeks in high estimation, as an evidence of the universal presence among men of the divine Logos (or "germinant Logos," *Λόγος σπερματικός*); but the whole truth, he taught, existed in Christ alone, who was the incarnate Logos itself. The philosophers and poets were able, according to the measure of their participation in the Logos, to see and recognize the truth (*οἱ γὰρ συγγραφεῖς πάντες διὰ τῆς ἐνοίας ἐμφύτου τοῦ Λόγου σποράς ἀνδράς ἐδύνατο ὁρᾶν τὰ ὄντα*). But the "germ," communicated to each man according to the measure of his susceptibility, and the image, must not be confounded with the original Logos itself, in which men are allowed to participate (*Apol.*, II. 13). Whatever is true and rational is Christian (*ὅσα οὖν παρὰ πᾶσι καλῶς εἰρηται, ἡμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἔστιν*, *Apol.*, II. 13).

Christ is the Logos, in whom the entire human race has part, the first-born of God, and those who have lived in communion with the Logos are Christians, although they may have been regarded as atheists; such were Socrates and Heraclitus and their like among the Hellenes, and Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, and many others, among the non-Greeks (*Apol.*, I. 46). Socrates proscribed Homer and spurred men on to seek for rational knowledge of the true God. He did not, however, consider it advisable to proclaim the Father and Architect of the world to all men. But this Christ has done, through the power of God, not through the arts of human speech (*Apol.*, II. 10). But beside the inner revelation made to the Greek philosophers through the omnipresent Logos, Justin believed that they possessed a knowledge of the teaching of Moses. The doctrine of our freedom as moral agents was taken, according to Justin, by Plato from Moses, and all that philosophers and poets have said of the immortality of the soul, of punishments after death, of the contemplation of heavenly things, was borrowed originally from the Jewish prophets. Germs of truth (*σπέρματα τῆς ἀληθείας*) have found their way from the latter to all parts of the world; but through the failure of men perfectly to apprehend this truth, there arose various conflicts of opinion (*Apol.*, I. 44). Plato not only knew of the Jewish religion, but he was acquainted with the whole of the Old Testament, though in many instances he misunderstood it; thus, e. g., his doctrine of the world-soul spread out in the form of a Greek letter *Chi* (by which Plato represents the angle which the Ecliptic makes with the Equator, *Tim.*, p. 36) arose from his misinterpretation of the narrative of the brazen serpent (Numbers xxi. 9). Orpheus, Homer, Solon, Pythagoras, and others, became acquainted with the doctrines of Moses in Egypt, and were thus enabled at least partially to correct erroneous opinions respecting the nature of God (*Cohortatio ad Græcos*, ch. 14. We make this reference to the *Cohortatio* on the supposition that it is genuine, a supposition which is rendered at least doubtful by the fact that in chap. 23, vs. 70 of this work the doctrine of the creation of matter is taught, on the ground that God would have no power over uncreated matter, whereas in his *Apol.*, I. p. 92, c, and elsewhere, Justin simply teaches, in agreement with Plato, that the world was made from "formless matter").

The idea of God, says Justin, is innate in man (*ἐμφυτός τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα*, *Apol.*, II. 6); so, too, the most general moral ideas are possessed in common by all men, although often obscured (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 93). God is one, and by reason of his oneness, nameless (*ἀνώνματος*, *Apol.*, I. 63) and ineffable (*ἄρρητος*, *Apol.*, I. 61, p. 94, d, et al.). He is eternal, unbegotten (*ἀγέννητος*, *Apol.*, II., 6, et al.), and unmoved (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 27). He is enthroned above the heavens (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 56: *ἐν τοῖς ὑπερουρανίοις ἀει μένωντος*). He brought forth from himself before the formation of the world a rational potency (*δυναμὴν τινα λογικὴν*), the Logos, through whose agency he created the world (*Apol.*, II. 6; *Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 60 seq.). The Logos became man in Jesus Christ, the son of the Virgin (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 48: *ὅτι καὶ προὔπηρχεν υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων, θεὸς ὢν, καὶ γεγέννηται ἄνθρωπος διὰ τῆς παρθένου*). Christ, the Word, abolished the Mosaic law in which not only the sacrifices, but also the rite of circumcision and all other ritual ordinances were commanded only on account of the hardness of heart of the people; for all this Christ substituted the moral law (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 11 seq.). He is the new law-giver (*ὁ καινὸς νομοθέτης*, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 18).—Justin thus agreed with the Jewish Christians in regarding the norm of moral and religious life as existing under the form of a law, while at the same time he joined hands with Paul (who, however, is not named by Justin) in going forward to the abrogation of the entire ceremonial law.—Beside God the Father and the Logos, his only-begotten Son, together with the angels or potencies of God, the Holy Ghost, or the Wisdom of God, is an object of worship (*Apol.*, I. 6: *ἀπολογισμὸς*

τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν (the Hellenic gods, whom Justin calls κακοὺς καὶ ἀνοσίους δαίμονας) ἀθεοὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου καὶ πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀνεπικίμκτου τε κακίας θεοῦ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιωμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατόν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώντες. Cf. *Apol.*, I. 13: τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς σεβόμενοι . . . τὸν διδάσκαλόν τε τοιῶν γεγνημένων ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς τοῦτο γεννηθέντα Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν . . . υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ μαθόντες καὶ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, πνεῦμα τε προφητικὸν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει). Baptism is administered, according to *Apol.*, I. 61, "in the name of God, the Father and Lord of all things, and of Jesus Christ the Saviour, and of the Holy Ghost" (ἐπ' ὀνόματος τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότην θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου). The divine foreknowledge does not imply fate nor destroy human freedom. The only necessity (and that a contingent one) that exists is, that men should receive eternal blessedness or punishment, according as they have chosen the good or the evil. The first resurrection will take place at the second coming (or *παρουσία*) of Christ, which Justin describes as near at hand (*Apol.*, I. 52; *Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 31 seq., ch. 80 seq., *et al.*); Jerusalem will be restored, and Christ will reign there a thousand years, granting rest and joy to his followers, according to the predictions of John in the Apocalypse; afterward the general resurrection will take place, followed by the judgment, which God will commit to Christ's hands (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 58., ch. 81). Each person will receive eternal punishment or salvation as his portion, according to the merit or demerit of his actions (ἐκαστον ἐπ' αἰωνίαν κόλασιν ἢ σωτηρίαν κατ' ἄξιαν τῶν πράξεων παρένεσθαι, *Apol.*, I. 12). Hell (*γέεννα*) is the place where those are to be punished by fire who have lived in unrighteousness and have doubted as to the coming realization of that which God foretold to them through Christ (*Apol.*, I. 12, 19, 44, *et al.*). This punishment will endure as long as it shall please God that souls should exist and be punished (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 5), i. e., eternally (*Apol.*, I. 28; *Dial. c. Tryph.*, ch. 130), and not, as Plato supposed, merely a thousand years (*Apol.*, I. 8).

Justin's influence on the later Church Fathers, by whom he was very highly esteemed as (to use the expression of Eusebius, *E. H.*, IV. 8) a "genuine defender of true philosophy," was so important, that it has been said not without reason (by Lange, in his *Dissertatio, in qua Justinus Mart. Apologia prima sub examen vocatur*, Jena, 1795, I. p. 7): "*Justinus ipse fundamenta jecit, quibus sequens aetas totum illud corpus philosophematum de religionis capitibus, quod a nobis hodie theologia thetica vocatur, superstruxit.*"

§ 79. Among the Apologists of Christianity in the second century, the most worthy of mention, besides Justin, are Tatianus, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, and Hermias. In Tatian, the Assyrian, Christianity appears tempered with a haughty over-estimation of the value of Oriental ideas, with barbaric hatred of Hellenic culture, and with a tendency toward a narrow asceticism. The writings of Athenagoras of Athens present an agreeable combination of Christian thought with Hellenic order and beauty of presentation; Athenagoras is in this respect the most pleasing of the Christian authors of the period to which he belongs. Theophilus of Antioch discusses, more than the other Apologists, the subjective conditions

of faith, especially the dependence of religious knowledge on purity of heart. Hermias' *Abuse of the Greek Philosophers* is an unimportant work.

Tatian's *Discourse to the Greeks* was first published, together with other patristic writings, at Zurich in 1546 (ed. Johannes Frisius). A Latin translation by Conrad Gesner was published at the same place in the same year. Text and translation were afterward repeatedly reproduced. Newer editions have been published by W. Worth (Oxford, 1700), Maranus (Paris, 1742), and, lastly, by J. C. Th. Otto (in his *Corp. Apol.*, Vol. VI., Jena, 1831). On Tatian, cf. Daniel, *Tatian der Apologet*, Halle, 1837.

The work of Athenagoras, entitled *περί ἀναστήσεως τῶν νεκρῶν*, was first printed at Louvain, 1541, and the *Περσεία περὶ Χριστιανῶν*, together with the work just named, which is intimately connected in substance with this *Apology*, at Zürich, in 1557, and frequently since then, last in the *Corpus Apologetarum Sacculi II.* ed., J. C. Th. Otto, Vol. VII., Jena, 1837. On Athenagoras, cf. Th. A. Clarisse, *De Ath. Vita, Scriptis et Doctrina*, Leyden, 1819.

The work of Theophilus, addressed to Autolyceus, was first published at Zürich in 1546, along with the Discourse of Tatian. It has recently been reproduced, together with the Commentary of Theoph. on the Gospels, by Otto, in the above-named *Corpus Apol.*, Vol. VIII., Jena, 1861.

Hermias' *Irratio Gentilium Philosophorum* was first printed in Greek and Latin at Basel in 1555. Numerous editions have since been published, and it is contained in Maranus' edition of Justin (1742).

Ten authors, in all, are known to us as Apologists of Christianity, as opposed to Paganism, in the second century. These are, besides those already mentioned in § 78, namely, Quadratus, Aristides, and Justin, the following: Melito of Sardis, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, and Miltiades the Rhetorician, whose works have not come down to us, and the four mentioned above, of whose works some are still in our possession: Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias. Besides Justin, Aristo of Pella and Miltiades wrote especially against Judaism.

Melito, Bishop of Sardis, wrote, among other things, an *Apology for Christianity*, which he presented to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, about the year 170. In this defense, addressed to the philosophical Emperor, Christianity is described as a "Philosophy," which had indeed first arisen among the barbarians, but which had attained to a flourishing condition in the Roman world in the time of the Empire, to the benefit of which it had greatly redounded (Melito, *ap. Euseb., Hist. Eccl.*, IV. 26). A Syriac translation of the *Apology* of Melito of Sardis has been discovered by Cureton and Renan, and has been published by Pitra in his *Spicilegium Solesmense*, II., pp. XXXVIII.-LV. (yet cf., *per contra*, Uhlhorn, in Niedner's *Z. f. h. Th.*, 1866, p. 104).

Apollinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis, wrote, among other things (about 180), a *λόγος*, to Marcus Aurelius, in favor of Christianity, and *πρὸς Ἑλλήνας συγγράμματα πέντε* (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, IV. 26, 27).

Miltiades, a Christian rhetorician, who wrote against Montanism, composed also *λόγους πρὸς Ἑλλήνας* and *πρὸς Ἰουδαίους*, and addressed an *Apology for Christianity* to the "rulers of the world" (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V. 17).

Aristo, of Pella in Palestine, by birth a Hebrew, wrote (about 140?) a work, in which the converted Hebrew, Jason, convinces the Alexandrian Jew, Papiscus, after a long dispute, of the truth of Christianity. This end is effected mainly by showing how the Messianic prophecies are fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth (Hieron., *Quaest. in Genes. sub. init.*; Maximus in *Scholias ad librum Dionysii Areopag. de mystica theologia*, ch. 1). The work was therefore probably of but slight importance as a contribution to the philosophy of Christianity. Celsus, the pagan opponent of Christianity, mentions the work of Aristo with derision (Origen, *Contra Cel.*, ed. Paris., I., l. IV., p. 544), and Origen only defends it partially and feebly.

Tatian, an Assyrian by birth, received, according to his own statement (*Orat. ad Gr.*, ch. 42), the education of a Greek, but became subsequently a convert to Christianity, the despised "philosophy of the barbarians." Irenæus (*Adv. Hæret.*, I. ch. 28) represents that he was a pupil of Justin. In his work addressed "to the Greeks" (πρὸς Ἕλληνας, written about 160-170 A. D.), which is still extant, and in which (as Ritter expresses it, *Gesch. der Philos.*, V. p. 32), "we see often less of the Christian than of the barbarian," Tatian labors to depreciate Greek culture, morals, art, and science, the better to recommend in their stead Christianity. To this end he does not disdain to revive the most vulgar calumnies which had been raised against the most illustrious Greek philosophers, at the same time misrepresenting their teachings (*Orat. ad Gr.*, ch. 2). With barbaric despotism of abstraction, he includes in the category of immoralities the sensuous wants of man, when esthetically refined and transfigured, as well as his brutish lusts, so far as both are not controlled by the moral rules, in order thereby to present Christian purity and continence in a clearer light (e. g., ch. 33: καὶ ἡ μὲν Σαπφῶ γίναιον πορνικὸν ἐρωτομανὲς καὶ τὴν ταυτῆς ἀσέλγειαν ῥόει· πασαι δὲ αἱ παρ' ἡμῖν σωφρονοῦσι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡλακάτας αἱ παρθέναι τὰ κατὰ θεὸν λαλοῦσιν ἱκονήματα τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν παιδὸς σπουδαϊότερον). As to his dogmatic attitude, Tatian pays especial attention to the development of the doctrines of God, as the rational principle and the hypostasis of the universe (ὑπόστασις τοῦ παντός); of the Logos, as the being whose nature is *actual* reason, and who issued from God by the will of God, not by the way of division, but by communication, like light from light; of the creation of the world and of the resurrection, of the sin of Adam, which resulted in the deep degradation of the human race, but did not destroy our freedom of will; and of redemption and regeneration through Christ (ch. 5 seq.). At a later epoch Tatian espoused the doctrines of the Valentinian Gnostics, and subsequently founded or contributed to build up the sect of the Encratites who rejected marriage as sinful, as also the use of animal food and wine, and even substituted water for wine in the celebration of the Eucharist.

Athenagoras of Athens, according to the very doubtful authority of Philippus Sidotes (a teacher in the school of catechists, in the fifth century), was for a time at the head of the school of catechists at Alexandria (see Guericke, *De schola, quæ Alexandriæ floruit catechetica*, Halle, in Saxony, 1824). He was familiar with Greek, and especially with the Platonic philosophy. In his *Apology*, the Πρεσβεία (*Supplicatio*) περὶ Χριστιανῶν, which he addressed in the year 176 or 177 to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and to his son and colleague Commodus, Athenagoras defends the Christians against the threefold accusation of atheism, unchaste associations, and Thyestian repasts. In replying to the first charge, he appeals to the declarations of Greek poets and philosophers against polytheism and in favor of the unity of God, and develops the doctrine of the divine Trinity. Athenagoras seeks to establish the unity of God by an *a priori* proof, which meets us here for the first time in Christian literature. If there were more Gods than one, he argues (*Suppl.*, ch. 8), these Gods must be at once unlike and in different places; for only those things are similar to each other and co-ordinate which are formed after a common model, and are therefore temporal and finite, and not eternal and divine; and there cannot be different localities for the abode of different Gods, for the God who formed the round world occupies the space outside the world, as being himself a supra-mundane being (ὁ μὲν κόσμος σφαιρικός ἀποτελεσθεὶς οὐρανοὶ κύκλους ἀποκλείεται, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ποιητὴς ἀνωτέρω τῶν γεγόντων, ἐπέχων αὐτὸν τῇ τούτων προνοίᾳ), and it is impossible that another God should exist either within the limits of the world-sphere, or there where the world-builder is; and if such a God existed beyond the latter locality in or around another world, his existence would not concern us, and, besides, on account of the limited sphere of his existence, he would be no true God.

Hellenic poets and philosophers, incited to inquiry by the divine Spirit, have themselves taught the unity of God, says Athenagoras; but perfect clearness and certainty of knowledge are obtained only from the divine instructions imparted to us in the Holy Scriptures, in the writings of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, who abandoned all ideas peculiar to themselves and were employed by the Holy Ghost as organs, just as the flute is used by the flutist (*Suppl.*, chs. 5-9). All things were made by God, through his intelligence or Logos, which, since God is necessarily a rational being, has always existed with him. The Logos came forth from God to be the prototype of the world and the active force (*ιδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια*) in all material things, and is thus the first product of the Father, or the Son of God. Father and Son are one; the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son through the unity and power of the Spirit. The Spirit also, which wrought in the Prophets, is an emanation from God (*ἀπόρροια τοῦ Θεοῦ*), going forth from him and returning to him like a ray of the sun. We acknowledge, as the object of our worship, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and we recognize their solidarity in power and their orderly division (*τὴν ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει ὁνῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν*); nor do we confine our theology to this, but believe that angels and servants of God have been assigned by the Logos to assist in the conduct of the world (ch. 10). We prove our faith in God by our purity of heart and our love to our enemies (ch. 11); for we are convinced that after death we shall be obliged to render an account for our lives (ch. 12). Christians cannot participate in the worship of the many pretended Gods of the various nations (ch. 13 seq.). Athenagoras denies the charges of immorality directed against the Christians, appealing to the well-known purity of the latter (ch. 32 seq.).

The work by Athenagoras on the *Resurrection of the Dead* contains an introduction (ch. 1) and two principal parts. The first part (chs. 2-10) is taken up with the refutation of objections; the second (chs. 11-25) contains the positive arguments. If the resurrection were impossible, argues Athenagoras, it must be from a lack either of ability or of will on the part of God. He would lack the requisite ability, provided—and only provided—he were deficient in knowledge or in power. But the work of creation shows that he is deficient in neither. If it is held that the resurrection of the body is impossible on account of the fact that our bodies are perpetually undergoing material change, so that the same particles may belong at different times to different human bodies, to all of which they can obviously not be restored at the resurrection, Athenagoras replies by denying the supposed fact, on the ground that every being assimilates from that which it takes as nutriment only such elements as agree with itself, and that no elements of the human body can be transformed into animal flesh and then be assimilated a second time by a second human body. If God has not the will to raise again the bodies of men, it must be because—and only because—such a resurrection would involve an injustice to those who were raised or to other creatures, or because it would be unworthy of God. But neither of these suppositions is correct, the first for obvious reasons, and the latter, because if it were unworthy of God to raise the dead, then it must have been unworthy of him to create man in the first instance. The positive arguments by which Athenagoras defends the doctrine of the resurrection are founded. 1) on the reason of man's creation, which was that he might always contemplate the divine wisdom, 2) on the nature of man, which demands that he should live eternally, in order that he may realize the life according to reason, 3) on the necessity of a divine judgment on men, 4) on the fact that in this life the end for which man was created is not attained, this end consisting neither in the absence of pain nor in sensuous pleasure, nor in the felicity of the soul alone, but in the contemplation of the truly-existent Being and in rejoicing in his decrees.

Theophilus of Antioch informs us (*Ad Autolyc.*, l. 14) that he was led to embrace

Christianity by reading the prophetic parts of the Holy Scriptures. In his work addressed to Autolycus (written soon after 180) he admonishes the latter likewise to believe, lest, remaining in unbelief, he be afterward, to his detriment, compelled to believe by those eternal punishments of hell, which the Prophets and, stealing from them, Greek poets and philosophers have foretold (I. 14). To the demand of Autolycus, "Show me thy God," Theophilus replies (ch. 1): "Show me thy man," i. e., show me whether thou art free from sin, for only the pure can see God. To the demand, "Describe God to me," he answers (I. 3): "God's nature is ineffable; his honor, greatness, loftiness, power, wisdom, goodness, and grace transcend all human conceptions. If I call God light, I name but his image; if I call him Logos, I name his dominion: if reason (νοῦς), his insight (φρόνησις); if spirit, his breath; if wisdom, his creation; if strength, his power; if energy, his efficient agency; if providence, his goodness; if dominion, his glory; if Lord, then I term him a judge; if a judge, then I pronounce him just; if Father, then I say that he is loving (ἀγαπῶντα, according to Heumann's conjecture, for τὰ πάντα, or, more correctly, Creator, on the supposition of Grabe, that τὰ πάντα being correct, the word παύσαντα has fallen out; cf. ch. 4: πατήρ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρὸ τῶν ὅλων, and Philo, *De Nom. Mut.*, ed. Mangey, I. p. 582 seq., where θεός, ποιητικὴ δύναμις, δὲ ἧς ἔθηκε τὰ πάντα and πατήρ are given as equivalent expressions); and if I call him fire, I name thereby the anger which he cherishes against evil-doers." He is unconditioned, because without beginning, and immutable, as he is immortal. He is called God (θεός) because he established all things (διὰ τὸ τεθεῆναι τὰ πάντα) and because he moves and works (διὰ τὸ θέεν). (Θεός—Zend: *Daéva*; Persian: *Dew* and *Diw* (*daemon*)—is derived, as is now known, from the root *Div*, to be bright or glitter, Sanscr. *Déva*, the shining one.) God created all things for his glory (I. 4: τὰ πάντα ὁ θεός ἐποίησεν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι, ἵνα διὰ τῶν ἔργων γιγνώσκῃται καὶ νοηθῇ το μέγας αἰνός). The invisible God is known from his works, just as from the regulated course of a ship the presence of a helmsman can be inferred. God made all things through his Logos and his Wisdom (I. 7). The Logos was from eternity with God (as Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος ἐν τοῖς ἰδίαις [τοῦ θεοῦ] σπλάγχνοις [II. 10] or ἐνδιάθετος ἐν καρδίᾳ θεοῦ [II. 22]); before the world was he who was "reason and wisdom" (νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις) was God's counsellor (σύμβουλος). But when God willed the creation of the world, he begot this Logos, placing him out of himself (τοῦτον τὸν Λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν) as the first-born before the creation, not as though he became thereby himself deprived of a λόγος, but so that the λόγος, after the act of generation, remained still a part of God (II. 24). The three days before the creation of the heavenly luminaries were types of the triad: God, Logos, and Wisdom (II. 15: τί ποτε τῆς τριάδος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας). God, who created us, can and will create us once again at the resurrection (I. 8). The names of the Greek gods are names of deified men (I. 9 seq.). The worship of the gods through images is irrational, and the doctrines of pagan poets and philosophers are foolish. The writings of Moses and the prophets are the oldest Scriptures, and contain that truth which the Greeks have forgotten and rejected (II., III.).—To what extent the *Commentary on the Four Gospels*, which has come down to us bearing the name of Theophilus, is genuine, cannot be determined with certainty. The polemical work of Theophilus against Marcion, mentioned in the *Hist. Eccl.* of Eusebius, as also the similar work against Hermogenes, the Aristotelianizing and Platonizing speculator (who supposed an original, uncreated, chaotic matter, on which God's power was exerted, in a manner like that in which the magnet attracts iron, a doctrine which was opposed also by Tertullian), and other writings of Theophilus, are lost.

Hermias is an author who appears to have lived in the first half of the third century after Christ. since he represents it as the fundamental doctrine of Plato, that God, matter, and form are the original causes of all things, and in this representation agrees with the

eclectic Platonists of the second century (cf. above, § 65), but not with the Neo-Platonists who lived after Plotinus. In his "*Abuse of the Pagan Philosophers*" (*διασυμψύχων τῶν ἑξω φιλοσόφων*), he endeavors to show how the views of those philosophers involve contradictions. "Now I am immortal and rejoice, now I am mortal and lament; now I am ground into atoms, or become water; air, fire; I am made an animal of the forest, or a fish—at last comes Empedocles and makes me a bush." Since Hermias does not enter into the grounds and the systematic connection of the views which he combats, and still less understands the order and law of development of the Grecian philosophy, his work has no scientific value. Heathen philosophy he considers as a gift of demons, who sprung from a union of fallen angels with earthly women (and not, like Clemens of Alexandria, as a gift of God, delivered to man by the inferior angels).

§ 80. Irenæus, who was born about 140 A.D., in Asia Minor, and died in about the year 202 while Bishop of Lyons and Vienne in Gaul, was a pupil of Polycarp. He is of importance in the history of the development of Christian thought chiefly as an opponent of the Gnostics. Irenæus ascribes the growth of Gnosticism to the corrupting influence of ante-Christian philosophy on the Apostolic tradition. Denouncing that freedom of speculation which had degenerated into mere lawlessness of the imagination, and that Antinomianism which had degenerated into a libertinism hostile to morality, he lays special emphasis on Christian tradition and the Christian law, and is hence to be regarded as one of the founders and principal representatives of the early Catholic Church. Maintaining the identity of the supreme God with the Creator of the world and with the author of the Mosaic law, Irenæus (with Paul) explains the difference between the revelations of the Old and New Testaments as arising from the nature of God's plan for the education of the human race, in which plan the Mosaic law was included as a means of preparation for Christianity. The Son or Logos and the Holy Ghost are one with the Father and instruments in the works of creation and revelation. Christ has confirmed the essential part of the law, the moral law, and has made it more broad by including among its objects the intentions of men, while at the same time he has declared us free from its external ordinances. Man freely decides for or against the divine command, and receives accordingly reward or punishment in eternity.—In the same circle of ideas moves also the disciple of Irenæus, the Roman presbyter Hippolytus, who, with more completeness than Irenæus in details, but at the same time less impartiality, seeks to demonstrate the heathen origin of the Gnostic doctrines.

The earliest editions of the works of Irenæus are those of Erasmus: *Opus eruditissimum dñi Irenæi episcopi Lugdunensis in quinque libros digestum, in quibus mire relegit et confutat veterum hæresum impias ac portentosas opiniones, ac vetustiss. codicum collatione emend. opera Des. Erasmi Rotærodami*

as *nunc primum in lucem ed. opera Jo. Frobenii*, Basel, 1524; 2d ed., 1528, 3d, 1564, etc.; on these are based the editions of Galliasius (Geneva, 1570), Grynnæus (Basel, 1571), Feuardentius (1575-76; 1594, etc.), Grabe (Oxford, 1702), Massuet (Paris, 1712, and Venise, 1734), and Ad. Stieren (Leipsic, 1833), which latter edition is accompanied with Massuet's essays on the Gnostics and on the life, writings, and doctrines of Irenæus. The writings of Irenæus fill Vol. VII. in that division of Migne's *Œuvres Patrologiques* which is devoted to the Greek Fathers. Böhrlinger treats with special fullness of Irenæus in *Die Kirche Christi*, I. 1, 2d ed., Zürich, 1861, pp. 271-612. There exist, besides, monographs on the Christology of Irenæus (by L. Duncker, Gött. 1848), on his Cosmology (W. Möller, *Die Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche*, etc., pp. 474-506), on his Eschatology (Moritz Kirchner, in *Theol. Stud. und Kritiken*, 1863, pp. 315-326), and on his doctrine concerning grace (Joh. Körber, *Ir. de gratia sanctificante, diss. inaug.*, Würzburg, 1865).

The work of Hippolytus, *κατὰ τῶν αἰρέσεων ἑλεγχος*, of which formerly only the first book, under the title, *Origenis Philosophumena*, was known, was discovered by Mynoides Mynas in 1842, and published in 1851 (cf. above, p. 21). Other writings of H. have been collected together by P. A. Lagarde under the title *Hippolyti Romani quas feruntur omnia Græca*, Leipsic and London, 1858. Cf. C. W. Haenell, *De Hippolyto episcopo, tertii sæculi scriptore*, Gött. 1888; Bunsen, *Hippolytus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1882-78; Döllinger, *Hippolytus und Kallistus*, Munich, 1858; J. E. L. Gieseler, *Ueber Hippolytus, die ersten Monarchianer und die röm. Kirche in der ersten Hälfte des dritten Jahrh.*, in *Theol. Stud. u. Kr.*, 1828; Volkmar, *Hippolytus und die römischen Zeitgenossen*, Zürich, 1855.

In a letter to Florinus (*ap. Stieren*, I. pp. 822-824) Irenæus mentions that he remembers very exactly the discourses of the aged Polycarp, of whom, in his boyhood, he, together with Florinus, was a pupil. Polycarp suffered martyrdom in 167 A. D.; Irenæus may have received his instruction not long before that date. According to Hieronymus (*Br.*, 75), he was also a pupil of Papias. Soon after this Irenæus came to Lyons in Gaul, at which place he was made presbyter, and, after the martyrdom of Pothinus in the year 177, bishop. Hieronymus names Irenæus as a Christian martyr, and Gregory of Tours (*Hist. of Gaul*, I. 27) affirms that he suffered death in the persecution under Severus (about A. D. 202). His chief work: *Showing up and Refutation of the Knowledge falsely so-called* (*ἑλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδοκρίμου γνώσεως*) has come down to us in an ancient Latin translation; yet many fragments, and in particular the largest part of the first book, have been preserved in the original text. This work is especially directed against the Valentinians. It was composed (according to III. 3. 3) at the time when Eleutherus held the office of Bishop of Rome (i. e., about 180 A. D.; but different portions of it were written at different times). Eusebius (*E. H.*, V. 26) mentions a treatise by Irenæus against Hellenic science, and also an exposition of the doctrines announced by the Apostles, and other writings. Irenæus designates as the fundamental characteristic of Gnosticism, the blasphemy that the supreme God and the Creator of the world are two different beings; and of the same nature with this division of the Father into two beings is, according to him, the division of the Son into a plurality of arbitrarily-assumed beings (as seen particularly in the teachings of the Valentinians). The Gnostic pretence that Jesus taught an esoteric doctrine is pronounced false by Irenæus. The true Gnosis is the apostolic doctrine, as delivered to us by the Church. Irenæus reminds his readers of the limits of human knowledge. The Creator is incomprehensible, transcending all human imagination. He is intelligent, but not after the manner of human intelligence; he is light, but not like what we know as light. All our notions of him are inadequate. It is better to know nothing, to believe in God and abide in his love, than through subtle investigations to fall into atheism. Whatever we know of God we know through his revelation of himself. Without God's aid, God cannot be known. Just as those who see the light are in the light, so those who perceive God are in him and participate in his splendor. God himself is the creator of the world. In it he reveals himself to man and by it the better class of heathens have already known him. What he did before the creation of the world he himself only knows. Matter owes its existence to God's will. In creating the world God was guided only by that plan which he had formed in his own mind. He had no need of (the

Platonic) "archetypes;" besides, if such archetypes existed, then there must have existed archetypes of those archetypes, and so on *in infinitum*. In God nothing is without measure; the measure of the Father is the Son, who in Jesus became man, who knows the depths of the divine nature, and who is the steward and distributor of the Father's grace, to the blessing of humanity; the Son or the Word, and the Spirit or the Wisdom of God are the hands of the Father. But we cannot measure the greatness of God. Jesus, the Son of the Virgin, was man in reality, and not in appearance only, and he lived through every period of life (till he was nearly fifty years old). When man was created, God impressed on his heart the natural moral law, and this impression was not effaced by the fall of man and the consequent introduction of sin into the world. This law was expressed in the decalogue; but the Jews, owing to their proneness to fall away from God, received in addition the ceremonial law, which was intended to restrain them from the worship of idols, and contained types of Christ, but which was not intended to remain always in force. Christ has taken away the bonds of servitude which it contained, and extended the decrees of freedom, but has not abrogated the decalogue. The revelations in nature, and in the Old and New Covenants, mark the three stages in the plan of salvation. It is the same God whose aid is given to men at these different stages, according to their different needs. Just as truly as Christ had a material body, so truly will our bodies also be raised again; it is not our souls alone that will continue to exist. The soul of man does not exist before his body, nor is there such a thing as the transmigration of souls. That the soul can immediately rise to God after the death of the body, Irenæus pronounces to be an heretical notion, held indeed by some who are called orthodox, but which is inconsistent with the true doctrine of the gradual advancement of the righteous in the next world, and which ignores the fact that we can only by degrees become accustomed to incorruption. At first all souls must go into Hades, whence they will rise at the time of the resurrection and will again be clothed with their bodies. But, before this, Antichrist must appear, and then the separation of the good from the bad, which will have been proceeding in the measure of the progress of the divine revelations, will be completed. By Antichrist is to be understood Satan incarnate in human form. When he shall have reigned for a time (three and one-half years) and sat enthroned in the temple at Jerusalem, Christ will come from heaven in the same flesh in which he suffered, and in the glory of the Father, and will cast Antichrist and his followers into the lake of fire. This will happen when the world shall have stood exactly six thousand years, or one thousand years for each day of its creation. Christ will then reign one thousand years among the righteous who have been raised from the dead, or during the period which is to correspond with the seventh day of creation, the day of rest. The citizens of this kingdom will live in blessed, painless fruition, and will be rewarded for their former perseverance amid vexations and sufferings. The earth itself will then be restored by Christ to its original condition. This kingdom of rejoicing is to be the kingdom of the Son. It will be followed by the kingdom of the Father, *i. e.*, by eternal blessedness; for as the Spirit leads men through faith to the Son, so the Son leads those who obtain salvation to the Father. But since the same God who is good is also just, a second resurrection will take place after the expiration of the reign of the Son, when the unrighteous will also be raised, and that to judgment. All who deserve punishment will receive it in the souls and bodies in which they turned aside from the offers of divine grace. This punishment will consist in the loss of all the blessings of grace; it will be eternal and infinite, as are also the blessings of God.

Hippolytus, a pupil of Irenæus (according to Photius, *Cod.* 121), was a Roman presbyter, and is reported to have been exiled to Sardinia in the year 235. On a pillar in the

vicinity of Rome, Hippolytus is represented as sitting on a *Cathedra*, on which a list of his works, and also the Easter-cycle, as reckoned by him, are engraved. Among the works thus mentioned is one bearing the title: *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας*, and as the author of the *ἑλεγχος*, cited above, designates himself (in the 10th book) as the author of a work under this title, it follows that the *ἑλεγχος* is with probability to be ascribed to Hippolytus. To Hippolytus also is attributed a *σύνταγμα κατὰ αἰρέσεων*, and the author of the *ἑλεγχος* mentions (in his Introduction) a smaller work, in which he had previously treated of the doctrines of the heretics, and which appears to have been identical with the *σύνταγμα* mentioned. It is true that Photius assigns the *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας* to the Roman presbyter Cajus, whom Baur (*Theol. Jahrb.*, 1853, 1. 3) considered as the author of the *ἑλεγχος*; but the relation of the statements issuing from Cajus respecting Cerinthus to those contained in the *ἑλεγχος*, and facts reported by Dionysius of Alexandria and Eusebius respecting Cajus, militate against attributing to him the work in question. (J. L. Jacobi, Duncker, Bunsen, Gieseler, Döllinger, and A. Ritschl regard Hippolytus as the author of the *ἑλεγχος*.) Others have ascribed the work to other authors, but without sufficient reason. The *ἑλεγχος κατὰ πασῶν αἰρέσεων* was written after the death of Callistus, Bishop of Rome, which took place in the year 223; if Hippolytus was its author, it must therefore have been written between A. D. 223 and 235. Hippolytus seeks in his works to demonstrate that the errors of the Gnostics were not derived from the Sacred Scriptures and Christian tradition, but from the wisdom of the Hellenes, from the doctrines of various heathen philosophers, and from pagan mysteries and astrology (Book I., *Proem.*). In his exposition of Valentinianism he follows Irenæus substantially, but the Basilidean doctrine he had studied for himself, although it is still doubtful whether his knowledge of that doctrine was derived from original writings of Basilides, or (what is perhaps more probable), from later works, written by persons belonging to a branch of the school. The Hellenes, says Hippolytus, glorified the parts of creation, since they knew not the Creator, and the heresiarchs have followed after them (X. 32). The one God, who is over all, begot first the Logos; and by Logos is meant, not speech, but that idea of the universe which is immanent in God (*ἐνδιάθετον τοῦ παντὸς λαγισμόν*). This Logos was not, like all the rest of creation, created out of nothing; God created it out of his own substance. Thus the Logos, as being consubstantial with God, is itself God (*ὁὗ καὶ θεός, οὐσία ὑπάρχων θεός*). The world was created by the Logos, at the command of the Father, out of nothing; it is therefore not God, and it can be annihilated whenever God wills it. Man was created a dependent being, but endowed with free will; the misuse of this freedom is the source of all evil. Since man is free, God has placed him under law; for the beast is governed by whip and bit, but man by command and reward and punishment. The law was first laid down by just men, and, more especially, afterward by Moses; the Logos, which warns and leads men to obey the law, has exerted its influence in all times; it has in these last days appeared personally to men, as the Son of the Virgin. Man is not God; but if thou wilt even become God (*εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ θεὸς γενέσθαι*), obey thy creator and transgress not his commandment, that, found faithful in that which is less, thou mayest be entrusted with that which is greater (X. 33). There are not two Gods, but only one, in whom there are two persons, and a third economy, the grace of the Holy Ghost. The Logos is the intelligence, which came forth from God and was revealed in the world as the Son of God. All things are through him; he comes from the Father, as light from light, or water from its source, or the ray of light from the sun. God is only one, whether considered as the commanding Father, the obeying Son, or the enlightening Holy Ghost. It is impossible otherwise to believe in the one God than by truly believing in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (Hippol., *Contra Hæres. Noët.*, 11 seq.).

§ 81. Tertullian (160–220), Presbyter of Carthage, went, in his opposition to Gnostic and especially to Marcionitic Antinomianism, to an extreme of ascetic ethics and legality, which transcended the limit maintained by the Church, and brought him finally to adopt the Puritanism of the Montanists (which was founded on an energetic belief in the speedy return of Christ). According to him, Christianity was a law, the new law of Jesus Christ. Tertullian was unfriendly to speculation. Philosophy, in his opinion, was the mother of heresies; Jerusalem should be completely separated from Athens, the Church from the Academy. His anti-philosophical tendency culminated in the proposition: *Credo quia absurdum est*.

Tertullian's Opera ed. Rhenanus, Basel, 1589; ed. Rigaltius, Paris, 1685, 1686; ed. Semler and Schütz, Halle, 1770; E. F. Leopold in Gersdorf's *Bibl. Patr. Lat.*, Vols. IV.–VII., Leipzig, 1889–91; F. Oehler, 8 vols., Leipzig, 1888–94. Works on him by J. A. Nösselt (*De vera aetate ac doctrina scriptorum Tertulliani*, Halle, 1768), W. Münscher (*Darstellung der moralischen Ideen des Clemens von Alexandrien und des Tertullian*, in Henke's *Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. VI., Heilmst. 1796, pp. 106 seq.), Neander (*Antignosticus, oder Geist des Tertullian und Einleitung in dessen Schriften*, Berlin, 1825, 2d edition, 1849), Schweigler (in his work on *Montanism*, Tübingen, 1841, p. 302), Hesselberg (*Tert. Lehre, entwickelt aus seinen Schriften*, Part I.: *Leben und Schriften*, Dorpat, 1848), Engelhardt (*Tertullian's schriftstellerischer Character*, in the *Zeitschr. f. hist. Theol.*, 1852, 2), G. Uhlhorn (*Fundamenta Chronologiae Tertullianae, diss. inaug.*, Göttingen, 1852); cf. also Böhlinger's account of Tertullian's doctrine in the second edition of his *Kirchengesch. in Biographien*.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus was born at Carthage, about A. D. 160, of heathen parents, and was first educated for the law. In about 197 A. D. he was converted to Christianity. He joined the Montanists in about the year 200, according to Nösselt and Hesselberg, or, according to the more probable supposition of Uhlhorn, in 202; others fix the date at 204–206. In developing his Christian theology, he was influenced by the judicial habit of mind resulting from his previous legal studies, while, in defending it, he employed that peculiar eloquence which had characterized him as an advocate; he made the spirit secondary to the law, and Christ, so to speak, the servant of Moses. His writings (as classified by Neander) are partly apologetic, addressed to pagans, and relating to the conduct of the Christians under the persecutions of the former—partly ethical and disciplinary, and partly dogmatic and polemical. Ante-Montanistic works of the first class are the *Ad Martyres*, *De Spectaculis*, *De Idolatria*, *Ad Nationes*, *Apologeticus* (about A. D. 200), *De Testimonio Animæ*; of the second class: *De Patientia*, *Orations* (Prayer), *Baptismo*, *Poenitentia*, *Ad Uzorem*, *De Cultu Feminarum*; of the third class: *De Praescriptione Haereticorum*. Montanistic works of the first class: *De Corona Militis*, *De Fuga in Persecutione*, *Contra Gnosticos Scorpiae*, *Ad Scapulam* (Proconsulem); of the second class: *De Exhortatione Castitatis*, *Monogamia*, *Pudicitia*, *Jejuniis*, *Virginibus Velandis*, *Pallio*; of the third class: *Adversus Marcionem*, *Adv. Hermogenem*, *Adv. Valentinianos* (if written by Tertullian), *De Carne Christi*, *Resurrectione Carnis*, *Anima*, *Adversus Praezam*.

Of all the ancient Church Fathers (except Tatian) Tertullian emphasizes most the opposition between morality and the sensuous nature of man, as also between the divine revelation and human reason. The divine mysteries cannot, indeed, in the last analysis, be opposed to reason, says Tertullian; God is the creator of matter, and the dualism of the Manicheans is false. But the monism thus avowed by Tertullian is constantly left by him in the background, and the antagonism of principles is portrayed in fiery declamations.

What have the philosopher and Christian in common? The disciple of Greece and the disciple of heaven? The aspirant for earthly honor and he who aspires to (eternal) life? The maker of words and the performer of deeds? The destroyer and the builder-up of things? The friend and the enemy of error? The corrupter and the restorer of truth, its thief and its guardian? What have Athens and Jerusalem, the Church and the Academy, heretics and Christians, in common with each other? Our doctrine has come down from the porch of Solomon, who himself left us as his legacy the injunction, to seek the Lord in simplicity of heart. Let those who offer us a Stoic, or Platonic, or dialectical Christianity, reflect what they are doing. There is no more curiosity for us, now that Christ has come, nor any occasion for further investigation, since we have the Gospel. We are to seek for nothing which is not contained in the doctrine of Christ. The Christian may not search for more than it is permitted him to find; the Apostle forbids endless questions. What could Thales, the first of the Physiologists, tell Croesus with certainty respecting the Godhead? Socrates was condemned, because, by destroying the gods, he advanced nearer to the truth; but even the wisdom of Socrates is not to be highly estimated, for who would have known the truth without God, and to whom is God known without Christ? Who can understand Christ without the Holy Ghost, and to whom has it been given thus to understand him, without the sacrament of faith? Socrates, as he himself confesses, was led by a demon. Every Christian laborer has found God; he shows him forth, and can answer every question that is asked concerning God, while Plato assures us that it is difficult to find the architect of the world, and that it is not practicable, if possible, to make him known to all, when found. O thou poor Aristotle, who hast discovered for the heretics the art of dialectic, the art of building up and destroying, the art of discussing all things and accomplishing nothing! What doest thou, O daring Academy? Thou uprootest the whole organism of human life, thou destroyest the order of nature, thou deniest the providence of God, when thou supposest that the senses, which God has given to his creatures, are deceptive as means of knowledge and unreliable as instruments for the practical uses of life (an anticipation of Descartes' argument from the *véracité de Dieu*). Poets and philosophers have drawn special, isolated truths from the Old Testament, but they have corrupted them and ambitiously claimed them as discovered by themselves. The philosophers are the patriarchs of the heretics. Platonism furnished the material for the Valentinian heresy, and Stoicism for the Marcionitic. The Epicureans are the fathers of those who deny the immortality of the soul, while all the philosophical schools lend support to the deniers of the resurrection. Those heretics who teach that matter is equally original with God draw upon Zeno's doctrine; those who speak of the "fiery God" have learned of Heraclitus. The philosophers contradict each other. While they hypocritically pretend to possess truth, the Christian possesses it indeed. Only the Christian is wise and true, and no one is greater than he. Even the offices of *Ludimagistri* and *Professores Literarum* are incompatible with the Christian character. Christianity is in contradiction with human wisdom and culture. "*Crucifixus est dei filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile est.*"

Like human thought, so also the human will is viewed by Tertullian as entirely corrupt. Instead of considering the sensuous nature of man as that which may be permeated, and, so to speak, filled out with the ideal, he leaves the former in all its crudeness, in order that he may the more successfully combat and condemn it, and in order that he may find in it, in so far as it is the necessary and inexpugnable basis of spiritual life, the source of universal depravity. *Matrimonium* and *stuprum* are both alike forms of *commixtio carnis*, and are distinguished only by the legal form. (In some passages, however, Tertul-

lian rises superior to his principle, and describes Christian marriage as a real life-communion.) Celibacy ("pure virginity") is best; but God permits us to marry once, out of regard for our frailty (*De Exhort. Castit.*, chs. 1, 9; *De Monog.*, ch. 15). Tertullian's Christian (like Tatian's) is "an angel riding on a tamed beast." With regard to marriage and the family, "*fuga saeculi*" is synonymous for him with fleeing from the world of moral action."

As in the doctrine of the Stoics (of whom Seneca, at least, was held in high estimation by Tertullian), so also in the doctrine of Tertullian, a dualistic ethics, in which the sensuous nature is condemned, is united with a sensualistic theory of cognition and a materialistic psychology. Tertullian's ontology is a gross form of Realism. He teaches: The senses do not deceive us. All that is real is material. The materiality of God and the soul is without prejudice to the exalted nature of the former and the immortality of the latter (*Nihil enim, si non corpus. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est, De Anima*, 7; *De Carne Chr.*, 11. *Quis enim negaverit, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie, Adv. Prax.*, 7). The soul has the same form as the body, and is delicate, luminous and aeriform in substance. If it were not material, it could not be acted upon by the body, nor would it be capable of suffering, and its existence in the body would not depend on the nourishing of the latter (*De Anima*, 6 seq.). The soul of the child comes from the semen of the father, like a shoot (*tradux*) from the parent-stock of a plant, and it afterwards increases gradually in sense and understanding (*De Anima*, 9). Every human soul is a branch (*sarculus*) of Adam's soul. With the soul the spiritual qualities of the parents are transmitted to the children; hence the universal sinfulness of the children of Adam (*tradux animae tradux peccati*). But together with this inherited sin, a remnant of goodness or of the divine image remains in us (*quod a deo est, non tam extinguitur, quam obumbratur*), so that sin becomes in us our own free work. The soul is naturally drawn toward Christianity (*anima naturaliter Christiana, De Testim. An.* 1 seq.; *Apolog.*, 17), as is seen in the fact that the simplest and most natural manifestations of the religious consciousness among polytheists manifest an involuntary tendency to return to the original monotheistic belief of humanity.

Just as the sun is not known by us in its real substance as it exists in the heavens, but only in its rays which are shed upon the earth, so God is never revealed to man in the fullness of his majesty, but only according to our human faculties of comprehension, as a human God, who has revealed himself in his Son (*Adv. Prax.*, 14). Since God is the greatest of beings, he can be only one (*Adv. Marc.*, I. 3, 5). He is eternal and unchangeable, free, subject to no necessity; his nature is reason, which is one with his goodness. Even anger and hate may be predicated of God; with his goodness is joined the attribute of justice (*Adv. Marc.*, I. 23 seq.; II. 6 seq.). So soon as God found Wisdom to be necessary for the work of the creation of the world, he conceived it in himself and begot it, a spiritual substance, bearing the characters of the revealing Word, the all-disposing reason and the all-executing power. On account of the oneness of this substance with the substance of God, it also is called God. It came forth from God, just as the ray breaks forth out of the sun; God is in it, as the sun is in the ray, the substance in each case being only extended, but not separated. Spirit came from spirit, God from God, light from light, without the source of existence being in either case thereby diminished. The Father is the whole substance of the Godhead, while the Son is a derivative from and a part of that substance, as he himself confesses, saying: "The Father is greater than I" (*Adv. Hermog.*, 18; *Apol.*, 21, *Adv. Praxeas*, 9). Reason always existed in God, but there was a time when the Son did not exist. The Son first came into existence when and because the Father had need of him as an instrument for the creation of the world, and so caused the

Son to come forth from himself as the second person in the Godhead (*Adv. Prax.*, 14; *Adv. Hermog.*, 3). But time, in the proper sense of the term, first began with the existence of the world; the Goodness, which made time, was, before the existence of time, without time (*Adv. Marc.*, II. 3). Like the Son, so also the Holy Ghost came forth from the divine substance (*Adv. Prax.*, 26). The third to Father and Son is the Spirit, just as the third to root and branch is the fruit of the branch, the third to source and stream is the mouth of the stream, the third to sun and ray is the extremity of the ray. Thus the Trinity is not in contradiction with the divine monarchy, and is in accordance with the economy of the universe (*Adv. Prax.*, 8). The world was created out of nothing, and not out of a material substance, which had eternally pre-existed, nor was it created from eternity. God was God before the creation of the world; but it is only since the creation that he has become Lord. The former title is the name of the substance of God, the latter designates his power (*Adv. Hermog.*, 3 seq.). Man was created after the image of God; God, in the formation of the first man, being guided by the model of the man Christ who was to come (*De Resurr.*, 6). The gods of the heathen are fallen angels, who allowed their love for mortal women to lead them away from God (*De Cultu Fem.*, I. 2).

Justice was originally an undeveloped "Nature," which feared God. Through the Law and the Prophets it attained next to childhood (yet only among the Jews, since God was not among the heathen; the heathen stood without, like the drop on the bucket; they are the dust on the threshing-floor). Through the Gospel it grew into the strength of youth. Through the new (Montanistic) prophecy, which demands perfect sanctification, it is developed into the maturity of manhood (*De Virginitus Velandis*, 1). The souls of the dead await in Hades the resurrection and the judgment. A blessed lot is in store for the righteous; all deformity, natural or acquired, will be removed, and the female sex will be converted into the male (*De Resurr.*, 57; *De Cultu Fem.*, I. 2).

Tertullian deserves especial remembrance on account of his energetic defense of religious freedom. The choice of one's religion is, he says, the right of every individual. It is not religious to seek to force men into religion (*Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putaverit colere. Nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debeat, non vi, quum et hostiae ab animo libenti exposculentur. Ita etsi nos compuleritis ad sacrificandum, nihil praestabitis diis vestris, Ad Scap.*, 2. *Colat alius Deum, alius Jovem, alius ad Coelum supplices manus tendat, alius ad aram Fidei, alius, si hoc putatis, Nubes numeret orans, alius Lacunaria, alius suam animam Deo suo voveat, alius hirci. Videte enim, ne et hoc ad irreligiositatis elorium concurrat, adimere libertatem religionis et interdicere optionem divinitatis, ut non liceat mihi colere quem velim, sed cogere colere quem nolum. Nemo se ab invito coli vult, ne homo quidem, Apol.*, ch. 24). Yet it may be doubted, whether Tertullian would have conceded the same religious liberty to heathens and heretics, if the Christians had been in the majority and in possession of the civil power; the unmistakable satisfaction with which he speaks of the future torments of the enemies of Christ (*De Spectac.*, 30, 61-62; *Conf. Apol.*, 43, 295), hardly permits us to suppose it.

§ 82. The moral reaction excited by the Antinomianism of the Gnostics led to a legal conception of Christian ethics, investing the latter with a character akin to, but not identical with, Jewish legalism. The leaders in this reaction defined Christianity as the new law of Jesus Christ, and in the persons of Tertullian and the Montanists overstepped the limit of doctrine prescribed by the Church. In like

manner the speculative reaction against Gnostic polytheism (and Docetism), and especially against the doctrine that the supreme God was not identical with the Creator of the world, led to the placing of renewed emphasis on the doctrine of monotheism. The result of this was not a simple return to the monotheism of the Jewish religion, but a return to a form of monotheism nearly allied to Judaism, and in Monarchianism the leaders in this reaction went beyond the trinitarian middle-ground chosen by the Church. Monarchianism is the doctrine of the unity of God, excluding the doctrine of the Trinity, or the doctrine that the Father, as One divine person, is alone Lord of all, and that the Logos and Holy Ghost have no separate, personal existence. Monarchianism is Modalism, in so far as the Logos and the Holy Spirit are viewed by it as modes of the existence or essence of God, or even merely as modes in which he reveals himself. Monarchianism was taught variously in the form of a modified Ebionitism, of Patripassianism, and of a doctrine mediating between these two. The earlier Church Fathers, in whose teachings the dogma of the Trinity had not attained to that distinct form to which it was afterward developed in the Church, leaned, so far as they avoided Monarchianism, almost without exception to a form of that doctrine which asserted the subordination of the Son and the Holy Ghost to the Father, and which afterward received its most distinct expression in Arianism. The doctrine finally adopted by the Church, and which is commonly named after Athanasius, agreed with Monarchianism in its opposition to the theory of subordination, and in its doctrine of the identity in essence of the Father and the Logos and the Spirit, while, in agreement with the theory of subordination, it affirmed the complete personal distinction of the three, and opposed their reduction to mere attributes or even to mere forms of the revelation of One divine person.

In regard to the abundant literature of the subjects of this paragraph, it may suffice, in view of their specifically theological character, to refer to such leading works as those of Baur and Dörner, cited above (p. 268), and to Schleiermacher's treatise on Sabellianism, *Werke*, I. 2, pp. 485-574, Mühlcr's *Athanasius*, Mayence, 1897, and Heinr. Voigt, *Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien*, Bremen, 1861.

In so far as the development of the doctrines of the unity and trinity of God was founded on the biblical passages which relate to the Father, to Christ, and to the Holy Ghost, it belongs only to positive theology to treat of it; but in so far as it was founded on speculative grounds, it belongs at once to the history of theological dogmas and to the history of Christian philosophy. In this place a summary exposition will suffice, all the more, owing to the minute and exhaustive treatment which this controverted subject usually and of necessity receives in works on *dogmatic history*.

One fraction of the Monarchians, the followers of Artemon, asserted that until the time of Victor, Bishop of Rome, their doctrine was the reigning one in the Roman Church, and that it was first proscribed by Victor's successor, Zephyrinus (after A. D. 200). This may be an exaggerated statement, rendered possible only by the indefiniteness of the earliest formulas of Christian doctrine; yet that Monarchianism, connected with a legalistic theory of morals, was in the earlier times of Christianity in fact widely extended, is evident from numerous writings that have been traced back to the Apostolic Fathers, and especially from the, for a long time, highly esteemed work, the "Shepherd of Hermas," and also from the testimony of an opponent of Monarchianism, namely, Tertullian (*Adv. Praxeas*, ch. 3: *simplices quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotae, quae major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus diis saeculi ad unicum et verum Deum transfert, non intelligentes unicum quidem, sed cum sua oikonomia esse credendum, expavescent ad oikonomiam. Numerum et dispositionem trinitatis divisionem praesumunt unitatis, quando unitas ex semet ipsa derivans trinitatem non destruitur ab illa, sed administretur. Itaque duos et tres jam jactitant a nobis praedicari; se vero unius Dei cultores praesumunt, quasi non et unitas irrationaliter collecta haeresim faciat, et trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituat*).

Theodotus of Byzantium and Artemon are representatives of that form of Monarchianism which was nearly allied to deism, or rather to the doctrine of the Ebionites, which was founded on the revelation of the Old Testament, and also to the synoptic form of doctrine. Theodotus taught that Jesus was born of the Virgin according to the will of the Father, and that at his baptism the higher Christ descended upon him. But this higher Christ Theodotus conceived as the Son of Him who was at once the supreme God and the Creator of the world, and not (with Cerinthus and other Gnostics) as the son of a deity superior to the God of the Jews. Artemon supposed a special influence to have been exerted by the supreme God on Jesus, whereby he was distinguished from all other men and made the Son of God. In the teachings of these Monarchianists the Logos-conception is not found.

Noetus of Smyrna taught (according to Hippol., *Philos.*, IX. 7 seq.) that the one God, who created the world, though in himself invisible, had yet from most ancient times appeared from time to time, according to his good pleasure, to righteous men, and that this same God had himself become also the Son, when it pleased him to submit to being born; he was consequently his own son, and in this identity of the Father and the Son consisted the "monarchia" of God. (Hippolytus compares this doctrine with the Heraclitean doctrine of the identity of contraries, expressing his belief that the former arose from the latter.) An associate and disciple of Noetus was Epigonus, who brought the doctrine he professed to Rome; and his pupil, again, was Cleomenes, who defended the doctrine of Noetus in the time of Bishop Zephyrinus, the successor of Victor. With this Cleomenes, according to Hippolytus, Callistus, the successor of Zephyrinus, was on terms of friendship, and was of like opinion (teaching: *τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν εἶναι νόον, αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα, ὀνόμασι μὲν (δύοι) καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὅν, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον*). The one person is indeed nominally, but not in essence, divided (*ἐν τούτῳ πρόσωπον ὀνόματι μὲν μεριζόμενον, οὐσίᾳ δ' οὐ*). Father and Son are not two Gods, but one; the Father as such did not suffer, but he "suffered with" the Son (*Philos.*, IX. 12: *τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ νόῳ, οὐ . . . πεπονθέναι*).

The Monarchian, Praxeas, who taught at Rome in the time of Victor, and against whom Tertullian wrote a polemical work, appears to have adopted the opinions of Noetus and to have taught that the Father descended into the Virgin. He distinguishes the divine and human in Christ as spirit and flesh; but by the flesh he understands human nature entire. Christ, he says, suffered, as man; to the Father, or God in him, Praxeas ascribed a co-passion (*compassio*).

The doctrine of Sabellius may be looked upon as a return from the Patripassian form of Monarchianism to the earlier form, coupled with the adoption of the Logos-conception and such modification of the latter as the case required. Sabellius of Libya was Presbyter of Ptolemais, in the African Pentapolis, and lived at Rome under Zephyrinus. He is one of the most important representatives of Monarchianism, which is often called after his name (Sabellianism). He discriminated (according to Athanas., *Contra Arianos*, IV.; Epiph., *Haer.*, 62; Basil., *Epist.*; Hippol., *Philos.*, IX. 11 seq.) between the Monas and the Trias, and taught: ἡ μονὰς πλατυθείσα γέγονε τριάς (ap. Athanas., *Orat.*, IV., *Contra Arian.*, § 13). From this it might appear as if the Monas were related to Father, Son, and Spirit, as the common foundation of all three, and as if the latter were the three forms in which it was revealed, namely, as the Father, before the time of Christ, in the creation of the world and the giving of the law (or in the general relation of the Monas to the world); secondly, as Christ; and lastly, as the Spirit in the Church. This is the interpretation given by Schleiermacher in his essay on Sabellius (1822; *Werke*, Vol. I. 2, pp. 485-574), and with him many of the more recent investigators, and also Baur, substantially, have agreed. But with the expression cited is joined the following (*ibid.*, § 25): ὁ πατήρ ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐστὶ, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα, which places it beyond doubt, that by the Monas, which is expanded into Son and Spirit, the Father himself was meant, and that therefore the doctrine of Sabellius is distinguished from the (Philonic and) Johannean, according to which the Father is the absolute God and the Logos is the revealing principle, only by its non-recognition of the proper personality of the Logos (and by the greater prominence given in it to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost—which indeed was somewhat inconsequent, since it would have been more natural that the Holy Ghost should have been regarded by Sabellius rather as an attribute of the Logos), and not by its causing God to recede (like the other persons of the Godhead) into a secondary position with reference to the Monas. How little is proved by the expression, ἡ μονὰς πλατυθείσα γέγονε τριάς, against the identity of the Monas with the Father, is obvious from the perfectly analogous expression employed by Tertullian in his own name: *unitas ex semet ipsa derivans trinitatem*, while yet there can be no doubt that Tertullian himself regarded the Father as absolutely first and original, and conceived the Son and Spirit as derived from him. The Logos came forth from God for the creation of the world, and especially for the creation of man (ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν, προήλθεν ὁ λόγος). The Logos is the divine reason, not a second person, but a faculty of God; as a person (or an hypostasis) the Logos appeared first in Christ. The Logos is not subordinate to God the Father, but is identical with God's essence; but its hypostatic existence in Christ was transitory. As the sun receives back into itself the ray which went forth from it, so the divine Logos, after its hypostatization in Christ, returned again to the Father or Monas. Cf. Voigt, *Athan.*, pp. 249, 265 seq.

The (Sabellian) idea that the Logos, although existing before its manifestation in Christ, was not previous to that event a distinct person, having a distinct essence, but was only immanent in the essence of God the Father, was expressed by Beryllus, Bishop of Bostra in Arabia (according to Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, VI. 33) in the formula: Christ, previously to his life upon earth, did not possess a distinct personal existence (κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν), and his divinity was not originally his own, but only the divinity of the Father dwelling in him (μηδὲ θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμπεριλαμβομένην αὐτῷ μόνῃ τὴν πατρικὴν). (Yet it has been attempted, though incorrectly, to find in the historical data concerning Beryllus' doctrine a proof that the latter agreed with the doctrine of Noetus.) Beryllus was brought over by Origenes (who, however, ascribed personal pre-existence to all men, and hence, in logical consistency, naturally ascribed the same to the spirit of Christ) to the doctrine of the Church, that the Logos, as a person distinct from God the Father, existed before

the incarnation. Cf. Ullmann, *De Beryllo Boetreno*, Hamb. 1835, and Heinr. Otto Friedr. Fock, *Die Christologie des Beryll von Bostra*, in Niedner's *Zeitschrift für histor. Theol.*, Leips. 1846, pp. 376-394.

The consequences of Sabellianism for the doctrine of the person of Christ were drawn especially by Paul of Samosata. If the Logos is not a second person, but only the rational energy of God, then Jesus (as also each of the prophets who were filled with the Holy Ghost) must have been a distinct person from God and a man. While, therefore, the Logos, as the rational energy of God, is not subordinated to God, but is, rather, identical with him, Christ, as a person, must stand in the relation of subordination to God the Father. Jesus, according to Paul of Samosata, was, although begotten in a supernatural manner, yet in himself only a man, but he became the Son of God and became God by his moral perfection (*θεοποίηται*). The reason or rational energy of God dwelt indeed in him, yet not by means of a substantial union of the God and the man in him, but through the exertion of a divine influence, by which his human powers of understanding and will were increased. Paul of Samosata disputed (according to Athanas., *De Syn.*, ch. 51) the theory of the *homousia*, or consubstantiality of two divine persons, the Father and the Son; if this theory were true, he argued, the *ousia*, or substance common to both, would necessarily rank as the first and absolute existence, while the two persons would be related to each other, not as father and son, but as two brothers or as common sons of the original *ousia*. That the doctrine here controverted by Paulus is identical in substance with that defended by Sabellius (as Baur argues), the Monas of Sabellius bearing the same relation to the persons of the Godhead as does the *ousia* in the above representation, is an incorrect assumption, as shown by the account already given of the doctrine of Sabellius. The arguments of the Samosatans are directed rather against the doctrine adopted by the Church, from which he draws the above consequence, by whose acknowledged absurdity he seeks to overthrow the postulate from which it is derived. (And in fact the Synod at Antioch, in the year 269, which maintained the distinction of persons and the identity of Christ with the second person of the Godhead, rejected the term *homoousios*, in order to escape the consequence indicated by Paulus and finally adopted by Synesius).

The subject of Arianism, which teaches that the second person of the Godhead is subordinate to the Father and that there was a time when this person was not existing, as also of the conclusion of the controversy concerning these points by the triumph of the Athanasian doctrine of the equality in essence (*homousia*) of the three persons of the Godhead, and of the further development of doctrine which took place within the bosom of the Church, may here be omitted, as topics belonging to ecclesiastical and dogmatic history, it being sufficient for our purpose thus to have called attention to the dogmatic basis of the next succeeding stadium of philosophical speculation. The motives which led to the triumph of Athanasianism were not so much of a scientific as of a specifically religious and ecclesiastical nature. A laudatory account of the life and doctrine of Athanasius has been written, from the Catholic stand-point, by J. A. Möhler (Mayence, 1827); H. Voigt (Bremen, 1861) treats of the same subject from the stand-point of Orthodox Protestantism. Whatever judgment, for the rest, may be passed on Athanasius (296-373), whether the dogma which he successfully advocated be thought to mark a real advance toward a purer expression of the idea of God and man as united in one, or whether there be found in it a concealed tritheism, which afterward Augustine and others again modified so as to make it more consonant with the monotheistic idea, the historic fact must in any case be acknowledged, that the Athanasian form of the doctrine in question, not only in respect of terminology, but also in respect of conception and application, was not known in the Christian Church from the beginning, but marks, on the contrary, a later stadium in the development of

Christian thought. In the view of the earlier Christians, who taught that the world was created or formed in time, the Logos was a being who came forth from God for the purpose of that formation or creation. Origen's doctrine of the eternal creation of the world attributed also to the Logos an eternal personal existence, which was likewise in harmony with Origen's doctrine of the pre-existence of human souls. Later orthodoxy let fall the pre-existence of souls and the eternity of the creation of the world, but held fast to the doctrine of the eternal existence of the Logos as a second person, begotten of God the Father, whereby its rank was so much elevated that it was but a short advance to the formula of *homousia*. The Holy Ghost, finally, which originally was only the spirit of God itself, was now, with a species of logical consistency, placed as a third person in the same rank with the first and second persons. That the nature of the religious consciousness of man renders these hypostatizations necessary, and that the denial of them must lead to an unreligious pantheistic speculation, or else to abstract deism, can hardly be asserted with justice. The biblical conception of man's religious consciousness includes the possibility of the inspiration of man by the Spirit of God, unassociated with adherence to any fixed dogmas, and with this conception the Sabellian doctrine (to which, rather than to the Athanasian, Schleiermacher, on good religious grounds, gave the preference) would seem more nearly accordant than that which finally prevailed in the Church. Faith in development and in historical progress degenerates into unphilosophical superstition when might and success are made the criteria of right and truth.

§ 83. The reaction against Gnosticism was accompanied by an attempt on the part of some of the teachers of the Church to assimilate the legitimate elements of Gnosticism to the doctrine of the Church. In particular, Clement of Alexandria and Origenes, who were teachers in the school for catechists at Alexandria, may be regarded as representatives of a class of Gnostics, who strove to remain free from all heretical tendencies and to maintain an entire agreement with the universal (catholic) faith of the Church, and who, in the general character of their teachings, though not in every separate point of doctrine, were successful in this attempt. This party were well disposed toward Hellenic science, and in particular toward Hellenic philosophy, which they sought to bring into the service of Christian theology. Philosophy, teaches Clement—applying to Paganism the same method of historical and philosophical judgment which Irenæus and Tertullian employed with reference to primitive times and with reference to Judaism and Christianity—philosophy served among the Hellenes the same end which the law served among the Jews,—it educated them for Christianity; and for those whose faith depends on scientific demonstration it must still serve as a discipline preparatory for the Christian doctrine. Clement and Origen seek, by means of an allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament Scriptures, to prove the oneness of Judaism and Christianity. Christianity, they say, is

Judaism unveiled ; in the former the revelation of God has become more perfect. The *Gnosis* of the heretics is at fault in not recognizing the identity of the Creator and Lawgiver of the world with the Father of Jesus Christ, and in despising the world and denying the freedom of the will.—In their Christology, Clement and Origen lean toward a form of the doctrine of subordination, which recognizes only in God the Father the absolute and eternal being, conceives the Son and the Spirit as persons in the full sense of the word, and represents them as having come forth from the Father from eternity according to the will of the Father, and as not equal with the Father. The creation of the world is viewed by Clement and Origen as an act of God, accomplished not in time, but from eternity. To the human soul Origen (with Plato) ascribes pre-existence before the body, into which latter it descended in consequence of some moral delinquency. The soul is endowed with free will. It is on the freedom of the will that the distinction between good and bad, virtue and vice, reposes ; in its full recognition of human freedom lies the peculiar ethical character of Christianity, as opposed to Paganism. Active obedience to the divine commands is the condition of salvation. It was in virtue of his freedom that the divine and human were united in Christ. In the person of Christ the divine and human interpenetrate each other, as when iron is heated through by fire. Christ's redemptive act was a contest against demoniac powers ; every Christian who denies the world and obeys God's commandments takes part in this contest. The end of all things will come when the punishment of transgressions shall have been accomplished, and will consist in the restoration (*Apokatastasis*) of all men to their original goodness and blessedness, in order that God may be all in all.

On the question whether and to what extent the theology of the Church Fathers in general, and that of the Alexandrians in particular, was affected by the philosophy of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, treat Souverain (*Le Platonisme dévoilé ou essai touchant le verbe Platonicien*, Cologne [Amsterdam], 1760 ; German translation by Löffler, Züllichau, 1792), Franciscus Baltus (*Défense des SS. Pères accusés de Platonisme*, Paris, 1711), Mosheim (*De turbata per recentiores Platonicos ecclesia*, first published in 1725, and reprinted in connection with his translation of Cudworth's *Systema Intellectuale*, Leyden, 1773), Keil (*De causis alieni Platonis recentiorum a relig. Christiana animi*, 1785, and in his "Programma" *De doctoribus veteris ecclesie culpa corruptas per Platonicos sententias theologias liberandis*, 1793, reprinted in Keil's *Opusc. Acad.*, ed. Goldhorn, sectio posterior, Leipzig, 1821, pp. 350-358), Oelrichs (*De doctrina Platonis de Deo a Christianis et rec. Platonis varie expl. et corrupta*, Marburg, 1788), Dähne (*De ymag. Clementis Alexandrini et de vestigiis neoplatonicis philosophias in ea obvia*, Leipzig, 1831), Alb. Jahn (*Diarrhet. Platonica*, Bern, 1839), Baumgarten-Crusius (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*, I. 67 seq.), Heinrich v. Stein (*Der Streit über den angebl. Platonismus der Kirchenväter*, in *Niedner's Zeitschr. f. Nat. Th.*, 1861, No. 3, pp. 319-419, and in the second part of his *Gesch. des Platonismus*, Göttingen, 1864). In relation to this question may also be compared various essays and articles, such as Clausen's (*Apologues*

ecclesias Chr. ante-Theodosiani Platonis ejusque philosophias arbitri, 1813), Ehler's and others' (see above, § 41, p. 117).

Of the Alexandrian School for Catechists, treat Guerike (Halle, 1824-25), and C. F. W. Hasselbach (*De schola, quae Alexandriae floruit, catechetica*, Stettin, 1896, and *De Catechumenorum ordinibus*, *ibid.*, 1899); cf. Baumgarten-Crusius (*Dogmengesch.*, I. p. 126), Schnitzer (*Origenes p. V.*), Redepenning (*Origenes*, I. p. 57 seq.), and also Matter, in his *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1840, and J. Simon, *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1845.

The works of Clement of Alexandria have been edited by P. Victorius (Florence, 1550), Fried. Sylburg (Heidelberg, 1592), Potter (Oxford, 1715), Frid. Oberthür (Herbipoll, 1780), Reinhold Klotz (in *Bibliotheca sacra patrum ecclesiae Graecorum*, Part III., Leipzig, 1831-34); in Migne's *Cursus* they form Vols. VIII. and IX. of the Greek Fathers. Of Clement treat Münscher (see above, under Tertullian), P. Hofstede de Groot, *Diap. de Clemente Alex. philosopho christiano*, Groningen, 1826, Dähne, *De yvwa Clementis Alex.* (see above), Lepsius, "On the *πύρα σπουδαία* in Clemens Alex.," in the *Rhein. Mus.*, 1836, pp. 142-148, Reinkens, *De Clemente presbytero alexandrino, homine, scriptore, philosopho, theologo libero*, Breslau, 1861, Herm. Reuter, *Clem. Alex. theol. moralis capita selecta, comm. acad.*, Berlin, 1863, II. Lämmer, *Clem. Alex. de λόγῳ doctrina*, Leipzig, 1855, Hébert-Duperron, *Essai sur la polémique et la philos. de Clément d'Alexandrie*, 1855, J. Cognat, *Clément d'Alexandrie, sa doctrine et sa polémique*, Paris, 1866, H. Schürmann, *Die hellenische Bildung und ihr Verhältnis zur christlichen nach der Darstellung des Clem. v. Alex. (G.-Fr.)*, Münster, 1859, Freppel, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1866; cf. also, particularly, Baur, in his *Christliche Gnosis*, pp. 502-540, and W. Möller, in the work above cited (*Kosmologie der griechischen Kirche*), pp. 506-535.

Of the works of Origen, the Latin texts were edited by J. Merlin (1st edition, Paris, 1512-19); the work *Adversus Celsum* appeared in print first at Rome, A. D. 1481, in the Latin translation of Christophorus Persona, and was first edited in Greek by David Hösche (Augsburg, 1605), and afterward by W. Spencer (Cambridge, 1658; 2d edition, 1677); his Commentaries, in Greek, on a part of the Bible were edited and published, together with introductory essays by Huetius (Rome, 1668, Paris, 1679, etc.); his complete works have been published by C. and C. V. Delarue (Paris, 1788-50), Oberthür (15 vols., Würzburg, 1780-94), and by C. H. E. Lommatsch (Berlin, 1831-47). The work *περί ἀρχῶν* has been separately published by Redepenning (Leipzig, 1836). In Migne's *Cursus* the works of Origen fill Vols. XI.-XVII. Of Origen treat, among others, Schnitzer (*Origenes über die Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft*, Stuttgart, 1836), G. Thomasius (*Origenes*, Nuremberg, 1837), Redepenning (*Origenes, eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*, Bonn, 1841-46), Krüger (on Origen's relation to Ammonius Saccas, in *Ilgen's Zeitschr.*, 1843, I. pp. 46 seq.), Fischer (*Commentatio de Origene theologia et cosmologia*, Halle, 1846), Ramers (*Des Orig. Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches*, Trier, 1851), Fernand (*Exposition orig. des opinions d'Origène sur la nature et l'origine du péché*, Strasbourg, 1861); cf. Baur and Dörner, Ritter, Neander, Möhler, and Böhlinger, in their works before cited, Kahnia, *Die Lehre vom heil. Geist*, Vol. I., 1847, pp. 331 seq., and W. Möller, *Kosmol.*, etc. (see above), pp. 536-560.

On Celsus compare F. A. Philippi, *De Celsi adversarii Christianorum philonophandi genera*, Berlin, 1836, C. W. J. Bindemann, *Ueber C. u. a. Schrift gegen die Christen*, in the *Zeitschrift für histor. Theol.*, 1842, G. Baumgarten-Crusius, *De scriptoribus succell.*, p. Chr. II., qui novam relig. impugnaverunt, Misena, 1845.

The old controversy respecting the "Platonism of the Church Fathers" is to-day not yet in every respect ended. That these Fathers submitted in a measure to the influence of the philosophy of Plato is unquestioned; but it is susceptible of dispute how far this influence extended, and whether it was direct or indirect. That certain of the Church Fathers occupied themselves as scholars with the works of Plato could scarcely account for the exertion of more than a secondary influence on the development of Christian dogmas and Christian philosophy—an influence which has often been over-rated. Of much greater consequence was the indirect influence which Platonism (and Stoicism), in their Jewish-Alexandrian form and in their combination and blending with Jewish religious ideas, exerted in shaping the doctrine contained in the New Testament writings of Paul and in the fourth Gospel, and so, in consequence of the canonical importance of these writings, in determining the creed of all Christendom. Subsequently, the ideas thus introduced into Christianity, having become common Christian property, served as points of union and departure for further studies.

"Alexandria, the original home of *Gnosis*, is also the birth-place of Christian theology, which, in its first form, itself aimed to be nothing else than a Christian *Gnosis*" (Baur, *Char. der drei ersten Jahrh.*, 2d ed., p. 248). The Catechists' School at Alexandria may have been founded at a comparatively early date, upon the model of the schools for Hellenic culture, after that, as an ancient tradition has it, the Evangelist Mark had there proclaimed the message of Christ. Athenagoras is said to have taught in this school (see above). In 180 A. D. it was under the direction of Pantænus, who, before his conversion to Christianity, had been a Stoic. With him (from 189 on) and after him his pupil Titus Flavius Clemens, the Alexandrian, taught there; several of his works have come down to us, in particular the *λόγος προτρεπτικός πρὸς Ἕλληνας*, in which he argues against Paganism, from the absurdities and scandals of the heathen mythology and mysteries, and admonishes his readers to come to Christ, and become obedient to the one God and the one Logos of God; further, the *Paedagogus*, containing rules of Christian ethics, and the *σπράγματα* or *σπρωματεῖς* in eight books, in which Clement expounds the substance of Christian faith in its relation to the doctrines of Greek philosophers and of Christian heretics, and seeks to guide his readers from faith to knowledge, to the true Gnosis; but proceeds (as he himself acknowledges and as he indicates by his title, which characterizes the work to which it is prefixed by comparing it to a carpet of various colors), not with systematic order and connection, but aphoristically; there is, besides, a shorter work by him under the title: *τίς ὁ σωόμενος πλοῦσιος*; Several other writings are mentioned by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, VI. 13.

Clement adopts the view of Justin, that to Christianity, as the whole truth, the conceptions of ante-Christian times are opposed, not as mere errors, but as partial truths. The divine Logos, which is everywhere poured out, like the light of the sun (*Strom.*, V. 3), enlightened the souls of men from the beginning. It instructed the Jews through Moses and the prophets (*Paed.*, I. 7). Among the Greeks, on the contrary, it called forth wise men and gave them, through the mediation of the lower angels, whom the Logos had appointed to be shepherds of the nations (*Strom.*, VII. 2), philosophy as a guide to righteousness (*Strom.*, I. 5; VI. 5). Like Justin, Clement maintains that the philosophers took much of their doctrine secretly from the Orientals, and, in particular, from the religious books of the Jews, which doctrine they then, from desire of renown, falsely proclaimed as the result of their own independent investigations, besides falsifying and corrupting it (*Strom.*, I. 1, 17; *Paed.*, II. 1, etc.). Yet some things pertaining to true doctrine were really discovered by the Greek philosophers, by the aid of the seed of the divine Logos implanted in them (*Cohort.*, VI. 59). Plato was the best of the Greek philosophers (*ὁ πάντα ἀριστος Πλάτων*, . . . *οἷον θεοφορούμενος*, *Paed.*, III. 11; *Strom.*, V. 8). The Christian must choose out that which is true in the writings of the different philosophers, i. e., whatever agrees with Christianity (*Strom.*, I. 7; VI. 17). We need the aid of philosophy in order to advance from faith (*πίστις*) to knowledge (*γνῶσις*). The Gnostic is to him who merely believes without knowing as the grown-up man to the child; having outgrown the fear of the Old Testament, he has arrived at a higher stage in the divine plan for man's education. Whoever will attain to Gnosis without philosophy, dialectic, and the study of nature, is like him who expects to gather grapes without cultivating the grape-vine (*Strom.*, I. 9). But the criterium of true science must always be the harmony of the latter with faith (*Strom.*, II. 4: *κυριώτερον οὖν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἢ πίστις καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς κρεττήριον*). The Gnostic must raise himself through the world of birth and sin to communion with God (*Strom.*, VI. 16). With Gnosis is inseparably joined love, which renders man perfect (*Strom.*, VII. 10). Clement regards a positive knowledge of God as impossible; we know only what God is not. God is formless and nameless, although we rightly make use of the best names in designating him; he is infinite; he is neither genus, nor difference, neither

species, nor individual, neither number, nor accident, nor any thing that can be predicated of another thing (*Strom.*, V. 11, 12). Only the Son, who is the power and wisdom of the Father, is positively knowable (*Strom.*, V. 1 seq.). In Clement's utterances concerning the Son, the Philonic wavering between the theory of subordination and Modalism (see above, p. 231) is not fully overcome.—The Holy Ghost occupies the third place in the divine triad; he is the energy of the Word, just as the blood is the energy of the flesh (*Strom.*, V. 14; *Paed.*, II. 2).

Of the ethical precepts which Clément lays down in the *Paedagogus*, those are peculiarly worthy of notice which relate to marriage. In distinction from Tertullian and others, who saw in marriage only a legalized satisfaction of an animal instinct and who barely tolerated it, while affirming celibacy to be morally superior to it, Clement appeals in favor of the opposite view to the example of several of the Apostles, such as Peter and Philip, who were married; he meets the argument drawn from the example of Christ by saying that Christ's bride was the Church, and that he, as the Son of God, occupied an altogether exceptional position, and argues that it is necessary to the perfection of man that he should live in wedlock, beget children, and not allow himself by the cares which they bring him to be drawn away from love to God, but endure and overcome the temptations arising from children, wife, domestics, and possessions (*Strom.*, III. 1, 6; VII. 12). As in marriage, so in the case of riches, every thing depends on a mind capable of preserving itself pure and faithful in every situation in life, independent of external goods, and master of its own interior freedom (*τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλοῦσιος*; see, especially, ch. 19). In the case of martyrdom, again, the essential thing is not the act of confession and the suffering, as such, but the constant and successful striving to purify one's self from sin and to endure readily all that the confession of Christianity may render necessary (*Strom.*, IV. chs. 9 and 10).

Origen (born A. D. 185, probably at Alexandria, died in 254, in the reign of Valerian) was educated in his early youth by his father Leonidas, and afterward especially by Clement of Alexandria. Familiar with the Scriptures from his youth, he also devoted himself, as he came to maturity, to the study of the works of the Greek philosophers, especially to the works of Plato, Numenius, Moderatus, Nicomachus, and the Stoics Chæremon, Cornutus, Apollophanes, and others; he then attended, though, as it seems, not till after his twenty-fifth year, the school of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism (Porphyr., *ap. Euseb.*, *E. H.*, VI. 19). Origen taught in the School for Catechists while yet very young, beginning when he was eighteen years old. Compelled in the year 232 to quit Alexandria, he lived in his later years at Cæsarea and Tyre. Of his writings, which for the most part are explanatory of various parts of the Bible, the *περὶ ἀρχῶν* (concerning the fundamental doctrines)—in which he, first among all Christian theologians, undertook to set forth the doctrines of the Christian faith in a systematic connection, but which, with the exception of a few fragments preserved by Hieronymus, has come down to us only in the Latin translation of Rufinus (or, rather, in the revision of Rufinus, for Rufinus altered the original text, so as to soften down what was most heterodox in it)—and the work *Contra Celsum*—a defence of Christian faith against the objections of a Platonist—are those which have special philosophical significance.

Before Origen there existed no system of Christian doctrine. The beginnings of a systematic presentation were contained in the Epistle of Paul to the Romans and in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The necessity of reducing the teachings of the Bible and the doctrines developed in the course of the controversies against heretics and non-Christians to a systematic form, was first felt by the teachers at the School for Catechists, and they, in going to work to meet this necessity, were guided by the baptismal confession and the

Regula Fidei. In the writings of Clement the subjects of his *Gnosis* are loosely combined, the treatises disclose no plan followed in detail, they are only labors preparatory to a system. Setting out with these materials, Origen laid the foundation of a well-ordered system of Christian dogmas. Yet his order was not very exact. The gain of a systematic doctrinal form was, however, not secured without substantial loss. The doctrines relating to the pre-mundane existence of God being placed first, in the regular scholastic order, concealed those living germs seated in man's religious feeling or contained in the history of religion, which might otherwise have influenced beneficially the historical development of Christian doctrine, and the doctrine of Soteriology was left comparatively undeveloped.

Origen says: "The Apostles taught only what was necessary; many doctrines were not announced by them with perfect distinctness; they left the more precise determination and demonstration of many dogmas to the disciples of science, who were to build up a scientific system on the basis of the given articles of faith" (*De Princ., Pref., 3 seq.*). The principle that a systematic exposition should begin with the consideration of that which is naturally first, is expressly enounced by Origen (*Tom. in Joan., X. 178*). where, in an allegorical interpretation of the eating of the fishes, he says: in eating, one should begin with the head, i. e., one should set out from the highest and most fundamental dogmas concerning the heavenly, and should stop with the feet, i. e., should end with those doctrines which relate to that realm of existence which is farthest removed from its heavenly source, whether it be to that which is most material or to the subterranean, or to evil spirits and impure demons.

The order of presentation in the four books respecting fundamental doctrines is (according to the outline given by Redepenning, *Orig., II. 276*) as follows: "At the commencement is placed the doctrine of God, the eternal source of all existence, as point of departure for an exposition in which the knowledge of the essence of God and of the unfoldings of that essence leads on to the genesis of the eternal in the world, viz.: the created spirits, whose fall first occasioned the creation of the coarser material world. This material is without difficulty arranged around the ecclesiastical doctrines of the Father, Son, and Spirit, of the creation, the angels, and the fall of man. All this is contained in the first book of Origen's work on fundamental doctrines. In the second book we set foot upon the earth as it now is; we see it arising out of an ante-mundane though not absolutely eternal matter, in time, in which it is to lead its changing existence until the restoration and emancipation of the fallen spirits. Into this world comes the Son of God, sent by the God of the Old Testament, who is no other than the Father of Jesus Christ; we hear of the incarnation of the Son, of the Holy Ghost as he goes forth from the Son to enter into the hearts of men, of the psychical in man in distinction from the purely spiritual in him, of the purification and restoration of the psychical man by judgment and punishment, and of eternal salvation. In virtue of the inalienable freedom belonging to the spirit, it fights its way upward in the face of the evil powers of the spiritual world and against temptations from within, supported by Christ himself and by the means of grace, i. e., by all the gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost. This freedom, and the process by which man becomes free, are described in the third book. The fourth book is distinct from the rest and independent, as containing the doctrine of the basis on which the doctrine of the preceding books rests, viz., the revelation made in Holy Scripture" (whereas later dogmatists have been accustomed to place this doctrine before the other contents of their systems).

Of the special doctrines of Origen, the following are those most worthy of notice. In opposition to the Gnostics, he, like Irenæus and others, holds it to be apostolic doctrine that God, who created the world out of nothing, is at once just and good, the author of the Old and New Testaments, the giver of the law and the Father of Jesus Christ, who was born of the Virgin through the influence of the Holy Ghost, and became man by his own

voluntary self-humiliation (*De Princ.*, I. 4). He conceives God as a purely spiritual essence, not fire, nor light, nor breath, but an absolutely immaterial unit (*μονάς* or *εὐάς*, *De Princ.*, I. 96 seq.). Only on the supposition that he is immaterial can God be conceived as absolutely unchangeable, for all that is material is mutable, divisible, and perishable (*De Princ.*, II. 184). The depths of the divine wisdom and knowledge are unsearchable; the entire fullness of the divine light is accessible to no creature (*Tom. in Jo.*, II. 80 seq.). Yet God is not without measure and limit, he is self-limiting; the absolutely unlimited would be unable to conceive itself (*Tom. in Matth.*, XIII. 569). God's omnipotence is limited by his goodness and wisdom (*C. Cels.*, III. 493). The Son is always begotten of God the Father, in the same manner in which light always begets its own lustre, or as the will proceeds outward from the mind, without causing a division of the latter into parts, i. e., without being separated from the mind (*De Princ.*, I. 110 seq.). In all which the Father is and has the Son participates, and in this sense a community of essence may be predicated of him and the Father; yet he is (*De Orat.*, 222) not only as an individual (*κατὰ ἰδιοκείμενον*) another being than the Father, a second God (*C. Cels.*, V. 608: *δεύτερος θεός*), but he is also inferior to him in essence (*κατ' οὐσίαν*), in so far as his existence is conditioned and depends on that of the Father; he is *θεός*, but not, like the Father, *ὁ θεός*, he knows the Father, but his knowledge of the Father is less perfect than is the Father's knowledge of himself (*Tom. in Joh.*, XXXII. 449). As being a copy, he is inferior to the original, and is so related to the Father as we are to him (*Fragm. de princ.*, I. 4); at least in that measure in which the Son and the Spirit tower above all creatures, does the Father tower above themselves (*Tom. in Jo.*, XIII. 235). In relation to the world, the Son is a prototype, *ἰδέα ἰδεῶν* (*C. Cels.*, VI. 64). In the unfolding of the divine unity into plurality, the Son is the first term, the Spirit the second, standing next to the created world, yet himself belonging to the Godhead as the last element or term in the adorable Trinity (*Tom. in Jo.*, VI. 133: *τῆς προσκυνητῆς τριάδος*). The Spirit receives all which he is and has through the Son, as the latter also receives all from the Father; he is the mediator of our communion with God and the Son (*De Princ.*, IV. 374). Later in order than the Holy Ghost, but not later in time, is the entire world of spirits, created by the will of the Father, and numbering more than we can calculate, though not absolutely innumerable (*De Princ.*, II. 219; *Fragm. de princ.*, II. 6). The time will come when all spiritual beings will possess the knowledge of God in the same perfect measure in which the Son possesses it, and all shall be sons of God in the same manner in which now the Only-begotten alone is (*Tom. in Jo.*, I. 17), being themselves deified through participation in the deity of the Father (*Tom. in Jo.*, II. 50: *μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενοι*), so that then God will be all in all (*De Princ.*, III. 318, 321).

The goodness of God could never remain inactive nor his omnipotence be without objects for his government, hence the creation of the world cannot have been begun in any given moment of time, but must be conceived as without beginning (*De Princ.*, III. 308). There have been no æons in which no worlds existed. This present world has, nevertheless, had a commencement, and is subject to decay, and the duration of each world-æon, and therefore (since, according to Origen, the number of the æons is obviously finite) time itself, is limited; God could not foreknow all things if the duration of the world was unlimited (*Tom. in Matth.*, XIII. 569). God did not find matter already in existence and then merely communicate shape and form to it, but he himself created matter; otherwise a providence, older than God, must have provided for the possibility of his expressing his thoughts in material forms, or a happy accident must have played the rôle of providence (*De Princ.*, II. 164). God, who in himself is spaceless, is by his working power everywhere present in the world, just as the architect is present in his work, or as the soul, as organ of sensa-

tion, is extended throughout the body; only that which is evil is not filled by his presence (*De Orat.*, p. 233; *De Princ.*, II. 172). God comes down to men, not in space, but by his providence (*C. Cels.*, V. 586). The created human spirit, having turned away from the fullness of the divine life, was placed in a material environment, but is free to choose between the good and the bad; the faculty of willing and the power which men may use for good, are the gift of God, but man's decisions are his own work. Yet even in this God affords us his aid through his Holy Spirit; each of our actions results from a mixture of our own volition and of divine assistance (*De Princ.*, III.; *In Ps.*, p. 672; *In Matth.*, XII. 561). Evil is the turning away of the creature from the fullness of true being to emptiness and nothingness, hence a privation; life in sin is a life of death (*De Princ.*, I. 109). The cause of evil is neither God nor matter, but that free act of turning away from God, which God did not command, but only did not prevent (*C. Cels.*, VII. 742). In the future world there will be rewards and punishments, but at last evil itself must become ancillary to good; the consequences of evil cannot endure until after the end of the world; at the end of all things will take place the *Apokatastasis*, the restoration of all things to unity with God (*De Princ.*, III. 312 seq.). The evil spirits, at their head the devil, tempt us as much as is necessary that we may prove ourselves (*C. Cels.*, VI. 666); but even they are corrigible and shall be redeemed (*De Princ.*, I. 156; III. 233). Good angels stand at our side; at last love brought the Logos himself down to us, and led him to assume not only a human body, but also a complete, rational, human soul (*De Princ.*, II. 6: IV. 32). To numerous ages of the world the Logos did not appear himself; in the present *æon*, which is already drawing near to its end, he has come down as a Redeemer, to lead all things back to God (*De Princ.*, II. 17). The divine Logos, mightier than sin, is the world-redeeming power; through him the Almighty God, for whom nothing is irretrievably lost, will lead all men back to full and blessed life (*De Princ.*, I. 109, 324). The object of future punishments is purification; as by fire, the evil in us will be extirpated more quickly in those who are purest, less quickly in the impure; the worst sinners will continue in these punishments, as in their hell, till the end of time; after which God will be all in all, being the measure and the form of all the motions of the souls, who only feel and behold him (*De Princ.*, III. 311).

The Holy Scriptures were inspired by God, and contain his word, or his revelations. The doctrine contained in them has already made its way as revealed truth among all peoples, whereas the philosophical systems of men, with all their proofs, have not been able to gain the acceptance of a single people, much less of all nations. That the Scriptures are inspired is testified not only by the fact of their wide propagation, but also by the impression which we receive in reading them; for we then feel ourselves touched by the breath of the Holy Ghost. These Scriptures contain pre-eminently (*πρωτεύουσιν*) matter of instruction, and inform us respecting the formation of the world and other mysteries; in the next place, they furnish precepts for our conduct. The Gospel and the Apostolic Epistles stand in no respect behind the Law and the Prophets. The Old Testament is unveiled in the New. Yet the New Testament is itself not the end and consummation of the revelations of God, but it is related to the complete truth as the Old Testament is to it; it awaits its unveiling at the second coming of Christ, and is only a shadow and image of those things which shall be after the end of the present period of the world; it is temporary and not immutable, and will one day be changed into an eternal Gospel (*De Princ.*, III. 327; IV. 1 seq.; 61 seq.; 364). Even a Paul and a Peter descried only a small portion of the truth (*Hom. in Jerem.*, VIII. 174 seq.; *Tom. in Epist. ad Rom.*, V. 545). The understanding of the secret meaning of the Holy Scriptures or their allegorical interpretation is a gracious gift of the Holy Ghost, the greatest of all his gifts;

Origen calls it, not—after the manner of his predecessors, including Clement—*Gnosis* (which designates for him only an inferior stage of knowledge), but Wisdom (*ἡ θεία σοφία*, *C. Cels.*, VI. 639; *Sel. in Ps.*, p. 568; *χάρισμα τῆς σοφίας* or *λόγον καὶ σοφίας*, *Sel. in Math.*, p. 835). Origen designates the allegorical method of interpretation in opposition to the ordinary method of interpretation or interpretation proper, as the spiritual in opposition to the somatic; from it he occasionally distinguishes also moral interpretation, which he terms psychical (*De Princ.*, IV. 59). (In reality, allegorical interpretation amounted in practice, in the case of all those passages in which the biblical writer did not himself intend to speak allegorically—which intention, it is true, the Alexandrians always imputed to him, when the literal sense failed to edify themselves—only to a species of aphoristical philosophizing on the occasion of Bible passages.)

The eclectic Platonist, Celsus, incorrectly supposed by Origen to be an Epicurean (and therefore to be distinguished from the Epicurean of the same name who lived about 170 A. D., and is mentioned by Lucian in the *Pseudomantis*) wrote about the year 200 a *λόγος ἀληθής* against the Christians, in which he combats Christianity, partly from the Jewish and partly from his own philosophical stand-point, reducing its historical basis to an abortive attempt at insurrection, and opposing to the Christian idea of forbearing love the idea of justice; to faith in the redemption of humanity, faith in an eternal, rational order of the universe; to the doctrine of God incarnate, the idea of the remoteness of God, whose influence on earthly things is exerted only indirectly, and to faith in the resurrection of the body, the doctrine of the nothingness of matter and of the future existence of the soul alone. Celsus finds the cause of the wide acceptance of Christianity in the fear and hope excited among the uncultured masses, who were incapable of rising above sensuous conceptions, by threats and promises with reference to their future condition. In return, Origen, in his reply, written at the request of his friend Ambrosius, asserts the reasonableness and demonstrableness of the Christian faith. He finds his proofs of Christianity in the fulfilled prophecies of the Old Testament (*Contra Celsum*, I. 366), in the miracles which were daily performed on the sick and on persons possessed by evil spirits through the reading of the Gospel (*ib.*, I. 321 *et al.*), in the victorious extension of Christianity and its sanctifying power, and in the conspicuous purity of the Christian communities in the midst of general corruption (*ib.*, I. 323; III. 466). Origen then seeks to establish the single dogmas of Christianity in substantially the same manner as in the *περὶ ἀρχῶν*. The right of the Christian communities to exist, against the will of the state, is founded by Origen on the law of nature, which is given by God and is higher than the written law (*C. Cels.*, V. 604).

The later adherents of Orthodoxy, the form and character of which were fundamentally influenced by the doctrine of Origen (see above, § 82, end) recognized the importance of the services rendered by him to Christianity, and yet at the same time opposed him, receiving with favor his apologetical, but rejecting his systematic, work, while, on the other side, Arians, and afterward Pelagians, appealed to him as an authority. In his writings lay combined (as in more recent times in the writings and views of Schleiermacher) the germs of opposed theological systems, which at a later period were to attain to an independent development. The same Justinian who (in A. D. 529) broke up the school of the Neo-Platonists, condemned (about 540) Origenism in nine anathemas.

§ 84. While Christological speculation was developed chiefly by Hellenistic theologians, the Latin teachers of the Church gave prominence more especially to the general basis of the Christian doctrine,

as contained in the belief in God and immortality, as also to anthropological and ethical questions. Minutius Felix, a Roman attorney, defended, without touching on Christology, the belief of the Christians in the unity of God. He sought to show that this belief was held by the most distinguished philosophers; he combated sharply the polytheism of the popular faith, as opposed to reason and the moral sense, and maintained, against various objections, the Christian doctrines of the perishableness of the world, the imperishability of the soul, and the resurrection of the body. With less elegance of form, but greater completeness of detail, and yet often more superficially than thoroughly, the same theme is handled by Arnobius, who also pays some attention to the Christological question, attempting to prove the deity of Christ by his miracles. He holds the belief in God's existence to be innate. With Justin and Irenæus, he denies the natural immortality of the soul, whose nature he regards as intermediate between the divine and material, and he opposes the Platonic arguments for the pre-existence and post-existence of the soul, reserving his favor only for the theological and moral argument. The rhetorician Lactantius unites in his theologico-philosophical writings agreeableness of form and Ciceronian purity of style with a tolerably comprehensive and exact knowledge of his subject-matter; yet his always clear and facile presentation sometimes lacks in thoroughness and profundity. He sets the Christian doctrine as the revealed truth over-against the polytheistic religion and the ante-Christian philosophy, both of which he makes war upon as being false and pernicious, although confessing that no opinion is without some elements of truth; but affirming that he only can rightly point out these elements who has been taught of God. The union of true wisdom with true religion is the end which he seeks to further by his writings. The rejection of polytheism, the recognition of the unity of God, and Christology, are for him the successive stages of religious knowledge. True virtue rests on true religion; its end is not itself, but eternal blessedness.

The apologetical work of Minutius Felix was first published with the work of Arnobius *Adv. Gentem* (Rome, 1548), it being supposed to be the last (eighth) book of the latter work; under its proper title of *Octavius*, and as a work of Minutius Felix, it was first edited by Franz Balduin (Heidelberg, 1560), then in the edition of Arnobius (Rome, 1588, etc.), and in more recent times by Lindner (Langensalza, 1778), Russwurm (Hamburg, 1824), Muralt (Zürich, 1836), Lübker (with translation and commentary, Leipzig, 1896), by Franc. Oehler, in Gerodorf's *Bibl. Patrum Eccles. Lat. vol.* (Leipzig, 1847), and by J. Kayser (Paderborn, 1863), and finally by Halm, Vienna, 1867 (see above, p. 263).

The work of Arnobius, *Adversus Gentem*, was first printed at Rome in 1548; more recently it has been published at Leipzig, 1816, edited by Joh. Con. Orelli, at Halle, 1844, edited by Hildebrandt, and in

Gersdorf's *Bibl. patr. eccl. Lat.*, Vol. XII., edited by Franz Oehler, Leipzig, 1846. On Arnobius, see E. Klusmann, *Arnob. u. Lucretius*, in the *Philologus*, Vol. XXVI. 1867, pp. 862-866.

The works of Lactantius, of which the *Institut. Div.* were the first to appear in print (Sublaco, 1465 seq., Rome, 1470 seq., etc.), have been printed very often; more recent editions are those by J. L. Büchmana (Leipzig, 1739), J. B. Le Brun and Nic. Lenglet-Dufresnoy (Paris, 1748), O. F. Fritzsche, in Gersdorf's *Bibl.*, Vols. X. and XI. (Leipzig, 1842-44), and in J. P. Migne's *Bibl.* (Paris, 1844).

The short work of Minutius Felix (who lived probably before the end of the second century, and in some of his ideas follows in the path of Tertullian), marked by gracefulness of style and mildness of spirit, contains an account of the conversion of the heathen Cæcilius by the Christian Octavius. Cæcilius urges, that in view of our uncertainty respecting all supra-terrestrial things, men should not with vain self-conceit allow themselves to judge respecting them, but that men should retain and respect, in regard to them, the traditions of their ancestors, and that, if they will philosophize, they should confine themselves, like Socrates, to the things which relate to man, while in relation to other things they find, with Socrates and the Academics, their true wisdom in the knowledge of their ignorance. *Quod supra est, nihil ad nos. Confessae imperitiæ summa prudentia est.* In reply to this argumentation (which, of course, was equally good for men of all religions, including Christians, when their religion should once have become dominant and traditional), Octavius answers, first, by pointing out the contradiction involved in the combination of theoretical skepticism with actual adherence to a traditional religion. Octavius approves the requirement of self-knowledge, but asserts, in opposition to the affirmations of Cæcilius respecting the incognoscibility of the transcendent, that in the universe all things are so intimately united to each other, that the human cannot be known without the divine (*ut nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter excusseris, nescias humanitatis*). Besides, continues Octavius, our knowledge of God is not so uncertain; such knowledge is our prerogative, as beings endowed with speech and reason, and it results for us from our observation of the order of nature, and especially from our observation of the adaptation of means to ends in the structure of all organized beings, and, above all, in man (*Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tam confessum, tamque perspicuum, quum oculos in coelum sustuleris et quæ sunt infra circumque lustraveris, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo omnis natura inspiretur, moveatur, alatur, gubernetur?—Ipsa præcipue formæ nostræ pulchritudo Deum fâctur artificem; nihil in homine membrorum est, quod non et necessitatis causa sit et decoris. Nec universitati solummodo Deus, sed et partibus consulit*). The unity of the order of nature proves the unity of the Deity. God is infinite, almighty, and eternal; before the world he was to himself in the place of the world (*Ante mundum sibi ipse fuit pro mundo*). He is fully known only to himself, being exalted beyond the reach of the senses and the understanding of man. On account of his unity he needs no peculiar or specifying name; the word God is sufficient. Even to the popular consciousness the intuition of the unity of the divine is not foreign (*si Deus dederit*, etc.); it is expressly acknowledged by nearly all philosophers. Even Epicurus, who denied to the gods activity, though not existence, saw a unity in nature; Aristotle recognizes a unique divine power, the Stoics teach the doctrine of providence, Plato speaks in the *Timæus* almost like a Christian, when he calls God the father and architect of the world, adding that he is difficult to be known and is not to be publicly proclaimed; for the Christians, too, regard God as the father of all things, and they proclaim him publicly only then, when they are called on to bear witness to his truth. In this view it may be held either that the Christians are philosophers, or that the philosophers were already Christian. The gods of the heathen are deified kings or inventors. The faith of our ancestors should not determine our own; the ancients were credulous and took pleasure in miraculous narratives, which we recognize as fables; for if such things as are narrated had taken

place, they would also be taking place to-day; but they did not take place, because it was impossible that they should. It is the poets who most prejudice the interests of truth, when they ensnare us in their sweet illusions; Plato was right in banishing them; the myths of the heathen religions are lenient toward vice. Impure demons, assuming the title of Gods, have thus secured the worship of men. The true God is omnipresent: *ubique non tantum nobis proximus, sed infusus est; non solum in oculis ejus, sed et in sinu vivimus*. The world is perishable, man is immortal. God will renew our bodies, just as in the actual economy of nature all things are periodically renewed; the belief that the soul alone is immortal is a half-truth; the doctrine of the transmigration of souls is a fable, though even in this doctrine there is contained a foreshadowing of truth. It is right that a better lot should fall to the Christians than to the heathen, for not to know God is alone sufficient to justify punishment, while the knowledge of God is a ground of pardon; besides, the moral life of the Christians is better than that of the heathen. The doctrine of divine predestination is not in contradiction with the justice of God nor with human freedom; for God sees beforehand what will be the characters of men, and determines their fate accordingly; fate is only the sentence of God (*Quid enim aliud est fatum, quam quod de unoquoque nostrum Deus fuit est?*). Sufferings serve to test the quality of Christians and to confirm them in their contests with adverse powers. They are right in refraining from worldly pleasures, which are of doubtful character in moral and religious regards.

In the work written soon after 300 by Arnobius, the African, "against the Heathen" (*Adversus Gentes*), the polytheism of the popular faith is opposed in a manner similar to that adopted in the work of Minutius, though with greater fullness. Arnobius denounces polytheism as absurd and immoral, and defends the doctrine of the one, eternal God, in whom, he says, the Hellenic gods themselves, in case they existed, must have had their origin, and who therefore is not to be identified with Zeus, the son of Saturn. Arnobius energetically rejects the allegorical interpretation of the myths concerning the gods. The doubt whether the highest God exists at all he considers (I. 31) unworthy of refutation, since the belief in God is inborn in all men; even the brute animals and the plants, if they could speak, would proclaim God as the Lord of the universe (I. 33). God is infinite and eternal, the place and space of all things (I. 31). In distinction from Minutius Felix, however, Arnobius seeks also to answer the reproach of those who affirmed that the gods were angry with the Christians, not because they worshiped the eternal God, but because they held a man who was crucified as a criminal to be a God (I. 36 seq.). To this Arnobius replies that Christ might justly be called God on account of the benefits conferred by him on the human race; he was, however, also God in reality, as appears from his miraculous works and his power to transform the opinions and characters of men. Arnobius lays very great weight on the argument from miracles. Philosophers, he says (II. 11), like Plato, Cronius, and Numenius (cf. above, pp. 237-238), whom the pagans believe, were perhaps morally pure, and learned in the sciences, but they could not, like Christ, work miracles; they could not calm the sea, heal the blind, etc., and consequently we must regard Christ as higher than they and give more credence to his affirmations concerning hidden things than to theirs. In respect of terrestrial and supra-terrestrial things, all are compelled to believe; the Christian believes Christ (II. 8 seq.). It was necessary that Christ should appear on earth as a man, because, if he had come down to it in his original nature, he could not have been seen by men nor have accomplished the objects of his mission. Arnobius combats, with Justin, the Platonic doctrine that the human soul is by nature immortal, and particularly the opinion that knowledge is reminiscence; in answer to the argument brought forward in the *Meno*, he says that the slave who answered correctly the geometrical questions of Socrates, did so, not owing to a knowledge of the subject already

existing in him, but in consequence of intelligent reflection (*non rerum scientia sed intelligentia*) and of the methodical manner in which the questions were put to him (II. 24). A man who from his birth should have lived in complete solitude would show no signs of intellect and by no means be filled with notions of supra-terrestrial things perceived in a previous life. Equally false is the opinion of Epicurus that the souls of men perish; if that were so, it would be not only the greatest error, but foolish blindness, to restrain the passions, since there would be no future reward awaiting us for so violent a labor (II. 30). The immortality, which heathen philosophers infer from the supposed divine nature of the soul, is regarded by the Christians as a gift of God's grace (II. 32). The true worship of God consists, not in bringing offerings, but in having right views concerning the Deity (*opinio religionem facit et recta de divinis mens*, VII., 51 Or.).

At about the same time when Arnobius wrote, Firmianus Lactantius, the rhetorician and Christian convert, composed his *Institutiones Divinae*; of this work he prepared an abridgment: *Epitome Divinarum Institutionum ad Pentadum fratrem* (in which he says that Christ was born, in round numbers, 300 years before then, ch. 43). Other extant works of his are: *Liber de officio Dei ad Demetrianum*; *De ira Dei liber*; *De moribus persecutorum liber*; *Fragmenta* and *Carmina*. Jerome (*Cat.*, ch. 80) calls Lactantius a pupil of Arnobius; yet there is no evidence in his writings of his having stood in such a relation to Arnobius. In the *Inst. Div.* (V. 1-4) he mentions particularly as his predecessors Tertullian, Minutius Felix, and Cyprian (who lived 200-258 A. D., and labored especially for the unity of the Church, and to whom belongs the dictum: *habere jam non potest Deum patrem, qui ecclesiam non habet matrem*), but not Arnobius, and the content of his work shows also, apparently, no signs of Arnobianic influence. Tertullian did not satisfy him in the matter of *form*; of Minutius Felix he makes laudatory mention, saying that his work shows that, if he had devoted himself solely to the subject of which he treated, he would have been able fully to meet all its requirements; but Cyprian, he says, uses language that is too mystical for the apologetic purpose; he fails in his method of demonstration, since his appeal to the authority of the biblical writings could carry no conviction to unbelievers. Lactantius evidently composed his *Institutiones* and also his *Epitome* of them at a time when Christianity had not yet received public recognition; the addresses to Constantine as the protector of the Christians were inserted in his principal work either by himself or by others at a later epoch. The work *De officio Dei* grounds the belief in God's existence on the adaptations seen in the forms of the organic world, in pointing out which Lactantius goes into very minute details. In the *Institutiones* Lactantius proposes not only to demonstrate the right of Christianity to exist, but also to communicate instruction in the Christian doctrine itself (IV. 1 seq.; V. 4), and to combine the wisdom whereby polytheism is destroyed, and the true God known and, in his quality of Father, loved, with the religion which worships him as Lord of all; but knowledge, he says, must precede worship. The highest good for man is neither pleasure, which the animals also enjoy, nor even virtue, which is only the way to it, but religion. For humanity is synonymous with justice, but justice is piety, and piety is the recognition of the fatherhood of God (*Inst.*, III. 11 seq.; IV. 4; V. 1). Lactantius presupposes in the *Inst. Div.* (what in the *De offic. Dei* he demonstrates in full), as something scarcely ever doubted, that the rational order of the world proves the existence of a divine providence (*Inst.*, I. 2: *nemo est enim tam rudis, tam feris moribus, qui non, oculos suos in coelum tollens, tametsi nesciat, cujus dei providentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur, aliquam tamen esse intelligat ex ipsa rerum magnitudine, motu, dispositione, constantia, utilitate, pulchritudine, temperatione, nec posse fieri quin id, quod mirabili ratione constat, consilio majori aliquo sit instructum*). He then turns to the demonstration of the unity of God, which he infers from the perfection

of God as the eternal Spirit (*Inst.*, I. 3: *Deus autem, qui est aeterna mens, ex omni utique parte perfectae consummataque virtutis est; . . . virtutis autem perfecta natura in eo potius est, in quo totum est, quam in eo, in quo pars exigua de toto est; Deus vero, si perfectus est, ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia*). A plurality of Gods would involve the divisibility of the divine power, from which its perishableness would follow. Several Gods, if they existed, might will opposite things, whence contentions would arise between them, which would destroy the order of the world; only on the condition of a single providence existing and controlling all the parts of the world, can the whole subsist; hence the world must necessarily be directed by the will of one being (I. 3). As the human body is governed by one spirit, so the world by God (*ibid.*). Beings that must obey the one God are not Gods (*ibid.*). To the unity of God bear witness not only prophets (I. 4), but also poets and philosophers—not as though the latter had rightly known the truth, but because the power of truth is so great that it enlightens men even against their will (I. 5); no philosophical school is altogether without elements of truth (VII. 7). In his appeal to the philosophical witnesses to the unity of God, Lactantius evidently follows in substance, Minutius Felix; both of them draw their information chiefly from Cicero's work *De Natura Deorum*; but Lactantius is far from agreeing with Minutius Felix in his favorable judgment of philosophers, for he affirms, with Tertullian, that heathen religion and philosophy are each false and misleading, and places them in contrast with the truth revealed by God (I. 1; III. 1 *et pass.*), employing against the philosophers the biblical proposition that the wisdom of men is foolishness with God. The third book of the *Inst.* is expressly devoted to showing the nullity of philosophy (*philosophiam quoque ostendere quam inanis et falsa sit, ut omni errore sublato veritas patefacta clarescat*, III. 2. *Philosophia quaerit sapientiam, non ipsa sapientia est, ibid.*). Philosophy must be either knowledge or opinion. Knowledge (and here the philosophical knowledge of nature, natural philosophy, is chiefly meant) is unattainable by man; he cannot draw it out of his own mind, since the power to do this belongs only to God and not to man (*mortalis natura non capit scientiam nisi quae veniat extrinsecus*); we know not the causes of things, as Socrates and the Academics rightly teach. Hence not philosophy, but revelation, conducts to the knowledge of truth. Dialectic is useless (III. 13). In Ethics the opinions of philosophers differ in the same manner as in Physics. In order to choose from among them, we must be already wise, which yet we were to learn to be from the philosophers; moreover, the skeptical Academic admonishes us never to believe in any school, whereby he evidently destroys even the possibility of our believing in his own doctrines. What remains, therefore, but to fly to the giver of true wisdom? After his refutation of false religion and philosophy, Lactantius turns to the exposition of the Christian doctrine, and attempts to show that God so ordered all things from the beginning, that as the end of the world (*i. e.*, the expiration of the 6,000 years to which its duration was limited) drew near, it was necessary that the Son of God should come down to the earth and suffer, in order to build up a temple for God and lead men to righteousness. He founds the belief in Christ as the Logos and Son of God mainly on the testimony of the prophets (*Inst.*, IV.). Father and Son are one God, because their spirit and will are one; the Father cannot be truly worshiped without the Son (IV. 29). (The Holy Ghost is not recognized by Lactantius as a third person in the Godhead, but only as the spirit of the Father and the Son.) The temple of God erected by Christ is the Catholic Church (*Inst.*, IV. 30). Justice consists in piety and equity; piety is its source, equity, which rests on the recognition of the essential equality of men, is its power and energy (V. 14). Both the source and the power of justice remained hid for the philosophers, since they had not the true religion, but to the Christians they have become known by revelation (V. 15). Virtue is the fulfilling of the divine law, or the true worship, which consists,

not in sacrifices, but in pure intentions and in the fulfillment of all obligations toward God and man (*Inst.*, VI.). Not the suppression of the passions, nor their restraint, but the right employment of them, is the part of virtue (VI. 16); even God is sometimes angry (*De Ira Dei*). Justice has been clothed by God in the semblance of folly, in order thus to point to the mysterious nature of true religion; justice would indeed be folly if no future reward was reserved for virtue. Plato and Aristotle had the laudable intention of defending virtue; but they were unable to accomplish their aim, and their exertions remained vain and useless, because they were unacquainted with the doctrine of salvation, which is contained in the Holy Scriptures; they erroneously imagined that virtue was to be sought on its own account, and that it had its reward in itself alone (*Inst.*, V. 18: *qui sacramentum hominis ignorant ideoque ad hanc vitam temporalem referunt omnia, quanta sit vis justitiæ scire non possunt; nam et quum de virtute disputant quamvis intelligant ærumnis ac miseriis esse plenissimam, tamen expetendam ajunt sua causa; ejus enim præmia quæ sunt æterna et immortalia, nullo modo vident; sic rebus omnibus ad hanc præsentem vitam relatis virtutem plane ad stultitiam redigunt.* *Inst.*, V. 18: *virtus et mercedem suam Deo judice accipiet et vivet ac semper vigebit; quæ si tollas, nihil potest in vita hominum tam inutile, tam stultum videri esse quam virtus.* *Inst.*, VI. 9: *nec aliter virtus quum per se dura sit, haberi pro bono potest, quam si acerbitalatem suam maximo bono penset*). In this manner Lactantius arrives at the conclusion that the soul (whose existence is the result, not of the act of generation, but of divine creation, *De Opif. Dei*, 19) is immortal, and divinely-ordered rewards await the virtuous in the future world (*Inst.*, V. 18), without which virtue would be useless. The world exists for man, man for immortality, and immortality for the eternal worship of God. The conviction of man's immortality Lactantius seeks to justify, first, on the ground of the testimony of the Scriptures, and then by arguments deemed sufficient to compel belief (*Inst.*, VI. 1 seq.). The arguments which Plato borrows from the automatism and the intellectuality of the soul seem to him insufficient, since other authorities can be cited against them (*Inst.*, VII. 8). The soul can exist without the body, for is not God incorporeal? It will continue to live after the death of the body, since it is capable of knowing and worshipping God, the Eternal; without immortality virtue would not have that worth which it in fact possesses, nor would vice receive the punishment which befits it (*Inst.*, VII. 10 seq.). Our souls, when raised, will be clothed by God with bodies (VII. 23). First, the righteous will arise to beatific life; at the second resurrection the unrighteous or unbelieving will be reawakened, and that to eternal torments (VII. 26).

SECOND SECTION.

THE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE COUNCIL OF NICE.

§ 85. After the Christian religion had attained to recognized independence and supremacy in the Roman state, and the fundamental dogmas had been ecclesiastically sanctioned (at the Council of Nice, A. D. 325), Christian thought directed itself, on the one hand, to the more special, internal elaboration of the doctrines which had now

been defined and agreed upon in general terms, and, on the other, to the work of demonstrating them on grounds either of Christian or of philosophical theology. The contests between heresy and orthodoxy awakened the productive energy of thought. Philosophico-theological speculation was most cultivated in the period next following by the school of Origen. The most prominent representative of this school is Gregory of Nyssa (331-394), the first, who (after the defence, chiefly by Athanasius himself, of the Christological dogma against the Arians and Sabellians) sought to establish by rational considerations the whole complex of orthodox doctrines, though, at the same time, he did not neglect the argument drawn from biblical passages. In his scientific method Gregory follows Origen; but he adopted the doctrine of the latter, only in so far as it agreed with the orthodox dogmas; he combats expressly such theorems as that of the pre-existence of the soul before the body, and deviates from the approved faith of the Church only in his leaning toward the theory of a final restoration of all things to communion with God. He pays particular attention to the problems of the divine Trinity and of the resurrection of man to renewed life. Gregory regards the doctrine of the Trinity as the just mean between Jewish monotheism, or Monarchianism, and pagan polytheism. To the question, why three divine persons are not three Gods rather than one, he replies, that the word God (*θεός*) designates the divine essence, which is one, and not the person; his investigations, occasioned by this problem, concerning the relation of the divine essence to the individuals in the Godhead, are in a certain respect an anticipation of the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. The origin of the human soul is simultaneous with that of the body; it is everywhere present in its body; it survives the body, and has, after the death of the latter, a spaceless existence; but it has the power to find again, from amidst the whole mass of existing matter, the particles which belonged to its body, and to reappropriate them, so that at the resurrection it will again clothe itself in its body. Gregory lays great weight on human freedom in the matter of appropriating the means of salvation; only on condition of this freedom, he argues, can we be convinced of God's justice in the acceptance of some and the rejection of others; God foresaw how each man would decide, and determined his fate accordingly. Moral evil is the only real evil; it was necessary in view of human freedom, without which man would not be essentially superior to the animal. In view of this justification of

the moral order of the world, Gregory repels the Manichæan dualism between a good and a bad principle. From God's superabundant goodness and from the negative nature of evil follows the final salvation of all beings; punishment serves for purification; there will be no place left for evil, when the will of God is triumphant.

The works of Gregory of Nyssa have been published in part by L. Sifanus (Basel, 1563 and 1571) and others; a completer edition, by Morellus (Paris, 1615). Single works of his have been edited by various men, notably, in recent times, the *Dialogues on the Soul and the Resurrection*, by Krabinger (Leipzig, 1887); a selection of his most important writings, together with a German translation, has been published by Oehler (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, I. Theil: Gregor von Nyssa*, Vols. I.-IV., Leipzig, 1858-59); his dialogues on the soul and the resurrection, with German translation and critical notes, by Herrn. Schmidt, was published at Halle in 1864. Concerning him treat Rupp (*Gregors des Bischofs von Nyssa Leben und Meinungen*, Leipzig, 1834), Heyns (*Diap. de Greg. Nyss.*, Leyden, 1885), E. W. Möller (*Gregoris Nysseni doctrinam de hominis natura et illustravit et cum Origeniano comparavit*, Halle, 1854) and Stigler (*Die Psychologie des heiligen Gregorius von Nyssa*, Regensburg, 1857).

The most important scientific productions of the Greek Fathers issued from the School of Origen. From him his disciples inherited especially the love for Platonic studies, of which the result is manifest in the numerous imitations contained in their writings. That portion of the doctrine of Origen which disagreed with the then crystallizing doctrine of the Church, or whatever was heterodox in his teachings, they either openly opposed or tacitly removed. Methodius of Tyre (about 290—his extant writings have recently been published, together with copious demonstrations of the Platonic correspondences in them, by Albert Jahn, Bern, 1865; in Migne's *Patrol. Coursus Compl.*, his works fill Vol. XVIII. of the Greek Fathers), although in other respects himself a Platonizer, argued against the doctrines of the pre-existence of the soul, its fall and descent into the body as into a prison, and the eternity of the divine creative work. He recommends an ascetic life. His exposition is rich in fanciful analogies. In the later period of the existence of this school appear "the three lights of the Church of Cappadocia": Basil the Great, of Cæsarea (cf. Alb. Jahn, *Basilii Platonizans*, Bern, 1838, and his *Animadversiones*, *ibid.*, 1842; E. Fialon's *Biographie de St. Basile*, Paris, 1861), his friend, Gregory of Nazianzen, celebrated as a pulpit orator and theologian, and a pupil of Athanasius, and Basil's brother Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa. These all held Origen in great reverence; Basil and Gregory of Nazianzen commenced preparing an anthology of his writings under the title *philoxalia*. In hierarchical talent Basil was the most distinguished of the three, while in the department of ecclesiastical theology and eloquence, Gregory of Nazianzen was most eminent; but in respect of the philosophical demonstration of Christian dogmas, Gregory of Nyssa did the most important service, for which reason to him alone a more detailed exposition must here be devoted. Hilarius of Poitiers (respecting whom a comprehensive monograph has recently been published by Reinkens, Breslau, 1865), the champion of Athanasianism in the West, about the middle of the fourth century, is also rather of significance for the history of the Church than for that of philosophy, and the same may be said of Julius Firmicus Maternus—who wrote, near the middle of the fourth century, *De errore Profanarum Religionum* (ed. Carl Halm, Vienna, 1865, see above, p. 263), in order to excite the secular authorities to an energetic persecution of the adherents of the ancient faith—as also of Cyprian, the predecessor by a century of the latter (lived 200-258), and many other Church teachers.

At the period in the history of Christianity at which we have now arrived, the period when Christianity had attained to political supremacy and had become dogmatically fixed

by decrees of Councils, there appears, together with the greater orthodoxy of its doctrines in point of objective expression, a less degree of firmness or at least of directness in the convictions of its supporters with reference to these doctrines. This is characteristically illustrated in the language used by Gregory of Nyssa in his "Dialogue with his sister Macrina concerning the Resurrection"—language which he indeed admits to be somewhat imprudent and bold, but which no one of the earlier Church Fathers could have employed, namely: "The words of Scripture are like commandments, by which we are forcibly constrained to believe in the eternal duration of the soul; we have not been convinced of this doctrine by rational demonstration, but in this, as in other respects, our minds seem servilely to accept through fear what we are commanded to believe, and not spontaneously impelled to assent to it" (III. p. 183 c, *ed. Morell*). Gregory, it is true, condemns this language on his part; but in that which follows it we do not find that the mental attitude of Gregory is, for example, that of one who seeks merely to excite anew and to confirm a faith founded on the witness of the divine to the human spirit, a faith directly awakened by Scripture and preaching, and only diminished in energy; we find rather that the author proceeds to furnish the required rational proofs, and this, too, not with a view to raising to knowledge a faith already fixed and sure of itself, but in order to prop up the faith, which at least for a moment was wavering, and to restore the lacking conviction. The deductions of the writer are at times interrupted by an appeal to passages of Scripture (which, however, are allegorically interpreted, after the manner of the Alexandrians, with an arbitrariness limited only by the rule of faith and the dogmatic canon, notwithstanding the unconditional subjection which Gregory expressly professes to the authority of the Scriptures, see III. 20); but the complete unity of the theological and philosophical points of view disappears; Gregory of Nyssa is the representative of the separation, beginning in his time, of these two intellectual forces, theology and philosophy, in the sense above indicated. Later authors (as Augustine, notably) returned indeed to the order proclaimed by Clement, and made their thinking dependent on their faith, yet not in the sense of a mere restoration of the earlier form of religious thought; from the time when a certain body of doctrine had been finally defined, the immediate unity of the processes of demonstration and definition ceased with reference to it, and remained confined to dogmas not yet defined, and then began the new direction of thought to the work of the rational justification of given dogmas. From this time on, (Christian) philosophy becomes, with reference to the fundamental dogmas, what it was in the Middle Ages with reference to all doctrines (with few exceptions), the hand-maid of (not identical with) theology. Yet the boundary-line is by no means altogether distinct; in many respects the character of the earlier period is apparent in the following one, and *vice versa*. The contrast between them appears in the fullest degree when the two first Christian centuries, especially the Apostolic and Gnostic periods, are compared with that mediæval period, when hierarchism and scholasticism reached their culminating point; in the intervening centuries the contrast is reduced to a relative difference of more or less.

In his *λόγος κατηχητικός* Gregory of Nyssa develops the Christian doctrine in systematic connection. The belief in God he grounds on the art and wisdom displayed in the order of the world, and the belief in the unity of God, on the perfection which must belong to God in respect of power, goodness, wisdom, eternity, and all other attributes, but which could not exist if there were several Gods. Still, continues Gregory, the Christian who combats the error of polytheism has need to exercise great care, lest, in contending against the Hellenes, he may unwittingly fall back into Judaism; for the Christian doctrine itself admits a distinction of hypostases in the unity of the divine nature. God has a Logos, for he cannot be without reason. But this Logos cannot be merely an attribute of God, it must be

conceived as a second person. To this more exalted conception of the divine Logos we are led by the consideration, that in the measure in which God is greater than we, all his predicates must also be higher than the homonymous ones which belong to us. Our Logos is a limited one; our discourse has only a transient existence. But the subsistence (*ὑπόστασις*) of the divine Logos must be indestructible and eternal, and hence necessarily living, since that which is rational cannot be conceived as lifeless and soulless, like a stone. Moreover, the life of the word of God must be an independent life (*αὐτοζωή*), and not a mere life by participation (*ζωῆς μετουσίᾳ*), since in the latter case it would lose its simplicity. But, further, there is nothing which has life and is deprived of will; therefore the divine Logos has also the faculty of will (*προαιρουμένη δύναμις*). Again, the will of the Logos must be equalled by his power, since a mixture of power with impotence would destroy his simplicity. His will, as being divine, must be also good and efficient; but from the ability and will to work the good follows the realization of the latter, hence the bringing into existence of the wisely and artfully adjusted world. But since, still further, the logical conception of the Word is in a certain sense a relative one (*πρός τι*), the word being necessarily related in thought to him who speaks it, it follows that, together with the Word, the Father of the Word must be recognized as existing (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη λόγος, μή τινος ὢν λόγος*). Thus the mystery of our faith avoids equally the absurdity (*ἀνομία*) of Jewish monotheism, which denies to the Word life, activity, and creative power, and that of heathen polytheism, since we acknowledge the equality in nature of the Word and of the Father of the Word; for whoever affirms goodness or power or wisdom or eternity or freedom from evil, death and decay, or absolute perfection as a mark of the Father, will find the Logos, whose existence is derived from the Father, marked by the same attributes (*λόγ. κατηχ.* Prologue and chap. 1). In like manner Gregory seeks by the analogy of human breath—which indeed (he adds) is nothing but inhaled and exhaled fire, i. e., an object foreign to us—to demonstrate the community of the divine Spirit with the essence of God and the independence of its existence (*ἰβιδ.*, chap. 2). In this doctrine he believes the proper mean between Judaism and Paganism to be found: from the Jewish doctrine the unity of the divine nature (*ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἐνότης*) has been retained, from Hellenism, the distinction into hypostases (*ἡ κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις διάκρισις*, *ἰβιδ.*, chap. 3). (That the same argumentation, which in the last analysis reposes only on the double sense of *ὑπόστασις*, viz.: a) real subsistence, b) individually independent, not attributive subsistence, could be used with reference to each of the divine attributes, and so, for the complete restoration of polytheism, Gregory leaves unnoticed.) A number of difficulties, arising from this view of the topics thus far treated, are discussed by Gregory in treatises "Concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," "On the Holy Trinity," "On Tritheism," and "To the Hellenes, from the Stand-point of the Universal Dicta of Reason." In the last-named work he says: If the name God signified the person of God, then, whenever we speak of the three persons we should necessarily speak of three Gods; but if the name God indicates the essence of God, then we affirm the existence of only one God, acknowledging, as we do, that the essence of the Holy Triad is only one. Now, in fact, the name God is the name only of the divine essence. If it were a personal name, only one of the three persons would be called God, just as only one is called Father. But if it should be said: we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three men, and not one man, as we should be compelled to do if the word man signified the universal essence of humanity, and not rather individual human existence (*τὴν μερικὴν*, or what Gregory calls a more exact expression, *ἰδικὴν οὐσίαν*); and if it be said that, according to this analogy, the word God, like the word man, ought to be considered as denoting separate, individual personality, and that it must be confessed that there are three Gods in the Christian Trinity,—Gregory admits, in reply, the analogy, but interprets and applies it in a contrary sense, affirming

that the word man, like all similar words, is applied to individuals only by an abuse of language, which arose from the accidental circumstance that it is not always possible to perceive the same essence in individuals of the lower orders (evidently a doubtful way of meeting the difficulty, since the plural can express nothing but the plurality of individuals of the same essence or nature, similarity of essence and identity of concept not excluding the possibility of numerical difference; when Gregory says, p. 85, c, d: *ἔστι δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος καὶ Βαρνάβας κατὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ἄνθρωπος καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος, πολλοὶ οὐ δύναται εἶναι, λέγονται δὲ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καταχρηστικῶς καὶ οὐ κυρίως*, it is impossible not to perceive that he confounds the abstract conception, which indeed excludes the plural, with the concrete conception, which demands it; and so sometimes expressly employs the abstract for the concrete expression, as in p. 86a, where he says of Scripture: *φυλάττουσα ταῦτότητα θεότητος ἐν ιδιότητι ὑποστάσεων*). It is doubtless not without a feeling of the deficiencies of his argumentation, that Gregory confesses that man can by severe study of the depths of the mystery win only a moderate knowledge of it, such is its unspeakable nature (*κατὰ τὸ ἀπόρητον μετρίαν τινὰ κατανόησιν—λόγ. κατηχ., cap. 3 iné.*).

God created the world by his reason and wisdom, for he cannot have proceeded irrationally in that work; but his reason and wisdom are, as above shown, not to be conceived as a spoken word or as the mere possession of knowledge, but as a substantially-existent, personal and willing potency. If the entire world was created by this second divine hypostasis, then certainly was man also thus created, yet not in view of any necessity, but from superabounding love (*ἀγάπης περισσίᾳ*), that there might exist a being, who should participate in the divine goods. If man was to be receptive of these goods, it was necessary that his nature should contain an element akin to God, and, in particular, that he should share in the eternity of the divine nature, i. e., be immortal. Thus, then, man was created in the image of God and in possession of all divine goods. He could not, therefore, be without the gifts of freedom, independence, and self-determination, and his participation in the divine goods was consequently made dependent on his virtue. In virtue of his freedom he could decide in favor of evil, which cannot have its origin in the divine will, since then it would not be subject to censure—but only in our inner selves, where it arises in the form of deviation from good, just as darkness is the privation (*στέρησις*) of light, or as blindness is the privation of the power of vision. The antithesis between virtue and vice is not to be so conceived, as if they were two independent existences; but just as to being non-being is opposed, not as a second existence, but as non-existence set over-against existence, so vice is opposed to virtue, not as something existing in and for itself, but as absence of the better. Since now all that is created is subject to change, it was possible that first one of the created spirits, namely, he who was entrusted with the oversight of the earth, should turn his eye away from the good and become envious, and that from this envy should arise a leaning toward badness which should, in natural sequence, prepare the way for all other evil. He seduced the first men into the folly of turning away from goodness, by disturbing the divinely-ordered harmony between their sensuous and intellectual natures and guilefully tainting their wills with evil (*λόγ. κατ., chs. 5 and 6*). God knew what would happen and hindered it not, that he might not destroy our freedom; he did not, on account of his foreknowledge of the evil which would result from man's creation, leave man uncreated, for it was better to bring back sinners to original grace by the way of repentance and physical suffering than not to create man at all. The raising up of the fallen was a work befitting the giver of life, the God who is the wisdom and power of God, and for this purpose he became man (*ibid., chs. 7, 8; 14 seq.*). The incarnation was not unworthy of him; for only evil brings disgrace (*ch. 9*). The objection, that the finite cannot contain the infinite, and that therefore the

human nature could not receive into itself the divine, is founded on the false supposition that the incarnation of the Word means, that the infinity of God was contained in the limits of the flesh as in a vessel; on the contrary, the divine nature is to be conceived as having been so united with the human, as flame is with a combustible, which former extends beyond the latter, as also our souls overstep the limits of our bodies and through the motions of thought extend themselves without hindrance through the whole creation (ch. 10). For the rest, the manner in which the divine nature was united to the human surpasses our power of comprehension, although we are not permitted to doubt the fact of that union in Jesus, on account of the miracles which he wrought; the supernatural character of those miracles bears witness to their divine origin (ch. 11 seq.). After we had freely sold ourselves to evil, he, who of his goodness sought to restore us to liberty, could not for this end have recourse to measures of arbitrary violence, but must follow the way of justice. It was necessary, therefore, that a ransom should be paid, which should exceed in value that which was to be ransomed, and hence it was necessary that the Son of God should surrender himself to the power of death. His goodness moved him to save us and his justice impelled him to undertake the redemption by the way of exchange of those who were reduced to bondage. His power was more signally displayed by his incarnation than it would have been had he remained in his glory, and the act of incarnation was not in conflict with his wisdom, eternity, or omnipresence (ch. 22 seq.). By concealing the divine nature within the human, a certain deception was indeed practiced on the Evil One; but for the latter, as himself a deceiver, it was only a just recompense that he should be deceived himself; the great adversary must himself at last find that what has been done was just and salutary, when he also shall have been purified, and as a saved being shall experience the benefit of the incarnation (ch. 26). It was necessary that human degeneracy should have reached its lowest point before the work of salvation could enter in (ch. 29). That, however, grace through faith has not come to all men must not be laid to God's account, who has sent forth his call to all men, but to the account of human freedom; if God were to break down our opposition by violent means, the virtue and praiseworthiness of human conduct would be destroyed in the destruction of human freedom, and man would be degraded to the level of the irrational brute (ch. 30 seq.). Gregory seeks farther to show how it was worthy of God that he should die on the cross (ch. 32). He then shows the saving nature of prayer and of the Christian sacraments (chs. 33-37). It is essential for regeneration to believe that the Son and the Spirit are not created spirits, but of like nature with God the Father; for he who would make his salvation dependent on anything created would trust to an imperfect nature and one itself needing a savior (ch. 38 seq.; cf. the treatise on the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, p. 38, d: those who hold the Son to have been created must either worship a creature, which is idolatrous, or not worship him, which is unchristian and Jewish). He alone has truly become a child of God who gives evidence of his regeneration by voluntarily putting away from himself all vice (ch. 40).

A series of anthropological speculations are contained in the work "On the Creation of Man." Biblical propositions are combined with Aristotelian and Platonic ideas and with a teleological physiology. The possibility of the creation of matter by the divine spirit rests on the fact that matter is only the unity of qualities which in themselves are immaterial (ch. 23 seq.). Man is more noble than the rest of creation (ch. 3). His spirit pervades his whole body, and not merely a single part of it (ch. 12 seq.). It begins to exist at the same time with the body, neither before nor after (ch. 28). The soul will at a future time be reunited with its body, and, once purified by punishment, will return to the Good (ch. 21). The subject of eschatology is discussed by Gregory in the "Dialogue con-

cerning the Soul and the Resurrection." Faith in the continued existence of the soul after death is declared to be necessary to virtue, since it is only on the condition of man's future existence that virtue has any advantage over pleasure (p. 184, a). But Gregory does not (like Lactantius) proceed at once to construct on the basis of this necessity a "moral" argument for immortality, holding, rather, that the case is one that calls for speculative or scientific arguments. To the objection of those who assert that the nature of the soul, as of all real things, is material, he replies that the truth of this doctrine would involve the truth of Atheism, but that Atheism is refuted by the fact of the wise order which reigns in the world, and that the spiritual nature of God, which cannot be denied, proves the possibility of immaterial existence (p. 184, b seq.). We may with the same right conclude from the phenomena of the human Microcosm to the actual existence of an immaterial soul, as from the phenomena of the world as a whole to the reality of God's existence (p. 188, b seq.). The soul is defined by Gregory as a created being, having life, the power of thought, and, so long as it is provided with the proper organs, the power of sensuous perception (p. 189, c). The power of thought is not an attribute of matter, since, were it otherwise, matter would show itself endowed with it, would, for example, combine its elements so as to form works of art (p. 192, b seq.). In its substantial existence, as separable from matter, the soul is like God; but this likeness does not extend to the point of identity; the soul only resembles God, as a copy resembles its original (p. 196, a). As being "simple and uncompounded" (*ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀσύνθετος φύσις*) the soul survives the dissolution of the composite body (*σύνκρημα*—p. 197, c), whose scattered elements it continues and will continue to accompany, as if watching over its property, until the resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them anew (p. 198, b seq.; cf. 213, a seq.). Anger and desire do not belong to the essence of the soul, but are only among its varying states (*πάθη τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐκ οὐσία*); they are not originally a part of ourselves, and we can and must rid ourselves of them (p. 199, c seq.), and bring them, so long as they continue to mark our community with the brute creation, into the service of good (p. 204, c seq.). Hades, which the soul enters after its separation from the world of sense, is not a particular place; it means the Invisible (*τὸ ἀφανές τε καὶ αἰεδός*, p. 210, a; cf. Plat., *Phædo*, p. 80, d); those passages in the Bible in which the regions under the earth are alluded to are explained by Gregory as not literal or descriptive of real localities, but allegorical—although in this point Gregory would not strenuously resist the partisans of the opposite interpretation, since in the principal point, the recognition of the soul's future existence, he and they agree (p. 211, a seq.). God decrees to sinners severe and long-continued pains in eternity, not because he hates them, nor for the sake alone of punishing them, but for their improvement, which latter cannot take place until the soul has undergone a painful purging from all its impurities (p. 226, b seq.). The degree of pain which must thus be endured by each one is necessarily proportioned to the measure of his wickedness (227, b). When the process of purification has been completed, the better attributes of the soul appear, imperishability, life, honor, grace, glory, power, and, in short, all that belongs to human nature as the image of divinity (p. 260, b). In this sense the resurrection is the restoration of man to his original state—as Gregory often defines it (*ἀνάστασις ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἀποκατάστασις*, p. 252, b *et al.*).

The doctrine of the final reunion of all things with God is too firmly rooted in Gregory's conception of the negative nature and limited power of evil, and of the supreme goodness of the God whose punishments aim only at the improvement of the sinner, to admit of the passages in his writings, which contain this doctrine, being regarded as interpolations. Such, according to the report of Photius (*Bibl. Cod.*, 233), the Patriarch Germanus of Constantinople (about 700) pretended that they were; the Patriarch was evidently moved

by the apologetic desire to save Gregory's orthodoxy. Yet it cannot be denied that Gregory's doctrine of freedom, as excluding all compulsion of the will in the direction of goodness, does not accord well with the theory of the necessary return of every soul to goodness; one can but regret the absence of any attempt to remove this at least seeming contradiction.

Without doubt Augustine was a more highly gifted man than Gregory; yet the Origenistic and Gregorian form of teaching, as compared with the Augustinian, possesses nevertheless, in point of logic and moral spirit, advantages peculiar to itself which were never reached by the Latin Church Father.

§ 86. In Augustine the development of ecclesiastical doctrine in the Patristic Period reaches its culminating point. Aurelius Augustinus was born on the 13th of November, in the year 354, and died August 28, 430, while Bishop of Hippo Regius. His father was a heathen, but his mother was a Christian, who brought up her son in the Christian faith. He subsequently espoused the belief of the Manichæans and prepared himself by classical studies for the office of a teacher of rhetoric. After a skeptical transition-period, when also Platonic and Neo-Platonic speculations had prepared him for the change, he was won over by Ambrosius to Catholic Christianity, in the service of which he thenceforth labored as a defender and constructor of doctrines, and also practically as a priest and bishop. Against the Skepticism of the Academics/Augustine urges that man needs the knowledge of truth for his happiness, that it is not enough merely to inquire and to doubt, and he finds a foundation for all our knowledge, a foundation invulnerable against every doubt, in the consciousness we have of our sensations, feelings, our willing, and thinking, in short, of all our psychical processes. From the undeniable existence and possession by man of some truth, he concludes to the existence of God as the truth *per se*; but our conviction of the existence of the material world he regards as only an irresistible belief. Combating heathen religion and philosophy, Augustine defends the doctrines and institutions peculiar to Christianity, and maintains, in particular, against the Neo-Platonists, whom he rates most highly among all the ancient philosophers, the Christian theses that salvation is to be found in Christ alone, that divine worship is due to no other being beside the triune God, since he created all things himself, and did not commission inferior beings, gods, demons, or angels to create the material world; that the soul with its body will rise again to eternal salvation or damnation, but will not return periodically to renewed life upon the earth; that the soul does not exist before the body, and that the latter

is not the prison of the former, but that the soul begins to exist at the same time with the body; that the world both had a beginning and is perishable; and that only God and the souls of angels and men are eternal.—Against the dualism of the Manichæans, who regarded good and evil as equally primitive, and represented a portion of the divine substance as having entered into the region of evil, in order to war against and conquer it. Augustine defends the monism of the good principle, or of the purely spiritual God, explaining evil as a mere negation or privation, and seeking to show from the finiteness of the things in the world, and from their differing degrees of perfection, that the evils in the world are necessary, and not in contradiction with the idea of creation; he also defends, in opposition to Manichæism (and Gnosticism in general), the Catholic doctrine of the essential harmony between the Old and New Testaments. Against the Donatists, Augustine maintains the unity of the Church. In opposition to Pelagius and the Pelagians, he asserts that divine grace is not conditioned on human worthiness, and maintains the doctrine of absolute predestination, or, that from the mass of men who, through the disobedience of Adam (in whom all mankind were present potentially), have sunk into corruption and sin, some are chosen by the free election of God to be monuments of his grace, and are brought to believe and be saved, while the greater number, as monuments of his justice, are left to eternal damnation.

Luther
Calvin

The works of St. Augustine were published at Basel in 1506, and subsequently—edited by Erasmus—in 1528–29 and 1569. An edition by the *Loventenses theologi* appeared at Antwerp in 1577, another, by the Benedictines of the Maurine Congregation, at Paris, 1639–1700 (*Ed. Nov.*, Antwerp, 1700–1708), and still another, in more recent times, at Paris, 1835–40. Of the numerous writings of Augustine the *Confessiones* (ed. stereotyp., Leipzig, 1807) and *De Civitate Dei* (Leipzig, 1823, Cologne, 1850, Leipzig, 1868), have very frequently been edited separately; Krabinger's edition of the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium de Fide, Spe et Caritate* (Tübingen, 1861) is distinguished by its critical exactness. Cf. Busch, *Librorum Augustini Recensio*, Dorpat, 1826. In Migne's *Patr.*, the works of Augustine form Vols. XXXII.–XLVII. of the Latin Fathers. The fourth volume of a French translation, made under the direction of Ponjoulat and Baulx, and to be completed in fifteen volumes, appeared at Montauban, in 1866.

The *Biography of Augustine*, by his younger friend Possidius, is to be found in most of the editions of Augustine's works (especially in Vol. X. of the Maurine edition); it serves as a complement to Augustine's own *Confessiones*. Of the numerous modern works on Augustine, the most comprehensive are those of G. F. Wiggers (*Versuch einer pragmat. Darstellung des Augustinismus u. Pelagianismus*, Hamburg, 1821–83), Kloth (*Der heilige Kirchenlehrer Augustinus*, Aix-la-Chapelle, 1840); C. Hindemann (*Der heilige Aug.*, Vol. I., Berlin, 1844; Vol. II., Leipzig, 1856; Vol. III., Greifswald, 1869). Friedrich Böhlinger, in his *Gesch. d. Kirche Chr.* (I. 3, Zürich, 1845, pp. 99–774), Neander (*Ch. Hist.*) and Schaff (*Ch. Hist.*), treat with great fullness of Augustine. On Augustine's doctrine of time, cf. Fortlage (Heidelberg, 1838); on his psychology: Ganganf (Augsburg, 1832) and Ferraz (Paris, 1863, 2d edition, 1869); on his logic: Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, I., Leipzig, 1855, pp. 663–672); on his doctrine of cognition: Jac. Merten (*Ueber die Bedeutung der Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Augustinus und des heiligen Thomas von Aquino für den gesch. Entwicklungsgang der Philosophie als reiner Vernunftwissenschaft*, Treves, 1865), and Nic. Jos. Ludw. Schütz (*Dei Augustini de origine et via cognitionis intellectualis doctrina ab ontologia metaphysica, comm. philos.*, Münster, 1867); on his doctrine of self-knowledge: E. Meiser (*Aug. apud*

Cartesi placita de mentis humanas sui cognitione quomodo inter se congruant a senecis differant, diss. inaug., Bonn, 1860); on his doctrine of sin and grace in relation to the doctrines of Paul and the Reformers: Zeller (in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübingen, 1854, pp. 295 seq.); on his doctrine of miracles: Friedr. Nitzsch (Berlin, 1865); on his doctrine of God as trine: Theodor Gangauf (Angsburg, 1866); on his philosophy of history: Jos. Reinkens (Schaffhausen, 1866). Of the more recent French works on Augustine the most comprehensive is F. Nourrisson's *La Philosophie de St. Augustin*, Paris, 1865, 2d ed., 1866. Cf. also A. F. Hewitt, *The Problems of the Age, with Studies in St. Augustine*, New York, 1868.

Augustine's father, Patricius, remained a heathen until shortly before his death; his mother, Monica, was a Christian, and exerted a profound influence over her son. Educated at Thagaste, Madaura, and Carthage, Augustine followed first in his native city, then at Carthage and Rome, and from 384-386 in Milan, the vocation of a teacher of eloquence; yet his interest always centered chiefly in theological problems. The *Hortensius* of Cicero awakened in the young man, who had been addicted to sensuous pleasures, the love of philosophical inquiry. The biblical Scriptures failed at that time, in respect of form and content, to satisfy him. To the question of the origin of evil, the Manichæan dualism seemed to him to furnish the most satisfactory answer; the supporters of this doctrine seemed to him, also, to judge more correctly, when they rejected the Old Testament as contradicting the New, than did the Catholic Church, which presupposed the entire harmony of all biblical writings. But the contradictions of the Manichæan doctrine in itself and with astronomical facts gradually destroyed his faith in it, and he approached more and more toward the skepticism of the New Academy, till finally (in the year 386) the reading of certain writings of (Plato and) Neo-Platonists (in the translation of Victorinus) turned him in the direction of a positive faith, and the preaching of Bishop Ambrosius at Milan—which he had attended originally only on account of the rhetorical excellence of the style of that orator—led him back to the Church. The allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament removed its apparent contradictions with the New, and removed from the notion of God that anthropomorphism which had given offense to Augustine; and the thought of the harmony of the divinely-created universe in all its parts converted him from dualism. Augustine was baptized by Ambrosius at Easter in 387. Soon afterward he returned to Africa, became in 391 priest at Hippo Regius and in 395 was raised to the dignity of a bishop at the same place (first as assistant bishop of Valerius, who soon afterward died). He waged an untiring combat against the Manichæans, Donatists, and Pelagians, and labored for the confirmation and extension of the Catholic faith, advancing constantly more and more from religious philosophy to positive dogmatics. He died on the 28th of August, in the year 430.

The earliest of Augustine's works, written in his Manichæan period, while he was a professional rhetorician, and entitled *De Pulchro et Apto*, is lost. Of his extant works, the earliest is that directed against the skepticism of the Academics (*Contra Academicos*), which he composed before his baptism, while residing at Cassiciacum, near Milan, in the autumn of 386; at the same place he wrote the treatises *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* and the *Soliloquia*, and after his return to Milan, but also before his baptism, the *De Immortalitate Animæ*, which is the sketch of a continuation of the *Soliloquia*, and a book on Grammar. Here also he began to write works on Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Music, and Philosophy (August., *Retract.* I. 6). Still, the genuineness of the works on grammar and on the principles of dialectic and rhetoric, published among his writings, has been questioned: according to Prantl's showing, the *Principia Dialecticæ* may perhaps be considered as genuine, while the supplementary treatise on the ten categories is spurious; the latter is perhaps (as Prantl conjectures) a modification of Themistius' paraphrase of the *Categories* of Aristotle (cf. W. Grecelius, *S. Aurelii Augustini de Dialectica Liber*, G.-Pr., Elberfeld,

1857, for the arguments in favor of the genuineness of the *Dialectic* and *Rhetoric* attributed to Augustine, and for the spuriousness of the *Grammar*, together with emendations of the text of the *Dialectic*. The work on immortality was followed by another on the *Greatness of the Soul*, composed while Augustine was stopping at Rome, on his return from Milan to Africa; this was succeeded by the three books on the *Freedom of the Will* directed against the Manichæan solution of the question of the origin of evil—of which books he wrote the two last in Africa—and by the works on the *Morals of the Catholic Church* and on the *Morals of the Manichæans*, which were likewise begun at Rome; at Thagaste, whither he returned in 388, he composed, among other works, the books on *Music*, the work *De Genesi contra Manichæos*—an allegorical interpretation of the biblical history of creation—and the book *De Vera Religione*, which he had already projected while at Cassiciacum; this latter work was an attempt to develop faith into knowledge. His works against Manichæism are the *De Utilitate Credendi*, which was written while Augustine was presbyter at Hippo, the *De duabus Animabus*, in which he combats the doctrine of the union of a good and a bad soul in man, the work against *Adimantus*, the disciple of Mani, which discusses the relation of the Old Testament to the New, and the *Disputation with Fortunatus*; in the period of Augustine's presbyterial functions, fall also—besides numerous expositions of the books of Scripture, including a literal interpretation of the first part of Genesis—a discourse concerning faith and the symbol or confession of faith, and his casuistical work on lying. Of the works subsequently composed by Augustine, after he was made a bishop, the greater number were polemical writings aimed against the Donatists and the Pelagians, being written in the former case in defense of the unity of the Church, and in the latter in defense of the dogma of original sin and of the predestination of man by the free grace of God; of especial importance are the works on the *Trinity* (400–410) and on the *City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*), the latter Augustine's principal work, begun in 413, completed in 426. The *Confessiones* were written about 400. The *Retractiones* were written by Augustine a few years before his death, and are a review of his own works, together with corrective remarks, which, for the most part, were intended to restrict those of his earlier opinions which were deemed too favorable to the sciences and to human freedom, so as to make them strictly accordant with the teaching of the Church.

The knowledge which Augustine seeks is the knowledge of God and of himself (*Soliloqu.*, I. 7: *Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino. Ib.*, II. 4: *Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te!*) [Of the principal branches of philosophy, ethics or the doctrine of the highest good rightly fulfills its task only when it finds this good in the enjoyment of God; dialectic is valuable as an instrumental science, as the doctrine of cognition, teaching how to teach and how to learn (*De Ord.*, II, 38; cf. *De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 10: *rationalem partem sive logicam, in qua quaeritur, quonam modo veritas percipi possit*); physics is of value only in so far as it teaches of God, the supreme cause; otherwise it is superfluous, or so far as it contributes nothing to our salvation (*Confess.*, V. 7: *beatus autem qui te scilicet etiam illa nesciat; qui vero et te et illa novit, non propter illa beator, sed propter te solum beatus est; ib.*, X. 55: *hinc ad perscrutanda naturae, quae praeter nos est, aperta proceditur, quae scire nihil prodest*). In opposition to the thought expressed in his early work, *De Ordine* (II. 14, 15), that the sciences constitute the way which leads us to the knowledge of the order which reigns in all things, and consequently to the knowledge of the divine wisdom, Augustine observes in the *Retractiones* (I. 3. 2), that there are many holy men who are not acquainted with the liberal sciences, and that many who are acquainted with them are without holiness. Science profits only where love is, otherwise she puffs up. Humility must cure us of the impulse to seek for unprofitable knowledge. To the good angels the knowledge of material things, with which demons are puffed up, appears mean

in comparison with the sanctifying love of the immaterial and immutable God ~~they~~ ^{they} have a more certain knowledge of things temporal and changeable, for the very reason that they behold the first causes of those things in the Word of God, by whom the world was made (*De Civ. Dei*, IX. 22). This view of Augustine respecting the relative value or worthlessness of the various sciences exercised a decisive influence on the entire intellectual character of the Christian world of the Middle Ages.

With his opinion of philosophy corresponds Augustine's judgment respecting the philosophers before Christ (which it is worth while to reproduce here, more particularly on account of its influence in subsequent times). In the eighth book of the *Civitas Dei* (ch. 2) he gives a sketch of the "Italic" and "Ionic" philosophy before Socrates; by the former he understands the Pythagorean philosophy, in the latter he includes the doctrine of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and his two pupils Anaxagoras and Diogenes, of whom, he says, the former conceived God as the fashioner of matter, while the latter regarded air as the substance in which the divine reason inhered. One of Anaxagoras' disciples, says Augustine, was Archelaus, and he is said to have had for a disciple Socrates, who (ch. 3) first limited all philosophy to ethics, either on account of the obscurity of physics, or, as some, who were more disposed to favor Socrates, have judged, because none but a mind ethically purified should venture on the investigation of the eternal light, in which the causes of all created beings live unchangeable. Of the disciples of Socrates, Augustine only mentions briefly Aristippus and Antisthenes, and then discourses more fully (ch. 4 seq.) of Plato and the Neo-Platonists as the most eminent of all ancient thinkers. After the death of Socrates, Plato familiarized himself with the wisdom of the Egyptians and the Pythagoreans. He divided philosophy into *moralis*, *naturalis*, and *rationalis philosophia*; the latter belongs principally (together with natural philosophy) to theoretical (*contemplativa*) philosophy, while moral philosophy is equivalent to practical (*activa*) philosophy. Plato, continues Augustine, retained in his writings the Socratic method of concealing his own opinions to that extent, that it is difficult to know what was his real belief respecting the most important subjects. Augustine prefers, therefore, to confine himself to the later Platonists, "*qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius atque veracius intellexisse atque secuti esse fama celebriore laudantur.*" Augustine numbers Aristotle among the Old Platonists, but adds that he founded a "*secta*" or "*haeresis*" of his own, distinct from the Academics; he was a "*vir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem impar, sed multos facile superans*" (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 12). The later followers of Plato desired to be called, not academics nor Peripatetics, but Platonists, pre-eminent among whom were Plotinus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus. For them God is the *causa subsistendi*, the *ratio intelligendi*, and the *ordo vivendi* (ch. 4). "No philosophers have approached nearer to us than did they" (ch. 5). Their doctrine is superior to the "fabulous religion" of the poets, the "civil religion" of the pagan state, and the "natural religion" of all other ancient philosophers, including that of the Stoics, who thought to find the first cause of all things in fire, and that of the Epicureans, who found the same in the atoms, and both of which philosophical sects were too sensualistic in their theories of knowledge and too little theological in their ethics. In searching for the eternal and immutable God, the Platonists, with reason, went beyond the material world and the soul and the realm of mutable spirits (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 6: *cuncta corpora transcendunt quaerentes Deum; omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcendunt quaerentes summum Deum*). But they separated themselves from the truth as held by Christians, in paying religious veneration, not only to this supreme God, but also to inferior deities and demons, who are not creators (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 24). The Christian, even without the aid of philosophy, knows from the Holy Scriptures, that God is our Creator, our teacher, and the giver of grace (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 10). Some Chris-

tians have been led, in their astonishment at the agreement of Plato's theology with that of the Scriptures, to the belief that, while he was in Egypt, he heard the prophet Jeremiah, or even read the prophetic Scriptures; Augustine confesses that for a time he himself entertained that opinion (expressed by him, *De Doctr. Christ.*, II. ch. 29); but he finds (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 11), that Plato lived considerably later than Jeremiah; he holds it not impossible that Plato made himself acquainted with the contents of the biblical writings by means of an interpreter, and thinks that he may have drawn his doctrine of the immutability of God from the biblical expressions: *Ego sum qui sum*, and *qui est, misit me ad vos* (Exod. iii. 14); yet he (ch. 12) holds it quite as possible that Plato inferred the eternal being of God from the contemplation of the world, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. i. 19 seq.). The Platonists were not altogether without a knowledge even of the Trinity, although they speak of three Gods with undisciplined words (*De Civ. Dei*, X. 29). But they reject the doctrine of the incarnation of the immutable Son of God, and do not believe that the divine reason, which they call *πατρικὸς νοῦς*, took on itself a human body and suffered the death of the cross; for they do not truly and loyally love wisdom and virtue, they despise humility, and illustrate in themselves the words of the prophet (Isaiah xxix. 14): *perdam sapientiam sapientium et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo* (*De Civ. Dei*, X. 29). These philosophers saw, though obscurely, the goal, the eternal fatherland; but they missed their way, and their disciples are now ashamed to leave the school of Plato for the school of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost gave to the fisherman, John, the knowledge of the Incarnate Word (*ib.*, ch. 29). Not he who, following reason, lives according to human customs, but only he who subjects his spirit to the will of God and follows God's commands, can be saved (*Retract.*, I. 1. 2).

In the earliest of his extant works Augustine seeks to demonstrate, in opposition to the Academics, the existence of a necessary element in knowledge. It is a characteristic feature of his discussion of this subject that he does not begin with the question of the origin of knowledge, but with the question, whether the possession of truth is one of our wants, or whether, without it, happiness is possible; or, in other words, that he proceeds, in the first instance, not genetically, but teleologically. One of the interlocutors, the youthful Licentius, defends the proposition, that the mere searching for truth makes us happy, since wisdom or the life according to reason, and the intellectual perfection of man, on which his happiness depends, consist, at least during his earthly life, not in the possession, but in the loyal and unceasing pursuit, of truth. Trygetius, a young man of the same age with Licentius, affirms, on the contrary, that it is necessary to possess the truth, since constant searching without finding is synonymous with erring. Licentius replies, that error consists rather in assenting to the false instead of the true; that seeking is not error, but rather wisdom, and is, as it were, the straight way of life, by following which man frees his spirit from the entanglements of the body, so far as this is possible, unites all its powers within itself, and becomes at the end of his life worthy to attain his true end, the enjoyment of divine, as now he enjoys human, happiness. But Augustine himself does not at all approve the doctrine of Licentius. He affirms, first, that without the true the probable is unattainable, which yet the Academics held to be attainable, and then, that the true, to which the probable is similar—this similarity constituting the essence of the probable—is the standard by which the probable is known. He then remarks that no one, certainly can be wise without wisdom; and that every definition of wisdom, which excludes knowledge from the idea of wisdom and makes the latter equivalent to the mere confession of ignorance, and to abstinence from all assent, identifies wisdom with nullity or with the false, and is therefore untenable. (It is obvious that Augustine here leaves wisdom in the sense of a "way of living," out of consideration.) But if knowledge

belongs to wisdom, then it belongs also to happiness, for only the wise man is happy. He who lightly pretends to the name of the wise man without possessing the knowledge of truth, draws around himself only pitiable, deceived followers, who, always seeking, but never finding, with mind desolate and inspired by no living breath of truth, must end by cursing their misleading guides. Besides, the pretended inability of man to attain to knowledge does not exist, on which the Academics found their demand that men should always withhold their assent. It is neither true that the impressions of the senses are altogether deceptive, nor that thought is fully dependent on them; a certain kind of knowledge is arrived at even in physics and ethics through our dialectical knowledge of the necessity, that of the two alternatives of a contradictory disjunction, the one must be true (*certum enim habeo, aut unum esse mundum aut non unum, et si non unum, aut finiti numeri aut infiniti*, etc.). In the work *De Beata Vita*, Augustine adds the argument, that no one can be happy who is not in possession of that which he wishes to possess; but no one seeks who does not wish to find; he, therefore, who seeks the truth, without finding it, has not that which he wishes to find, and is not happy. Nor is he wise, for the wise man, as such, must be happy. So, too, he who seeks after God, has indeed already God's grace, which leads him, but has not yet come to complete wisdom and happiness. In the *Retractationes*, however, Augustine emphasizes rather the thought, that perfect blessedness is not to be expected till the future life.

Seeking, in opposition to Skepticism, an indubitable certitude as a point of departure for all philosophical investigation, Augustine finds it, in his work *Contra Academicos*, in all disjunctive propositions, on the one hand, and remarks, on the other, that our sensible perceptions are at least subjectively true: *noli plus assentiri quam ut tibi apparere persuadeas, et nulla deceptio est* (*Contra Acad.*, III. 26), and in the nearly synchronous work *De Beata Vita* (ch. 7), he lays down the principle, which has been so fruitful in philosophy, that it is impossible to doubt one's own living existence—a principle, which, in the *Soliloquia*, written immediately afterward, is expressed in this form: thought, and therefore the existence of the thinker, are the most certain of all things (*Sol.*, II. 1: *Tu, qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? Scio. Unde scis? Nescio. Simplicem te sentis an multiplicem? Nescio. Moreri te scis? Nescio. Cogitare te scis? Scio*). In like manner, Augustine concludes (in *De Lib. Arbitr.*, II. 7) from the possibility of our being deceived (*falsi posse*) to the fact of our existence, and makes being, life, and thought co-ordinate. (Cf. *De Vera Religione*, 72: *noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas, et si animam mutabilem inveneris, transcede te ipsum. Ibid.* 73: *omnis, qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re, quam intelligit, certus est. Omnis igitur qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in se ipso habet verum unde non dubitat, nec ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non itaque oportet eum de veritate dubitare, qui potuit undecunque dubitare. De Trinitate*, X. 14: *utrum aeris sit v's vivendi—an ignis—dubitaverunt homines; vivere se tamen et meminisse et intelligere et velle et cogitare et scire et judicare quis dubitet? quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit, si dubitat, unde dubitet meminit, si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit, si dubitat, certus esse vult, si dubitat, cogitat, si dubitat, scit se nescire, si dubitat, judicat non se temere consentire oportere. Ibid.* XIV. 7: *nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id, quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est, quam ipsa sibi*). In *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 26, Augustine finds an image of the divine Trinity in the triad of our being, our knowledge of our being and our self-love, in regard to which error is impossible (*nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus; in his autem tribus quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas verisimilis turbat; non enim ea, sicut illa quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, . . . quorum sensibilibus etiam imagines vis simillimas nec jam corporeas cogitatione versamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsos in istorum desideria conciliamus, sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione*

iudicatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est). That material bodies exist, we can indeed only believe; but this belief is necessary in practice (*Confess.*, VI. 7), and because not to believe thus would lead to worse errors (*De Civ. Dei*, XIX. 18). Faith is also necessary to the knowledge of the wills of other men (*De Fide Rerum, quas non Vid.*, 2). Faith, in the most general sense, is assenting to an idea (*causæ assensionis cogitare*, *De Prædest. Sanct.*, 5). That which we know, we also believe; but not all, that we believe, are we able immediately to know; faith is the way to knowledge (*De Div.*, qu. 83, qu. 48 and 68; *De Trin.*, XV. 2; *Epist.*, 120). When we reflect upon ourselves, we find in ourselves not only sensations, but also an internal sense which makes of the former its objects (for we have knowledge of our sensations, but the external senses are unable to perceive their own sensations), and, finally, reason, which knows both the internal sense and itself (*De Lib. Arb.*, II. 3 seq.). That which judges is always superior to that which is judged; but that, according to which judgment is rendered, is also superior to that which judges. The human reason perceives that there is something higher than itself; for it is changeable, now knowing, now not knowing, now seeking after knowledge, now not, now correctly, now incorrectly judging; but truth itself, which is the norm according to which it judges, must be unchangeable (*De Lib. Arb.*, II. 6; *De Vera Rel.*, 54, 57; *De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 6). If thou findest thy nature to be changeable, rise above thyself to the eternal source of the light of reason. Even if thou only knowest that thou doubtest, thou knowest what is true; but nothing is true unless truth exists. Hence it is impossible to doubt the existence of the truth itself (*De Vera Rel.*, 72 seq.). Now the unchangeable truth is God. Nothing higher than it can be conceived, for it includes all true being (*De Vera Rel.*, 57; *De Trin.*, VIII. 3). It is identical with the highest good, in virtue of which all inferior goods are good (*De Trin.*, VIII. 4; *quid plura et plura? bonum hoc et bonum illud? tolle hoc et illud et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni*). All ideas are in God. He is the eternal ground of all form, who imparted to created objects their temporal forms (*De Div.*, qu. 46; *De Ideis*, 2: *Sunt namque ideæ principales formæ quædam vel rationes rerum stabiles et immutabiles, quas ipsæ formatæ non sunt atque per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur, et quæ ipsæ neque oriuntur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne, quod interire potest et omne, quod oritur et interit*); he is the absolute unity to which all that is finite aspires, without ever fully reaching it, the highest beauty, which is superior to and the condition of all other beauty ("*omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas est*"); he is absolute wisdom, blessedness, justice, the moral law, etc. (*De Vera Rel.*, 21 et al.; *De Lib. Arb.*, II. 9 seq.; *De Trin.*, XIV. 21). The mutability of created things is to us a reminder of the immutability of the truth (*Conf.*, XI. 10). Plato did not err in positing the existence of an intelligible world; this was the name which he applied to the eternal and unchangeable reason, by which God made the world; he who refuses to accept this doctrine must say that God proceeded irrationally in the creation of the world (*Retract.*, I. 3. 2). In the One divine wisdom are contained immeasurable and infinite treasures of intelligible things, in which are included all the invisible and immutable rational grounds of things (*rationes rerum*), not excepting the visible and mutable things, which were created by the divine wisdom (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 10. 3; cf. *De Div.*, quæst. 83, qu. 26. 2: *singuli igitur propriis sunt creati rationibus*). In the case of bodies, substance and attribute are different; even the soul, if it shall ever become wise, will become such only by participation in the unchangeable wisdom itself, with which it is not identical. But in beings whose nature is simple, and which are ultimate and original and truly divine, the quality does not differ from the substance, since such beings are divine, wise, and happy in themselves, and not by participation in something

foreign to them (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 10. 3). In the same manner it is true of God himself that the distinction of quality and substance, and, in short, of all the (Aristotelian) categories, is inapplicable to him. God falls under no one of the categories (*De Trin.*, V. 2: *ut sic intelligamus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem*). Even the category of substance is not properly applicable to God, although he in the highest sense is or has reality (*De Trin.*, VII. 10: *res ergo mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae: Deus autem si subsistit ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tamquam in subjecto et non est simplex,—unde manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatore intelligatur essentia quod vere ac proprie dicitur*). Yet Augustine prefers to follow the terminology of the Church (*ib.*, II. 35), all the more because an adequate knowledge of God and the power adequately to name him are unattainable by man in this earthly life (*De Trin.*, VII. 7: *verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur, et verius est, quam cogitur*). It may be questioned whether any positive affirmation respecting him is literally true (*De Trin.*, V. 11; cf. *Conf.*, XI. 26); we know with certainty only what he is not (*De Ord.*, II. 44, 47); yet it is no inconsiderable advantage to be able to deny of God what does not belong to him (*De Trin.*, VIII. 3). If we had no knowledge whatever of God we could not invoke and love him (*De Trin.*, VIII. 12; *Confess.*, I. 1, VII. 16). God is, as was rightly perceived and acknowledged by the Platonists, the principle of being and knowledge, and the guiding-star of life (*Confess.*, VII. 16; *De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 4). He is the light in which we see the intelligible, the light of eternal reason; what we know, we know only in him (*Conf.*, X. 65; XII. 35; *De Trin.*, XII. 24).

God is the Triune. Augustine confesses his belief in the Trinity in the sense established by Athanasius and adopted by the Church, and seeks by various analogies to render the conception more accessible to the common apprehension (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 24: *credimus et tenemus et fideliter praedicamus quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est Sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, unus unum, aeternus coaeternum, summe bonus aequaliter bonum, et quod Spiritus sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus et ipse consubstantialis et coaeternus ambobus, atque hoc totum et Trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum et unus Deus propter inseparabilem divinitatem, sicut unus omnipotens propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam, ita tamen, ut etiam quum de singulis quaeritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur, quum vero de omnibus simul, non tres dii vel tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se voluit praedicari*). Augustine does not (with Gregory of Nyssa, Basilus, and others) conceive the relation of the three divine persons or hypostases to the unity of the divine essence as similar to the relation of finite individuals to their universal (i. e., the relation of Peter, Paul, and Barnabas to the essence of man); the substance of the Godhead is realized fully and completely in each of the three persons (*De Trin.*, VII. 11). Augustine repudiates, indeed, decidedly the heresy of the Sabellians, who with the unity of the essence of God affirmed also the unity of his person; but the analogies which he employs to illustrate the nature of the Trinity are taken from the sphere of individual existence; so, in particular, the analogy drawn from the combination of being, life, and knowledge in man (*De Lib. Arb.*, II. 7), or, as Augustine afterward preferred to put it, the analogy from the union of being, knowledge, and love in man (*Confess.*, XIII. 11; *De Trin.*, IX. 4; *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 26), or from memory, thought, and will, or, within the sphere of reason, from the consciousness of eternity, wisdom, and love of blessedness (*De Trin.*, XI. 16; XV. 6 seq.), as also the analogy to the Trinity which he finds in all created things, in that they all unite

in themselves being in general, their own particular being, and the orderly combination of the former (the universal) with the latter (the particular, *De Vera Rel.*, 13: *esse, species, ordo*; cf. *De Trin.*, XI. 18: *mensura, numerus, pondus*). The trace of the Trinity appears, so far as this is consistent with the dignity of the latter, in all creatures (*De Trin.*, VI. 10).

The being of God is the highest and most complete form of being (*summa essentia, summe est*), and is therefore unchangeable (*immutabilis*). To the things which he created out of nothing he gave various degrees of being, but to none of them such being as his own. He assigned to them, also, a natural order (*naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit, De Civ. Dei*, XII. 2 seq.). The opposite of God is not being, in any of its forms, but non-being, and evil which is related to the latter as its product (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 2 seq.). The good God was free and subject to no necessity in creating the world, and his object was to create something good (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 21 seq.). The world bears witness through its order and beauty to its divine authorship (*ib.*, XI. 4). God created it, not out of his own essence, for then it would have been equal with God, but out of nothing (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 10; *Confess.*, XII. 7). As being creative substance, God is in all places (*ubique diffusus*). The preservation of the world is a continual creation. If God should withdraw from the world his creative power, it would straightway lapse into nothingness (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 25). His creative work is not an eternal one; for since the world is finite, it must be limited in time as in space. Yet we are not to conceive unlimited periods of time as having preceded the creation of the world, nor infinite spaces as existing outside of it; for time and space exist, not out of the world, but in and with it. Time is the measure of motion; but in the eternal there is no motion or change. The world, therefore, was created with time, rather than in time. But God's design and resolve to create the world existed from eternity (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 4 seq.). The world is not simple, as is all that is eternal, but manifold, though not without unity; the idea that many worlds exist is the product of an empty play of the imagination (*De Ord.*, I. 3; *De Civ. Dei*, XV. 6).

It was necessary that, in the order of the universe, that which is deemed mean and inferior should not be wanting (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 4). We should not judge of things by the standard of their utility to us, nor hold that to be bad which is injurious to us, but should judge of each object according to its own nature; every thing has its measure, its form, and a certain harmony in itself. God is to be praised in view of all that exists (*ib.*, 4 seq.). All being, as such, is good (*De Vera Rel.*, 21: *in quantum est, quidquid est, bonum est*). Even matter has its place in the general order of things; it was created by God; its excellence consists in its plasticity. The body is not the prison of the soul (*De Vera Rel.*, 36).

The soul is immaterial. There are found in it only functions, such as thought, knowing, willing, and remembrance, but nothing which is material (*De Trin.*, X. 13). It is a substance or subject, and not a mere attribute of the body (*ibid.*, 15). It feels each affection of the body at that point where the affection takes place, without being obliged first to move itself to that place; it is therefore wholly present both in the entire body and in each part of it, whereas the corporeal is with each of its parts only in one place (*Ep.* 166 *ad Hier.*, 4; *Contra Ep. Man.*, ch. 16). Augustine distinguishes as faculties in the soul, memory, intellect, and will; all passions are manifestations of the will (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 6: *voluntas est quippe in omnibus, immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt*). The relation of memory, intellect, and will to the soul must not be conceived as analogous to the relation of color and figure to the body, or of accidents to the substratum in which they are found; for accidents can extend no farther than their substrata (*subjecta, ὑποκειμένα*)—the figure or color of one body cannot be those of another body. But the mind (*mens*) can, in loving, love both itself and that which is other than itself; in knowing, know itself

and that which is other than itself; hence memory, intellect, and will, share in the substantiality of the mind (*De Trin.*, IX. 4), although the latter, not *is*, but *has*, the faculties of memory, intellect, and love (*ib.*, XV. 22). All these functions can be directed upon themselves, the understanding can know itself, memory can remember that we possess memory, the free will can make use of its freedom or not (*De Lib. Arbitr.*, II. 19). The immortality of the soul follows philosophically from its participation in immutable Truth, and from its essential union with the eternal reason and with life (*Solil.*, II. 2 seq.; *De Imm. An.*, 1 seq.); sin robs it not of life, but only of blessedness (*De Civ. Dei*, VI. 12). Yet it is faith alone which authorizes the hope of true immortality, or of eternal life in God (*De Trin.*, XIII. 12). (Cf. Plato's argument in the *Rep.*, X. p. 609, and the last argument in the *Phaedo*, above, p. 128).

The cause of evil is to be found in the will, which turns aside from the higher to the inferior, or in the pride of those angels and men who turned away from God, who has absolute being, to themselves, whose being was limited. Not that the inferior as such is evil, but to decline to it from the higher is evil. The evil will works that which is evil, but is not itself moved by any positive cause; it has no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens* (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 6 seq.). Evil is not a substance or nature (essence), but a marring of nature (the essence) and of the good, a "defect," a "privation," or "loss of good," an infraction of integrity, of beauty, of happiness, of virtue; where there is no violation of good there is no evil (*Esse vitium et non nocere non potest*). Evil, therefore, can only exist as an adjunct of good, and that, not of the immutably, but only of the mutably good. An absolute good is possible, but absolute evil is impossible (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 22; XII. 3). Such was Augustine's chief argument against Manichæism, which taught that evil was equally original with good, and that it constituted a second essence side by side with the good. Evil, continues Augustine, does not disturb the order and beauty of the universe; it cannot wholly withdraw itself from subjection to the laws of God; it does not remain unpunished, and the punishment of it is good, inasmuch as thereby justice is executed; as a painting with dark colors rightly distributed is beautiful, so also is the sum of things beautiful for him who has power to view them all at one glance, notwithstanding the presence of sin, although, when considered separately, their beauty is marred by the deformity of sin (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 23; XII. 3; cf. *De Vera Rel.*, 44: *et est pulchritudo universae creaturae per haec tria inculpabilis, damnationem peccatorum, exercitationem justorum, perfectionem beatorum*). God would not have created those angels and men of whom he knew beforehand that they would be wicked, if he had not also known how they would subserve the ends of goodness; the whole world thus consists, like a beautiful song, of oppositions (*contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur*, *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 18). To these considerations Augustine attached so great an importance, that, unlike Origen and Gregory of Nyssa and others, he believed the doctrine of a general ἀνοκαράστασις (or "restoration") unnecessary in a theodicy.

God created first the angels—a part of whom remained good, while the rest became evil—and then the visible world and man; the angels are the "light," which God first created (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 9). The human race began with one man, created in the beginning by God (*ib.*, XII. 9). Not only they err, who (like Apuleius) hold that the world and man have always existed, but also those, who, on the authority of incredible writings, hold it to be historically demonstrated that they have existed many thousands of years, since it appears from the Holy Scriptures that it is not yet six thousand years since man was created (*ib.*, XII. 10). The shortness of this period is not sufficient to render the biblical statement incredible; for if, instead of six thousand, a countless number of thousands of years had passed since man's creation, the number would still vanish, in comparison with

the previous eternity, in which God had not created man, into nothingness—like a drop compared with the ocean, or rather in a manner incomparably more absolute (*ib.*, XII. 12). The (Stoic) belief, that after its destruction the world is renewed, and that all events repeat themselves in successive world-periods, is altogether false; Christ has died only once, and will not again enter into the bonds of death, and we shall in the future be eternally in the presence of God (*ib.*, XII. 13 seq.).

The first man contained, not indeed visibly, but in the foreknowledge of God, the germ of two human communities, the secular state and the city of God; for from him were to spring the men, of whom some were to be united with the evil angels in punishment, and the rest with the good angels in receiving rewards, according to the hidden, yet just, decree of God, whose grace cannot be unjust, and whose justice cannot be cruel (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 27). Through the fall of man, which was the result of disobedience to the divine command, man became subject to death as his just punishment (*ib.*, XIII. 1). Of death, however, there are two kinds, namely, the death of the body, when the soul quits it, and the death of the soul, when it is abandoned of God; the latter is not an absolute cessation of existence and life, but the cessation of life from God. Death in the first sense is indeed in itself an evil, but for the good it works only good; the second death, which is the *summum malum*, comes only to the bad. The body, as well as the soul, of man is destined to rise again. The bodies of the righteous will be transfigured and become more noble than was the body of the first man before the fall. The bodies of the wicked, on the contrary, will be given over to everlasting suffering (*ib.*, XIII. 2 seq.). Since Adam had forsaken God, he was forsaken of God, and death in every sense was the punishment with which he was threatened (*ib.*, XIII. 12, 16); voluntarily depraved and justly condemned, he begot depraved and condemned children; for we were all in him, when "all of us" consisted of him alone; the form in which we were to live as individuals had not yet been created and communicated to us, but there was already existent in Adam the *natura seminalis* from which we were to arise, and since this nature was stained with sin, given over to death, and justly condemned, the same character was transmitted to the posterity of Adam. Through the misuse of man's free will arose this prolonged mischief which is leading the human race, radically corrupted, through a series of sufferings to eternal death, with the exception only of those who are redeemed by God's grace (*ib.*, XIII. 14; cf. XXI. 12: *hinc est universa generis humani massa damnata, quoniam qui hoc primitus admisit, cum es quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus est, ut nullus ab hoc justo debitoque supplicio, nisi misericordia et indebita gratia liberetur*). These theses seem to involve, with reference to the origin of human souls, the doctrine of Generationism or Traducianism, to which Augustine was in fact inclined on account of his doctrine of original sin; yet he never took ground decidedly in its favor, but only rejected the doctrine of pre-existence as erroneous, and with it renounced the Platonic doctrine of learning as a species of reminiscence (*De Quant. An.*, 20); nor did he express his disapproval of Creationism, according to which each soul is the result of a special creative act on God's part, but remained undecided to the end (*Retract.*, I. 1. 3 seq.; cf. *De Trin.*, XII. 15). Adam did not sin from a motive of mere sensual pleasure, but, like the angels, from pride (*ib.*, XIV. 3; 13). Human nature, ruined by the original sin, can be restored only by its author (XIV. 11). For the purpose of this restoration Christ appeared. Looking forward to redemption, God permitted the temptation and fall of the first man, although it was in his power to cause that neither an angel nor a man should sin; but he would not remove the question of their remaining holy or becoming sinful from their own voluntary decision, in order that it might be shown how much evil their pride and how much good his grace could accomplish (XIV. 21). Voluntary service is better than involuntary; our mission is to serve God freely (*servire liberaliter Deo*).

The freedom of the will is only by grace and in it. The first freedom of the will, the freedom of Adam, was the ability not to sin (*posse non peccare*), but the highest freedom, that of the saved, will be the inability to sin (*non posse peccare*, *De Corr. et Grat.*, 33). By grace the will is made holy: the will follows grace as its servant. It is certain that we act, when we act, but the fact that we act, that we believe, will, and execute, is due to God, who communicates to us the necessary active powers. Man does nothing good, except as God by his working causes him to do it. God himself is our might (*potestas nostra ipse est*, *Solil.*, II. 1; cf. *De Gratia Christi*, 26 et al.). The doctrine of Pelagius (who, according to *Aug. de Prædest. Sanct.*, ch. 18, says: "*praesciebat Deus, qui futuri essent sancti et immaculati per liberae voluntatis arbitrium et ideo eos ante mundi constitutionem in ipsa sua praescientia, qua tales futuros esse praescivit, elegit*") involves a misapprehension of the fact that this self-determination is conditioned upon the irresistible grace of God, and it is not in harmony with Holy Scripture. Cf., besides the above-mentioned (p. 334) work of Wiggers, especially J. L. Jacobi's *Die Lehre des Pelagius*, Leips. 1842; and Friedr. Wörter, *Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre*, Freib. in Br., 1866. Augustine's last works: *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiae*, are directed against the semi-Pelagian doctrine, as held especially by Cassianus, who admitted that man can accomplish nothing good without grace, but ascribed the beginning of every good work, which God's grace alone could bring to completion, to the free will of man himself, and could not admit that God would save only a portion of the human race and that Christ died only for the elect. Augustine, on the contrary, maintained the doctrine of all-determining, antecedent grace, and that even the commencement of good in man is dependent on such grace. St. Jerome (on whom compare, among others, Otto Zöckler, Gotha, 1865, and A. Thierry, *St. Jérôme et St. Augustin*, Paris, 1867) says in the *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* (composed A. D. 415): Man can determine himself in favor of good or evil, but it is only with the assistance of grace that he can accomplish the good.

God's grace having from the beginning withdrawn a part of the human race from the general ruin, there thus arose by the side of the earthly state, the state or city of God (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 28). Of these two societies, the one is predestinated to reign eternally with God, the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil (*Ibid.*, XV. 1). The whole period of the life of men is the period of the development (*excursus*) of these two states (*Ibid.*, XV. 1). Augustine distinguishes, sometimes three, sometimes six periods within the history of man. Men lived at first without law, and then no attempt was made by them to oppose the lust of this world; next under the law, when opposition was attempted, but without success; and finally, under grace, the period of opposition and victory. But of the six periods, the first extends from Adam to Noah, Cain and Abel being the representatives of the two "states;" it ends by being buried up in the flood, just as, in the history of individual man, the period of childhood is buried in oblivion. The second period extends from Noah to Abraham, and may be compared to the period of boyhood in man; as a punishment for man's arrogance, the confusion of tongues at Babel took place, only the people of God preserving the primitive language. The third period reaches from Abraham to David, and is the period of the youth of humanity; the law is now given, but still more distinctly sound the divine promises. The fourth period, that of the manhood of humanity, extends from David to the Babylonish captivity; it is the time of the kings and prophets. The fifth period covers the time from the Babylonish captivity to Christ; prophecy now ceases, and the deepest humiliation of Israel begins precisely at the time when, the temple having been rebuilt and the nation released from the Babylonish captivity, it had hoped for a better condition. The sixth period begins with Christ and will end with all earthly history; it is the period of grace, of the struggle and victory of believers, and terminates with the introduction of the

eternal Sabbath, when all struggling will end in repose and time will be swallowed up in eternity, when the citizens of the divine city will rejoice in everlasting salvation, and the commonwealth of this world will be given over to eternal damnation, so that history closes with a separation which is irreversible and eternal. Augustine made the history of the Israelites the basis of this philosophy of history, and according to its periods he determined those of the world's history in general. Of the other nations he notices, besides the Oriental nations, especially the Greek—among whom, he says, their kings introduced the worship of false gods before the time of Joshua, and poets deified distinguished men and rulers or natural objects—and the Romans, whose history he describes as beginning contemporaneously with the destruction of the Assyrian nation, while the prophets were living in Israel. Rome, says Augustine, was the Western Babylon, stained at its very origin by fratricide, and gradually increased through lust of dominion and avarice, and through ostensible virtues, which were, rather, vices (XIX. 25), to an unnatural, gigantic magnitude. In the time of its supremacy over the nations, Christ was to be born, in whom the prophecies made to the people of Israel find their accomplishment, and all races of men are blessed (*De Civ. Dei*, XV. seq.).

Augustine distinguishes seven stadia in the progress of the individual soul to God; but it is only in his early years that he treated of this subject. In defining these stadia, he assumes the Aristotelian doctrine as his guide, but (following the analogy of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the higher virtues) goes further than that doctrine would lead him. The stadia are marked by: 1) the vegetative forces, 2) the animal forces (including memory and imagination), 3) the rational force, on which the development of the arts and sciences depends, 4) virtue, as the purification of the soul attained by struggling against sensual pleasure and by faith in God, 5) security in goodness, 6) attaining unto God, 7) the eternal vision of God (*De Quant. An.*, 72 seq.). In the vision of God we arrive at complete likeness to God, whereby we do not indeed become Gods, nor like God himself, but his image is restored in us (*De Trin.*, XIII. 12; XIV. 24).

Augustine combats decidedly and in numerous passages the doctrine, that all punishments are intended to serve merely for the purification of those who are punished; they are needed as a proof of the divine justice; it would not be unjust if all men were eternally punished; but since the divine mercy must also be manifested, some are saved, though only a minority; the far larger number of men remain under punishment, in order that it may be shown what was due to all (*De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 12). No man of sound faith can say, that even the evil angels must be saved through God's compassion, for which reason also the Church does not pray for them; but he who should be led by a misplaced sympathy to believe in the salvation of all men, ought, from the same motive, to believe in the salvation of the wicked angels also; the Church makes request, indeed, for all men, but only because she does not know with certainty of any individual, whether God has appointed him to salvation or to damnation, and because the time for saving repentance is still present; if she knew with certainty who they are, that "*prædestinati sunt in æternum ignem ire cum diabolo*," she would no more pray for them than for the devil (*De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 24). Thus Augustine maintains the dualism of good and evil in respect of the end of the world's development as decidedly, as, in opposing Manichæism, he combats the dualistic doctrine, when applied to the principle of all being (which doctrine he meets with the theory of a gradation in the orders of existences).

§ 87. The philosophy of the Christian Church in the Orient was founded, in the later Patristic period, on a combination of Platonic and Neo-Platonic and, to some extent, also of Aristotelian ideas

with Christian Dogmatics. Synesius of Cyrene, born A. D. 375, adhered, even after his consecration as a Christian priest and bishop, to the essential, fundamental idea of Neo-Platonism, and regarded that portion of the Christian dogmas which was not in accordance therewith as constituting a sacred allegory. Nemeseus, Bishop of Emesa in Phœnicia, and probably a younger contemporary of Synesius, likewise stands, in his work on the nature of the soul, on the ground of the Platonic and in part also on that of the Aristotelian philosophy, teaching the pre-existence of the human soul and the unending duration of the world, though rejecting other Platonic doctrines. He defends the theory of the freedom of the will against the doctrine of fatalism. Æneas of Gaza, on the contrary, disputes in his dialogue "*Theophrastus*" (composed about 487) the doctrine of the pre-existence of the human soul, as also that of the eternity of the world. Among the opponents of the latter doctrine in the sixth century may be named also the Bishop of Mitylene, Zacharias Scholasticus, and the commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus of Alexandria, which latter person, by extending the Aristotelian doctrine that substantial existence is to be predicated in the fullest sense only of individuals, to the dogma of the Trinity, incurred the accusation of Tritheism. To the period when Neo-Platonic opinions could expect to be received only under the garb of Christianity—probably the end of the fifth century—belong the writings which their author designates as the work of Dionysius the Areopagite, of Athens, one of the immediate disciples of the Apostles. It is in a great measure the kind of speculation contained in these works which is continued in the writings of Maximus the Confessor (580-662), a profound, mystical theologian. John of Damascus, who lived in the eighth century, gives, in his work on the "*Source of Knowledge*," a brief account of (the Aristotelian) Ontology, then a refutation of heresies, and finally a minute and systematic exposition of Orthodox Dogmatics. The purpose of John in the entire work is, according to his express declaration, not to advance anything original, but only to sum up and present what has been said by holy and learned men. Accordingly, he does not labor for the further development of Christian doctrine, which he regards as already substantially complete, but only collocates and arranges the thoughts of his predecessors, employing philosophy, and more especially logic and ontology, as an instrument in the service of theology, and thus illustrating already the principle of Scholasticism.

The works of Synesius were published by Turnebus, at Paris, in 1558, and by Dionysius Petavius, Paris, 1612, 1631, 1633. Single works of his have been often published, in particular, the *Calistii Encomion*, Stuttgart, 1834, and "*Die ägypt. Ern. über die Vorsehung.*," Sulzbach, 1833, by Krabinger, and the *Hymni*, by Gregoire and Collobat, Lyons, 1836; also in the 15th volume of the *Sylloge Posteriorum Gr.*, by J. F. Boissonade, Paris, 1823-1832. Works upon him have been written by Aem. Th. Clausen (*De Synecio Philosopho, Libyae Pentapoleos Metropoli*, Copenhagen, 1831), Thilo (*Comm. in Synec. Hymnum Sac.*, *encl. Universitätsprogramm*, Halle, 1842 and 1848), and Bernh. Kolbe (*Der Bischof Synesius von Kyrene*, Berlin, 1840); cf. also Franz Xaver Kraus (*Studien über Syn. von Kyrene*, in the *Theol. Quartalschr.* 1865, No. 3, pp. 331-448, and No. 4, pp. 587-600).

Nemesii repi φέρους ἀνδρώου pr. ed. graec. & lat. a Nicasio Eliebedio, Antwerp, 1565; ed. J. Fell, Oxford, 1671. ed. Ch. Fr. Matthaei, Leipzig, 1803, *Nemes über die Freiheit*, translated from the Greek by Fülleborn in his *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos. I.*, Züllichau, 1791. *Nemesius über die Natur des Mönches*, German transl. by Osterhamner, Salzburg, 1819.

Aeneas Gazaei Theophrastus, ed. J. Wolf, Zürich, 1560; *Aen. Gaz. et Zach. Myti. de immortalitate animae et mortalitate universae, ejusdem dial. de opif. mundi*, ed. C. Barth, Leipzig, 1655. *Airinas emi Ζαχαρίας. Aeneas Gazaeus et Zacharias Mytilenaeus de immortalitate animae et consummatione mundi*, ed. J. F. Boissonade, Paris, 1834. On Aeneas of Gaza compare the work of Wernsdorf (Naumburg, 1816), and his *Disp. de Aen. G. ed. adorn.*, prefixed to the edition of Boissonade.

Concerning the editions of the writings of John Philop., see above, § 70, p. 254. Cf. the article by Trechsel, in the *Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1835, Article I.

The works attributed to Dionysius Areopagita, *De Divinis Nominibus*, *De Theologia Mystica*, *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, (decem) *Epistolae*, were first printed in Greek as *Dion. Areopag. Opera*, at Basel, 1539, and afterward at Venice, 1568, Paris, 1552; ed. Lanselina, Paris, 1615; ed. Balthas. Corderius, Antwerp, 1634, the latter edition reproduced at Paris in 1644, Brixen, 1854, last in Migne's collection; German by J. G. V. Engelhardt (*Die angeblichen Schriften des Areopagiten Dionysius überreist und mit Abhandlungen begleitet*, Sulzbach, 1823), who also reproduces the essay of Dallaeus (Geneva, 1664) concerning the age of the author of the Areopagitic writings; cf. L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius, *De Dionys. Areopag.*, Jena, 1823, also in his *Opusc. theol.*, Jena, 1836; Karl Vogt, *Neuplatonismus und Christenthum*, Berlin, 1836; F. Hipler, *Dionysius der Areop.*, Regensburg, 1861; Ed. Böhmner, *D. A.*, in the *Review* entitled *Damasus*, 1864, No. 3.

Maximi Confessoris operi, ed. Combefisius, Paris, 1675. *Maximi Confessoris de variis difficultatibus locis s. patrum Dionysii et Gregorii librum*, ed. Fr. Oehler, Halle, 1697.

Johannis Damasceni opera in lat. serm. conversae per Billium, Paris, 1577; *Opera quas extant*, ed. Le Quien, Paris, 1712.

Synesius was a Neo-Platonist before he became a Christian. The female philosopher, Hypatia (see above, § 69, p. 254), was his instructress, and his relations with her continued friendly after his conversion. After he had accepted Christianity and been designated by Theophilus the Patriarch of Alexandria, as Bishop of Ptolemais, he frankly declared to Theophilus that he did not in all points assent to the teaching of the Church. He did not believe in the final destruction of the world, was inclined to favor the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, believed, indeed, in the immortality of the soul, but considered the doctrine of the resurrection as merely a sacred allegory; he promised, nevertheless, in his doctrinal teachings to accommodate himself to the dogmas generally accepted, holding that the people had need of myths, that pure, unfigured truth was capable of being known only by a few, and would only serve to dazzle and blind the spiritual eyes of the multitude (*Epist.* 95, p. 236 A, ed. Petav.). This same aristocracy of intelligence, which was in conflict with the common spirit of the Christian Church, appears in his poetical works, composed when, notwithstanding the confession above mentioned, the episcopal dignity had been conferred upon him. More in the Neo-Platonic than in the Christian manner he conceives God as the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the indifference of contraries, which, after "super-existent" throes, was poured forth through its first-born form in an unspeakable manner, received a triple-headed energy, and as super-existent source was crowned by the beauty of the children which, issued from the middle, collect in numbers around that middle. After this exposition, however, Synesius enjoins silence on the too audacious

lyre; it must not proclaim to the people the most mysterious of sacred things (the priority of the Monad before the three persons of the Godhead?). The Holy Ghost, divided without division, having entered into matter, the world thus received its form and motion. The Holy Ghost is present also in those who fell to earth, as the power which shall raise them up again to heaven.

Nemesius, who lived about A. D. 450—according to others, 400—occupies also substantially the Neo-Platonic stand-point; the Aristotelian element in his writings is only of subordinate importance, and determines more the form than the content of his philosophizing. His investigations are chiefly of a psychological nature. For him, as for Plato, the soul is an immaterial substance, involved in incessant and self-produced motion. From it the body receives its motion. The soul existed before it entered the body. It is eternal, like all supra-sensible things. It is not true that new souls are constantly coming into existence, whether by generation or by direct creation. The opinion is also false, that the world is destined to be destroyed, when the number of souls shall have become complete; God will not destroy what has been well put together. Nemesius rejects, nevertheless, the doctrine of a world-soul and of the migration of the human soul through the bodies of animals. In considering the separate faculties of the soul, and also in his doctrine of the freedom of the will, Nemesius follows largely Aristotle. Every species of animals, he says, possesses definite instincts, by which alone its actions are determined; but the actions of man are infinitely varied. Placed midway between the sensible and the supra-sensible worlds, man's business is to decide by means of his reason in which direction he will turn; that is his freedom.

Æneas of Gaza, a pupil at Alexandria of Hierocles the Neo-Platonist, and Zacharias of Mitylene approved only those Neo-Platonic doctrines which were in accordance with Christian Dogma.

In the same limited way, Johannes Philoponus (whose works were written between 500 and 570), a pupil of Ammonius Hermiæ (see above, § 70, pp. 255, 256, 259), attempted, though with imperfect success, to follow Aristotle. He laid stress (in distinction from Simplicius and other Neo-Platonists) upon the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. The Ideas, he taught, are the creative thoughts of God, which, as archetypes, can and must have existed before their temporal copies.

In the works ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts xvii. 34), who was reputed to have been first Bishop of Athens, the attempt is made to blend the dominant ideas in Neo-Platonism with the Christian doctrine. "After that the doctrine of the Church had been developed and had become the common property of all believers, there were men, to whom this, which all, including the most superficial, could believe, seemed for this reason insufficient, and who sought therefore for a faith resting on a profounder basis. Besides, heathen philosophy, as it made its way anew and more extensively than ever before among the Christians, furnished necessarily new food for doubt and consequently for mysticism" (Ritter).

The first mention of the Areopagitic writings is found in a letter of Innocentius, the Bishop of Maronia, in which he refers to a conference that had been held at Constantinople in the year 532, at the command of the Emperor Justinian—Hypatius, the Metropolitan of Ephesus, presiding—with the Severians (known as a sect of moderate Monophysites, who admitted that Christ was *κατὰ σάρκα ὁμοῦσιος ἡμῖν*, but were opposed by the more rigid Monophysites as *ἐθαρρολάτραι*). The Severians appealed to passages in the writings of Cyrillus, Athanasius, Felix, Julius, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, and also of Dionysius Areopagita (whose work scarcely touches upon the questions there in dispute, although it contains some of the expressions used at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the

expressed purpose of the author being rather to further the positive development of doctrine than to condemn opponents, in which particular he conformed to the spirit of the imperial Henotikon issued in 482). Hypatius, the spokesman of the Catholics, disputed the genuineness of the works imputed to Dionysius, which neither Cyril nor Athanasius and others had known. Afterward, however, these works gained credit in the Catholic Church, especially after the Roman Popes Gregory, Martin, and Agatho had cited them in their writings and appealed to their authority. The commentary on them composed by the orthodox abbot, Maximus Confessor, strengthened their authority. They exerted a not inconsiderable influence over the Scholastic Philosophy of Western Europe after their translation by Scotus Erigena; from them the Mystics of the Middle Ages drew chiefly the substance of their opinions. Their inauthenticity was first asserted by Laurentius Valla, and afterward demonstrated by Morinus, Dallæus, and others. The only question remaining for us, therefore, concerns the time of their composition, and not their spuriousness; they date probably from the last decades of the fifth century. To set back the date of Pseudo-Dionysius from the second half of the fifth century into the first half of the fourth, is in contradiction with the general historical development of Christian thought, and can only win a semblance of historic legitimacy, when, neglecting the general view, the regard is fixed only on single passages in the earlier Church Fathers, which, because they remind modern savants of similar passages in Dionysius, are declared to be in fact derived from the latter, and to prove an acquaintance on the part of their authors with the works in question; while, in fact, these correspondences are explained partly by the common Platonic and Neo-Platonic basis on which all these writers stand, and partly by a common influence tending in the opposite direction. The Neo-Platonic influence is quite unmistakable; but the form of Neo-Platonism manifested in it, though chiefly Plotinic, yet betrays also (as Erdmann, among others, rightly affirms) the influence of the later members of the school, especially Jamblichus and Proclus, with both of whom Pseudo-Dionysius agrees in the doctrine that the One is exalted, not simply above the *voûs* and the ideas (*νόητα*), but also above goodness itself. The description of God, as restoring the divided multitude of created things to unity, as substituting for universal war undifferentiated union through participation in the divine peace (*De Div. Nom.*, ch. 11), suggests Proclus' doctrine of the *μονή*, *πρόδος* and *ἐπιστροφή* (see above, § 70, p. 257). Not while the effort was being made to determine the fundamental outlines of a system, but only after a *corpus doctrinae*, fixed in all or nearly all of its most important points, had once been developed, become traditional, and arrived at assured supremacy, could this whole, as such, within the limits of the Church, be at once acknowledged and denied, or reduced to a merely symbolical significance in the manner illustrated by Pseudo-Dionysius.

Dionysius distinguishes between *affirmative theology*, which, descending from God to the finite, contemplates God as the being to whom all names belong, and *abstracting theology*, which, following the way of negation, ascends again from the finite to God and considers him as the nameless being, superior to all positive and negative predicates. Following the latter method, the soul, after completing its ascent into that region of being which, from its very sublimity, is to the impotent human intellect a region of obscurity, becomes completely passive, the voice is stilled, and man becomes united with the Unspeakable (*De Theol. Myst.*, ch. 3). "Affirmative theology" formed the subject of the theological treatises—mentioned by Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, chs. 1 and 2, and *De Theol. Myst.*, ch. 3, but not now extant—in which the unity and trinity of God were treated of, the Father being considered as the original source of deity, Jesus and the Holy Ghost as his branches, and in which the entrance of the "super-essential" Jesus into true human nature is described, by which act, it is said, he became an essence. The same is true of the work

entitled: *De Divinis Nominibus*—in which the spiritual or "intelligible" names of God were discussed, all of these names being vindicated as applicable to the whole Trinity—and of the work on *Symbolical Theology* (also lost), which treated of those names of God which are derived by analogy from the sensuous world. "Abstracting theology" is contained in the short work entitled, *De Theologia Mystica*, which forms a negative termination to the system. The *Celestial Hierarchy of Angels* and the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* as its image, are considered in the two works bearing those titles.

In the work on the Names of God Dionysius mentions with approval the doctrine of "certain of our divine and holy teachers," by whom a distinction was made between two forms of goodness and deity, the one being supra-good and supra-divine—or transcendent in its attributes—and the other being ideally good and divine. The former was a gift from God, and was endowed with the power to create good, which power it exercised by the creation of the second form of goodness and deity above specified. God, the Invisible, was, according to the same doctrine, the author also of those providences and dispensations of goodness which fall in superabundant fullness to the lot of all existing things, and so, in reality, the Cause of all things was exalted above all, and the super-existent and supra-natural was superior to every form of nature or essence (*De Nom. Div.*, ch. 11). The supra-essential One limits the existing One and all number, and is itself the cause and principle of the One and of number and, at the same time, the number and the order of all that exists. Hence the Deity, who is exalted above all things, is praised as a Monad and as a Triad, but is unknown to us or to any one, whether as Monad or as Triad; in order truly to praise the supra-unified in him and his divine creative power, we apply to him not only the triadic and monadic names, but call him the nameless One, the supra-essential, to indicate that he transcends the category of being. No Monad or Triad, no number, no unity, no generation, nothing which exists or is known by those who exist can enable us to comprehend the mysterious nature of the supra-essentially supra-exalted supra-Deity. He has no name, no concept. The region which he inhabits is inaccessible to us. He transcends all things. We do not even ascribe to him the attribute of goodness, as though that were adequate to express his nature, but filled with longing to understand and to say something of his ineffable nature, we consecrate to him first the most holy and reverend name; and in this, no doubt, we are in accord with the Holy Scriptures, but we remain far removed from the truth of the case. For this reason the Scriptures have also preferred the way of negation, which withdraws the soul from that which is akin to it and carries it through all divine intelligences, above which is placed that Nameless One who is exalted above all conception, all name, and all knowledge (*De Div. Nom.*, ch. 13).

Whatever proceeds from him who is the cause of all things is comprehended by Dionysius under the denomination of the Good (*De Div. Nom.*, ch. 5). In God exist the archetypes (ideas) of all existing things. The Holy Scriptures call these archetypes *πρωτοπλάτους*. The Good is a term of wider extension than Existence, for it includes both the existent and the non-existent, and is superior to both. The nature of evil is negative. If evil, as evil, positively subsisted, it would be evil to itself and would, therefore, destroy itself. The name of the existent extends to all that is, and it is exalted above all being; existence extends farther than life. The name life applies to all that lives and is exalted above all that lives; life extends farther than wisdom. The name of wisdom applies to all that is spiritual and endowed with reason or sensation, and is exalted above all these. To the question why it is that the realm of life is higher and nearer to God than the realm of (mere) existence, the realm of sensation than the realm of (mere) life, the realm of understanding than the realm of (mere) feeling, and why, finally, the realm of spirits (*πνεύμα*) is higher than the realm of (mere) understanding, Dionysius answers that this is because that

which is most richly endowed by God must be better than all else and exalted above all else; but it is the spirit which has received the richest endowments, since both being and life and feeling and thought belong to it, etc. (*De Div. Nom.*, chs. 4 and 5). (In this answer Dionysius ranks as highest that which possesses the greatest wealth of attributes, after the manner of Aristotle; and yet within the spheres of the ideal and supra-ideal Dionysius gives the first place to that which is most abstract or to that which possesses the greatest extension and the least content. In this he follows Plato, but does not succeed better than Proclus or any other of his Neo-Platonic predecessors, in the attempt to carry through to its logical end either the one or the other of these opposite tendencies of thought.)

Maximus Confessor (580-662), who, as an opponent of the Monotheletes and on account of his steadfast endurance of persecution, enjoyed great consideration in the Church, follows in the main Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius. He taught that God had revealed himself through nature and by his word. The incarnation of God in Christ was the culmination of revelation, and would therefore have taken place even if man had not fallen. When God became man, man was made God (*θεωσις*). The universe will end in the union of all things with God.

The monk, Johannes Damascenus, who lived about 700 A. D., brought together, with the aid of the Aristotelian Logic and Ontology, all the teachings of the Church in a systematic and orderly form. The authority of his work is still great in the East; the later Scholastics of Western Europe also stood under his influence in their expositions of theological doctrine.

§ 88. The history of philosophical speculation in the Western portion of the Church during the period immediately following the death of Saint Augustine, is for the most part connected with the names of Claudianus Mamertus, Marcellianus Capella, Boëthius, and Cassiodorus. Claudianus Mamertus, a Presbyter at Vienne in Gaul, defended, about the middle of the fifth century, from the Augustinian stand-point and against Faustus the Semi-Pelagian, the doctrine of the immateriality of the human soul, which latter, he taught, was subject only to motion in time, but not to motion in space. Marcellianus Capella wrote about 430 a compendium of the *septem artes liberales*, which became very influential in the Middle Ages. Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boëthius was educated by Neo-Platonists, and labored zealously and successfully for the preservation of ancient science and culture in the Christian Church, through his translations of and commentaries on various works of Aristotle, Porphyry, Euclid, Nicomachus, Cicero, and others, and through his additions to them, as also through his work, founded on Neo-Platonic principles and entitled *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*. A contemporary of Boëthius, Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, the Senator, opposed, like Claudianus Mamertus, in his work *De Anima* the hypothesis of the materiality of the rational human soul and defended the doctrine of

the likeness of the soul to God; he wrote also concerning Instruction in Theology and on the liberal arts and sciences, following in this more particularly the lead of Boëthius, of whose more extended works he prepared an epitome for didactic purposes. On the works of these men were founded those of Isidorus Hispalensis (about 600), Beda Venerabilis (about 700), and Alcuin (about 800).

The work of Claudianus Mamertus, *De Statu Animæ*, was edited by Petrus Mosellanus (Basel, 1720) and Casp. Barth (Cygn. 1655).

The *Satyricon* of Marcianus Capella has been often published, more recently, in particular, by Frans Eyssenhardt, Leips. 1866. Cf. E. G. Graff, Old High German translation and explanation of M. C.'s two books *De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*, made about the beginning of the eleventh century, Berlin, 1888, and Hattemer, *Notkers W.*, II., pp. 257-373. On M. C. and his satire see C. Böttger in Jahn's *Archiv*, vol. 18, 1847, pp. 691-622. Prantl treats of his Logical Compendium in his *Gesch. d. Log.*, I. 672-679.

The work of Boëthius, *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, was first published at Nuremberg in 1473; a more recent edition is that of Obbarius, Jen., 1843; his Works were printed at Venice in 1492 and at Basel in 1546 and 1870; for the old High German translation of the *Consol.*, published by Graff and Von Hattemer, see below, § 91. Of him write, especially, Fr. Nitzsch (*Das System des Boëthius*, Berlin, 1860); cf. Schenkl in *Verh. der 18 Vers. deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner*, Vienna, 1859, pp. 76-92, on the relation of Boëthius and his works to Christianity; and concerning his logic, see Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.*, I. 679-722.

The works of Cassiodorus were published by Jo. Garetius, Rouen, 1679, and at Venice, 1729; the last part of the *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum* was first edited and published by A. Mai, Rome, 1831. On Cassiodorus, cf. F. D. de St. Marthe (Paris, 1695), Buat (in *Abh. der Batr.*, Akad. d. W., I. p. 79 seq.), Stäudlin (in *Kirchenhist. Archiv* für 1825, p. 259 seq.), Prantl (*Gesch. der Log.*, I. pp. 723-724).

The *Encyclopaedia* of Isidorus Hispalensis, under the title: *Originum s. Etymologiarum Libri XX.*, was edited and published at Augsburg in 1472, c. notis Jac. Goltzfredt, in *Auct. Lat.*, p. 811 seq., and recently at Leipsic, 1883, ed. by E. V. Otto. The work *De Nat. Rerum*, ed. by Gust. Becker, Berlin, 1857, the *Opera*, ed. by De la Bigne, Paris, 1750, by Jac. du Breul, Paris, 1601, Cologne, 1617, and in more modern times by Faustinus Arevalus, in seven volumes, Rome, 1797-1803, and lastly in Migne's *Patrol. Cursus Completus*. On his logic compare Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. pp. 10-14.

The works of Beda Venerabilis were printed at Paris in 1521 and 1544, and at Cologne in 1612 and 1688. A. Giles, *The Complete Works of the Venerable Bede in the Original Latin*, 12 vols., London, 1843-44; *Carmina*, edited by H. Meyer, Leips. 1885.

Alcuin's works have been published by Quercetanus (Duchesne), Paris, 1617, and Frobenius, Ratib. 1777. On him cf. F. Lorenz (*Alcuin's Leben*, Halle, 1829), Monnier (*Alcuin et son influence littéraire, relig. et polit.*, Paris, 1853), and Prantl (*Gesch. der Log.*, II., pp. 14-17); concerning his pupil, Rhabanus Maurus, cf. F. H. Chr. Schwarz (*De Rhabano Mauro primo Germaniæ præceptore*, Heidelberg, 1811), and Prantl (*Gesch. d. Log.*, II. p. 19 seq.); cf. below, § 91.

The philosophical importance of Claudianus Mamertus (Presbyter at Vienne in the Dauphinée; died ca. 477) is founded on his argumentation in favor of the immortality of the soul. Tertullian had once asserted the materiality of God, but this opinion had long been given up, yet even as late as ca. 350 A. D., Hilarius, the Athanasian and Bishop of Poitiers (mentioned above, § 85, p. 327), affirmed that in distinction from God all created things, including, therefore, the human soul, were material. This doctrine was afterward maintained by Cassianus, the chief founder of Semi-Pelagianism—a doctrine which sought to mediate between the Augustinian and Pelagian stand-points—by Faustus, Bishop of Regium in Gaul, and one of the most prominent Semi-Pelagians after the middle of the fifth century, and by Gennadius, near the end of the fifth century. In every created object, according to Faustus, matter and form are united. All created things are limited, and have an existence in space, and are therefore material. Every created object has quality and quantity—for God is the only being exalted above and independent of the logical categories—and with quantity is necessarily combined a relation to space, or exten-

sion; and, finally, the soul, since it dwells in the body, is necessarily a substance, having limits in space, and is, therefore, material. Claudianus Mamertus rejoins: It is true that all creatures, and, therefore, the soul among them, fall within the sphere of the categories; the soul is a substance, and has quality; but the soul is not, like material substances, subject to all the categories; in particular, quantity, in the usual spatial sense of that term, cannot be predicated of it; it has magnitude, but only in respect of virtue and intelligence. The motion of the soul takes place only in time, and not, like that of material objects, in time and space together. The world, in order to be complete, must contain all species of existences, the immaterial, therefore, as well as the material, of which the former resembles God by its non-quantitative and spaceless character, and is superior to material objects, while, by its creatureship and its being subject to the category of quality and to motion in time, it differs from the unqualitative and eternal God and resembles the material world. The soul is not environed by, but itself environs, the body, which it holds together. Yet Claudianus also adopts the Neo-Platonic and Augustinian theory that the soul is present entirely in all parts of its body, just as God is present in all parts of the world.

The work on the *Artes Liberales*, composed about 430 (between 400 and 439) by Marcellianus Capella (who never confessed the Christian faith), and to which the marriage of Mercury with Philology forms the introduction, contains the oldest compendium of the doctrines then and afterward taught in the schools which has come down to us complete.

Concerning Boëthius (470-526), cf. above, pp. 256 and 259. We still possess his translations of the *Analytica Priora* and *Posteriora*, the *Topica* and the *Soph. Elench.* of Aristotle, as also his translation of the *De Interpretatione*, and his commentary on the same, also his translation of the *Categories*, with commentary, his commentary on Victorinus' translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, his own translation of the *Isagoge*, which he likewise accompanied with a commentary, and the works: *Introductio ad Categoricos Syllogismos*; *De Syllogismo Categorico*, *De Syllogismo Hypothetico*, *De Divisione*, *De Definitione*; *De Differentiis Topicis*. His commentary to the *Topics* of Cicero is not preserved entire. The aim of Boëthius in these works was purely didactic, his plan being simply to hand down in a form as readily intelligible as possible the investigations of earlier philosophers. His *Consolatio*, as also the *De Unitate et Uno*, etc., is founded on Neo-Platonic ideas. The work *De Trinitate* has been falsely ascribed to him.

Cassiodorus (born about 468, died not before 562) proposes in all his works, not to effectuate an essential progress in philosophic thought, but simply to present a review and summary of the most important contents of the works which he has read (*De Anima*, 12). In his work *De Anima* he asserts that man alone has a substantial and immortal soul, but that the life of the irrational animals has its seat in their blood (*De An.*, 1). The human soul is, in virtue of its rationality, not indeed a part of God—for it is not unchangeable, but can determine itself to evil—but capable, through virtue, of making itself like God; it is created to be an image of God (*De An.*, 2 seq.). It is spiritual, for it is able to know spiritual things. Whatever is material is extended in three dimensions, in length, breadth, and thickness; it has fixed limits and is present in any determinate place with only one of its parts. The soul, on the contrary, is present in its entirety in each of its parts; it is everywhere present in its body and not limited by a spatial form (*De An.*, 2: *ubiqueque substantialiter inserta est; tota est in partibus suis, nec alibi major, alibi minor est, sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius, ubique tamen vitali intensione porrigitur*; *ib.* 4: *ubiqueque est nec formam recipit*). Cassiodorus differs from Claudianus Mamertus by denying that even the category of quality, in its proper sense, applies to the soul (*De An.*, 4). Cassiodorus recommends the liberal arts and sciences (the three *Artes* or *Scientiæ Sermocinales*: grammar,

dialectic, rhetoric, and the four *Disciplinæ* or *Scientiæ Reales*: arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) as being useful, inasmuch as they serve to facilitate the understanding of the Holy Scriptures and the knowledge of God, although it is possible without them to arrive at the knowledge of Christian truth (*De Instit. Div. Litt.*, 28). His work *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum* was much used as a text-book in the centuries next following the time of their composition. Cassiodorus often refers in them to the more comprehensive compilations of Boëthius; his dialectic is mainly taken from Boëthius and Apuleius.

Isidorus Hispalensis (died 636) furthered the encyclopedic studies by his *Encyclopædia*, and, in particular, following in the lead of Cassiodorus and Boëthius, he carried forward the logical tradition of the schools by devoting the second book of his *Encyclopædia* to rhetoric and dialectic, both which subjects he included under the name of logic. His three books of *Sentences*, containing dicta of the Church Fathers, and his works *De Ordine Creaturarum* and *De Rerum Natura* were also used by later writers as sources of information.

The Anglo-Saxon Bede (673-735) made up his *Compendia* chiefly by drawing upon the writings of Isidorus; these *Compendia*, again, as also Isidorus and the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise concerning the ten categories, were drawn upon by Albinus Alcuinus (736-804) in the composition of his works on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. An excerpt from Cassiodorus on the seven liberal arts, much read in the Middle Ages, was formerly incorrectly supposed to be the work of Alcuin. In this work these "arts" are called the seven pillars of wisdom, or the seven steps by which one may rise to perfect science (*Oper.*, ed. Froben., II. p. 268). In the Cloister-Schools which were founded by Alcuin the *septem artes ac disciplinæ liberales*, or at least some of them, were taught by the *Doctores*, dialectic being pursued with special enthusiasm. From the application of dialectic to theology arose "Scholasticism;" but before this application was made there was a period in which dialectic was pursued merely as a part of the *Trivium*, and which consequently does not belong to the Scholastic Period.

SECOND PERIOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN TIMES.

THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ 89. Scholasticism was philosophy in the service of established and accepted theological doctrines, or, at least, in such subordination to them, that, where philosophy and theology trod on common ground, the latter was received as the absolute norm and criterion of truth. More particularly, Scholasticism was the reproduction of ancient philosophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine, with an accommodation, in cases of discrepancy between them, of the former to the latter. Its divisions are: 1) the commencement of Scholasticism or the accommodation of the Aristotelian logic and of Neo-Platonic phi-

losophemes to the doctrine of the Church, from John Scotus Erigena to the Amalricans, or from the ninth till the beginning of the thirteenth century; 2) the complete development and widest extension of Scholasticism or the combination of the Aristotelian philosophy, which had now become fully known, to the dogmas of the Church—from Alexander of Hales to the close of the Middle Ages, the revival of classical studies, the commencement of the investigation of nature and the division of the Church. During this time, philosophy among the Arabs and the Jews stood in a like relation to the respective religious doctrines of those nations.

Of those who have written upon the Scholastic Philosophy, we name Lud. Vives (*De Causis Corruptarum Artium*, in his *Works*, Basel, 1555), Lambertus Dansus (in his *Prolegom. in primum librum Sententiarum cum comm.*, Geneva, 1580), Ch. Binder (*De Scholastica theologia*, Tübingen, 1624), J. Lannoy (*De varia Aristotelis fortuna in acad. Parisiens.*, Paris, 1658, and *De scholis celebr. a Carolo M. et post ipsum indauratis*, Paris, 1672), Ad. Tribenhorius (*De doctoribus scholasticis et corruptis per eos doctrinarum humanarum rerum scientia*, Giessen, 1665; second edition, edited by Heumann, Jena, 1719), G. D. Bultius (*Uss. universit. Parisiensis*, Paris, 1665-73), Jac. Thomassin (*De doctoribus schol.*, Leips. 1676), Jac. Brucker (*Hist. crit. philos.*, t. III., Leips. 1748, pp. 708-912), W. L. G. v. Eberstein (*Die natürl. Theologie der Scholastiker, nebst Zusätzen über die Freiheitslehre und den Begriff der Wahrheit bei denselben*, Leipsic, 1808), and Tiedemann, Duhle, Tennemann, Ritter, and others, in their general histories of philosophy; of modern writers, compare especially: A. Jourdain (*Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, Paris, 1819, 2d ed., Paris, 1848, German translation by Stahl, Halle, 1831), Rousselot (*Études sur la philosophie dans le moyen-âge*, Paris, 1840-42), Barth. Hauréan (*De la philosophie scolastique*, 2 vols., Paris, 1850; *Singularités historiques et littéraires*, Paris, 1861), Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, Vol. II., Leipsic, 1861, Vol. III., *ibid.*, 1867), W. Kamlitz (*Gesch. der scholast. Philosophie*, 1. Theil: *von Joh. Scotus Erigena bis Abälard*, Prague, 1858), and Alb. Stückl (*Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*, Vols. I.-III., Mayence, 1864-66); also Erdmann in his *Grundr. der Gesch. d. Philos.*, Vol. I., Berlin, 1865, pp. 245-466, and in his article on *Der Entwicklungsgang der Scholastik*, in the *Zeitschr. für wiss. Th.*, Vol. VIII., No. 2, Halle, 1865, pp. 112-171. Cf. also V. A. Huber, *Die Englischen Universitäten*, Vol. I. (The Middle Ages), Cassel, 1839; Charles Thurot, *De l'organisation de l'enseignement dans l'université de Paris au moyen-âge*, Paris and Besançon, 1850; L. Figulier, *Vies des Savants Illustres du Moyen-Âge avec l'appréciation sommaire de leurs travaux*, Paris, 1867; Herm. Diergens, *Zur Lehre von den Universitäten*, Heidelberg, 1867, and de Cupély, *Esprit de la philos. scol.*, Paris, 1868; E. D. Hampden, D.D., afterward Bishop of Hereford, *The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology*, Oxford, 1882; 8d edition, London, 1888; also *Life of Thomas Aquinas; a Dissertation of the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages*, London, 1848.

The name of Scholastics (*doctores scholastici*) which was given to the teachers of the *septem liberales artes* (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, in the *Trivium*; arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, in the *Quadrivium*), or at least of some of them, in the Cloister-Schools founded by Charlemagne, as also to teachers of theology, was afterward given to all who occupied themselves with the sciences, and especially with philosophy, following the tradition and example of the Schools. (The earliest known use of the term *σχολαστικὸς* as a word of technical import occurs in a letter from Theophrastus to his pupil Phanas, from which extracts are given in Diog. L., V. 50. The term was transmitted to the Middle Ages through the medium of Roman Antiquity.)

At the beginning of the Scholastic Period philosophic thought had not yet been brought into a relation of complete vassalage to Church doctrine; Scotus Erigena, in particular, affirmed rather the identity of true religion with true philosophy than the subordination of the latter to the former. In fact, he deviated not unessentially from the teaching

of the Church, in seeking by a forced interpretation of the latter, in accordance with the principles of the (Dionysian and Neo-Platonic) philosophy, which he adopted, to bridge over the cleft between philosophy and dogma; and even in the period next succeeding, a certain conformity of thought with the doctrine of the Church was only gradually effected, and that after violent struggles. In the second division of the Scholastic period (from the middle of the thirteenth century on), the conformity of the reconstructed Aristotelian philosophy with the faith of the Church appears as firmly settled, yet limited, from the beginning, by the fact that the specifically Christian dogmas (the Trinity, incarnation, resurrection of the body, etc.) were excepted in this connection as undemonstrable by reason. The relation of vassalage, which the most eminent Scholastics ascribed to philosophy with reference to theology, is not to be understood as implying that all dogmas were to be philosophically demonstrated or justified, or that all philosophizing stood in direct relation to theology, and that there existed no interest in philosophical problems as such and on their own account. Such an interest, although in reference to a limited range of problems, did exist in great intensity. The vassalage of philosophy consisted in the fact that an impassable limit was fixed for the freedom of philosophizing in the dogmas of the Church, that the test of truth and falsehood in matters common to philosophy and theology was not sought in observation and in thought itself, but in the doctrines of the Church, and that accordingly the Aristotelian doctrine, partly in its theological portions (with reference to the doctrine of the eternity of the world), and partly in its psychology (relatively to the doctrine of the *voûc* as related to the inferior parts of the soul), was modified by the most eminent Scholastics, while those dogmas which were incapable of philosophical demonstration or confirmation were not allowed to be made at all the subjects of philosophical discussion. With its territory thus limited, philosophy was indeed allowed by theology a freedom which was rarely and only by exception infringed upon. The number of theological theses demonstrable by reason became gradually more and more limited, most so at the time of the renewed supremacy given to Nominalism by William of Occam. Thus, at last, in place of the Scholastic presupposition of the conformity to reason of the teachings of the Church, there arose an antagonism between the (Aristotelian) philosophy of the Schools and the Christian faith. This led (chiefly during the period of the transition to modern philosophy, see below, Vol. II., § 3 seq.) to various results. A portion of the philosophers (as, notably, Pomponatius and his followers) came secretly to favor a direction of thought hostile to the dogmatic Supra-naturalism of the Church. On the other hand, a portion of the believers (Mystics and Reformers) were led to take sides openly against the reason of the Schools and in favor of unconditional surrender to a revelation believed to be superior to all human thought, while still others, finally, were led to new essays in philosophy, founded partly on the renewal of older systems (in particular, the Neo-Platonic), and partly on independent investigation (Telesius, Bacon, and others).

FIRST DIVISION.

THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHOLASTICISM.

§ 90. Johannes Scotus, or Erigena, is the earliest noteworthy philosopher of the Scholastic period. He was of Scottish nationality, but was probably born and brought up in Ireland. At the call of Charles the Bald he emigrated to France. In his philosophical speculations, which are set forth mainly in his work entitled *De Divisione Naturae*, he followed more particularly the lead of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose works he translated into Latin, as also of his commentator Maximus Confessor, and of Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and other Greek teachers of the Church, and, after them, of the Latin Doctors, especially of Augustine. True philosophy was, in his view, identical with true religion. Attempting to interpret the dogmas of the Church in the light of the supposed early-Christian, but in fact Neo-Platonizing conceptions of pseudo-Dionysius, he produced a system containing at once the germs of mediæval mysticism as well as of dialectical Scholasticism, but which was rejected by the authorities of the Church as in contradiction with the true faith. Erigena sought to render the Christian conception of creation intelligible by interpreting it in the sense of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. God, he taught, is the supreme unity, one and yet manifold; the process of evolution from him is the pluralization of the divine goodness [or original being] by means of the descent from the general to the particular, so that, first after the most general essence of all things, the genera, having the highest generality are produced, then the less general, and so on, by the addition of specific differences and properties down to the species, and finally, to individuals. This doctrine was founded upon the realization of an abstraction: the general, namely, was conceived as an essence existing *realiter*, in respect of order, before the particular; or, in other words, the Platonic doctrine of ideas, in that conception of it which it was subsequently customary to express by the formula: "*universalia ante rem*," lay at the basis of the doctrine of John Scotus. Yet Scotus did not deny that the universal exists also in the particular. The going forth of finite beings from the Deity was called by Scotus the process of unfolding (*analysis, resolutio*), and, in addition to this, he

taught the doctrine of the return of all things unto God or their deification (*reversio, deificatio*), or the congregation of the infinite plurality of individuals in the genera and finally in the simplest unity of all, which is God, so that then God should be all in all. John Scotus followed Dionysius the Areopagite also in distinguishing affirmative theology, which ascribes to God positive predicates with a symbolical meaning, from negative theology, in which the same predicates in their ordinary signification are denied of him.

The work of John Scotus Erigena entitled *De Divina Prædestinatione* first appeared in print (after the printing of his translation of Dionysius, at Cologne, in 1556), in *Gudberti Maurini vet. auct. qui nono seculo de prædestinatione et gratia scripserunt opera et fragmenta*, Paris, 1660, tom. I., p. 108 seq. The *De Divisione Naturæ*, condemned to be burned by Pope Honorius III., February 23, 1225, was first published by Thomas Gale, Oxford, 1681, next by C. B. Schilter, Münster, 1838, and finally, together with the translation of Dionysius, by H. J. Floss, Paris, 1853, as Vol. 123 of Migne's *Patrologias Cursus Completus*. Erigena's Commentary to Marcianus Capella, edited by Hauréau, Paris, 1861. Of John Scotus write, in particular, P. Hjort (*Johann Scotus Erigena oder von dem Ursprung einer christlichen Philosophie und ihrem heiligen Beruf*, Copenhagen, 1828), Heinrich Schmid (in *Der Mysticismus des Mittelalters in seiner Entstehungsperiode*, Jena, 1824, pp. 114-178), Fr. Ant. Staudenmaier (*Johannes Scotus Erigena*, Vol. I., Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1834), Ad. Heflicher (*Die christl. Mystik*, Bd. II., Gotha, 1842, pp. 15-126), St. René Taillandier (*Scot Erigène et la philosophie scolastique*, Strasbourg, 1843), Nis. Müller (*Joh. Scotus Erigena und seine Irrthümer*, Mayence, 1844), Theod. Christlieb (*Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scotus Erigena*, Gotha, 1850), Joh. Huber (*Joh. Sc. Erig., ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter*, München, 1861), A. Stöckl (*De Joh. Sc. Er.*, Münster, 1867), Oscar Hermens (*Das Leben des Scotus Erigena*, Inaug. Diss., Jena, 1868). Cf. Hauréau, *Philos. scolastique*, I., pp. 111-180, Wilh. Kanlich, in *Abh. d. böhm. Ges. d. W.*, XI., 1861, pp. 147-198, and *Gesch. d. scholast. Philos.*, I. pp. 26-236; also the prefaces of the editors of the works of John Scotus, and, on his logic, Peanli, *Gesch. d. Log.*, II., pp. 20-37.

Johannes, who in the MSS. is called sometimes Scotus and sometimes Jerugena or Erigena, came probably from Ireland, which was then called Scotia Major, as the native land of the Scotch, who migrated thence into Scotland. Gale's derivation of Erigena from Ergene, in the County of Hereford, as the place of his birth, is incorrect, and Mackenzie's derivation of it from Aire, in Scotland, is improbable; the name points (as Thomas Moore, *History of Ireland*, I. ch. 13, has shown) to Hibernia (*Ἰέρνη*). The year of the birth of John Scotus must fall between 800 and 810. He received his education probably in the schools which were then flourishing in Ireland. He understood Greek, though perhaps not so well as Latin. Of the writings of ancient philosophers, he was acquainted with the *Timæus* of Plato in the translation of Chalcidius, also with the *De Interpretatione* of Aristotle, the *Categ. (Ἰ)*, together with the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and the *Compendia* of Boëthius, Cassiodorus, Marcianus Capella, Isidorus, and others who wrote after them, and with the *Principia Dialecticæ* and *Decem Categ.* ascribed to Augustine. Charles the Bald called him, about 843, soon after his accession to the throne, to the court-school (*schola palatina*) at Paris, at the head of which he remained for some time. Charles also commissioned him to translate the pretended writings of Dionysius Areopagita, which had been presented in 824 to Louis the I. by the Emperor Michael Balbus. But the Pope, Nicolaus I., complained to the king that Scotus did not send his translation to him before its publication, that it might undergo his censorship, and he proposed to call him to defend himself against a charge of holding heretical opinions. It is uncertain whether John Scotus, upon this, was removed from his position as teacher in the Court-School; in any case, he retained the favor of the king and remained near him. According to some accounts he was called by

Alfred the Great ca. 882 to the University founded at Oxford and was afterward murdered by the monks while holding the office of Abbot at Malmesbury; but in these accounts he seems to have been confounded with another Johannes. According to Hauréau (*Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, tom. XVI.), John Scotus died in France about 877.

The Church Fathers acknowledged the full authority of the Old, and, at an early date, also of the New Testament. But the allegorical method of interpretation which they employed, and which in many cases led to very liberal constructions of Scripture, prevented their relation to that authority from being one of mere dependence, while, in relation to their predecessors, they all assumed, substantially, to possess equal authority with them, and did not hesitate to modify and rectify the teachings of the latter, in accordance with their own views. The Scholastics, on the contrary, and with them John Scotus—at least so far as his intention is concerned—treat the authority of the "Fathers" with almost as much consideration as the words of Scripture itself. According to Scotus, all our inquiries must begin with faith in revealed truth (*De Prædest.*, I.: *salus nostra ex fide inchoat. De Divis. Nat.*, II. 20 (ed. Schlüter): *Non enim alia fidelium animarum salus est, quam de uno omnium principio quas vere prædicantur credere et quas vere creduntur, intelligere*). We may not—as we read, *ibid.*, I. 66—advance concerning God our own inventions, but only that which is revealed in the Holy Scriptures or what may be inferred from its statements (*ibid.*, II. 15: *ratiocinationis exordium ex divinis eloquiis assumendum esse existimo*). But it is our business to discover by the aid of reason the sense of the divine utterances, which is manifold and, like a peacock's feather, glows with many colors (*ib.*, IV. 5), and in particular to reduce figurative expressions to their literal sense (*ib.*, I. 66). In penetrating into the mysteries of revelation, we are to be guided by the writings of the Fathers of the Church. It is not befitting in us to pass judgment on the wisdom of the Fathers, but we must piously and with reverence accept their teachings; yet it is permitted us to choose out what appears in the judgment of the reason to be more in accordance with the divine oracles (*ib.*, II. 16), especially in cases where the ancient teachers of the Church are in contradiction with each other (*ib.*, IV. 16).

Appealing to the authority of Augustine, John Scotus affirms the identity of true philosophy with true religion; he bases this assertion especially on the fact that community of cultus depends on community of doctrine (*De Prædest.*, *Proem*: *non alia est philosophia, i. e., sapientiae studium, et alia religio, quum hi, quorum doctrinam non approbamus, nec sacramenta nobiscum communicant. Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae religionis regulas exponere? Conficitur inde verum esse philosophiam veram religionem conversamque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam*). But he does not conceive true religion altogether as simply identical with the doctrine sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority; on the contrary, in case of a collision between authority and reason, he would give the preference to reason (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. p. 39; *ib.*, I. 71: *auctoritas ex vera ratione processit, ratio vera nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis auctoritas, quae vera ratione non approbatur, infirma esse videtur; vera autem ratio, quum virtutibus suis rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis adstipulatione roborari indiget*. Yet he confesses [*ib.*, II. 36]: *nihil veris rationibus convenientius subjungitur, quam sanctorum patrum inconcussa probabilisque auctoritas*). His opponents charged him with a want of respect for the authorities of the Church; they said he had argued (in his work against Gottschalk) too independently on the subject of predestination.

The fundamental idea, and at the same time the fundamental error, in Erigena's doctrine is (as Hauréau, also, justly remarks, *Philos. Schol.*, I. p. 130) the idea that the degrees of abstraction correspond with the degrees in the scale of real existence. He hypostasises the *Tabula Logica*.

In the work entitled *De Divisione Naturae*, John Scotus sets out with the division of *φύσις*, or nature—in which conception he includes all that is either existent or non-existent—into four species: 1) that which creates and is not created, 2) that which is created and creates, 3) that which is created and does not create, 4) that which neither creates nor is created (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. 1: *videtur mihi divisio naturae per quatuor differentias quatuor species recipere, quarum prima est quae creat et non creatur, secunda quae creatur et creat, tertia quae creatur et non creat, quarta quae nec creat nec creatur*). The first is the cause of all that is existent or non-existent; the second includes the ideas which subsist in God as *primordiales causae*; the third comprises all things that appear in space and time; and the fourth coincides with the first in so far as both refer to God, the first, namely, to God as Creator, the fourth to God as the end of all things.

By the non-existent Scotus means, not that which has absolutely no being (*quod penitus non est*), or mere privation, but (1), in the highest sense, that which is above the reach of our senses or our reason; (2) that which, in the scale of created being—which descends from the rational force (*virtus intellectualis*) through *ratio* and *sensus* down to the *anima nutritiva et auctiva*—is in each given case the higher, in so far as it as such is not known by the inferior, whereas it is to be denominated existent, in so far as it is known by those who are higher in the scale than itself, and by itself; (3) that which is as yet only potentially existent (like the human race in Adam, the plant in the seed); (4) in the language of philosophy, the material, since it comes and goes, and is not truly existent, like the intelligible; (5) sin, as being the loss of the divine image (*De Div. Nat.*, I. 2 seq.).

The creating and uncreated being alone has essential subsistence. He alone truly is. He is the essence of all things (*De Div. Nat.*, I. 3: *ipse namque omnium essentia est, qui solus vere est, ut ait Dionysius Areopagita. Ib.*, I. 14: *solummodo ipsam [naturam creatricem omniumque causalem] essentialiter subsistere*). God is the beginning and end of things (*Ib.*, I. 12: *est igitur principium, medium et finis: principium, quia ex se sunt omnia quae essentiam participant, medium autem quia in se ipso et per se ipsum subsistunt omnia, finis vero quia ad ipsum moventur, quietem motus sui suaeque perfectionis stabilitatem quaerentia*). God's essence is incognizable for men and even for the angels. Nevertheless, his being can be seen in the being of things, his wisdom in their orderly classified arrangement, and his life in their constant motion; by his being is to be understood, here, the Father, by his wisdom, the Son, and by his life, the Holy Ghost (*ib.*, I. 14). God is therefore an essence (*essentia*) in three substances. True, all these terms are not literally appropriate; Dionysius says justly that the highest cause can be expressed by no name; these expressions are only symbolically pertinent. They belong to that affirmative theology which is called, among the Greeks, *καταφατική*; negative theology (*ἀποφατική*) denies their applicability to God. Symbolically or metaphorically speaking, God can be called truth, goodness, essence, light, justice, sun, star, breath, water, lion, and numberless other things. But in reality he is exalted above all these predicates, since each of them has an opposite, while in him there is no opposition (*De Div. Nat.*, I. 16: *essentia ergo dicitur Deus, sed proprie essentia non est, cui opponitur nihil, ὑπερβολικός igitur est, id est superessentialis; item bonitas dicitur, sed proprie bonitas non est, bonitati enim malitia opponitur, ὑπεράγαθος igitur, plus quam bonus, et ὑπεραγαθότης, id est plus quam bonitas*). In like manner John Scotus applies to this "creative and uncreated nature" the predicates *ὑπέρθεος*, *ὑπεραληθής* and *ὑπεραλήθεια*, *ὑπεραιώνιος* and *ὑπεραιωνία ὑπέρσοφος*, and *ὑπερσοφία* (transcendently divine, true, eternal, wise), all of which sound indeed affirmative, but involve a negative sense. So, too, he represents this *natura* (in this following expressly the example of St. Augustine) as superior to the ten categories, those most universal genera into which Aristotle had divided all created things (*ib.*, I. 16 seq.).

The uncreated but creating nature is the source of all created things. First of all, the created natures or beings, which are endowed at the same time with creative power, were produced. These include the totality of *primordiales causas*; *prototypa*, *primordialis exempla*, or ideas, i. e., the eternal archetypes of things (*De Divis. Nat.*, II. 2: *species vel formae, in quibus remanet omnium faciendarum priusquam essent immutabiles rationes conditae sunt*).

These Ideas, which are the first causes of individual existences, are contained in the divine Wisdom or the divine Word, the only-begotten Son of the Father. Under the influence of the Holy Ghost (or the fostering divine love) they unfold their effects, which are the created and not creating objects, or the external world (*Ib.*, II. 19: *spiritus enim sanctus causas primordiales, quas pater in principio, in filio videlicet suo, fecerat, ut in eorum causa sunt procederent, fovebat, hoc est divini amoris motu nutrebat; ad hoc namque causa ab aliis, ex quibus haec metaphorice assumpta est, fovetur, ut intima invisibilisque vis, quae in eis latet, per numeros locorum temporumque in formas visibiles corporalesque pueritudo, ignis, aerque in humoribus seminum terrenaque materia, operantibus, erumpat*). The materiality of the world is (*ib.*, I. 36, where John Scotus appeals to the authority of Gregory of Nyssa, cf. § 86, p. 381) only apparent; it is due to the combination of accidents (*accidentium quorundam concursus*). By that "nothing," out of which, according to the doctrine of the Church, the world was created, is to be understood God's own incomprehensible essence (*De Divis. Nat.*, III. 19: *ineffabilem et incomprehensibilem divinae naturae inaccessibilemque claritatem omnibus intellectibus sive humanis sive angelicis incognitam (superessentialis est enim et supernaturalis) eo nomine (nihil) significatam crediderim*). Creation is an act of God, by which he passes through (*processio*) the *primordiales causas* or *principia* into the world of invisible and visible creatures (*ib.*, III. 25). But this procession is an eternal act (*ib.*, III. 17 seq.: *omnia quae semper vidit, semper fecit; non enim in eo praecedit visio operationem, quoniam coaeterna est visioni operatio;—videt enim operando et videndo operatur*). The substance of all finite things is God (*Non enim extra eam (divinam naturam) subsistent; conspectum est, ipsam solam esse vere ac proprie in omnibus et nihil vere ac proprie esse quod ipsa non sit. Proinde non duo a se ipsis distantia debemus intelligere Dominum et creaturam, sed unum, et id ipsum. Nam et creatura in Deo est subsistens, et Deus in creatura mirabili et ineffabili modo creatur, se ipsum manifestans, invisibilis visibilem se faciens et incomprehensibilem comprehensibilem et occultus apertus et incognitus cognitum et forma et specie carens formosum et speciosum et superessentialis essentialem et supernaturalis naturalem,—et omnia creans in omnibus creatum et omnium factor factum in omnibus*). Scotus says expressly that he affirms the doctrine of the descent of the Triune God into finite things, not only with reference to the single instance of the incarnation, but with reference to all created things or existences. Our life is God's life in us (*ib.*, I. 78: *se ipsam sancta trinitas in nobis et in se ipsa amat, videt, movet*). The knowledge which angels and men have of God is God's revelation of himself in them (*apparitio Dei*), or theophany (*theopnevia*, *ib.* I. 7 seq.).

The nature which neither creates nor is created is not a fourth nature, distinct from the three first, but is in reality identical with the creating, uncreated nature; it is God, viewed as the term in which all things end, to which all finally return. After this nature they repose eternally in God; the process of development or "creation" is not repeated (*De Divis. Nat.*, II. 2: *prima namque et quarta unum sunt, quoniam de Deo solummodo intelliguntur; est enim principium omnium quae a se condita sunt, et finis omnium quae eum appetunt, ut in eo aeternaliter immutabiliterque quiescant. Causa siquidem omnium propterea dicitur creare, quoniam ab ea universitas eorum, quae post eam ab ea creata sunt, in genera et species et numeros, differentias quoque ceteraque quae in natura condita considerantur, mirabili quadam divinaque multiplicatione procedit; quoniam vero ad eandem causam omnia quae ab ea procedunt dum ad finem perveniunt reversura sunt, propterea finis omnium dicitur et neque creare*).

negare creari perhibetur; nam postquam in eam reversa sunt omnia, nihil ulterius ad regenerationem loco et tempore generibus et formis procedet, quoniam in ea omnia quiescent erunt et, ut ita dixerim, individuum atque immutabile manebunt. Nam quas in processibus naturarum multipliciter divisa atque partita esse videntur, in primordialibus causis unita atque unum sunt, ad quam unitatem reversura in ea aeternaliter atque immutabiliter manebunt. Ib., III. 23: jam desinit creare, omnibus in suas aeternas rationes, in quibus aeterniter manebunt et manent conversis, appellatione quoque creaturae significari desistentibus; Deus enim omnia in omnibus erit, et omnis creatura obumbrabitur in Deum, videlicet conversa sicut astra sole oriente).

Since the Deity is viewed by John Scotus as the substance of all things, it is impossible for him, with the Aristotelians (whom he terms Dialecticians), to regard individual, concrete things as substances, of which the general may be predicated, and in which the accidental is contained; he views all things, rather, as contained in the divine substance, the special and individual as immanent in the general, and the latter, again, as existing in things individual as in its natural parts (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. 27 seq.). Yet neither is this view identical with the original Platonic doctrine; it is a result of a transference of the Aristotelian conception of substance to the Platonic idea, and of an identification of the relation of accidents (*συμβεβηκότα*) to the substances in which they inhere, with that of the individuals to the ideas, of which, in the Platonic doctrine, they are copies.

That this doctrine is taken wholly from Dionysius the Areopagite and his commentator Maximus, is expressly affirmed by John Scotus, especially in the dedication of his translation of the *Scholía* of Maximus to Gregory of Nazianzen; the Platonic and Neo-Platonic basis is also manifest throughout it. The attempt to combine it with the doctrine of the Church in one harmonious whole could not be carried through without logical inconsistency. If God is the *ὄν*, the real essence, that is cognized through the most universal conception of being, then it follows, on the one hand, that the conception which represents him as a personal being, is and can only be the result of the imagination, not of thought, and, on the other, that plurality, or, in particular, trinity, cannot be predicated of God himself, but only of his development or outcome; so Plotinus represents the *νοῦς* with the ideas as occupying the second place in the ontological order and as coming after the absolutely simple original essence (the world-soul forming the third form of Deity). But the Logos-doctrine, in the form given it by Athanasius, required Scotus to treat the Logos (as also the Holy Ghost) as a part of the original essence (i. e., of God), placing only the ideas, which are in the Logos, in the second class (as in the third was placed the world, made with the co-operation of the Holy Ghost).—The return of all things into God, which, in agreement with his fundamental conception, was taught by Scotus, was not in harmony with the doctrinal system of the Church.

In addition to Platonic and Neo-Platonic, there are traces also of Aristotelian influences in the works of John Scotus, although he was only indirectly acquainted with any of the metaphysical teachings of Aristotle. The three first of his four "divisions of nature" are a partly Neo-Platonic, partly Christian, modification of the three-fold ontological division of Aristotle (*Metaph.*, XII. 7): the unmoved and moving, the moved and moving, and the moved and not moving, with which Scotus may have become acquainted from a passage in Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, V. 9: *causa igitur rerum quae facit nec fit, Deus est; aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales; corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae*). The Dionysian doctrine of the return of all things into God furnished then the fourth form.

In the doctrine of John Scotus universals are before and also in the individual objects, which exist, or rather the latter are in the former; the distinction between these (Realistic) formulae appears not yet developed in his writings. But his system could scarcely lead

later thinkers to Nominalism, unless by the unremoved contradictions which it contained, and which might lead to the denial of the postulate of the substantial existence of universals and to the conception of the latter as merely subjective forms; viewed in its positive aspects, the system contains no germs of Nominalism. The following notice, taken from an old *Historia a Roberto rege ad mortem Philippi primi*, was first published by Bulæus, in his *Historia Univers. Paris.*, I. p. 443: *in dialectica hi potentes exstiterunt sophistae: Johannes, qui eandem artem sophisticam vocalem esse disseruit, Robertus Parisiacensis, Rocelinus Compendiensis, Arnulphus Laudunensis, hi Joannis fuerunt sectatores, qui etiam quamplures habuerunt auditores* (cf. Hauréau, *Philos. Scol.*, I. pp. 174 seq., and Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. pp. 76 seq.). The Johannes to whom reference is here made is surely not John Scotus (as Hauréau and Prantl assume), but a later dialectician, otherwise unknown to us. Erigena is throughout a realist. He teaches, it is true, that grammar and rhetoric, as branches of dialectic, or aids to it, relate only to words (*voce*s), not to things, and that they are therefore not properly sciences (*De Divis. Nat.*, V. 4: *matri artium, quae est dialectica, semper adhaerent; sunt enim veluti quaedam ipsius brachia rivulique ex ea manantes vel certe instrumenta, quibus suas intelligibiles inventiones humanis usibus manifestat*); but he co-ordinates dialectic itself or *λογική*, *rationalis sophia* (*De Div. Nat.*, III. 30) with ethics, physics, and theology, defining it as the doctrine of the methodical form of knowledge (*quae ostendit quibus regulis de unaquaque trium aliarum partium disputandum*), and assigning to it, in particular, as its work, the discussion of the most general conceptions or logical categories (predicaments), which categories he by no means regards as merely subjective forms or images, but as the names of the highest genera of all created things (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. 16: *Aristoteles, acutissimus apud Graecos, ut ajunt, naturalium rerum discretionis repertor, omnium rerum, quae post Deum sunt et ab eo creatae, innumerabiles varietates in decem universalibus generibus conclusit;—illa pars philosophiae, quae dicitur dialectica, circa horum generum divisiones a generalissimis ad specialissimam iterumque collectione a specialissimis ad generalissimam versatur*. *Ib.*, I. 29: *dialectica est communium animi conceptionum rationabilium diligens investigatrixque disciplina*. *Ib.*, I. 46: *dialecticae proprietas est rerum omnium, quae intelligi possunt, naturas dividere, conjungere, discernere, propriosque locos unicuique distribuere, atque ideo a sapientibus vera rerum contemplatio solet appellari*. *Ib.*, IV. 4: *intelligitur, quod ars illa, quae dividit genera in species et species in genera resolvit, quae διαλεκτική dicitur, non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ab auctore omnium artium, quae vere artes sunt, condita et a sapientibus inventa et ad utilitatem solerti rerum indagine usitata*. *Ib.*, V. 4: *ars illa, quae a Graecis dicitur dialectica et definitur bene disputandi scientia, primo omnium circa οὐσίαν veluti circa proprium suum principium versatur, ex qua omnis divisio et multiplicatio eorum, de quibus ars ipsa disputat, inchoat, per genera generalissima mediaque genera usque ad formas et species specialissimas descendens, et iterum complicationis regulis per eodem gradus, per quos degraditur, donec ad ipsam οὐσίαν, ex qua egressa est, perveniat, non desinit redire in eam, qua semper appetit quiescere et circa eam vel solum vel maxime intelligibili motu convolveri*).

The most noteworthy features in John's theory of the categories (in the first book) are his doctrine of the combination of the categories with each other, and his attempt to subsume them under the conceptions of motion and rest, as also his identification of the category of place with definition in logic, which, he says, is the work of the understanding. The dialectical precepts which relate to the form or method of philosophizing are not discussed by him in detail; the most essential thing, in his regard, is the use of the four forms, called by the Greeks division, definition, demonstration, and analysis (*διαμερής, διοριστική, ἀποδεικτική, ἀναλυτική*). Under the latter he understands the reduction of the derivative and composite to the simple, universal, and fundamental (*De Praed. Prooem.*), but uses the term also in the opposite sense, to denote the unfolding of God in creation

(*Praef. ad amb. S. Maz.* : *divina in omnia processio ἀναλυτική dicitur, reversio vero θέσις, ἡ. ε., deificatio*).

In the controversy respecting predestination, John Scotus took sides against Gottschalk's doctrine of two kinds of fore-ordination, of fore-ordination to salvation and of fore-ordination to damnation, announcing his belief in the former only. In the disputes concerning the Eucharist, he gave prominence to the idea that the presence of Christ in that sacrament is of a spiritual nature. But of these specifically theological points it is unnecessary here to treat.

§ 91. The doctrine combated by John Scotus and held by those whom he called the dialecticians, who derived it in part from writings of Aristotle and Boëthius, as also the doctrine of Augustine and Pseudo-Augustine,—according to which individual objects were substances in the fullest sense, while species and genera were such only in a secondary sense, and generic and specific characteristics were predicable of individual substances, in which latter the unessential marks or accidents also inhered—found among the Scholastics during and after the time of John Scotus, numerous supporters, some of whom advanced it expressly in opposition to his Neo-Platonic theory, while others admitted rather the true substantiality of the universal. Among a portion of these “dialecticians” a doubt arose whether, since the general can be predicated of the individual, the genus was to be regarded as anything positive (real)—for it seemed impossible that one *thing* should be affirmed as a predicate of another *thing*; this doubt led to the assertion that genera were to be viewed as mere words (*voces*). The development of these doctrines was connected, in particular, with the study of Porphyry's Introduction to the logical writings of Aristotle, in which Introduction the conceptions: *genus*, *differentia*, *species*, *proprium*, and *accidens*, are treated of; the question was raised, whether by these were to be understood five realities or only five words (*quinque voces*). A passage in this same Introduction touched upon the questions: (1) whether genera and species (or the so-called universals) have a substantial existence or whether they exist solely in our thoughts; (2) whether, supposing them to exist substantially, they are material or immaterial essences; and (3) whether they exist apart from the objects perceptible by the senses or only in and with them. Porphyry declined to enter upon a special discussion of these questions (which he found suggested in the metaphysical writings of Aristotle—that were unknown in the earlier part of the Middle Ages—in the Platonic or Pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Parmenides*, and in the teachings of his own master, Plotinus), on the

ground that they were too difficult to be considered in an introductory work; but even those few words were sufficient so to express the main problem itself, and to indicate the possible ways of attempting its solution, as to furnish a point of departure for mediæval Realism and Nominalism, and that all the more, since the dialectical treatment of the fundamental dogmas of the Church could not but lead to the discussion of the same problem. The doctrine (of Plato, or at least the doctrine ascribed to him by Aristotle), that universals have an independent existence apart from individual objects, and that they exist before the latter (whether merely in point of rank and in respect of the causal relation, or in point of time also), is extreme Realism, which was afterward reduced to the formula: *universalia ante rem*. The (Aristotelian) opinion, that universals, while possessing indeed a real existence, exist only in individual objects, is the doctrine of Moderate Realism, expressed by the formula: *universalia in re*. Nominalism is the doctrine that only individuals have real existence, and that genera and species are merely subjective combinations of similar elements, united by the aid of one and the same concept (*conceptus*), through which concept we think the manifold homogeneous objects which it includes, and under one and the same word (*nomen voc*), which word, for want of a sufficient number of simple proper names, we employ to express at once the totality of homogeneous objects included under the concept. Of Nominalism there are two varieties, according as stress is laid on the subjective nature of the concept (conceptualism), or on the identity of the word employed to denote the objects comprehended under the concept (Extreme Nominalism, or Nominalism in the narrower sense of the term). The formula of Nominalism is: *universalia post rem*. All these leading types of doctrine appear, either in embryo or with a certain degree of development, in the ninth and tenth centuries; but the more complete expansion and the dialectical demonstration of them, as well as the sharpest contests of their several supporters, and also the development of the various possible modifications and combinations of them, belong to the period next succeeding.

Of Realism and Nominalism in the Middle Ages treat, among others, Jac. Thomassin (*Oratio de unitate nominalium*, in his *Orationes*, Leipzig, 1688-86), Ch. Melners (*De nominalium ac realium initiis*, in: *Comm. soc. Gott. XII., class. hist.*), L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius (*Progr. de vero scholasticorum realitatis et nominalium discrimine et sententia theologica*, Jen., 1821), F. Exner (*Ueber Nominalismus und Realismus*, Prague, 1842), H. O. Köhler (*Realismus und Nominalismus in ihrem Einfluss auf die dogmatischen Systeme des Mittelalters*, Gotha, 1858); C. S. Barash, *Zur Gesch. des Nominalismus vor Boetius, nebst handschr. Quellen der Wiener kais. Hofbibliothek*, Vienna, 1866 (on the marginal comments in a MS. of the Pseudo-Augustinian *Categories*). Cf. the works above cited on the philosophy of the Scholastics.

Following after Jourdain (*Recherches critiques*, etc., and other writings) Cousin, Hauréau, and Prantl, in particular, have demonstrated that, until nearly the middle of the twelfth century, the only logical writings of the ancients known in the Middle Ages were the following: Aristotle's *Categ.* and *De Interpr.*, in the translation of Boëthius, Porphyry's *Isagoge*, in the translations of Boëthius and Victorinus, the works of Marcellus Capella, Augustine, Pseudo-Augustine, and Cassiodorus, and the following works of Boëthius: *Ad Porphyr. a Victorino translatus, ad Arist. de interpret., ad Cic. Top., Intro. ad categoric. syllog., De syllog. categorico, De syllog. hypothetico, De divisione, De definitione, De differ. top.* Both the *Analytica*, the *Topica*, and the *Soph. Elench.* of Aristotle were unknown. Of all the works of Plato it is probable that only a portion of the *Timæus*, and that in the translation of Chalcidius, was possessed by mediæval scholars; with this exception his doctrines were known to them only indirectly, particularly through passages in Augustine. They possessed also the work of Apuleius, entitled *De Dogmate Platonis*. The *Analyt.* and *Top.* of Aristotle became gradually known after the year 1128, and his metaphysical and physical writings from about the year 1200.

The passage in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, which was the historical occasion of the development of the various dialectical tendencies above named, reads as follows, in the translation of Boëthius, in which it was known in the Middle Ages: *Quoniam si necessarium, Chrysostomi, et ad eam quæ est apud Aristotelem prædicamentorum doctrinam, nosse quid sit genus, quid differentia, quid species, quid proprium et quid accidens, et ad definitionum assignationem, et omnino ad ea quæ in divisione et in demonstratione sunt, utilis istorum rerum speculatione, compendiosam tibi traditionem faciens, tentabo breviter velut introductionis modo, ea quæ ab antiquis dicta sunt aggredi, ab altioribus quidem quaestionibus abstinens, simpliciores vero mediocriter conjectans. Max de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive substantia sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive substantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibus an in sensibus posita et circa hæc consistentia, dicere recusabo; altissimum enim negotium est huiusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis.* Victor Cousin (in *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836, p. LVI.), following the lead of Tennemann and others, has called especial attention to this passage as being the point of departure for the contest between Realism and Nominalism in the Middle Ages.

In distinction from the Neo-Platonism of Joh. Scotus, the school of Hrabanus Maurus, who died in 856, while Archbishop of Mayence (works edited by Colvener, Cologne, 1627), held fast to the stand-point of Aristotle and Boëthius. Cf., respecting Hrabanus, Schwarz, and Prantl (above, § 88), and F. Kunstmann (Mayence, 1841).

Eric (Heiricus) of Auxerre, who studied at Fulda, at the school founded by Alcuin's pupil, Hrabanus, under the direction of Haimon (likewise a pupil of Alcuin), and, after further training at Ferrières, opened a school at Auxerre, wrote, among other things, on the margin of his copy of the Pseudo-Augustinian *Categoriae*, glosses, which were discovered and have been published by Cousin and Hauréau. The style is clear and facile; the difference of logical stand-points is as yet but slightly marked. Heiricus says (as cited by Hauréau, *Phil. Scol.*, p. 142) with Aristotle and Boëthius: *rem concipit intellectus, intellectum voces designant, voces autem litteræ significant*, and affirms (after Aristotle, *De Interpret.*, 1) that *res* and *intellectus* are natural, and that *voces* and *litteræ* are conventional (*secundum positionem hominum*). He does not, however, view the universal, as it exists in our conceptions, as corresponding with a real or objective universality in things, but expresses himself rather after the manner of Nominalism (*ap. Hauréau, Phil. Scol.*, p. 141): *sciendum autem, quia propria nomina primum sunt innumerabilia, ad quæ cognoscenda intellectus nullus seu memoria sufficit, hæc ergo omnia coartata species comprehendit et facit primum gradum. qui latissimus est, scilicet hominem, equum, leonem et species huiusmodi omnes continet; sed*

quia haec rursus erant innumerabilia et incomprehensibilia, alter factus est gradus angustior jam, qui constat in genere, quod est animal, surculus et lapis; iterum haec genera, in unum coacta nomen, tertium fecerunt gradum arctissimum jam et angustissimum, utpote qui uno nomine solummodo constat, quod est usia. Concepts of qualities do not denote things (Heiricus ap. Hauréau, *Ph. Sc.*, p. 139: *si quis dixerit album et nigrum absolute sine propria et certa substantia, in qua continetur, per hoc non poterit certam rem ostendere, nisi dicat albus homo vel equus aut niger*). In the same Codex are also contained, together with marginal notes upon them, Boëthius' translation of Aristotle's *De Interpr.*, Augustine's *Dialectica*, and the translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry by Boëthius. In the glosses to the latter work, the questions of Porphyry are answered in accordance with the doctrine of moderate (Aristotelian) Realism, which appears as the doctrine generally prevalent in the period in which Eric lived. The true being or subsistence (*vere esse* or *vere subsistere*) of genera and species is defended (ap. Cousin, *Ouvr. Inéd. d'Abélard*, p. LXXXII.); these are in themselves immaterial, but subsist in things material; the latter, as being individual, are the objects of sense-perception, while the universal, conceived as existing by itself, is the subject of thought. The genus is (conceptualistically) defined as *cogitatio collecta ex singularum similitudine specierum*. These glosses are, including the statement with reference to Plato (*sed Plato genera et species non modo intelligit universalia, verum etiam esse atque praeter corpora subsistere putat*), almost without exception extracts from Boëth. in Porphyr. *a se translationem*, in particular from the passage cited by Hauréau, *Ph. Sc.*, I. p. 95 seq.

Heiricus' pupil, Remigius of Auxerre, taught, beginning in 882, grammar, music, and dialectic at Rheims and, later, at Paris, where he had among his pupils Otto of Clugny. His *Commentary* on Marcius Capella (taken in large measure from the *Commentary* of John Scotus on the same author—see extracts in Hauréau's *Ph. Scol.*, I. p. 144 seq., and *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits*, t. XX. p. II.) betokens a more realistic tendency, containing, as it does, the Platonic doctrine that the specific and individual exist by participation in the universal, yet without quitting the Boëthian and Aristotelian stand-point of immanence. Remigius defines the genus as the collection of many species (*genus est complexio, id est collectio et comprehensio multarum formarum i. e. specierum*). That this is to be understood as describing, not a mere subjective act, but an objective unity, is seen from the definition of *forma* or *species* as a substantial part of the genus (*partitio substantialis*) or as the substantial unity of the individuals included in the species (*homo est multorum hominum substantialis unitas*). Remigius discusses the question (oft treated by his predecessors), how the accidents exist before their union with the individuals to which they belong, in what manner, for example, rhetorical culture exists before its union with Cicero. His decision is, that accidents, previous to their manifestation, are already contained potentially in the individuals of the species, that, e. g., rhetorical culture is contained in human nature in general, but that in consequence of Adam's sin it disappeared in the depths of ignorance, continued *in memoria*, and is now called into consciousness (*in praesentiam intelligentiae*) by the process of learning (Remig., ap. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits*, XX., II. p. 20).

Of the dialectical writings belonging to the ninth century, a manuscript should here be mentioned, which was discovered and published by Cousin (in *Ouvrages Inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836) and is entitled *Super Porphyrium*. Cousin and Hauréau, on the ground of manuscript tradition, assign its authorship to Rhabanus Maurus, but it is more probably to be ascribed (in agreement with Prantl's opinion, which Kaulich also adopts) to one of his (direct or indirect) disciples. In this work logic is divided (not as by Rhabanus himself—*De Universo*, XV. 1, ed. Colvener, Cologne, 1627—into dialectic and rhetoric, but) into grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. The intention of Porphyry in his *Isagoge* is de-

scribed here as follows (*ap. Cousin, ib.*, p. 613): *intentio Porphyrii est in hoc opere facilem intellectum ad prædicamenta præparare tractando de quinque rebus vel vocibus, genere scilicet, specie, differentia, proprio et accidente, quorum cognitio valet ad prædicamentorum cognitionem.* The author discusses the view of some who argued that Porphyry intended to treat in his *Isagoge*, not *de quinque rebus*, but *de quinque vocibus*, on the ground, as our author relates, that otherwise his definition of the genus would be inapt (*genus est quod prædicatur*); for a thing cannot be a predicate (*Res enim non prædicatur. Quod hoc modo probant: si res prædicatur, res dicitur; si res dicitur, res enunciatur; si res enunciatur, res profertur; sed res proferri non potest, nihil enim profertur nisi vox, neque enim aliud est prolatio, quam aëris plectro lingue percussio*). Another proof, we are told, was founded by the same party on the fact that Aristotle, in the work on the *Categories*, to which Porphyry was preparing an introduction, intended mainly to treat *de vocibus* (in the language of Boëthius: *de primis rerum nominibus et de vocibus res significantibus*), and the introduction must, of course, correspond in character with the work to which it belongs. It is not, however, for this reason denied, that the word genus may be taken realistically, for Boëthius says that the division of the genus must be conformable to nature. The genus is defined as *substantialis similitudo ex diversis speciebus in cogitatione collecta*. In the statement of Boëthius: *alio namque modo (substantia) universalis est quum cogitatur, alio singularis quum sentitur*, the following meaning is found by the author: *quod eadem res individuum et species et genus est, et non esse universalis individuis quasi quiddam diversum, ut quidam dicunt; scilicet speciem nihil aliud esse quam genus informatum et individuum nihil aliud esse quam speciem informatam*. This work shows how, at the time now under consideration, the germs of the different doctrines were all existing side by side in relative harmony, being as yet undeveloped.

The pursuit of dialectic, as of all the *artes liberales*, in the schools, continued during the tenth and eleventh centuries, but was almost entirely unproductive of new scientific results, till near the end of the latter century. At Fulda, about the middle of the tenth century, Poppo taught dialectic, mainly on the basis of the works of Boëthius, following in this not only the tradition of his convent but also the universal custom of his times. He is said also to have written a commentary on the *De Consolatione* of Boëthius. Reinhard wrote, in the cloister of St. Burchard at Würzburg, a commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle. A considerable scholastic activity, first excited, as it would appear, by the school founded by Hrabanus at Fulda, was developed in the cloister of St. Gallen. Nother Labeo (died 1022) contributed much to its maintenance and development. He translated into German the *Categ.* and *De Interpr.* of Aristotle, the *Consol. Philos.* of Boëthius, and the *De Nuptiis Philologie et Mercurii* of Marciianus Capella (as also the Psalms), and composed works on the divisions of the art of thinking, on syllogisms, on rhetoric and music (published by Graff, Berlin, 1837, and again, more completely and exactly, by Heinr. Hat-tomer, in *Denkmale des Mittelalters*, 3d vol., St. Gallen, 1844-49).

Gerbert, who was subsequently made Pope, under the title of Sylvester II. (died 1003), was educated in the cloister at Aurillac in Auvergne, which had been brought under more rigid discipline by Otto of Clugny, the scholar of Remigius, and afterward in other schools of France and also in Spain among the Arabs (from whom also he took the Indian numerals). Cf., concerning him, C. F. Hock, Vienna, 1837; Max Büdinger, Cassel, 1861; G. Friedlein, Erlangen, 1861, and M. Cantor, *Mathematische Beiträge zum Culturleben der Völker*, Halle, 1863, of which section XIII. treats of Boëthius, XIX. of Isidorus, Beda, and Alcuin, XX. of Otto of Clugny, and XXI. and XXII. of the life and mathematical labors of Gerbert. Of the works of Gerbert, one treats of the Lord's Supper, and the other of the rational and of the use of the reason (*De Rationali et Ratione Un.*, printed in Pez's *Thes. Anecd.*, I. 2, pp. 146 seq., and in the *Oeuvres de Gerbert*, edited by A. Olleris, Clermont-

Ferrand and Paris, 1867, pp. 297-310). Besides these, Cousin (*Ouvrages Intéd. d'Abélard*, pp. 644 seq.) has published some mathematical matter from the pen of Gerbert. The Rational may be either eternal and divine (in which division Gerbert includes the Platonic ideas), or it may be something living in time. In the former the rational power is always active, in the latter only at times; in the former potentiality is inseparable from actuality, it is *sub necessaria specie actus*, while to the essence of the latter only the rational capacity necessarily belongs, while the real manifestation of reason is here only an *accidens*, not a *substantialis differentia*. Hence the proposition: *rationale ratione utitur*, is true of rational beings of the first class, as a universal proposition, but of those of the second, only as a particular one; Gerbert holds that a logical judgment, expressed without specification of quantity, can be taken as a particular judgment. Thus Gerbert solves the difficulty which at the beginning he had pointed out in the proposition: *rationale ratione utitur*, that, namely, it appeared to contradict the logical rule according to which the predicate must be more general than the subject. He not unsuitably introduces in his discussion of this problem the distinction between the higher concept in the logical sense, i. e., the concept of wider extension, and the concept the object of which stands higher in rank in the order of existence.

Among the pupils of Gerbert was Fulbert, who in the year 990 opened a school at Chartres, and was Bishop there 1007-1029. Devoted pupils called him their Socrates. Distinguished for his knowledge of sacred and secular topics, he accompanied his instructions with a pressing exhortation to his scholars not to give heed to deceitful innovations and not to deviate from the paths of the holy fathers. The danger that dialectic would be raised to a position in which it would surpass in authority the Bible and the Church, was already beginning to be felt, for which reason the demand was expressly formulated on the part of the Church that it should be made to retain its ancillary position. Petrus Damiani (cf., respecting him, Vogel, Jena, 1856), the apologist of the monastic life and of monastic asceticism, says, about 1050 (*Opera*, ed. Cajetan., Paris, 1743, III. p. 312): *quæ tamen artis humanæ peritia si quando tractandis sacris eloquiis adhibetur, non debet jus magisterii sibimet arroganter arripere, sed velut ancilla dominæ quodam famulatus obsequio subservire, ne si præcedit, oberret*. In a similar strain the monk Othlo (who died at Regensburg about 1083) complains, about the same time, in his work *De Tribus Quaest.* (cited by Pez, *Theas. Anecd.*, III. 2, p. 144), of the existence of dialecticians, who were so exclusively dialecticians that they imagined themselves bound to limit even the statements of Holy Scripture in obedience to the authority of dialectic, and gave more credence to Boëthius than to the sacred penman. The definition of person as *substantia rationalis* offered already an opportunity for collision with the Church in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, and the strife was soon afterward to break out on this point (with Roscellinus).

A scholar of Fulbert was Berengarius of Tours (999-1088), whose dialectical zeal was greater than his respect for ecclesiastical authority. The rationalizing position assumed by him with respect to the question of the Lord's Supper was the occasion of a conflict between him and the orthodox dialectician Lanfranc (born at Pavia about 1005, first educated in the law at Bologna, afterward a monk and Scholastic in the convent at Bec in Normandy, and from 1070 on, Archbishop of Canterbury; died 1089; *Opp.* ed. d'Achéry, Paris, 1648; ed. Giles, Oxford, 1854), who, in the opinion of their contemporaries and according to the judgment of the Church, defeated Berengarius in argument. The doctrine defended by Berengarius in his work *De Sacra Coena adv. Lanfrancum* (ed. A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, Berlin, 1844), is thus summed up by Hugo, Bishop of Langres: "You say that in the sacrament [of the Eucharist] the presence of the body of Christ involves no change in the nature and essence of the bread and wine, and you regard that body, which you had said

was crucified, as an intellectual body" (*dicitur in huiusmodi sacramento corpus Christi sic esse, ut panis et vini natura et essentia non mutetur, corpusque quod dixeris crucifixum, intellectualem constituisse*). Berengarius disputes the theory of a change of substance without a corresponding change in the accidents. His opponents took exceptions in part to the appeal to the senses—in part to the dialectical arguments by which he supported his opposition to the doctrine of the change of substance. But we will not enter more minutely upon the details of this dispute, on account of its specifically theological character. Cf. Lessing, *Ber. Turonensis*, Brunswick, 1770; Stäudlin, Leips. 1814, and others. This controversy exerted an unfavorable influence on the authority of the writings of John Scotus; for, because Berengarius in his doctrine of the Lord's Supper had in great measure simply followed the work of John Scotus, *De Eucharistia*, the latter book was condemned (at the Synod at Vercelli, 1050) and the reading of his writings was altogether prohibited. A farther result was that the inviolability of the contents of the creed against the attacks of reason began now to be urged.

Probably Lanfranc, and not Anselm, his pupil, was the author of the work: *Elucidarium sive dialogus summam totius theologie complectens* (formerly published among Anselm's works, though its authorship was questioned; Giles, on the authority of numerous MSS., ascribes it to Lanfranc and has included it in the edition of his writings). In this work the whole substance of the dogmatics of the time is set forth in genuine scholastic manner, in syllogistic form and with a dialectical examination of proofs and counter-proofs. This form of investigation is applied also in the task of delineating and determining dogmatically the forms under which the conditions of men in another state are to be represented to the imagination (e. g., in the consideration of the questions whether clothes will be worn in the future life, in what position the bodies of the damned are placed in hell, etc.).

Hildegard of Lavardin, Bishop of Tours (born 1057, died about 1133), was a pupil of Berengarius, whom he greatly revered. He warned against the pursuit of dialectic as dangerous and vain, taking refuge, for his own part, in that simple and unquestioning faith which, he said, was not contrary to reason. He defined faith as *voluntaria certitudo absentium, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta* (*Tract. Theol.*, ch. 1 seq., in *Opera*, ed. Ant. Beaugendre, Paris, 1708, p. 1010). God chooses neither to be completely comprehended—in order that faith may not be deprived of its proper merit—nor yet to remain wholly unknown—that there may be no excuse for unbelief. Hildegard seeks to prove the existence of God, by arguing from the creaturehood of man and of all finite things, which, he reasons, implies the existence of an eternal cause. With his skeptical depreciation of dialectic there was combined a shade of mysticism. God, he taught, was above, beneath, without, and within the world (*super totus praesidendo, subter totus sustinendo, extra totus complectendo, intra totus est implendo*). In his *Philos. Moralis* Hildegard follows Cicero and Seneca. Bernard of Clairvaux termed Hildegard a great pillar of the Church ("*tantum ecclesiae columnam*").

§ 92. Nominalism, as the conscious and distinct stand-point of the opponents of Realism, first appeared in the second half of the eleventh century, when a portion of the Scholastics ascribed to Aristotle the doctrine that logic has to do only with the right use of words, and that genera and species are only (subjective) collections of the various individuals designated by the same name, and disputed the interpretation which gave to universals a real existence. These Nominalists

were sometimes called modern dialecticians, because they opposed the traditional realistic interpretation of Aristotle. Among the Nominalists of this time, the most famous is Roscellinus, Canon of Compiègne, who, by his application of the nominalistic doctrine to the dogma of the Trinity, gave great offense and thereby occasioned the speedy discomfiture of Nominalism. If, as the Nominalistic theory affirms, only individuals exist in reality, then the three persons of the Godhead are three individual substances, that is, in fact, three Gods, and nothing but the prevalent ecclesiastical phraseology, in which the Godhead is only designated as threefold in person and not in substance, stands in the way of our speaking of these persons as three Gods. This consequence was openly avowed by Roscellinus, and he was accordingly required by the Ecclesiastical Council of Soissons (1092) to recant the offensive inference; but the Nominalistic doctrine itself, from which it had been deduced, he appears still to have maintained and taught subsequently to this time. In the period immediately following, Nominalism did not entirely disappear, yet there were but few who ventured openly to confess it. It was first renewed in the fourteenth century, particularly by William of Occam. The most influential opponent of Roscellinus, among his contemporaries, was Anselm of Canterbury. The special champion of Realism in France was William of Champeaux, who taught that the species inheres in each of the individuals included in it, *essentially*, or, as he was afterward led by Abelard to say, *indifferently*. Abelard, too, who sought to maintain an intermediate and conciliatory position, opposed the extreme Nominalism of Roscellinus, his earlier teacher.

A letter from Roscellinus to Abelard is published by J. A. Schmeller, from a Munich MS. (cod. lat. 4648), in the *Abh. der philos.-philol. Classe der k. bayr. Akad. der Wiss.*, V. 3, pp. 189 seq., 1851, and is included by Cousin in his new edition of the Complete Works of Abelard. The dissertation of Joh. Mart. Chladenius (*De otto et haerent Roscellini*, Erl., 1754, also included in G. E. Waldan's *Theaurus bibl. et bibl. graphicus*, Chemnitz, 1792) is now antiquated. The theological consequences of the tendencies arrayed against each other in the time of Roscellinus and Anselm, are developed by Bouchitté in *Le rationalisme chrétien à la fin du onzième siècle*, Paris, 1842.

On William of Champeaux, cf. Michaud, *Guillaume de Champeaux et les écoles de Paris au XIII^e siècle, d'après des documents inédits*, Paris, 1867, 2d edition, 1868.

Roscellinus is often named as the founder of Nominalism. Thus, for example, Otto von Freising (*De gestis Frederici I., lib. I.*) says of Roscellinus: *primus nostris temporibus sententiam vocum instituit in logica*. So, too, Anselm, Abelard, John of Salisbury, and Vincentius of Beauvais, know of no predecessor to Roscellinus. On the other hand, in the work entitled *Bernardus triumphans*, Roscellinus is termed by Caramuel Lobkowitz, "not the author, but the builder-up" (*non auctor, sed auctor*) of the sect of Nominalists, and in the notice cited above (in the section upon John Scotus, p. 363) a Johannes (who lived probably about 1050—not Erigena, nor John of Saxony, who was called by King Alfred, in

about the year 847, from France to England, where he died while Abbot of Althenay) is mentioned as his predecessor, and Robert of Paris and Amulph of Laon are mentioned as his fellows in opinion. Herman, Abbot of Tournay in the first half of the twelfth century, reports that about A. D. 1100 Master Raimbert of Lille taught dialectic nominalistically (*dialecticam clericis suis in voce legebat*), and with him many others; these men, he continues, had excited the enmity of Odo or Odardus, who expounded dialectic not in the modern way (*juxta quosdam modernos*) or nominalistically (*in voce*), but realistically (*in re*), according to Boëthius and the ancient teachers. These moderns, so the writer complains, prefer to interpret the writings of Porphyry and Aristotle in accordance with their new wisdom, than according to the exposition of Boëthius and the other ancients. It is scarcely possible that in so short a time the school of Roscellinus had become so widely extended; the distinction of parties must have been already developed at an earlier period. The report (*Aventin. Annal. Boior.*, VI.), therefore, that Roscellinus of Brittany was the originator of the new school (*novi lycei conditor*) and that through him there arose a "new sort of Aristotelians or Peripatetics," is only in so far true, as that he was the most influential representative of the *sententia vocum*, or Nominalistic doctrine.

Roscellinus (or Rucelinus) was born in Armorica (in Lower Brittany, therefore). He studied at Soissons and Rheims, resided for a time (about 1089) at Compiègne as Canon, and afterward at Besançon, and also taught at Tours and Locmenach (near Vannes in Brittany), where the youthful Abelard was among his pupils. In the year 1092 the Council of Soissons forced him to recant his tritheistic exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. He appears to have written nothing, but to have delivered his opinions orally alone. There is extant, however, a letter, mainly about the doctrine of the Trinity, which was probably addressed by him to Abelard. With this exception, it is only from the statements of his opponents, which, if not distorted, were at least colored by the influence of passion, that we can learn what his doctrines were. Yet it is possible in a degree to correct these reports by comparing them with the nominalistic utterances of others who lived earlier. Such a comparison furnishes us in many cases the most satisfactory commentary on the reported doctrines of Roscellinus.

Anselm (*De Fide Trin.*, ch. 2) speaks of "those dialecticians of our times, those heretics in dialectic, who think that the so-called universal substances are only emissions of sound by the voice (words, *flatus vocis*); who are unable to understand that color is anything apart from the body in which it inheres, or that the wisdom of man is other than the soul of man;" he charges these "heretics in dialectic" with having their reason so enslaved by their imagination, that they are unable to set the latter aside and view apart that which must be considered by itself. Though the expression "*flatus vocis*" cannot have been employed by the Nominalists themselves, yet it must undoubtedly have been suggested by something in their own phraseology, and recalls the passage above cited (p. 369) from the commentary of Pseudo-Hrabanus, *Super Porphyrium*: *res proferri non potest, nihil enim profertur nisi vox, neque enim aliud est prolatio, nisi aëris plectro linguas percussio*, which was intended to prove that since the genus, in conformity with the Boëthian definition, may be affirmed as a predicate, it cannot be a thing (*res*), but only a word (*vox*). The other stricture of Anselm, that Roscellinus was unable to distinguish between the attribute and the subject to which it belongs, proves that the belief of Roscellinus was in agreement with the above-mentioned (p. 369) doctrine of Heiricus: "If any one pronounces the word black or white by itself, he will not indicate thereby any particular thing, unless he says 'white or black man, or horse'" (*si quis dixerit nigrum et album absolute, . . . per hoc non poterit certam rem ostendere, nisi dicat albus homo vel equus aut niger*). This indeed shows the stricture to have been without foundation; for what the Nominalists opposed was the

passage from abstraction, or ἀφαίρεσις, to χωρισμός, or to the doctrine that that which is abstracted is actually and independently existent, apart from that from which it is abstracted. Anselm, who committed the error which the Nominalists thus denounced, affirmed from his stand-point, not only that they did not hold to the separate existence of the universal (the product of abstraction), but also that they did not possess the faculty of abstraction; but he did not demonstrate the illegitimacy of the distinction (which, indeed, they themselves had, perhaps, not marked with sufficient distinctness) on which the stand-point of his opponents was founded.

Anselm says further (*De Fid. Trin.*, ch. 2): *qui enim nondum intelligit, quomodo plures homines in specie sint homo unus, qualiter in illa secretissima natura comprehendat, quomodo plures personae, quarum singula quaeque est perfectus Deus, sint Deus unus? et cujus mens obscura est ad discernendum inter equum suum et colorem ejus, qualiter discernet inter unum Deum et plures rationes (relationes)? denique qui non potest intelligere aliud esse hominem nisi individuum, nullatenus intelliget hominem nisi humanam personam.* The contrast of the stand-points is here clearly presented; Realism regards the totality of similar individuals as constituting a real unity, the totality of men as a generic unity, *unus homo in specie*; Nominalism, on the contrary, holds that this unity exists only in the common name, and that the only real unity is the individual.

It was but logically consistent if Nominalism, which held the union of several individuals in the same genus or species to be merely the result of a subjective act, in like manner affirmed the distinction of parts in the individual to be only the result of a subjective act of analysis. That Roscellinus affirmed this consequence, appears from the statements of Abelard. Abelard says, in his letter concerning Roscellinus to the Bishop of Paris, that Roscellinus, holding that the distinction of parts in any object was merely subjective and verbal, and not real, held, by implication, that, for example, when we are told in the New Testament that Jesus ate part of a fish, we are to understand that what he really ate was a part of the word "fish," and not a part of the thing which it denotes (*hic sicut pseudo-dialecticus, ita et pseudo-christianus quem in dialectica sua nullam rem, sed solum vocem partes habere aestimat, ita divinam paginam impudenter pervertit, ut eo loco quo dicitur dominus partem piscis assi comedisse, partem hujus vocis quae est piscis assi, non partem rei intelligere cogatur. Id., De Divis. et Defn.*, p. 472 ed. Cousin: *fuit autem, memini, magistri nostri Roscellini tam insana sententia, ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat*). The objection, that the wall must surely be regarded as a part of the house, was met by Roscellinus, according to Abelard, with the argument that then the wall, as being a part of the whole, must also be a part of the parts, of which the whole consists, viz.: of the foundation, and the wall, and the roof, i. e., it must be a part of itself. Plainly sophistical as is this argumentation of Roscellinus in the awkward form in which it is here given (it is perhaps not reported with exact fidelity, or at least not in its complete connection with the whole teaching of Roscellinus), it nevertheless contains the idea necessarily associated with the Nominalistic stand-point, that the relation of the part to the whole, like every relation, is only subjective, but that *realiter* every object exists in itself alone, related only to itself, and consequently that *realiter* nothing exists as a part, apart from the act by which we think of it as related to the whole, since otherwise it must be in and by itself, and when viewed by itself, a part, and consequently a part of itself. Understood in this sense, the argumentation appears, indeed, one-sided and just as disputable as is the Nominalistic or Individualistic partisan stand-point itself (for the objective reality of relations can be affirmed with at least as much reason as it can be disputed), but it is by no means sophistical. The consequence drawn by Abelard, however, as to the eating of a part of the word fish, is not a necessary

one, for the reason that in the act of eating, an actual separation into parts takes place, while Roscellinus disputed only the objective validity of that division into parts which we make in thought and discourse. Whatever is a substance, is, according to the teaching of Roscellinus, as such not a part; and the part is as such not a substance, but the result of that subjective separation of the substance into parts, which we make in (thought and in) discourse. In respect to numerous divisions (e. g., of time according to centuries, of that which is extended in space, according to the ordinary units of measurement, of the circle into degrees, etc.), which to us are indispensably necessary, and to which we are often naively inclined to assign an objective significance, the remark of Roscellinus is undoubtedly pertinent.

Probably the Nominalism of Roscellinus, though developed with greater logical consistency than had been shown by his predecessors, would yet not have attracted any very special consideration, nor have immortalized his name as that of the head of a party, had it not been for his tritheistic interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, which excited universal attention. Like the earlier dialecticians, of whom the monk Othlo complained (see above, p. 370), Roscellinus accepts unconditionally the Boethian definition of person as *substantia rationalis*; he refuses to admit that these words, when applied to the Trinity, are to be taken in any other than the ordinary sense, affirming that if we are in the habit of speaking of the Godhead as including three persons, and not three substances, this is but the result of custom (*non igitur per personam aliud aliquid significamus quam substantiam, licet ex quadam loquendi consuetudine triplicare soleamus personam, non substantiam, Epist. ad Abelardum*, cited by Cousin, *Ab. Cpp.*, II. p. 798). Generating substance and generated substance (*substantia generans*, and *substantia generata*), he affirms, are not identical (*semper enim generans et generatum plura sunt, non res una, secundum illam beati Augustini præfatam sententiam, quo ait, quod nulla omnino res est quæ se ipsum gignat, Ibid. p. 799*). He asks why three eternal beings (*tres æternæ*) are not to be assumed to exist, seeing that the three persons of the Godhead are eternal (*si tres illæ personæ sunt æternæ*). With this agrees the statement of Anselm, *Epist.*, II. 41: *Roscellinus clericus dicit, in Deo tres personas esse tres res ab invicem separatas, sicut sunt tres angeli, ita tamen, ut una sit voluntas et potestas. De Fide Trin.*, ch. 3: *tres personæ sunt tres res sicut tres angeli aut tres animæ, ita tamen, ut voluntate et potentia omnino sint idem*. Roscellinus, says Anselm, advanced the argument, that, if the three persons were "one thing" (*una res*), it would follow that, together with the Son, the Father also, and the Holy Ghost, must have entered into the flesh. The affirmation of Roscellinus (which is reported also by Anselm, *Ep.*, II. 41), that only custom opposes our speaking of the three persons of the Godhead as three Gods, appears, when compared with certain passages of Gregory of Nyssa and other Greek Church Fathers, and even with the mild judgment of St. Augustine respecting the One, the *voûc* (or Reason) and the World-soul as the three chief Gods of the Neo-Platonists, less heretical and less at variance with the common belief, than when judged in the light of the more rigid monotheism of St. Augustine and others, who in many regards approximated in their teachings to the modalism of the Sabellians, and only rejected it on account of its incompatibility with the doctrine of the incarnation as held by the Church. What Anselm counter-affirmed was the reality of the generic unity of the three divine persons: *unus Deus*. For the rest, Roscellinus, who was not inclined to heresy, as such, but desired to hold fast to the Christian faith and to defend it, could well believe that in using the expression: *tres substantiæ* (which was applied by John Scotus, among others, to the three divine persons), he was not in discord with the teaching of the Church, since he everywhere used the word *substantia* in the sense of that which has an independent existence, in which sense it may be employed to translate the Greek word *ὑπόστασις* (hypostasis),

which, confessedly, is used in the plural (*τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*) with reference to the three persons; his language was indeed at variance with what had become the established terminology of the Church; for in the latter the term *substantia* was always employed as the equivalent of the Greek word *οὐσία* (being, substance), and was, therefore, only used in the singular, in order to express the unity of the essence (*essentia*) of the divine persons; this usage necessarily became all the more invariable, since *οὐσία* has the same double signification as *substantia*.

To Sabellianism, with which Hauréau (*Ph. Sc.*, I. p. 189 seq.) erroneously identifies the doctrine of Roscellinus, this doctrine offers a direct contrast, although both are founded on a common principle. Sabellianism reasons thus: Three persons in the Godhead are three Gods; now there are not three Gods, but only one; therefore there are not three persons in the Godhead (but only three forms of existence). Roscellinus argues, on the contrary: Three divine persons are three divine beings; there are three divine persons, hence there are three divine beings. The Sabellians affirmed that tritheism followed inevitably from the doctrine of Athanasius. Roscellinus accepted this consequence. The defenders of the doctrine of the Church, on the contrary, while agreeing with the Sabellians that tritheism was an erroneous doctrine, denied that it could be deduced from the doctrine of Athanasius. The doctrine of Roscellinus is essentially distinguished, on the other hand, from the doctrine of the Arians, by its recognition of the equality in power (and will) of the three divine persons. Roscellinus appears originally to have believed that, with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, his own doctrine was in agreement with that of Lanfranc, who was at that time greatly honored as the vanquisher of the heresy of Berengarius, and with that of Lanfranc's pupil and successor, Anselm, until one of his hearers, named Johannes, addressed himself by letter to Anselm, communicating the doctrine of Roscellinus and requesting the judgment of Anselm respecting it; this was the occasion of Anselm's controversy with Roscellinus.

William of Champeaux was born about 1070, and died, while Bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne, in 1121. He studied first under Manegold of Lutenbach at Paris, next under the at that time very famous Anselm of Laon (to be distinguished from *Anselmus Cantuariensis*), and finally under Roscellinus at Compiègne, to whose doctrine, however, the doctrine of William, who asserts the reality of the universal (notwithstanding its immanence *in re*, *in e.*, in the individual), was decidedly opposed. He then taught in the Cathedral School at Paris, where Abelard heard and disputed with him, until the year 1108, when he retired to the convent of St. Victor, where he assumed the functions of chorister. Yet in this place he soon resumed his lectures on rhetoric, philosophy, and theology, and appears to have laid the foundation for the mystical tendency which afterward reigned in the school of St. Victor. From 1113 to 1121 William was bishop of Châlons. He remained a friend of St. Bernard of Clairvaux until his death. Of his works, there are extant a number on theological subjects (*De Eucharistia* and *De Origine Animæ*; in the latter he pronounced himself in favor of Creationism, *in e.*, in support of the doctrine that the soul is created at the beginning of its earthly existence) and other works, which have been edited by Mabillon, Martène, and Patru. There are also extant a few MSS. of his on philosophical problems. In the main, we are obliged to rely for our knowledge of his opinions on the accounts of Abelard. The latter says (in his *Historia Calamitatum*) of William of Champeaux, that he taught that universals were essentially and wholly present in each one of their individuals, and that in the latter there was no diversity of essence, but only a variety of accidents (*erat autem in ea sententia de communitate universalium, ut eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret individuis, quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas*). In reply, Abelard objects that

if this were true, then the same substance must receive different and mutually incompatible accidents, and, in particular, the same thing must be in different places at the same time. (The latter objection is clearly developed in the *De Gener. et Spec.*, apparently in the spirit of Abelard's doctrine.) For if the essence of humanity is wholly present in Socrates, then it is not where Socrates is not. If, therefore, it is yet really also in Plato, then Plato must be Socrates and Socrates must be not only where he himself is, but also where Plato is. As a consequence of these objections, William of Champeaux is said to have modified his opinion and to have substituted *individualiter* for *essentialiter* in his expression of it; that is to say, he now taught, according to this account, that the universal substance exists in each individual, not in the entirety of its essence, but by virtue of individual modifications. But according to another lection, which, it can scarcely be doubted, is the correct one, the word substituted was *indifferentier*, so that William of Champeaux sought to avoid the objection of Abelard by teaching, instead of the numerical unity of each universal essence, its plurality unaccompanied with difference. In a passage (cited by Michaud) from one of the theological works of William (edited by Patru, Paris, 1847), the latter remarks that the word *idem*, *the same*, may be taken in two senses, the one implying the indifference and the other the identity in essence of the objects termed the same; thus Peter and Paul are the same in so far as they are both men, having the universal attribute of humanity, namely, rationality, although the humanity of each is more strictly speaking not identical, but similar; but this kind of sameness, adds William, the sameness of indifference, does not exist among the persons of the Trinity (*Vides "idem" duobus accipi modis, secundum indifferentiam et secundum identitatem ejusdem prorsus essentialitatis; secundum indifferentiam, ut Petrum et Paulum idem dicimus esse in hoc quod sunt homines; quantum enim ad humanitatem pertinet, sicut iste est rationalis, et ille; sed si veritatem confiteri volumus, non est eadem utriusque humanitas, sed similis, quum sunt homines. Sed hic modus unius ad naturam divinitatis non referendus*). How it was that the problem of the Trinity led to the doctrine of Realism, and how the latter was thought to solve the former, appears most clearly from a passage (cited by Hauréau, *Ph. Sc.*, I. p. 227) from Robert Pulleyn, who represents a "dialectician" of the realistic school as saying: "the species is the whole substance of the individuals contained in it, and the whole and same species is in each of the individuals; therefore the species is one substance, but its individuals are many persons, and these many persons are that one substance" (*species est tota substantia individuorum, totaque species eademque in singulis reperitur individuus; itaque species una est substantia, ejus vero individua multae personae, et hae multae personae sunt illa una substantia*).

Toward the end of the eleventh century there was developed (as Thurot well remarks, *Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature*, 1868, No. 42, p. 249) a very active, intellectual movement, which was more productive of original results than was either the period preceding it—when the interest in scientific subjects was, for the most part, very restricted in extent—or the succeeding period, when thought was, so to speak, buried under a mass of authorities. But this fact is scarcely sufficient to justify the beginning of a new period at this point, for the general character of mediæval philosophy, as determined by the number and nature of the authorities on which it depended, underwent no general change until about the year 1200.

§ 93. Anselmus, born in 1033 at Aosta (*Augusta Praetoria*, in Piedmont), was in 1060 induced by the fame of Lanfranc to enter the convent at Bec in Normandy. In 1063 he became Prior, and in 1078 Abbot of the same. From 1093 till his death in 1109 he was

Archbishop of Canterbury, which office he administered according to the principles of Pope Gregory VII. The sense of his motto, "*Credo, ut intelligam*," is that Christians should advance from direct faith to whatever degree of scientific insight may be attainable by them, but always only on condition that the Christian creed, already fixed in dogmatic form (and not, as in the time of the Fathers, in process of development, side by side with and by the aid of philosophic and theological thought), remain untouched and be regarded as the absolute norm for thought. The result of examination may only be affirmative; if in any respect it is negative, thought is by that very fact exposed as false and sinful, the dogma sanctioned by the Church being the adequate doctrinal expression of the truth revealed by God. The fame of Anselm is connected chiefly with the ontological argument for God's existence given in his "*Proslogium*," and with the Christological theory of satisfaction developed in his work: "*Cur Deus homo?*" The ontological argument is an attempt to prove the existence of God, as following from the very idea which we have of him. By the word God we understand, by definition, the greatest object or being that can be conceived. This conception exists in the intellect of all such as have the idea of God, and in the intellect of the atheist as well, for the atheist understands what is expressed by the words: the absolutely greatest. But the greatest cannot be in the intellect alone, for then it would be possible to conceive something still greater, which should exist not only in the intellect but also in external reality. Hence the greatest must exist at the same time in the intellect and in the sphere of objective reality. God, therefore, is not simply conceived by us; he also really exists. That this argument is a paralogism was asserted by Gaunilo, a monk and one of Anselm's contemporaries, residing at Mar-Moutier. From Gaunilo's objections Anselm sought to rescue his argument in his "*Liber Apologeticus*."—According to Anselm's theory of satisfaction, which was adopted by the Church, and which is substantially an application of juridical analogies to relations that are simply ethical and religious, the guilt of men, as sinners against the infinite God, is infinitely great, and must, therefore, according to the principles of divine justice, be atoned for by a punishment of infinite severity. If this punishment were to fall upon the human race, all men must suffer eternal damnation. But this would conflict with the divine goodness. On the other hand, forgiveness without atonement would conflict with

the divine justice. The only remaining alternative, therefore, by which at once the goodness and justice of God could be satisfied, was to resort to the expedient of representative satisfaction, which, in view of the infinite nature of our guilt, could be rendered only by God, since he is the only infinite being. But he could not represent the human race without assuming the character of a man descended from Adam (yet conceived without sin by the Virgin); hence the necessity that the second person of the Godhead should become man, in order that he, standing in the place of humanity, might render to God the satisfaction due to him, and thereby conduct the believing portion of humanity to salvation.

The works of Anselm were published at Nuremberg by Casp. Hochfeder in 1491 and 1494, at Paris in 1544 and 1549, at Cologne in 1578, *ib.*, by Picardus, in 1612, at Paris, by Gabr. Gerberon, in 1675, *ib.*, 1721, at Venice in 1744, and, more recently, at Paris, in J. P. Migne's collection, Vol. 155, 1852. The *Cur Deus Homo?* has been edited more recently by Hugo Laemmer, Berlin, 1857, and by F. Fritzsche, Zürich, 1866. The *Monologium* and *Proslolium*, together with the accompanying works: *Gaunilioni liber pro insipientibus* and *Ans. liber apologeticus*, have been edited by Carl Haas and published as Part I. of *Sancti Anselmi opuscula philosophico-theologica selecta*, Tüb. 1868. Anselm's life was written by his pupil Eadmer, a Canterbury monk (*De vita S. Anselmi*, ed. G. Henschen, in *Acta Sanctorum*, t. X., p. 868 seq., and ed. Gerberon in his edition of the works of Anselm); from this biography John of Salisbury and others have drawn. Among the modern authors who have written of Anselm, we may name Mühlcr, in the *Tüb. Quartalschrift*, 1827 and 1828 (reproduced in M.'s Complete Works, edited by Döllinger, Regensburg, 1839, Vol. I., p. 32 seq.), G. F. Franck, *Anselm v. C.*, Tüb. 1842, Rud. Hassc, *Anselm von Canterbury*, Leipzig, 1842-59 (cf. Haase, *De ontologio Anselmi pro satisfactione Dei argumenta*, Bonn, 1849), and Charles de Rémusat, *Anselme de Cantorbéry, tableau de la vie monastique et de la lutte du pouvoir spirituel avec le pouv. temporel au XI. siècle*, Paris, 1854, 2d ed. 1863; cf. the article entitled *Anselm von Canterbury als Vorkämpfer für die kirchliche Freiheit des 11. Jahrh.*, in G. Philipp's and G. Görres *Hist.-Polit. Bl. für das kath. Deutschl. land*, Vol. 42, 1858. On Anselm's theory of satisfaction, cf. C. Schwarz, *Diss. de satisf. Chr. ab Ans. Cant. exposita*, Gryph., 1841; Ferd. Chr. Baur, in his history of the doctrine of atonement and in the second volume of his work on the doctrine of the Trinity; Dorner, in his history of the development of the person of Christ, and others. On Anselm's doctrine of faith and knowledge, compare Ludw. Abroell, *A. C. de mutuo fidei ac rationis consortio* (*diss. inaug.*), Würzburg, 1854, and Aemilius Hühne, *Anselmi Cantuariensis philosophia cum aliorum eius ætatis decretis comparatur ejusdemque de satisfactione doctrina diffunditur* (*diss. inaug.*), Leipzig, 1867. [Cf. further, on Anselm's anthropology and soteriology, W. G. T. Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrines*, Vol. II., New York, 1864, pp. 111-140 and 273-284.—Th.]

Anselm requires unconditional submission to the authority of the Church. So inflexible is he on this point, that if we were to regard his doctrine as properly characterizing the period to which he belongs, we should be obliged to term it the period of the strictest subordination of philosophy to theology. (It is thus characterized, among others, by Cousin, who, in his *Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie, neuvième leçon, Oeuvres I.*, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 190, describes the first period as that of the *subordination absolue de la philosophie à la théologie*, the second as that of their alliance, and the third as the *commencement d'une séparation*). But, on the one hand, the character of the Anselmic philosophy was not that of the whole period, since there were other prominent thinkers in that period who differed from Anselm in opinion and against whom the more rigid churchmen were obliged to contend before carrying off the victory; and, on the other hand, the *intention* to reduce philosophy to a position of the most complete subordination, was very different from that actual, elaborate adaptation of it in all its parts to be an instrument in the service of the Church, which was effected in the period next succeeding,

notably by Thomas Aquinas and his pupils.—It is a characteristic circumstance that Anselm sought to establish on rational grounds, not only the existence of God, but also (what Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Occam subsequently declined, and only Raymundus Lullus ventured again to attempt) the Trinity and incarnation; he attempted to accomplish this by the aid of Platonic and Neo-Platonic doctrines.

Anselm affirms repeatedly, as his fundamental principle, that knowledge must rest on faith, and not faith on a preceding knowledge developed out of doubt and speculation. Anselm derived this principle from Augustine (*De Vera Rel.*, chs. 24, 45; *De Utilitate Cred.* 9; *De Ord.*, II. 9), but carried it to a greater extreme than Augustine, who, however resolutely he may have combated the Manicheans, in their one-sided founding of faith upon knowledge, nevertheless admitted that faith might rest on knowledge as well as knowledge on faith, and required that both should reciprocally further each other (*De Vera Rel.*, *ib.*; *Epist.* 120 *ad Consent.*, § 3). Anselm defends his position with the following argument: Without faith there is no experience, and without experience understanding is impossible (*De Fide Trin.*, 3). Knowledge is the higher; to advance to it is the duty of every one, according to the measure of his capacity. *Cur Deus homo?* ch. 2: "As the right order demands that we first receive into ourselves, believing, the mysteries of Christianity, before subjecting them to speculative examination, so it seems to me the part of negligence if, after having become confirmed in the faith, we do not endeavor to understand what we have believed." By this, however, Anselm does not mean that, after the objects of faith have first been appropriated by a willing and trustful acceptance of them and the understanding of them has thus been made possible, the believer, now arrived at the stage of intelligence, is free to judge for himself concerning their truth and value (in which sense the principle would be identical with that which governs our relation to ancient poetry, mythology, and philosophy); on the contrary, he constantly affirms the absolute inviolability of the Catholic doctrine. The substance of faith cannot be made more certain by means of the knowledge which grows out of it, for it is in itself eternally sure and fixed; much less may it be contested. For, says Anselm, whether that is true which the universal Church believes with the heart and confesses with the mouth, no Christian can be permitted to place in question, but, while holding fast to it without doubting, and loving and living for this faith, he may and should search in humility for the grounds of its truth. If he is able to add to his faith, intelligence, let him thank God; if not, then let him not turn against his faith, but bow his head and worship. For human wisdom will sooner destroy itself on this rock than move the rock (*De Fide Trin.*, chs. 1, 2). In the letter which Anselm gave to Bishop Fulco, of Beauvais, to be delivered by him to the council which was to be held against Roscellinus, he explains in a similar sense the doctrine here enunciated (*Christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere*), and advises—with more consistency than humanity—that no discussion should be entered into with Roscellinus at the Synod, but that he should be at once called on to recant. The result could only be that the opponent remained unconvinced, with no choice but to become a martyr to his doctrine or to play the hypocrite and submit. Roscellinus at Soissons was moved, as he afterward declared, by the fear of death, to choose the latter alternative, openly returning, when the danger was over, to the conviction which he had in reality never renounced. Anselm supplemented the above advice by attempting to refute Roscellinus in his *De Fide Trinitatis*.

The *Dialogus de Grammatico*, probably Anselm's earliest work, is a dialogue between a teacher and his pupil on a question frequently discussed by the dialecticians of Anselm's time (as Anselm attests, ch. 21), viz.: whether *grammaticus* is to be subsumed under the category of substance or under that of quality. Grammatical cultivation does not belong

to the essence of man, but only to the essence of the grammarian as such. Hence the propositions may be affirmed: *omnis homo potest intelligi sine grammatica*; *nullus grammaticus potest intelligi sine grammatica*; or, "Every man can be conceived as destitute of grammatical knowledge," but "No grammarian can be conceived as destitute of such knowledge." By the rules of logic, it would seem to follow from these premises that no grammarian is man. Why is this inference not correct? Because, replies Anselm, of the different senses in which the premises are true: the first premise, namely, is not universally true, except when predicated of men, considered simply as men and without reference to the possibility that some men may be grammarians; the second premise, on the contrary, is true without qualification. It only follows, therefore, that the concepts grammarian and man are different, but not that no grammarian is a man. If the grammarian is a man, he is a substance; but how then can Aristotle cite *grammaticus* as an example of a concept of quality? The word *grammaticus* contains two elements, *grammatica* and *homo* (the adjective and the substantive significations), the former in the word *grammaticus* directly (*per se*), the latter indirectly (*per aliud*); if we consider only the former signification, the word denotes a How (*Quale*), not a What (*Quid*), but, if the latter, it denotes a substance, the *homo grammaticus*—a *substantia prima*, if an individual grammarian is meant; a *substantia secunda*, if the species is intended. Since dialectic is concerned chiefly with the means of expression (*voces*) and their signification, and only indirectly with the things named (*res*), (as Anselm teaches with Boëthius, who says in his commentary to the *Categories*: *non de rerum generibus neque de rebus, sed de sermonibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur*), the dialectician must confine himself to the meaning which is immediately contained in the words *per se*, and must, therefore, to the question, *quid est grammaticus?* answer: *vox significans qualitatem*; for the thing directly denoted by the word *grammaticus* is the *quale*, the *habens grammaticam*, and it is only *secundum appellationem* that man is also denoted.—This work shows that Anselm also, notwithstanding his "Realism," viewed dialectic as relating especially to words (*voces*), and that with Aristotle he regarded the individual as substance in the first and fullest sense (*substantia prima*), and the species and genus as substances only in the secondary sense (*substantia secunda*).

In the *Dialogus de Veritate* Anselm follows Aristotle in teaching that the truth of an affirmative or negative judgment depends on the existence or non-existence of the subject of the judgment; the *res enunciata* is the *causa veritatis* of the judgment, although not its *veritas* or *rectitudo* as such. From the truth of the logical judgment or of thought, Anselm distinguishes a truth of action and of being in general, and then, with Augustine and in Platonic fashion, concludes from the actuality of some truth to the existence of the truth *per se*, in which all that is true must, in order to be true, participate. The truth *per se* is only a cause; the truth of being is its effect and at the same time the cause of the truth of knowledge; the latter is only an effect. The truth *per se*, the *summa veritas per se subsistens*, is God.

In the *Monologium* (composed about 1070, before the *Dial. de Verit.*) Anselm constructs, on the basis of the realistic theory that goodness, truth, and all other universals possess an existence independent of individual things, and are not merely immanent in and only existing through the latter (as in the case of color in material objects), a proof of the being of God, in which proof he follows substantially St. Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.*, II. 3–15; *De Vera Rel.*, 55 seq.; *De Trin.*, VIII. 3, see above, p. 340; cf. Boëth., *De Consol. Phil.*, V., Pr. 10). There are many goods which we desire, partly as a means or for their utility (*propter utilitatem*), and partly for their intrinsic beauty (*propter honestatem*). But all these goods are only more or less good, and therefore imply, like all things of a merely relative nature, something which is perfectly good and by which their worth is estimated. All relative

goods, then, necessarily presuppose an absolute good; this *summum bonum* is God (*Memol.*, ch. 1). In like manner, all that is great or high is only relatively great or high; there must, therefore, be something absolutely great and high, and this is God (ch. 2). The scale of beings cannot ascend *in infinitum (nullo fine claudatur)*; hence there must exist at least one being, than whom no other is higher. There can, further, exist only one such being. For if several supreme beings, similar to each other, existed, they would all either participate together in one supreme essence (*essentia*), or be identical with it. In the former case, not they, but this supreme essence, would stand at the head of the scale of existences; in the latter case they would not be many, but one. But the one highest existence is God (ch. 4). The Absolute exists from and by itself (ch. 6). The dependent is not, in respect of matter and form, derived from the Absolute, but it is created by it (ch. 7 seq.). Whatever is created does not possess in itself the power to continue in being, but requires the preserving presence of God (*Sicut nihil factum est, nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam. Ita nihil viget, nisi per ejusdem servatricem praesentiam*, ch. 13; cf. Augustin, *De Civ. Dei*, XII. 25; see above, p. 342, where the conservation of the world is described as a continual creation and the view is developed that, if God should withdraw his power and presence from the world, the latter would instantly sink back into nothingness). Justice among finite beings is derived, existing only by participation in absolute justice. But God is not just by participation; God is justice itself (ch. 16). In the Absolute justice is identical with goodness, wisdom, and every other attribute (*proprietas*, ch. 17); they all involve the attributes of eternity and omnipresence (ch. 18 seq.). God created all things by his word, the eternal archetype, of which creation is the copy (ch. 29 seq.). The speaker and the spoken word constituted a duality, though it is impossible to say what they separately are. They are not two spirits, nor two creators, etc. They are numerically, but not intrinsically, distinguishable (*alii*, but not *alii*). In their mutual relation, of which the relation of begetter and begotten furnishes the most pertinent image, they are two, while in their essence they are one (ch. 37 seq.). For the sake of preserving the divine unity, there must be joined with the self-duplication of the Deity a reactive tendency, a unifying process; just as the first consciousness of man, or *memoria*, becomes by reduplication consciousness of consciousness, or *intelligentia*, so the unifying tendency above mentioned appears in the Godhead as the reciprocal love of the Father and the Son, which proceeds from *memoria* and *intelligentia*, i. e., as the Holy Ghost (ch. 49 seq.). The constant and logically illegitimate hypostatization of abstractions, which occurs in this "*exemplum meditando de ratione fidei*," is evident; Anselm himself really acknowledges that he has not arrived by his speculation at the conception of personality, when he affirms (ch. 78) that only the poverty of language compels us to express the *trina unitas* by the term *persona* (or by *substantia* in the sense of *individuas*), and that in the literal sense of the word there is in the supreme being no more a plurality of persons than of substances (*Omnes plures personae sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias quot sunt personae; quod in pluribus hominibus, qui quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae, cognoscitur. Quare in summa essentia sicut non sunt plures substantiae, ita nec plures personae*). Anselm here only advances further in the same direction in which Augustine had gone, in departing from the generic conception of the Trinity, which prevailed among the Greek theologians, such as Basilus, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, and approaching toward Monarchianism. On the other hand, passages like the above might easily lead Roscellinus, who held fast to the full signification of the concept of personality, to believe that Anselm must confess himself at one with him in his assertion that the three persons were three *res per se*, and that they could, if usage only permitted it, be designated as three Gods.)—In the *Monologium* Anselm seeks (chs. 67–77) to explain the nature of the human

spirit and to demonstrate its eternity. The human spirit is a created image of the divine spirit, and, like the latter, has the faculties of memory, intelligence, and love. It can and ought to love God as the highest good, and all else for his sake; in this love is contained the guarantee of its own eternity and eternal blessedness, for no end will be made to this blessedness either by its own will or against its will by God, since God is himself love. If, however, the finite spirit refuses the love of God, it must suffer eternal punishment. With the *immutabilis sufficientia* of the saved must correspond the *inconsolabilis indigentia* of the lost. Love has its root in faith, which is the consciousness of the object of love, and more particularly in living faith, which involves a striving after its object (i. e., the root of faith is *credere in Deum*, in distinction from merely *credere Deum*). Love, on the other hand, is itself the condition of that hope which anticipates the attainment of the end of present strife. (The Augustinian antithesis between salvation and damnation—the former as depending on “faith,” and the latter as consisting in a satisfaction rendered to God by the eternal pain of the sinner, and termed justice—reappears in the works of Anselm in all its naked severity.)

The conception of God, to which, on cosmological grounds, by a logical ascent from the particular to the universal, Anselm had arrived in the *Monologium*, he seeks in the *Prologium* (*Alloquium Dei*, originally entitled *Fides quaerens intellectum*) to justify ontologically by a simple development of the conception of God, i. e., he seeks to prove God's existence as following from the very idea which we have of Him; for Anselm had been disquieted by the circumstance that in the proof attempted in the *Monologium*, the demonstration of the existence of the Absolute had appeared dependent on the existence of the relative. We reproduce here the ontological argument, of which the substance is given above, p. 378, in Anselm's own words, since the phraseology itself is important in deciding upon the conclusiveness of the argument. *Domine Deus, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam quia es, sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus. Et quidem credimus, te esse bonum quo majus bonum cogitari nequit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia dixit insipiens in corde suo (according to Psalm xiv. 1): non est Deus? Sed certe idem ipse insipiens quam audit hoc ipsum quod dico: bonum, quo majus nihil cogitari potest, intelligit utique quod audit, et quod intelligit utique in ejus intellectu est, etiam si non intelligat illud esse. (Aliud est rem esse in intellectu, et aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam quum pictor praecogitat imaginem quam facturum est, habet eam quidem jam in intellectu, sed nondum esse intelligit quod nondum fecit; quum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu et intelligit jam esse quod fecit.) Convincitur ergo insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid bonum quo majus cogitari nequit, quia hoc quum audit intelligit, et quicquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Ad certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari non potest, majus cogitari potest (sc. id, quod tale sit etiam in re). Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re (ch. 2). Hoc ipsum autem sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari aliquid esse, quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est utique eo, quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest. Vere ergo est aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse, et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster (ch. 3).* To the question, How then is it possible for the fool to say in his heart or to think that there is no God? Anselm replies by urging the difference between the mere thinking of a word or the being conscious of an idea, and the cognition of the reality which the word denotes and to which the idea corresponds (ch. 4). The paralogistic nature of the argument was observed by some among the contemporaries of Anselm, although the precise nature of its defect was not at first made perfectly clear. Every deduction from a definition is valid

only upon the hypothesis of the existence of the subject of the definition. Thus, Xenophanes, the Eleatic, had correctly inferred from the nature of God (his existence being assumed) his unity and spirituality (cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, III. 2. 24: *θεοῖς μὲν εἶναι φάσκοντες, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς δέ*), and Augustine (who defined God as the highest good, than which nothing better can be conceived) had deduced from the definition of God his eternity: whoever admits that there is a God, and yet denies his eternity, contradicts himself, for eternity belongs to the essence of God; just so certainly as God is, is he also eternal (Augustin., *Confess.*, VII. 4: *non est corruptibilis substantia Dei, quando si hoc esset, non esset Deus*. The passages, *De Trin.*, VIII., ch. 3, and elsewhere, which are often referred to in this connection, correspond rather with the argumentation in the *Monologium*.) That which distinguishes the argumentation of Anselm from Augustine's, is that in the former an attempt is made to conclude to the existence of God, and this peculiarity of the ontological argument constitutes its defect. The only conclusion which is logically valid is this: so surely as God exists, so surely is he a real being—which is a meaningless tautology—or, at the most, say, this: so surely as God exists, so surely does he exist not only in the mind, but also in nature. This latter distinction, between the (real and not merely ideal) existence of God in the mind of man and his existence in nature, is employed by Anselm instead of the distinction between merely ideal and real existence. By this means the conditional clause on which the argument depends, viz.: *if God exists*, is put out of view. Anselm confounds the literal sense of the expression: *in intellectu esse*, with its metaphorical sense. He rightly distinguishes between the two senses: "existing in the imagination," and "known as existing in reality," and correctly proposes to lay the former at the basis of his argumentation. He avoids in reality the possible confusion of meanings pointed out by himself. But he does not avoid confounding existence in the imagination, or existence in the form of a mental representation—which can be metaphorically termed the existence of the (real or imaginary) object of the idea in the mind, but which in reality is only the existence of an image of that object in the mind—with real (objective, substantive) existence in the mind. Hence the deceitful appearance as if it were already ascertained that the object of the idea "God" somehow exists (namely, in the mind) and as if the condition on which all arguing from definitions depends, viz.: that the existence of the subject of the definition be previously ascertained, were fulfilled, and as if all that remained were to determine more precisely the kind and manner of God's existence. That which is demonstrated to be absurd is in reality not the belief entertained by the atheist, that God does not exist and that the idea of God is an objectless idea, but the belief which he neither entertains nor can be forced to adopt, but which Anselm supposes that he must either entertain or be forced to assume, viz.: that *God himself* (assumed as existing objectively in the mind) is an objectless idea, existing as a merely subjective representation. This appearance is maintained so long as it serves to give to the argumentation a plausible basis. But in the conclusion, which pretends to contain, as a result of the argumentation, not merely the manner of God's existence, but the fact of his existence, the original sense of the antithesis between *in intellectu esse* and *in re esse*, namely: "exist, ideally alone, in the human consciousness" and "exist in reality," is resumed. Anselm's argument was combated in an anonymous *Liber pro Insipiente* by a monk named Gaunilo of the Convent of Marmoutier (*Majus Monasterium*, not far from Tours; according to Martène, in his manuscript history of the convent, *op. Ravaisson, Rapports sur les bibliothèques de l'Ouest*, Paris, 1841, Append. XVII., Gaunilo was a Count of Montigni, who, after meeting in 1044 with some misfortunes resulting from personal feuds, entered the convent, where he lived till as late as 1083). Gaunilo, who speaks of the other contents of the *Prologium* in terms of great respect, points out correctly the weak place in Anselm's argument. He remarks that it does not

follow from the fact that we have and that we understand the conception of God, that God so exists in the intellect that we may conclude from this to his existence in reality; that "than which nothing greater can be conceived" does not exist in the human intellect in any other sense than that in which all objects that we know exist there: an imaginary island, of which we may have a conception, exists in the intellect just as much as God does when we have a conception of him. If the being of God "in the intellect" were taken in the fuller sense of "knowing that he exists," (*intelligere rem esse*)—which, however, Anselm himself disavows—this would amount to presupposing that which was to be proved. The real existence of the object must be ascertained beforehand, if from its essence we would deduce its predicates (*Prius enim certum mihi necesse est fiat, re vera esse alicubi majus ipsum, et tum demum ex eo quod majus est omnibus, in se ipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum*). Gaunilo then seeks to demonstrate that Anselm's argument proves too much, since, in a similar manner, the existence of a perfect island might be proved. But Anselm, in his rejoinder, the *Liber apologeticus adversus respondentem pro insipienti*, denied the pertinence of the latter objection, expressing his confidence that his argument applied to that being, and only to that one, than whom a greater could not be conceived (*praeter quod majus cogitari non possit*), though without showing with what reason he restricted the application of his argument to that particular instance; and in his explanations relative to that expression in which the defect of the argument is to be sought for—for Gaunilo had not exposed with complete logical definiteness what was deceptive in the metaphor "*in intellectu esse*"—he fell back into the old mistake of making *cogitari* and *intelligi* (the thought or conception of an object) synonymous with its *esse in cogitatione vel intellectu* (or its real existence in thought or in the intellect), so that constantly and without consciousness of the absurdity of the act, he compares with each other two *beings*, one of which is conceived but does not exist, while the other is both conceived and exists, and then concludes that the latter is greater, by the fact of existence, than the former; the greatest conceivable being, *being* in the intellect, must, says Anselm, not only be in the intellect, but must also exist out of the intellect and in reality. The idea of a being, than whom none greater can be conceived, as existing solely in the intellect, is, indeed, contradictory. But the contradiction in the idea does not prove the existence of such a being in reality; it proves rather that the affirmation, that when such a being is conceived by the intellect, it *is* in the intellect, is literally false and inadmissible; at all events, it is not admissible until existence has been proven; for only under the presupposition that God exists, and not for the purpose of establishing this postulate itself, can (with Augustine, *In Joh. Ev.*, ch. 3, *Tract. XVI.*: "*crescat ergo Deus, qui semper perfectus est, crescat in te; quanto enim magis intelligis Deum et quanto magis capis, videtur in te crescere Deus*") our knowledge of God be described as God's existence in us, and the growth of that knowledge as the growth of God in us. The other deficiency of the argument, that, namely, the indeterminate conception of that than which nothing greater can be thought, is still far removed from the conception of a personal God, Anselm sought to supply (ch. 5 seq.) by the logical development of the concept of "the Greatest," showing that the Greatest must be conceived as creator, spirit, almighty, merciful, etc. The opinion often expressed in modern times, and especially by Hasse (*Anselm*, II. pp. 262–272), that the ontological argument stands or falls with Realism, is incorrect. The reverse is, indeed, true of the arguments employed in the *Monologium*, for these are founded on the Platonic-Augustinian theory of ideas. But there is no necessary connection between Realism, which teaches that our subjective conceptions *correspond* with real universals known through the former, and what is the characterizing feature of the ontological argument, *viz.*: the confusion of *intelligi* with *esse in intellectu*, or, in other words, the deduction of *real existence* in

the intellect from the presence of an idea in the intellect. Realism does, indeed, involve the presupposition (which, for the rest, not even Nominalism, as such, altogether rejects, the presupposition, which Skepticism only leaves undecided, and which Criticism combats by its distinction between empirical and transcendental objectivity), that necessity is thought is a proof of objectively real existence; but this presupposition is very different from the confusion that lies at the foundation of the ontological argument, of the idea with the object of the idea, conceived as existing in the mind. Realism affirms only that that, in regard to which the proposition or the logical judgment, *that it exists*, has been categorically (not merely hypothetically) and without logical error demonstrated, exists in reality, but not that that, which we, whether arbitrarily or with subjective necessity, *think*, or the *idea* of which we understand, itself exists in any literal sense in this our thought or understanding of it, or that on account of this thought or understanding it is to be recognized as having objective reality. (It is nevertheless not to be denied, that the confusion above described was peculiarly natural in connection with the form of Realism held by Anselm.)

Of the work entitled: *Our Deus homo?* the first book was written in 1094 and the second in 1098. In it Anselm treats of the doctrine of redemption and atonement. It is Anselm's merit in this work that he gets beyond the theory of a ransom paid to the devil—a theory which until his time had been very widely accepted, and which, as held by several of the Fathers of the Church (Origen and other Greeks, Ambrosius, Leo the Great, and others) had extended to the avowal that God had outwitted the devil. For the notion of a conflict between God's grace and the rights of the devil (as asserted even by Augustine, *De Lib. Arbitr.*, III. 10), Anselm substitutes the notion of a conflict between the goodness and justice of God, which conflict, he asserts, came to an end with the incarnation. The defect of his theory (a defect only in conformity with the mediæval tendency to emphasize the aspect of *opposition* between God and the world) is the transcendence of the act of atonement, in his view of it, in that, although accomplished through the humanity of Jesus, it is represented as exterior to the consciousness and intention of the men to be redeemed, so that stress is laid rather on the judicial requirement that guilt should be removed, than on the ethical requirement of a purified will. The Pauline "dying and rising with Christ" is left out of consideration; the subjective conditions of the appropriation of salvation are not discussed; the equal salvation of all men seems logically to follow from the doctrine of Anselm, and the confinement of Christ's merit to those who accept grace by faith could not, therefore, but appear arbitrary. Thus it was possible that the Church, holding this doctrine, should think of making this appropriation of grace dependent on other, more convenient conditions, and finally on the purchase of indulgences. The objective and divine aspect was realistically emphasized and the subjective and individual element, the element of human personality (which, *per contra*, Nominalism could emphasize to the point of destroying the community of nature belonging to different persons) was placed in the background. This deficiency necessarily called forth in the succeeding period a reformatory movement, which, directed at first only against the extreme consequences of the defective doctrine, terminated in an ethical and religious transformation of its fundamental conception. Yet this mere suggestion of these specifically theological points may suffice here.

§ 94. Petrus Abælardus (Abeillard, or Abélard), was born in 1079, at Pallet (or Palais), in the county of Nantes. He was educated under Roscellinus, William of Champeaux, and other Scholastics. He then

taught in various places—in particular, from 1102 till about 1136, at Paris, though with several interruptions—and died in 1142, at the priory of St. Marcel, near Châlons-sur-Saône. In dialectic he adopted a position by which he avoided at once the Nominalistic extreme of Roscellinus and the Realistic extreme of William of Champeaux. His doctrine was, however, not far removed from strict Nominalism. He taught that the universal exists not in words as such, but in affirmations, or in words considered in reference to their signification (*sermones*). The forms of things existed in the divine mind before the creation, as conceptions (*conceptus mentis*). In his *Introduction to Theology*, Abelard lays down the principle that rational insight must prepare the way for faith, since without that faith is not sure of its truth. In opposition to the tritheism of Roscellinus, and by employing the Augustinian terminology, he gives to the doctrine of the Trinity a Monarchian interpretation, explaining the three persons as being God's power, wisdom, and goodness, and yet not denying the personality of those attributes. He interprets the Platonic world-soul as meaning the Holy Ghost or the divine love in its relation to the world, in so far as this love bestows goods on all men, Jews and heathen included. In Ethics Abelard lays stress on the state of the heart; it is not the act as such, but the intention, on which sin and virtue depend. Whatever is not in conflict with the conscience, is not sinful, although it may be faulty, since conscience may err; the harmony of the will with the conscience is then only a sufficient evidence of one's virtue, when the conscience holds that to be good or pleasing to God which in reality is such. Bernard of Chartres, William of Conches, and Adelard of Bath, held a Platonism modified by Christian elements, but they carefully maintained the authority of the Aristotelian doctrine with reference to our knowledge of the world of sensation. Among the logicians of those times may be mentioned, as representatives of various forms of Realism, Walter of Mortagne, and especially Gilbertus Porretanus, the author of a Commentary to (Pseudo-) Boëthius' *De Trinitate* and *De Duabus Naturis in Christo*, and of a work on the last six categories. Abelard's pupil, Petrus Lombardus, the "*Magister Sententiarum*," prepared a manual of theology, which for a long time was universally employed as the basis of theological instruction and a guide for the dialectical treatment of theological problems. The mystical theologians, like Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, took ground in opposition

to the high estimate placed on dialectic, and especially in opposition to its application to theology. John of Salisbury, the erudite and elegant author, labored as an opponent of the narrow scholastic logic of dispute, and in favor of the union of classical studies with the Scholastic theology. Alanus "*ab insulis*" (of Lille) composed a system of ecclesiastical theology founded on rational principles. Amalrich of Bene and David of Dinaut renewed doctrines found in the works of Dionysius Areopagita and John Scotus Erigena, pantheistically identifying God with the essence of the world. Alanus, David, and probably Amalrich, were acquainted with a number of works translated from the Arabic.

A part of the works of Abelard, including, in particular, his correspondence with Heloise, his Commentary on the Romans, and his Introduction to Theology, were first published from the MSS. of François d'Amboise, state counsellor, by Querestanus (Duchesne), Paris, 1616; the *Theologia Christiana* was printed first in the *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum* of Martène and Durand, Vol. V., 1717, the *Ethics* or the *Sotto te ipsum*, in the *Thesaurus Anecdotorum Novissimus*, by B. Pez, Vol. III., 1721; the *Dialogue inter philosophum, Judasum et Christianum*, by F. H. Rheinwald (Berlin, 1891), who has also published an *Epitome Theologiae Christianae*, by Abelard, Berlin, 1835; the *Dialogue* was also included by Victor Cousin in the *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1838, as were also, among other things, the theological work entitled *Sci et Non*, which is made up of contradictory sayings of the Church Fathers, and is not complete, the *Dialectica* of Abelard, the fragment *De Generibus et Speciebus*, ascribed by Cousin to Abelard, and *Glosses* to the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, to Aristotle's *Categ.* and *De Interpretatione* and to the *Topics* of Boethius; a complete edition of the works of Abelard was afterwards set on foot by Cousin (*Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita nunc primum in unum collecta, textum rec., notas, argum., indicem adj. Victor Cousin, adjuvante C. Jourdain*, Vol. I., Paris, 1849, Vol. II., *ibid.* 1850); the first complete edition of the *Sci et Non* was edited by E. L. Th. Henke and G. Steph. Lindenköhl, Marburg, 1851. Abelard's theological writings fill the 178th volume of Migne's *Patrol. Cursus Completus*.

The life of Abelard was recounted by himself in the *Historia Calamitatum Mearum*; of his life, and especially of his relations with Heloise, treat Gervaise, Paris, 1730, John Berington, Birmingham and London, 1797, German translation by Samuel Hahnemann, Leipzig, 1789, Feseler, 1806, Fr. Chr. Schloesser, *Abélard und Heloise, Leben und Meinungen eines Schwärmers und eines Philosophen*, Gotha, 1807, Guizot, Paris, 1839. Ludw. Feuerbach, *Abélard und Heloise*, 2d edition, Leipzig, 1844; the work entitled *Les amours, les malheurs et les ouvrages d'Abélard et Heloise*, published in 1616, was republished by Villemain, Paris, 1838. Cf. also B. Duparay, *Pierre le Vénéral, abbé de Cluny, sa vie, ses œuvres et la société monastique au douzième siècle*, Châlons-sur-Saône, 1862. On his dogmatics and ethics, Frerichs (Jena, 1827), on the principles of his theology, Goldhorn (Leipzig, 1836, cf. *Zeitsch. f. Hist. Theol.*, 1866, No. 2, pp. 162-229), and on his scientific importance as a philosopher and theologian, Cousin (in his Introduction to the *Ouvrages Inéd.*, Paris, 1836), and J. Bornemann (in *Anselmus et Abaelardus sive entia scholasticismi*, Havnia, 1840) have written. The most complete work on Abelard is Charles de Émouart's *Abélard*, Paris, 1845 [cf. *North American Review*, Vol. 68, 1859, pp. 182-166.—Tr.], which contains parts of the still inedited *Glossulae super Porphyrium* by Abelard (different from the *Glosses* published in the *Ouvr. Inéd.*), though some of those which are of decisive import are given only in a French paraphrase. J. L. Jacobi, *Abélard und Heloise*, Berlin, 1850; A. Wilkens, *Peter Abélard*, Bremen, 1855; G. Schuster, *Ab. u. Heloise*, Hamburg, 1860; Ed. Bonnier, *Ab. et St. Bernard*, Paris, 1862; H. Hayd, *Ab. und seine Lehre*, Regensburg, 1868; O. Johanny de Rochely, *St. Bernard, Abélard et le Rationalisme Moderne*, Paris and Lyons, 1867.

Several copies of the work of Bernard of Chartres on the *Megacosmus* and *Microcosmus* are contained in the Imperial Library at Paris; parts of it are published by Cousin in the Supplement to the *Ouvrages Inéd. d'Abélard*, pp. 627-639; *ibid.* 640-644 are extracts from Bernard's allegorical explanation of the *Aeneid* of Virgil.

The work of William of Conches on Nature, under the title: *Magna de Naturis Philosophia*, was published in 1474; the beginning of the *Philosophia Minor* was printed under the title *repi edicte* in the works of Beda Venerabilis, Basel, 1568, Cologne, 1612 and 1688, II., p. 306 seq.; Cousin (*Ouvrages inéd.*

Abelard, pp. 669-977) has published parts of the *Secunda* and *Tertia Philosophia* (Anthropology and Cosmology) by the same author; extracts from the *Glossae* to the *De Consolat. Philos.* are given by Ch. Jourdain in *Notices et Extraits*, etc., XX, 2, 1861; perhaps (according to Haureau's conjecture) William of Conches is to be regarded as the author of the Commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato, from which Cousin (who ascribes it to Honorius of Autun, who lived at the beginning of the twelfth century) has published extracts in the Supplement to the *Ouvr. Inéd. d'Ab.*, pp. 643-657. The *Dragneticon* (thus spelled instead of *Dramaticon*) *Philosophiae*, his last work, has been edited under the title of *Dialogus de substantiis physicois confectus a Wilhelmo Anonymo philosopho industria Guili. Grataeoli*, Strasburg, 1668. Cf. Haureau, *Singularités historiques et littéraires*, Paris, 1861 (cited above, p. 356).

Fragments of the *De Eodem et Diverso*, by Abelard of Bath, are given in A. Jourdain's *Rech. Crit.*, 2d edition, 1848, pp. 258-277. On physical philosophy in the twelfth century, a work was published by Ch. Jourdain, at Paris, in 1838.

Letters on theological topics, by Walter of Montagne, are printed in D'Achery's *Spicilegium*, ed. de la Barre, Paris, 1723, III., p. 590 seq. Mathoud, also, in his edition of the Works of Robert Pulleyn (Paris, 1655) gives some extracts from the writings of the same author.

The commentary on (Pseudo-) Boethius de *Trinitate*, by Gilbertus Porretanus, is included in the edition of the writings of Boethius, published at Basel, 1570, pp. 1128-1273; his work *De Sex Principiis* was published in the oldest Latin editions of Aristotle, in connection with the *Organon*,—separate edition by Arnold Woosterfeld, Leipzig, 1807. Cf., concerning him, Lipsius, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encycl.*, Sect. I., Part 67.

Petri Lombardi libri quatuor sententiarum was published at Venice, in 1477, Basel, 1516, Cologne, 1576, etc., and is also included in the 192d Vol. of Migne's *Patrologia*; the *Sentences* of Robertus Pullus, and of Peter of Poitiers, were edited by Mathoud, Paris, 1655; Du Boulay, in his *Hist. Univers. Par.*, and Haureau, *Ph. Sc.*, I., p. 383 seq., publish fragments of the *Quaestiones de Divina Pagina* or *Summa Theologiae*, by Robert of Melun.

Bernardi Clarevallensis Opera, ed. Mariæne, Venice, 1567; ed. Mabillon, Paris, 1696 and 1719; on him, Neander (Berlin, 1813, 3d edition, 1863), Ellendorf (Essen, 1837), and G. L. Plitt (in Niedner's *Zeitschr. für histor. Theologie*, 1862, pp. 168-288), have written. *Hugonis a S. Victoris Opera*, Paris, 1524; Venice, 1568; *Stud. et industr. Canonico-rum abbat. S. Vict.*, Rouen, 1648, and in Migne's *Patrol.*, Vols. 175-177; of him write A. Liebner (Leipzig, 1836), Haureau (Paris, 1860), and Ed. Böhmer (in the "*Damaris*," 1864, No. 8). *Richardi a S. Vict. Opera*, Venice, 1506; Paris, 1518; in Migne's *Patrol.*, Vol. 194; on him cf. Engelhardt, *Bibl. a. S. Vict. und Johannes Ruysbroeck*, Erlangen, 1888. Wilhelm Kanlich, *Die Lehren des Hugo u. Richard von St. Victor*, in *Abh. der Böhm. Gesellschaft der Wiss.*, 8th Series, Vol. XIII., for the years 1868 and 1864, Prague, 1865 (also published separately). Cf. concerning the orthodox, as also concerning the heretical Mystics of that period, Heinrich Schmid, *Der Mysticismus in seiner Entstehungsperiode*, Jena, 1894; Görres, *Die christl. Mystik*, Regensb. 1886-43; Helfferich, *Die christl. Mystik*, Hamburg, 1842; Noack, *Die christl. Mystik des Mittelalters*, Königsberg, 1858.

The *Polieratus sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum* of John of Salisbury appeared first in an edition without date at Brussels, about 1476, then at Lyons, 1513, etc.; the *Letters* were published at Paris (ed. Masson), in 1611, and with the *Polieratus* in the *Bibl. Max. Patrum*, Lyons, 1677, Vol. XXIII.; the *Metalogicus*, Paris, 1610, etc.; the *Enthelicus* (*Nutheticus*), together with literary and historical investigations by Christian Petersen, Hamburg, 1848; complete edition of works, by J. A. Giles, 6 vols., Oxford, 1843, reproduced in Migne's *Patrolog.*, Vol. 199. On him, cf. Herm. Reuter, *Joh. a. S. sur Gesch. der christl. Wissenschaft im zwölften Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1842; Carl Schaarschmidt, *J. a. S. in seinem Verhältnisse zur class. Litteratur*, in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Ph.*, new series, XIV., 1858, pp. 203-224, and Johannes Sarceveriensis *nach Leben und Studien, Schriften und Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1862.

Alant ab insulis Op. ed. de Visch, Antwerp, 1658. *De arte catholicae fidei* ed. Pez. in *The. anecd.*, Vol. I. The most complete collection of his works is contained in Vol. 120 of Migne's *Patrologia*.

Hahn treats of Amalrich and the Amalricans in *Theol. Stud. u. Crit.*, 1846, No. 1; of Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinant, Krönlein treats, *Ibid.*, 1847, pp. 271-280.

In addition to the great talent of Abelard as a teacher and his conflicts with the Church (he was condemned by two Synods, at Soissons in 1121, and at Sens in 1140), his unfortunate love-relations with Heloise, the niece of the revengeful Canon Fulbert, have made his name popular. Abelard taught dialectic at Melun, then at Corbeil, afterward at Paris in the school connected with the Cathedral, and again at Mount Sainte-Geneviève and in the Monastery of St. Dionysius; in the Cathedral School at Paris he also gave theological instruction. (From the union of the schools of logic at Mount St. Geneviève with the

theological school in the Convent of Notre-Dame arose the University of Paris; the instructors and scholars formed a corporation, *Universitas Magistrorum*, or, in the language generally employed in the papal bulls of the thirteenth century, "*Universitas magistrorum et scholarium Parisiensis studentium*." Till about the year 1200 the University had been under the more or less arbitrary control of the Chancellor of the Chapter of Notre-Dame; its corporate independence was secured to it by Innocent III. See Thurot, p. 11 of the work cited above). Rémusat very justly describes the instruction given by Abelard as indicating "rather an originality of talent than of ideas" (*Abél.*, I. p. 31). Victor Cousin says (*Coursus inéd. d'Ab., Introduct.*, p. VI.): "It is the regular and systematic application by Abelard of dialectic to theology, which constitutes perhaps his most signal title to a place in history." From the time of Charlemagne, says Cousin (p. III. seq.), grammar and elementary logic and dogmatics were indeed more or less taught, but dialectic was scarcely at all introduced into theology; this it remained for Abelard mainly to do. "Abelard is, therefore, the principal founder of the philosophy of the Middle Ages, so that it is at once France that gave to Europe in the twelfth century Scholasticism by Abelard, and, at the commencement of the seventeenth century, in Descartes, the destroyer of this same philosophy and the father of modern philosophy" (p. IV.). These statements contain some truth, but great exaggeration. Before Abelard, Anselm had applied dialectic to theology with all the skill of a virtuoso, and had in his way rationalized dogmatics; with still greater genius had John Scotus Erigena, following in the lead of Dionysius Areopagita, and hence of the Neo-Platonists, made the same application, which, for the rest, the Greek Church Fathers and Augustine, in particular, also did in a greater or less measure; the interval between John Scotus and Anselm was also filled with many noticeable attempts to apply dialectic to theological questions, especially to the doctrines of the Eucharist and the Trinity. Abelard, therefore, simply went further in a way which had already been opened up. That which is peculiar to him is rather his facile and elegant style, than the strictly dialectical form of his reasoning; although it is to be confessed that he contributed very materially toward assuring the permanent adoption of the dialectical form in theological discussions. In comparison with the rigid orthodoxy of Anselm, he shows what for his times was a rather strong rationalistic tendency.

Abelard, like all the Scholastics of his time, was acquainted with no Greek works, except in Latin translations; Plato he knew only from the quotations of Aristotle, Cicero, Macrobius, Augustine, and Boëthius, but not, so far as appears, from the translation by Chalcidius of a part of the dialogue *Timæus*, which he might have seen; and of Aristotle's works, he was unacquainted not only with the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, but also with both the *Analytica*, the *Topica*, and the *De Soph. Elen.*; he knew only the *Categ.* and *De Interpretatione*. He says himself, in his *Dialectic* (composed in the latter part of his life, probably 1140-42, see Cousin, p. 228 seq.): *Sunt autem tres, quorum septem codicibus omnis in hac arte eloquentia latina armatur: Aristotelis enim duos tantum, Praedicamentorum scilicet et Periermenias libros, usus adhuc Latinorum cognovit, Porphyrii vero unum, qui videlicet de quinque vocibus conscriptus, genere scilicet, specie, differentia, proprio et accidente, introductionem ad ipsa praeeparat Praedicamenta; Boëthii autem quatuor in consuetudinem duximus libros, videlicet Divisionum et Topicorum cum Syllogismis tam categoricis quam hypotheticis.* He confesses in the same work (p. 200) his ignorance of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, and adds that he could not learn Plato's dialectic from Plato's own writings, because the latter were not translated (p. 205 seq.). In the time next succeeding the time of Abelard, and in part during his life, the other logical writings of Aristotle became generally known; and Abelard must himself (as Prantl shows, *Gesch. der Log.*, pp. 100 seq.) have had some indirect knowledge of the contents of these writings before he composed his *Dialectica*.

Te a passage in the *Chronica* of Robert de Monte, relating to the year 1128, an "*alma manus*"—which, according to Pertz (*Monum.*, VIII. p. 293), likewise belonged to a person of the twelfth century—has added the notice: *Jacobus Clericus de Venetia transtulit de graeco in latinum quosdam libros Aristotelis et commentatus est, scilicet Topica, Analyt. Pr. et Post. et Elenchos, quamvis antiquior translatio haberetur*. The "earlier translation" of these parts of the *Organon* was that of Boëthius, which, however, was not widely circulated, and the new translation did not at once become universally known and had not been seen by Abelard when he wrote his *Dialectic*. Gilbertus Porretanus, who died in 1154, cites the Aristotelian *Analytics* as a work already generally known. His disciple, Otto of Freising, was the first, or one of the first, to bring into Germany the *Topica*, the *Analytics*, and the *Elench. Soph.*—perhaps in the translation of Boëthius. John of Salisbury knew not only these, but also other new translations, in which greater literalness had been aimed at. That part of the *Organon*, which first became known about the middle of the twelfth century, was for centuries termed "*Nova Logica*," and the part previously known, "*Vetus Logica*." With this distinction must not be confounded that of a "*Logica Antiqua*" (or *Antiquorum*), which included the *Nova* as well as the *Vetus Logica*, and a "*Logica Moderna*" (*Modernorum*), which will be treated of in §§ 95 and 103.

In dialectic Abelard recognizes Aristotle as the highest authority. In speaking of a difference between Aristotle and Plato as to the definition of the Relative, Abelard (*Dial.*, p. 204) employs language which illustrates characteristically the dependence of men in his time on authority. He says: "It were possible to choose a middle course; but that may not be, for if we suppose Aristotle, the leader of the Peripatetics, to have been in fault, what other authority shall we receive in matters of this kind (si Aristotelem Peripateticorum principem culpam praesumamus, quem amplius in hac arte recipimus)? There is only one thing in Aristotle which Abelard cannot suffer, and this is his polemic against Plato, his teacher. Abelard prefers by a favorable interpretation of the words of Plato to pronounce both master and scholar in the right (*Dial.*, p. 206).—These views belonged indeed to the old age of Abelard. In contending against the dialecticians of his times, he sometimes depreciated their leader, Aristotle, when he seemed to come in conflict with theological authority (*Theol. Christ.*, II., p. 1275; *ib.*, 1282: "*Aristoteles vester*").

Abelard ascribes to dialectic the work of distinguishing the true and the false (*Dial.*, p. 435: *veritatis seu falsitatis discretio*. *Glossulae super Porphyrium*, ap. Rémusat, p. 95: *est logica auctoritate Tullii* (cf. Boëth., ad *Top. Cic.*, p. 762) *diligens ratio disserendi, i. e., discretio argumentorum per quae disseritur i. e. disputatur*). Logical distinction is accomplished by distinguishing between the different applications of words (*discretio impositionis vocum*, *Dial.*, p. 350; cf. p. 351: *Si quis vocum impositionem recte pensaverit, enuntiationum quarumlibet veritatem facilius deliberaverit, et rerum consecutionis necessitatem velocius animadverterit. Hoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet vocum impositiones pensando, quantum unaquaque proponatur oratione sive dictione discutiat; physicae vero proprium est inquirere utrum rei natura consentiat enuntiationi, utrum ita esse, ut dicitur, rerum proprias habeat vel non*). Physics is presupposed by logic, for the peculiarities of objects must be known in order to the right application of words (*ibid.*). Words, as Abelard, according to the then universal opinion and in Peripatetic language teaches, were invented by men to express their thoughts; but thoughts must conform to things (*Theol. Christ.*, p. 1275: *vocabula homines instituerunt ad creaturas designandas, quas intelligere poterunt, quam videlicet per illa vocabula suos intellectus manifestare vellent*. Cf. *ib.*, p. 1162 seq. on the cognatio between the *sermones* and *intellectus*. *Dial.*, p. 487: *neque enim vox aliqua naturaliter rei significatas inest, sed secundum hominum impositionem; vocis enim impositionem summas artifices nobis commisit, rerum autem naturam proprias suas dispositioni reservavit*

unde et vocem secundum impositionis suae originem re significata posteriorem liquet esse). But because human speech is of human origin, it is not therefore arbitrary, but it has in the objects it expresses its norm (*Introd. ad theol.*, II. 90: *constat juxta Boëthium ac Platōnem cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones*).

The position of Abelard with reference to the problem of Nominalism and Realism, or the doctrine of universals, is still a subject of dispute. In his *Dialectic* he does not expressly take up the subject. In the *Glossae in Porphyrium* he contents himself with an explanation of the literal sense of the passage in Porphyry, which only defines the problem itself. It is only in the *Glossulae super Porphyrium* that he expresses his own views. But these *Glossulae* exist only in MS.; Rémusat has published many passages from this work, but has failed to give the Latin text of precisely those passages which were of decisive importance. Furthermore, the treatises *De Intellectibus* and *De Generibus*, from which results less equivocal could have been derived, have been incorrectly ascribed to Abelard. Still it is possible to discern the main points of his doctrine. John of Salisbury describes it as a modification of the Nominalism of Roscellinus, that Abelard found the universal not in the words (*voces*) as such, but in words as employed in sentences (*sermones*); the main argument employed against Realism by the representatives of this doctrine, he adds, was that a thing cannot be predicated of a thing, but that the universal is that which is predicable of many things, and is, therefore, not a thing (*Joh. Sal., Metalog.*, II. 17: *alius sermones intuetur et ad illos detorquet quidquid alicubi de universalibus memini scriptum; in hac autem opinione deprehensus est peripateticus Palatinus Abaelardus noster;—rem de re praedicari monstrum dicunt*). With this agree Abelard's own expressions. He says (*Dial.*, p. 496): "According to us, it is not a thing, but only a name, which can be predicated of several objects" (*nec rem ullam de pluribus dici, sed nomen tantum concedimus*). But he defines the universal (Rémusat, II. 104) as that whose nature it is to be predicated of several objects (*quod de pluribus natum est praedicari*, following Arist., *De Interpret.*, ch. 7: τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλείους πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶ καθ' ἕκαστον). The universality, therefore, is contained in the word; yet not in the word as such, as though this were itself anything universal (for every word is but a particular single word), but in the word applied to a class of objects, or in the word so far as it is predicated of these objects, hence in the sentence, *sermo*; only metaphorically are the objects themselves called universals. Says Rémusat (II. p. 105): *Ce n'est pas le mot, la voix, mais le discours, sermo, c'est à dire l'expression du mot, qui est attribuable à divers, et quoique les discours soient des mots, ce ne sont pas les mots, mais les discours qui sont universels. Quant aux choses, s'il était vrai qu'une chose pût s'affirmer de plusieurs choses, une seule et même chose se retrouverait également dans plusieurs, ce qui répugne. Ibid., p. 109: il décide que bien que ces concepts ne donnent pas les choses comme discrètes ainsi que les donne la sensation, ils n'en sont pas moins justes et valables et embrassent les choses réelles, de sorte qu'il est vrai que les genres et les espèces subsistent, en ce sens qu'ils se rapportent à des choses subsistantes, car c'est par métaphore seulement que les philosophes ont pu dire que ces universaux subsistent; au sens propre ce serait dire qu'ils sont substances et l'on veut dire seulement que les objets qui donnent lieu aux universaux subsistent*. In explanation of the very indefinite expression "donner lieu," we can, since Rémusat does not give here the words of Abelard, only fall back upon the above words concerning *genres* and *espèces*, that these "*se rapportent à des choses subsistantes*." The French historians are wont to designate this doctrine of Abelard's as Conceptualism; yet Abelard by no means lays chief stress on the subjective concept as such, but on the word in its relation to the object denoted by it. The pith of his doctrine is contained in the sentence (Rémusat, II. p. 107): *Est sermo praedicabilis*.

Only in an undeveloped form is Conceptualism contained in these words, in so far, namely, as the signification of each word is in the first instance the concept connected with it, which concept, however, itself has respect to the object denoted by the word (just as the logical judgment respects objective relations), whence Abelard distinguishes (*Dial.*, p. 238 seq.) a *significatio intellectualis* and *realis* of all words and propositions; cf. Abelard's affirmation (*Dial.*, p. 496) that the Definitum is the word explained in respect of its meaning (not in respect of its essence—*nihil est definitum, nisi declaratum secundum significationem vocabulum*).

In regard to the question of objective existence Abelard expressly combats the (extreme realist) theory that the universal has an independent existence *before* the individual. True, the species arise out of the genus by the addition of a form to the latter (*Dial.*, p. 486: *in constitutione speciei genus quod quasi materia ponitur, accepta differentia, quae quasi forma superadditur, in speciem transit*); but this issuing of the species from the genus does not imply a priority of the latter in point of time or existence (*Introd. ad Theolog.*, II. 13, p. 1083: *quum autem species ex genere creari seu gigni dicantur, non tamen ideo necesse est genus species suas tempore vel per existentiam praecedere, ut videlicet ipsum prius esse contigerit quam illas; numquam etenim genus nisi per aliquam speciem suam esse contingit, vel ullatenus animal fuit, antequam rationale vel irrationale fuerit, et ita species cum suis generibus simul naturaliter existunt, ut nullatenus genus sine illis, sicut nec ipsae sine genere esse poterint*). It were not impossible to detect in these deliverances the Aristotelian doctrine of the universal in the individual (so, in particular, H. Ritter, *Gesch. der Ph.*, VII. p. 418, judging especially from this passage, ascribes to Abelard the doctrine: *universalia in re, non ante rem*); but Abelard is far from expressing in principle this moderate form of Realism and developing it in systematic and logical form. For, holding that doctrine, he would have been obliged to declare the subjective sense of the word "*universale*" to be the metaphorical one and to explain the expression, "that which can be predicated," as meaning: "that which is in such sense objective, that its concept (and the corresponding word) can be predicated." On the contrary, Abelard (*Dial.*, p. 458) expressly repels the realistic hypothesis (*eam philosophicam sententiam, quae res ipsas, non tantum voces, genera et species esse conficitur*). Still, it would be in vain to seek in Abelard's works a rigid solution of the problem in question, with which he occupied himself only incidentally and rather polemically, than in the way of positive development. His merit consists here only in the fortunate avoidance of certain untenable extremes.

Notwithstanding his opposition to the theory of the independent existence of the universal, Abelard finds means to support the doctrine of Plato, such as, from the statements of Augustine, Macrobius, and Priscianus, he understands it to be. The Ideas, he says, exist as the patterns of things, even *before* the creation of the latter, in the divine understanding. Still, the remnant of substantiality which remained to the Ideas after the Plotinic transformation of the Platonic doctrine, became less and less in the speculations of the Christian thinkers, who were seeking, not to determine what was the real object of the Socratic concept, but to discover between God, the personal spirit, and the world, a connecting link, by which the creation of the latter might be explained; Abelard had already arrived at the conception of the Ideas as subjective conceptions of the divine mind (*conceptus mentis*, *Theol. christ.*, I. p. 1191: *non sine causa maximus Plato philosophorum prae ceteris commendatur ab omnibus. Ibid.*, IV. p. 1336: *ad hunc modum Plato formas exemplares in mente divina considerat, quas ideas appellat et ad quas postmodum quasi ad exemplar quoddam summi artificis providentia operata est. Introd. ad Theol.*, I. p. 987: *sic et Macrobius (Somn. Scip., I. 2, 14) Platonem insecutus mentem Dei, quam Graeci Noym appellant, originales rerum species quas ideas dictas sunt, continere meminit, ante*

quam etiam, inquit Priscianus, in corpora prodirent, h. e. in effecta operum provenirent. *Id.*, II. p. 1095 seq.: *hanc autem processionem, qua scilicet conceptus mentis in effectum operandi prodit, Priscianus in primo constructionum (Inst. Gramm., XVII. 44) diligenter aperit dicens generales et speciales formas rerum intelligibiliter in mente divina constituisse, antequam in corpora prodirent, h. e. in effecta per operationem, quod est dicere: antea providit Deus quid et qualiter ageret, quam illud impleat, ac si diceret: nihil improaemeditate sive indiscrete egit.* In reference to the divine mind, therefore, Abelard inclines in reality to a form of Conceptualism, for the adherents of which there would, however, no longer remain any logical motive for limiting the Ideas to universals, since God thinks also the particular. This consequence was soon deduced by Bernard of Chartres (below, p. 397).

Abelard holds, with Augustine, that of all the ancient philosophers the Platonists taught the doctrine most consonant with Christian faith, their One or Good, the Nous with the ideas, and the world-soul, being interpreted as referring to the three persons of the Trinity: God the Father, the Logos, and the Holy Ghost. Abelard's explanation of the world-soul as representing the Holy Ghost gave offence, and was one of the points in the accusation of Bernard of Clairvaux against him. In his *Dialectic* Abelard industriously gives prominence to the points of difference between the Platonic doctrine and the Catholic, and in particular to the fact that the soul of the world is represented as coming forth from the Nous in time, whereas the Holy Ghost proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, and only his working in the world has had a temporal beginning, namely, with the world itself. The passage in the *Dialectic* appears like a recantation, for which reason Cousin (*Ouv. inéd. d'Abél., Introd.*, p. XXXV.) not without reason concludes that this work was composed after the Council of Sens (1140).

If, as Nominalism or Individualism logically implies, three divine persons are three Gods, then one God is one divine person. Abelard, who did not quit the nominalistic stand-point as such (notwithstanding the modifications by which he brought it nearer to Conceptualism), but decidedly rejected the Tritheism of Roscellinus, verged by his doctrine toward Monarchianism (which reduces the three persons to three attributes of God), although he did not confess this consequence. Otto of Freising, a pupil of Gilbertus Porretanus, while showing how the theological position of Abelard resulted from the Nominalism which he had imbibed from Roscellinus, his first teacher, says (*De Gestis Frid.*, I. 47) that Abelard compared the unity in essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to the unity in the Syllogism of the three parts of the Syllogism (*sententiam ergo vocum seu nominum in naturali tenens facultate non caute theologiae admiscuit, quare de sancta Trinitate docens et scribens tres personas nimium attenuans non bonis usus exemplis inter cetera dixit: sicut eadem oratio est propositio, assumptio et conclusio, ita eadem essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus*). This comparison is employed by Abelard in the *Introd. ad Theol.*, II. p. 1078; it was probably suggested by *August. de Vera Rel.*, 13, see above, p. 342; but the introduction of the Syllogism into the comparison is the work of Abelard. He often employs, besides, the almost Monarchianistic comparisons of Augustine, the opponent of the generic interpretation of the Trinity.

The question whether God can do more than he really does is decided by Abelard to the effect that it can only be answered in the affirmative, when abstract reference is had to the divine power alone; but that when the unity of the divine power and wisdom is considered, it must be answered in the negative (*Th. Chr.*, p. 1353 seq.; *Epist. Th.*, ed. Rheinw., p. 53 seq.).

In his presentation of the doctrines of the Church, the chief merit of Abelard consists in his endeavor to maintain a certain independence with regard to patristic authority. In the bold work "*Sic et Non*," he makes the authorities neutralize each other by placing side by

side their mutually contradictory assertions. Abelard gives indeed rules whereby the contradictions may for the most part be recognized as only apparent, or due to the evil designs of forgers or to the inaccuracy of copyists; yet enough of them are left standing to force assent to the proposition that only what is contained in the canonical Scriptures is without exception and unconditionally true, and that no one of the Church Fathers may be regarded as of equal authority with the Apostles. Our duty is to investigate, and for investigation, according to Aristotle, doubt prepares the way (*Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo veritatem percipimus*, *Prolog.*, ap. Cousin, p. 16). Where a strict demonstration cannot be given, the moral consciousness must be our guide (*Introd. ad Th.*, III. p. 119: *magis autem honestis quam necessariis rationibus utimur, quoniam apud bonos id semper principium statuitur, quod ex honestate amplius commendatur*).

Not inconsiderable is Abelard's merit in Ethics, especially on account of his development of the doctrine of conscience, by emphasizing the subjective aspect. He regards Christian ethics as a reformation of the natural law of morals (*Theol. Christ.*, II. p. 1211: *si enim diligenter moralia evangelii praecepta consideremus, nihil ea aliud quam reformationem legis naturalis inveniemus, quam seculos esse philosophos constat*). The philosophers, like the Evangelists, represent the intention (*animi intentio*) as the criterion of morality. They rightly teach that the good hate sin from love of virtue, and not from a slavish fear of punishment (*ib.*, p. 1205). The business of Ethics is, according to Abelard, to point out the highest good, as the aim of human endeavor, and to show the way to the same (*Dialog. inter philos.*, *Jud. et Chr.*, p. 669). The absolutely highest good is God: the highest good for man is love to God, which makes him well-pleasing to God, and the greatest evil is to hate God, whereby man becomes displeasing to God (*ib.*, p. 694 seq.). The way which leads to the highest good is virtue, *i. e.*, a will of which goodness has become a confirmed quality (*ib.*, p. 669 seq.; *ib.*, 675: *bona in habitum solidata voluntas*). The "*habitus*" of virtue makes one inclined to good actions, just as the opposite *habitus* inclines one to evil actions (*Eth.*, *Prolog.*, p. 594). Yet it is not in the action, but in the intention, that moral good and evil reside. In the broader sense, it is true, the word fault (*peccatum*) denotes any deviation from the fitting (*quaecunque non convenienter facimus*, *Eth.*, ch. 15), even when unintentional, but in its narrower signification it denotes only a voluntary error. Actions as such are indifferent. Nor is the propensity to evil, which belongs to us in consequence of original sin, *a. g.*, the merely natural inclination to anger or sensuality arising from the disposition of the body, in itself sin. It is only the consenting to evil which is sin, and that because it implies a culpable contempt of God (*Eth.*, ch. 3: *non enim quae fiunt, sed quo animo fiunt, pensat Deus, nec in opere, sed in intentione meritum operantis vel laus consistit*. *ib.*, ch. 7: *opera omnia in se indifferentia nec nisi pro intentione agentis vel bona vel mala dicenda sunt, non videlicet quia bonum vel malum sit ea fieri, sed quia bene vel male fiunt, hoc est ex intentione qua convenit fieri aut minime*. *ib.*, ch. 3: *hunc vero consensum proprie peccatum nominamus, hoc est culpam animae, qua damnationem meretur vel apud Deum rea statuitur*. *Quid est enim iste consensus nisi contemptus Dei et offensio ipsius? Non enim Deus ex damno, sed ex contemptu offendi potest*). Abelard gives special prominence to the conception of conscience (*conscientia*), or the individual moral consciousness of the acting subject, as opposed to the objective norms of morality. The idea of sin, he affirms, implies not only a departure from what is morally good in itself, but at the same time a violence done to the sinner's own moral consciousness; whatever, therefore, is not in conflict with this consciousness is not sin, although that which harmonizes with one's own moral consciousness is not for that reason virtue, unless this consciousness is what it ought to be. The coincidence of the objective norms with the subjective consciousness is the condition of virtue in the most complete sense, which consists in a direction of the will in accordance with

these guides; and the same coincidence is the condition of sin in the most complete sense, as being a direction of the will in opposition to the same guides. If, however, the subjective moral conviction of a person is erroneous, then the corresponding acts of will and performance are, not indeed good, but faulty, though less faulty than would be a course of action in accordance with the objective norms, but opposed to the conscience of the agent (*Eth.*, ch. 13: *non est peccatum nisi contra conscientiam*. *Ib.*, ch. 13: *non est itaque intentio bona dicenda quia bona videtur, sed insuper quia talis est sicut existimatur quam videlicet illud ad quod tendit, si Deo placere credit, in hac insuper existimatione sua nequaquam fallatur*. *Ib.*, ch. 14: *sic et illos qui persequantur Christum vel suos, quos persequendos credebant, per operationem peccasse dicimus, qui tamen gravius culpam peccassent, si contra conscientiam eis parcerent*). Sin, in the proper and strict sense of the word, as the consenting to known evil and contempt of God, is avoidable, although on account of the sinful propensities, against which we are obliged to combat, it cannot be avoided without great difficulty (*Ib.*, ch. 15: *si autem proprie peccatum intelligentes solum Dei contemptum dicamus peccatum, potest revera sine hoc vita transigi, quamvis cum maxima difficultate*).

The rationalistic tendency of Abelard was complained of by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, who affirmed that he "savored of Arius when he spoke of the Trinity" (referring to the comparison of the Father and the Son to the genus and the species; others of his comparisons are more Sabellian in spirit), "of Pelagius when he spoke of grace, and of Nestorius when he spoke of the person of Christ" (*Epist. ad Guidonem de Castello*). St. Bernard said further, that "while he labored to prove Plato a Christian, he showed himself a heathen" (*Epist. ad papam Innocentium*). But although Abelard was compelled to recall those parts of his teachings which were in conflict with the doctrine of the Church, his influence on his contemporaries and on following generations was great and lasting. By Anselm and Abelard the dialectical form was ineffaceably impressed on the theology of the Middle Ages.

An anonymous *Commentary to the De Interpretatione*, from which Cousin (*Fragments Philos., Phil. Scol.*) has published some extracts, belongs to the school of Abelard; in it logic is defined as *doctrina sermonum*, and, in accordance with the plan followed by Abelard himself in his *Dialectica*, is divided into *doctrina incomplexorum, propositionum et syllogismorum*. Farther removed from Abelard's doctrine are the contents of the treatise *De Intellectibus*, which Cousin (*Fragm. Philos.*, 2d ed., Paris, 1840, pp. 461-496) has published as a work of Abelard, and in which the concepts (*intellectus*), which the author calls also *speculationes* or *visus animi*, are explained and distinguished from *sensus, imaginatio, existimatio, scientia*, and *ratio*. Aristotle's *Anal. Poster.* must at least in parts have been known to the author, and that in another translation than the Boëthian, since in the latter *dóxa* is translated by *opinio*, and not by *existimatio* (see Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. pp. 104, 206). The concept is derived by abstraction from the perceptions of the senses, and in it we think a form without regard to its substratum (*subjecta materia*), or an undifferentiated essence, with no distinction of individuals (*naturam quamlibet indifferenter absque suorum scilicet individuorum discretionem*). The manner in which we here regard the object of the concept is different from that in which the object itself subsists, since in reality the *indifferens* only exists in the midst of individual plurality, and not unmixed and by itself, as in thought (*nequam enim ita pure subsistit, sicut pure concipitur, et nulla est natura, quae indifferenter subsistat*). This, however, does not render the concept false; for it could only be such in case I conceived the object as being different from what it really is, but not when only the *modus attendendi intellectus* and the *modus subsistendi* of the *res* are distinguished from one another.

The treatise to which Cousin has given the title: *De Generibus et Speciebus* (publishing

it from a MS. of St. Germain as a work of Abelard's in *Ouvr. Inéd. d'Ab.*, pp. 507-550), is, as was rightly perceived by H. Ritter (*Gesch. der Philos.*, VII. p. 363, cf. Prantl, II. p. 143 seq.), of a style and of contents such as preclude our attributing it to Abelard; but Ritter's conjecture that Joscelyn (or Gauslenus)—who was Bishop of Soissons from 1122 to 1151, and of whom we know, through John of Salisbury (*Metalog.*, II. 17, p. 92), that he "*universalitatem rebus in unum collectis attribuit et singulis eandem demit*"—or one of his pupils was the author, is also uncertain. In this work several doctrines relating to the subject of the controversy between Nominalism and Realism are cited and discussed in an erudite and acute manner, all of which doctrines belong indeed to the first half of the twelfth century, but scarcely all of them to the time of Abelard's youth (when Cousin believes the work to have been written). In distinction from Abelard, the author of this work, who indeed employs in part the arguments of Abelard (p. 514), confesses his adhesion to a moderate form of Realism, by which the universal is represented as not immanent in the single individual as such, but in the totality of similar individuals. Abelard (see above, p. 392) had founded his Nominalistic conception of universals on the Aristotelian definition of the universal as that whose nature it is to be predicated of several objects, by combining with this definition his doctrine that not things, but only words can be predicated (or, *res de re non praedicatur*). But the author of the treatise now in question escapes this nominalistic consequence of the above definition by taking "predicated" in the sense of "principally signified by the predicated word" (*principaliter significari per vocem praedicatam*, Cousin, p. 531); but that which is signified is always something objective, and in the case of the names of species, that which is signified *principaliter* is the totality of similar individuals. (The author illustrates the difference between *principaliter significare* and secondary meanings by a reference to the Aristotelian employment of white as an example of quality—reminding us thus of Anselm's dialogue *De Grammatico*.) Accordingly the author defines (p. 524 seq.) the species as not that human essence, which is in Socrates or any other individual alone, but as the collected essence of all individuals of the same nature; the species is thus essentially plural, though one in name, just as a nation is called one, though consisting of many persons (*speciem dico esse non illam essentiam hominis solum, quae est in Socrate vel quae est in aliquo alio individuorum, sed totam illam collectionem ex singulis aliis hujus naturae conjunctam, quae tota collectio, quamvis essentialiter multa sit, ab auctoritatibus tamen una species, unum universale, una natura appellatur, sicut populus quamvis ex multis personis collectus sit, unus dicitur*). The individual is not identical with the universal, but when the universal is affirmed of the individual (e. g., *Socrates est homo*), the meaning is that the former inheres in the latter (p. 533: *omnis natura, quae pluribus inhaeret individuis materialiter, species est*). The usual denomination of the genus as the *materia*, and of the *substantialis differentia* as the *forma*, by the addition of which it becomes a species, is also found here (p. 516 et al.). The matter of the individual is its species and its individuality is its form (p. 524: *unumquodque individuum ex materia et forma compositum est, ut Socrates ex homine materia et Socratitate forma, sic Plato ex simili materia, sc. homine, et forma diversa, sc. Platonitate, componitur, sic et singuli homines; et sicut Socratitas, quae formaliter constituit Socratem, nusquam est extra Socratem, sic illa hominis essentia, quae Socratitatem sustinet in Socrate, nusquam est nisi in Socrate*).

Bernard of Chartres (born about 1070-1080), William of Conches, and Adelard of Bath, who all taught in the first half of the twelfth century, grounded their teachings on Plato, but endeavored, in order not to come in conflict with the authority of Aristotle, to combine the opinions of both those thinkers. We stand, says Bernard of himself and his contemporaries, in comparison with the ancients, like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants. On the authority of the Platonic *Tymaeus* (in the translation of Chalcidius) and of the Augustinian reports concerning Platonism, or rather concerning Neo-Platonism, Bernard

supposes matter (*hylē*) to have been reduced to orderly shape by the world-soul, and that the world-soul issued from the divine reason in which the Ideas were contained, and which was itself the Logos of God the Father, the *suprema divinitas*, called also by Bernhard *Tagalon*. The Ideas or *formae exemplares*, which remain unchanged amid all the changes of individual objects and are the original grounds of all things, exist as eternal concepts of genera, species, and also of individuals in the divine reason (Bern., *Megacosm.*, ap. Cousin, *Oeuvr. Inéd. d'Abélard*, p. 628: *Noys summi et exsuperantissimi Dei est intellectus et ex ejus divinitate na'a natura, in qua vitae viventis imagines, notiones aeternae, mundus intelligibilis, rerum cognitio praefinita. Erat igitur videre velut in speculo tersiore quidquid operis Dei secretior destinaret affectus. Illic in genere, in specie, in individuali singularitate conscripta quidquid hylē, quidquid mundus, quidquid parturient elementa. Illic exarata supremi digito dispunctoris textus temporis, fatalis series, dispositio saeculorum; illic lacrymae pauperum fortunaque regum, etc.*). The soul [of the world] is an *Endelychia* (*ἐντελέχεια* of Aristotle) which issued, as if by emanation (*velut emanatione defluxit*), from the divine mind. This soul (p. 631) then gave shape to nature (*naturam informavit*). William of Conches, who discusses particular physiological and psychological problems, avows, in those cases in which Platonism diverges from the Christian doctrine, his adhesion to the latter (*Christianus sum, non academicus*, ap. Cousin, *Oeuvr. Inéd. d'Ab.*, p. 673), especially in reference to the question of the origin of souls (*cum Augustino credo et sentio quotidie novas animas non ex traduce* [which opinion Augustine had, however, not unconditionally rejected], *non ex aliquo substantia, sed ex nihilo, solo jussu creatoris creari*). Little as William of Conches is disposed to accept the authority of the Church Fathers in matters of physics (*"etsi enim majores nobis, homines tamen,"* etc.), he yet submits to it unconditionally in spiritual matters (*"in eis, quae ad fidem cath. vel ad institutionem morum pertinet, non est fas Bedae vel alicui alii sanctorum patrum contradicere"*). In what manner the theory of ideas was reconciled with the Aristotelian doctrine is shown by the work (composed about 1115) of Adelard of Bath, who distinguished himself through his extensive knowledge of natural history, acquired on long journeys, especially among the Arabians, and who translated Euclid from the Arabic (cf. Sprenger, *Mohammad*, Vol. I., Berlin, 1861, p. III.). He says (ap. Hauréau, *PA. Sc.*, I. p. 225 seq.) that Aristotle was right in teaching that genera and species were immanent in individuals, in so far as it is true that the objects of sensation are, according to the manner in which they are considered—i. e., according as we pay attention to their individual existence or to that in which they resemble each other—individuals or species or genera, but that Plato was also right in teaching that they only exist in complete purity apart from things, i. e., in the divine mind.

Walter of Mortaigne (died in 1174 while Bishop of Leon), is mentioned by John of Salisbury as the chief representative of the doctrine that the same objects, according to the different condition (*status*) in which they are considered—i. e., according as our attention is directed to their differences or to their likeness, to the *indifferens* or the *consimile* in them—are either individuals or species or genera (*Metalog.*, II. 17: *partiuntur igitur status duce Genitro de Mauretania, et Platonem in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum, in eo quod homo, speciem, in eo quod animal, genus, sed subalternum, in eo quod substantia, generalissimum*). This doctrine is spoken of by the same author as no longer maintained by any one in his time. Abelard (in the *Glossulae super Porphyrium*, ap. Rémusat, *Ab.*, II. p. 99 seq.; probably arguing against Adelard of Bath), and, from a different point of view, the author of the work *De Generibus et Speciebus* (Cousin, *Oeuvr. Inéd. d'Ab.*, p. 518) had opposed it.

Gilbert de la Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus, called also Pictaviensis, from Poitiers, his native place), a pupil of Bernard of Chartres and others, advanced, in connection with the Boethian rendering of Aristotle's definition of the universal (*quod natum est de pluribus prae-*

dicant), the doctrine of "native forms" (which John of Salisbury thus sums up: *universalem formis nativis attribuit et in earum conformitate laborat; est autem forma nativa originalis exemplum et quae non in mente Dei consistit, sed rebus creatis inhaeret, haec graeco eloquio dicitur eidos, habens se ad ideam ut exemplum ad exemplar, sensibilis quidem in re sensibili, sed mente concipitur insensibilis, singularis quoque in singulis, sed in omnibus universalis*). In his commentary to (Pseudo-) Boëthius *de Trinitate* (*Op. Boëth.*, ed. Davis, 1570, p. 1152), Gilbert distinguishes two significations of the word substance: 1) *quod est, sive substantia*, 2) *quo est, sive subsistentia*.* Genera and species are generic and specific subsistences, but not objects existing substantially (*non substant vere*, p. 1139); subsisting things constitute the being of their subsistences (*res subsistentes sunt esse subsistentiarum*), while the subsistences are substantial forms (*formae substantiales*, p. 1255 seq.). There are generic and specific, and also singular subsistences, which latter exist always in only one individual; individuals are distinguished from each other not only by accidental, but, also, by substantial properties (p. 1128). The intellect (*intellectus*) collects (*colligit*) the universal, which exists, but not as a substance (*est, sed non substant*), from the particular things which not merely are (*sunt*) but also (as subjects of accidents) have substantial existence (*substant*, p. 1138 seq.), by considering only their substantial similarity or conformity (p. 1135 seq.; 1252). In sensible or natural things form and matter are united; the forms do not exist as "native forms" apart from things (*inabstracte*), but with them (*concretue*); the mind can by abstraction (*abstractim*) attend to them (*attendere*); for things are often conceived (*conciipiuntur*) not in the way in which they are, but in another way (p. 1138). In God, who is pure form without matter, the archetypes of material things (*corporum exemplaria*, p. 1138) exist as eternal, immaterial forms. No one of the categories (as Gilbert teaches, with Augustine and others) can be applied in its literal sense to God (p. 1154); theological speculation, which relates to the immaterial, to that which exists abstractly, cannot conform altogether to the laws of natural, concrete things (p. 1140; 1173). In his theological speculations Gilbert caused scandal by teaching that the one God in three persons was the one *deitas* or *divinitas*, the one form in God by which God is God, and from which the three persons derive their form (*forma in Deo, qua Deus sit, the forma, qua tres personas informantur*). The subject was especially discussed at the Council at Rheims in 1148. Saint Bernard condemned the distinction between *Deus* and *Divinitas*.—The work of Gilbert, *De Sex Principiis*, treats of the last six categories of Aristotle: *actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habere*. Numerous commentaries on it were written by later Scholastics. According to Gilbert, quantity, quality, and relation (*in proprio statu*) are inherent (*formae inhaerentes*) in the category of substance, while the last six categories are only (*respectu alterius*) assistant forms (*formae assistentes*) in connection with the same category. The validity of this distinction is quite questionable, especially when *relatio* is reckoned among the inherent forms, for relation is impossible without a reference to a second object, and it is in just this reference that it consists; Gilbert regarded it as sufficient that the possibility in general of being related to something else should exist in the object itself. In this Albertus Magnus agreed with him; but the later Scholastics recognized only substance, quantity, and quality as absolute categories, and ascribed to the seven others a relative character, just as Leibnitz also recognized as "*déterminations internes*" only "*l'essence, la qualité, la quantité*" (reducing, however, the ten categories of Aristotle to five, viz.: substance, quantity, quality, action and passion, and relation).

Petrus Lombardus (of Lumelogn, near Novara, in Lombardy, and who died in 1164,

* ["Since forms have no accidents, it cannot be said that they *substant*, or are *substantes*, but since they, nevertheless, *substantur*, they are termed *subsistentes* [or 'subsistences']."] Erdmann, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.*, § 168. 3.—Tr.]

while Bishop of Paris) collected in his four books of *Sentences* various sayings of the Church Fathers concerning ecclesiastical dogmas and problems, but was not uninfluenced in his exposition of them by Abelard's *Sic et Non* and the *Summa Sententiarum* of Hugo of St. Victor. Petrus Lombardus treats, in the first book, of God as the absolute good (*quo fruimur*), in the second of creatures (*quibus utimur*), in the third of the incarnation (which Hugo had considered in connection with the doctrine of God and the Trinity in his first book) and of redemption and of the virtues, and in the fourth of the seven sacraments, as the signs (*signa*) by which salvation is communicated, and of the end of the world. His work became and for centuries continued in the schools to be the principal basis of theological instruction. It was imitated by some, and commented on by very many. In the dialectical treatment of theological questions his *Sentences* were, as a rule, made the point of departure. Similar works were prepared by Robert Pulleyn (died at Rome in 1150; from his work: *Sententiarum libri octo*, Petrus Lombardus borrowed much), Robert of Melun, Hugo of Amiens, and Peter of Poitiers, a pupil of Peter the Lombard.

The orthodox Mystics of the twelfth century, such as Abelard's opponent, Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153)—who valued knowledge only in so far as it ministered to edification and held that to seek for knowledge on its own account was heathenish—Hugo of St. Victor (1097-1141)—a man of encyclopedical erudition, who laid down the principle that the "uncorrupted truth of things cannot be discovered by reasoning"—and his disciple, Richard of St. Victor (died in 1173)—who treated the faculty of mystical contemplation as superior to *imaginatio* and *ratio*—contributed to the elaboration of ecclesiastical doctrine; but, inasmuch as they really made the images of the fancy of more account than the conceptions of the reason, they occupied a position so foreign and hostile to philosophy, that it was impossible that they should contribute materially to the advancement of the latter. Walter of St. Victor, a monastic Prior, gave (according to Buleus, *Hist. Univ. Par.*, I. p. 404, and Launoy, *De var. Arist. fort.*, ch. 3), in about the year 1180, to Abelard, Petrus Lombardus, Gilbert and Peter of Poitiers, the name of the "four labyrinths of France," affirming that all of them, "inspired with the Aristotelian spirit, had treated with scholastic levity of the ineffable Trinity and the Incarnation."

John, of Salisbury in the south of England (*Johannes Saresberiensis*), was born about 1110-20, and educated in France in the years 1136-1148. In the latter year he returned to England. He was a friend of Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury, and of Thomas Becket, and from 1176 till his death in 1180 was Bishop of Chartres. He was a pupil of Abelard, of Alberich, the anti-nominalistic logician, of Robert of Melun, of William of Conches, and Gilbert de la Porrée, and also of Robert Pulleyn the theologian, and others. Like Abelard and Bernard of Chartres, but to a still greater extent than they, he combined with the study of logic and theology the study of classical authors. He composed in 1159-1160, about twenty years after the time when he had pursued his studies in logic, his two principal works, the *Policraticus*, i. e., the overcoming of the inanities (*nugae*) of the court by the spirit of ecclesiastical philosophy, and the *Metalogicus*, on the value of logic, in which he undertook the defense of that discipline (*logicae suscepit patrocinium*, *Prolog.*, p. 8, ed. Giles). The *Metalogicus* is full of information concerning the manner in which logic was cultivated by the Scholastics of John's time. John mentions in the *Metalogicus* (II. 17) eight different opinions (the eighth, according to which the species are "*maneries*," or *manières*, is akin to the seventh, according to which they are formed by the act of *colligere*), and among them, as the third in order (after the doctrines of Roscellinus and Abelard), the conceptualistic (which he thus expresses: *alius versatur in intellectibus et eos duntaxat genera dicit esse et species; sumunt enim occasionem a Cicerone et Boethio, qui Aristotelem laudant auctorem quod haec credi et dici debeant notiones* [Cicero appeals only to the authority of "*Graeci*," by whom

the Stoics are to be understood]; *est autem, ut ajunt, notio ex ante perccepta forma cuiusque rei cognitio enodatione indigens, et alibi: notio est quiddam intellectus et simplex animi conceptio; eo ergo deflectitur quidquid scriptum est, ut intellectus aut notio universarium universalitatem claudat*). John does not avow an unconditional acceptance of either of these doctrines, but shows himself everywhere most favorably inclined to the doctrine of Gilbert; he conceives the *universalia* to be essential qualities or forms, immanent in things and separated from them only by abstraction, and he contests the hypothesis of independent Ideas existing apart from God. For the rest, in reference to this question he for the most part expresses himself as in doubt (*Metaph.*, II. 20: *qui me in his quae sunt dubitabilia sapienti, academicum esse pridem professus sum*). He holds it to be unfitting to spend too much time on problems of this kind or to devote all one's life to them alone, and charges even Aristotle with subtilizing (*argutias*, *Polier.*, III. 3; VII. 12 *et al.*); Aristotle, he says, was more convincing in his arguments against the opinions of others than in the demonstration of his own, and was by no means infallible and, as it were, "*sacrosanctus*" (*Metaph.*, III. 8; IV. 37). John had too often seen how, in the defense of an opinion, all other passages from the authorities were violently accommodated to the one passage from which the opinion in question had been derived, not to feel scandalized by a mode of interpretation which permitted such procedures. He therefore demands that heed be paid to the changes in the use of words, and that perfect uniformity in expression be not always expected. He also admits the real difference in opinion and even the errors of the ancient masters, without, however, comprehending their differences as phases of the development of philosophic thought. In opposition to the fruitless contentions of the schools, John lays great weight on the "*utile*," and especially on whatever furthers moral progress. All virtue, even that of the heathen, is derived from divine illumination and grace (*Polierat.*, III. 9). The perfect will is in God's sight equal to the act; yet works furnish that evidence which God requires of our perfect will (*Polier.*, V. 3: *probatio dilectionis exhibitio operis est*). John's practical standpoint is that of rigid ecclesiasticism.

Alanus ("*ab Insulis*") (died a monk at Clairvaux, about 1203) wrote in five books, *De Arte sive de Articulis Fidei Catholicae*, in which he sought to confirm the principal doctrines of the Christian Church by rational grounds. Setting out from general propositions in regard to causation (such as *quidquid est causa causae, est etiam causa causati; omnis causa subjecti est etiam causa accidentis* [*nam accidens habet esse per subjectum*]; *nihil semet ipsum composuit vel ad esse produxit* [*nequit enim aliquid esse prius semet ipso*], etc.), he presents, following essentially the order of the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, in the first book the doctrine of God, the One and Triune, the sole cause of all things; in the second, the doctrine of the world, the creation of angels and men, and free-will; in the third, the doctrine of the restoration (*reparatio*) of fallen man; in the fourth, the doctrine of the sacraments of the Church; and in the fifth, the doctrine of the resurrection and the future life. Alanus had known the book on *Causae* (*Liber de Causis*), which is founded on Neo-Platonic theses and came to the Scholastics through the Jews.

Amalrich, of Bena in the district of Chartres (died while teaching theology at Paris, in 1206 or 1207), and his followers, among whom David of Dinant was the most distinguished, philosophized in a sense somewhat opposed to the teaching of the Church and ap-peaching to Pantheism. Their doctrines were condemned in the beginning of the thirteenth century, at the Synod of Paris in 1209, and at the Lateran Council called by Pope Innocent III., in 1215, and their writings, as also the work of Erigena and the *Physics* of Aristotle, and afterward also the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, which seemed to favor their doctrines, were forbidden to be read (cf. below, § 98). Amalrich taught (according to Gerson, *De Concordia Metaph. cum Log.* IV.) the identity in some sense of the Creator with the creation.

God was the one essence of all creatures. The Ideas possessed creative power, although they were themselves created. All that was divisible and changeable would return finally into God. David of Dinant composed a book entitled *De Totis* (i. e. *de divisionibus*), in which he sought to demonstrate that God and the original matter of the universe and the *Nous* were identical, since they all corresponded with the highest (most abstract) concept which can be formed; if they were diverse, there must exist above them some higher and common element or being, in which they agreed, and then this would be God and *Nous* and the original matter (Albert. M., *Summa Th.*, I. 4. 20). The principal sources from which this extreme Realism was derived, were (in addition to the Albigensian heresy, which was founded on Manicheism and Paulicianism) the works of John Scotus and Dionysius Areopagita; but at least David of Dinant, and probably Amalrich also, had made use of the *Metaphysics* and *Physics* of Aristotle—on which, together with his *Ethics*, from this time forward the development of Scholasticism depended—and David of Dinant had very probably made use of the "*Fons Vitæ*" of Avicbron (*Ibn Gebirol*, see below, § 97).

§ 95. The causes which led to the transformation of the Scholastic philosophy after the end of the twelfth century and its development into the highest perfection attainable for it, were that acquaintance with all the works of Aristotle, for which the Scholastic philosophers were indebted to the Arabians, the Jews, and, at a later time, to the Greeks, as also their acquaintance with the philosophy of those men by whom Aristotle was thus made known to them. Among the Greek Christians, after the suppression of Neo-Platonism by the decree of Justinian (529), and when the heterodox influence of this philosophy on Christian theologians (as illustrated by Origen and his pupils) had been brought to an end, the Aristotelian philosophy gained constantly in authority, the Aristotelian dialectic, which was first employed only by heretics, being finally employed also by the orthodox in their theological controversies. The school of the Syrian Nestorians at Edessa (afterward at Nisibis) and the medico-philosophical school at Gandisapora were principal seats of Aristotelian studies; through them the Aristotelian philosophy was communicated to the Arabians. The Syrian Monophysites also participated in the study of Aristotle, especially in the schools at Resaina and Kinnesrin. Johannes Philoponus, a Monophysite and Tritheist, and Johannes Damascenus, an orthodox monk, were Christian Aristotelians, the latter of whom, in scholastic fashion, employed the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle as aids to the systematic presentation of the strictly orthodox faith. In the eighth and ninth centuries all studies were on the decline in the Orient; yet the tradition of them was preserved. In the eleventh century Michael Psellus and Johannes

Italians distinguished themselves especially as logicians. From the centuries next following several commentaries on works of Aristotle and some minor works on other philosophers have been preserved. In the fifteenth century the Greeks, particularly after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in the year 1453, brought to the nations of the West that increased knowledge of ancient literature which, in the department of philosophy, gave rise to the struggle between Aristotelian Scholasticism and the newly-arising Platonism.

The philosophy of the Greeks in the Middle Ages is discussed by Jas. Brucker (*Hist. crit. philos.*, Vol. III., Leipzig, 1743, pp. 532-554), and, in later times, with special reference to logic, by Carl Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik*, I., p. 648 seq., and II., pp. 261-266). E. Rénan (Paris, 1852) has written of the Peripatetic philosophy among the Syrians. Cf. G. Hoffmann, *De hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristotelicis (Diss. Inaug.)*, Berlin, 1863.

The Aristotelian logic was already regarded to a certain extent as an authority in the school of Origen. Gregory of Nazianzen wrote an abridgment of the *Organon* (see Prantl, *Gesch. d. L.*, I. p. 657). But at first the Aristotelian philosophy was studied more by heretics than by Orthodox Christians. The Platonic doctrines were more allied to those of Christianity and were more highly esteemed, yet in proportion as theology became a scholastic science the Aristotelian logic was more highly prized as an *organon*.

Together with Nestorianism, Aristotelianism found acceptance in the fifth century among that part of the Syrians who dwelt in the East, and especially in the school at Edessa. The oldest document of this philosophy among the Syrians is a commentary on *Arist. de Interpr.*, by Probus, a contemporary of Ibas, who was Bishop of Edessa, and translated the commentaries of Theodorus of Mopsueste on certain books of the Bible. The same Probus wrote also commentaries on the *Anal. Pri.* and *Soph. El.* In 489 the school at Edessa was broken up by command of the Emperor Zeno, on account of the Nestorianism which prevailed in it, and the persons implicated fled to Persia and spread there, under the favor of the Sassanidæ, their religious and philosophical doctrines. Out of the remains of the school at Edessa arose the schools at Nisibis and Gandisapora, the latter being more particularly devoted to medicine (*Academia Hippocratica*). King Chosroës of Persia took a lively interest in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Men educated in the school at Gandisapora became afterward teachers of the Arabs in medicine and philosophy. Later, but not with less zeal than the Nestorians, the Syrian Monophysites or Jacobites applied themselves to the study of Aristotle. At Resaina and Kinnerin in Syria existed schools in which the Aristotelian philosophy was dominant. This study of Aristotle began in the sixth century with Sergius of Resaina, who translated Aristotle's works into the Syriac language. In codices of the British Museum there exist by him (according to Rénan, *De Philos. Perip. apud Syros*, p. 25): *Log. tractatus, Liber de causis universi juxta mentem Aristotelis, quo demonstratur universum circulum efficere*, and other works. Among the men educated at Kinnerin, Jacob of Edessa, who translated theological and philosophical works from Greek into Syriac, deserves to be mentioned; his translation of the *Categ.* of Aristotle is still extant in MS.

Concerning Johannes Grammaticus or Philoponus, see above, § 87, pp. 347, 349, and concerning Johannes Damascenus, *ib.*, pp. 347, 352. In the second half of the ninth century the Patriarch Photius distinguished himself by his comprehensive erudition; his *Bibliotheca* (ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1824) contains extracts from numerous philosophical works. His work on the Aristotelian Categories exists in MS.

Michael Psellus (born A. D. 1020) wrote an *Introduction to Philosophy* (printed Venice, 1532, and Paris, 1541), a book on the opinions of the philosophers concerning the soul (Paris, 1618, etc.), and also commentaries on the *Quinque Voces* of Porphyry and Aristotle's *Categorias* (Venice, 1532; Paris, 1541) and Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* (Venice, 1503).*

A younger contemporary and rival of Psellus and his successor in the dignity of a *ἐπαγὸς φιλόσοφος* was Johannes Italus, author of commentaries on the *De Interpr.* of Aristotle and on the first four books of the *Topica*, and the author also of other logical works which are preserved in MS. (see Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. p. 294 seq.). A contemporary of Johannes Italus was Michael Ephesius, who, like Eustratius, Metropolitan of Nicosia in the twelfth century, and others, wrote a commentary on parts of the *Organon* of Aristotle.

In the first half and about the middle of the thirteenth century lived Nicephorus Blemmydes, author of an *Ἐπιτομή λογικῆς* (published by Thomas Wegelin, Augsburg, 1606). (The Greek *voces memoriales* for the syllogistic modes, with the exception of the Theophrastic modes, are found also in this *Ἐπιτομή*, although only written on the margin in the MSS, no mention being made of them in the text; they were, therefore, probably added by later hands, in imitation of the Latin words Barbara, etc.). An individual termed Georgius Aneponymus wrote likewise about the same time a compendium of the Aristotelian logic (printed at Augsburg in 1600).

From the beginning of the fourteenth century a compendium of logic by Georgius

* To him also is ascribed a compendium of Logic, bearing the title: *Σύντομος εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους λογικὴν ἐπιστήμην* (edited by Elias Ehinger, Wittenberg, 1697), which reproduces in five sections the substance of the *σέπτι ἐμπνεύσεις* of Aristotle, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, and the *Categ. Anal. Priora* and *Topica* of Arist.; the *Topica* are given in the same form in which Boethius gives them; they are followed, in chapters 26 and 28 of the fifth book, by a section on *σημασία* (signification) and on *ὑποθέσεις* (supposition). A complete summary of the contents of this *Synopsis* is given by Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. pp. 265-266. In this compendium are found the syllogistic mnemonic words, in which α denotes the universal affirmative judgment, ε the universal negative, ι the particular affirmative, and ο the particular negative judgment. The *voces memoriales* given for the four chief modes of the first figure, are γράμματα, ἔνταψ, γραφίς, τεχνικός; for the five Theophrastic modes of the same figure (out of which modes Galenus formed the fourth figure): γράμματα, ἔνταψ, χάρις, πάρεστος, ἰσός; for the four modes of the second figure: ἔνταψ, μέτρον, ἀχολαί; for the six modes of the third figure: ἔνταψ, σθεναρός, ἰσός, ἐστίς, ἀμάλος, φέμετος (cf. Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. p. 275 seq.); the Latin logicians used instead the familiar words: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, etc. The discussion of *σημασία* and *ὑποθέσεις*, added to the last chapter of the *Topica*, forms a part of the doctrine which later Latin logicians were accustomed to present under the title "*De Terminorum Proprietatibus*," and to which they gave the name of Modern Logic (*Terminologia Modernorum*) in distinction from the logic transmitted from ancient times (*Logica Antiqua*). Whether Psellus was really the author of this *Σύντομος*, is, however, very doubtful. In a manuscript of the work now at Munich (formerly at Augsburg), apparently of the fourteenth century, the following notice is added by a later hand: τοῦ σοφιστῆτος φελλοῦ εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους λογικὴν ἐπιστήμην σύντομος, and hence Ehinger edited the work as one of Michael Psellus. But in other manuscripts the work is called a translation of the logical compendium of Petrus Hispanus (see below, § 108), Georgius Scholarius (see below, Vol. II. § 3) being named as the translator. The name of the translator is probably incorrectly given, for the Munich MS is so old that it can scarcely have been translated from the Latin work, unless it were by an earlier translator (say, Maximus Planudes, who lived about 1350). Prantl regards the *Compendium* of Petrus Hispanus as a translation of the *Synopsis* of Psellus, while Val. Rose and Charles Thurot believe the Greek work to be a translation of the Latin one. If we adopt the latter theory, which the comparison of texts compels us to do, there still remains the question as to the origin of the new logical doctrines "*de terminorum proprietatibus*" (which arose in general from the blending of logic and grammar), which question needs, in regard to single points, to be answered more satisfactorily than it as yet has been. Cf. Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II. p. 288, and III. p. 18; also "*Michael Psellus und Petrus Hispanus, eine Rechtsvergleichung*," Leipzig, 1867, and, on the other hand, Val. Rose, in the "*Hermes*," II, 1867, p. 146 seq., and Charles Thurot in the *Revue archéologique*, n. s. X., Juillet à Décembre, 1864, pp. 267-281, and Nos. 18 and 22 of the *Revue Critique* for 1867.

Pachymères has been preserved; it is entitled *Ἐκτίμησις τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους λογικῆς* (printed at Paris, 1548), and follows closely the Aristotelian *Organon*. In the fourteenth century *Theodorus Metochita* wrote paraphrases of the physiological and psychological works of Aristotle, and works on Plato and other philosophers (Fabric., *Bibl. Gr.*, Vol. IX.). In the period next succeeding, the study of Plato and Aristotle was pursued with zeal by the Greeks.

§ 96. The whole philosophy of the Arabians was only a form of Aristotelianism, tempered more or less with Neo-Platonic conceptions. The medical and physical science of the Greeks and Greek philosophy became known to the Arabs especially under the rule of the *Abassidæ* (from A. D. 750 on), when medical, and afterward (from the time of the reign of *Almamun*, in the first half of the ninth century) philosophical works were translated from Greek into Syriac and Arabic by Syriac Christians. The tradition of Greek philosophy was associated with that combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism which prevailed among the last philosophers of antiquity, and with the study by Christian theologians of the Aristotelian logic as a formal organon of dogmatics; but in view of the rigid monotheism of the Mohammedan religion it was necessary that the Aristotelian metaphysics, and especially the Aristotelian theology, should be more fully adopted among the Arabs than among the Neo-Platonists and Christians, and that in consequence of the union among the former of philosophical with medical studies the works of Aristotle on natural science should be studied by them with especial zeal. Of the Arabian philosophers in the *East*, the most important were *Alkendi*, who was still more renowned as a mathematician and astrologer, *Alfarabi*, who adopted the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, *Avicenna*, the representative of a purer Aristotelianism and a man who for centuries, even among the Christian scholars of the later mediæval centuries, stood in the highest consideration as a philosopher and, still more, as a teacher of medicine, and finally *Algazel*, who maintained a philosophical skepticism in the interest of theological orthodoxy. The most important Arabian philosophers in the *West* were *Avempace* (*Ibn Badja*), *Abubacer* (*Ibn Tophail*), and *Averroës* (*Ibn Roschd*). *Avempace* and *Abubacer* dwell in their works on the idea of the independent and gradual development of man. *Abubacer* (in his "*Natural Man*") develops this idea in a spirit of opposition to positive religion, although he affirms that positive religion and philosophical doctrine pursue the same end, namely, the union of the human intellect with the divine. *Averroës*, the celebrated commentator of Aristotle, inter-

prets the doctrine of the latter respecting the active and the passive intellect in a sense which is nearly pantheistic and which excludes the idea of individual immortality. He admits the existence of only one active intellect, and affirms that this belongs in common to the whole human race, that it becomes temporarily particularized in individuals, but that each of its emanations becomes finally reabsorbed in the original whole, in which alone, therefore, they possess immortality.

The philosophy of the Arabs, and especially the Arabian translations of Aristotle, are treated of by Mohammed al Schahrastani (died A. D. 1158) in his History of religious and philosophical sects among the Arabs, written in Arabic and edited by W. Cureton, London, 1842-46—German translation by Haasbrück, Halle, 1850-51. On the same subject Abulfaragius (of the thirteenth century), *Ist. Dynast.* (Oxford, 1685), and other Arabian scholars have written, and also the following authors: Huetius, *De claris interpretibus*, Paris, 1681, p. 128 seq.; Renaudot, *De barbaricis Aristotelis versionibus*, apud Fabr., *Bibl. Gr.*, t. III, p. 201 seq., ed. Harless, cf. L., p. 861 seq.; Brucker, *Ist. Crit. Philoe.*, III, Leipzig, 1748, pp. 1-240 (Brucker follows particularly Moses Maimonides and the historian Pococke, but also copies many fables from the untrustworthy Leo Africanus); Reiske, *De principibus muhammedanis, qui aut ab eruditione aut ab amore litterarum et litterarum claruerunt*, Leipzig, 1747; Casiri, *Bibliotheca Arabico-hispana*, Madrid, 1760; Buhle, *Commentatio de studiis graecorum litterarum inter Arabes institutis et rationibus*, in the *Comm. reg. soc. Götting.*, t. XI, 1791, p. 216; *Proleg. edit. Arist. quam curavit Buhle*, t. I., Zweibrücken, 1791, p. 315 seq.; Camus, *Notices et extraits des manusc. de la bibl. nat.*, t. VI, p. 392; de Sacy, *Mém. sur l'origine de la littérature chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1805; Joa. von Hammer in the *Leips. Literaturzeitung*, 1812, 1814, 1820, 1824, and especially in Nos. 161-163, which contain a short history of Arabian metaphysics; A. Tholuck, *De vi, quam Graeco philosophia in theologiam tum Mohammedanorum, tum Judaeorum exercuerit*, part. I., Hamb. 1835; F. Wüstenfeld, *Die Akademien der Araber und ihre Lehrer*, Göttingen, 1837, *Gesch. der arab. Aerzte*, Göttingen, 1840; Aug. Schmölclers, *Docum. philos. Arab.*, Bonn, 1836, and *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1842 (where particularly the Motekallemia or philosophizing theologians and the philosopher Algazel are treated of); Flügel, *De arabicis scriptorum graeco. interpretibus*, Meissen, 1841; J. G. Wenrich, *De auctorum graecorum versionibus et commentariis syriacis, arabicis, armeniacis, persicisque*, Leipzig, 1842; Ravalsson, *Mém. sur la philos. d'Aristote chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1844 (in *Compt. rend. de l'acad.*, t. V.); Eitter, *Gesch. der Philos.*, VII, pp. 668-760 and VIII, pp. 1-178; Haureau, *Ph. Sc.*, I, pp. 802-890; v. Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. der arab. Literatur*, Vols. I-VII, Vienna, 1850-56; E. Renan, *De Philos. perip. apud Syros*, Paris, 1852, p. 51 seq.; S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, renfermant des extraits méthodiques de la source de vie de Salomon Ibn Gebirol, dit Avicebron, etc., des notices sur les principaux philosophes arabes et leurs doctrines, et une esquisse historique de la philosophie chez les juifs*, Paris, 1859; cf. his article on the Arabs, *Kemid Farabi, Gasali, Ibn-Badja, Ibn-Roschd, Ibn-Sina*, in the *Dictionnaire des sciences philos.*, Paris, 1844-52; Fr. Dieterici, *Der Streit zwischen Monach und Theer* (an Arabian poem of the tenth century), *Die Naturanschauung und Naturphil. der Araber im neunten Jahrhundert aus den Schriften der lausenen Brüder übersetzt*, Berlin, 1861, *Die (mathematische) Propädeutik der Araber*, Berlin, 1865, and *Die Logik und Psychologie der Araber im 10. Jahrh. nach Chr.*, Leipzig, 1863, and Heinr. Steiner, *Die Mystikitten oder Freidenker im Islam als Vorläufer der islamischen Dogmatiker und Philosophen, nebst kritischen Anm. zu Gassali's Munkid*, Leipzig, 1865. Cf. also E. H. Palmer, *Oriental Mysticism, a treatise on the Sufistic and Unitarian Theosophy of the Persians, compiled from native sources*, London, 1867; Leopold Dukes, *Philosophisches aus dem 10. Jahrh. bei den Mohammedanern und Juden*, Nakel, 1865; A. v. Kremer, *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam*, Leipzig, 1868.

Of Alkendi write Abulfaragius, in his *Ist. Dynast.*, IX; and, among the moderna, Leckemacher, Helmst., 1719; Brucker, *Ist. crit. philoe.*, III, Leipzig, 1748, pp. 68-69; Casiri, *Bibl. Arab.*, I, 332 seq.; Wüstenfeld, *Gesch. der arab. Aerzte und Naturforscher*, Göttingen, 1840, p. 21 seq.; Schmölclers, *Essai sur les écoles philos. chez les Arabes*, p. 181 seq.; Haureau, *Ph. Sc.*, I, p. 868 seq. (who also makes some citations in the passage referred to from the *Tractatus de erroribus philosophorum* (cf. the thirteenth century, still existing in MS.); G. Flügel, *Al-Kindi, genannt "der Philosoph der Araber," ein Vorbild seiner Zeit und seines Volkes*, Leipzig, 1857 (in the *Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, published by the German Oriental Society, Vol. I. No. 3), in which (pp. 20-86) the titles of the two hundred and sixty-

five works of Alkendi are enumerated as given in the *Fihrist*; and Munk, in the *Diet. des Sc. Ph.*, s. v. Kandi, and *Mélanges*, pp. 389-341.

On Alfarrabi, cf. among others Casiri, *Bibl. Arab.-Hisp.*, I. p. 190; Wüstenfeld, *Gesch. der arab. Aerzte und Naturf.*, p. 83 seq.; Schmölckers, *Docum. philos. Arab.*, p. 15 seq.; Munk, *Diet.*, s. v. Farabî, and *Mélanges*, pp. 341-382; two of his works were printed in Latin, at Paris, in 1688, viz: *De Scientiis* and *De Intellectu et Intellecto* (the latter published also with the works of Avicenna, Venice, 1495); in addition to these Schmölckers gives two others, *Abu Nasr Alfarrabi de rebus studio Aristotelicæ philosophiæ præmittendis commentatio* (pp. 17-23), and *Abu Nasr Alfarrabi fontes quaestionum* (pp. 43-56). A considerable number of citations from Alfarrabi are to be found in the works of Albertus Magnus and others. Moritz Steinschneider, *Alfarrabi*, Petersburg and Leipzig, 1869.

Several of the works of Avicenna were translated into Latin before the end of the twelfth century, the *Canones* of the Art of Medicine being translated by Gerhard of Cremona, while Dominicus Gundisalvi and Avendath the Jew translated his Commentaries on Aristotle's *De Anima*, *De Caelo*, *De Mundo*, *Auscultat. Phys.* and *Metaphys.*, and his *Analysis of the Organon* (Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques*, p. 116 seq.) His *Logic* was edited at Venice in 1498. His *Logic* (in part) and several other works, under the title, *Avicennas peripateticæ philosophiæ medicorum fœcilis opera in lucem redacta*, Venice, 1495; a short treatise on logic by Avicenna was published in a French translation by P. Vattier, at Paris, in 1658; a didactic poem, intended to convey elementary instruction and containing the main principles of logic, is included by Schmölckers in his *Docum. Philos. Arab.*, pp. 26-42. A German translation of Avicenna's poem, entitled "To the Soul," is given by v. Hammer-Purgstall in the Vienna *Zeitschrift für Kunst*, etc., 1833. His philosophy is discussed by Scharestani in his History of the relig. and phil. Sects, pp. 348-429 of the Arabian text, and 213-382 (Vol. II.) of Haarbrücker's German translation; on his logic see Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.* II. pp. 818-861, and B. Hanenberg, *Zur Erkenntnislehre von Ibn Sina und Albertus Magnus*, in the *Abh. der philos.-philol. cl. der k. bay. Akad. der Wiss.*, XI. 1, Munich, 1866, pp. 189-267.

A translation of Algazel's "*Makacid al-filaisfa*" was brought about near the middle of the twelfth century, by Dominicus Gundisalvi; it was edited with the title, *Logica et Philosophia Algazelis Arabica*, by Peter Lichtenstein of Cologne, Venice, 1506. The *Confessio fidei orthodoxorum Algazeliana* is given in Pococke's *Spec. Hist. Arab.*, p. 274 seq., cf. Brucker, *Hist. crit. philos.*, V., pp. 348 seq. 356 seq. The ethical treatise, entitled "*O Child*," has been published in Arabic and German by Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, Vienna, 1838; in his Introduction, von Hammer gives the particulars of the life of Algazel. Another ethical work, called "*The Scales of Actions*," translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Abraham ben Hasdai of Barcelona, has been published by Goldenthal under the title, *Compendium doctrinæ ethicæ*, Leipzig, 1839. Tholuck, in the above-cited work, *De F.*, etc., cites several theological dicta from a Berlin MS. of Algazel's *Liber quadraginta glaciatorum circa principia religionis*. The work entitled "*The Resurrection of the Religious Sciences*," is discussed by Hitzig in the *Zeitschr. d. d. morgenl. Ges.*, VII., 1853, pp. 173-186, and by Gosche (see below). Cf. Aug. Schmölckers, *Essai sur les écoles philos. chez les Arabes et notamment sur la doctrine d'Algazel*, Paris, 1842; Munk, *Dictionn. des sc. phil.*, s. v. Gassâl, and *Mélanges*, pp. 366-383, and E. Gosche, *Ueber Ghazzâl's Leben und Werke*, in *Abh. der Berliner Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1856, *phil.-hist. Cl.*, pp. 239-311; with reference to his logic see Prantl, II. pp. 361-373.

On Averroës, see Munk, *Mélanges de philos. juives et arabes*, pp. 383-410.

Abubacer's work: "*Uaji Ibn Jakdhan*," was early translated into Hebrew, and was published in Arabic with a Latin translation by Ed. Pococke, under the title, *Philosophus autodiductus eius epistola, in qua ostenditur quomodo ex inferiorum contemplatione ad superiorum notitiam mens ascendere possit*, Oxford, 1671 and 1700; it was translated from this Latin version into English by Ashwell and George Keith, a Quaker, from the Arabic original by Simon Ockley, into Dutch by other translators, and into German by Joh. Georg Pritius (Frankfort, 1726), and by J. G. Eichhorn (*Der Naturmensch.*, Berlin, 1758). Cf. on Abubacer, Ritter, *Gesch. der Ph.*, VIII. pp. 104-115, and Munk, *Mélanges*, pp. 410-418.

The works of Averroës were first printed in Latin in 1472, and afterwards very frequently, generally with the works of Aristotle. Of those who have written upon Averroës we name Lebrecht, in the *Magazin für die Litteratur des Auslandes*, 1842, No. 79 seq.; E. Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*, Paris, 1862, 2d ed., 1865, and Munk, *Diet.*, III. p. 157 seq., and *Mélanges*, pp. 418-458. On his logic, see Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, II. pp. 374-383, and M. Jos. Müller, *Philos. und Theol. des Averroës*, in the *Monumenta Saccularia*, published by the Royal Academy of Sciences of Bavaria, on the occasion of its 100th anniversary, March 23, 1869, Munich, 1859. A medical work by Averroës, on therapeutics, was published in Latin under the title "*Colliget*" (*Colligat, Generalitates*), in the tenth volume of the works of Aristotle, together with the Commentary of Averroës, Venice, 1552, etc. An astronomical work, containing a summary of the Ptolemaic Almagest, in which Averroës follows strictly the Ptolemaic system, is still existing in MS., and also in a Hebrew translation, in the Imperial Library at Paris; in other works he said, with Ibn Badja and Ibn Tophail, that the Ptolemaic computations were correct, but that the actual state of things did not correspond with the system of Ptolemy; the theory of epicycles and eccentricities was improbable, and he wished, since he was

then too old for such inquiries, that his words might incite others to further investigations (Averr. in *Arist. Metaph.*, XII. 8). And in fact, his somewhat younger contemporary, Abu Ishak al Bitroddi (Alpetragius, about 1300), the astronomer, and pupil of Ibn Tophail, in order to avoid the hypothesis of epicycles, excentricities, and the two contrary motions of the spheres, originated another theory, of which the fundamental idea was, that the slower motion from east to west was to be explained not by a supposed motion in the contrary direction, but from the diminished influence of the outermost moving sphere—an influence decreasing as the distance from it increased. The work of Alpetragius was translated by Michael Scotus into Latin in 1317; another Latin translation, made from another in Hebrew, appeared at Venice, in 1581. Cf. Munk, *ibid.*, pp. 518-522. But Averroës has become far more renowned in philosophy than in medicine and astronomy, especially through his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. For several of these works he did a three-fold service, by preparing, 1) short paraphrases, in which he reproduced the doctrines of Aristotle in strictly systematic order, omitting Aristotle's examinations of the opinions of other philosophers, but occasionally adding his own views and the theories of other Arabian philosophers, 2) commentaries of moderate extent, which he himself designates as *résumés*, and which are commonly termed the intermediate commentaries, 3) complete commentaries (of later date). The works of each kind relating to the *Analytica Posteriora*, the *Physica*, the *De Caelo*, *De Anima*, and *Metaphysica*, are still extant. (The Arabic original of the intermediate commentary on the *De Anima* exists, written in Hebrew characters, in the Library at Paris.) Of the works on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, the *Categ.*, *De Interpr.*, *Anal. Priora*, *Top.*, *De Soph. El.*, *Rhetor.*, *Poet.*, *De Gen. et Corr.*, and *Meteorolog.*, only the shorter commentaries and the paraphrases are in existence. For the *Nicom. Ethics* Averroës wrote only a shorter commentary. Only paraphrases of the *Pures Naturalis* and of the four books *De Partibus Animalium*, and of the five books *De Generatione Animalium*, are extant. There exists no commentary by Ibn Roschd on the ten *Libri Hist. Animalium*, nor on the *Politica*, of which, at least in Spain, no copies were at hand. The Greek originals of the Aristotelian writings were unknown to Ibn Roschd; he understood neither Greek nor Syriac; where the Arabic translations were unclear or incorrect, he could only attempt to infer the correct meaning from the connection of the Aristotelian doctrine. Besides his Commentaries, Ibn Roschd composed several philosophical treatises, of which the more important were, 1) *Tahafut al Tahafut*, i. e., *destructio destructionis*, a refutation of Algazel's refutation of the philosophers; a Hebrew translation of this work is extant in MS., from which again a (very bungling) Latin translation was made, published at Venice in 1497 and 1587, and in the Supplement to several old Latin editions of the works of Aristotle, together with the Commentaries of Averroës. 2) Investigations concerning diverse passages of the *Organon*, in Latin, with the title: *Quæstia in libros logicos Aristotelis*, printed in the same Latin editions of Aristotle; Prantl (*Gesch. der Log.*, II., p. 374) regards these *Quæstia*, as also an "*Epitome*" of the *Organon*, as spurious. 3) Physical treatises (on problems in the *Physica* of Aristotle), published in Latin in the editions mentioned. 4) Two treatises on the union of the pure (immaterial) intellect with man, or of the active intellect with the passive, in Latin, *ibid.*, with the titles: *Epistola de connectione intellectus abstracti cum homine* and *De animæ beatitudine*. 5) On the potentia or material intellect, extant only in a Hebrew translation. 6) Refutation of Ibn Sina's division of beings into beings absolutely accidental (sublunary), beings accidental as such but rendered necessary through an agency external to themselves (God), and the absolutely necessary being—in reply to which Averroës remarks, that the necessary product of a necessary cause can never be called accidental; the work exists in Hebrew among the MSS. of the Imperial Library at Paris. 7) On the agreement of religion with philosophy, in Hebrew, *ibid.* 8) On the true sense of religious dogmas or ways of demonstrating religious dogmas, in Hebrew, *ibid.*, in Arabic, in the Escurial. Some other treatises are lost.

Sprenger, in his work on the life and doctrine of "*Mohammad*" (I., Berlin, 1867, p. 17), designates as the cause of the rise of Mohammedanism among the Arabs, the felt need of a religion at once monotheistic and antitrinitarian; but a need, adds Sprenger, is always and necessarily followed by an attempt to satisfy it, which attempt is repeated until the end is attained. In contradistinction from ecclesiastical Christianity, Mohammedanism can be regarded as the result of the late but all the more energetic reaction of Subordinationism, which, since the Council of Nicea, had been suppressed by violence rather than spiritually overcome, and from the stand-point of which the Trinitarian faith necessarily appeared as a concealed tritheism. An edict such as that of the Emperor Theodosius of the year 380, which threatened all who were not Catholics, and who were denominated as "inordinate madmen," with temporal and eternal punishments, might indeed fortify Catholicism externally, but could not strengthen it internally; on the contrary, it could only foster a languid and prescriptive faith, which continued only in controversies concerning dogmatic

subtleties to manifest a certain vitality, but was unable to resist a violent shock from without.

Ebionitic Christians had still continued, even after the triumph of Catholicism, to maintain their existence, particularly in the Nabathæan wilderness. They were divided into several sects, of which some retained rather the features of Judaism, while others possessed those of Orthodox Christianity. In the time of Mohammed there existed two of these sects in Arabia, the Rakusii and the Hanifs (Sprenger, I. 43 seq.). To the first belonged (according to Sprenger's conjecture) Kosa, who preached at Mecca the unity of God and the resurrection of the dead, and for this purpose also visited the fair at Okatz, where Mohammed heard him. The Hanifs were (according to Sprenger, *ib.*) Essenes, who had lost nearly all knowledge of the Bible and had submitted to various foreign influences, but professed a rigid monotheism. Their religious book was called "*Roll of Abraham*." In the time of Mohammed several members of this sect were living in Mecca and Medina, and Mohammed himself, who originally had worshiped the gods of his people, became a Hanif. The doctrine of the Hanifs was Islam, i. e., submission to the one God; they were themselves Moslim, i. e., men characterized by such submission. Very considerable was the direct influence exerted by Judaism on Mohammed (cf. Abraham Geiger, *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthum aufgenommen?* Bonn, 1833). The name Mohammed seems to have been an official designation assumed by the founder of the new religion; according to an old tradition he was originally called Kotham, and afterward also Abul Kasim (father of Kasim) after his eldest son; he, however, said of himself that he was the Mohammad, i. e., the extolled, the Messiah announced by the Torah, but that in the Gospel his name was Ahmad, i. e., the Paraclete (see Sprenger, I. p. 155 seq.); Abraham had called him and the Son of Mary had foretold his coming (*ib.*, p. 166).

In Mohammed himself and in his followers, the abstract idea of the one infinitely exalted being, to whom alone worship was due, led to the enthusiasm of a quickly-blazing fanaticism. This fanaticism pitilessly annihilated all resistance, but its subjects were unable to appreciate in their full significance and to cultivate the many influences and forces of actual human life; they failed to recognize the immanence of the divine in the finite; they lacked the power to bring the sensual nature of man under that discipline which would make it ancillary to morality, and were obliged therefore either to govern it despotically or to leave it under the unchecked influence of passion, while no alternative was left to the rational spirit but the mechanical subjection of an unreflecting and fatalistic faith to the will of Allah and to the revelation of himself as made through the Prophet. By a doctrine which was the direct opposite of the Christian doctrine of peace, and which called on men to fight for the glory of God, and by a course of action which received from this doctrine its religious sanction, extremely important results were attained in the beginning; but soon the period of stability commenced and the period of relaxation and degeneracy quickly followed.

It is reported that, in the year 640, what remained (said to be 50,120 volumes) of the Alexandrian Library, after its destruction in 392 by Christians under Bishop Theophilus, was burned by Amru, the General of the Caliph Omar, as a means of raising the Koran to a position of exclusive authority (Abulfarag., *Hist. Dyn.*, p. 116). Be this a mere legend or an historical fact, it cannot be denied that the Mohammedan doctrine of Islam was completely antagonistic to the Old-Hellenic conception of life, as represented in the principal works of that collection. It was of necessity more hostile than Christianity to Greek paganism. Among the Grecian philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, although (especially in his ethics, which rested on the Hellenic principle of freedom and order) differing essentially in spirit from the doctrines of Mohammedanism, contained many points of agreement with

these doctrines. His doctrine of the personal unity of God made his metaphysics more acceptable to the Mohammedans than to the Fathers of the Christian Church. His physics was a source of information in a field of inquiry scarcely touched on in the Koran, and could not but be welcome as furnishing a scientific basis for the healing art. His logic could be of service as an instrument (*organon*) of method in every science, and especially in every theology which aspired to a scientific form. Thus Aristotelianism gradually found entrance among the Mohammedans, notwithstanding that the Koran forbade all free investigation concerning religious doctrines, and consoled those who doubted only with the hope of a solution of their doubts at the judgment-day. Still, foreign philosophy remained always confined to a narrow circle of inquirers. The rationalistic *Mutazilîn*, the orthodox *Ascharites*, etc., were *theological* dogmatists (*Motekallemîn*, Hebrew *Medabberim*, i. e., *Teachers of the Word*, in distinction from the teachers of the *Fikâh*, i. e., the traditional law).

The acquaintance of the Mohammedan Arabs with the writings of Aristotle was brought about through the agency of Syrian Christians. Before the time of Mohammed many Nestorian Syrians lived among the Arabs as physicians. Mohammed also had intercourse with Nestorian monks. Hareth Ibn Calda, the friend and physician of the prophet, was a Nestorian. It was not, however, until after the extension of the Mohammedan rule over Syria and Persia, and chiefly after the Abassidæ had commenced to reign (A. D. 750), that foreign learning, especially in medicine and philosophy, became generally known among the Arabs. Philosophy had already been cultivated in those countries during the last days of Neo-Platonism, by David the Armenian (about 500 A. D., see above, p. 259; his *Proleg. to Philos.* and to the *Isagoge* and his commentary on the *Categ.*, in Brandis' collection of Scholia to Arist.; his Works, Venice, 1823; on him, cf. C. F. Neumann, Paris, 1829) and afterward by the Syrians especially. Christian Syrians translated Greek authors, particularly medical, but afterward philosophical authors also, first into Syriac and then from Syriac into Arabic (or they perhaps made use also of earlier Syriac translations, some of which are to-day extant). During the reign and at the instance of Almamun (A. D. 813-833) the first translations of works of Aristotle into Arabic were made, under the direction of Johannes Ibn-al-Batrik (i. e., the Son of the Patriarch, who, according to Renaud [I. L, p. 57], is to be distinguished from Johannes Mesue, the physician); these translations, in part still extant, were regarded (according to Abulfaragius, *Histor. Dynast.*, p. 153 *et al.*) as faithful but inelegant. A man more worthy of mention is Honein Ibn Ishak (Johannitius), a Nestorian, who flourished under Motewakkel and died in 876. Acquainted with the Syriac, Arabic, and Greek languages, he was at the head of a school of interpreters at Bagdad, to which his son Ishak ben Honein and his nephew Hobeisch-el-Asam also belonged. The works not only of Aristotle himself, but also of several ancient Aristotelians (Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Themistius, and also Neo-Platonic exegetes, such as Porphyry and Ammonius), and of Galenus and others, were translated into (Syriac and) Arabic. Of these translations, also, some of those in Arabic are still existing, but the Syriac translations are all lost. (Honein's Arabic translation of the *Categories* has been edited by Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leips. 1846.) In the tenth century new translations, not only of the works of Aristotle, but also of those of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Syrianus, Ammonius, etc., were produced by Syrian Christians, of whom the most important were the Nestorians Abu Baschar Mata and Jahja ben Adi, the Tagritan, as also Isa ben Zana. The Syriac translations (or revisions of earlier translations) by these men have been lost, but the Arabic translations were widely circulated and have in large measure been preserved; they were used by Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroës, and the other Arabian philosophers. The *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Laws* of Plato were also translated into Arabic. Averroës (in Spain, about 1150) possessed and paraphrased the *Rep.*

but he did not possess the *Politics* of Aristotle; the book existing in MS. at Paris, entitled *Siaseset, i. e., Politica*, is the spurious work *De Regimine Principum s. Secretum Secretorum*; the *Politics* of Aristotle is not known to exist in Arabic. Further, extracts from the Neo-Platonists, especially from Proclus, were translated into Arabic. The Syrians were led, especially in consequence of their contact with the Arabs, to extend their studies beyond the *Organon*; they began to cultivate in the Arabic language all the branches of philosophy on the basis of Aristotle's works, and in this they were afterward followed by the Arabs themselves, who soon surpassed their Syrian teachers. Alfarabi and Avicenna were the scholars of Syrian and Christian physicians. The later Syrian philosophy bears the type of the Arabian philosophy. The most important representative of the former was Gregorius Barhebraeus or Abulfaragius, the Jacobite, who lived in the thirteenth century and was descended from Jewish parents, and whose compendium of the Peripatetic philosophy (*Butyrum Sapientiae*) is still of great authority among the Syrians.

Alkendi (Abu Jusuf Jacob Ibn Eshak Al Kendi, i. e., the father of Joseph, Jacob, son of Isaac, the Kendean, of the district of Kendah) was born at Basra on the Persian Gulf, where later, in the tenth century, the "Brothers of Purity," or the "Sincere Brethren," who collected in an Encyclopedia the learning then accessible to the Arabians, were located. He lived during and after the first half of the ninth century, dying about 870. He was renowned as a mathematician, astrologer, physician, and philosopher. He composed commentaries on the logical writings of Aristotle and wrote also on metaphysical problems. In theology he was a rationalist. His astrology was founded on the hypothesis that all things are so bound together by harmonious causal relations that each, when completely conceived, must represent as in a mirror the whole universe.

Alfarabi (Abn Nasr Mohammed ben Mohammed ben Tarkhan of Farab), born near the end of the ninth century, received his philosophical training mainly at Bagdad, where he also began to teach. Attached to the mystical sect of the Sûf, which Said Abul Chair had founded about A. D. 820 (under the unmistakable influence of Buddhism, although Tholuck [*"Soufismus,"* Berlin, 1821, and *"Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländ. Mystik,"* Berlin, 1825] assigns to it a purely Mohammedan origin), Alfarabi went at a later epoch to Aleppo and Damascus, where he died A. D. 950. In logic Alfarabi follows Aristotle almost without exception. Whether logic is to be regarded as a part of philosophy or not, depends, according to Alfarabi, on the greater or less extension given to the conception of philosophy, and is therefore a useless question. Argumentation is the instrument by which to develop the unknown from the known; it is employed by the *utens logicus*; *logica docens* is the theory which relates to this instrument, argumentation, or which treats of it as its subject (*subjectum*). Yet logic also treats of single concepts (*incomplexa*) as elements of judgments and argumentations (according to Alfarabi, as reported by Albertus M., *De Praedicabil.*, I. 2 seq., cf. Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, II., p. 302 seq.). Alfarabi defines the universal (see Alb. M., *De Praed.*, II. 5) as the *unum de multis et in multis*, which definition is followed immediately by the inference that the universal has no existence apart from the individual (*non habet esse separatum a multis*). It is worthy of notice that Alfarabi does not admit in its absolute sense the aphorism: *singulare sentitur, universale intelligitur*, but teaches that the singular, although in its material aspect an object of sensible perception, exists in its formal aspect in the intellect, and, on the other hand, that the universal, although as such belonging to the intellect, exists also *in sensu*, in so far as it exists blended with the individual (Alb., *An. post.*, I. 1. 3). Among the contents of the Metaphysics of Alfarabi, mention should be made of his proof of the existence of God, which was employed by Albertus Magnus and later philosophers. This proof is founded on Plat., *Tim.*, p. 28: τὸ γενομένον φαμέν ἵνα' αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνάγκη εἶναι γενέσθαι, and Arist.,

Metaph., XII. 7: *ἐστὶ τοῖσιν τι καὶ ὁ κίνησις*, etc., or on the principle that all change and development must have a cause. Alfarabi distinguishes (*Fontes Quæstionum*, ch. 3 seq., & Schmolders *Doc. Phil. Ar.*, p. 44) between that which has a possible and that which has a necessary existence (just as Plato and Aristotle distinguish between the changeable and the eternal). If the possible is to exist in reality, a cause is necessary thereto. The world is composite, hence it had a beginning or was caused (ch. 2). But the series of causes and effects can neither recede *in infinitum*, nor return like a circle into itself; it must, therefore, depend upon some necessary link, and this link is the first being (*ens primum*). This first being exists necessarily; the supposition of its non-existence involves a contradiction. It is uncaused, and needs in order to its existence no cause external to itself. It is the cause of all that exists. Its eternity implies its perfection. It is free from all accidents. It is simple and unchangeable. As the absolutely Good it is at once absolute thought, absolute object of thought and absolute thinking being (*intelligentia, intelligibile, intelligens*). It has wisdom, life, insight, might and will, beauty, excellence, brightness; it enjoys the highest happiness, is the first willing being and the first object of will (desire). In the knowledge of this being Alfarabi (*De rebus studio Arist. phil. præmitt. comm.*, ch. 4, & Schmolders, *Doc. ph. Arab.*, p. 22) sees the end of philosophy, and he defines the practical duty of man as consisting in rising, so far as human force permits it, into likeness with God. In his teachings respecting that which is caused by or derived from God (*Fontes Quæst.*, ch. 6 seq.) Alfarabi follows the Neo-Platonists. His fundamental conception is expressed by the word *emanation*. The first created thing was the Intellect, which came forth from the first being (the *Νοῦς* of Plotinus; this doctrine was logically consistent only for Plotinus, not for Alfarabi, since the former represented his One as superior to all predicates, while Alfarabi, in agreement with Aristotle and with religious dogmatics, recognized in his first being intelligence). From this intellect flowed forth, as a new emanation, the Cosmical Soul, in the complication and combination of whose ideas the basis of corporeality is to be found. Emanation proceeds from the higher or outer spheres to the lower or inner ones. In bodies matter and form are necessarily combined with each other. Terrestrial bodies are composed of the four elements. The lower psychical powers, up to the potential intellect, are dependent on matter. The potential intellect, through the operation (in-beaming) of the active divine intellect, is made actual (*intellectus in actu* or *in effectus*), and this actual intellect, as resulting from development, may be called acquired intellect (*intellectus acquisitus*, after the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias, concerning the *νοῦς ἐνέκρυτος*, see above, p. 185). The actual human intellect is free from matter, and is a simple substance, which alone survives the death of the body and remains indestructible. Evil is a necessary condition of good in a finite world. All things are under divine guidance and are good, since all was created by God. Between the human understanding and the things which it seeks to know there exists (as Alfarabi teaches, *De Intellecto et Intellectu*, p. 48 seq.) a similarity of form, which arises from their having both been formed by the same first being, and which makes knowledge possible.

Avicenna (Abu Ali Al Hosain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina) was born at Afsenna, in the Province of Bokhara, in the year 980. His mind was early developed by the study of theology, philosophy, and medicine, and in his youth he had already written a scientific encyclopedia. He taught medicine and philosophy in Ispahan. He died at Hamadan in the fifty-eighth year of his life. His medical *Canon* was employed for centuries as the basis of instruction. In philosophy he set out from the doctrines of Alfarabi, but modified them by omitting many Neo-Platonic theorems and approximating more nearly to the real doctrine of Aristotle. The principle on which his logic was founded, and which Averroës adopted and Albertus Magnus often cites, was destined to exert a great

Influence. It was worded thus: *intellectus in formis agit universalitatem* (Alb., *De Praedicationibus*, II. 3 and 6). The genus, as also the species, the differentia, the accident, and the proprium, are in themselves neither universal nor singular. But the thinking mind, by comparing the similar forms, forms the *genus logicum*, which answers to the definition of the genus, viz.: that it is predicated of many objects specifically different, and answers the question, "What is it?" (tells the *quidditas*). It is the *genus naturale* which furnishes the basis of comparison. When the mind adds to the generic and specific the individual accidents, the singular is formed (Avic., *Log.*, Venice edition, 1508, f. 12, ap. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, II. 347 seq.). Only figuratively, according to Avicenna, can the genus be called matter and the specific difference, form; such phraseology (frequent in Aristotle) is not strictly correct. Avicenna distinguishes several modes of generic existence, viz.: *ante res*, *in rebus*, and *post res*. Genera are *ante res* in the mind of God; for all that exists is related to God as a work of art is related to the artist; it existed in his wisdom and will before its entrance into the natural world of manifold existence; in this sense and only in this sense is the universal before the individual. Realized with its accidents in matter the genus constitutes the natural thing, *res naturalis*, in which the universal essence is immanent. The third mode of the existence of the genus is that which it has in being conceived by the human intellect; when the latter abstracts the form and then compares it again with the individual objects to which by one and the same definition it belongs, in this comparison (*respectus*) is contained the universal (Avec., *Log.*, f. 12, *Metaph.*, V. 1, 2, f. 87, in Prantl, II. p. 349). Our thought, which is directed to things, contains nevertheless dispositions which are peculiar to itself; when things are thought, there is added in thought something which does not exist outside of thought. Thus universality as such, the generic concept and the specific difference, the subject and predicate and other similar elements, belong only to thought. Now it is possible to direct the attention, not merely to things, but also to the dispositions which are peculiar to thought, and this takes place in logic (*Metaph.*, I. 2; III. 10, in Prantl, II. p. 320 seq.). On this is based the distinction of "first" and "second intentions." The direction of attention to things is the first intention (*intentio prima*); the second intention (*intentio secunda*) is directed to the dispositions which are peculiar to our thinking concerning things. Since the universal as such belongs not to things, but to thought, it belongs to the second intention. The principle of individual plurality, according to Avicenna, is matter, which he regards, not with Alfarabi as an emanation from the Cosmical Soul, but with Aristotle as eternal and uncreated; all potentiality is grounded in it, as actuality is in God. Nothing changeable can come forth directly from the unchangeable first cause. His first and only direct product is the *intelligentia prima* (the *voûc* of Plotinus, as with Alfarabi); from it the chain of emanations extends through the various celestial spheres down to our earth. But the issuing of the lower from the higher is to be conceived, not as a single, temporal act, but as an eternal act, in which cause and effect are synchronous. The cause which gave to things their existence must continually maintain them in existence; it is an error to imagine that things once brought into existence continue therein of themselves. Notwithstanding its dependence on God, the world has existed from eternity. Time and motion always were (Avic., *Metaph.*, VI. 2 *et al.*; cf. the account in the *Tractatus de Erroribus*, ap. Hauréau, *Ph. Sc.*, I. p. 368). Avicenna distinguishes a twofold development of our potential understanding into actuality, the one common, depending on instruction, the other rare, and dependent on immediate divine illumination. According to a report transmitted to us by Averroës, Avicenna, in his *Philosophia Orientalis*, which has not come down to us, contradicted his Aristotelian principles, and conceived God as a heavenly body.

Algazel (Abu Hamed Mohammed Ibn Ahmed Al-Ghazzali), born A. D. 1059 at Ghaz-

zâlah in Khorasan, taught first at Bagdad, and afterward, having become a Sôfi, resided in Syria. He died A. D. 1111 at Tus. He was a skeptic in philosophy, but only that his faith might be all the stronger in the doctrines of theology. His course in this respect marked a reaction of the exclusively religious principle of Mohammedanism against philosophical speculation—which in spite of all accommodation had not made itself fully orthodox—and particularly against Aristotelianism; between the Mysticism of the Neo-Platonists, on the contrary, and the Sôfism of Algazel there existed an essential affinity. In his "*Makacid al filasifa*" (The Aims of the Philosophers) Algazel sets forth the doctrines of philosophy, following essentially Alfarabi and particularly Avicenna. These doctrines are then subjected by him to a hostile criticism in his "*Tthafot al filasifa*" (Against the Philosophers), while in his "*Fundamental Principles of Faith*" he presents positively his own views. Averroës wrote by way of rejoinder his *Destructio Destructionis Philosophorum*. Algazel exerted himself especially to excite a fear of the chastisements of God, since in his opinion the men of his times were living in too great assurance. Against the philosophers he defended particularly the religious dogmas of the creation of the world in time and out of nothing, the reality of the divine attributes and the resurrection of the body, as also the power of God to work miracles, in opposition to the supposed law of cause and effect. In the Middle Ages his exposition of logic, metaphysics, and physics, as given in the *Makacid*, was much read.

The result of the skepticism of Algazel was in the East the triumph of an unphilosophical orthodoxy; after him there arose in that quarter no philosophers worthy of mention. On the other hand, the Arabian philosophy began to flourish in Spain, where a succession of thinkers cultivated its various branches.

Avempace (Abu Bekr Mohammed ben Jahja Ibn Badja), born at Saragossa near the end of the eleventh century, was celebrated as a physician, mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher. About 1118 he wrote, at Seville, a number of logical treatises. At a later period he lived in Granada, and afterward also in Africa. He died at a not very advanced age in 1138, without having completed any extensive works; yet he wrote several smaller (mostly lost) treatises, among which, according to Munk (*Mélanges*, p. 336), were *Logical Tractates* (still existing, according to Casiri, *Biblioth. Arabico-Hisp. Escorialensis*, I. p. 179, in the library of the Escorial), a work on the soul, another on the conduct of the solitary (*régime du solitaire*), also on the union of the universal intellect with man, and a farewell letter; to these may be added commentaries on the *Physics*, *Meteorology*, and other works of Aristotle relating to physical science. Munk gives the substance of the "*Conduct of the Solitary*," as reported by a Jewish philosopher of the fourteenth century, Moses of Narbonne (*Mél.*, pp. 389–409). This work treats of the degrees by which the soul rises from that instinctive life which it shares with the lower animals, through gradual emancipation from materiality and potentiality to the acquired intellect (*intellectus acquisitus*), which is an emanation from the active intellect or Deity. Avempace seems (according to Averroës, *De Anima*, fol. 168 A) to have identified the *intellectus materialis* with the imaginative faculty. In the highest grade of knowledge (in self-consciousness) thought is identical with its object.

Abubacer (Abu Bekr Mohammed ben Abd al Malic Ibn Tophail al Keisi) was born in about the year 1100, at Wadi-Asch (Guadix), in Andalusia, and died in 1185, in Morocco. He was celebrated as a physician, mathematician, philosopher, and poet, and pursued still further the path of speculation opened up by Ibn Badja. His chief work, that has come down to us, is entitled *Haji Ibn Jakdhan, i. e.*, the Living One, the Son of the Waking One. The fundamental idea is the same as in Ibn Badja's "*Conduct of the Solitary*;" it is an exposition of the gradual development of the capacities of man to the point where his

intellect becomes one with the divine. But Ibn Tophail goes considerably farther than his predecessor in maintaining the independence of man in opposition to the institutions and opinions of human society. In his theory he represents the individual as developing himself without external aid. That independence of thought and will, which man now owes to the whole course of the previous history of the human race, is regarded by him as existing in the natural man, out of whom he makes an extra-historical ideal (like Rousseau in the eighteenth century). Ibn Tophail regards positive religion, with its law founded on reward and punishment, as only a necessary means of discipline for the multitude; religious conceptions are in his view only types or envelopes of that truth to the logical comprehension of which the philosopher gradually approaches.

Averroës (Abul Walid Mohammed Ibn Achmed Ibn Roschd), born A. D. 1126, at Cordova, where his grandfather and father filled high judicial offices, studied first positive theology and jurisprudence, and then medicine, mathematics, and philosophy. He obtained subsequently the office of judge at Seville, and afterward at Cordova. He was a junior contemporary and friend of Ibn Tophail, who presented him to Calif Abu Jacub Jusuf soon after the latter's ascent of the throne (1163), and recommended him in place of himself, for the work of preparing an analysis of the works of Aristotle. Ibn Roschd won the favor of this prince, who was quite familiar with the problems of philosophy, and, at a later epoch, he became his physician in ordinary (1182). For a time he was in favor also with the son of this prince, Jacub Almansur, who succeeded to his father's rule in 1184, and he was still honored by him in 1195. But soon after this date he was accused of cultivating the philosophy and science of antiquity to the prejudice of the Mohammedan religion, and was robbed by Almansur of his dignities and banished to Elisana (Lucena) near Cordova; he was afterward tolerated in Morocco. A strict prohibition was issued against the study of Greek philosophy, and whatever works on logic and metaphysics were discovered, were delivered to the flames. Averroës died in 1198, in his seventy-third year. Soon afterward the rule of the Moors in Spain came to an end. The Arabian philosophy was extinguished, and liberal culture sunk under the exclusive rule of the Koran and of dogmatics.

Averroës shows for Aristotle the most unconditional reverence, going in this respect much farther than Avicenna; he considers him, as the founders of religions are wont to be considered, as the man whom alone, among all men, God permitted to reach the highest summit of perfection. Aristotle was, in his opinion, the founder and perfecter of scientific knowledge. In logic, Averroës everywhere limits himself to merely annotating Aristotle. The principle of Avicenna: *intellectus in formis agit universalitatem*, is also his (Averr., *De An.*, I. 8; cf. Alb. M., *De Praedicab.*, II. ch. 6). Science treats not of universal things, but of individuals under their universal aspect, which the understanding recognizes after making abstraction of their common nature (*Destr. destr.*, fol. 17: *scientia autem non est scientia rei universalis, sed est scientia particularium modo universali, quem facit intellectus in particularibus, quum abstrahit ab iis naturam unam communem, quae divisa est in materiis*). The forms, which are developed through the influence of higher forms, and, in the last resort, through the influence of the Deity, are contained embryonically in matter. The most noticeable thing in his psychology is the explanation which he gives of the Aristotelian distinction between the active and the passive intellect (*νοῦς παθητικός* and *ποιητικός*). Thomas Aquinas, who opposes the explanation, gives it in these words: *intellectum substantiam esse omnino ab anima separatam, eaque unum in omnibus hominibus;—nec Deum facere posse quod sint plures intellectus*; but, he says, Averroës added: *per rationem concludo de necessitate quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem*. In his commentary to the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*, Averroës compares the relation of the active reason

to man with that of the sun to vision; as the sun, by its light, brings about the act of seeing, so the active reason enables us to know; hereby the rational capacity in man is developed into actual reason, which is one with the active reason. Averroës attempts to reconcile two opinions, the one of which he ascribes to Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the other to Themistius and the other Commentators. Alexander, he says, had held the passive intellect (*νοῦς παθητικός*) to be a mere "disposition" connected with the animal faculties, and, in order that it might be able perfectly to receive all forms, absolutely formless; this disposition was in us, but the active intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), which was the cause of its development or of its becoming receptive intellect (*νοῦς ἐπίκτητος*), was without us; after our death our individual intellects no longer existed. Themistius, on the contrary, and the other Commentators, had regarded the passive intellect not as a mere disposition connected with the lower psychical powers, but as inhering in the same substratum to which the active intellect belonged; this substratum, according to them, was distinct from those animal powers of the soul which depend on material organs, and as it was immaterial, immortality was to be predicated of the individual intellect inhering in it. Averroës, on the other hand, held that the passive intellect (*νοῦς παθητικός*) was, indeed, more than a mere disposition, and assumed (with Themistius and most of the other Commentators, except Alexander) that the same substance was passive and active intellect (namely, the former, in so far as it received forms, the latter, in so far as it constructed forms); but he denied that the same substance in itself and in its individual existence was both passive and active, assuming (with Alexander) that there existed only one active intellect in the world, and that man had only the "disposition" in virtue of which he could be affected by the active intellect; when the active intellect came in contact with this disposition there arose in us the passive or material intellect, the one active intellect becoming on its entrance into the plurality of souls particularized in them, just as light is decomposed into the different colors in bodies; the passive intellect was (according to Munk's translation): "*une chose composée de la disposition qui existe en nous et d'un intellect qui se joint à cette disposition, et qui, en tant qu'il y est joint, est un intellect prédisposé (à puissance) et non pas un intellect en acte, mais qui est intellect en acte en tant qu'il n'est plus joint à la disposition*" (from the *Commentaire moyen sur le traité de l'Âme*, in Munk's *Mé.*, p. 447); the active intellect worked first upon the passive, so as to develop it into actual and acquired intellect, and then on this latter, which it absorbed into itself, so that after our death it could be said that our *νοῦς*, mind, continued to exist—though not as an individual substance, but only as an element of the universal mind. But Averroës did not identify this universal mind (as Alexander of Aphrodisias identified the *νοῦς ποιητικός*) with the Deity himself, but conceived it (following in this the earlier Arabian commentators and indirectly the Neo-Platonists) as an emanation from the Deity, and as the mover of the lowest of the celestial circles, i. e., the sphere of the moon. This doctrine was developed by Averroës particularly in his commentaries on the *De An.*, whereas, in the *Paraphrase* (written earlier) he had expressed himself in a more individualistic sense (Averr., ap. Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 442 seq.). The psychological teaching of Averroës resembled, therefore, in the character of its definitions, that of Themistius, but in its real content that of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, since both Averroës and Alexander limited the individual existence of the human intellect (*νοῦς*) to the period preceding death, and recognized the eternity only of the one universal active intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*). For this reason the doctrines of the Alexandrists and of the Averroists were both condemned by the Catholic Church (cf. Vol. II. § 3).

Averroës professed himself in no sense hostile to religion, least of all to Mohammedanism, which he regarded as the most perfect of all religions. He demanded of the philos-

pher a grateful adherence to the religion of his people, the religion in which he was educated. But by this "adherence" he meant only a skillful accommodation of his views and life to the requirements of positive religion—a course which could not but fail to satisfy the real defenders of the religious principle. Averroës considered religion as containing philosophical truth under the veil of figurative representation; by allegorical interpretation one might advance to purer knowledge, while the masses held to the literal sense. The highest grade of intelligence was philosophical knowledge; the peculiar religion of the philosopher consisted in the deepening of his knowledge; for man could offer to God no worthier cultus than that of the knowledge of his works, through which we attain to the knowledge of God himself in the fullness of his essence (Averroës in the larger Commentary to the *Metaph.*, ap. Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 455 seq.).

§ 97. The philosophy of the Jews in the Middle Ages was partly the Cabala and partly the transformed doctrine of Plato and Aristotle. The Cabala, a secret philosophy of emanations, is contained in two works entitled *Jezirah* (Creation) and *Sohar* (Brightness). The former was in the tenth century already regarded as a very ancient book, but it was probably composed after the middle of the ninth century. The doctrine of the *Sohar* was built up, after the commencement of the thirteenth century, on the basis of earlier ideas, by Isaac the Blind and his pupils Ezra and Azriel, and other Anti-Maimunists. It was committed to writing in about the year 1300 by a Spanish Jew, most probably by Moseh ben Schem Tob de Leon. It was subsequently increased by additions and made the subject of commentaries. Tradition ascribes the *Jezirah* now to Abraham, the father of the Jewish race, and now to Rabbi Akiba (who was executed in consequence of his participation in the insurrection of Bar-cochba—about 135 A. D.—whom he had announced as the Messiah, and of his violation of the edict issued after the suppression of the revolt, forbidding him to teach), and the *Sohar* to Simeon Ben Jochai, the pupil of the latter. Some of the fundamental Cabalistic doctrines are indeed old, but in the course of their development they were considerably modified under the influence of Greek and particularly of Platonic conceptions—an influence exerted, perhaps, first through the medium of the Jewish-Alexandrian religious philosophy, and afterward through Neo-Platonic writings. Contact with foreign types of culture—first and especially with Parseeism, then with Hellenism and the Roman world, and afterward also with Christianity and Mohammedanism—widened the view of the Jewish people and led by degrees to a more and more complete removal of the national limits in its theological belief. But in proportion as its conception of the world became more broad and complete, its conception of

God became more transcendent: Jehovah was conceived as more spiritual, higher, farther removed from the individual, and, finally, as exalted above space and time, and his active relation to the world was regarded as depending on the agency of beings intermediate between God and the world. Thus the Persian doctrine of angels first found entrance among the Jews, being especially cultivated by the Essenes. Then arose, particularly at Alexandria under the co-operating influence of Greek philosophy, the doctrine of the divine attributes and energies, which appears in its most developed form, blended with the Platonic theory of ideas and the Stoic Logos-doctrine, in Philo's writings, and which, as a doctrine of the Logos and of the Æons, found its way into the system of the Christian faith and into the Christian Gnosis. The secret doctrine of the Rabbis in the first Christian centuries was founded chiefly on the allegorical interpretation of two passages in the Bible, viz.: the history of creation, in the book of Genesis, and the vision of the chariot of God (the *Mer-kaba*), in the prophecy of Ezekiel. In the later, more developed Gnosis of the Cabala, the origin of the world in God was represented in the form of a gradually descending series of emanations of the lower from the higher.—Of the theologians who philosophized on the basis of human reason, the earliest belonged to the sect of the Karaites or Karaites (who rejected the Talmud; the sect was founded about A. D. 761, by Anan ben David). The most notable among these was David ben Merwan al Mokammez (about 900). More worthy of mention is the Rabbinist Saadja ben Joseph al Fajjumi (892-942), the rationalistic defender of the Talmud and opponent of the Karaites, who undertook to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Mosaic and post-Mosaic articles of Jewish faith. Solomon Ibn Gebirol, who lived about 1050 in Spain, is the representative of a class of Jewish thinkers who wrote under the influence of the Neo-Platonic philosophy. Solomon Ibn Gebirol was regarded by the Christian Scholastics as an Arabian philosopher, and he was cited by them under the name of Avicbron. His doctrines exerted a material influence on the later development of the Cabala as contained in the *Sohar*. Near the end of the eleventh century Bahja ben Joseph composed an ethical work on the duties of the heart, in which more stress was laid on internal morality than on mere legality. A direct reaction against philosophy was encouraged by the poet Juda ha-Levi (about 1140) in his book entitled *Khosari*. In this book the author represents, first, Greek

philosophy, and then Christian and Mohammedan theology, as vanquished by the doctrines of Judaism, and develops the grounds on which the Rabbinic Judaism was founded; he lauds the secret doctrine of the *Jezirah*, which book he ascribes to the patriarch Abraham. A reconciliation of Jewish theology with Aristotelian philosophy was attempted about the middle of the twelfth century by Abraham ben David of Toledo; soon after him the solution of the same problem was undertaken with far greater success by the most celebrated of the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, Moses ben Maimon (Moses Maimonides, 1135-1204). In his "*Guide of the Doubting*," Maimonides ascribed to Aristotle unconditional authority in the science of sublunary things, but limited it in the science of heavenly and divine things by asserting the greater authority of revelation. By giving prominence to the spiritual and moral ideas of Judaism, he exerted on all Jewish theology (even that of the Karaites, as seen, notably, in the doctrine of Ahron ben Elia in the fourteenth century) a salutary and, in spite of violent reactions, a permanent influence. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the philosophy of the Arabian Aristotelians, being proscribed by the Mohammedan rulers, found an asylum among the Jews in Spain and France, especially in Provence, their writings being translated from Arabic into Hebrew, and, in some cases, made the subject of new commentaries. As a commentator of the Paraphrases and Commentaries of Averroës, and also as the author of independent works, Levi ben Gerson is especially distinguished; his writings fall in the first half of the fourteenth century. Through the agency of Jews, Arabic translations of (genuine and spurious) works of Aristotle and Aristotelians were made into Latin. In this way the entire Aristotelian philosophy was first brought to the knowledge of the Scholastics, who were thus inspired soon afterward to procure for themselves other translations of the works of Aristotle, which were founded immediately on the Greek text.

A survey of the entire philosophy of the Jews is given by Sal. Munk, in his *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, pp. 461-511 (*Esquisses historiques de la philosophie chez les juifs*); a German translation of this sketch, by B. Beer, was published at Leipzig in 1882. A. Schmiedl has an article on the conceptions of substance and accident in the philosophy of the Jews of the Middle Ages, in the *Monatschr. für Gesch. u. Wiss. des Judenthums*, ed. by Frankel, Breslau, 1864. Cf. J. M. Jost, H. Grätz, and Abr. Geiger in their histories of Judaism, and Julius Fürst, *Bibliotheca judæica, bibliographisches Handbuch der gesammten jüdischen Literatur*, Leipzig, 1849-63, and Steinschneider, *Jüdische Literatur*, in *Brock und Gruber's Encyclopädie*, Sect. II., Vol. 27.

A. Nager, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Talmud*, Leipzig, 1864.

A collection of cabalistic writings, set on foot by Joh. Pistorius, and containing a Latin translation of

the *Jesirah*, as also Joh. Reuchlin's *Libri tres de arte cabalistica* (first published in 1517), was printed at Basel in 1587, under the title: *Artis Cabalisticæ Scriptores*. The *Jesirah* was published in Hebrew at Mantua in 1563, and then translated into Latin and annotated by Blittangelus, Amsterdam, 1642, etc. The *Sohar* was published first at Mantua, 1553-60, then in more complete form at Cremona, 1569, and Lublin, 1623, also Amsterdam, 1670; again in an extensive collection of cabalistic writings, published by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, under the title: *Kabbala denudata seu doctrina Ebraeorum transcendentalis et metaphysica atque theologica*, Vol. I., Sulzbach, 1677-78, Vol. II., Frankfurt, 1684, and separately, Sulzbach, 1684; also Amsterdam, 1714, 1728, 1772, 1805, Krotoschin, 1844, 1853, etc. In the seventeenth century the genuineness of the *Sohar* was disputed by Joh. Morin (*Thesori bibl.*, p. 363 seq.; cf. Tholuck, *Comm. de vi, quam græca philoa. in theolog. tum Mohammedanorum, tum Judæorum exercuerit*, II. p. 16 seq.), and by Leon of Modena (in the work: *Are Nohem*, published by Julius Fürst, Leipzig, 1840). Of modern works on the Cabala the most important is Ad. Franck's *Syst. de la Kabbala*, Paris, 1942, translated into German by Ad. Jellinek, Leipzig, 1844, under the title: *Die Kabbala oder die Religionsphilosophie der Hebräer*; a minute critique of this work, but one that goes too far in its opposition to Franck's conception of the cabalistic doctrine, is the work of H. Jösi, *Midrash ha-Sohar, die Religionsphilosophie des Sohar und ihr Verhältnis zur allgemeinen jüdischen Theologie*, Leipzig, 1849. Cf. also, L. Zunz, *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*, Berlin, 1852 (chap. IX., *die Geheimlehre*); Franck, *Deux mémoires sur la Cabbale*, Paris (Aod.), 1839; Franck, *Dict. ph.*, Art. *Kabbala*; Adler, in Noses's *Jahrbücher* for 1846 and 1847; M. S. Freytag, *Philoa. cabalistica et pantheismus, ex fontibus primariis adumbr.*, Königsberg, 1832, *Philosophus et Cabalistæ, Choker u. Mekubbal*, *ibid.* 1840; Tholuck, *De ortu cabbalæ* (part II. of the above-cited *Commentatio*), Hamburg, 1837; H. Grätz, *Gnosticismus und Judenthum*, Krotoschin, 1846; Ad. Jellinek, *Moses ben Schem Tob de Leon und sein Verhältnis zum Sohar*, Leipzig, 1851, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kabbala*, Leipzig, 1852, *Auswahl kabbalistischer Mystik*, Leipzig, 1855; S. Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 275 seq. et al.; Isaac Missea, *Die jüdische Geheimlehre*, Cracow, 1862-63; Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Vol. VII. 1863, Note 3, p. 442 seq. and Note 12, p. 487 seq.; Ginsburg, *The Kabbalah, its doctrine, development, and literature, an essay*, London, 1865. For the later history of the Cabala we may cite, in addition to the histories of Judaism, the work by Abr. Geiger, *Leon da Modena (1571-1645), seine Stellung zur Kabbalah, zum Talmud und zum Christenthum*, Breslau, 1856.

Saadja's Book concerning Religions and Dogmas, translated in the twelfth century from Arabic into Hebrew, by Jehuda Ibn Tibbon, has been repeatedly edited; a German translation by Jul. Fürst appeared at Leipzig, in 1845. Of him treat Sal. Munk, *Notices sur Saadia*, Paris, 1838; Leop. Duken, in *Litt. Mittheilungen über die ältesten hebräischen Esageten, Grammatiker und Lexikographen*, Stuttgart, 1844.

From the *Fons Vitæ*, the principal work of Ibn Gebirol, extensive extracts which were made from the Arabic original by the Jewish philosopher, Schem Tob Ibn Falagura, of the thirteenth century, and translated by him into Hebrew (with the Hebrew title, *Mekor Chaffiq*), have been published, together with a French translation, by S. Munk, in his *Mélanges de philoa. juvæ et arabæ*, Paris, 1857; there is a notice of a Latin MS. of the whole work, by Beyerlein, in Zeller's *Theol. Jahrb.*, XV. and XVI. The discovery that Ibn Gebirol was identical with the Avicbron (or Avencebrol) often cited by the Scholastica, was announced by S. Munk in the *Literaturblatt des Orients* for 1845, No. 46, col. 721. Specimens of the religious poetry of Ibn Gebirol are given by S. Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 159 seq., and Michael Sachs, in *Die religiösen Poesien der Juden in Spanien*, Berlin, 1845, pp. 8-40. A treatise, written by Ibn Gebirol in 1045, on the Improvement of Morals, has been repeatedly published in the Hebrew translation, made in 1167 by Jehuda Ibn Tibbon, last at Luneville, 1804. A treatise on the Soul, translated into Latin by Dominicus Gundisalvi, is mentioned by Munk, p. 170, as a work probably composed by Ibn Gebirol, but containing passages interpolated by the translator.

The work of Bahja ben Joseph, on the Duties of the Heart, was published in the Hebrew translation of Jehuda Ibn Tibbon, at Naples, in 1490, etc., and last by Is. Benjakob, Leipzig, 1846; also with a German translation, by R. J. Fürstenthal, Breslau, 1836. Of Bahja ben Joseph, Ad. Jellinek treats, in the edition by Is. Benjakob, Leipzig, 1846, and M. F. Stern, *Die Herzenspflichten von B. d. J.*, Vienna, 1856.

The *Khawari* of Jehuda ha-Levi, in the translation made at Lunel in 1167, by Jehuda Ibn Tibbon of Granada, has been published many times, last at Hanover, in 1838, Prague, 1838-40, and, in part, Leipzig, 1841-42; with a Latin translation by Joh. Buxtorf, Basel, 1660, and in German (not complete), ed. H. Jolowicz and Dav. Cassel, Leipzig, 1841-42.

The work composed in Arabic by Abraham ben David ha-Levi of Toledo, and entitled "*The Sublime Path*," has been preserved in a Hebrew translation, which was published, together with a German translation by Simpson Weil, at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in 1852.

The principal philosophical work of Moses Maimonides, *Dalalat al Ha'irin* (Guide of the Dumb), was published several times before 1480 in the Hebrew translation of Samuel Ibn Tibbon (lived about 1200), under the title, "*Morah Nebuchim*," no place of publication being given,—then Venice, 1551, etc., with Latin translation, Paris, 1620, and, likewise with Latin translation, ed. Joh. Buxtorf, Basel, 1698, translated

(In part) into German, by R. J. Fürstenthal, Krotoschin, 1838, and translated by Simon Scheyer, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1838, and recently in Arabic and French, with critical, literary, and explanatory notes, by S. Munk, under the title, *Le guide des égarés, traité de théologie et de philosophie*, Vol. I.-III. Paris, 1856, '61, '64. In regard to the latter extremely meritorious work, it is only to be regretted that the habit of incorrectly translating the title has, through the practice of the author, apparently obtained a new sanction, although Munk himself, in his note on the title, II. p. 379 seq., gives as its true sense: *Indication ou guide pour ceux qui sont dans la perplexité, dans le trouble ou dans l'indécision*, so that not those who have gone astray, but those who are wandering in uncertainty, the seekers or doubters, are to be understood, those who, in view of the different ways opened before them, the ways of philosophy and positivism, of allegorical and literal biblical interpretation, are undecided and in need of counsel; the Latin translation, Paris, 1820, has the correct title: *Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum*; Albertus Magnus cites it as *Dux Neutorum*; others, *Directio Perplexorum*. The *Ethics* of Maimonides has been published in a German translation by Simon Falkenheim, Königsberg, 1832. His *Vocabularium Logicæ* was published at Venice in 1550, etc., and last at Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1846. Of Maimonides treat—besides Munk—Franck, in the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*, Vol. IV. p. 81, Simon Scheyer, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1845, Abr. Geiger, Rosenberg, 1850, M. Joël, *Die Religionsphilosophie des M. b. M.*, in the "Programme" of the Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau, 1850, and, with special reference to his influence on Albertus Magnus, the Scholastic, in another work published at Breslau in 1868. The *Ethics* of Maimonides, and its influence on the Scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century, are discussed by Ad. Jarczyewsky, in the *Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik*, New Series, Vol. XLVI. Halle, 1865, pp. 5-24. *Moses ben Maimôn's acht Capitel, arab. und deutsch mit Anm. von M. Wolf*, Leipzig, 1868.

Commentaries on the *Moreh Nebuchim*, or on parts of it, have been written, in particular, by Schem Tob ben Joseph ibn Falaquera (1380, printed at Prassburg in 1837), Joseph ibn Caspi (about 1300, published at Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1846), Moses ben Josus of Narbonne (composed, 1355-63, edited by Goldenthal, Vienna, 1852), and Ia. Abrabanel (in the fifteenth century, published by M. J. Landau, Prague, 1881-82).

Commentaries by Levi ben Gerson, relating to the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, the *Categ.* and the *De Interpr.*, are printed in the Latin translation of Jacob Mantino, in the first volume of the old Latin editions of the works of Aristotle, as also are the Commentaries of Averroës. His philosophical and theological work, entitled "*Mikamot Adonai*," was published at Riva di Trento, in 1560. M. Joël (Breslau, 1862) and J. Well (Paris, 1868) treat of his religious philosophy, and Prantl (*Gesch. der Log.*, II. pp. 394-396) of his logic. There has lately appeared: *Levi ben Gerson, Mikamot ha-Schem. Die Kämpfe Gottes. Religionsphilosophische und koem. Fragen, in sechs Büchern abgehandelt.* (In Hebrew.) New edition, Leipzig, 1866.

The system of religious philosophy of Ahron ben Elia of Nicomedia, the *Kawita*, completed at Constantinople in 1346, was published by Delitzsch and Steinschneider, Leipzig, 1841. Cf. Franck, *Archives Israélites*, 1842, p. 173, and Jul. Fürst, *Geschichte des Karäerthums*, Leipzig, 1862-65.

Ad. Franck estimates the date of the rise of the Cabala as earlier than the dates assigned by all others who have investigated the subject. He sees traces of it in the Septuagint, in the proverbs of Ben Sira and in the Book of Wisdom, and accounts for them as arising from the influence of the Zoroastrian religion on the Jews. Yet Franck admits that in the Cabala dualism is replaced by the theory of emanations, that ideas, forms, and attributes take the place of angels, and that "mythology is forced back by metaphysics," and it is quite a matter of question whether this transformation arose from the influence of Jewish monotheism alone, or whether Hellenic modes of thought were not also in their measure the cause of it; that at least the more developed cabalistic system gives evidence of the influence of Platonism, is beyond question. The conjecture (defended, among others, by S. Munk, *Palästina*, p. 515, and *Mé.*, p. 468) is a very probable one, that the Essæi or Essenes were the first who held the half-mystical, half-philosophical doctrine, which was developed among the Jews not later than the time of the rise of Christianity, and whose influence was manifested in the development of Christian Gnosticism and in the doctrines of the Cabala.

At a later epoch, theorems of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, known at first, perhaps, through original Greek texts, but shortly afterward through Arabic translations, and certainly also the philosophy of Ibn Gebirol, exerted an influence on the development of the cabalistic doctrine. The doctrine of angels, applied to the biblical history of creation and the vision of Ezekiel, was apparently the earliest form of a doctrine which subsequently

entered into the Cabala (in which form it had perhaps been already held by the Essenes); at a considerably later period, and having but a tolerably superficial connection with this earlier speculation, appears to have followed the development of the doctrine of the *Sephiroth* and the worlds, under Jewish-Alexandrian, Gnostic, and Neo-Platonic influences. Respecting the beginnings only conjectures are possible, such is our lack of positive information; respecting the more developed Cabala there exist data for a more definite judgment.

The need of finding a middle term to mediate between the Deity, conceived as transcendent, and the visible world, led to the cabalistic speculations, in which the Oriental doctrine of angels and the Platonic theory of Ideas, as modified at Alexandria, were blended together. The question raised by some of the later Cabalists and by historians as to whether the cabalistic *Sephiroth* were beings distinct from God (as affirmed by Rabbi Menachem Recanati, and, in modern times, by H. Joël, who represents them as creatures), or momenta of God's existence, which are only subjectively distinguished by us (as, according to Corduero, Rabbi David Abbi Simra maintained), or whether God (according to the conciliatory theory of Corduero, adopted by Franck) was regarded as indeed above, but also as in and not without them, seems incapable of solution, since it implies in the Cabala the existence and maintenance of distinctions which a doctrine so much the work of fancy, and so little of the reflective reason, was not capable of containing. Of a similar nature, as we have seen, is the uncertainty in which we are placed with regard to Philo's doctrine of the Logos and of the other Potencies or Ideas, since we find him sometimes ascribing to them an attributive, and sometimes a substantial form of existence (see above, § 63, p. 230 seq.). The doctrine of emanations, advanced in the Cabala, has not the character of a theory resting on philosophical grounds and put forward in conscious opposition to the doctrine of creation; it is intended rather as an interpretation of the latter. But that the idea of emanation is present in the fundamental doctrines of the Cabala is none the less true, and it is incorrect (with H. Joël) to consider those doctrines as containing only the dogmatic theory of creation, and to seek for the doctrine of emanation exclusively in the later additions and commentaries, although it is indeed in these latter that the doctrine is most definitely developed and is based on metaphysical axioms.

In the *Jerirah* the outlines of the doctrines of God, of the intermediate beings, and of the worlds, are presented. The author of the book considers (in Pythagorean and Platonic fashion) the series of numbers (*Sephiroth*) and the letters of the alphabet, "which are the elements of the divine word, and are inscribed on the air at the boundary of the intellectual and physical worlds," as the basis of the world-soul and of the whole creation.

The *Sohar* teaches the incognoscibility of God as he really is, and his gradual manifestation through the series of emanations. God, the Ancient of Days, the Hidden of the Hidden Ones, is, apart from his revelation in the world, a nothing, so that the world, created by him, came forth out of nothing. (This doctrine recalls the Basilidian doctrine of the non-existent God, and also the doctrine of Dionysius.) This nothing is infinite, and is therefore called the Limitless, *En-Soph*. Its light originally filled all space: beside it nothing existed. But in order that something else might come into existence, it concentrated itself into a portion of space, so that outside of itself there was a void, which it proceeded to fill with a light, whose brightness diminished in proportion to the removal of the light from its source. *En-Soph* first revealed himself in his word or his working, his son, the first man, Adam Kadmon, the man in the vision of Ezekiel (Ezek., ch. i.). The potencies or intelligences which constitute this Adam Kadmon (as parts of his being, just as the *δυνάμεις* or *λόγοι* are parts of the Logos of Philo) are the ten *Sephiroth*, numbers, forms, circles of light, which surround the throne of the Highest. The three first *Sephi-*

worlds are, 1) *Kether*, crown, 2) *Chokhma*, wisdom (*σοφία*), 3) *Binah*, understanding (*λόγος*). (This separation of *σοφία* and *λόγος* belongs to the Post-Philonic period, but in the present form is of much later date still.) The seven other *Sephiroth* are, 4) *Chesed*, grace (or *Gedulah*, greatness), 5) *Din*, judgment, rigor (or *Geburah*, strength), 6) *Tiphereth*, beauty, 7) *Netzach*, firmness, 8) *Hod*, splendor, 9) *Iesod*, foundation, 10) *Malkuth*, kingdom. Occasionally, the second, fourth, and seventh of the *Sephiroth* are grouped together, and entitled pillars of grace, the third, fifth, and eighth being termed pillars of strength, and the first, sixth, and ninth, middle pillars. (This recalls the Gnostic distinction between the just God and the good God, which, however, here becomes a mere distinction of powers or attributes, in order to preserve the monotheistic principle.) The *Sephiroth* constitute the first emanation, or the world *Aniah*, which is followed by three other worlds (named after Isaiah xliii. 7), viz.: the world *Beriah* (from *barah*, to create, to shape), containing the pure forms or simple substances (ideas), which are conceived as spiritual, intelligent beings; then the world *Jezirah* (from *जार*, to form), the world of the celestial spheres, of the Souls or Angels; and, lastly, the world *Asijah* (from *asah*, to make), the world of the material works of God, of objects which are perceptible through the senses, and which arise and decay. (With the four-fold division of Plotinus: the One, the Nous, with ideas immanent in the same, the soul, and the material realm, this division agrees in so far as it represents the ideas still as distinct from the *Sephiroth*.) The three first *Sephiroth* exert their influence in the spiritual world, the next three in the psychical, and the three next in the material world. In man, the spiritual, immortal soul (*neshama*) belongs to the first of the three worlds, the animating breath (*ruach*) to the second, and the breath of life (*nephech*) to the third. The soul wanders through different bodies, until it rises purified into the world of spirits. The last soul to enter into the earthly life, will be that of the Messiah.

To the fanciful Cabala, a philosophy which followed the guidance of the understanding, formed a contrast that sometimes led to mutual enmities. The rise of this philosophy was essentially conditioned on the contact of Judaism with Hellenism and Mohammedanism. Of little importance were the logico-philosophical studies of Jewish physicians, such as, in particular, Isaac Israeli (flourished about 900; died at an advanced age, about 940-950; according to Steinschneider's conjecture, in his work on Alfaraabi, p. 248, Isaac Israeli was the author of an old commentary on the *Jezirah*). The Karaites, who broke with the Talmudic tradition, were the first Jewish theologians, who, following the example of the Mohammedan theologians, treated of dogmatics in systematic form. In this they were afterward followed by the Rabbinic theologians (Rabbinists).

Seadja was born at Fajjum, in Egypt, in about the year 892. He was appointed at the head of the Jewish school at Bora, or Bura, in Babylon in 928, and died in 942. He was celebrated not only as a philosopher, but also as a religious poet, and was (as Jost expresses it, *Gesch. des Judenthums*, II., Leipzig, 1858, p. 279) "a fruit of the Jewish soil, modified by grafts from the Arabian garden." In the year 933 he wrote his principal work on religious philosophy, in which, following, as it seems, the example of his older Karaite contemporary, David ben Merwan al Mokammez of Basra in Arabian Irak, he attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of the articles of the Jewish faith and the untenableness of the dogmas and philosophemes opposed to them. The work contains (according to Julius Fürst), besides the Introduction, ten sections, with subjects severally as follows: 1) The world and its beings are created; 2) The Creator of all things is One; 3) Law and Revelation; 4) Obedience to God and disobedience, perfect righteousness and bondage; 5) Merit and guilt; 6) The nature of the soul and its future existence; 7) Revivification of the dead; 8) Emancipation and redemption; 9) Reward and punishment; 10) Ethics. The cardinal points of his philosophy are the unity of God, plurality of attributes without plu-

rality of persons, the creation of the world out of nothing, and not from material elements previously existing, the inviolability of the revealed law, the freedom of the will, future retribution and (rejecting the doctrine of its transmigration) the reunion of the soul with the body at the resurrection, which is to take place when the number of souls which were to be created has been exhausted. The substance of the teaching of Saadja is therefore in unison throughout with Jewish orthodoxy; but the form which it took as a system of religious philosophy was in large measure determined by the precedent of the Arabian *Motekallemin*, the *Mutazilim* being those between whose doctrine and that of Saadja the greatest resemblance exists. (The *Mutazilim* were a rationalizing fraction of the *Motekallemin*, who took from the dogma of predestination something of its severity, by reducing it to the doctrine of mere foreknowledge, in order to save human freedom and moral responsibility; the Ascharites, on the contrary, insisted especially upon the truth of this dogma in all its severity.) The positive influence of Aristotelianism is slight. Yet Saadja shows an acquaintance with some of the logical doctrines of Aristotle, and especially with his doctrine of categories, and he (II. 8) expressly undertakes to prove the non-applicability of these latter to the Deity. On the other hand, he opposes some doctrines which are founded on Aristotelianism, such as the eternity of the world and also the naturalistic biblical criticism of Chivi Albachli (of Bactria), the Rabbinit.

In Spain the earliest representative of philosophy among the Jews was Salomo ben Jehuda ben Gebirol (or Gabirol, i. e., Gabriel, in Arabic, Abu Ajjub Soleiman ibn Jahja ibn Djehirul), whom Sal. Munk has discovered to be identical with the philosopher whom the Scholastics knew under the name of Avicbron (or Avengebrol), as author of the work "*Fons Vitae*" (*Mekor hajim*), and whom they regarded as an Arabian philosopher. Born in 1020 or 1021 at Malaga, and educated at Saragossa, he labored in the years 1035-1069 or 1070 as a religious poet, moralist, and philosopher. His principal work was the *Fons Vitae*. Schem Tob, who translated the most important parts of it into Hebrew, defines the general idea which underlies the whole work as being contained in the doctrine that even spiritual substances are in some sense material, the matter of which they are formed being spiritual matter, the substratum of their forms a sort of basis into which the form descends from above. Albertus Magnus says (*Summa totius Theol.*, I. 4, 22), that the work ascribed to Avicbron rested on the hypothesis that things corporeal and incorporeal were of one matter (*corporaliū et incorporaliū esse materiam unam*), and Thomas Aquinas (*Quaest. de Anima*, Art. VI.) names him as the author of the doctrine that the soul and all substances, except God, are compounded of matter and form. From the extracts published by Munk it appears how this hypothesis squares with the whole of his philosophy, which arose from the blending of Jewish religious doctrines with Aristotelian, and, in particular, with Neo-Platonic philosophemes. The first book treats of matter and form in general and of their different kinds; the second, of matter as that which gives body to the universe (to which the categories apply); the third, of the existence of the (relatively) simple substances, the middle essences which are said to be contained in the created Intellect, and are intermediate between God, the first Cause, and the material world; the fourth, of these intermediate essences as consisting of matter and form; the fifth, of matter and form in the most general sense of the terms or of universal matter and universal form, followed by considerations relative to the divine will, as the outcome of the divine wisdom, through which being is educed from nothing, or as the middle term between God, the first substance, and all that consists of matter and form, or, again, as that source of life whence all forms emanate. All the arguments of the author postulate the Platonic theory of the real existence of all which is thought by means of universal concepts. Everything, argues Avicbron, that subsists falls under the concept of subsistence, therefore all things which subsist

possess real subsistence in common with each other; but this common element cannot be a form, since it is in the form of an object that its peculiarity and difference from other objects consists; it must therefore be matter—matter in the most general sense (*materia universalis*), of which corporeal and spiritual matter are the two species. Since form can only have its existence in matter, the forms of intelligible things must possess some sort of material substrate peculiar to themselves. God, who is immaterial, is called form only in an unnatural sense. (It would have been more consistent either to apply the general thesis to God, or to deny the separate existence of God, and to identify him with the *materia universalis* or the material substance. The latter alternative was chosen by David of Dinant, who was probably not uninfluenced by the doctrine of Avicbron—and in modern times again by Spinoza.) In the doctrine of the matter peculiar to intelligible essences, Avicbron follows Plato, in so far as the latter, as is reported by Aristotle, ascribed to the ideas a material substratum (which ascription was the necessary consequence of their hypostatization), and also Plotinus, who enounced explicitly the distinction, contained at least by implication in the doctrine of Plato, of the different kinds of matter. (Plotinus, *Ennead.*, II. 4, 4: “with the *μορφή*, form, there is everywhere necessarily joined the *ὕλη*, matter, or the *ὑποκείμενον*, substrate, of which it is the *μορφή*; if the sensible world, the image of the unseen or intelligible world, consists of matter and form, there must also be a kind of matter as well as form in the archetype.”) The Jewish philosopher was not acquainted with the works of Plotinus, but he probably had met some of the Neo-Platonic writings in Arabic translations. These writings, nearly all of which are pseudonymous, and which after the end of the twelfth century were known to the Scholastics in Latin translations, and were so employed by them, were (according to Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 240 seq.; Munk follows in part the authority of Mohammed al Schahrestani, an Arabian historian, who wrote of religious and philosophical sects, and died in the year 1153) the following:

1) The *Elementa Theologiæ* of Proclus.

2) *Pseudo-Empedocles*, on the Five Elements, and perhaps still other works ascribed to Empedocles, translations of which had been brought from the East to Spain, soon after the commencement of the tenth century, by Mohammed ibn Abdallah ibn Mesarrah of Cordova; in them the ancient natural philosopher is credited with teaching that the Creator made the *materia prima* as primitive element; from this emanated the Intellect, and from the Intellect the Soul; the vegetative soul was the rind of the animal soul, this the rind of the *anima rationalis*, and the latter again that of the *anima intellectualis*; the different individual souls were parts of the universal soul, while the product of this soul was nature, in which hate reigned, as love reigned in the universal soul; seduced by nature, the individual souls had turned aside to the sensuous world, while for their rescue, purification, and recovery to the communion of things intelligible, the prophetic spirits went forth from the universal soul.

3) *Pseudo-Pythagoras*, who represents symbolically the Creator, the Intellect, the Soul, and Nature, by the numerical terms: Monad, Duad, Triad, and Tetrad, or distinguishes them as, 1) unity before eternity, 2) unity with eternity, 3) unity after eternity and before time, and 4) unity in time.

4) *Pseudo-Aristotle's Theologia*, a work which in the ninth century had already been translated into Arabic and was known in a Latin translation to the Scholastics. This translation was printed at Rome, in 1519, with the title: *Sapientissimi philosophi Aristotelis Stagyrîtæ theologia sive mystica philosophia secundum Aegyptios*, and is reprinted in Du Val's complete edition of the works of Arist.; following this translation and also the Arabic text, Munk gives a number of extracts from the work in his *Mélanges*, p. 249 seq. In this work the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the first Cause, of the Intellect, and of the pure Forms

(Ideas), which are in it, of the world-soul with the individual souls, and of nature as comprising the things which arise and perish, is developed, the immateriality of the pure forms contained in the Intellect is asserted, on the authority of the *Metaphysics*, which is mentioned as an earlier work by the same author, and the theory is combated that all substances, with the exception of the Deity, consist of matter and form. Between the One and the Intellect Pseudo-Aristotle inserts the divine Word, the Logos. Cf. Hanneberg, *De Theologie des Aristoteles*, in the Reports of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1862, I. 1-12.

5) Perhaps the work *De Causis*, which likewise contains Neo-Platonic doctrines, for the most part in literal extracts from the *Institutio Theologica* of Proclus. It is a late compilation of thirty-two metaphysical theses, and was perhaps not made until after the time of Ibn Gebirol; possibly the compiler was David, the Jewish commentator (as Albertus Magnus supposes, who, however, was unacquainted with the source of the compilation; Thomas recognized as such source the "*Elevatio Theologica*" of Proclus, by which his *Στοιχειώδεις θεολογικαί*, *Institutio Theologica*—perhaps the work of a pupil of Proclus—is to be understood). As a supposed work of Aristotle it was translated into Latin, about A. D. 1150, by the Archdeacon Dominicus Gundisalvi, with the aid of Johannes Avendeath (Ibn David?), a converted Jew, and was known to the later Scholastics and used by Alanus ab Insulis (Alanus of Lille), who cites it as "*liber de essentia puras bonitatis*." The belief that it was used by Aristotle was, notwithstanding the better knowledge of Albertus and Thomas, long entertained by many, and it was printed in the first Latin editions of the works of Aristotle (Venice, 1496, and in Vol. VII. of the Lat. ed. of the works of Aristotle and Averroës, Venice, 1552). Analyses of its contents are to be found in Hauréau's *Phil. Scol.*, I 284 seq., and in Vacherot's *Hist. Critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, III. 96 seq. In it abstract concepts are treated as possessing real existence; that which corresponds to the more abstract concept is treated as being the higher, earlier, and more powerful cause; being is placed before life, and life before individual existence. The Pseudo-Pythagorean distinction between the highest form of existence, which is before eternity, the Intellect, which is with eternity, the Soul, which is after eternity and before time, and temporal things, is found also in this work. Cf. Hanneberg, Reports, etc., 1863, pp. 361-388.

Considerable as was the influence of the philosophy of Ibn Gebirol with a portion of the Scholastics (and, in particular, with Duns Scotus), it was correspondingly small with the Jews of the period next succeeding, among whom only his poems and ethical writings procured for his name any popularity. But the Arabian philosophers of the twelfth century seem not to have known of him at all. Aristotelianism, which, in consequence of the gradually increasing influence of the writings of Ibn Sina, was making its way among the Mohammedans and Jews in Spain, drove out the Neo-Platonic ideas, which, however, soon found a place of refuge in the Cabala. To this must be added, that the intermediate position assigned by Ibn Gebirol to the Will, which he represented as emanating from the divine Wisdom, notwithstanding the stress laid by him in single passages on the unity of this will with God, and his attempts to conceive it as an attribute, was of a nature to give offence to the more rigid monotheists.

Bahja (or Bahijja?) ben Joseph composed, near the end of the eleventh century, a work on the "Duties of the Heart," in which, commencing with a consideration of the unity of God, he sketches out a complete system of Jewish Morals. The author seeks to demonstrate, by reason, Scripture, and tradition, that the performance of spiritual duties is not a mere supererogatory addition to that piety which is manifested in obedience to law, but is the foundation of all laws.

Jehuda ben Samuel ha-Levi (born about 1080, died 1150), a celebrated author of religious songs, in his work entitled *Khovvi*—in which the scenes of the dialogues are based

on the (historical) conversion of a Chazar king to Judaism—expresses himself moderately respecting the Mohammedan and Christian religions, but with severity respecting Greek (Aristotelian) philosophy, which denied that the world had a beginning in time. He warns his readers not to approach this philosophy. He seeks, in a popular style, to justify the Jewish law on rational grounds.

As the author of a "*Microcosmus*" (about 1140), Josef Ibn Zaddek should be mentioned.

Abraham ben David, of Toledo, wrote, in the year 1160, in the Arabic language, a work called "The Sublime Faith," in which he defends the Aristotelian philosophy, but combats strongly the Neo-Platonism of Ibn Gebirol. He develops in particular the doctrine of the freedom of the human will.

Moses Maimonides, or Maimuni (Moseh, son of Maimun the judge), was born at Cordova, March 30, 1135, and retired with his father, on account of the religious compulsion attempted by the Almohades, first to Fez, and then (1165) by way of Palestine to Egypt, and lived in Fostat (ancient Cairo), where he died December 13, 1204. Educated in the Aristotelian philosophy, and acquainted with Arabic commentators (in particular with Abu-Bacer; he did not, on the contrary, read the works of Averroës until a few years before his death), he introduced in his *Explanation of the Mishnah* (composed 1158–1168) and in the fourteen *Books of the Law* (1170–1180) systematic order into the Talmud-Conglomerate (whereas the historical sense in him, as in his contemporaries generally, remained undeveloped). His chief philosophical work (completed about A. D. 1190), the "*Guide of the Dabting*," contains (according to Munk's judgment, *Mélanges*, p. 486) nothing which in philosophical respects was of decisive importance or originality, but it contributed mightily toward bringing the Jews to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, through which they became able to transmit to Christian Europe the science of the Arabs, and thereby to exercise a considerable influence on the Scholastic philosophy. Maimonides' influence was greatest on the theology of the Jews. The fundamental idea in his works is that the law was given to the Jews, not merely to train them to obedience, but also as a revelation of the highest truths, and that, therefore, fidelity to the law in action is by no means sufficient, but that the knowledge of the truth is also a religious duty. By this teaching he offered a powerful incitement to speculation in religious philosophy, yet he also contributed by his enunciation of definite articles of faith to a narrow determination of Jewish dogmas, although his own investigations bear throughout a rationalizing character. Maimonides is no friend to astrological mysticism: we are only to believe that which is either attested by the senses or strictly demonstrated by the understanding or transmitted to us by prophets and godly men. In the province of science, he regards Aristotle as the most trustworthy leader, and only differs from him when the dogma requires it, as, especially, in the doctrine of the creation and providential guidance of the world. Maimonides holds firmly to the belief (without which, in his opinion, the doctrines of inspiration and of miracles as suspensions of natural laws could not be maintained), that God called into existence out of nothing, not only the form, but also the matter of the world, the philosophical proofs to the contrary not appearing to him conclusive. If these proofs possessed mathematical certainty, it would be necessary to interpret those passages in the Bible which appear to oppose them allegorically—which is now not admissible. Accordingly, Maimonides condemns the hypothesis of the eternity of the world in the Aristotelian sense, or the doctrine that matter is eternal *ab initio*, and has always been the substratum of an order or form arising from the tendency of all things to become like the eternal and divine Spirit; the Bible, he says, teaches the temporal origin of the world. Less discordant with the teachings of the Bible, according to M., is the Platonic theory, which he interprets with the strictest exactness according to the literal sense of the dialogue *Timæus* (which he might have read in an Arabic translation).

He understands the theory as assuming that matter is eternal, but that the divinely-~~created~~ order, by the addition of which to matter the world was formed, had a beginning in time. Yet he does not himself accept this theory, but adheres to the belief that matter was created by God. In *Ethica*, Maimonides lays special stress on the freedom of the will. Every man has complete freedom, either to enter upon the way of goodness and piety, or to go in the ways of evil and wickedness. Do not, says Maimonides, allow thyself to be persuaded by fools that God predetermines who shall be righteous and who wicked. He who sins has only himself to blame for it, and he can do nothing better than speedily to change his course. God's omnipotence has bestowed freedom on man, and his omniscience foreknows man's choice without guiding it. We should not choose the good, like children and ignorant people, from motives of reward or punishment, but we should do good for its own sake and from love to God; still, retribution does await the immortal soul in the future world.—The resurrection of the body is treated by Maimonides as being simply an article of faith, which is not to be opposed, but which also cannot be explained.

The presupposition of Maimonides that there exists a kind of knowledge independent of faith, to which, in so far as it possesses complete certainty, the literal sense of Scripture must be sacrificed by means of allegorical interpretation, appeared to some of the Rabbis to be an inadmissible limiting of the authority of the biblical revelation; it was a "selling of Holy Scripture to the Greeks," or a "destroying of firm ground." His interpretation of the sensuous representations of the Godhead and of the future life, which the Bible contains, and of some of the miracles, and his attempt to find rational grounds for the Jewish laws, were regarded by them as jeopardizing religion. In France there were fanatics who did not content themselves with anathemas, but who claimed and obtained the aid of Christian inquisitors against the detested heresy. But this very step, this treason committed against the national spirit of the Jews, contributed materially to the triumph of the rationalizing tendency of Maimonides, whose works soon obtained an almost unresisted authority among the Jews, not only of the East, but also of the West. They were also highly esteemed by Arabian and Christian thinkers.

Among the numerous Jewish philosophers, who figured for the most part as translators and commentators of Aristotle and of Arabian disciples of Aristotle, the most noteworthy are, in the thirteenth century, Schem Tob ben Joseph ibn Falquera, the commentator of the *Moreh Nebuchim* and translator of the extracts from Ibn Gebirol's *Fountain of Life*, and, in the fourteenth century, Levi ben Gerson (born in 1288, died 1344), and Moses, the son of Joshua, of Narbonne, called Master Vidal. The former of these men was a partisan of the doctrine of Ibn Roschd. He adopted the Aristotelian theory of the formation of the world by God out of a material substance previously existing, which substance, however, as being absolutely formless, was nothing, and explained the immortality of the soul as consisting in its union with the active intellect, in which each soul, according to the degree of its perfection, participated. Moses, the son of Joshua, wrote the commentary (mentioned above, p. 421) on the *Moreh* of Maimonides and other commentaries on the works of Arabian philosophers, still extant in MSS.

The work in imitation of the *Moreh* by Ahron ben Elia, of Nicomedia (a Karaite who lived in the fourteenth century) and entitled the "Tree of Life" (which contains also detailed accounts respecting the religious and philosophical schools among the Arabs), is a presentation, on a philosophical basis, of the dogmas of Mosaism.

From the fifteenth century onward the renewed Platonism (which is to be treated of hereafter) exerted a certain influence on the philosophy of the Jews, as may be seen in the dialogues concerning Love, by Leo the Hebrew, the son of Isaac Abrabanel.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE PERIOD OF THE FULL DEVELOPMENT AND UNIVERSAL SWAY OF
THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ 98. The introduction into Europe of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *Psychology* and *Ethics*, and of the partly Neo-Platonic, partly Aristotelian writings of Arabian and Jewish philosophers, led to a material extension and transformation of philosophical studies among the Christian Scholastics. The theosophical doctrine of emanation contained in some of those works, and especially in certain books which were at first falsely attributed to Aristotle, but which were in fact the work of Neo-Platonists, favored, in connection with the doctrines of John Scotus Erigena, a leaning toward pantheistic doctrines. But a powerful ecclesiastical reaction soon took place, which at first threatened to operate not only against these doctrines, but also against the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle, but which afterward, when the theistic character of the genuine works of Aristotle became known, assisted his doctrine to obtain a decided triumph and to force the Platonism of the earlier Scholastics, which they derived from Augustine and other Church Fathers, into the background. The prevalence of the Aristotelian, Arabian, and Jewish doctrines of monotheism in the philosophy of the later Scholastics had for a consequence the complete accomplishment of the till then imperfect separation of natural from revealed theology, the doctrine of the Trinity, in the philosophical justification of which Church Fathers and earlier Scholastics had found the principal aim of their philosophical thinking, being now maintained on the ground of revelation alone, and withdrawn, as a theological mystery, from the sphere of philosophical speculation, while the belief in the existence of God was philosophically justified by Aristotelian arguments. Through an extensive appropriation, and in part also through a modification of the doctrines of Aristotle to suit the demands of the Church, the Scholastic philosophy became, both materially and formally, for the fundamental theses contained in the "*theologia naturalis*," and formally, for the mysteries reserved to mere faith, the adequate instrument of ecclesiastical theology. This it continued to be until after the renewal of

Nominalism, when the Scholastic postulate of the harmony of the substance of faith with reason—which postulate, however, from the time when Aristotelianism became dominant, in the thirteenth century, had never been affirmed in its full sense, except as applying to the fundamental theses above mentioned—became more and more restricted, and was at last altogether rejected.

Of the introduction of the Scholastics to the knowledge of the physical, metaphysical, and ethical works of Aristotle (and also to the writings of the Arabian and Jewish commentators) A. Jourdain treats, in his *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, Paris, 1819, 2. 62, 1820, German translation by Stahr, Halle, 1881; cf. Renan, *Acerr.*, Paris, 1852, pp. 148 and 158 seq.; 238 seq. On the first reception given to these writings, see Hauréan, in his *Phil. Sool.*, I. p. 291 seq.; cf. also, Hauréan, *Le concile de Paris de l'année 1210*, in the *Revue archéol.*, new series, vol. 10, Paris, 1884, p. 417—424.

The question as to when and in what way the Scholastics became acquainted with the works of Aristotle, except the *Organon*, has been answered by the investigations of A. Jourdain, who has shown that their first acquaintance with these works was brought about through the Arabians, but that not long afterward the Greek text was brought to the West (particularly from Constantinople) and translated directly into Latin. In former times the prevalent (and, substantially, the correct) belief was, that the Latin translations had been made from the Arabian; but in numerous cases critics forgot to distinguish sufficiently between the case of the logical writings, which had been known earlier, and the other writings of Aristotle, and they paid too little attention to the fact of the gradual addition of direct translations from the Greek. Heeren (in his *Gesch. des Studiums der class. Litt.*, I. p. 183) fell into the opposite mistake of under-estimating the agency of the Arabs. Buhle (*Lehrb. der Gesch. der Philos.*, V. p. 247) guards the proper mean by directing attention especially to the difference between the case of the *Organon* and that of the other works, but without investigating and communicating the documentary proofs subsequently given by Jourdain. That the *Organon*, however, was not fully known until the middle of the twelfth century, and that before that time the Scholastics were acquainted with the *Categ.* and *Interpr.*, together with the *Isagoge* and the works of Boëthius, was first discovered after Jourdain's investigations by Cousin, Prantl, and others.

The influence of Arabian science was felt sporadically in the early days of Christian Scholasticism. Gerbert in Spain had drawn upon it to a certain extent, although (as Bädinger has shown in his work *Ueber Gerberts wiss. und polit. Stellung*, Marburg, 1851) he did not understand the Arabic language (and probably not the Greek). Constantinus Africanus, a monk, who lived about A. D. 1050 and journeyed in the East, and afterward established himself in the monastery of Montecassino, translated from the Arabic various, and especially medical, works, among which were the works of Galenus and Hippocrates, by which the teachings of William of Conches appear to have been influenced. Soon after 1100 Adelard of Bath made himself acquainted with some of the performances of the Arabs, from which he borrowed several theses in natural philosophy. About 1150, by command of Raimund, Archbishop of Toledo, Johannes Avendeth (Johannes ben David, Johannes Hispalensis) and Dominicus Gundisalvi translated, from the Arabic through the Castilian into Latin, the principal works of Aristotle and certain physical and metaphysical writings of Avicenna, Algazeli, and Alfarabi, as also the "Fountain of Life" of Avicenna (The Gebirol). The work entitled "*De Causis*" (also called *De causis causarum*, *De intelligentiis*, *De esse*, *De essentia purae bonitatis*) on which David the Jew wrote a commentary, and which was a compilation of Neo-Platonic theses, became widely circulated soon after 1150, in a

Latin translation, as a work of Aristotle, and had an important influence in determining the method of Alanus. The *Theologia* (also called *De secretione Aegyptiorum philosophia*), falsely ascribed to Aristotle, was known in a Latin translation at least as early as 1200, and perhaps still earlier. It was partly owing to the existence and influence of this work that at first Neo-Platonic doctrines were admitted among the Scholastics under the authority of Aristotle. Probably this work, as also the *De Causis* and Avicbron's *Fons Vitæ*, were influential in determining the doctrine of Amalrich of Bena (who seems only to have taught orally) and his pupils, although the essence of his doctrine was undoubtedly derived from Scotus Erigena (as is clearly demonstrated by the reports of Henry of Ostia—in his *Lectura sive apparatus super quinque libros decretalium*, printed in 1512, ad I. 1, 2, and copied by Tennemann, by Krönlein, and by Huber, in his *Scotus Erigena*, Munich, 1861, p. 435 seq.—and of Martinus Polonus, *Chron.*, IV., copied by Huber, p. 437, and by Haureau, *Ph. Sc.*, I. 412). Soon after the death of Amalrich (which took place in the year 1208 or 1207) it became known that his heresy was not confined to the proposition which he had openly taught and which he had finally been forced to recant, viz.: that every believer must regard himself as a member of the body of Christ, but that it rested on a pantheistic basis and was connected with the many-branched heresy, which was then threatening the existence of the Church and with which the "*Eternal Gospel*" (composed about A. D. 1200 by Joachim of Flores, Abbot of Calabria, and a good Catholic, of whom Ernest Renan treats in the *Rev. des deux Mondes*, Vol. 64, July, 1866, pp. 94–142), and also still later, mystical works (in particular, the *Evangelium Sancti Spiritus* of the *Fratricelli*, composed by John of Parma, who lived 1210–1289) were in many respects tainted. God the Father—so some of the Amalricans taught—became man in Abraham, and the Son became man in Christ, who had abrogated the Jewish law. But now the time of the Holy Ghost had been introduced, who had become incarnate in themselves and had abrogated also the institutions and sacraments of the Church, and substituted knowledge and love in the place of faith and hope. Not works, but the will and spirit, are decisive; he who abides in love does not sin. This heresy was exterminated by fire and imprisonment, and the study of the physical works of Aristotle, in so far as they seemed to favor the heresy, as also of the works of Erigena, was prohibited by ecclesiastical decrees. In the year 1209 the Provincial Council, assembled at Paris under the presidency of Peter of Corbeil, Archbishop of Sens, ordered, among other things, that neither the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy, nor commentaries on the same, should be read, whether publicly or secretly, at Paris (*nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto*). The historian Rigordus, or rather his continuator, Guillaume le Breton, reports (inexactly) that the metaphysical writings of Aristotle (and it was to these that David of Dinant really appealed), which had shortly before been brought from Constantinople and translated from Greek into Latin, had been burned and the study of them prohibited, because they had given occasion to the Amalrican heresy. The continuator of the chronicle of Robert of Auxerre says, not of the *Metaphysics*, but of the *Physics* of Aristotle (*libri Aristotelis, qui de naturali philosophia inscripti sunt*), that the reading of it was forbidden by the Council (in 1209) for three years; the same is related by Caesarius of Heisterbach, who only names *libros naturales*. From this it might seem that in 1212 the prohibition was removed. Yet in the statutes of the University of Paris, which were sanctioned in the year 1215 by Robert of Courçon, the papal legate, the study of the Aristotelian books on dialectic, both the "old" and the "new" books (i. e., the parts of the *Logic* of Aristotle which were previously known and those which first became known about A. D. 1140) is ordered, while the study of the works of Aristotle on metaphysics and on natural philosophy, as also of the compendia of their contents, and of the doctrines of David of Dinant, Amalrich, and Mauritius,

the Spaniard (by whom some conjecture that Averroës is intended, Mauritius being regarded as a corrupted form of Mauvitiua, a name sometimes given to Averroës) is forbidden. The *Ethica* remained unprohibited, but exerted in the following decade only an inconsiderable influence. By a bull of February 23, 1225, Pope Honorius III. commanded the burning of all copies of the work of Erigena entitled *περί φύσεως μετέωρου*. In April, 1231, Pope Gregory IX. directed that the *libri naturales*, forbidden by the Provincial Council for a specific reason (which reason, according to Roger Bacon, was that these books contained the doctrine of the eternity of the world), should not be used until they had been examined and purified from all suspicion of error. From this limiting clause, and from the fact that at about this same time all the works of Aristotle, including the *Physics*, began to be expounded by the most esteemed doctors of the Church, and that in 1254, at Paris, the *Metaph.* and *Phys.* were officially included in the list of subjects to be taught by the *Facultas Artium*, we may infer that the Scholastic theologians had learned gradually to distinguish the genuine Aristotle from the Platonizing expositions of him, and had perceived that it was precisely the metaphysical basis of the dreaded heresy, namely, the hypostatizing of the universal, which was most vigorously combated by Aristotle. Roger Bacon expressly testifies that the ecclesiastical prohibition remained only in force until 1237. The doctrine of Aristotle acquired the greatest authority in the following time, when it was customary to draw a parallel between him, as the "*praeursor Christi in naturalibus*," with John the Baptist, as the "*praeursor Christi in gratiis*." (How great his authority was in the latter portion of the Middle Ages, is shown, among other things, by the literature of the "*auctoritates*" or "*dicta notabilia*," of which Prantl treats in the *Sitzungsber. der Münchener Akad. der Wiss.*, 1867, II, 2, pp. 173–198.) Even before the judgment of the Church had become more favorable, the Emperor Frederick II. caused the works of Aristotle, together with Arabian commentaries (especially those of Averroës), to be translated into Latin, in Italy, under the superintendence of Michael Scotus and Hermannus Alemannus, with Jewish assistance. The whole body of the works of Aristotle was at hand from about A. D. 1210 to 1225 in Latin translations from the Arabic (Am. Jourdain, *Rech. crit.*, 2d ed., Paris, 1843, p. 212). Subsequently Robert Greathead and Albertus Magnus, among others, and, in particular, Thomas Aquinas, labored to secure purer texts founded on direct translations from the Greek, while Thomas of Cantimpré, William of Moerbeke, Henry of Brabant (the latter in about the year 1271, and in consequence of a request from Thomas Aquinas) and others, did good service as translators.

While the application of dialectic to theology had been already in the first period a characteristic of Scholastic philosophy, it was not until the second period that the dialectic method of exposition, as adopted by the Scholastic philosophers, reached its highest development. The means by which this development was attained, were the study of the Aristotelian logic and metaphysics and the practice of Scholastic disputation. The method consisted, first, in connecting the doctrines to be expounded, with a commentary on some work chosen for the purpose. The contents of this work were divided and subdivided until the separate propositions, of which it was composed, were reached. Then these were interpreted, questions were raised with reference to them, and (for the most part in strictly syllogistic form) the grounds for affirming and for denying them were presented. Finally the decision was announced, and in case this was affirmative, the grounds for the negative were confuted, or, in the opposite case, the grounds for the affirmative. The names of the persons holding the various opinions which were discussed, were, as a rule, not given. No opinions were defended during this period, which were altogether original and were not supported by some authority. (The truth of this latter statement, in what belongs to the province of logic, has been demonstrated in detail by Prantl.)

§ 99. Alexander of Hales (died 1245) was the first Scholastic who ~~was~~ acquainted with the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and also with a part of the Commentaries of the Arabian philosophers, and who employed the same in the service of Christian theology. He did not, however (like Albertus Magnus), treat systematically of the separate branches of philosophy as such, but merely made use in his *Summa Theologiae* of philosophical doctrines for the demonstration of theological dogmas. William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (died 1249), defended the Platonic theory of ideas and the doctrine of the substantiality of the human soul against Aristotle and Arabian Aristotelians. As a Christian, he identified the whole complex of Ideas with the second person of the Godhead. Robert Greathead, Bishop of Lincoln (died 1252), combined Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines. Michael Scotus is of importance in the history of philosophy, more as a translator of the works of Aristotle than as an original author. The learned Vincentius of Beauvais (died 1264), was rather an encyclopedist than a philosopher. Bonaventura (died 1274), the mystical philosopher and scholar of Alexander of Hales, gave to the teachings of Plato (as transformed by the Neo-Platonists and Church Fathers) the preference over those of Aristotle, but subordinated all human wisdom to divine illumination. There is greater merit, according to Bonaventura, in the fulfillment of the monastic vows than in common morality, and the highest point which the human soul can reach is mystical contemplation, which affords a foretaste of future blessedness.

The *Summa Universae Theologiae* of Alexander of Hales was first printed at Venice in 1475, then at Nuremberg in 1482, Venice, 1576, etc.

The Works of William of Auvergne were published at Venice in 1501, and more accurately and completely by Blaise Leferson, at Orleans, in 1674.

The *Summary* of the eight books of Aristotle's *Physics*, by Robert Greathead of Lincoln, was printed at Venice in 1498 and 1500, and at Paris in 1583; his Commentary on the *Anal. Post.*, at Venice several times, and at Padua in 1497. Cf., concerning him, Reinhold Pauli, *Bischof Grosseseltens und Adam von Marek*, Tübingen (*Unte.-Schrift*), 1864.

Michael Scotus's *Super Autorem Sphaerae* was printed at Bologna in 1495, and at Venice in 1681, his *De Sole et Luna* at Strasburg in 1622, and his *De Chiromantia* repeatedly in the fifteenth century.

Vincentius of Beauvais' *Speculum Quadruplex: Naturale, Doctrinale, Historiale, Morale*, was published at Venice in 1494, and Duaci 1624, the *Speculum Nat. et Doctrinale*, Strasburg, 1478, and, with the *Histor.*, Nuremberg, 1496. Cf., on him, a work by Christoph Schloesser, published at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in 1819, Aloys Vogel, *Unte.-Pr.*, Freiburg, 1843, and Pranti, *Gesch. der Logik*, III. pp. 77-88. The "Mirror of Doctrine" was composed, according to Al. Vogel, about A. D. 1250, the "Mirror of History" about 1254; the "Mirror of Morals" was not written by Vincentius, but by a later author, between 1810 and 1820; this work, at least, contains later interpolations; but even the other parts are, according to Pranti's belief (*Gesch. der Log.*, III. 87), not free from interpolations (which are found nevertheless in MSS. of the fourteenth century).

The writings of Bonaventura were printed at Strasburg in 1493, Rome, 1588-96, etc. *Bonaventurae opera*, ed. A. C. Feltier, Besançon et Paris, 1861, etc. *Bonavent. opus. duo praestantissima: Breviloq.*

et *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, ed. Car. Jos. Hefele, 8d edition, Tübingen, 1862. Of him treat especially W. A. Hollenberg (*Studien zu Bonae*, Berlin, 1862; *Bon. als Dogmatiker*, in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1881, Heft 1, pp. 95-130), and Berthäumier (*Gesch. des heiligen Bonae. ins Deutsche übersezt*, Regensburg, 1868); of the proper sections in the works above (p. 389) cited on Medieval Mysticism.

The *Summa Theologiae* of Alexander of Hales—who was born in the county of Gloucester, joined the Franciscan Order, and studied and taught at Paris, where he died in 1245—is a syllogistical demonstration of ecclesiastical dogmas, following, though not servilely, in part the *Sentences* of Hugo of St. Victor, and in part—more especially in its arrangement—the similar work by Peter the Lombard. His work, however, is not the first which bore the title of a *Summa* of theological doctrines, since before him *Summae* had been written by Robert of Melun and Stephen Langton, and, still earlier, William of Auxerre had composed an "*Explanatio in quatuor sententiarum libros*," which was printed at an early date at Paris. But while earlier Scholastics had known only the *Logic* of Aristotle, and William of Auxerre, yielding to the commands of the Church, had ignored the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* (he only mentions, in addition to the *Logic*, the *Ethics* of Aristotle), Alexander of Hales first used the entire philosophy of Aristotle as an auxiliary of theology in his, for the rest, strictly orthodox and papally recommended *Commentary*. Of the Arabians, he notices, in particular, Avicenna, and rarely Averroës. Alexander of Hales is a Realist. Yet he regards the *Universalia ante rem* as being in the mind of God: "*maxime intelligibilem nuncupavit Plato ipsam rationem sempiternam, qua fecit Deus mundum*." They do not exist as independent essences apart from God. They constitute the *causa exemplaris* of things; yet they are not distinct from the *causa efficiens*, but are identical with it in God. The *Universale in re* is the form of things (as Alexander assumes in agreement with Gilbert de la Porrée). Alexander's pupils honored him with the title of *Doctor Irrefragabilis*. The *Summa* was finished after his death by his scholars, about A. D. 1252. Alexander of Alexandria, who likewise belonged to the Franciscan Order, wrote the *Glossae* to the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, which were printed at Venice in 1572, and were sometimes ascribed to Alexander of Hales. A pupil of Alexander of Hales, and his successor in the Franciscan chair of instruction at Paris, was John of Rochelle, who gave special attention to psychology.

William of Auvergne, born at Aurillac, teacher of theology at Paris and Bishop of Paris from 1228 onward (died in 1249), wrote works entitled *De Universo* and *De Anima*, which were based in large measure on Aristotle, to whom, however, he only conceded such authority as was consistent with the truth of ecclesiastical dogma. He also refers frequently, though for the most part only for the purpose of combating them, to the doctrines of Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Avicbron, Averroës, and others. In his ideology and cosmology William of Auvergne follows Plato, whom, however, he knew only through the *Timaeus* and *Phaedo*. Just as we are forced, on the ground of certain sense-perceptions, to believe in the existence of material objects, as perceived by us through the senses, so must we, in view of the facts of intellectual cognition, recognize the existence of intelligible objects, which are reflected in our intellects (*De Univ.*, II. 14). The "archetypal world" (*mundus archetypus*) is God's Son and true God (*De Univ.*, II. 17). In order to know the intelligible, there is no need of an active Intellect external to us and separated from our souls. Our intellects belong to our souls; and the latter exist independently of the body, as separate substances, having need of the body as an instrument for the exercise of sensual functions, but by no means as a condition of their existence; the soul is related to its body, as the cithern-player to his cithern (*De Anima*, V. 23).

Robert Greathead (Robertus Capito, Grosseteste), born at Strodbrook, in the county of Suffolk, educated at Oxford and Paris, for a time Chancellor of the University of Oxford,

intimately connected with the Franciscans, and a violent opponent of the Pope, died in 1253 while Bishop of Lincoln. He wrote commentaries on various works of Aristotle and also on the mystical Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. He distinguishes three kinds of form: 1) form immanent in matter, which the Physicist considers; 2) that form which is abstracted by the understanding and is considered by the mathematician; and 3) immaterial form, which the metaphysician considers. Among the forms which are in themselves immaterial and not simply separated in reflection from matter, he reckons, beside God and the Soul, the Platonic Ideas.

Michael Scotus (born in 1190), who translated the *De Celo* and *De Anima* of Aristotle, together with the Commentaries of Averroës, and other works, was regarded as a learned but heterodox philosopher. He wrote on astrology and alchemy, but his principal merit lay in his translations.

Vincentius of Beauvais, a Dominican and teacher of the sons of Saint Louis, contributed materially, by his comprehensive, compiled work, in which he touched, among other subjects, upon philosophy, to the furtherance of encyclopedical studies in the Middle Ages. He often cites Albertus Magnus, and sometimes even Thomas.

John Fidanza, born at Balneoregium (Bagnaréa in Tuscany) in the year 1221, was surnamed Bonaventura by Saint Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan Order, who performed on him a miraculous cure in his youth, and became in his twenty-second year a Franciscan and afterward (1256) the General of the Order. He was a pupil of Alexander of Hales from 1243 to 1245, then of John of Rochelle, and, from 1253 on, the successor of the latter in the professorial chair. He died in 1274, and was canonized in 1482. His revering admirers named him "*Doctor Seraphicus*." Bonaventura developed further the mystical doctrine begun by Bernard of Clairvaux on the basis furnished by Dionysius Areopagita, and continued by Hugo and Richard of St. Victor and others. He was somewhat affected by the influence of Aristotelianism, but, after the manner of the earlier Scholastics, in all questions which rose above mere dialectic, followed by preference Plato in the sense in which the latter was then understood, *i. e.*, as interpreted by Augustine. Bonaventura affirms that, according to Plato, God was not only the beginning and end of all things, but also their archetypal ground (*ratio exemplaris*); but this latter doctrine, he adds, was disputed by Aristotle with arguments possessing no force. (This judgment indicates that Bonaventura falsely identified the theory of the hypostatical nature of the Ideas—which Aristotle disputed—with the doctrine of their existence in God, which latter doctrine, however, was first advanced several centuries later by Philo, whose point of departure was the Jewish conception of God, and by the Neo-Platonists and Christian philosophers, who arrived at it by a theological transformation of the theory of ideas.) Bonaventura adds, further, that from this error of Aristotle arose another, that, namely, of ascribing to God no providential care of earthly things, since he had not in himself the "ideas," by which he could be cognizant of them (whence it appears that Bonaventura conceived the Platonic ideas, which Aristotle opposed, as thoughts of the divine mind). Further, Bonaventura censures the blindness of Aristotle in holding the world to be eternal and in opposing Plato, who, conformably to truth, assigned a beginning to the world and to time. But all human wisdom, even that of Plato, appears to him as folly in comparison with mystical illumination. As regards his ethical doctrine, especial importance belongs to Bonaventura's defence of the genuine Christian character of the monastic principle of poverty, and of mendicancy as a means of obtaining the necessaries of life—a principle on which the Franciscans, more than any other order of monks, laid stress. The (Aristotelian) ethical principle of the right mean between the too much and the too little is valid, he says, only in common life; but that type of life which is ordered according to

the counsels of the Gospel, the *vita supererogationis*, to which poverty and chastity belong, is of a higher order. Bonaventura does not hold every Christian to be bound to the imitation of Christ in all things, but distinguishes three stages of Christian perfection: the observance of the requirements of the law, the fulfillment of the spiritual counsels of the Gospel and the enjoyment of eternal happiness in contemplation, and he regards the attainment of the higher stages as reserved to ascetics. The mystical work of Bonaventura, entitled *Soliloquium*, a dialogue between man and his soul, is in imitation of Hugo, and the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, in imitation of Richard of St. Victor; in his *Meditations on the Life of Jesus*, written in a style at once popular and mystical, Bonaventura follows more especially Bernard.

§ 100. Albert of Bollstädt, born at Lauingen in Swabia, in the year 1193, educated at Paris and Padua, a Dominican teacher at Paris and Cologne, and from 1260 to 1262 Bishop of Regensburg, died at Cologne 1280, and was called, on account of his extensive learning and great talent as an instructor, "the Great" (Albertus Magnus) and "*Doctor Universalis*." He was the first Scholastic who reproduced the whole philosophy of Aristotle in systematic order, with constant reference to the Arabic commentators, and who remodeled it to meet the requirements of ecclesiastical dogma. The Platonism and Neo-Platonism, which in the earlier periods of Scholasticism had been predominant in all those parts of philosophy which went beyond logic (so far as these were at all cultivated at that time), were not indeed wholly removed from them by Albert. On the contrary, they exercised a not inconsiderable influence on his own philosophical speculations, but through the greater influence of the Aristotelian order of ideas were forced into the background. Albert was acquainted with a number of Platonic and Neo-Platonic writings; all of the works of Aristotle were accessible to him in Latin translations from the Arabic, and a few of them in translations from the Greek. In a series of works, consisting of commentaries on the works of Aristotle and paraphrases of the same, Albert set forth the doctrines of Aristotle, as modified to meet the views of the Church. The universal exists, according to him, in a threefold sense: 1) as *universale ante rem*, in the mind of God, according to the Neo-Platonic and Augustinian teaching, 2) as *universale in re*, according to the doctrine of Aristotle; and 3) as *universale post rem*, by which Albert understands the subjective concept, in which alone Nominalism and Conceptualism had admitted the existence of the universal. In speculative theology Albert separates strictly, in all cases, the doctrine of the Trinity and the dogmas connected with it from rational or philosophical theology, in which particular he was followed by

Thomas. He taught, in agreement with the doctrine of the Church, that the creation of the world was an act in time, rejecting the Aristotelian theory of the eternal subsistence of the world. In psychology, his most important modification of the Aristotelian teaching was his uniting of the lower psychical faculties with that substance separate from the body which Aristotle termed the *Nous*, bodily organs being necessary, according to Albert, not to the existence of these faculties, but only to their activity in the earthly life. The Ethics of Albert rests on the principle of the freedom of the will. With the cardinal virtues of the ancients he combines the Christian virtues, as virtues of equal rank.

The Works of Albertus Magnus were published in twenty-one folio volumes by Petr. Jammy, Lyons, 1651, his *Phys. and Metaph.*, Venice, 1518, per *M. Ant. Zimarium, De Caelo*, ib., 1519. Of him treat Rudolphus Noviomagensis (*De Vita Alb. Magni*, Cologne, 1499) and others, and, in more recent times, Joachim Sigart (*Albertus Magnus, sein Leben und seine Wissenschaft*, Regensburg, 1857) and others; cf. F. J. von Blanco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, Part I., 1855—in which work, among other things, a biography of Alb. is contained—and M. Joël, *Das Verhältniss Albert's d. G. zu Moses Maimonides*, Breslau, 1868 (cf. above, ad § 97); Haneberg, *Zur Erkenntnislehre des Avicenna und Alb. M.* (cf. above, p. 407); Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, III., 89-107. Albert's botanical work has been published by Jessen: *Alberti Magni de vegetabilibus libri septem, historias naturales pars XVIII.: editionem criticam ab Ernesto Mey o coceptam abeolotii Carolus Jessen*, Berlin, 1867. [O. d'Assailly, *Albert le Grand*, Paris, 1870.—Tr.]

The year of Albert's birth was, according to the more probable authority, 1193; others regard it as 1205. At Padua Albert studied philosophy, mathematics, and medicine, and there, in the year 1221, he was induced by Jordanus the Saxon to join the Dominican Order, after which he pursued his studies in theology at Bologna. Beginning in the year 1229, he taught philosophy during a series of years at Cologne and other places. In 1245 he began to teach at Paris, whence he subsequently returned to Cologne as a teacher of philosophy and theology. To the latter place, though repeatedly called away to fill various ecclesiastical offices, he always returned anew to his studies and his professorial occupations. He died at Cologne November 25, 1280. Albert is said to have developed slowly in his youth, and in his old age to have suffered from impaired faculties ("Albertus ex asino factus est philosophus et ex philosopho asinus"). Familiar as he was with the Aristotelian doctrine, the historical course of development of Greek philosophy in general remained unknown to him. He identifies Zeno the Eleatic with the founder of Stoicism, calls Plato and Speusippus Stoics, and the like. In knowledge of natural science he was distinguished above the most of his contemporaries. His works give evidence of his very extensive erudition; yet he often fails in power to control the results of his wide-spread investigations. In the spirit of system, in critical insight and clearness of thought, his pupil, Thomas Aquinas, was far superior to him. In Commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and in Minor works (*De adhaerendo Deo*, etc.) Albert trod also the ground of Mysticism.

In the interpretation and presentation of the doctrines of Aristotle, Albert follows principally Avicenna. He mentions Averroës more rarely, and generally only for the purpose of opposing him; still, he follows him occasionally, especially in his commentary on the *De Caelo*. In many particulars he follows Maimonides, as one less removed than the Arabian philosophers from ecclesiastical orthodoxy, especially in disputing against the arguments for the eternity of the world.

While Anselm of Canterbury applies his principle "*Credo, ut intelligam*," especially to the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the incarnation (in the *Cur Deus homo?*), Albert, while searching constantly for rational arguments in support of the articles of faith, and for the fortification of believers, the direction of the ignorant, and the refutation of the unbelieving, yet excludes the specifically biblical and Christian doctrines of revelation from the sphere of things knowable by the light of reason (*Summa Theol., Opp.*, Vol. XVII. p. 6: *et ex lumine quidem connaturali non elevatur ad scientiam trinitatis et incarnationis et resurrectionis*). He asserts (p. 32) as a reason for this, that the human soul has power only to know that, the principles of which it has in itself (*anima enim humana nullius rei accipit scientiam nisi illius, cujus principia habet apud se ipsam*), and since it finds itself to be a simple essence, containing no trinity of persons, it cannot conceive of the Godhead as tri-personal, except as illumined by the light of grace (*nisi aliqua gratia vel illuminatione altioris luminis sublevata sit anima*). Still Albert does not repudiate the Augustinian idea that natural things contain an image of the Trinity.

Logic is defined by Albert (*Opp.*, I. p. 5) as a speculative science, teaching us how to pass from the known to the knowledge of the unknown (*sapientia contemplativa docens qualiter et per quæ devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam*). He divides it into the doctrine of *incomplexa*, or uncombined elements, in regard to which it is possible only to inquire after the essence, which is denoted by their definition, and of *complexa*, or combinations of these elements, in connection with which the different modes of inferring are treated of. *Philosophia prima* or *Metaphysics* treats of that which *is*, as such, according to its most universal predicates, as which Albert designates, in particular, unity, reality, and goodness (*quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum, Opp.*, XVII. p. 158). Albert affirms the reality of the universal, because, if the universal were not real, it could not with truth be predicated of real objects. It could not be known if it did not exist in reality; it does exist as *form*, for in its form lies the entire being of an object. There are three classes of forms, and hence three modes of existence of the universal: 1) *before* the individuals, in the divine mind, 2) *in* the individuals, as the one in the many, and 3) *after* the individuals, as a result of abstraction, performed by us in thought (*De Natura et Origine Animæ Tr.*, I. 2: *et tunc resultant tria formarum genera: unum quidem ante rem existens, quod est causas formativa; aliud autem est ipsum genus formarum, quæ fluctuant in materia; tertium autem est genus formarum, quod abstrahente intellectu separatur a rebus*).

The universal *per se* is an eternal emanation from the divine intelligence. It does not exist independently out of the divine mind. The form present in material things, considered as the end of development (*finis generationis vel compositionis substantiæ desideratæ a materia*), is termed by Albert their reality (*actus*), but considered as including the full being of the object (*totum esse res*), it is termed their quiddity (*quidditas*). The principle of individuation is to be sought in matter, in so far as this is the bearer or substratum (*subiectum, ὑποκείμενον*) of forms. The particular form of each object depends on the nature and capacity of the matter of which it is composed (*ibid.*, I. 2). Matter contains in itself form potentially (*potentia*, it contains the *potentia inchoationis formæ*, *Summa Theol.*, II. 1. 4). Material generation or development is a process whose products are educed from matter (*educi e materia*) through the agency of an actually existing cause. Variety in material constitution is not the cause but the result of diversity of form (*Phys.*, VIII. 1, 13); but all individual plurality depends on the division of matter (in *Metaph.*, XI. 1: *individuum multitudo fit omnis per divisionem materiæ*). The matter of which any individual object (*hoc aliquid*) consists, is limited and distinguished by individuating accidents (*terminata et signata accidentibus individuantibus*). The particular is *substantia prima*, the universal is *substantia secunda*. The occasional denomination in Aristotle of the universal as a kind

of matter—which language it is difficult to reconcile with the doctrine that it is the form of a thing which constitutes its essence—is explained by Albert (in a manner similar to that in which Avicenna explains it) by the distinction of this matter, which is so called only in virtue of a logical usage, from real matter; he holds fast to the proposition, that the existence of the universal is formal and not material (*De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, I. 2. 3: *esse universale est formae et non materiae*). The universal is an essence fitted to give being to a plurality of objects (*essentia apta dare multis esse. Per hanc aptitudinem universale est in re extra*). But its only actual existence is in the intellect.

Albert teaches, with Aristotle, that those effects which are last in the order of reality are first in the order of our knowledge, and constitute its point of departure (the *posteriora* are *priora* quoad nos, *Summa Theol.*, I. 1, 5). From the experimental knowledge of nature we must rise to the knowledge of God as the author of nature, and from the experience of grace we ascend to the comprehension of the grounds of faith (*fides ex posterioribus crediti quaerit intellectum*). It is not the ontological, but the cosmological argument, which makes us certain of God's existence. God is not fully comprehensible to us, because the finite is not able to grasp the infinite, yet he is not altogether beyond our knowledge; our intellects are, as it were, touched by a ray of his light, and through this contact we are brought into communion with him (*Ib.*, I. 3, 13). God is the universally active intellect, which is constantly emitting intelligences from itself (*De Caus. et Procr. Univ.*, 4. 1: *primum principium est indeficientur fluens, quo intellectus universaliter agens indesinenter est intelligentias emittens*). God is simple, but he is not for this reason (as held by David of Dinant) to be regarded as that which is most universal, and identified with the *materia universalis*; for simple substances are distinguished from each other by themselves and not by constitutive differences. Nothing can belong in common to God and his creatures, and hence past and future eternity cannot belong to both. The world was not created out of a pre-existing matter—for God would be a being having need of something, if his working presupposed an already existing matter—but out of nothing. Time must have had a beginning, otherwise it would never have reached the present instant (*Summa Theol.*, II. 1, 3). Creation is a miracle, and cannot be comprehended by the natural reason, whence the philosophers never advance beyond the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which is applicable only to secondary causes and not to the first cause, and is of authority only in physics, and not in theology (*Summa de Creaturis*, I. 1, 1; *Summa Theol.*, II. 1, 4).

Only that whose existence is self-derived has by its very nature eternal being; every creature is derived from nothing, and would therefore perish, if not upheld by the eternal essence of God (*Summa Theol.*, II. 1, 3). By virtue of its community with God, every human soul is an heir of immortality. The active Intellect is a part of the soul, for in every man it is the form-giving principle, in which other individuals cannot share (*Intellectus agens est pars animae et forma animae*, *Metaph.*, XI. 1, 9). This same thinking and form-giving principle bears in itself the forces, which Aristotle calls the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, and motive faculties, and hence these latter are, like the former, capable of being separated from the body, and are immortal. To the refutation of the monopsychism of Averroës, which, as Albert himself testifies, was then widely accepted, and which asserted the unity of the immortal spirit in the plurality of human souls that are constantly arising into existence and perishing, Albert, by command of Pope Alexander IV., consecrated, in about the year 1255, an especial treatise (*De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, *Opp.*, Vol. V. p. 218 seq.), which he afterward incorporated into his *Summa Theol.* (*Opp.*, Vol. XVIII.); in it he opposes to thirty arguments, which might be advanced in favor of the Averroistic doctrine, thirty-six arguments of a contrary bearing. In his *De Natura et Origine Animae* (*Opp.*, Vol. V. f. 182) and in his Commentary on the third

book of Aristotle's *De Anima* (Tr., II. ch. 7) he returns to this same controversy. He designates the opinion combated by him as an "error completely absurd, most wicked, thoroughly reprehensible."

Between that which the reason recognizes as desirable, and that which natural propensity desires, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) decides; through this decision desire is transformed into perfect will (*perfecta voluntas*). The law of reason (*lex mentis, lex rationis et intellectus*), which engages us to act or not to act, is conscience (*conscientia*); this is inborn and imperishable, in so far as it is the consciousness of the principles of action: it is acquired and variable in relation to single cases (*unde lex mentis habitus naturalis est quantum ad principia, acquisitus quantum ad scila*). Albert distinguishes from conscience the moral capacity, which he, like Alexander of Hales (after Jerome in his commentary on the vision of Ezekiel, I. 4-10: *scintillae conscientias*, with reference to 1 Thess. i. 5), calls *synteresis* or *synderesis*; the former is a *habitus* (ἔξῃς), the latter only a *potentia* (δύναμις). Virtue he defines with Augustine as a quality of goodness in the mind, productive of right living and of no evil, and which God alone produces in man (*bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam solus Deus in homine operatur*). To the four cardinal virtues of the ancients and the Aristotelian virtues which were joined with them as "adjunct virtues," he gives the name of "acquired virtues," and adds to them, in imitation of Petrus Lombardus, the three theological or "infused" virtues: faith, hope, and love (*Ab. Opp.*, XVIII. pp. 469-480).

§ 101. Thomas of Aquino was the son of Landolf, Count of Aquino, and was born in 1225 or 1227 at the Castle of Roccasicca, near Aquino in the territory of Naples (ancient Arpinum). He received his first instruction from the monks of the Convent of Monte Cassino, and in early life was induced to enter the Dominican Order at Naples. He then continued his studies at Cologne and Paris, particularly under the guidance of Albert the Great, and became afterward a teacher of philosophy and theology at Cologne, Paris, Bologna, Naples, and other places. He died March 7, 1274, in the Cistercian Convent of Fossa Nuova, near Terracina, while on his journey from Naples to the Council of Lyons, and was canonized during the pontificate of John XXII., in the year 1323. He brought the Scholastic philosophy to its highest stage of development, by effecting the most perfect accommodation that was possible of the Aristotelian philosophy to ecclesiastical orthodoxy. He distinguished, however, the specifically Christian and ecclesiastical doctrines of revelation—which, in reply to the objections of their opponents, could only be shown by the reason to be free from contradiction and probable—from those doctrines which could be positively justified on rational grounds. Besides commentaries on works of Aristotle and numerous philosophical and theological monographs, he composed, in particular, the three following comprehensive works: the Commentary on the

Sentences of Peter the Lombard, in which he discussed subjects of theological controversy; the four books of the *De Veritate Fidei Catholicae contra Gentiles* (composed later, in 1261 and 1264), containing a rational demonstration of theology; and, lastly, the (unfinished) *Summa Theologiae*, in which all revealed doctrines were to be systematically presented. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in regarding knowledge, and pre-eminently the knowledge of God, as the supreme end of human life. On the question of universals he is a realist, in the moderate Aristotelian sense. The universal, he teaches, is, in the world of reality, immanent in the individual, being separated from it only by the abstracting mind; but our conception of the universal is not hereby rendered false, so long as we do not judge that the universal exists independently, but simply make it alone the subject of our attention and judgment. But Thomas recognizes, besides the universal *in* things or the Essence (the *forma substantialis* or *quidditas*) and the universal *after* things, or the concept which we form by abstracting in thought the essential (the *quidditas*) from the accidental (or the unessential attributes, *formas accidentales*), a form in which the universal exists *before* things, viz.: as ideas in the divine mind, *i. e.*, as the thoughts which God, before the creation of the world, had of the things to be created; it is only against the Platonic theory of ideas, as represented by Aristotle, that, in agreement with the latter, he assumes an attitude of decided opposition, rejecting as an idle fiction the hypothesis of ideas existing independently (separately), whether in things or in the divine mind. The existence of God is demonstrable only *a posteriori*, namely, from the contemplation of the world as the work of God. There must be a first mover, or a first cause, because the chain of causes and effects cannot contain an infinite number of links. The order of the world presupposes an orderer. God exists as pure, immaterial form, as pure actuality, wholly free from potentiality; he is the efficient and final cause of the world. The world has not existed from eternity; it was called into existence out of nothing by God's almighty power at a determinate instant in time, with which instant time itself began. Yet the non-eternity of the world in the past is not strictly demonstrable on philosophical grounds, but only probable, and it is only made certain by revelation. The immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality, since a pure form can neither destroy itself nor, through the dissolution of a material substratum, be destroyed. Immateriality must be ascribed

to the human intellect from the very nature of the latter. For the intellect thinks the universal; but if it were a form inseparable from matter, like the soul of a brute, it could think only the individual, and not the universal. Immateriality, further, is an attribute of the whole soul, since the sensitive, appetitive, motive, and even vegetative faculties, belong to that substance, which possesses the power of thought. The soul exercises the latter power without the aid of a bodily organ, whereas the lower functions can only be exercised by it through material organs. The human soul does not exist before the body. It does not acquire its knowledge through the recollection of ideas beheld in a pre-existent state, as Plato assumed. Nor does it possess innate conceptions. Its thinking rests on the basis of sensuous perceptions and of representative images, from which the active intellect abstracts forms. The will depends on the understanding; that which appears good, is necessarily sought after; but necessity arising from internal causes and reposing on knowledge, is freedom. In Ethics, Thomas adds to the natural virtues—in treating of which he combines Plato's doctrine of the four cardinal virtues with the doctrine of Aristotle—the supernatural or Christian virtues, namely, faith, love, and hope.

The complete works of Thomas Aquinas were published at Rome in 1570, in seventeen folio volumes; at Venice in 1594, Antwerp, 1612, Paris, 1660, Venice, 1787, Parma, 1852, etc. The editions of single works, especially of the *Summa Theologiae*, are extremely numerous. The source of information for his life is the *Biography* incorporated in the *Acta Sanctorum VII. Mart.*, written by Gulielmus de Thoco, a contemporary of Thomas, together with the *Acta* of the process of canonization. Of recent works on Thomas and his doctrine (many of which in the last few decades of years were occasioned by the Güntherian philosophy and the Thomist-Scholastic reaction against it), it may suffice to mention the following: Hürtel, *Th. u. A. und seine Zeit*, Augsburg, 1846; Carle, *Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de St. Thomas*, 1846; Montet, *Mémoires sur Thomas d'Aquin*, in the transactions of the *Acad. des sc. morales*, Vol. II., 1847, pp. 511-611; Ch. Jourdain, *La philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1858; Cacheux, *De la philosophie de St. Thomas*, Paris, 1858; Liberatore, *Die Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquino, übersetzt von E. Franz*, Mayence, 1861; Karl Werner, *Der h. Thomas von Aquino*, Regensburg, 1858, etc. (Vol. I.: Life and Writings; Vol. II.: Doctrine; Vol. III.: History of Thomism), cf. Gaudin, *Philosophia juxta h. Thomas dogmata*, new ed. by Roux Laverne, Paris, 1861; (E. Plassman, *Die Schule des h. Thomas von Aquino*, Soest, 1857-69); Anton Kietter, *Die Moral des h. Thomas von Aquino*, Munich, 1858; Olschinger, *Die speculative Theol. des Th. v. Aqu.*, Landshut, 1858, and *Quaestiones controversae de philosophia scholastica*, *ibid.*, 1859; Aloys Schmid, *Die thomistische und scottische Gewissheitslehre*, Dillingen, 1859; Kuhn, *Glauben und Wissen nach Thomas von Aquino*, in the *Thöl. theol. Quartalsschrift*, 1860, No. 3; Hejnr. Contzen, *Th. von A. als volkswirtsch. Schriftsteller, ein Beitrag zur national-ökon. Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters*, Leipzig, 1861; see the controversial works against the renewal of Thomism, such as those by Günther and Güntherians, and by Frohachammer, Michella, and others; Kuhn, *Philosophie und Theologie*, Tübingen, 1860; cf. those sections in the works on the history of philosophy in the Middle Ages, by Tenneman, Ritter, Haureau, and in the works on the history of dogmas and on Church history by Möhler, Neander, Baur, and others, which relate to this topic; Jellinek, *Th. von A.*, in the *Jüd. Lit.*, Leipzig, 1858. In the Review entitled *Der Katholik*, a number of articles have been published in different years (1859 seq.) containing a critique from its (Thomistic) stand-point of the recent literature bearing on Thomas of Aquino. J. v. Merten, *Ueber die Bedeutung der Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Augustinus und des heiligen Thomas von Aquino für den gesch. Entwicklungsengang der Philos. als reiner Ver-*

sumptibus, Treves, 1865. Albert Ritschl, *Gesch. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott*, in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.*, X. pp. 277-318 (relating especially to the theology of Thomas and Scotus). Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, III. pp. 107-118.

Of the works of Thomas Aquinas which relate to philosophy, should be named (in addition to the three larger ones above mentioned, viz.: the Commentary on the Sentences, the *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theol.*), in particular, the following: Commentaries on *Arist. de interpret.*, *Anal. post.*, *Metaph.*, *Phys.*, *Præca Naturalia*, *De Anima*, *Eth. Nic.*, *Polit.*, *Meteor.*, *De Cælo et Mundo*, *De Gen. et Corr.*, and on the *Liber de causis*; an early work entitled *De Ente et Essentia*, and numerous other minor treatises, such as *De Principio Individuationis*, *De Proposit. Modabilibus*, *De Fallaciis*, *De Eternitate Mundi*, *De Natura Materie*, etc. Several other treatises are either insufficiently authenticated (*De Natura Syllogismorum*, *De Inventionibus Medii*, *De Demonstrationibus*, etc.) or are probably spurious (*De Natura Accidentis*, *De Natura Genetis*, *De Pluralitate Formarum*, *De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, *De Universaliibus*, etc.).

The relation of philosophy to theology in the doctrine of Thomas is most distinctly expressed by him in the following words: "It is impossible for the natural reason to arrive at the knowledge of the divine persons. By natural reason we may know those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, but not those which pertain to the distinction of the divine persons, and he who attempts to prove by the natural reason the trinity of persons, detracts from the rights of faith" (*Sum. Theol.*, I., *Qu. 32, Art. 1*). In like manner the Church's doctrines of the creation of the world in time, of original sin, of the incarnation of the Logos, of the sacraments, purgatory, the resurrection of the flesh, the judgment of the world, and eternal salvation and damnation, are not to be demonstrated by natural reason. These revealed doctrines are regarded by Thomas as above, but not contrary to, reason. As regards these doctrines, reason can confute arguments, which are adduced in opposition to faith, either by showing them to be false, or by showing that they are not binding (*solvere rationes, quas inducit (adversarius) contra fidem sive ostendendo esse falsas, sive ostendendo non esse necessarias*). Reason can also find out for them analogies or probable reasons (thus Thomas himself, in the steps of Augustine, illustrates the mutual relation of the persons of the Trinity by the analogy of the soul, the Son, in particular, corresponding with the understanding, and the Spirit with the will); but it cannot from its own principles advance to the demonstration of those dogmas. The cause of this inability is, that reason can only conclude from the creation to God, in so far as God is the principle of all existence; but the creative power of God is common to the entire Trinity, and belongs, therefore, to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of persons (*S. Th.*, I., *Qu. 32, Art. 1*). The demonstration of the doctrines peculiar to Christianity is only possible when the principle of revelation is admitted and faith is given to the documents of revelation. But that which necessitates this admission and this faith is to be found partly in an inward moving of God, who invites us to faith (*interior instinctus Dei invitantis*), and partly in the miracles, in which are included the fulfilled prophecies and the triumph of the Christian religion. The indemonstrableness of the doctrines of faith is a source of the merit attaching to faith as an act of confidence in the divine authority. In the realm of faith the will has the pre-eminence (*principalitatem*). The intellect assents to the articles of faith in obedience to the command of the will, and not because forced to do so by proof. The truths cognizable by natural reason are the preambles of faith (*præambula fidei*), just as, in general, nature precedes grace and is not nullified by it, but perfected (*gratia naturam non tollit, sed perficit*). It is the *præambula fidei*, and only these, that are the subject of demonstrative arguments (*rationes demonstrativæ*, *Summa Theol.*, II. 2). But only a few are able in this way really to perceive the truths cognizable by natural reason; hence God has included them in his revelation. In so far, therefore, as the *præambula fidei* are themselves propositions to be believed, they are the *prima credibilia*, the basis and root of all others. By its demonstrations of the *præambula fidei*, and

by showing that the dogmas reserved for faith alone are not refutable by reason and as probable, natural reason subserves the interests of faith (*naturalis ratio subsevit fidei*).

This so precise determination of the boundaries of philosophical or natural theology, as opposed to the revealed doctrines of Christianity, was due to the influence of the monotheism of Aristotle and his Arabian and Jewish commentators. None of the earlier Scholastics and none of the Church Fathers expressed the distinction in this manner. That it was thus made by Thomas cannot be ascribed to the influence of the Platonic or Areopagitic doctrine, in which, the rather, the trinitarian idea was ever accustomed, now in a more rational, and now in a more mystical form, to find its support; Thomas was influenced rather by the fact that with Aristotle the unity of the divine essence was identical with the unity of the divine person. This distinction between the teachings of reason concerning God and the teachings of revelation continued prevalent (although opposed by Raymundus Lullius and others), and was even more strongly emphasized in the later periods of Scholasticism by the Nominalists. It appeared also in the post-Scholastic period, not indeed among the renewers of Platonism, who appealed to Plato and Plotinus and their disciples in confirmation of the dogma of the Trinity, but in the schools of Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz, until the Critical Philosophy of Kant withdrew not only the trinity, but as well the unity of the divine person, from the sphere of doctrines susceptible of theoretical or rational demonstration, and relegated all conviction respecting God and divine things to the province of mere faith—faith not indeed in the teachings of revelation, but in the postulates of the moral consciousness—while the schools of Schelling and Hegel again vindicated the right of the doctrine of the Trinity, speculatively modified or interpreted, to a place in rational theology. In this—but on the basis of Catholic Christianity—the latter were imitated by Günther and his disciples, who excluded from the sphere of reason only the *historical* mysteries of Christianity, but failed to secure the approbation of the ecclesiastical authorities. Thomism is now the ruling doctrine in the Catholic Church; and in Protestant theology, also, the (Thomist) distinction prevails. The decree, approved at Paris in the year 1271, asserting the supremacy of theology over philosophy (*ap. Du Boulay, III. p. 398; cf. Thurot, De l'orig. de l'enseign. dans l'univ. de Paris, Paris, 1850, p. 105 seq.*) and directing that no instructor in the Philosophical Faculty should treat of any specifically theological question (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation), favored the same distinction.

The logical and metaphysical basis of philosophy is with Thomas, even more decidedly than with Albert, the Aristotelian, although not without certain modifications derived partly from Platonism and partly from Christian theology. The Thomist doctrine of concepts, judgments, syllogisms, and proofs, is the doctrine of Aristotle. *Metaphysics* is made by him conversant with "being, as such, and its modifications" (*ens in quantum ens et passiones entis*). In itself each *ens* is *res* and *unum*; in distinction from others, it is *aliquid*; as in harmony with the action of the knowing faculties, it is *verum*; and as harmonizing with the will, it is *bonum*. Thomas holds with Albert the conciliatory and almost nominalistic form of Realism, which was taught by Aristotle, and according to which the universal is in reality immanent in the individual, from which it is by us mentally abstracted and regarded independently in consciousness. Yet Thomas does not altogether reject the Platonic doctrine of ideas, but only in certain regards. If, namely, by ideas are understood independently existing generalities, then Aristotle was right in arguing against these ideas, as against meaningless fictions (*Universalia non habent esse in rerum natura ut sint universalia, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata, De Anima, art. 1. Universalia non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus, Contra Gent., I. 65*). But taken in another sense—in which sense the doctrine of ideas is supported by the authority of Saint Augus-

line—Thomas recognizes the theory of ideas as unobjectionable, viz.: when the ideas are understood as thoughts immanent in the divine mind, and when their action upon the sensible world is conceived as merely indirect (*Contra Gentiles*, III. 24: *formas quas sunt in materia, venerunt a formis, quas sunt sine materia, et quantum ad hoc, verificatur dictum Platonis, quod formas separatas sunt principia formarum, quas sunt in materia, licet ponerit eas per se subsistentes et causantes immediate formas sensibilibus, nos vero ponimus eas in intellectu existentes et causantes formas inferiores per motum coeli*). Thomas admits, therefore, the existence of the universal in a threefold sense: *ante rem, in re, post rem* (*In Sent.*, II., dist., III., qu. 3). The cause, according to Thomas, which led Plato falsely to conceive the universal as possessing hypostatic existence, lay in his erroneous supposition that we could have no certain knowledge of abstract truth, unless the universal not merely possessed a reality of some sort, but also existed in the same manner in our thought and in external reality (*Summa Theol.*, I. 84: *credidit (Plato), quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo, quo est in cognito, et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in se ipsis subsistere, sc. immaterialiter et immobiliter*). Thomas demonstrates the incorrectness of this view by showing, in the steps of Aristotle, what is the nature of the process of abstraction. Just as the senses in their sphere are able to separate what *realiter* is not separate,—as the eye, e. g., perceives only the color and shape of an apple, and not its smell and taste,—so, and much more even, the mind can effect the like purely subjective separation by considering in the individuals only the universal (*De Potentiis Animae*, ch. 6: *quia licet principia speciei vel generis numquam sint nisi in individuis, tamen potest apprehendi animal sine homine, asino et aliis speciebus, et potest apprehendi homo non apprehenso Socrate vel Platone, et caro et ossa non apprehensis his carnibus et ossibus, et sic semper intellectus formas abstractas, id est superiora sine inferioribus, intelligit*). Thomas goes on to prove that this subjective abstraction (*ἀφαίρεσις*) in thought is not vitiated by the fact of its not being founded on an objective distinction and separation (*χωρισμός*) of things, employing the same argument which was employed in the twelfth century by the author of the *De Intellectibus* (see above, p. 396), the argument, namely, that the separation effected in thought appertains not to our judgment of the true state of the case, but is only an incident of the action of our minds, of the act of *attention* or *apprehension* (*ibid.*: *nec tamen falso intelligit intellectus, quia non iudicat hoc esse sine hoc, sed apprehendit et iudicat de uno non iudicando de altero*). If, as thus appears, the universal has no substantial existence in the sphere of reality, it must yet possess reality in some other form, because all science respects the universal, and would be illusory if the universal were without all reality; the truth of knowledge depends on the reality of the objects of knowledge. The universal exists in reality in the individual, as the one in the many, as the essence of things or their *quidditas*; the intellect performs only that act of abstraction whereby the universal becomes, in the intellect, the one *beside* the many.

The individualizing principle (*principium individuationis*) is matter, in so far as it is the substratum of forms or is bounded by determinate limits (*Materia non quomodolibet accepta est principium individuationis, sed solum materia signata, et dico materiam signatam, quae sub certis dimensionibus consideratur: De Ente et Essentia*, 2). Into the definition of man, matter in general (*materia non signata*) alone enters (in so far, namely, as man, as such, does not exist without matter); into the definition of Socrates, the matter, which is peculiar to him, would enter, if Socrates (the individual as such) could be defined (*Prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva, Summa Th.*, III. qu. 77, art. 2). This doctrine rests on the proposition which Aristotle (*Met.*, I. 6) opposes to the theory of the Platonists, who asserted that the idea was the principle of unity, and matter that of indeterminate plurality: *φαίνεται δ' ἐκ μᾶς ὅλης μία τράπεζα, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐπιτέρων εἰς ὧν πολλὰς ποιεῖ*). Thomists

(notably, for example, Ægidio Colonna, and, later, Paolo Soncini and others) employed the expression: "matter quantitatively determined" (*materia quanta*) to denote the principle of individuation, and referred, in justification, to the teaching of Thomas (in the *Summa 2. Gent.*, II. 49 et al.: *principium diversitatis individuorum ejusdem speciei est divisio materie secundum quantitatem*; *De Princ. Indiv.*, fol. 207: *quantitas determinata dicitur principium individuationis*). But this *quantitas determinata*, according to Thomas, is not the cause, but only the condition of the existence of individuals. It does not create the individual substance, but accompanies it inseparably and determines it in its actual and present form (*hic et nunc*, *De Pr. Ind.*, *ibid.*). It can, indeed, be objected to this doctrine, and was objected by Realists, who saw in the form the principle of individuation, that *quantitas* denotes a quantity already possessing individual determination, and that this determination is left unexplained. Moreover, since Thomas admits the existence of "separate" or immaterial forms (*formae separatae*), he teaches that these are individualized by themselves, since they have no need for their existence of a form-receiving substratum (*Formae separatae eo ipso, quod in alio recipi non possunt, habent rationem primi subjecti, et ideo se ipsis individuuantur*;—*multiplicatur in eis forma secundum rationem formae, secundum se et non per aliud, quia non recipiuntur in alio: omnis enim talis multiplicatio multiplicat speciem, et ideo in eis tot sunt species, quot sunt individua*, *De Nat. Mat.*, ch. 3; cf. *De Bot.* ch. 3). The correctness of this conclusion of Thomas may, indeed, be questioned. If the cause of individual existence is contained in a form-receiving principle (in a *ὑποκείμενον*, *subjectum*, or in some form of matter), then, if we admit that there are forms having an independent existence, we must of course admit with Thomas, that in them the form is its own substratum (*subjectum*, *ὑποκείμενον*). But the question is, whether we should not rather infer from the principle first laid down, that there are no "separate forms" which exist as individual essences, that all mere forms are merely universal (and hence, a *g.*, that the intellects of men are one in the Averroistic sense), and that all individuality depends on some kind of material existence. Duns Scotus (in imitation of earlier opponents of Thomas, who, about 1276, had already advanced similar objections) raised the question, how, if the doctrine of Thomas was true, the soul, which was immaterial, could be multiplied (*apud D. Thomam individuatio est propter materiam; anima autem in se ipsa est sine materia; quomodo ergo potest multiplicari*)?

Aristotle had regarded the Deity and the active intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), which was the only immortal part of the soul, as immaterial and yet individual forms; yet it is not perfectly clear how he conceived the relation between this immortal intellect and the individual soul into which it was reputed to enter from without. Among his earliest successors, the naturalistic leaning toward the conception of all form as immanent in matter, gained ground more and more; on this conception rest the doctrines of Dicaearch and Strato. Alexander of Aphrodisias conceded to the Deity, but to the Deity alone, a transcendent, immaterial, yet individual existence; but he represented the soul as completely dependent on matter in all that relates to its individual existence. The later Eriegetes, disciples of Neo-Platonism, defended the doctrine of the individual, independent existence of the human intellect (*νοῦς*), as well as that of the Deity, and in this they were followed by Thomas, in especial opposition to the Averroistic conception; and Thomas also, like Albert, ascribed to the soul, regarded as substantial and separate from the body, not only the highest functions, which are implied in thought, but also the lower ones.

Thomas discriminates between several classes of forms. Immaterial forms (*formae separatae*) are God, the angels, and human souls; the forms of sensible objects are inseparably united to matter.

God is the absolutely simple form; he is pure actuality. God's being is indeed *per se*

certain, because his essence is identical with his being, so that the predicate of the proposition, "God is," is identical with the subject. But God's being is not immediately certain for us, because we do not know what God is. God's existence, so far as our knowledge is concerned, is something to be proved, and the grounds for this proof are to be sought in that which is more knowable for us, although not most knowable in itself, i. e., in the works of God (*Summa Th.*, I. 2, 1). This methodical principle is the Aristotelian principle that the prior (*πρότερον*) or more knowable (*γνωριμώτερον*) by nature (*φύσει*) must be learned by us from that which is prior or more knowable for us (*ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον* or *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*), i. e., the conditioning from the conditioned. Accordingly, Thomas represents God as only a *posteriori* knowable for us, and regards those proofs, which, like Anselm's, are founded on the mere conception of God, as not binding. The system of faith, which presupposes the existence of God, proceeds from the consideration of God to the consideration of the created world; but in philosophy we must advance from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of God. When Thomas Aquinas says: God cannot be known *a priori*, he means by a *priori* knowledge that which Aristotle means by the same expression, viz.: a knowledge of things derived from the knowledge of their causes (which is obviously impossible in the case of the uncaused supreme cause), and not, according to the modern Kantian modification of that expression, knowledge which is wholly independent of experience. In a certain sense, says Thomas, man has naturally (*naturaliter*) the knowledge of God. He has it in so far as God is for him the happiness (*beatitudo*) for which he naturally seeks; for seeking implies a kind of knowledge. But for certain and clear knowledge proof is necessary; the existence of God is neither a mere article of belief, nor, like those propositions whose predicates are already contained in the concept of the subject (*S. Th.*, I. 2, 1), an axiomatic or self-evident truth (it is not an "analytical judgment" in the Kantian sense; and of "synthetic judgments *a priori*" there are, according to Thomas, none). After mentioning two arguments against the existence of God, of which the one is taken from the presence of evil in the world—which, it is affirmed, is incompatible with the existence of an infinite goodness—and the other from the possibility of tracing all natural results to nature and all intended ones to human thought and will, Thomas proposes (*Summa Th.*, I., *qu.* 2, *art.* 3) the following proofs of God's existence: 1. There must be a first unmoved principle of motion (after Arist., *Met.*, XII. 7). 2. The series of active causes cannot recede in *infinitum*, because in all regular causal series the first terms in the series are the causes of the middle terms, and these are the causes of the last. (The finiteness of the number of terms, which was to be proved, is here presupposed by Thomas). 3. The accidental depends on the necessary, and the necessary either on something else that is necessary or on itself; hence, since this series also cannot extend backwards in *infinitum*, there must exist a necessary being, the cause of whose necessity is not to be found anywhere but in himself, and which being is the cause of necessity for other things. 4. There are found in things different degrees of perfection; hence there is something which has the highest degree of perfection and is, therefore, the cause of the perfection, goodness, and reality of all other things; that is, there exists a most perfect or most real being. 5. Natural objects, which have not the power of knowledge, nevertheless act as if with intelligence; but that which has no knowledge can only then work with an appearance of intelligence, when it is directed by a knowing being, as the arrow is directed by the archer. Natural causes are therefore insufficient for the explanation of the processes of nature, and there must be assumed to exist an intelligent being as their guide and ruler. Thus the ultimate explanation of natural effects and also of human actions, in so far as they imply an unconscious adaptation of means to ends, cannot be found in nature and the human mind, but must be referred to God as their first

cause; the existence of evil does not conflict with this, since God overrules for good the evil which he permits.

Thomas follows Albert in refuting the pantheistic doctrine of Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinant, that God is the essence of all things, and hence either their *forma universalis*, which Amalrich may have taught, or the *materia universalis*, as professed by David. This doctrine was maintained on the ground that, if God were not himself the most universal of things, he would be distinguished therefrom by a specific difference, and so consist of *genus* and *differentia*, and consequently not be simple; but only inasmuch as he is the absolutely simple being can God be the absolutely necessary being. Thomas denies that all diversity implies specific differences and a generic agreement. Two objects, he says, may suffer absolutely no comparison with each other (may be completely disparate), and such is the relation between the infinite and the finite (*quod differant non aliquo extra se, sed quod differant potius se ipsis*, In Libr. II. Sent., Distinct. XVII., qu. 1, art. 2).

All beings, says Thomas, except God were created by God. At the creation God chose from the various possible worlds the best one, and gave to it reality. The world has not existed from eternity, but only since a definite moment, with which moment time itself began. Thomas regards the creatureship of the world not as a matter of mere faith, but as scientifically demonstrable (by the above cited proofs of the existence of God as the author of the world), but the beginning of the world in time he regards as only an article of faith and not philosophically demonstrable; the arguments of Aristotle for the past eternity of the world are in his view not conclusive, and yet he is at the same time just as far from ascribing to the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the world in time full demonstrative force. The dictum: The efficient cause must precede in time that which it causes (*oportet, ut causa agens precedat duratione suum causatum*), is, he says, not true in relation to a perfect cause; God could by his almighty power create an eternal world. That the world was created from nothing does not (as Albert and his predecessors had assumed) prove its temporal origin; for "from nothing" (*ex nihilo*) implies only the non-existence of anything from which the world was made (*non esse aliquid, unde sit factum, or non ex aliquo*); but this non-existence does not need to be referred to a temporal past, and "from nothing" (*ex nihilo*) implies something which followed *after* this nothing (*post nihillum*), not necessarily in the sense of temporal succession, but only in that of order (*posterius secundum ordinem naturae*). Nor would the world, if eternal, be like God in essence; for the world is subject to constant change in time, while God is unchangeable. The principle of the impossibility of a *regressus in infinitum in causis efficientibus* offers no difficulty, for in the world there are only intermediate causes, and the absolute cause is not involved in the question of the world's eternity. If the incompatibility of the past eternity of the world with the immortality of the individual human soul be affirmed (an objection afterward renewed by Luther), on the ground that in the past infinity of time there must have come into being an infinite number of souls, which could yet not actually co-exist, Thomas rejoins, that at least the angels, if not men, could have been created from eternity. Accordingly, Thomas affirms: *mundum incipisse (initium durationis habuisse) sola fide tenetur*, "that the world had a beginning in time, is an article of mere belief." The preservation of the world, Thomas, with Augustine, conceives as an ever-renewed creation (*Contra Gent.*, II. 38; *S. Th.*, I. qu. 46 and 104). Cf. Frohschammer, *Ueber die Ewigkeit der Welt*, in the *Athenäum*, I., Munich, 1862, p. 609 seq.).

The angels were the first and the noblest creatures of God. They have their being not through themselves, but from God; their being is not identical with their nature. They are not absolutely simple. The plurality of angels is a plurality of individuals; but since they are immaterial, the difference between them in the sense explained above (p. 446) can

only be conceived of as of the same nature with the difference between species; as many as are the individuals, so many are the species (*tot sunt species, quot sunt individua*). Among the angels must be classed the intelligences which move the stars. That the stars are moved, not by a physical, but by an intellectual cause (hence either by God or by angels), Thomas holds to be apodictically certain, and that they are moved by angels he regards as rationally probable (*C. Gent.*, III. 23 *et al.*). (Cf. A. Schmid, *Die peripatetisch-scholastische Lehre von den Gestirngeistern*, in the *Athenäum*, I., Munich, 1862, pp. 549-589).

Like the angels, so also the souls of men are immaterial forms, *formae separatae*. Thomas accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body, as also the Aristotelian division of the psychical functions; but ascribes to the same soul, which as *voûs*, or rational soul, has individual and yet immaterial existence and is separable from the body, the animal and vegetable functions, so that for him the form-producing principle of the body, the *anima sensitiva*, *appetitiva*, and *motiva*, and, finally, the *anima rationalis*, are all one and the same substance. (This doctrine attained at the Council of Vienne, 1311, to the authority of a dogma.) The vegetative and animal faculties, which Aristotle conceived as necessarily connected with the body, are represented by Thomas (as by Albert) as depending only in their temporal activity on bodily organs. The intellect alone works without an organ, because the form of the organ would hinder the correct knowledge of other forms than itself (*Comm. de An.*, III. 4; *S. Th.*, I., *qu.* 75, *art.* 2). God and the active and passive human intellects are related to each other as are the sun, its light, and the eye (*Quodlibeta*, VII., VIII.). The forms, which the passive intellect takes from the external world through the senses, are rendered really intelligible by the active intellect, as the colors of bodies are made really visible by the light, and through abstraction they are raised by the same agency to an independent existence in our consciousness. All human knowledge depends on an influence of some sort exerted by the objects known on the knowing soul. There is no knowledge that is innate and independent of all experience. He who is deprived of a sense wants the corresponding conceptions; one born blind has no conception of colors. The human intellect needs, in order to its earthly activity, a sensuous image (*phantasma*), without which no actual thought is possible for it, although the senses as such grasp, not the essence of things, but only their accidents. (*S. Th.*, I., *qu.* 78, *art.* 3: *sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia solum*. *S. Th.*, I., *qu.* 84 (cf. *qu.* 79): *Intellectus agens facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia per modum abstractionis cujusdam*. *Ib.*, *qu.* 84: *Impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indicis apparet. Primo quidem, quia quum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicujus corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad ejus actum actus alicujus potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam, unde manifestum est, quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendi scientiam de novo, sed etiam utenda scientia jam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et caeterarum virtutum. Videmus enim, quod impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praecepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in se ipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua phantasmata, per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspicat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando aliquem volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. Hujus autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a*

corpore separata, et per huiusmodi intelligibile materialia cognoscit; intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens, et per huiusmodi naturas visibilibus rerum etiam in invisibilibus rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit, de ratione autem huius naturae est, quod non est abeque materia corporali.— Si autem proprium objectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata, vel si formae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus secundum Platonicos, non oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata.

The Averroistic theory of the unity of the immaterial and immortal intellect in all men (*intellectum substantiam omnino ab anima separatam esseque unum in omnibus hominibus*), whereby individual immortality was rendered theoretically impossible, is termed by Thomas an "*error indecentior*," which had for some time been acquiring influence with many persons. He argues partly against the correctness of the Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle, and partly against the Averroistic teaching itself. In opposition to the interpretation, he asserts that it results clearly from the words of Aristotle, that the active intellect, in the opinion of Aristotle, belonged to the soul itself (*quod hic intellectus sit aliquid animae*), that it was not a material faculty and that it worked without a material organ, and that it therefore existed separate from matter and entered from without into the body, after the dissolution of which it could still remain active. Against the truth of the Averroistic doctrine Thomas advances the arguments that the possession by man of an intellect separate from the soul would not justify us in calling man himself a rational being, while yet rationality is the specific difference which separates man from the brutes, that with reason you take away at the same time the will, and therefore the moral character, and finally, that the necessary relation of thought to sensuous images (*phantasmata*) could not subsist in an intellect separated from the soul. But the theory of the unity of the active intellect in all men seems to him absurd, because there would follow from it the individual unity of different persons and the complete similarity of their thoughts, consequences that contradict experience. But it must be remarked that these objections are only pertinent in case the one intellect separable from all individuals is interpreted, not as the one common mind existing in the plurality of rational individuals, but as an intellect existing individually for and by itself externally to them.

Thomas pronounces himself equally opposed to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the human soul, and in favor of the doctrine of its continued existence after the termination of its terrestrial life. To the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence he opposes the argument that for the soul, as the "*form*" of the body, union with the body is natural, and separation, if not *contra*, is at least *praeter naturam*, hence accidental, and therefore also subsequent to union (*quod convenit alicui praeter naturam, inest ei per accidens; quod autem per accidens est, semper posterius est eo quod est per se. Animae igitur prius convenit esse unitam corpori quam esse a corpore separatam*). God creates the soul outright, as soon as the body is prepared for it (*C. Geni*, II. 83 seq.). But the immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality. Forms which inhere in matter are destroyed by the dissolution of this matter, as are the souls of animals on the dissolution of their bodies. But the human soul, which, since it has the power of cognizing the universal, must subsist apart from matter, can neither be destroyed by the dissolution of the body with which it is united, nor by itself, since *necessary* being is implied in the very conception of form, which is actuality, and such being is therefore inseparable from such form (*S. Th.*, I. 75, 6: *impossibile est, quod forma subsistens desinat esse*). (This argument is similar to that of Plato in the *Phaedo*, viz.: that life is inseparable from the soul according to the very idea of the latter.) Thomas joins with this the argument drawn from the longing of the soul after immortality, and founded on the principle that a natural longing cannot remain unsatisfied. The desire of unending

being is natural to the thinking soul, because the latter is not confined in its thoughts by the limit of the Now and the Here, but is able to abstract from every limitation, and desire follows knowledge (*S. Th.*, I. 75). Immortality belongs not merely to the thinking power, but also to the lower powers, for all of these belong to the same substance with the thinking power, and depend only for their active manifestation, not for their existence, on bodily organs (*Ib.*, qu. 76: *discendum est, quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine nisi sola anima intellectiva, et quod ipsa sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas et facit ipsa sola quicquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt*—*Anima intellectiva habet non solum virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi*, *Ib.*, qu. 76, art. 5). Since this thinking and feeling soul is at the same time the form-giving principle of the body, it forms for itself after death, by means of this very power, a new body, similar to its former one (*Summa c. Gent.*, IV. 79 seq.).

In Ethics Thomas follows Aristotle in the definition of virtue and in the division of the virtues into ethical and dianoetic, the latter being also ranked by him, as by Aristotle, as the higher. He ranks, further, the contemplative life, in so far as the contemplation is theological, above the practical. But to the philosophical virtues, chief among which Thomas, with Albert, reckons the four cardinal virtues, he adds the theological virtues of faith, love, and hope; the former, as acquired virtues, lead to natural happiness, but the latter, the theological virtues, as being infused by God (*virtutes infusae*), lead to supernatural happiness. Thomas's doctrine of virtue is made still more complicated by his adoption (after Macrobius) of the Plotinic distinction between civil, purifying, and perfecting virtues (*virtutes politicae, purgativae, exemplares*). The will is not subject to the necessity of compulsion—where compulsion is opposed to desire—but to that necessity which does not destroy freedom, the necessity of striving after ends. Voluntary action is self-action, i. e., action resulting from an internal principle (*Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, id est a principio intrinseco*, *Summa Th.*, I, qu. 106). The animal, confined as he is to the particular, judges of ends by instinct, but man does so freely and after comparison by the reason (*ex collatione quadam rationis*). By calling up one or another class of ideas we can control our decisions. The choice lies in our power; still, we have need of divine help in order to be truly good, even in the sphere of the natural virtues, which, if man had not fallen, he could have practiced by his own strength. The moral faculty (*synderesis* or *synteresis*), which was not destroyed by the fall of man, cannot be a mere potentiality. It is a *habitus quidam naturalis principiorum operabilium, sicut intellectus habitus est principiorum speculabilium*;—*conscientia est actus, quo scientiam nostram ad ea quae agimus, applicamus*. Highest and perfect happiness is the vision of the divine essence; and this, since it is a good which surpasses the power of created beings to produce, can only be given to finite spirits by the agency of God (*Summa Th.*, I., qu. 82 seq.; II. 1 seq.).

In 1286 Thomas was made a *doctor ordinis* by the Dominicans; afterward the Jesuits also adopted substantially his teaching. His authority early became so generally recognized in the Church beyond the circle of his order as to justify the title of honor, "*Doctor universalis*." Still more frequently was Thomas called "*Doctor angelicus*." Of his immediate disciples, the most noteworthy are Ægidius of Colonna, of Rome, an Augustinian monk extolled as *Doctor fundatissimus* (1247–1316); the Dominican monk, Hervæus Natalis (Hervæus of Nedellec in Brittany, renowned as an opponent of the Scotists (died at Narbonne in 1323); Thomas Bradwardine (died 1349), who upheld strongly the doctrine of determinism, in opposition to the semipelagianism of the Scotists, and William Durand of St. Pourçain (Durandus de S. Porciano, died 1332, called "*Doctor resolutissimus*"), who, however, from being a supporter of Thomism, became its opponent, and prepared the way for nominalism. We may mention also Ægidius of Lessines—who defended the Thomist doc-

trine in a work entitled *De Unitate Formae*, written in 1278—and Bernardus de Trilia (died 1292), who wrote *Quaestiones de Cognitione Animae*, and Johannes Parisiensis (about 1290), who was perhaps the author of the "*Defensorium*" of the Thomist doctrine against the "*Correctorium fratris Thomae*," written (in 1284) by William Lamarre, a Franciscan; the *Defensorium* (printed at Venice in 1516) has usually been ascribed to Egidius Romannus. Farther, Gottfried of Fontaines (*de Fontibus*), the teacher at the Sorbonne, from whose *Quodlibeta*, composed about A. D. 1283, Hauréau (*Ph. Scol.*, II. p. 291 seq.) gives some extracts, favored Thomism. Dante's poetry is also based on the doctrine of Thomas (cf. Vol. II., § 3, of this work, and especially the work there cited of Ozanam on Dante and the Cath. Philos. in the thirteenth century, Paris, 1845; cf. also Wegele, *Dante Alighieri's Leben und Werke*, 2d ed., Jena, 1865; Charles Jourdain, *La philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, II. p. 128 seq., and Hugo Delff, *Dante Alighieri*, Leipsic, 1869. Delff points out, in particular, the influence of Platonism and Mysticism in the works of Dante). Of the later Thomists, the most prominent was Franz Suarez, who died in 1617. Of him, as the last chief of Scholasticism, K. Werner has written at length (in a work published at Regensburg in 1861).

§ 102. Johannes Duns Scotus, born at Dunston, in Northumberland (or, according to others, at Dun, in the North of Ireland), distinguished himself in the Franciscan Order as a teacher and disputer, first at Oxford, then, in 1304 and the following years, at Paris, and in 1308 at Cologne, and died while still young (according to the ordinary account at the age of thirty-four) at Cologne, in November, 1308. As an opponent of Thomism he founded the philosophical and theological school named after him. His strength lay rather in acute, negative criticism of the teachings of others, than in the positive elaboration of his own. Strict faith in reference to the theological teachings of the Church and the philosophical doctrines corresponding with their spirit, and far-reaching skepticism with reference to the arguments by which they are sustained, are the general characteristics of the Scotist doctrine. After having destroyed by his criticism their rational grounds, there remains to Scotus as the objective cause of the verities of faith only the unconditional will of God, and as the subjective ground of faith only the voluntary submission of the believer to the authority of the Church. Theology is for him a knowledge of an essentially practical character. Duns Scotus limits the province of natural theology by reckoning not only, with Thomas, the Trinity, the incarnation, and the other specifically Christian dogmas, but also the creation of the world out of nothing and the immortality of the human soul, as among the propositions which reason cannot demonstrate, but can only defend as being beyond the reach of refutation and as more or less probable, and which revelation alone rendered certain. Still he by no means affirms in principle the antagonism of

reason and faith. In philosophy, the authority of Aristotle is not so great with him as with Thomas; he adopts many Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions, with which he became familiar especially through Avicbron's (Ibn Gebirol's) "Fountain of Life." All created things, says Scotus, have besides their form some species of matter. Not matter, but form, is the individualizing principle; the generic and specific characters are modified by the individual peculiarity, which is what renders an object capable of being designated as "this" (gives it its *haecceitas*). The universal essence is distinct, not only in the intellect, but also in reality, from the individual peculiarity, although it does not exist apart from the latter; the distinction is not merely virtually present in things and afterward realized by the mind, but it exists formally in the things themselves. The soul unites in itself several faculties, which differ from one another, not *realiter*, as parts or accidents or relations, but *formaliter*, as do unity, truth, and goodness in God (the *Ens*). The human will is not determined by the understanding, but has power to choose with no determining ground. The undetermined freedom of the will is the ground of the merit of that self-determination which is in conformity with the divine will.

There exists only the following complete edition of the works of Duns Scotus: *Joh. Duns Scoti, doctoris subtilis ordinis minorum, opera omnia collecta, recognita, notis et scholiis et commentariis ill.*, Lyons, 1689. This edition was prepared by the Irish fathers of the Roman College of St. Isidorus; Lucas Wadding, the annalist of the Franciscan Order and principal editor of the edition, is ordinarily named as its editor. It does not contain the *Positiva*, t. e., the Commentaries on the Bible, but only the philosophical and dogmatic writings (*quas ad rem speculativam spectant* or *disertationes scholasticas*). Vol. I. *Logica*. II. *Comment. in libros Physic.* (apurious); *Quaestiones supra libros Arist. de anima*. III. *Tractatus de rerum principio, Theoremata, Collationes*, etc. IV. *Expositio in Metaph.* *Conclusiones metaphysicas, Quaestiones supra libros Metaphysicorum*. V.-X. *Distinctiones in quatuor libros sententiarum*, the so-called *Opus Oxoniense*. XI. *Reportatorium Parisiense libri quatuor*, the so-called *Opus Parisiense*, the Commentary on the *Sentences* of Petrus Lombardus, which was written down by persons who heard his lectures at the University of Paris (in Erdmann's judgment less perfect in expository form, though, in some of its theorems, indicating greater maturity than the *Opus Oxoniense*). XII. *Quaestiones quodlibetales*. The *Quaestiones quodlibetales* was published separately, Venice, 1606, the *Reportata super IV. l. sententiarum*, Paris, 1617-18, and by Hugo Cavellus, Cologne, 1635, the *Quaestiones in Ar. l. g.*, 1520 and 1622, *Super libros de anima*, 1528, and by Hugo Cavellus, Lyons, 1625, the *Distinctiones in quatuor libros sententiarum*, by Hugo Cavellus, Antwerp, 1630. Among the earlier works on Scotism, that of Joannes de Rada is particularly instructive. It is entitled: *Controversiae theologicae inter J. Thomam et Scotum super quatuor libros sententiarum, in quibus pugnantiae sententiae referuntur, potiores difficultates elucidantur et responsiones ad argumenta Scoti rejiciuntur*, Venice, 1609, and Cologne, 1620. A *Summa Theol.* was compiled from the works of Duns Scotus by the Franciscan monk Hieronymus de Fortino; a general exposition of the Scotist doctrine is given by Fr. Eleuth. Albergoni in his *Resolutio doctrinae Scoticae, in qua quid Doctor subtilis circa singulas quas exagitat quaestiones sentiat, breviter ostenditur*, Lyons, 1648. Of more recent authors, Baumgarten-Crusius has written a *De Scoti*, Jena, 1826. The philosophical system of Scotus is described in the larger histories of philosophy; cf. also Erdmann, *Andeutungen über die wissenschaftliche Stellung des Duns Scotus*, in the *Theol. Studien und Kr.*, 1868, No. 3, pp. 439-451, and *Grdr. der Geschichte der Philos.*, I, § 218-215; Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, III. 203-223.

In the doctrine of Duns Scotus, as in that of Thomas, philosophy was made almost throughout ancillary to theology in all that concerns the general and specifically Christian dogmas. *Theologia Naturalis* was indeed confined by Scotus within narrower limits, but it was not abolished. Natural reason, said Scotus, conducts to the beatifying vision of God, but needs to be completed by revelation. It does not conflict with the teachings of revelation, and, so far from being indifferent in its relation to these teachings, it furnishes them with an essential support. As a theologian, Scotus defended the doctrine, first made a dogma in our times, but which is in complete correspondence with the spirit of Catholicism, the doctrine of the *immaculata conceptio B. Virginis*, whereas Thomas had not yet recognized it. The criticism of the opinions of others, which is the predominant characteristic in the writings of Scotus, is not a speculation with reference to the nature or principles of Scholasticism, and tending to the destruction of Scholasticism; for his object remains always the establishment of a harmony between philosophy and the teaching of the Church. His doubting is not to the prejudice of faith; he says (*In Sent.*, III. 22): Faith does not exclude all doubt, but only victorious doubt (*nec fides excludit omnem dubitationem, sed dubitationem vincentem*). Although, therefore, Scotus' critique of the validity of the arguments for Christian doctrine might and necessarily did prepare the way for the rupture between philosophy and theology, and although some of his utterances went beyond the limit which he prescribed for himself in principle, Scotism is none the less, like Thomism, one of the doctrines in which Scholasticism culminates.

The relation of Duns Scotus to Thomas of Aquino was similar to that of Kant to Leibnitz. Thomas and Leibnitz were dogmatists; Duns Scotus and Kant were critics, who disputed more or less the arguments for the theorems of natural theology (especially those for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul), but did not deny the truth of the theorems themselves; both founded the convictions, for which the theoretical reason no longer furnished them with proofs, on the moral will, to which they assigned the priority over the theoretical reason. A fundamental difference is indeed to be found in the circumstance that for Duns Scotus the authority of the Catholic Church, for Kant that of the personal moral consciousness, is the court of final appeal, and in the further circumstance that Kant's critique is radical and universal, while that of Scotus was only partial. But as Scotus to the doctrines of the Church, so Kant to the convictions of the universal religious consciousness ever maintains the positive relation of one who assents to them in that particular sense in which that consciousness understands them.

Having enjoyed in his youth the advantage of discipline in mathematical and other studies, Duns Scotus knew what was meant by *proving*, and could therefore recognize in most of the pretended proofs offered in philosophy and theology no real proofs. At the same time the authority of the Church was in his view sacred and inviolable. The harmonious combination of the desire for scientific exactness with the disposition to accept with faith the Church's dicta, characterizes the "*Doctor subtilis*." With him logic is a science, like physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. But in theology, notwithstanding that its object is the highest of all objects, he finds it difficult to recognize the characteristics of a science, because it maintains itself only on grounds of probability and is of much greater practical than theoretical importance.

With Albert and Thomas, Duns Scotus agrees in assuming a threefold existence of the universal: it is *before* things, as form in the divine mind; *in* things, as their essence (*quidditas*), and *after* things, as the concept formed by mental abstraction. He, too, condemns nominalism and vindicates for the universal a real existence, on the ground that otherwise our knowledge through concepts would be without a real object; all science, he says, would resolve itself into mere logic, if the universal, to which all scientific knowledge

relates, consisted merely of rational concepts. Reality seems to him in itself indifferent in relation to universality and individuality, so that both can equally belong to its sphere. But Duns Scotus is not at one with his predecessors on the subject of the relation of the universal to the individual. The universal should not, according to him, be identified with the form nor the individualizing principle with the matter; for the individual, as the *ultima realitas*, can, since individual existence is not a deficiency, only through the addition of *positive* determinations arise from the universal, i. e., only when the universal essence or the *quidditas* is completed by the individual nature (*haecceitas*). Just as *animal* becomes *homo*, when to life the specific difference of *humanitas* is added, so *homo* becomes Socrates, when to the generic and specific essence the individual character, the *Socralitas*, is added. Hence also the immaterial can be individual in the full meaning of this term; the Thomist view, that in angels species and individual coincide, and that, therefore, every angel is alone in its kind, is to be rejected. In the single object the universal is not only *virtualiter* but *formaliter* distinct from the individual, but not separated from it, as one thing is separated from another thing. Duns Scotus seeks to prevent the confounding of his doctrine with the Platonic doctrine (in the sense in which, from the accounts of Aristotle, he understands and combats that doctrine, *Opus Oxon.*, II., *dist.* 3; *Report. Paris.*, I., *dist.* V. 36; *Theorem.*, 3 et al.).

The most universal of all concepts is, according to Duns Scotus, the concept of Being (*Ens*, see *De An.*, *qu.* 21). This concept is of wider signification than are the logical categories, or it is a "transcendent" concept, for not only the substantial *is*, but also the accidental *is*; in like manner it is more general than the concepts God and the world, for *being* is a predicate of both, and that, too, not merely *aequivoce* (not by mere homonymy, similarity of words without similarity of meaning). Yet this concept is not properly to be called the highest generic concept, for the genus presupposes likeness of category; no genus can at once include what is substantial and what is accidental. Hence the expression "generic concept" is inapplicable to the concept *Ens*, and, in general, to all transcendental concepts. The other *transcendentalia* besides *Ens* are called by Duns Scotus *passiones Entis*, or modifications of being. He distinguishes (*Metaph.*, IV., *n.* 9) two kinds of them, the simple (*unicas*) and the disjunctive (*disjunctae*). Among the former he reckons One, Good, True (*unum, bonum, verum*); among the latter identity or difference (*idem vel diversum*), contingency or necessity (*contingens vel necessarium*), and actuality or potentiality (*actus vel potentia*). The distinction of equal and unequal, like and unlike, can also be regarded as transcendent, when not referred merely to the categories of quantity and quality (*Opus Oxon.*, I., *dist.* 19, *qu.* 1).

God, as being *actus purus*, is absolutely simple. His existence, according to Scotus, does not follow for us from the mere idea which we have of him (*ex terminis*), nor is it demonstrable *a priori*, i. e., by reasoning from his cause, since he has no cause, but only *a posteriori*, i. e., from his works. There must be an ultimate cause superior to all else, which cause is at the same time the ultimate end of all things, and this is God. Scotus admits, however, the impossibility of arriving in this way—i. e., by arguing from the finite—at the strict demonstration of anything more than the existence of one ultimate cause, on which all things finite depend. It is impossible in this way to prove the existence of an absolutely almighty cause, or the creation of the world out of nothing (*Opus Oxon.*, I., *dist.* 42; *Rep. Paris.*, I., *dist.* 42; *Quodlib.*, *qu.* 7). In so far as man is the image of God, self-contemplation may furnish him a point of departure from which he can rise *via eminentiae* to the knowledge of the divine nature (*Opus Oxon.*, I., *dist.* 3).

Everything which is not God, including the created spirit, has matter and form. But the matter which underlies the human soul and the angels, is very different from that of

which bodies are composed. Duns Scotus calls matter, when not yet determined by form *materia prima*, but makes a further, threefold distinction between *materia primo-prima*, the most universal basis of all finite existence, created and formed immediately by God, *materia secundo-prima*, the substratum in which *generatio* and *corruptio* take place, and which is changed and transformed by the second or created class of agents (*agentia creata* or *secundaria*), and *materia tertio-prima*, the matter which is shaped by the artist, or, in general, by any external agent, after it has received, through the internal operation of nature, a natural form, and before it has as yet been shaped in agreement with the form intended by the artist. The *materia secundo-prima* is a *materia primo-prima* distinguished by the mark of perishability, and the *materia tertio-prima* is a *materia secundo-prima* determined by natural *generatio*. There exists no matter besides the first-named, but only this under various forms (*materia prima est idem cum omni materia particulari*). In connection with the theorem that every created substance, whether spiritual or corporeal, has some form of matter, Duns Scotus expressly affirms his adhesion to the doctrine of Avicembron (whom Albert and Thomas had opposed), saying: "*ego autem ad positionem Avicembronis redeo*." (Cf. Avicembron's doctrine, above, § 96, and in Munk, *Mél.*, p. 9 seq.) Like Avicembron, so also Scotus regards as that which is most universal, matter, absolutely undetermined, which, since it is undifferentiated, is the same in all created beings (*quod unica sit materia*), so that the world appears to him as a gigantic tree, whose root is matter, whose branches are all perishable substances, whose leaves are the changeable accidents, whose fruit the angels are, and which God planted and cares for (*De Rerum Princ.*, qu. VIII.). Duns Scotus, the hierarchist and enemy of the Jews, who even held it justifiable to resort to the compulsory agency of the secular power to force Jews into the Church, had no suspicion that Avicembron, on whose teachings his own were founded, was the Jew Ibn Gebirol, whose songs were highly esteemed in the synagogue.

The fundamental proposition of Scotus in psychology and ethics was this: *voluntas est superior intellectui*, the will is superior to the intellect. The will is the moving agent in the moving element in the whole realm of the soul, and everything obeys it. In his doctrine of the speculative functions Scotus agrees mostly with Thomas. He too opposes, even more decidedly than his predecessor, the theory of in-born knowledge; he does not admit such knowledge even in the angels, in whom Thomas represents God as having implanted, by radiation from himself, intelligible forms. The intellect forms universal concepts by abstraction from perceptions. It is unnecessary that between knowledge and its object there should subsist an equality (*aequalitas*), but only a proportion between the knowing agent and the object known (*proportio motivi ad mobile*). Thomas, says Scotus, taught incorrectly, that the lower is unable to know the higher. In the act of perception Scotus teaches that the soul is not a mere recipient, but an active participant. He emphasizes still more the activity of the soul in the higher speculative functions, and especially in its free assent to propositions which are not absolutely certain. Besides external perception, which takes place *per speciem impressam*, Scotus recognizes an intuitive act of self-apprehension on the part of the soul *per speciem expressam*, *quam reflexione sui ipsius supra se exprimit*; for, he says, through its essence alone the soul is not conscious of itself, but attains to self-consciousness only when in itself it produces out of its essence the image (*species*) of itself (*De Rerum Princ.*, qu. XV.). But Scotus' doctrine of the will is entirely different from that of Thomas. Thomas teaches the determination of the will, Scotus its indetermination. Thomas affirms the doctrine of predestination in the strict, Augustinian sense of the term. Scotus teaches a doctrine of Synergism not far removed from Pelagianism. According to Thomas, God commands what is good, because it is good; according to Scotus, the good is good, because God commands it. The relation between the under-

standing and the will in us is an image of the same relation as it exists *eminenter* in God. The fundamental psychical powers in us are an image of the persons in God, and thus render possible for us a certain natural knowledge of the Trinity. Creation, incarnation, the necessity of accepting the merit of Christ as atonement for our guilt, are facts depending solely on the free-will of God, unconditioned by any rational necessity. He might have left the world uncreated. He might, if he had willed it, have united himself with any other creature instead of man. The suffering which Christ endured as a man is not necessarily, but only (according to the Scotist theory of acceptance) because he accepts it, an equivalent reckoned to the credit of the believer for the punishment made necessary by his guilt. Thus the pre-eminence ascribed by Scotus to the will over the reason in God and in man resolves itself in fact into the omnipotence of the arbitrary will of the Deity.

The most noted of the disciples of Duns Scotus were Joh. de Bassolis, who seems to have taught before Occam a philosopher, whose doctrines he never mentions; Antonius Andreæ, the "*Doctor dulcificus*" (died about 1320); Franciscus de Mayronis, the "*Magister abstractionum*" or "*Doctor illuminatus*" (died A. D. 1325—his works were printed at Venice in 1520), who is said (this widely-accepted supposition has been disproved by Charles Thurot, in *De l'organisation de l'enseignement dans l'Université de Paris au moyen-âge*, p. 150) in 1315 to have caused the rule for disputations at the Sorbonne (*actus Sorbonici*) to be promulgated, which provided that the defender of a thesis must reply from six o'clock in the morning till six in the evening to all objections which were made to it; Walter Burleigh (Burlæus, born 1275, died about 1337), the "*Doctor planus et perspicuus*" and the realistical opponent of Occam; and Nicolaus de Lyra, Petrus of Aquila, and others.

§ 103. Of the contemporaries of Thomas of Aquino and Duns Scotus, the following are those who are of most importance as philosophers: Henry Goethals (of Muda, near Ghent, hence called Henricus Gandavensis, born about 1217, died 1293), who defended, in opposition to the Aristotelianism of Albert and Thomas, a doctrine more allied to the Platonism of Augustine; Richard of Middletown (Ricardus de Mediavilla, born about 1300), a Franciscan, who followed more nearly the Scotist than the Thomist doctrine; Siger of Brabant (de Curtraco—died before 1300), who passed over from a type of doctrine akin to Scotism to Thomism; Petrus Hispanus of Lisbon (died 1277, as Pope John XXI.), whose *Summulæ Logicales* were of considerable influence among the Scholastics, as a guide to the practice of logic; Roger Bacon (born at Ilchester 1214, died 1294), who became by his devotion to natural investigation a forerunner of Bacon of Verulam; and Raymundus Lullus (born 1234 on the island of Majorca, died 1315), who found for his fanciful theory of the combination of concepts, with a view to the conversion of the unbelieving and the reformation of the sciences, a great number of partisans (Lullists), even in later times, when the unsatisfying character of Scholasticism and an indefinable impulse toward the novel favored all sorts of quixotic attempts. In addition to the schools which acknowledged

the authority of the Church, there arose anti-ecclesiastical thinkers, who regarded philosophical and theological truth as two different things, or even rejected the theology of the Church as untrue.

Henrici Gandavensis Quodlibeta theologica, Paris, 1513, etc.; *Summa questionum ordinariam*, Paris, 1520; *Summa theologiae*, *ibid.* 1520, Ferrara, 1646. François Huet treats of Henry of Ghent, in *Recherches historiques et critiques sur la vie, les ouvrages et la doctrine de Henri de Gand, surnommé le docteur solennel*, Ghent, 1833.

Ricardi de Mediavilla comm. in quatuor libr. Sentent., Venice, 1489 and 1509, Brescia, 1591; *Quodlibeta*, Venice, 1507 and 1509, Paris, 1510 and 1529.

The *Summulas Logicales* of Petrus Hispanus have been very often printed, beginning in 1490, at Cologne, Venice, Leipzig, etc.; see Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, III, Leipzig, 1867, pp. 85-40.

R. Baconis opus majus ad Clementem IV., ed. Sam. Jebb, London, 1733; Venice, 1750. *Ejusdem epist. de secretis artis et naturae operibus atque nullitate magiae*, Paris, 1542. Cousin discovered fragments of the *Opus Minus*, an epitome, made by Roger Bacon himself, of the *Opus Majus*, and the whole of an introductory work, the *Opus Tertium* (published by J. S. Brewer in *Rerum Brit. med. aevi script.*, London, 1860). On Roger Bacon, cf. Emile Charles, *R. B.*, Paris, 1861, and H. Siebert, *Inaug.-Diss.*, Marburg, 1861; cf. also an article on *R. B.* in Gelzer's *Protest. Monatsbl.*, XXVII No. 2, February, 1896, pp. 68-82.

Raymundi Lullii opera ea, quae ad inventionem ab ipso artem universalem pertinent, Strasburg, 1596, etc. *Opera omnia*, ed. Salzinger, Mayence, 1721-42. Cf. Jo. Henr. Allstedtii *clavis artis Lullianae et verae logicae*, Strasburg, 1609; Perroquet, *Vie de R. Lulle*, Vendôme, 1667. On Raymundus Lullus and the beginnings of the Catalanian Literature, A. Hefferich (Berlin, 1868) has written. The logic of Lullus is described minutely in Prantl's *Gesch. der Log.*, III, pp. 145-177.

Henry of Ghent, surnamed "*Doctor solennis*," adopting the Platonic-Augustinian form of doctrine, according to which the Idea represents the universal, affirmed that in the divine mind there existed only ideas of genera and species, and none of individuals. He denied the doctrine of Thomas of Aquinas, who taught that in God there was an idea of each particular object ("*idea hujus creaturae*"); the divine knowledge of individuals is already contained in the knowledge of their genera. Henry of Ghent objected to the denomination of the matter of sensible objects as non-real and merely potential; he regarded this matter, rather, as a real substratum, capable of receiving forms. With Henry of Ghent were united Stephen Tempier, Robert Kilwardby, and, especially, William Lamarre, as early opponents of Thomism.

Richard of Middletown opposed both the theory that the universal exists *actually* in individual objects and the doctrine that matter is the principle of individuation; he laid stress on the practical character of theology and the non-demonstrableness by philosophical arguments of the mysteries of faith.

Siger of Brabant, who taught at the Sorbonne, wrote a Commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and *Quaestiones Logicales*, and other logical works, extracts from which are given in the *Hist. littéraire de la France*, XXI, pp. 96-127. Cf. Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.*, III, p. 234 seq. Dante (*Paradiso*, X. v. 136) mentions Siger as an excellent teacher.

Petrus Hispanus, after the example of William Shyreswood (who, born at Durham, studied at Oxford, afterward lived in Paris, and died in 1249 while Chancellor of Lincoln), and perhaps also of Lambert of Auxerre (about 1250, if indeed Lambert was the real author of the "*Summa Lamberti*," which was very similar to the Compendium of Petrus Hispanus, and exists in MS. at Paris), expanded the logic of the schools by incorporating into it new grammatical and logical material. The much-used manual of Petrus Hispanus, "*Summulae Logicales*," presents logic in seven sections or "*tractates*." Their titles are: 1. *De Enunciatione*, 2. *De Universalibus*, 3. *De Praedicamentis*, 4. *De Syllogismo*, 5. *De Locis Dialecticis*, 6. *De Fallaciis*, 7. *De Terminorum Proprietatibus (parva logica)*. The first six

sections contain in substance the logic of Aristotle and Boëthius (the so-called "*logica antiqua*," which must be distinguished from the "*vetus logica*," i. e., the formerly known logic, the logic already known before 1140); the seventh section, on the contrary, contained the additions of the moderns (*modernorum*). This seventh section, on the "properties of terms," treated *de suppositionibus* (by the *suppositio* was understood the representation by the concept of that which was contained in the extension of the concept, so that, e. g., *omnis homo mortalis est*, stood for *Cajus mortalis est*, *Titius mortalis est*, etc.), *de relativis*, *de appellationibus*, *de ampliacione*, and *de restrictione* (expanding or restricting the meaning of an expression), *de distributione* and *de exponibilibus*, which latter belonged also to the chapter entitled *De dictionibus syncategorematicis* (by which are to be understood the other parts of speech besides the noun and verb). The origin of these grammatico-logical speculations is questionable. That they were borrowed by the Western logicians from the "Synopsis of Psellus" (which, in the form in which it has come down to us, contains only the principal part of the doctrine of the *suppositio*, but may originally have contained the other parts of the seventh section of the *Summulae*) is (notwithstanding Prantl's support of it) an untenable hypothesis (see above, the Note to § 95, p. 404). Some of the new terms and doctrines were formed with reference to passages in the then newly-known works of Aristotle and his Greek commentators, and, probably, also of Arabian logicians belonging to the first half of the thirteenth century; others, and apparently the greater number of them, are older, and it is probable that they arose in the course of the twelfth century through a combination of the grammatical tradition with the logical (e. g., *suppositio*, according to Thurot's hypothesis, from the grammatical use of the word *suppositum* in Priscian; in Priscian, II. 15, is found the statement that the disiecticians recognized as parts of speech only the noun and the verb, and called other kinds of words "*syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia*"); yet, as to the origin of many terms, no sufficient evidence is at hand.

Roger Bacon was educated at Oxford and Paris, being a pupil of Robertus Capito, Petrus de Mahariscuria (Meharicourt, in Picardy), the physicist, and others, and became subsequently a Franciscan monk. He preferred to study nature rather than bury himself in scholastic subtleties. He studied mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, and optics, partly from Greek, Arabian, and Hebrew works, and partly by the personal observation of nature. Pope Clement IV. was his patron; but after the death of the latter he was obliged to atone for his opposition to the spirit of his times by many years of confinement. He did not succeed in diverting the interest of his contemporaries from metaphysics and directing it to physics and philology.

Raimundus Lullus (or Lullius) found a not insignificant number of partisans credulous enough to believe in the fanciful system whose merits he so vaingloriously vaunted. He was the author of an art of invention, which depended on the placing in different circles of various concepts, some formal, others material, so that, when the circles were turned, every possible combination was easily produced by mechanical means, presenting a motley conglomerate of sense and nonsense. Raimundus Lullus was also acquainted with the secret doctrine of the Cabala, which he attempted to employ in the interests of his intended improvement of sciences. He blamed Thomas for holding the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation to be indemonstrable; with his way of conducting "proofs" and "conquering" unbelievers, he found the demonstration of these dogmas not difficult. That the enthusiast met with applause needs no explanation.

Even during the most flourishing periods of Scholasticism, there were never wanting *anti-ecclesiastical* philosophemes, which were derived from the Aristotelian philosophy, especially in the Averroistic interpretation of the latter. That the first acquaintance with

foreign philosophy led to heterodox ideas has already been remarked (§ 98). It was, perhaps, the same influence which enabled the dialectician, Simon of Tournay, at Paris (about 1200), with equal facility (openly) to demonstrate the truth of the doctrines of the Church and (secretly) to show their untruth. It soon became a favorite practice with many to distinguish between philosophical truth (or whatever was directly inferable from the Aristotelian principles) and theological truth (harmony with the doctrines of the Church), which distinction, in the presence of the many unsustainable attempts to combine the two, had its perfect relative justification, but was a negation of the principle of Scholasticism, was condemned by the ecclesiastical authority, and failed in this period to become a ruling idea. This distinction flowed more particularly from Averroism (cf. Ern. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, p. 213 seq.). Already, in the year 1240, Guillaume d'Auvergne, then Bishop of Paris, made several theorems which were borrowed from the Arabs (and probably from the work *De Causis*) the subject of official censure. In the year 1269 Etienne Tempier, then Archbishop of Paris, summoned an assembly of teachers of theology, by whom thirteen Averroistic propositions were examined and (in 1270) condemned. But the anti-ecclesiastical doctrines continued to assert themselves. In the year 1276 Pope John XXI. censured the assertion that truth was twofold, and in 1277 Etienne Tempier found occasion to censure propositions like the following, which were professed by philosophers at Paris: God is not triune and one, for trinity is incompatible with perfect simplicity; The world and humanity are eternal; The resurrection of the body must not be admitted by philosophers; The soul, when separated from the body, cannot suffer by fire; Ecstatic states and visions take place naturally, and only so; Theological discourses are based on fables; A man, who is furnished with the moral and intellectual virtues, has in himself all that is necessary to happiness (see the supplement to the fourth book of the editions of Petrus Lombardus; Du Boulay, *Hist. univ. Paris.*, tom. III. pp. 397, 442; Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus*, Paris, 1728, I. p. 175 seq.; Charles Thurot, *De l'origine de l'enseignement dans l'univ. de Paris au m.-Age*, p. 105 seq.). One of the chief seats of Averroism was Padua. In about the year 1500 the doctrine of the twofold character of truth prevailed among Averroists and Alexandrists (cf. below, Vol. II., § 3).

§ 104. Preceded by Petrus Aureolus, the Franciscan (died 1321), and William Durand of St. Pourçain, the Dominican (died 1332), William of Occam, the "*Venerabilis Inceptor*" (died April 7, 1347), following in his terminology the "modern" logic, renewed the doctrine of Nominalism. The philosophical school which he thus founded, while in itself nearly indifferent with reference to the doctrine of the Church, acknowledged nevertheless the authority of the latter, but rendered it, at least in material respects, no positive services. Occam not merely, like Scotus, reduced the number of theological doctrines which, as Thomas had taught, were demonstrable by pure reason, but denied that there were any such. Even the existence and unity of God were, in his judgment, merely articles of faith. With him the critical method rose to an independent rank. The Nominalism of Occam was rather a continuance of the contest against Realism, than a positive and elaborate system. The particu-

lar alone being recognized as real, and the universal being represented as a mere conception of the thinking mind, great weight was laid on the external and internal perceptions, by which the particular is apprehended. With this doctrine prevailing, and with the co-operation of other influences tending in the same direction, it became easier than, when Realism prevailed, it had been to impose limits on Scholastic abstraction, and the way was prepared for an inductive investigation of external nature and of psychical phenomena.

Petri Aureoli Verberii archiepiscopi. Aqueensis commentar. in quatuor libros sententiarum, Rome 1596-1605. Cf. Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.*, III. pp. 819-827.

Durandus de St. Porciano comm. in magistr. sentent., Paris, 1508, Lyons, 1568, Antwerp, 1576. Cf. Prantl, III. pp. 292-297.

Güll. Occam, *Quodlibeta septem*, Paris, 1487, Strasburg, 1491; *Summa totius logice, or Tractatus, logices in tres partes divisa*, Paris, 1488, Venice, 1591, Oxford, 1675; *Quæstiones in libros Physicorum*, Strasburg, 1491, 1506; *Quæstiones et doctores in quatuor libros sententiarum*, Lyons, 1495, etc. *Centilogium theologicum*, *Ibid.* 1496; *Expositio aurea super totam artem oratoriam, videlicet in Porphyris prædicabilia et Arist. prædicamenta*, Bologna, 1496. Occam's *Disputatio super potestate ecclesiastica prælatu atque principibus terrarum commissa* was published by Melchior Goldast (it had been previously published in Paris in 1598) in the *Monarchia*, Vol. I. p. 185 seq., and his *Defensorium*, addressed to John XX., by Ed. Brown, in the Appendix to the *Fascic. rerum arpetendarum et fugiendarum*, p. 486 seq. Cf., on him, Rettberg's article on Occam and Luther, in the *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1839. W. A. Schreiber, *Die polit. u. relig. Doctrinen unter Ludwig dem Bayer*, Landshut, 1858, Prantl, *Der Unicearenstreit im 13 und 14 Jahrhundert*, in the Reports of the Ph. Cl. of the Munich Academy, 1864, I. 1, pp. 58-67, and *Gesch. der Log.*, III. pp. 327-420, and, on his and in general on the nominalistic doctrine of God, A. Ritschl, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, No. 1, 1868.

Pierre Aureol (Petrus Aureolus), born at Verberie-sur-Oise, and surnamed "*Doctor abundans*" or "*Doctor facundus*," professed a conceptualism which excluded from the sphere of real existence all genera and species (*In l. pr. Sent.*, dist. 23, art. 2: *manifestum est quod ratio hominis et animalis prout distinguitur a Socrate, est fabricata per intellectum nec est aliud nisi conceptus;—non enim fecit has distinctas rationes natura in existentia actuali*). He enounced the principle subsequently known as the Law of Parcimony (*In Sent.*, II., dist. 12, qu. 1: *non est philosophicum, pluralitatem rerum ponere sine causa; frustra enim fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora*). He held that we perceive things themselves without the intervention of "*formae speculares*" (*Ibid.*: *unde patet, quomodo res ipsae conspiciuntur in mente, et illud, quod intuemur, non est forma alia specularis, sed ipsamet res, habens esse apparens, et hoc est mentis conceptus, sive notitia objectiva*).

Durand de St. Pourçain (Durandus de St. Porciano), who has been mentioned above (p. 453) among the Thomists, began to teach in Paris in 1313. He was summoned to Rome some time after, became Bishop of Puy-en-Velay in 1318, and died in 1332. It is probable that his teaching at Paris preceded that of Occam, who about 1320 had acquired a reputation in that city, and hence that the opposition which he finally waged against Thomist opinions, which at first he had accepted, is not (with Rousselot, whose view is refuted by Hauréau, *Ph. Sc.*, II. p. 410 seq.) to be ascribed to the influence of Occam. He taught as follows: The universal and individual natures form together one and the same object, and are distinguished only by the manner in which we apprehend them; the genus and species, in other words, express in an indefinite manner that which the individual presents definitely. (This is an anticipation of the doctrine of Wolff, the Leibnitzian, that the individual, in distinction from the generic or specific concept resulting from abstraction, is that which is in all respects determined. The words of Durand are as follows:

Universale est unum solum secundum conceptum, singulare vero est unum secundum esse reale. Nam sicut actio intellectus facit universale, sic actio agentis singularis terminatur ad singulare.—Non oportet praeter naturam et principia naturae quaerere alia principia individui.—Nihil est principium individuationis, nisi quod est principium naturae et quidditatis). There exist only individuals; Socrates is an individual by the very fact of his existence (*In I. I. Sent., dist. 3*). The abstraction of the universal from the particular is not the operation of a distinct active intellect, as Averroës erroneously supposed, but of the same faculty which is affected by external impressions. Nor is it more true that the universal exists before the action of the intellect (*intellectio* or *operatio intelligendi*). On the contrary, the universal is the result of this action, the object from the contemplation of which it is derived being separated in our thoughts from the individualizing conditions (*In I. I. Sent., dist. 3, qu. 5: universale non est primum objectum intellectus nec prae existit intellectioni, sed est aliquid formatum per operationem intelligendi, per quam res secundum considerationem abstrahitur a conditionibus individuantiibus*).

William, born at Occam in the county of Surrey, in England, a Franciscan and pupil of Duns Scotus, and afterward teacher at Paris, took sides, in the contest of the hierarchy against the political power, with the latter. Pursued by the Pope, he fled to Lewis of Bavaria, who protected him, and to whom he said: "Do thou defend me by the sword, and I will defend thee with my pen" (*tu me defendas gladio, ego te defendam calamo*). As the renewer of Nominalism, he received from the later Nominalists the title of "*Venerabilis Inceptor*;" he was also called by his followers "*Doctor invincibilis*."

William of Occam founds his rejection of Realism on the principle: Entities must not be unnecessarily multiplied (*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*). He combats the realizing and hypostatizing of abstractions (*Sufficientia singularia, et ita tales res universales omnino frustra ponuntur*). From the fact that our knowledge depends on our possession of universal conceptions, it does not follow that the universal as such has reality. It is enough that the individuals, which in the formation of judgments are designated or represented together by the same concept, exist *realiter* (*scientia est de rebus singularibus, quod pro ipsis singularibus termini supponunt*). The *termini*, ὅροι, are, according to Petrus Hispanus, *compositi ex voce et significatione*. The Nominalists were hence called also *Terminists*. Occam employs *supponere pro aliquo*, taken intransitively, as synonymous with *stare pro aliquo*. This usage, as Thurot has shown, had become customary at least as early as the year 1200. When *supponere* is used transitively, the *termini* are the *supponentia* and the individuals the *supposita*.) The hypothesis of the real existence of the universal, argues Occam, leads, in whatever form it may be expressed, to absurdities. If (with Plato) independent existence be ascribed to the universal, the effect is to make of the latter an individual object. If it be represented as existent in individual things, so that in reality, and without reference to our thinking, it is distinguished from the individual, then the universal is pluralized or multiplied in proportion to the number of individuals, and is consequently individualized; but a "formal" distinction, supposed to exist in the individual object as such, were of necessity a real one, and can therefore not be assumed to exist. But if, on the contrary, the universal be asserted so to exist in the particular, that only the process of abstraction performed by us can give it separate reality, then it does not exist as universal in the particular, for thinking does not determine the nature of the external object, but only generates the concept in us. The universal, therefore, does not exist in things, but only in the thinking mind. It is a "mental conception, signifying univocally several singulars" (*conceptus mentis, significans univocè plura singularia*). It exists in the mind, not substantially (*subjective*), but as a representation (*objective*), while outside of the mind it is only a word, or, in general, a sign of whatever kind, representing

conventionally several objects. Each thing is as such individual (*quaelibet res eo ipso quod est, est haec res*). The cause of each thing is, by that very fact, at the same time the cause of its individual existence. The act of abstraction, by which the universal is formed in the mind, does not presuppose an activity of the understanding or will, but is a spontaneous, second act, by which the first act, i. e., perception, or the image left by perception in the memory (*habitus derelictus ex primo actu*), is naturally followed, as soon as two or more similar representations are present (*In Sent.*, I., *Dist.* 2; *Summa tot. log.*, ch. 16). The Aristotelian doctrine of categories is treated by Occam as resting on a division, not of things, but of words. The categories have, according to him, primarily a grammatical reference, and it is to this character of the categories that (like Trendelenburg, in more recent times) he directs particular attention.

Just as mental representations do not exist substantially in us, so the so-called Ideas do not exist substantially, or as parts of the divine essence, in God. They are simply the knowledge which God has of things; and they are his knowledge of particular, concrete things, since it is only these that exist *realiter* (*ideae sunt primo singularium et non sunt specierum, quia ipsa singularia sola sunt extra producibilia et nulla alia*). All this, however, is only true provided it is at all permitted us to represent to ourselves the divine knowledge after the analogy of our own.

Since all that exists is individual, it follows that intuition is the natural form of our cognition (*In Sentent.*, I., *dist.* 3, *qu.* 2: *nihil potest naturaliter cognosci in se nisi cognoscatur intuitive*). By intuitive knowledge, Occam understands a knowledge by which we are made to know whether a thing is or is not; the judgment itself is then made by the intellect. The act of judgment (*actus iudicativus*) presupposes the act of apprehension (*actus apprehensivus*). Abstracted knowledge, on the contrary, justifies no judgment in a question of existence or non-existence. Yet the most certain knowledge is not obtained through the senses; through them we receive only signs of things, which are indeed connected with the latter, but are not necessarily similar to them, just as, for example, smoke is a natural sign of fire, or groaning of pain, without its being true that smoke is similar to fire or groaning to pain. (Words are arbitrary signs of the conceptions of the mind, depending on human agreement, *συμβολή*, and are therefore only signs of signs and, indirectly, of things.) In judging of the existence of external objects deception is possible. The intuitive knowledge of the intellect concerning our own internal states is more certain than all sense-perception (*Intellectus noster pro statu isto non tantum cognoscit sensibilia, sed etiam in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua intellectibilia, quae nullo modo cadunt sub sensu, non plus quam substantia separata cadit sub sensu, cujusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio, tristitia et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensibilia nobis, nec sub aliquo sensu cadunt*, *In I. Sent.*, *Prol.*, *qu.* 1). But only the states, not the essence of the soul are known in this way. Whether sensations and feelings, and intellectual and volitional acts are the work of an immaterial Form, we do not know by experience, and the proofs offered on behalf of such an hypothesis are uncertain (*Quodl.*, I., *qu.* 10).

But Occam by no means restricts knowledge to that which is intuitive. On the contrary, he affirms that science is the evident knowledge of the necessarily true, which knowledge can be generated by the agency of syllogistical thinking (*ib.*, *qu.* 2). The fundamental principles are obtained from experience by induction. Occam does not, however, show how it is possible for apodictical knowledge to rest on the basis of experience (a possibility that is founded in the regularity, or conformity to law, of the real world itself, the knowledge of which is taken into our consciousness through processes of perception and thought regulated by the norms of logic), and from his stand-point it was impossible to show this. Consequently he was not protected against the (not less plausible than false)

objection of the subjective *a priori* philosophers (an objection which, in more recent times, has been advanced against his doctrine by Tennemann, the disciple of Kant, among others), namely, that the principles on which the generalization of experiences depends cannot themselves be derived from experience.

To the identification of the thinking mind (*anima intellectiva*) with the feeling soul (*anima sensitiva*) and with the soul as form-giving principle of the body (*forma corporis*) Occam is unfriendly. The sensitive soul is extended, he teaches, and is joined *circumscriptive* with the body, as the form of the latter, so that its parts dwell in separate parts of the body. But the intellective soul is another substance, separable from the body and joined with it *diffinitivè*, so that it is entirely present in every part. Occam's argument for the (ancient Aristotelian) doctrine of the separate substantial existence of the intellect (*νοῦς*) is founded on the antagonism of sense and reason, which, in Occam's opinion, is inconceivable as existing in one and the same substance.

Occam's principles could not lead to a rational theology, since all knowledge which transcends the sphere of experience was relegated by him to the sphere of mere faith. God, teaches Occam, is not cognizable by intuition; nor (as the ontological argument supposes) does his existence follow from the conception which we have of him (*ex terminis*); only an *a posteriori* proof, and that not a rigorous one, is possible. That the series of finite causes cannot contain an infinite number of terms, but that it implies God as a first cause, is not strictly demonstrable; a plurality of worlds, with different authors, is conceivable; the most perfect being is not necessarily infinite, etc. Nevertheless, Occam considers that the existence of God is indeed rendered probable on rational grounds (*Centil. theol.*, 1 seq.); but, for the rest, he declares that the "articles of faith" have not even the advantage of probability for the wise of this world and especially for those who trust to the natural reason ("*pro sapientibus mundi et præcipue innitentibus rationi naturali*"). The precepts of morals are not, in the view of Occam (who in this agrees with Scotus), in themselves necessary, it is conceivable, that God, if his will had been different, would have sanctioned, as being just and good, other principles than those which we are now taught to consider as the foundation of justice and good. Nor is the human will subordinate to the understanding. That the doctrine of the Trinity, according to which the one divine essence is entirely present in each of the three divine persons, implies the truth of Realism, is expressly admitted by Occam (*In Sent.*, I., *dist.* 2, *qu.* 4); but he is contented that in relation to subjects like this only the authority of the Bible and of Christian tradition, and not the principles of experimental science, should be accepted. The will to believe the indemonstrable is meritorious.

With Occam and his successors, the Scholastic axiom of the conformity of faith to reason gave place before what till their time was but a sporadically (see above, § 103, p. 460) appearing consciousness of their discrepancy. This consciousness led, among a portion of those who philosophized, to the postulation of two mutually contradicting kinds of truth, and those who adopted this postulate concealed, under a semblance of submission to the Church, their real espousal of the cause of philosophical truth. Mystics and reformers, on the contrary, were led by the same cause to take sides against the reason of the schools and to assert the claims of unreflecting faith.

§ 105. Among the Scholastics of the latest period, when Nominalism, renewed, was acquiring more and more the supremacy, the most noteworthy are John Buridan, Rector of the University of Paris in 1327 (died after 1350), and of importance for his investigations con-

cerning the freedom of the will and his logical text-book; Albertus de Saxonia, who taught at Paris about 1350-1360; Marsilius (or Marcelius) of Inghen (died 1392), who taught at Paris about 1364-1377, and afterward at Heidelberg; Peter of Ailly (1350-1425), the Nominalist, who defended the doctrine of the Church, but gave precedence to the Bible rather than to Christian tradition, and to the Council rather than to the Pope, and who sought in philosophy to steer between skepticism and dogmatism; Raymundus of Sabunde, a Spanish physician and theologian, and teacher of theology at Toulouse, who (about A. D. 1334-36, or perhaps still earlier) sought in a rational, yet, in some respects, rather mystical manner, to demonstrate the harmony between the book of nature and the Bible; and, lastly, Gabriel Biel (died in 1495), the Occamist, whose merit lay not in any original advancement of philosophical thought effected by him, but only in his clear and faithful presentation of the nominalistic doctrine. Of the Mystics of this later period, who for the most part are of more importance in the history of religion than in that of philosophy, d'Ailly's pupil and friend, Johannes Gerson (1363-1429), may here be mentioned, on account of his attempted combination of Mysticism with Scholasticism.

Joh. Buridan, *Summa de Dialectica*, Paris, 1487, *Compendium Logice*, Venice, 1489, *Quæstiones in octo libros phys.*, *De Anima*, *Parva Naturalia*, Paris, 1516, *In Arist. Metaph.*, Paris, 1518, *Quæstiones in decem libros ethic.*, Paris, 1489, and Oxford, 1687, *In Polit. Arist.* Paris, 1500, and Oxford, 1640.

Alberti de Saxonia *Quæstiones in libros de Cælo et de Mundo*, Venice, 1497.

Marsilli *Quæstiones supra quatuor libros sententiarum*, Strasburg, 1501.

Petri de Alliaco *Quæstiones super quatuor libros sentent.*, Strasburg, 1490. *Tractatus et sermones*, *ibid.*, 1490.

G. Bielt *Collectorium ex Occamo*, Tübingen, 1512. Gabriel Biel *in quatuor Sententiarum*, I. Tübingen, 1501. Cf. Linsenmann, *Gabriel Biel und die Anfänge der Universität zu Tübingen in der Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1865, pp. 195-226; G. Biel, *Der letzte Scholastiker, und der Nominalismus*, *ibid.*, pp. 449-481 and 601-676.

Gersonis *Opera*, Cologne, 1488, Strasburg, 1488-1502, Paris, 1521, Paris, 1606, and ed. by du Pin, Antwerp, 1704. Of Gerson treat, among others, Engelhardt, *De Gersonio mystico*, Erl., 1823, Lecuy, *Vie de G.*, Paris, 1885, Ch. Jourdain, Paris, 1888, C. Schmidt, Strasburg, 1889, Mettenleiter, Augsburg, 1857, and Joh. Baptist Schwab, Würzburg, 1859.

Raymundi *Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum* was printed two or three times before 1488, then at Strasburg in 1496, Lyons, 1507, Paris, 1509, etc., and recently, Sulzbach, 1859 (but without the prologue named in the Index), his *Dialogi de natura hominis* (a summary of the preceding work) at Lyons, 1st edition, 1568. Cf. Montaigne, *Essays*, II. 12. Among those who have written of Raymundus are Fr. Holberg, *De theol. nat. R. de S.*, Halle, 1843, David Matske, *Die natürliche Theologie des R. v. S.*, Breslau, 1946, M. Huttler, *Die Religionsphilosophie des R. v. S.*, Augsburg, 1851, C. C. L. Kleiber, *De R. edita et scripta* (Progr. of the Dorotheenstr. Realschule), Berlin, 1856, Fr. Nitzsch, *Quæstiones Raymundanae*, in *Niedner's Zeitschr. f. hist. Theol.*, 1859, No. 3, pp. 399-425, and C. Schaarschmidt in *Herzog's Theol. Realenc.* Vol. XII. 1860, pp. 571-577.

John Buridan, a pupil of Occam, discussed only the problems of logic, metaphysics, and ethics, and not those belonging specifically to theology. In his *Logic* he sought particularly to teach how to find the middle term, which could be conceived as a sort of bridge

between the *termini extremi*, and since, according to Arist., *Anal. Post.*, I. 34, it is in the quick discovery of middle terms that quickness of intellect is manifested, this introduction to the practice of logic, which might be of service to the more obtuse, was called *propositum astinorum* (according to Sanctacrucius, *Dial. ad mentem Scoti*, I. 3, 11, *ap.* Tennemann, *Gesch. der Philos.*, VIII. p. 916). Buridan declared it impossible (*In Eth. Nic.*, III. q. 1 seq.) to decide the question as to whether the will, when under the influence of evenly-balanced motives, can with equal facility decide in favor of or against a given action: to answer it affirmatively (doctrine of Indeterminism) were to contradict the principle, that when all the conditions requisite to a thing (*e. g.*, to a decision in favor of a proposed action) are present, the thing itself (*e. g.*, the decision supposed) must follow, and that the same conditions admit only one and the same result; but to deny it (Determinism) is to contradict the moral consciousness of responsibility. (In this reasoning the fact was overlooked, that the very quality of will which gives character to the decision is itself the subject of moral judgment, and that only an external causality, a necessity obstructing the will, whether this be an external or a psychical compulsion, and not the causality grounded in the will itself, the inner necessity which is contained in its own nature destroys the freedom of the will.) The oft-cited illustration of the "ass of Buridan," which stands motionless between two equally attractive bundles of hay, or between fodder and water, being drawn with equal force in both directions, has not been found in his works. The argument (as Thurot remarks) is derived from Arist., *De Coelo*, II. 13, p. 295 b, 13; the "*assens*" was added by the Scholastics (and, as it appears, by some of Buridan's opponents).

Albert of Saxony belongs to the more distinguished teachers at the University of Paris after the middle of the fourteenth century. His labors were confined chiefly to logic (and especially to the "modern" doctrine entitled *De Suppositionibus*) and physics. A noteworthy passage occurs in his exposition of the *De Coelo* (II. q. 21), where he mentions that one of his teachers appeared to have held that the theory of the motion of the earth and the immobility of the heavens could not be proved incorrect. His own opinion was, that even were all other arguments against that theory fully met by the counter-reasoning of his teacher, yet the relative positions of the planets and the eclipses of the sun and moon were inexplicable by the theory.

Marsilius of Inghen taught, first at Paris, then at the University of Heidelberg, of which he was one of the founders, the nominalistic doctrine of Durand and Occam.

Pierre d'Ailly (Petrus de Alliaco) labored in his Commentary on the *Sentences* (I. 1, 1), while discussing the preliminary questions respecting the possibility of knowledge, to demonstrate the proposition (of Occam), that self-knowledge is more certain than the perception of external objects. He argues: I cannot be deceived with regard to the fact of my own existence; but it is conceivable that my belief in the existence of external objects is an erroneous belief, for the sensations, on which it is grounded, might be produced in me by God's almighty power, even if there were no external objects; or God might permit me to retain these sensations after he had destroyed their external causes. Our conviction of the reality of the objects of perception rests, according to Peter, on the postulate that the ordinary course of nature and the divine agency will remain in the future what they have been in the past, and this conviction is practically or subjectively sufficient. Peter admits also that logic, or the science of inference, which presupposes the principle of contradiction, is in practice a source of scientific certainty; he adds that the existence of a science of mathematics is a sufficient refutation of him who denies the possibility of such certainty. In regard to the ordinary proofs of God's existence, he expresses the opinion, in agreement with Occam, that they are not logically binding, although sufficient to establish a probability.

Other Nominalists, who more or less distinguished themselves, were Robert Holcot, the Dominican (died A. D. 1349), who so far separated philosophical from theological truth, as to teach that from the premises of philosophy their pure consequence, unmodified by any side reference to the interests of theology, might and must be drawn; Gregory of Rimini (died 1358), who was influential as a General of the Augustinian Order; the mathematicians, Richard Suinshead or Suisset (about 1350) and Henry of Hessen (died 1397); John of Mercuria, who deduced from Determinism the (supposed) consequence that he who succumbs under an irresistible temptation does not sin, and that sin itself, as being willed by God, is rather good than bad (these propositions were condemned in the year 1347 by the University of Paris, which had already (1339) proscribed Occam's books and (1340) condemned Nominalism); Nicolaus of Autricuria, who in 1348 was forced to recall his attacks on Aristotle, together with his skeptical theses, which were founded on Nominalism, and his doctrine of the eternity of the world; and, finally, Gabriel Biel, who produced a summary of the doctrines of Occam, and was the so-called "last Scholastic," and whose nominalistic doctrine exerted a not inconsiderable influence on Luther and Melancthon. At Paris, in 1473, all teachers were bound by oath to teach Realism; but in 1481 the nominalistic doctrine was already again tolerated.

The attempt of Raymundus of Sabunde to prove the doctrines of Christianity from the revelation of God in nature had no imitators. Setting out with the consideration of the four stages designated as mere being, life, sensation, and reason, Raymundus (who agrees with the Nominalists in regarding self-knowledge as the most certain kind of knowledge) proves by ontological, physico-teleological, and moral arguments (the latter based on the principle of retribution), the existence and trinity of God, and the duty of grateful love to God, who first loved us. His work culminates in the mystical conception of a kind of love to God, by which the lover is enabled to grow into the essence of the loved.

Since the nominalistic philosophy, in the majority of its representatives, though not indeed hostile to theology, scarcely rendered it any positive services—being, rather, almost indifferent in regard to it—it was natural that the theologians should assume a corresponding attitude in reference to philosophy. Gerson (John Charlier of Gerson), the Mystic, himself an adherent of Nominalism and seeking to reconcile theology with Scholastic philosophy ("*concordare theologiam cum nostra scholastica*"), exhorts his followers to give but a moderate attention to secular science and philosophy; the truth could be learned only through revelation. Repentance and faith, says Gerson, lead more surely than all human inquiry to true knowledge. Neither Plato nor Aristotle is the right guide for him who is seeking his salvation. Better than all rational knowledge is obedience to the divine exhortation: *Poenite mini et credite Evangelio*! Such also was the attitude first assumed by Protestantism toward philosophy.

§ 106.* When Scholasticism had already passed its period of bloom, there grew up on German soil a peculiar branch of Mysticism, which exerted an indirect or a direct influence on the further development of science down to the most recent times. German Mysticism was developed chiefly in sermons from the German pulpit. Sermonizing was cultivated with especial ardor by the members of the

* This paragraph is from the pen of my friend Dr. Adolf Læssøe, of whose thorough studies in the department of Medieval Mysticism I am glad and grateful that this Compendium should reap the benefit.—UNIVERSITY.

Dominican Order. The object of the preachers was to present the system of the schools, as exhibited in the writings of Albert the Great and Thomas, in a manner which should take hold of the heart of every individual among the people. With the transference of science into the German language, and with the attempt of preachers to assume a popular style, the prevalent tendency toward the logical, and toward the ingenious combination of fundamental ideas in the form of syllogistic proofs, fell away; in its place came speculation, which, giving to the theorems of faith spiritual vitality, stripped them of the unyielding form of dogmas, and, viewing them from the standpoint of one vitalizing, central idea, spread them as a synthetic whole before the hearts and wills of the hearers. This central idea was the conception, still latent in the systems of Albert and Thomas, of the essential unity of the soul in reason and will with God, a conception which here, where a system of ideas took rather the form of an unity felt internally than of a whole consisting of logically-reasoned proofs, could be expressed freely and without regard to ulterior consequences, and around which were gathered all the kindred elements contained in the entire previous development of Christian science. In particular, the Platonic and Neo-Platonic elements, which were not wanting even with Albert and Thomas, were now placed in the foreground; an extreme Realism was everywhere tacitly presupposed. It was not the Church and its teaching, but Christianity, as they understood it, that the Mystics aimed to advance by edifying speculation and to render comprehensible by the transcendent use of the reason. The author and perfecter of this entire development was Master Eckhart. Appealing on almost all points to the doctrines of earlier speculators, in particular to those of the Pseudo-Areopagite, to Augustine, and to Thomas, he nevertheless, with bold originality, remolded the old in a new spirit, in many cases anticipating the labor of subsequent times. At all events, notwithstanding the censure of the Church, which fell on him, he produced the deepest impression on his contemporaries. Familiarly acquainted with Aristotle, and with the Scholastic philosophy founded on Aristotle, he by no means assumed a position hostile to the science of his times. He only rejected in many cases its form for purposes of his own, while he aimed to reveal its true sense. Theoretical knowledge was, in his view, the means by which man must become a partaker of divine knowledge; but, in Neo-Platonic fashion, he regarded, as the highest form in which reason

manifests itself, an immediate intuition transcending all finiteness and all determination. Earnestly as he pursued in sermon and treatise the end of edification and awakening, he was animated not less powerfully by a purely theoretical interest.

In the doctrine of Eckhart knowledge is represented as a real union of Subject with Object; only in knowledge is the absolute seized upon and with joy possessed. In opposition to the teaching of Duns Scotus, the will is treated as subordinate to the knowing faculty, and extreme emphasis is laid on the presence in the divine nature of the element of rational necessity. Reason finds its satisfaction only in a last, all-including unity, in which all distinctions vanish. The Absolute, or Deity, remains as such without personality and without work, concealed in itself. Enveloped in it is God, who is from eternity, and who has the power of revealing himself. He exists as the one divine nature, which is developed into a trinity of persons in the act of self-knowledge. In this eternal act the divine nature beholds itself as a real object of its own cognition, and in the love and joy which this act excites in itself it eternally takes back itself (as object of cognition) into itself (as subject of cognition). The Subject in this knowledge is the Father, the Object is the Son, the love of both for each other is the Spirit. The Son, as he is eternally begotten by the Father, involves at once the ideal totality of things. The world is eternally in God as a world of ideas or antetypes, and is withal simple in its nature. The manifold and different natures of finite things arose first through their creation in time out of nothing. Out of God, the creature is a pure nothing; time and space and the plurality, which depends on them, are nothing in themselves. The duty of man as a moral being is to rise beyond this nothingness of the creature, and by direct intuition to place himself in immediate union with the Absolute; by means of the human reason all things are to be brought back into God. Thus the circle of the absolute process, which is at the same time absolute rest, is gone through and the last end is reached, the annihilation of all manifoldness in the mystery and repose of the Absolute.—The fundamental conceptions of Eckhart's doctrine were not, in his time, further developed in a scientific manner by any one. The most influential representatives of Mysticism in his extremely numerous school were, Johann Tauler, Heinrich Suso, the unknown author of a small work entitled "*A German Theology*," and Johann Rusbroek.

Deutsche Mystiker d. 14. Jahrhunderts, edited by F. Pfeiffer, Vol. I. Leipzig, 1945; Vol. II. 1946. Vol. II. contains *Meister Eckhart*. Until the publication of this work only the sermons and treatises contained in the appendix to the edition of *Tauler's Sermons* (Basel, 1521) were known as works of Eckhart. Pfeiffer's extremely trustworthy edition, although containing only a part of the works named by Trithemius (*De Script. Eccles.*) and examined by Nicolaus Cusanus (*Opp.*, ed. Basil., p. 71) furnishes sufficient material for a survey of the ideas of the "Master." Much, that must now be ascribed to Eckhart, passed formerly under Tauler's and Rusbroke's names. In many cases the text is sorely mutilated, and many passages are rendered unintelligible.

Concerning the German Mystics, cf. in addition to the works above cited (p. 389) and the works on the History of Dogmas (p. 268), the following: Gottfr. Arnold, *Historia et descriptio theologiae mysticae*, Frankfurt, 1702. De Wette, *Christliche Sittenlehre*, II. 2, Berlin, 1831. Rosenkranz, *Die deutsche Mystik, zur Geschichte der deutschen Literatur*, Königsberg, 1866. Ullmann, *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, Vol. II. Hamburg, 1942, pp. 18-234. Ch. Schmidt, *Études sur le mysticisme allemand (Mémoires de l'acad. des sciences mor. et polit., t. II., p. 240, Paris, 1847)*. Wilh. Wackernagel, *Geach der deutschen Literatur*, Abth. 2, Basel, 1866, pp. 331-341. Boehringer, *Kirchengeschichte in Biographien* (II. 3: *Die deutschen Mystiker*), Zürich, 1935. Hamberger, *Stimmen aus dem Heiligtum der christl. Mystik und Theosophie*, 2 parts, Stuttgart, 1857. Greith, *Die Mystik im Predigerorden*, Freiburg in Br., 1861. G. A. Heinrich, *Les mystiques allemands au moyen-âge*, in the *Revue d'Economie Chrétienne*, November, 1906, p. 926 seq. C. Schmidt, *Nicolaus von Basel*, Vienna, 1866. T. Tietz, *Die Mystik und ihr Verhältniss zur Reformation*, in the *Zeitschr. für die luther. Theologie*, 1863, pp. 617-638. W. Treger, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Mystik*, in the *Zeitschr. für histor. Theol.*, 1869, pp. 1-145.

On Eckhart, cf. C. Schmidt, in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1869, p. 668 seq.; Martensen, *Meister E.*, Hamburg, 1849; Steffensen, *Ueber Meister E. u. d. Mystik*, in *Geizer's Protest. Monatsblätter*, 1853, p. 267 seq.; Petr. Gross, *De E. philosopho (diss. inaug.)*, Bonn, 1853; R. Heldrich, *Das theol. System des Meisters E. (Progr.)*, Posen, 1864; Joseph Bach, *Meister E., der Vater der deutschen Speculation*, Vienna, 1864; W. Preger, *Ein neuer Tractat Meister E.'s (Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol., 1864, p. 168 seq.)*, and *Kritische Studien zu Meister E. (ibid. 1866, p. 458 seq.)*; E. Böhmer, *Meister E. (Giesebrecht's Damaris, 1865, p. 52 seq.)*; Wahl, *Die Seelenlehre Meister E.'s (Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 1868, pp. 278-296)*; Ad. Lassen, *Meister Eckhart, der Mystiker*, Berlin, 1868; W. Treger, *Meister E. und die Inquisition*, Munich, 1869.

The most important editions of Tauler's Sermons are those of Leipzig, 1493, Basel, 1521 and 1522, Cologne, 1543; translated into Latin by Surius, Cologne, 1549; translated into modern German, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1836 and 1864, 3 parts. The book: *Von der Nachfolge des armen Lebens Christi* was published by Schlosser, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1838 and 1864. Cf. C. Schmidt, *Joh. Tauler*, Hamburg, 1841; Rudelbach, *Christl. Biogr.*, Leipzig, 1849, p. 187 seq.; F. Bähring, *Joh. Tauler und die Gottesfreunde*, Hamburg, 1853; E. Böhmer, *Nicolaus v. Basel u. Tauler* (Giesebrecht's *Damaris*, 1865, p. 148 seq.).

Suso's works appeared at Augsburg in 1482, 1512, etc.; translated into Latin by Surius, Cologne, 1555, ed. Diepenbrock, Regensb., 1829, 1837, 1854. *Die Briefe Heinrich Suso's*, from a MS. of the fifteenth century, ed. Wilh. Preger, Leipzig, 1867. Cf. C. Schmidt, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1843, p. 685 seq.; Böhmer, Giesebrecht's *Damaris*, 1865, p. 321 seq.; Wilh. Volkmar, *Der Mystiker Heinr. Suso (Gymn.-Progr.)*, Duisburg, 1869.

A list of editions of the opusculum, entitled *Eine deutsche Theologie* (first published in part by Luther, 1516) is given in the edition of F. Pfeiffer, Stuttgart, 1851, 2d edition, with modern German translation, Stuttgart, 1855 (Preface, pp. 10-18). Cf. Ullmann, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1852, p. 850 seq.; Liess, *Die Heilelehre der Theologie deutsch*, Stuttgart, 1837; Reifenrath, *Die deutsche Theologie des Frankfurter Gottesfreundes*, Halle, 1863.

Rusbroke Opp. latina, ed. Surius, Cologne, 1552, etc., in German, by Gottfr. Arnold, Offenbach, 1701. *Vier Schriften R.'s*, published in low German by A. v. Arnswaldt, Hanover, 1848. *Werken van Jan van Ruusbroec*, Ghent, 1858 seq., 5 parts. Cf. Engelhardt, *Nach. d. St. Victor u. E.*, Erlang., 1888 (see above, p. 339); Ch. Schmidt, *Étude sur Jean R.*, Straasburg, 1859.

Of the remaining exceedingly copious literature of the School of German Mystics founded by Eckhart, only fragments are extant, in part still unprinted. Cf. Wackernagel (see above) and Bach, *Meister Eckhart*, pp. 175-207. Yet important as these works were in their influence on the development of German prose and on the religious life of the German people, they were without any special importance for the progress of science. One of the most important of them, for the most part compiled from Eckhart, is found translated in Greith's *Die deutsche Mystik im Predigerorden*, pp. 96-202.

The characteristic spirit of German Mysticism appears, at least in germ, in the works of David of Augsburg, the Franciscan monk (died 1271—on him cf. Pfeiffer's *Deutsche Mystiker*, Vol. I. p. xxvi. seq. and pp. 309-386), and particularly in those of Albertus

Magnus. Eckhart, born, after 1250, perhaps at Strasburg, entered the Dominican Order, and was possibly an immediate pupil of Albert. He studied and taught afterward at Paris, but was summoned in 1302—hence before the arrival in Paris of Duns Scotus—by Bonifacius VIII. to Rome, and made a doctor ("*doctorem ipse inauguravit*," Quétif et Echard, *Script. Ord. Præd.*, Vol. I. f. 507). E. held positions of high dignity in his order. In 1304 he became its Provincial for Saxony, and in 1307 its General Vicar, commissioned to reform the convents of the Order in Bohemia. He taught and preached in many parts of Germany with the greatest *éclat*. Having been perhaps even before then removed from his offices, he was brought in 1327 before a tribunal of the Inquisition at Cologne. He recanted conditionally (*siquid errorum repertum fuerit, . . . hic revoco publice*), but appealed, in reply to further requisitions, to the Pope. He died before the bull condemning twenty-eight of his doctrines was published (March 27, 1329).

The youth of Eckhart fell in a time of active scientific conflicts. In 1270 and 1277 the Archbishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, was compelled to take steps against a wide-spread rationalism, which, setting out from the traditional distinction between revealed truths and truths of the reason, affirmed that only that which was scientifically demonstrable could be accepted as true, and consequently that all dogmas peculiar to Christianity were untrue (cf. above, p. 460). To this were added the manifold pantheistic and antinomian heresies of that age. It was with reference, not only to all these, but also, at a later epoch, with reference to the doctrines of Duns Scotus and the Nominalists, that Eckhart found it necessary to define his position. On the basis of the principles of Albert and Thomas, he went on to add to the superstructure which they had erected, and carried their philosophy of the intellect to the point of affirming that all religious truth lay within the sphere of human reason. But while he sought to penetrate religious truth with the eye of knowledge, he unconsciously foisted on it an interpretation of his own, treating the doctrines of the Church as a symbolical, representative expression of the truth, while he believed himself to possess, in the form of adequate conceptions, the full truth. Eckhart placed in the foreground of his theology the Neo-Platonic elements, derived particularly from the Pseudo-Areopagite, but also present in Albert and Thomas, while at the same time, by studying the writings of the Apostle Paul and of Augustine, he succeeded in giving to Ethics a more profound basis. The nature of his speculations was essentially influenced by the fact that he regarded himself as a servant rather of Christian truth than of the Church. Isolated expressions in his writings respecting the abuses of the Church are not so important a confirmation of this fact, as is the ingenuousness which everywhere characterizes him when maintaining conceptions of Christian doctrine which were in diametrical opposition to the teaching of the Romish Church. Thus he addressed himself above all to the Christian people, not to the schools, and viewed scientific knowledge chiefly with an eye for its morally edifying power. Eckhart did not intend to oppose either the Church or Scholasticism, but in reality he tore himself loose from their ground. At first, only the relative importance assigned to particular elements of doctrine was changed by him, the latter being liberated from the narrow spaces of the School and arranged to meet the needs of the Christian people; afterward, the character of the doctrines was transformed, and much that had been concealed under Scholastic formulas appeared as the proper consequence of the Scholastic doctrine. Scholasticism had for its object the advancement of the Church and its doctrine; Eckhart aimed to promote the spiritual welfare of Christians and to point out the nearest way to union with God. Hence his indifference and even hostility to the purely ecclesiastical and dialectical elements of the philosophy of the Schools wherever, instead of proposing the shorter and true way to God, they seemed to interpose an endless series of artificial and false conditions.

We find no questions of a purely logical nature discussed by Eckhart. But the universal is for him that which truly exists; in order to become active, it needs the individual, which on its part receives being and permanence from the universal, and can only through its immanence in the universal assert itself as real and permanent (cf., e. g., Pfeiffer, Vol. II., p. 632, line 30; 250, 16; 419, 24).

The chief points in his doctrine are indicated by Eckhart himself, on p. 91: he was accustomed, he says, to speak of "decease," of the building up anew of the soul in God, of the high nobility of the soul, and of the purity of the divine nature. The exposition of his doctrine must begin with his psychology, which includes the source of all his conceptions.

I. Eckhart's psychology agrees most nearly with that of Augustine and Thomas. The soul is immaterial, the simple form of the body, entire and undivided in every part of the body. The faculties of the soul are the external senses, and the lower and higher faculties. The lower faculties are the empirical understanding (*Bescheidenheit*), the heart (organ of passion), and the appetitive faculty; the higher faculties are memory, reason, and will, corresponding with Father, Son, and Spirit. The senses are subordinate to the perceptive faculty or the common sense; by the latter that which is perceived is handed over to the understanding and memory, having been first stripped of its sensuous and material element and the manifold in it having been transformed into unity. Sensuous perception takes place by the aid of images of the objects which are taken up into the soul. Regulated by the appetitive faculty, and purified and freed by the reflective intellect from all that is merely symbolical or figurative, the representative object of perception reaches the region of the highest faculties (p. 319 seq.; 538; 383 seq.). The soul is not subject to the conditions of space and time; all its ideas are immaterial (p. 325); it acts in time, but not temporally (p. 25). Regarding only its highest faculties in their supra-sensuous activity, we call the soul spirit; but as the vitalizing principle of material bodies, it is called soul. Yet both are one essence. All activity of the soul (in the narrower sense) depends on the presence of organs. But the organs are not themselves the essence of the soul; they are an outcome of its essence, although a degenerate outcome. In the profoundest recesses of the soul these organs cease, and consequently all activity ceases. Nothing but God the Creator penetrates these recesses. The creature can know only the faculties in which it beholds its own image. The soul has thus a double face, the one turned toward this world and toward the body, which the soul fits for all its activity, the other directed immediately to God. The soul is something intermediate between God and created things (pp. 110, 250, 170). (Cf. Greith, pp. 96-120).

The highest activity of the soul is that of cognition. This is represented by E. as an act in which all plurality and materiality are eliminated more or less forcibly, according to the kind of cognition. There are three species of cognition: sensible, rational, and supra-rational cognition; only the last reaches the whole truth. Whatever can be expressed in words is comprehended by the lower faculties; but the higher ones are not satisfied with so little. They constantly press further on, till they reach the source whence the soul originally flowed forth. The highest faculty is not, like each of the inferior faculties, one faculty among others; it is the soul itself in its totality; as such it is called the "spark," also (p. 113) *Synteresis* (corresponding to the soul-centre of Plotinus, cf. above, pp. 250, 251). This highest faculty is served by all the faculties of the soul, which assist it to reach the source of the soul, by raising the latter out of the sphere of inferior things (p. 131; 469). The spark is content with nothing created or divided; it aspires to the absolute, to that unity outside of which there remains nothing.

Reason is the head of the soul, and knowledge is the ground of blessedness. Essence

and knowledge are one. Of that which has most essence there is the most cognition. To know an object is to become really one with it. God's knowing and my knowing are one; true union with God takes place in cognition. Hence knowledge is the foundation of all essence, the ground of love, the determining power of the will. Only reason is accessible to the divine light (pp. 99, 84, 221). But the knowledge here referred to is something supra-sensible, inexpressible in words, unaided by the understanding; it is a supernatural vision above space and time, and is not man's own deed, but God's action in him. (By Suso, in his "Book Third," chap. 6, true knowledge is defined as the comprehension of two contraries united in one subject.) Hence it is also a non-cognition, a state of blindness, of not knowing. But in respect of form it remains a cognition, and all finite cognition is an active progress toward infinite cognition. Hence the first requirement is: grow in knowledge. But if this knowledge is too high for you, believe; believe in Christ, follow his holy image and be redeemed (p. 498). With right knowledge, all fancying, imagining and faith, all seeing through images and comparisons, all instruction by Scripture, dogmas, and authorities cease; then no external witness, no arguments addressed to the understanding, are longer necessary (pp. 242, 245, 381, 302, 458). But since the truth is incomprehensible to the empirical understanding—so much so, that if it were capable of being comprehended and believed, it would not be truth (p. 206)—the knowledge of the truth, in contradistinction from perception and mere logically correct thinking, is called faith (p. 567), with special reference to the fact that this relation of the soul to the supra-sensible (in the cognition of truth), springs up in the reason, but becomes operative in the will. When, in other words, the reason arrives at the limit of her power, there remains a transcendent sphere, which she cannot fathom. This she then reveals in the innermost recesses of the soul, where reason and will stand in living interchange, or in the will, and the will, illuminated by the divine light, plunges into a state of non-knowing and turns from all perishable light to the highest good, to God. Thus faith arises (pp. 102, 171, 176, 384 seq., 439, 454–460, 521, 537, 559, 567, 591), an exaltation which, commencing with the understanding, takes possession of the whole soul and guides it into its highest perfection (cf. Greith's work, p. 172 seq.).

The highest object of cognition is not the three persons of the Godhead, for these are distinguished from each other; nor the unity of the three, for this unity has the world outside itself. Reason penetrates beyond all determinateness into the silent desert, into which no distinction has ever penetrated, and which is exalted motionless above all contrast and all division (pp. 193, 281, 144).

II. In his Theology Eckhart starts from the Areopagite's negative theology (cf. above, p. 350). He resumes the distinction made by Gilbertus Porretanus between the Godhead and God (see above, p. 399), giving it a deeper signification, but presents the doctrine of the Trinity in the same form in which Thomas does. The Absolute is called, in Eckhart's terminology, the Godhead, being distinguished from God. God is subject to generation and corruption; not so the Godhead. God works, the Godhead does not work.—Yet these terms are not always precisely discriminated. God (i. e., the Godhead), we are told, has no predicates and is above all understanding, incomprehensible, and inexpressible; every predicate ascribed to him destroys the conception of God, and raises to the place of God an idol. The most abstract predicate is essence (being); but inasmuch as this too contains a certain determination, it also is denied of God. God is in so far a nothing, a not-God, not-spirit, not-person, not-image, and yet, as the negation of negation (p. 322), he is at the same time the unlimited "*In se*," the possibility to which no species of essence is wanting, in which every thing is (not one, but) unity (pp. 180, 268, 282, 320, 532, 540, 590, 5, 26, 46, 59).—The Godhead as such cannot be revealed. It becomes manifest first in its persons

(p. 320). The Absolute is at once absolute process. The Godhead is the beginning and final goal of the whole series of essences which exist. It is in the latter capacity, or, it is there where every essence is not annihilated, but completed (i. e., in the concrete universal), that the Godhead comes to repose. The eternal Godhead, as the beginning and end of all things, is concealed in absolute obscurity, being not only unknown and unknowable to man, but also unknown to itself (p. 288). God, says Eckhart, improving upon Pseudo-Dionysius, dwells in the nothing of nothing which was before nothing (p. 539). But God does not stop there. God as Godhead is a spiritual substance, of which it can only be said that it is nothing. In the Trinity he is a living light that reveals itself (p. 499). In the Godhead the relation between essence and nature oscillates constantly between identity and difference. In every object matter and form are to be distinguished (p. 530), with which correspond, in the Godhead, essence and the divine persons. The form of an object is that which the object is for others; it is the revealing element, and hence the persons of the Trinity are the form of the essence (p. 681). (In the school of Eckhart, as in that of Duns Scotus, form is the individualizing principle. Form gives separate essence, according to Suso in the "Third Book," ch. 4.) The persons of the Trinity are held together by the one divine nature common to them all, and this nature in the Godhead is the revealing principle in the same. The divine essence is the *natura non naturata*, the persons belong to the *natura naturata*; but the latter are no less eternal than is the former. The *natura naturata* is nothing but one God in three persons, and these endow the creature with its nature. The divine nature is the Father, if we disregard his distinction from the two other persons of the Godhead. The Father is as near to the *natura non naturata* as to the *natura naturata*. In the former he is alone, in the latter he is first (p. 537). The Father is contained in the unrevealed Godhead, but only as essence without personality, hence not yet as Father; it is only in self-knowledge that he becomes Father. He is a light which as person and essence is reflected in itself. The Father is the reason in the divine nature. There that which knows and that which is known are one and the same (pp. 499, 670). This being reflected in himself is the Father's eternal activity. It is called begetting and speaking, and the object of the activity is called the Son or the Word, the second person in the divine nature. Sensuous nature works in space and time, in which, therefore, Father and Son are separated; in God there is no time or space, therefore Father and Son are at the same time one God, distinguished only as different aspects of one substratum. The Father "pours out" himself; himself, as thus "poured out," effused, is the Son (p. 94). The Son returns eternally back into the Father in love, which unites both. This love, the common will of the Father and the Son, is the Spirit, the third person. The Trinity flows from the one divine nature in an eternal process, and into the same divine nature it is eternally flowing back. While the Godhead thus really includes three persons, it is in the unity of the Godhead that absolute power resides. By virtue of this power, and not in his personal capacity, the Father begets the Son; it is only through this act of begetting that the Father becomes a person. This begetting is eternal and necessary, and is implied in the conception of the divine essence (p. 335). The divine nature is in itself neither essence nor person, but it makes the essence to be essence, and the Father, Father. The divine nature and the divine persons mutually imply each other; they are alike eternal and alike original, but in the former no distinction is possible, while the latter admit of distinction. The self-conservation of the Godhead in its peculiarity is the eternal process; the immovable repose of the Godhead finds in the eternal process its substratum. In the divine nature eternal rest is involved in eternal procession (pp. 682, 677). In the absolute divine unity all difference is annulled, the eternal flux subsides into itself. The divine essence and the divine nature form only a relative opposition. If they

were two determinations of the Absolute, the one must have sprung from the other; in the absolute unity they are one. The Absolute, as essence, is the essence of the divine persons and of all things; as nature it is the unity of the persons. It is the essence of the divine essence, the nature of the divine nature (p. 669). The eternal process in God is the principle of eternal goodness and justice (p. 528).

To the revealed God belong the divine predicates, and especially the predicate of reason. God's life is his self-cognition. God *must* work and know himself. He is goodness and *must* communicate himself. His essence depends on his willing what is best. He works without a shade of temporality, unchangeable and immovable. He is love, but he loves only himself, and others in so far as he recognizes himself in them (pp. 11, 133, 134, 145, 270, 272).—Eckhart repeats very often that God cannot be comprehended by the finite understanding; what we say of him we must stammer. But he attempts to communicate in the form of definite conceptions his own intuition, and to describe God as the absolute process. In this description the doctrine of the Church is not recognizable. The divine persons, as Eckhart conceives them, are in reality the stadia of a process. He has not succeeded in his attempted logical derivation of plurality in the Deity. Plurality and whatever else revelation asserts of the divine nature are, the rather, incorporated by him directly into his conception of the Absolute, and asserted as facts, but they are by no means metaphysically deduced.

III. The Absolute is, further, the ground or cause of the world (p. 540 seq.). All things are from eternity in God, not indeed in gross material form, but as the work of art exists in the master. When God regarded himself, he saw the eternal images of all things prefigured in himself, not, however, in multiplicity, but as one image (p. 502). Eckhart follows Thomas in proclaiming the doctrine that there exists an eternal world of ideas (pp. 324–328). Distinct from this is the world of creatures, which was created in time and out of nothing. This distinction of two worlds must be kept in mind, in order not to impute to Eckhart a pantheism, which he was in fact far removed from holding (p. 325). The world was in the Father originally in uncreated simplicity. But at the moment of its first emergence out of God it took on manifoldness; and yet all manifoldness is simple in essence, and the independent existence of single objects is only apparent (p. 559). It is not that a new will arose in God. When the creature had as yet no existence for itself, it was yet eternally in God and in his reason. Creation is not a temporal act. God did not literally create heaven and earth, as we inadequately express it; for all creatures are spoken in the eternal Word (p. 488). In God there is no work; there all is one *now*, a becoming without becoming, change without change (p. 309). The *now* in which God made the world is the *now* in which I speak, and the day of judgment is as near to this *now* as is yesterday (p. 268). The Father uttered himself and all creatures in the Word, his Son, and the return of the Father into himself includes the like return of all creatures into the same eternal source. The logical genesis of the Son furnishes a type of all evolution or creation; the Son is the unity of all the works of God. God's goodness compelled him to create all that is created, with which he was eternally pregnant in his providence. The world is an integral element in the conception of God; before the creatures were, God was not God (p. 281). This, however, is true only in relation to the ideal world, and so it can be said: God is in all things, and God is all things. Out of God there is nothing but nonentity. The world of things, in so far as these appear to assert their independence over against God, is therefore a nonentity. Whatever is deficient, whatever is sensuous in its nature, is the result of a falling off from essential being, a privation: all creatures are pure nothing. They have no essence, except so far as God is present in them. Manifoldness exists only for the finite intellect; in God is only *one* word, but to the human understanding

there are *two*: God and creature (p. 207). Pure thought above time and space sees all things as one, and in this sense, but not when viewed with reference to their finite determinateness and diversity, all things are in God (pp. 311, 322 seq., 540) and have true being.—Eckhart does not attempt to explain the apparently independent existence of things. This appearance, he says, is connected with the genesis and existence of things in time (pp. 117, 466, 390, 589); but whence the possibility of being, out of God? In one passage (p. 497) Eckhart accounts for the plurality of concrete existence by the fall of man; but evil itself and sin are left unexplained. Eckhart is aware of the subjectivity of thought (p. 484, line 36); but that the false appearance in question has its source in human thought and is only subjective, is not his opinion. Not till a much later epoch was Eckhart's speculation farther developed by attempts to comprehend the nature of evil and to demonstrate the subjectivity of thought.

The relation of God to the world may be more precisely described as follows: God is the first cause of the world; in things God has externalized his innermost essence. Consequently he could never know himself if he did not know all creatures. If God were to withdraw what belongs to him, all things would fall back into their original nothingness. All things were made of nothing, but the Deity is infused into them. Nothingness is attached, in the form of finiteness and difference, to all that is created. God constrains all creatures to strive after likeness to him. God is in all things, not as a nature, nor in a personal form, but as their essence. Thus God is in all places, and he is present in every place with his entire essence. Since God is undivided, all things and all localities are places where God is. God communicates himself to all things, to each according to the measure of its ability to receive him. God is in all things as their intelligible principle; but by as much as he is in all things, by so much is he also above them. No creature can come in contact with God. In so far as God is in things, they work divinely and reveal God, but none of them can reveal him completely. Created things are a way leading either from God or to him. God so works all his works that they are immanent in him. The three persons of the Godhead have wrought their own images in all creatures, and all things desire to return into their source. This return is the end of all motion in created things. The creature strives always for something better; the aim of all variation of form is improvement (pp. 333, 143). Repose in God is the ultimate end of all motion.

The means for bringing all things back to God is the soul, the best of created things. God has made the soul like himself, and has communicated to it his entire essence. But that which exists in God by his essence does not thus exist in the soul, but is a gift of grace. The soul is not its own cause; while it is an efflux from the divine essence, it has not retained that essence, but has assumed another and a strange one. Hence it cannot resemble God in the form of its activities, but as God moves heaven and earth, so the soul vitalizes the body and imparts to it all its activities. At the same time, as being independent of the body, it can with its thoughts be elsewhere than in the body, as an infinite nature in the realm of finiteness (p. 394 seq.). All things were created for the soul. The reason, beginning with the activity of the senses, has power to take within its survey all creatures. All things are created in man. In the human reason they lose their finite limitations. But not only in thought does man ennoble all created things, but also by bodily assimilation in eating and drinking. Transformed into human nature, every creature attains to eternity. Every creature is *one* man, whom God must love from eternity; in Christ all creatures are *one* man, and this man is God. The soul never rests till it comes into God, who is its first Form, and all creatures never rest till they pass into human nature and through this into God, their first Form (pp. 152 seq., 530). Generation and growth end universally in degeneration (decay); our present temporal being ends in eternal

decay (p. 497). Thus the circle of the eternal process is run through, and things return to their center, the undeveloped, undisclosed Deity. It is the *μονή, πρόδος* and *ἐπιστροφή* of Proclus, which have entered by the way of Pseudo-Dionysius into Eckhart's, as previously into Erigena's speculation (cf. above, pp. 257, 350, and 358 seq.).

IV. With the conception of the return of all things through the soul to God, the principle of Ethics is given to Eckhart. Morality is for him this restoration of the soul and with it of all things into the Absolute. The condition of this restoration is death to self *i. e.*, the abolition of creatureship; its end is the union of man with God. It is particularly in the province of Ethics that Eckhart rendered important service. His speculation penetrates, still more deeply than the rationalism of Abelard, into the very substance of morality.

In order to bring back the soul to God, man is required to strip off all that pertains to the creature, and first of all in *cognition*. The soul is divided into faculties; each has its particular office, but the soul itself is only made so much the weaker for this division. Hence the necessity that the soul should gather itself together and pass from a divided life to a life of unity. God is not obliged to direct his attention from one thing to another, as we are. We must become as he is, and in an instant know all things in one image (pp. 13 seq., 264). If thou wilt know God divinely, thy knowledge must be changed to ignorance, to oblivion of thyself and of all creatures. This ignorance is synonymous with unlimited capacity for receiving. Thus all things become God for thee, for in them all thou thinkest and willest nothing but God alone. This is a state of passivity. God needs only that man should give him a quiet heart. God will accomplish this work himself; let man only follow and not resist. Not the reason alone, but the will also, must transcend itself. Man must be silent, that God may speak. We must be passive, that God may work. The powers of the soul, which before were bound and imprisoned, must become unemployed and free. Man must thus let go, must give up his proper selfhood. Give up thine individuality and comprehend thyself in thine unmixed human nature, as thou art in God: thus God enters into thee. Couldst thou annihilate thyself for an instant, thou wouldst possess all that God is in himself. Individuality is mere accident, a nothing; put off this nothing, and all creatures are one. The One, that remains, is the Son, whom the Father begets (p. 620). All the love of this world is built on self-love; hadst thou given up this, then thou hadst given up all the world. The man who will see God must become dead to himself and be buried in God, in the unrevealed and solitary Deity, in order again to become that which he was when he as yet was not. This state is called *decease*, a freedom from all passions, from one's self, and even from God. The highest point is reached when man, for God's sake, relinquishes God himself. This implies complete submission to God's will, joy in all sufferings, though they were the sufferings of hell, joy in the vision of God, as also in his absence. The "deceased" man loves no particular good, but goodness for goodness' sake; he does not comprehend God, in so far as God is good and just, but only in so far as he is pure substance. He has absolutely no will; he has entered completely into the will of God. Everything which comes between God and the soul must be removed; the end is not likeness, but unity. The soul, in being thus absorbed in God, enters at the same time into and dwells in the soul's most proper essence, in the wilderness of the soul, where the soul must be robbed of itself and be God with God—into that negation of all determination in which the soul has eternally hovered without truly possessing itself (p. 510). The highest degree of "decease" is called poverty. A poor man is he who knows nothing, wills nothing, and has nothing. So long as man still has the will to fulfill God's will, or desires God or eternity or any definite object, he is not yet truly poor, *i. e.*, not yet truly perfect (p. 280 seq.).

If I am in the state of "decease," God brings forth his Son in me. The sanctification of man is the birth of God in the soul. All moral action is nothing other than this bringing forth of the Son by the Father. (This language is found also in the Epistle to Diognetus, see above, p. 280.) The birth of God in the soul takes place in the same way as the eternal birth of the Word, above time and space. In this work all men are one Son, different in respect of bodily birth, but in the eternal birth one, a sole emanation from the eternal Word (p. 157). At the same time it is I who bring forth the Son in my moral action. God has begotten me from eternity, that I may be Father and beget him who begat me. God's Son is the soul's son. God and the soul have one Son, namely, God. This birth of God in the soul is irreversible. He in whom the Son is once begotten can never fall again. It were a mortal sin and heresy to believe otherwise (pp. 652 and 10).

From this principle are deduced the various doctrines of Ethics. *Virtuous action is purposeless action.* Not even the kingdom of heaven, salvation, and eternal life are legitimate objects of the moral will. As God is free from all finite ends, so also is the righteous man. Desire nothing, thus wilt thou obtain God and in him all things. Work for the sake of working, love for love's sake; if heaven and hell did not exist, thou shouldst yet love God for the sake of his goodness. Still more: thou shalt not love even God because he is righteousness or because of any quality in him, but only in view of his likeness to himself. All that is contingent must be laid aside, including therefore virtue, in so far as it is a particular mode of action. Virtue must be a condition, *my essential condition*; I must be built up and built over into righteousness. No one loves virtue except him who is virtue itself. All virtues should become in me necessities, being performed unconsciously. Morality consists not in doing, but in being. Works do not sanctify us, we are to sanctify works. The moral man is not like a pupil, who learns to write by practice, giving attention to every letter, but like the ready writer, who, without attention, unconsciously exercises, perfectly and without labor, the art which has become to him a second nature (pp. 524, 546, 549, 571). All virtues are one virtue. He who practices one virtue more than another is not moral. Love is the principle of all virtues. Love strives after the good. It is nothing other than God himself. Next to love comes humility, which consists in ascribing all good, not to one's self, but to God.—The beauty of the soul is, that it be well-ordered (cf. Plotinus' doctrine, above, § 68, p. 250). The lowest faculties of the soul must be subordinated to the highest, and the highest to God: the external senses must be subordinated to the internal senses, the latter to the understanding, the understanding to the reason, the reason to the will, and the will to unity, so that the soul may be "deceased" and nothing but God may enter into it.

It will be easily understood that Eckhart places a very low estimate on external works, such as fastings, vigils, and mortifications. The idea that salvation depends on them is declared to be a suggestion of the devil (p. 633). They are rather a hindrance than a help to salvation, if one depends on them. They are appointed to prepare the spirit to turn back into itself and into God, and to draw it away from earthly things; but lay on the spirit the curb of love, and thou wilt reach the goal far better (p. 29). No work is done for its own sake; in itself a work is neither good nor bad; only the spirit, from which the work proceeds, deserves these predicates. Nothing has life, except that which originates its motion from within. All works, therefore, which arise from an external motive are dead in themselves. The will alone gives value to works, and it suffices in place of them. The will is almighty; that which I earnestly will I have. No one but thyself can hinder thee. The true working is a purely interior working of the spirit on itself, i. e., of the spirit in God or upon God's motion. Even works of compassion, done for God's sake, have the same disadvantage which belongs to all external aims and cares. Such works make of the

soul, not a free daughter, but a serving-maid (pp. 71, 353, 402, 453 seq.). The *inner work* is infinite, and takes place above space and time; none can hinder it. God does not demand external works, that depend for their execution on space and time, that are limited, that can be hindered or forced, and that grow wearisome and old with time and repetition. Just as the liberty of falling can be taken away from the stone, but not the inclination to fall, so with the inner work of morality, which is to will and to incline toward all good and to strive against evil (p. 434). The action of the righteous is not legality, but a life of faith (p. 439). The true inner work is an independent rising of the reason to God, not through the aid of definite rational conceptions, but in simple immediate unity with God (p. 43). So also true prayer is the knowledge of the absolute essence. The prayer of the lips is only an outward practice, ordained for the assembly. True prayer is voiceless, a working in God and a giving up of ourselves to God's working in us, and so men should pray without ceasing in all times and places. Thou needest not to tell God what thou hast need of; he knows it all beforehand. Let him who would pray aright ask for nothing but God alone. If I pray for anything, I pray for that which is nothing. He who prays for anything besides God prays for an idol. Hence complete resignation to God's will belongs to prayer. The "deceased" man does not pray; for every prayer is for some definite object, but the heart of the "deceased" craves nothing. God is not moved by our prayers. But God has foreseen all things from eternity, including, therefore, our prayers, and he has from eternity granted or refused them (pp. 240, 352 seq., 487, 610).

There are no degrees in virtue. Those who are increasing in it are as yet not moral at all (pp. 80, 140). Complete sanctification is attainable. Man can surpass all the saints in heaven and even the angels. Even in his present body he can arrive at the state in which it is impossible for him to sin (p. 460). Then light streams through the body itself, all the powers of the soul are harmoniously ordered, and the entire outward man becomes an obedient servant of the sanctified will. Then man does not need God, for he has God. His blessedness and God's blessedness are one.

Eckhart avoids with great discretion the quietistic and antinomian consequences that seem to follow from such conceptions as his, and which in the contemporaneous fanaticism of the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, based on the doctrine of Amalrich of Bena, appeared in such glaring colors. A state of transcendent union with God by no means hinders a temporal and rational occupation with empirical things. The freedom from law and from all activity, which is above described, belongs, according to Eckhart, only to the "little spark," but not to the faculties of the soul. Only the "little spark" of the soul is to be at all times with God and united with God, but thereby are desire, action, and feeling, all to be determined (pp. 22, 385, 161, 514). Man cannot continue without interruption in that highest state termed above "poverty;" otherwise all communion of the soul with the body would cease. God is not a destroyer of nature; he completes it, and enters with his grace where nature achieves her highest works (pp. 18, 78). In this life no man can or ought to become free from passions, provided only that the excitement of the lower instincts be not allowed to disturb the reason, and that nothing strange or unfitting shall penetrate into the highest part of the soul (pp. 52 seq., 489, 686-668). No contemplation without working; mere contemplation were selfishness. The still work of reason is not prejudiced by external activity with the numerous faculties and conditions therein involved. That which the reason comprehends as One and out of time, the faculties translate into temporal and spatial definiteness. If a man were in an ecstasy, like St. Paul, and knew of a poor man who had need of a little pottage, it were better that he should leave his ecstasy and minister to the needy (pp. 18-21, 330, 554, 607). So far is it from being true that works cease when sanctification is attained, that it is not until after one's sanctification that right

activity, love to all creatures, and most of all to one's enemies, and peace with all, begins. Ecstasies are soon over, but union with God becomes an abiding possession of the soul even when, in the midst of the soul's outward activity, that union seems to be withdrawn. The outward works of mercy are indeed not done on their own account; they have an end where there is no sorrow nor poverty, in eternity, while the discipline of the inner man, from which they arise, begins here and endures eternally (p. 329 seq.). A man can relinquish himself and still—and then only with full right—retain temporal goods. He can enjoy all things; no natural sensation is unworthy of him. We should destroy no smaller good in us, in order to secure a greater one, nor should we give up any mode of activity that is of limited goodness for the sake of a greater good; but we should comprehend every good in its highest sense, for no good conflicts with another (pp. 427, 473, 492, 545, 572). Only the principle is important; from the right principle flow right actions as a matter of course (p. 179). Many people say: If I have God and his love, I can do what I will. They must be careful rightly to understand the case. So long as thou hast power to do anything which is against God's will, thou hast not God's love (p. 232). Do that to which thou feelest thyself most impelled by God. That which is one man's life is often another's death. All men are by no means required by God to follow the same way. God has not made man's salvation dependent on a particular form of activity. If thou findest that the nearest way for thee to God consists not in many works and outward labors and deprivations—which are not of great importance unless one feels himself peculiarly moved toward them and has power to do and undergo them without confusion in his inward life—if, then, thou findest this not in thee, be entirely at peace and care but little for it. Also follow Christ spiritually. Wouldst thou fast forty days because Christ did so? Nay, follow him only in this, that thou perceivest to what he draws thee most, and then practice renunciation. That were a weak inward life which should depend on its outward garb; the inner must determine the outer. Therefore those may with perfect right eat who would be quite as ready to fast. Torment not thyself; if God lays sufferings on thee, bear them. If he gives thee honor and fortune, bear them with no less readiness. One man cannot do all things; he must do some one thing; but in this one he can comprehend all things. If the obstacle is not in thee, thou canst as well have God present with thee by the fire or in the stall as in devout prayer. Be not satisfied with a God whom thou only conceivest in thought. If thought perishes, so perishes thy God. Thou mayst by faith arrive at the state in which thou shalt have God essentially dwelling in thee, and thou shalt be in God and God in thee (pp. 543–578).

V. Since God accomplishes the process of his own reintegration from a state of self-alienation by means of the soul, it follows that God needs the soul. He lies constantly in wait for us, that he may draw us into himself. For this end he works all his works. God can as little do without us as we without him. This eternal process in God is his grace. God's grace works supernaturally and in a manner that transcends reason; it is unmerited, eternally predestinated, but does not destroy our freedom of will. Nature makes no leaps; she commences with the least, and works steadily forward till she reaches the highest. God's action does not conflict with man's free-will. The work of grace is nothing else than a revelation of God, a revelation of himself for himself in the soul (p. 678). Grace begins with the conversion of the will, which conversion is at once a new creation out of nothing. It effects in man, not a course of action, but a condition, an indwelling of the soul in God.—Concerning the relation of grace to free will, Eckhart expresses himself in an uncertain manner.

By grace man regains the complete union with God, which he had originally. The soul, like all things, pre-existed in God. Then I was in God, not as this individual man, but as

God, free and unconditioned like him. Then there were no real differences in God. Immanent in the divine essence, I created the world and myself. By my emanation from him into individual existence I gave God his divine nature (his Godship), and do give it him constantly; for I give him that possibility of communicating himself which constitutes his essence. God can only understand himself through the human soul; in so far as I am immanent in the essence of the Deity, he works all his works through me, and whatever is an object of the divine understanding, that am I (pp. 581-583, 614, 281-284). If I return out of my finite form of existence into God, I receive an impulse that bears me above the angels and makes me one with God. Then I am again what I was; I neither increase nor decrease, but remain an immovable cause, that moves all things. This breaking through and out from the limitations of creatureship is the end of all existence and of all change. God became man that I might become God. I become one body with Christ and one spirit with God. I comprehend myself no otherwise than as a son of God, and draw all things after me into the uncreated good (pp. 511, 584). But the soul is nevertheless not annihilated in God. There remains a little point in which the soul continues to show itself a creature, in distinction from the Deity, namely, in this: that it is unable to fathom the depths of the Godhead. Complete annihilation of the soul in God is not its highest end. We become God by grace, as God is God by nature. This state is also called a *deification* of man (the *θεωσις* of Dionysius and Maximus—see above, p. 352—and of Erigena, see above, pp. 358, 362 seq.), and not only is the soul affected by this change, but the body also becomes transfigured, freed from the senses (pp. 128, 185, 303, 377, 465, 523, 533, 662).

The relation of evil to the absolute process is not clearly explained by Eckhart. It was impossible that this should be otherwise, since Eckhart, like his predecessors, conceded to evil only the character of privation. As denoting a necessary stadium in the return of the soul into God, evil is sometimes represented by Eckhart as a part of the divine plan of the universe, as a calamity decreed by God. All things, sin included, work together for good for those that are good (p. 556). God ordains sin for man and for those, most of all, whom he has chosen for great things. For this, also, man should be thankful. He should not wish that he had not sinned. By sin man is humiliated, and by forgiveness he is all the more intimately united to God. Nor should he wish that there might be no temptation to sin, for then the merit of combat and virtue itself would no longer be possible (pp. 426, 552, 557). Regarded from a higher stand-point, evil is not evil, but only a means for the realization of the eternal end of the world (pp. 111, 327, 559). God could do no greater harm to the sinner than to permit or predestine him to be sinful and then not send upon him suffering sufficiently great to break his wicked will (p. 277). God is not angry at sin, as though in it he had received an affront, but at the loss of our happiness, *i. e.*, he is angry only at the thwarting of his plan in regard to us (p. 54). To the permanent essence of the spirit sin is external only. Even after the commission of mortal sins the spirit retains in its essence its likeness to God; even then good works may arise from the eternal basis of the soul, the fruit of which remains in the spirit and, if the latter is received to grace, redound to its furtherance (pp. 71-74, 218).—Yet Eckhart also teaches the Church doctrine of original sin. Adam's fall really disturbed the divine plan of the world, and not only brought disorder into the nature of man, which was before free from all weakness and morally perfect, and rendered man mortal, but also introduced confusion into all external nature (pp. 368, 497, 658), and sin has since become the nature of all (pp. 370, 433, 529, line 26).

Eckhart distinguishes between and teaches both an eternal and a temporal incarnation, and makes abundant exertions to render the latter conceivable. He first discriminates carefully in Christ between the man and the God, and then teaches that these elements were

united in one person. Christ's person was eternally present in God as the second person of the Trinity. He assumed not the nature of a particular man, but humanity itself, which subsisted as an idea eternally in God. Hence, as Eckhart asserts with Maximus, in opposition to Thomas, God would have become man, even if Adam had not fallen. Not Adam, therefore, but Christ, is the first man whom God created; for when God created man, it was the future Christ that God had in mind (pp. 158, 250, 591). Christ was born as a man by a miracle at a definite moment of time, while at the same time he abides eternally in God. His body was derived from Mary, his spirit was created by God out of nothing: to the body as well as the spirit God communicated himself. The human and divine natures are united in Christ, but mediately and in such manner that each continues to subsist in its peculiarity; his person is the common substratum and bond of union of the two natures (pp. 674, 677). Between Christ as creature and the eternal Word the distinction must be carefully maintained. Christ's soul was in itself a creature: divinity was communicated to him in a supernatural manner after his creation. After Adam's fall it was necessary that all creatures should labor to bring forth a man who should restore them to their original glory (p. 497). By nature Christ's soul was like that of any other man; by moral exertion Christ raised himself into the immediate vicinage of God, as I also can do through him (p. 397). His soul is the wisest that ever existed. It turned in the creature to the Creator, and therefore God endowed it with divine attributes. Christ's created soul never completely fathomed the Deity. In his youth he was simple and unknowing, like any other child; during all his life on earth his unity with God was withdrawn, so that he had not the full intuition of the divine nature. In heaven the soul of Christ still remains a creature and is limited by the conditions of creatureship (pp. 535, 674). But the unequalled degree of moral elevation in him was due to an unparalleled working of divine grace. When Christ was created his body and soul were united in one moment with the eternal Word. In his deepest sufferings he remained united with the highest good in the highest faculty of his soul. But his body was mortal, and in his senses, his body, and his understanding, he was subject to suffering. His union with God was so powerful that he could never for an instant turn away from God, and the origin and end of all his actions was to be found in his own essence—they were free, unconditioned, and emptied of all finite ends (pp. 292, 293, 583). Christ's sitting at the right hand of the Father signifies his exaltation above time into the rest of Deity, to which also those who are risen with Christ shall attain (p. 116 seq.). Thus Christ is our pattern. If we can, like him, become not *one* man, but *humanity*, we shall receive by grace all that Christ had by nature.—Of the theory of satisfaction slight traces only are found in Eckhart, and these only such as were suggested by linguistic usage. Christ is the Redeemer by his moral merit. Through God's assumption of the human nature, the latter has been ennobled, and I attain this nobility in so far as I am in Christ and realize in myself the idea of humanity (pp. 64, 65). Christ has proved to us the blessedness of suffering; redemption through his blood is with Eckhart only another expression for the sanctifying, typical power of his sufferings (pp. 452, 184). By his perfect performance of duty he earned a reward, in which we all participate, so far as we are one with him (p. 644). Hence his mortal body deserves no worship; every moral soul is nobler than it (p. 397). The consideration of Christ's appearance as a man is but a preliminary step: even to the disciples Christ's bodily presence was a hindrance. We must follow and seek after the humanity of Christ till we apprehend his deity. Thinking much of the man Jesus, of his bodily appearance and his suffering, is viewed by Eckhart as the source of a false emotion and a sentimental devotion without moral power and clear knowledge (pp. 241, 247, 636, 658). Mary is blessed, not because she bore Christ bodily, but because she bore him spiritually, and in this every one can become like her (pp. 285, 345-347). In a similar

manner Eckhart judges concerning the sacraments, even when he is insisting most strongly on the orthodox doctrine. The Eucharist may indeed be the greatest gift of God to humanity; still, it is greater blessedness to have God spiritually born in us than to be united corporeally with Christ. For him who should be spiritually well prepared for it every meal would become a sacrament. Sacrament means sign. He who adheres constantly to the sign alone comes not to the inward truth to which the sign merely points (pp. 568, 239, 396, 593).—Until death it is possible to advance in sanctification, but not afterward. The state in which one is at his death remains his state forever (p. 639). Hell is a condition; it is existing in nothingness, in alienation from God. For those who are converted shortly before dying a purgatory of temporary duration is given. At the judgment-day it is not God that pronounces judgment, but man who passes sentence upon himself; as he then appears in his essence, so shall he remain eternally. At the resurrection the body receives and shares the essence of the soul; that which is raised is not the material body itself, but the ideal principle of the body (pp. 470–472, 522).

Eckhart's doctrine is an interpretation and in part a modification of the fundamental Christian dogmas, resting on a bold metaphysical fundamental conception, the idea of the equality in essence of the soul with God. In his independent attitude with reference to ecclesiastical doctrine Eckhart was a forerunner of modern science. If later thinkers, on grounds of pure rational science alone, have striven against an agreement of philosophy with Christianity, Eckhart, setting out with what he believed to be a conception held by the Church, arrived at the doctrine of the absolute supremacy of the reason. The type of his character and teaching was derived from the innermost essence of the German national character, and in Germany the impulses which his doctrines gave to thought have never ceased to be operative, even when his name has been almost forgotten. Eckhart wished to edify, but by means of clear knowledge. With him the dogmatic lost its specific form, the historical its essential meaning; the motives of his doctrine, although dominated by a high ethical consciousness and a corresponding endeavor, were of a purely scientific nature, notwithstanding that the scientific form was relatively wanting. Eckhart does not linger at the stages in the elevation of the soul to God, like the representatives of Romanic Mysticism, but expends his force in the exposition of that which truly is, and of true knowledge. Thus he seeks to separate the pure idea contained in the doctrine of the Church and of his predecessors from all its integuments, as also to comprehend the doctrines of the heretics in that aspect in which they are relatively justified. The mystical elements in Eckhart are his conception of the highest activity of the reason as immediate intellectual intuition, his denial of the being of all finite things, his demand that the individual self should be given up, and his doctrine of complete union with God as the supreme end of man. But his mysticism is not so much a matter of feeling as of thought, and this gives him that coolness and clearness which he seldom disowns. He does not shun the most extreme consequences; the paradoxical is rather sought than avoided, and the ever-enchanting, often fascinating, form of expression is carried to the extreme in its kind, in order to render it impressive and to make more manifest the contrast between the view presented and the more superficial view ordinarily taken. For this reason the expression is often more paradoxical than the thought, and Eckhart is careful to add the necessary restrictions. In many points the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas approaches exceedingly near to that taught by Eckhart; but his attitude with reference to the Church and its doctrines does not permit him to strike out so far beyond all statutory limits into the pure ground of the religious consciousness. In so far the doctrine of Eckhart is a spiritualized Thomism. The Romanic Thomas became the highest scientific authority of the Romish Church, while

the doctrine of Eckhart, the German, prepared the way through its ethics for the Reformation, and through its metaphysics for later German speculation.

The mystical school, which arose from Eckhart's teaching, was divided into a heretical and a Church party. The former, called the "false free spirits," favored a wild and in its consequences immoral pantheism, while the latter sought to combine Eckhart's doctrine in a modified form with personal piety. There followed a popular commotion, which affected large portions of the German people. Ancient heresies found a support in the doctrines of Eckhart. On the other hand, the widespread, retired community of the *Friends of God* (the name indicates the opposite of slaves of the law), whose peculiarity consisted in an extravagant feeling of the nearness of God, also found their chiefs mostly among the disciples of Eckhart. The most important of Eckhart's immediate disciples were the celebrated preacher Johannes Tauler of Strasburg (1300-1361)—who combined, in his sermons and in his opusculum on the Imitation of the Poverty of Christ, impressive and morally edifying exhortation with the repetition of the speculative doctrines of Eckhart, and Heinrich Suso, of Constance (1300-1365), the Minnesinger of the love of God, with whom the pious effusions of an extravagant fancy entered into singular union with Eckhart's abstract speculations. Also the treatise from the fourteenth century by an unknown author, which was discovered by Luther, and which, published under the title of "*A German Theology*," produced so great effects, is a substantially faithful reproduction of the fundamental ideas of Eckhart, although in parts the point of the original expression is blunted off. Though incited by the doctrines of Eckhart, John Rusbroek (1293-1381), Prior of the Convent of Grunthal, near Brussels, approached more nearly to the Romanic Mysticism, and taught, without going very deeply into ontological speculations, that the way to God was through contemplation. Yet he also became suspected, by Chancellor Gerson, of pantheism and of deifying the soul. None of the men named developed farther the doctrine of Eckhart in scientific form. With them the purely theoretical interest was inferior to the religious and ethical and practical; all of them fought against the wild outgrowths from Eckhart's conceptions. They sought in particular to indicate more exactly the distinction between God and his creatures; they considered the union of the soul with God, not as a union of essence, but as one of will and of vision, and conceived faith more as a subjection of the understanding to authority, although unable to break loose themselves from Eckhart's conception. Tauler and the "*German Theology*" were most instrumental in perpetuating Eckhart's speculation, while the ban of the Church rested with all its weight on Eckhart's memory and works.

Later Mysticism, as it was developed among the Brothers of the Common Life (founded by the friend of Rusbroek, Gerhard Groot, died 1384), and especially by Thomas Hamerken of Kempen (died 1471, "*Of the Imitation of Christ*"), and as, inspired from this source, it became in Johann Wessel's writings (died 1489) a system of reformed theology, bears no longer the speculative character of the school of Eckhart.

SUPPLEMENT.

TABLE, SHOWING THE SUCCESSION OF SCHOLARCHS AT ATHENS.

(Taken mostly from Zumpt, *Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die Succession der Scholarchen*, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy of Sciences for the year 1842, Berlin, 1844—Phil. and Hist. Papers, pp. 27–119.)

BEFORE CHRIST.			
PLATONISTS.	ARISTOTELIANS.	STOICS.	EPICUREANS.
Plato of Athens, 387 to 347.			
Speusippus of Athens, 347–339.			
Xenocrates of Chalcedon, 339–314.	Aristotle of Stagirus, 335–322.		
Polemo of Athens, 314–270. (With and under him, Crantor.)	Theophrastus of Eresus, 332–287. Strato of Lampascus, 287–269.	Zeno of Cittium, 308?–258?	Epicurus of Samos (of Athenian descent), 306–270.
Crates of Athens, 270—?	Lycō of Troas, 269–226.	Cleanthes of Assos, 258?–?	Hermarchus of Mitylene, 270—?
Arcesilaus of Pitana in Æolis, from—241?	Hieronymus the Rhodian.	(Herillus of Carthage and Aristo of Chios.)	Polystратus. Hippodamides.
Lacydes of Cyrene, 241–215.	? Praxiphanes.	Chrysippus of Soli, from—209?	Dionysius.
Telecles and Evander, 215 —?	? Prytanis.		
Hegesinus of Pergamum, ? —?	Aristo of Iulis in the island of Kéa, 226—?		
	? Aristo of Cos.		
	? Lyciscus.	Zeno of Tarsus, 209—?	Basilides.
	? Phormio.	Diogenes the Babylonian, from Seleucia on the Tigris (in Rome, 155).	? Protarchus of Bargylia in Caria.
Carneades of Cyrene, from—129? (in Rome, 155.)	Critolaus of Phaselis in Lycia (in Rome, 155).	Antipater of Tarsus.	? Demetrius Lacon.
Clitomachus (Asdrubal) of Carthage, 129–109.	Diodorus of Tyre (till after 110).	Panætius of Rhodes (till about 111).	? Diogenes of Tarsus.

BEFORE CHRIST.

PLATONISTS.	ARISTOTELIANS.	STOICS.	EPICUREANS.
? Charmadas. ? Æschines of Naples.	Erymneus.	Mnesarchus (about 110 to 90). Dardanus.	Apollodorus ὁ ἀπο- ρίωνος.
Philo of Larissa (in 87 at Rome, where Ci- cero heard him).	? Athenio (Aristio).		Zeno of Sidon (about 90-78). (Cicero and Atticus his "hearers" in 79.)
Antiochus of Askalon, 83?—68? (Cicero heard him in the win- ter of 79-78.)	Andronicus of Rhodes (about 70, teacher of Boëthius of Sidon) <i>ἐνδέκτατος ἀπὸ τοῦ</i> <i>Ἀριστερέλου.</i>	Dionysius. Antipater of Tyre.	Phædrus (from 78 to 70 teacher in Athens; previously, about 90, a teacher of Cicero at Rome).
Aristus of Askalon, 68?-49? (teacher of M. Brutus, about 65.)			Patron (70 till after 51). (Contemporane- ously with him, Phi- lodemus of Gadara lived at Rome, and Syro taught in Rome and perhaps in Ne- ples.)
Theomnestus of Naucratis in Egypt (about 44).	Cratippus of Mitylene (about 44). ? Xenarchus of Se- leucia in Cilicia (taught at Alexan- dria, Athens, and Rome).		

AFTER CHRIST.

PLATONISTS.	ARISTOTELIANS.	STOICS.	EPICUREANS.
Ammonius of Alexan- dria (under Nero and Vespasian, teacher of Plutarch).			
? Aristodemus of Ægium (under Do- mitian and Trajan).	? Menephylus (toward the end of the first century). ? Aspasia of Aphro- disias (about 120; Galenus heard one of his pupils in 145). ? Adrastus of Aphro- disias.		
Calvisius Taurus of Berytus or Tyre (in the times of Hadrian)	Herminus.		

PLATONISTS.

and Antoninus,
teacher of A.
lius).

(Favorini
? Atticus (in the
of Marcus Aun
Antoninus).

Diodotus or Theodo-
tus (about 230).

Kubulus (about 265). Pto.
(Longinus, teacher of
literature, lived till
273).

? Theodorus of Asine
in Argolis (under
Constantine the
Great).

? Euphrasius.


? Chrysanthius of Sar-
dis.

Priscus of M.
(about 350-3rd

Plutarch of
son of N
433).

Ascl.

Syri





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